ML19269D927

Applicant Motion for Reconsideration of 790419 Memo & Order of Clarification of 780419 Order Re Physical Security of Snm.Supporting Documentation & Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19269D927
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden, Quad Cities
Issue date:	05/07/1979
From:	Steptoe P ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE
To:
References
NUDOCS 7906210252
Download: ML19269D927 (14)

Text

NRC PUBLIC DOCUafENT RC011

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .: V f( ,

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IN THE MATTER OF ) y.s gi.' . 7[. .+

ss COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY Docket Nos. 2 Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 ) 50-254 and Dresden Units 2 and 3 ) 50-265

)

Amendments to Facility )

Operating License Nos. )

DPR-19, DPR-25, DPR-29 and )

DPR-30. )

APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR CLARIFICATION AND REFERRAL i I

Pursuant to 10 CFR Sections 2.751a(d) and 2.718 (i)  :

Applicant, Commonwealth Edison Company, respectfully requests the Licensing Board to reconsider its April 19, 1979 Memo-randum and Order following Special Prehearing Conference t

(hereinaf ter, " Order") admitting Intervenors' contentions 6 f i

and 11 relating to the possibility of sabotage of spent fuel 1/

We believe the tdmission of these contentions

~

shipments.

was based on an erroneous interpretation of the applicable f

regulations governing physical security of special nuclear l materials. Moreover, we believe that subsequent events show that the Board's concern that the sabotage issue might 1/ This motion is not premature, despite the fact that the Board has not yet ruled with respect to the admission of NRDC and CBE as parties. This is because the State of Illinois has been admitted and has adopted Contentions 6 and 11 as its own.

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2 escape consideration by anyone unless the Intervenors' contentions were admitted was unwarranted. Finally, and most importantly, even if the Board's concern about the sabotage issue " slipping through the cracks" is valid, admitting contentions 6 and 11 is not the best way to deal with the problem. The Board has a duty to invoke the pro-cedures outlined in 10 CFR S2.75',, which will ensure that the Commission is alerted promptly to the possible inadequacy of its regulations governing physical security of spent fuel shipments. See 10 CFR 52.758 (d) .

In the alternative, Applicant requests that the Licensing Board refer its decision on the sabotage issues to the hppeal Board for review pursuant to 10 CFR SS2.730(f) and 2. 718 (i) . Applicant also requests that the Licensing Board make clear whether it meant to modify Contention 6 before admitting it, since the April 19 Order appears to contain limits on the scope of the sabotage inquiry which are not reflected in Contention 6 as drafted by Intervenors.

I. The Licensing Board should reconsider its decision.

The Licensing Board's Order states, and Applicant agrees, that:

Part 73 of the Commission's regulations are concerned with physical protection of shipments of special nuclear materials, and 573.6 (b) specifically exempts shipments of spent fuel from coverage.

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(Order, at 7). Nevertheless, the Board suggests that these regulations are "at best ambigous." Id. at 9. The Licensing Board also suggests that while the Commission may have intended Section 73.6(b) as an exemption for spent fuel shipments from theft, it might not have meant to exempt entirely spent fuel shipments from "some degree of precaution inferior to that of Part 73 where a clear risk could be shown to individual shipments," Id. at 9. This is because, according to a preliminary report prepared for the Commission 2/

by Sandia Laboratories,~ "the ' sabotage value' of spent fuel is quite high," Id. at 8, and " sabotage of a licensed  ;

cask is physically possible." Id. at 9. '

But the exemption for spent fuel shipments in Section 73.6(b) is not at all ambiguous. On the contrary, .

i the exemption is brief and almost mathematically precise. ,

The exemption is not qualified by any distinction between the risks of theft and sabotage. The only support for distinguishing between theft and sabotage is found in the Sandia report. And it is an obvious error to use the results of a May 1978 report to explain what the Commissioners meant in 1969 when they promulgated Section 73.6(b). This attrib-utes to the Commissioners an ability to forsee events which they have never claimed for themselves. Furthermore, it is scarcely credible, as the Board suggests, that the 2/ Draft Generic Environmental Assessment on Transportation of Radioactive Materials Near or Through a Large Densely Populated Area, SAND-77-1927, (May, 1978) (henceforth, "the Sandia Report") .

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Commissioners would have drafted the simple unambiguous exemption in Section 73.6(b) and yet have assumed that the Licensing Boards would nevertheless divine that litigation of such issues was not foreclosed. The Commission is simply not that Delphic, or that capricious where important safety 3/

issues are concerned.

In short, the Board's Order is not a persuasive reading of the regulations as they presently exist. Instead, the Order clearly conveys the Board's concern that the AEC may have been mistaken in 1969 when it exempted spent fuel shipments from physical protection. The 1978 Sandia Report indicates that sabotage may be a real threat. The Board seems to have adopted a strained interpretation of the regulations because of its concern that unless Intervenors' contentions are admitted, "an important issue could escape considera, tion by anyone...." Order at 10.

Applicant agrees that if sabotage of spent fuel 4/

shipments is a realistic danger, ~ this is a matter for 3/ See, e.g. 43 Fed. Reg. 15613 (April 14, 1978), in which the Commission ordered that Radon releases be removed from Table S-3 and explicitly stated that they might be litigated in individual proceedings.

4/ This is not the appropriate place or time to take issue with the Sandia report. However, we note that the Board rather uncritically cited the findings of a draft report, not yet accredited by the NRC. In particular, the Board referred to maximum casualty figures based on urban environs, whereas the Dresden/ Quad Cities shipments will take place along a predominently rural route. This is not to say that the Board was wrong in looking to the Sandia report as a preliminary indication of whether a sabotage risk exists, but merely that when and if additional physical protection rules are written, these issues will have to be looked at in some detail by the decision-maker.

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f grave concern. however, bending the regulations to allow-consideration of this issue in individual licensing proceed-ings is not the right solution, for three reasons. First, recent events show that the Board's fear that the Sandia report and the sabotage issue will escape the Commission's scrutiny is unwarranted. The Board noted in its Order that the Staff was then reviewing the security of spent fuel shipments.

Order at 7. Subsequently, a report published several days after the Board's Order in this case was entered indicated that the Staff has submitted to the Commission proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 imposing safeguards requirements on spent fuel shipments to guard against the danger of sabotage raised by the Sandia report. Nucleonics Week, Vol.

2 0, No. 17, April 2 6, 1979 at pp. 11-12 (copy attached) . In a telephone conversation, representatives of the Staff 5/

~

informed Applicant that this report is true. Since the Commission now has the issue of safeguards for spent fuel shipments before it, Applicant believes it is appropriate for the Board to reconsider its admission of Intervenors' Contentions 6 and 11.

Second, even if one accepts the Board's premise that sabotage is "an important issue which may escape 5/ The Staff told us that the amendments to Part 73 were submitted to the Commission on April 18, 1979 via a document numbered SECY 79-278. Unfortunately, internal procedures prevented them from providing a copy of this document to Applicant. We hope however that the Staff in its response to this motion will provide che Board with detailed information as to the substance and timing of these proposed amendments.

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consideration by anyone" if the exemption in Section 73.6(b) is read literally, the Board has chosen the wrong remedy.

10 CFR S2.758(d) sets forth the mechanism through which the Commission can be notified immediately that the exemption from physical protection requirements for spent fuel shipments no longer appears justified. Merely admitting Intervenors' contentions in this proceeding will not necessarily accomplish this result. Moreover, there may be other licensing proceed-ings and even uncontested applications in which Section 73.6(b) may be applicable. If there is a real danger of sabotage, it is the duty of this Board to draw the Commission's attention to the possible deficiency in its regulations so that safeguards may be provided for all shipments of spent fuel.-6/

Finally, it is clear that it would be better for the Commission to deal with this sabotage issue through rulemaking than for the Licensing Board to attempt to do so in this adjudicatory proceeding. First, there is the pos-sibility of inconsistent requirements if each licensing board in a transshipment case deals with this issue on its own.

6/ We might add that since the Commission already has the Staff's proposal for amendments to Part 73 before it, this is not a situation where certification in accordance with 10 CFR S2.758 would add to the Commission's burdens. And cer-tainly the Commission would not want this Board to avoid bringing a possibly significant error in Part 73 to their attention out of a misplaced sense of delicacy. If the regulations really are not all right the Commission should be allowed to correct them. -

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Also, Commonwelath Edison's transshipment proposal is designed in large part to meet a short-term spent fuel storage ppace shortage at its generating stations pending construction and operation of a federal storage facility or implementation of some other government plan for the long-term disposition of spent fuel. In this context, the delay inherent in addressing sabotage in the licensing hearings rather than through rulemaking may be equivalent to denial. Moreover, the decision as to what safeguards should be required is without doubt a legislative judgment, rather than an adjudicatory fact. No one can conclusively establish that the threat postulated in Contention 6: "3 insiders and 15 outsiders, the latter armed with sophisticated rapid fire automatic l weapons, explosives, large shell mortars and armored vehicles,"  !

is or is not the threat which must be met. Rather, safeguards are developed by considering a broad spectrum of threats, probabilities, consequences and costs, and weighing each set of considerations against the others. This is a uniquely legislative task. Indeed, Applicant believes that the Board has not fully come to grips with the substantial difficulties of addressing sabotage of spent fuel in an adjudicatory proceeding, as is evidenced by the rather vague and confusing limits on the scope of inquiry suggested in its order. This 7/

is discussed below in Part II of this motion."

7/ One other point deserves mention. At oral argument in this proceeding, counsel for the State of Illinois and for CBE and NRDC suggested that 10 CFR 573.l(b) (4) gives the Board the authority to impose additional security procedures in this case. (Tr. at 64, 66). But this citation is in-apposite since the additional safeguards are clearly limited to those necessary to protect " classified materials," i.e.,

secret documents. Applicant proposes to ship spent fuel, not classified materials.

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II. The Licensing Board should clarify the form in which it meant to admit Contention 6.

The Board's Order states, at page 9:

Contention 6 as presently written asserts that the Licensee is required at least to furnish some information relating to sabotage or hijacking of shioments.... It is entirely possible that when the Commission exempted spent fuel shipments from physical protection under Part 73, the Commission assumed that licensing boards in individual proceedings might require some degree of precaution inferior to that of Part 73 where a clear risk could be shown to individual shipments.

(emphasis added) . But Contention 6 does not only ask the Licensee "to furnish some information." Instead, it states:

Applicant has failed to disclose any information sufficient to determine whether shipment of spent fuel between the plant sites will be vulnerable to sabotage, hijacking or other malevolent acts and whether this represents a serious risk to public health and safety.

a. A credible threat of an attack against such a shipment would be 3 insiders and 15 outsiders, the latter armed with sophisticated rapid fire automatic weapons, explosives, large shell mortars and armored vehicles,

b. There is no known basis for assuring detection of a threat of this size until it has materialized.

c. Unless applicant is taking safety precautions far beyond those routinely used in the nuclear industry, it will be unable to prevent a malevolent act involving spent fuel in transit.

d. A successful malevolent act directed against a spent fuel shipment could expose thousands of persons to fatal levels of radiation, could severely pollute water supplies and land areas, force long-term evacuation of major areas and create a threat of all these events unless certain unacceptable political and/or other demands are met.

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Al

_g.

Subsections 6 (a) and 6(b) postulate a threat in excess of any considered in Part 73. Subsection 6(c) also seems to mount a general challenge to the adequacy of Part 73 safeguards and to the safety precautions routinely used in the nuclear industry. Only the first paragraph of Contention 6 and subsection (d) are consistent with the reasoning in the Board's Order. Accorazngly, Applicant requests that this Board even if it is unwilling to reconsider its Order, strike subsections 6 (a), 6(b), end 6 (c) so that the admitted Contention 6 is consistent with the Order.

Also, the Board's Order suggests that additional safeguards may be imposed "where a clear risk could be shown to individual shipments." Order at 9. This seems tc indicate some sort of threshhold requirement for Intervenors to come forward with their reasons for believing that the threat hypothesized in Contention 6 is real. This should be made explicit, since otherwise the Applicant will have the impossible burden of proving a negative; i.e. that no such threat exists.

III. The Licensing Board should refer the sabotage issues to the Appeal Board.

In the event the Board declines to reconsider its Order admitting contentions 6 and 11, Applicant requests that Board refer the ruling to the Appeal Board pursuant to 10 CFR SS2.718(i) and 2.730(f).-8/ The standards for such 8/ Applicant's first preference is that the Board apply the procedures set forth in 10 CFR S 2.758, including if necessary certification to the Commission pursuant to Section 2.758 (d) .

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, referrals are set forth in Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc., (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2),

ALAB 405, 5 NRC 1190, 1191 (1977). Admittedly, the Appeal Board does not favor interlocutory review and will accept such referrals only where the Licensing Board's ruling either (1) threatens the party cdversely affected by it with immediate and irreparable impact which, as a practical matter, cannot be alleviated by a later appeal or (2) affects the basic structure of the proceeding in a pervasive or unusual manner.

Applicant believes that the Licensing Board's ruling will radically affect the future course of these 9/

proceedings.- As stated previously, considering sabotage will require the Licensing Board and the parties to address complicated issues of fact and policy concerning risks, consequences, and costs rather than narrow issues of adjudicative fact. There are no clear standards to guide the Licensing Board in such an inquiry. It is probable that access to proprietary and even classified documents may be necessary 10/

~-

to adequately assess the risks of sabotage. Moreover, 9/ The addition of the sabotage issues will, of course, result in significant delay, and time lost is irreparable injury. This is particularly true in these circumstances where much of the usefulness of the proposed transshipment is based on its availability to mitigate short term storage problems. Applicant feels, however, that the need for Appeal Board guidance is even more compelling when expressed in terms of the unusual and pervasive effect of the Licensing Board's order.

10/ It is our understanding, which perhaps the Staff can confirm, that some of the documents underlying the Commission's recent decision to " upgrade" Part 73 are classified and have never been made public.

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8 as discussed previously, there is a substantial public interest in seeing that the Appeal Board and other Licensing Boards are alerted to a possible deficiency or et least ambiguity in the Commission's regulations governing physical protection of special nuclear material. This is not the first or the last application to ship spent fuel. Finally, referral to the Appeal Board is appropriate because what is involved here is a simple matter of interpreting the regulations rather than a mixed question of fact and law. See Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants, ALAB-517, 2 CCH Nuclear Regulation Reports 1 30,354 (January 4, 1979)). .

For the reasons stated, Applicant requests that the Licensing Board reconsider its ruling on sabotage issues '

and invoke the procedures in 10 CFR 52.758 which are designed  :

to handle perceived inadequacies in the Commission's regula-tions. In the alternative, Applicant requests that the Board clarify its April 19, 1978 order and refer the sabotage issues to the Appeal Board.

Respectfully submitted, m

N l N mn ChA-One of the Attarneys forg Commonwealth Edison Company ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE One First National Plaza Suite 4200 Chicago, Illinois C0603 (312) 558-7500 2263 226

y contained. Tests showed later that there was no significant increase in the level of radiation beyond 2 3 km

.

7 ,,

from the plant. 'she minister also told Michel that there had been a series of fires at nuclear plants,althou they were not directly connected with the reactors.They apparently were caused by such thingm.'N '

oil spilh and did not result in radioactivity danger. ..

Other souices in hioscow lates said the Soviets appear to have had sental other accidents at their nucl facilities,none of them setious. Abont 10 years ago the heat shield at one of the pressurized water reactors at Novosoroneth vibrated so violently that it became detached.htore recently,the 410 Mw PWRis believed tri E[ have suffered damage from an carthquake.

NeporveJmiy told Alithel that the Three Mile Island mishap is !cading the Soviets to take a closer look

,

at safety procedmes,but that they stdlintend to press ahead with their nuclear power program.The minister mamtained that the design of the newest Soviet reacturs is safer than that of the Dabcock & Wilcox unit at '

liarrisburg, Pa. The stand.nJ graphite and water 1,000-Mw unit has four horizontal steam generators compa w:th the two veitical umts in the American stations,which the minister said gives them a 90 min saf ety margm

. j,1 because gravity and convection continue to naturally circulate coolant around the loop. '

The minister also indicated that the Russians plan to build nuclear plants nearer to, rather than farther. ,

away from, citics and populated areas. lle told Michel they will be put no closer than 10 km from ,,

cities an that the land between them and the cities will be under the power authorities

• control. Western sources m Moscow say most custing Smiet nut! car plants appear to be at least 30 km from centers of population.

j,.

O At present, the Soucts have about 30 reactors in operation for a total of some 9,0004fw of capacity. In the - - -

offi' sial 5 have said they plan to increase this to 100,000 Mw by 1992,a gnal that westein sources consider is heyond their teach in that period.

4' Tile GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICEWILLPRODETIIETilREEMILEISLAND ACCIDENTat the request y of Rep. John Durgell(D4hchJ, chairman of the llouse energy & power subcommittee.The six. month in-vestiption will focus on whether safety considerations were compson ised to facilitate licensing of the p

.f '

the adequacy of the federal response to the accident, operator training, application of regulatory standa '

and unpheations of the accident for other operating reactors. '-

Commenting on the necessity for the G AO inquiry, Dingell said,"While I am aware that the NRC will conduct its own mvestigation of this accident,any agency'sinvestigation ofitself must inevitably be subject to question. Further, the investigation to be conducted by the recently appointed presidential commissior, h to be unfmed to just the Three Mile' Island accident and,therefore,is too hmited iii scope to be usefulin esaluanng the iniphcations of this incident on the future use of nuclear energy.The presidential.#commissio al>o lacks the expertise needed to conduct a comprehensise analysis of this accident."

• That ttnal statement al>o apphes to various congressional committees considering hearings and inquiries

• 4 into 'lluce Mde l>lar.d, aceoidmg to i.ongressional staff sontces who said the situation would be bette: left in the hands of G AO alone.

Dingell al>o plans to resiew the Price Anderson A*ct, focusing on whether the $560-million liability i

hmit for m.elcar accidents should be increased or eliminated completely. IT ngell's subcommittee will hold heanngs tins summer to Jetermine the cost,to utilities,of obtaining nuclear plant insurance from the prhate se< rur.

NRC STAFF PROPOSES SAFEGUARDS RESTRICTIONS FOR SPENT FUEL SHIPMENTS . ,,,;.%_._m,,,p .

s..,.

NRC commissioners have tentatively decided to consider next month safeguards restrictions on spent fuel sinpments - restnetions proposed by the staff just last week.The impetus for the staff proposals was a -

Sandia Lahoissone,iepmt on emnonmentalimpacts of nuclear shipmentsin utban areas (SAN 771927) * .

issued last May.The repmt conehided that a severe accident with radiologicalieleases -

was extremely un but neve theless desnhed potential consequences of such an accident. ,

Some spen' fuel shippen .ne lashing out at Sandia for doing the kinds of testing and analyses ,.1' that en-courage segulousy action sui n a is hemg taken by the NpC staff."h's alnmit smt of self.deteating," said one source last week at 1 Sandia4pomued transportat;on seminar in Albut seique. N.M.(A Sandia offic:al said that the report had been nn>micipieted by the NRC staff). At the s;me time.sluppeis are waining that the mposed safego.nds wdi unnecessanly tesnict spent luel shipments. twther hampering the already pro Iem plagued hanspoit;,non aspect of the nucleas fuel cycle.

T he NRC staff is proposing to amend 10 CFR part 73 to require the following safeguards restrictions -

foi all powei teactiu and non-lk)l: reseaich reactm spent fuel slupment> ni.ide in the (l.S.:

- routing - ih I >luppeis avoni. "*heie practicable," nmies neas faire population aicas and that they be setpo;ed to obiam NRt' appunal fm mules they plan to use. State pohse mmt also be nouded.Th h.is not de6ned a la,ge populitmn .nea but expects to soon. "Ifit is not piacucable to asoid a latge populJ '

NU('li ONtrS %IIX e Apnl 2h.19N 2263:227 oyJ ApoMgIL, n

-

e.r

- ays one NRC source.

tion area, then other measures might he required" such as a local his means,police besides escort,s the

~ escorts - that unarmed e>cmis accomp.my shipmenss. For truck shipments t ,

driver,at le.tst one escost for the vehicle and two escorts if another vehicle is us

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escorts are requned to ride in view of,or on,the cask Icar. dl abotage.This will be subject to NRC in. * . T.# . ,

- training - that escoris and/or drivers be tramed to ,an e s

[

I f l methods available for immobilizing . S spection.- immobiliintion of schiele - that tiuck shippers adopt one o severa ,

either the tractor or uade to prevent a shipment being hijacked. h hi nt so that the driver / '

- communications - that cormnumeations equipment be a part of eac s pme . -

I escorts are constantly in touth wuh a centrallocation. f l hi ents he obtained seven

- advance nutification - that NHC appmval for safeguaids on spent ue " says s pm days prior to a sinpment. "Of comse all .ir angements will have to be made w .

t terrorists one NRC somce.

Accmdmg to the staff somee,the mam objective of the proposed lides - safeguards is to prev , , ,

from attasking a spent fuel Shipment with high explosives and exposing a large released m aerosol form. the source.

"We can't say these requirements are shsolutely essentialbut lfe claimswe feel they are pmde The shippers do not agice. "'! here is ah>olutely bt e because nothing it is massive, tokvery substantiate . these," . z. y s

nd. "

that a spent fuel eask wonld, m fad, he Another one shipper,alsoof the highly least , , l# likely tarre

" ., j y .

"5 other types of nonnuclear e Aplosive materials thJt are easier tor)tostorage gain access aipments'to. ~

- * /r. -

critical of the proposed reqmrements,says they could hamper AFR(away-from.rese

,, g

• g in the futme.

NRC's safegnards division wants the proposalsb adopted snurce says_sonn.There.y/ -

appears staff members as to whether they should be issued as effective immediatelyQ. if appro that the I.2 year romme miemakmg procedme wiU surely be circumvente .Sandia sindy conclusions i?~on im-a> intenm untd NRC completes a 12 year iesearch piogram 70 licenses.Currendy to cunfirm theNRC - - ,

pacts. NRC would enforce requisements, the somce i ' says, through part 50 and part t seguires safeguar da im highly ennched m. unum and plutonium.The commi>> on s au ,

guards, the somte says,is sleat - I.pm Str;nws E DISPOSAL technique NEITilER COSTS NOR LONG TER\1 prefeiable to another,acem.hng to Doln diaft ensimnmentalimpact RISKS ld "and theDirrER geologic dis- ENOUGli TO M nercial waste man-statement ou co agement. The state oitetimology is the " maps dcasion factor,"The the draft conc..u es, po>al option has an edge."On how best to exploit that betweenedge,however, cady the dra Interagency Review Group on Waste Management l td recommended that the Pre '

estabbshment 01 a repository in salt - with research on other media acce era e -f geologic envir repoinmy deenion untd the set of potential sites covers a brnader range o (NW,5 Apr,22),

19 Ost '78,1).

The Atomic Industrial Forum has urged te President to choose the rust :dternativedisposed of with a choice which would teDect "the government's conviction that wastes will be ! ment fin risk to the pubbe."The draft stah ment,wluth hill > inscif i as the final necewaiy c Jt "significa hamper the "mmimi-cal suategy im waste dispmal. m > nni that tinung of reposito -

2:tmn" of " human and envnomnemal" si>k. i K AT ITS WINDSCALE,nenhwest .

d 30.000 -

BRITIS!! NUCLEAR FUELS LTD.llAS SUFFERED ANOTH .

40,000 cunes of actiuty. Th6 leak,into the ground mside HNFl.'s d the Enviionment site,was in rnid-Nuclear Inst.dlanons inspecimate and to the goveinment d "fewDepartments tens of thousands of Energy an March. But it was only last week quanofied by the company as invohing an estim d the amount more closely as being of curies" at a meeting of IINI L's local haison comm g repiesentanves about its actmues. 'lhis week a DNFL Earth. spokesman Secretary of identifie T "abom 30.600 but it might be 40.000"cunes.Respomhng fhl k appears to betius week to que State fm Energy Anthony Wedgwood Benn revealed in a >ratement that the som a steel.hned sump in a buddmg containmg tants that tempanan The leak tirstyshowed o up as contamina-cennanun by evaporalmn and final storage m long term vorage tanks.

we r ositui t K . Aprit h,1979 I

k

. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

, IN THE MATTER OF )

) .

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-237

) 50-249 Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 ) 50-254 and Dresden Units 2 and 3 ) 50-265

)

Amendments to Facility )

Operating License Nos. )

DPR-19, DPR-25, DPR-29 and )

DPR-30. )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Philip Steptoe, hereby certify that a copy of APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR CLARIFICATION AND REFERRAL has been served upon the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, this 7th day of May, 1979; Gary L. Milhollin, Esq. Susan N. Sekuler, Esq. .

1815 Jefferson Street Russell R. Eggert, Esq.  ;

Madison, Wisconsin 53711 Assistant Attorneys General l Environmental Control Division '

Mrs. Elizabeth B. Johnson 188 West Randolph Street, Suite 2315 Union Carbide Corporation Chicago, Illinois 60601 Nuclear Division P. O. Box X Atomic Safety and Licensing Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. Quentin J. Stober Washington, D. C. 20555 Fisheries Research Institute University of Washington Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Seattle, Washington 98195 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq. Washington, D. C. 20555 Natural Resources Defense Council Docketing and Service Section 915 15th Street, N. W. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Richard Goddard '^s 'r Office of the Executive f Legal Director hA - 'fh'%

s . k (

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory \ CXP}b * '

Commission Philip Sthqtoe \

Washington, D. C. 20555 2263 229

- - . .