ML20205N094

Comments on Petition for Rulemaking PRM-50-50 Re Authorization of Reactor Licensees to Depart from License Conditions & Tech Specs in Emergency Situations.Young Criticism of Inerting Practices at Plant W/O Credence

ML20205N094
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	10/24/1988
From:	Delgeorge L COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
References
FRN-53FR32624, RTR-NUREG-0616, RTR-NUREG-616, RULE-PRM-50-50 53FR32624-00006, 53FR32624-6, NUDOCS 8811030447
Download: ML20205N094 (3)

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.. e Commonwealth

[] One jFirst Nabonal Plata. Edison Chicago, Hl.nms a 7 Address Reply to: Post Office Box 757 p/ CNeago, Hlinois 60690 h

October 24, 1988 .

DOfhCICO t.Na t Mr. o,amuel Chilk '88 GCT 26 F5 38

Secretary ,

Docketing and Servi:e Branch Q F ." . m r. 4,s, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission " EE MW g Washington, D.C. 20555 l Subject Petition for Rulemaking submitted by Charles Young, Docket No. PRM-50-50 DOCT.T NUMBER l Pr.T;n0t1 RULE PRM

Dear Mr. Chilk:

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p:3 g Mr.CharlesYoungsubmittedthesubjectpetitionforrulemakinDto revise 10 CTR 50.54(x)-(y) on April 18, 1988. Notice of Mr. Young's petitica v,s subsequently published in the Endani Ragiatu and public coneneat on the petition was sought by October 25, 1988. A correction to the original notice was published in the Endatal Ragistu on October 17, 1988.

Sections 50.54(x) and (y) presently authorise reactor licensees to depart from license conditions and technical specifications in emergency situations under certain prescribed conditions. The authority to depart from such requirements is to be used in connection with an emergency protective l action only when no other alternative is immediately apparent. Further, the

, usa of the authority must be approved by at least a Licensed Senior Operator ,

( and such action must be reported immediately to the NRC.

I l These regulations are based on the reality that it is not possible to

( establish license requirements and technical specifications that foresee and .

i accommodate every eventuality that may occur during an emergency situation at, '

an operating reactors and because of that fact, licensees are provided with ,

the flexibility to depart from license requirements and technical  :

specifications, if it is necessary to do so to protect public health and  :

safety. Mr. Young disagrees. He asserts, in his petition, that only  ;

continuous adherent's to plant techigical specifications will asbure plant j safety. Hence, Mr. Young would revise sections 50.54(x) and (y) to eliminate ,

the present operating flexibility and require strict adherecce to license l

requirements and technical specifications.

Sections 50.54(x) and (y) were added to the reguantions as a result i of an NRC rulemaking which was conducted in 1982 and'1983. The rulemaking was l initiated in response to an NRC recommendation to ' provide reactor licensees I with the authority to depart f rom license requirements 1:' ~rgesey situations Tha reconcendation was one of the lenanna 1, a from th' accident at Three Mile ici.r.t. W 8' was included in NL,,

• e.mprehensive-w alu9 ton cf tne causes of that accident, which =as documentei i r. dU FF,u-O o16 -

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l 8811030447 PN" 001024 PDR PDR J 50-50 l I

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NRC took careful account of the 41rty-seven public comments which were teceived in response to the rulemaking proposal to establish sections 50.54(s) and (y). Thirty-five of the comments favored the rule. H.r . foueg did not autwit ccornents.

One commenter pointed out that the authority to depart fM.m established operating requirements is emergency circtuastances hrs lor.g bs6n in pince in the shipping and airline industries. NRC acknow*. edged thtt it was mindful of these precedents and that its authority to fashion a s!allsr requirement was consistent with the views of Congress. 53 Fed. Reg. 13967-968 (April 1, 1983). The balance of the favorable commenters supported the need for the rule in tha nuclear industry. NRC, in response to one of the dissenting commenters who thought the authority to depart from license requirements would be abused, stressed that reporting requirement and the subsequent review by NRC of the use of the authority would provide sufficient nasurance that the rule would not be abused. In rum, the basis supporting NRC's issuance of sections 50.54(x) and (y) was thoughtfully considered and well-founded. Mr. Young's petition to change these r69ulations, on the other hand, lacks this sound basis.

Mr. Young's petition relies primarily on the unjustified assertion ,

that commonwealth Edison Company's operating policy permits reactor operate 14 to "turn of f water being pumped into a nuclear reactor during an emergency before the safety system has finished its job," and that such a policy, in Mr.

Young's understanding, is justified by Edison by sections 50.54(x) and (y).

(NRC's corrected notice, 53 Fed. Rag. 40432, October 17, 1988). Mr. Young concludes further that such a practice could cause an accident at any of Commonwealth Edison's plants similar to the one at Three Mile Island. Thus, Mr. Young concludes that the authority, provided by section 50.54(x), to depart from license requirements in emergency situations should be rescinded.

Commonwealth Edison Company does not have an operating policy for ita nuclear reactors that permits, as Mr. Young suggests, the indiscriminate shut-down of a safety system. The cempany does have a policy that implements sections 50.54(x) and (y). That policy incorporates the limitations and safeguards of these regulations as euplained above. Thus, any decision to depart f rom license requirements would be made rigorously within this f ramework s and not improvidently, as implied by Mr. Young's character 1:ation of "turning oft" a safety system before it "has finished the job." Mr.

Young's concerns ars misplaced. The petition, therefore, lacks basis and it should be rejected.

Mr. Young also argues in his petition that Commonwealth Edison Company has engaged le several hasardous practices at its Dresden and Qved Cities plants. It appears f rom the NRC's corrected Endrial Regitter notico that Mr. Young is not offerlug these alleged hasardous practices as support

, for his petition. Nwertheless, thase misstatements should be corrected to remove Sny question as to their validity.

~ .

Mr. Yovng complains that, contrary to the technical specificatioW.

fcr the Dresden nuclear plant, the primary coatainssut area for tinit 3 van delr.arted while the reactor was operating to allow entry by workore. Al. hough the primary containment area, generally, must be inerted while the roset or is operating, the Dresden technical specifications allow deinerted eparatlov, for periods not to exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The NRC reviewed 4 number of inttdaces when this practice was employed by Edison, and it concluded that the application of the 24-hout exception to the inerting technical specification tcquireaent when pecperly implemented was not an unsafe practice. This conclusioa is documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50 2.17/61-29, at al. , dat ed July 12, 1982. In addition, Commonwealth Edison Company complies with the occupational rediation exposure limits and guidelines of 10 CTR part 30 for its cuclear workers, including workers who enter the primary containment areas at Dresdon and Quad Cities when the plants are operating in accordance with the 21. hour eAception noted above. In sum, Mr. Young's assertion to the cent rary and his esit icism of the inerting practices at Dresden are erronecus and without credenen.

We appreciate this opportunity to subm!'. our views on Mr. Yeung's petition.

Sincerely, 7/ / /

f*-

L.O. De1 George U

Assistant Vice-President gd i

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