05000440/FIN-2009005-03: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = A Wilson, J Tapp, R Russell, E Coffman, R Leidy, J Cameron, P Voss, T Hartman, P Smagacz, E Denison, M Marshfield, D Szwarc, W Slawinski, C Moore, M Phalen, M Bielbym, | | Inspector = A Wilson, J Tapp, R Russell, E Coffman, R Leidy, J Cameron, P Voss, T Hartman, P Smagacz, E Denison, M Marshfield, D Szwarc, W Slawinski, C Moore, M Phalen, M Bielbym, Marshfieldd Melendez-Colon, W Slawinski, R Baker, J Cameron, T Hartman, P Smagacz | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = A maintenance error during the spring 2009 refueling outage, while the reactor was in Mode 4, caused a loss of all RHR system capabilities. The licensee initially classified the event as reportable and made the phone report. The licensee determined later that it was not reportable and retracted the initial report. The failure to report a safety system function failure caused by a maintenance error is considered a URI pending a review by the licensees staff and the inspectors. On April 27, 2009, during a refueling outage, work which involved installing a jumper for testing caused a fuse to blow which resulted in the RHR common suction isolation valve failing closed, thereby tripping the running 'A' RHR pump. This also made the 'B' RHR system unavailable. The event was reported by the licensee in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as an event or condition at the time of discovery that could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function needed to remove residual heat. The licensee later retracted the event based on their onsite analysis of the event. The licensee initiated a corrective action to investigate the decision to retract the event report. Pending further review of the licensees evaluation and supporting documentation by the NRC staff to determine if this performance deficiency constitutes a failure to report a safety system functional failure, the issue is considered a URI (URI 05000440/2009005-03, Potential Missed Reporting Requirement for Loss of Residual Heat Removal During Shutdown) | | description = A maintenance error during the spring 2009 refueling outage, while the reactor was in Mode 4, caused a loss of all RHR system capabilities. The licensee initially classified the event as reportable and made the phone report. The licensee determined later that it was not reportable and retracted the initial report. The failure to report a safety system function failure caused by a maintenance error is considered a URI pending a review by the licensees staff and the inspectors. On April 27, 2009, during a refueling outage, work which involved installing a jumper for testing caused a fuse to blow which resulted in the RHR common suction isolation valve failing closed, thereby tripping the running \'A\' RHR pump. This also made the \'B\' RHR system unavailable. The event was reported by the licensee in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as an event or condition at the time of discovery that could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function needed to remove residual heat. The licensee later retracted the event based on their onsite analysis of the event. The licensee initiated a corrective action to investigate the decision to retract the event report. Pending further review of the licensees evaluation and supporting documentation by the NRC staff to determine if this performance deficiency constitutes a failure to report a safety system functional failure, the issue is considered a URI (URI 05000440/2009005-03, Potential Missed Reporting Requirement for Loss of Residual Heat Removal During Shutdown) | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:38, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Perry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000440/2009005 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Wilson J Tapp R Russell E Coffman R Leidy J Cameron P Voss T Hartman P Smagacz E Denison M Marshfield D Szwarc W Slawinski C Moore M Phalen M Bielbym Marshfieldd Melendez-Colon W Slawinski R Baker J Cameron T Hartman P Smagacz |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |