05000461/FIN-2010003-09: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = B Kemker, D Lords, D Melendez, | | Inspector = B Kemker, D Lords, D Melendez Colon, E Coffman, J Cassidy, M Mitchell, M Ring, R Russell, S Mischke | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings required that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Contrary to the above, on or about January 18, 2010, the licensee failed to provide appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria in surveillance test procedure CPS 9861.05D014, LLRT Data Sheet for 1MC010, Revision 2, to enable operators performing testing and evaluating the results of testing for compliance with the limits in TSSR 3.6.1.3.11, an activity affecting quality, to identify when the testing results exceeded the limits. Specifically, the procedure did not contain the relevant acceptance criteria. The inspectors determined that this violation was associated with a licensee-identified finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) during a Phase 2 SDP review using the guidance in IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, because the as-found leakage from the penetration was significantly less than the 1,000% containment volume per day criterion in Table 6.2, Phase 2 Risk Significance Type B Findings at Full Power. The inspectors also noted that multiple barriers exist to a large release through the feedwater system lines. This violation is being treated as a NCV consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The licensee entered this violation into its corrective action program as AR 01025446. Refer to Section 4OA3.2 of this inspection report for the review and closure of the LER. | | description = Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings required that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Contrary to the above, on or about January 18, 2010, the licensee failed to provide appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria in surveillance test procedure CPS 9861.05D014, LLRT Data Sheet for 1MC010, Revision 2, to enable operators performing testing and evaluating the results of testing for compliance with the limits in TSSR 3.6.1.3.11, an activity affecting quality, to identify when the testing results exceeded the limits. Specifically, the procedure did not contain the relevant acceptance criteria. The inspectors determined that this violation was associated with a licensee-identified finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) during a Phase 2 SDP review using the guidance in IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, because the as-found leakage from the penetration was significantly less than the 1,000% containment volume per day criterion in Table 6.2, Phase 2 Risk Significance Type B Findings at Full Power. The inspectors also noted that multiple barriers exist to a large release through the feedwater system lines. This violation is being treated as a NCV consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The licensee entered this violation into its corrective action program as AR 01025446. Refer to Section 4OA3.2 of this inspection report for the review and closure of the LER. | ||
}} | }} |
Revision as of 20:40, 20 February 2018
Site: | Clinton ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000461/2010003 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | B Kemker D Lords D Melendez Colon E Coffman J Cassidy M Mitchell M Ring R Russell S Mischke |
INPO aspect | |
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