Information Notice 2002-03, Highly Radioactive Particle Control Problems During Spent Fuel Pool Cleanout: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES | ||
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION | |||
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 January 10, 2002 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-03: HIGHLY RADIOACTIVE PARTICLE CONTROL | |||
PROBLEMS DURING SPENT FUEL POOL | |||
CLEANOUT | CLEANOUT | ||
==Addressees== | ==Addressees== | ||
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, holders of licenses for | All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, holders of licenses for permanently | ||
shutdown facilities with fuel onsite, and holders of licenses for non-power reactors. | |||
==Purpose== | ==Purpose== | ||
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to | The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert | ||
addressees to recent issues involving evaluation and control of radioactive particles generated | |||
during removal of material from a spent fuel pool prior to shipping the material offsite for | during removal of material from a spent fuel pool prior to shipping the material offsite for | ||
disposal. | disposal. The issue emphasized in this notice is that highly radioactive (hot) particles represent | ||
a radiological hazard not just in terms of shallow dose to the skin or an extremity but also as a | a radiological hazard not just in terms of shallow dose to the skin or an extremity but also as a | ||
deep or whole-body dose. | deep or whole-body dose. It is expected that recipients will review the information for | ||
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. | applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. | ||
Line 38: | Line 50: | ||
==Description of Circumstances== | ==Description of Circumstances== | ||
Toward the end of a 5-month spent fuel pool cleaning project, the Susquehanna Steam | Toward the end of a 5-month spent fuel pool cleaning project, the Susquehanna Steam Electric | ||
pool. | Station completed compacting irradiated components that had been temporarily stored in the | ||
(ACS) unit to compact control rod blades and local power range monitors. | |||
pool. Working under water remotely, the licensee had used an advanced crusher and shearer | |||
(ACS) unit to compact control rod blades and local power range monitors. On October 12, | |||
2000, the ACS was removed from the cask storage pit with a crane after apparently inadequate | 2000, the ACS was removed from the cask storage pit with a crane after apparently inadequate | ||
cleaning with a high-pressure spray Hydrolazer. | cleaning with a high-pressure spray Hydrolazer. The ACS was moved over the refueling floor | ||
and into the reactor head washdown area for further decontamination prior to shipment offsite. | and into the reactor head washdown area for further decontamination prior to shipment offsite. | ||
The ACS was not totally wrapped or sealed during this movement. | The ACS was not totally wrapped or sealed during this movement. Also, access to the ACS | ||
pathway over the refueling floor was not radiologically controlled during the move. | |||
During the movement of the ACS, the refueling floor local area radiation monitor began to | |||
alarm. The cause was a previously unidentified highly radioactive particle which had fallen from | |||
the ACS. The particle was later determined to be a 2.78 gigabecquerel (Gbq) [75 millicuries | |||
(mCi)] Co-60 particle, reading approximately 8 sievert/h (Sv/h) (800 rem/h) at contact. | |||
The licensee stopped work, shielded and captured the particle, and initiated radioactive particle | |||
included formation of a root cause event review team. | control zone coverage for the entire refueling floor. Additional actions undertaken at that time | ||
included formation of a root cause event review team. The teams work led to upgraded | |||
controls, surveying, more management oversight and more detailed planning and work | controls, surveying, more management oversight and more detailed planning and work | ||
procedures for handling high specific activity particles.A search was then begun for additional hot particles on the refueling floor. | procedures for handling high specific activity particles. | ||
was required for certain work activities. | |||
A search was then begun for additional hot particles on the refueling floor. Workers in particle | |||
control zones were surveyed for particles every 15 minutes, and more protective clothing (PC) | |||
was required for certain work activities. The 15-minute control was a default stay time, and not | |||
based on dose calculations for the high-activity particles known to be present. | |||
During the cleanup activities, more than 30 radioactive particles were found on the refueling | |||
floor. Two high activity radioactive particles found on September 9 and December 6, 2000, had | |||
resulted in shallow-dose equivalent (SDE) exposures of 0.12 and 0.17 Sv (12 and 17 rem), | resulted in shallow-dose equivalent (SDE) exposures of 0.12 and 0.17 Sv (12 and 17 rem), | ||
which is below the annual SDE limit of 50 rem. | which is below the annual SDE limit of 50 rem. The licensee discovered two more high-activity | ||
particles, a 0.78 Gbq (21 mCi) particle on November 28, and a 0.7 Gbq (19 mCi) particle on | particles, a 0.78 Gbq (21 mCi) particle on November 28, and a 0.7 Gbq (19 mCi) particle on | ||
December 4, 2000; these particles did not result in significant exposure to personnel. | December 4, 2000; these particles did not result in significant exposure to personnel. No actual | ||
exposures in excess of any annual dose limits occurred during the cleanup activities. | exposures in excess of any annual dose limits occurred during the cleanup activities. | ||
the | During a scheduled NRC health physics, rad-waste transportation, baseline inspection during | ||
December 11-15, 2000 (Inspection Report Nos. 05000387/2000-009 and 05000388/2000-009, ADAMS Accession No. ML010250469), the NRC inspector identified significant weaknesses in | |||
the licensees particle control program. The inspector noted that the licensee had failed to | |||
identify that conventional hand-held survey instruments using standard survey methods were | identify that conventional hand-held survey instruments using standard survey methods were | ||
Line 80: | Line 115: | ||
underestimating the contact dose rates of the particles, thus underestimating the radiological | underestimating the contact dose rates of the particles, thus underestimating the radiological | ||
hazards not just to the skin but in terms of whole body exposure. The | hazards not just to the skin but in terms of whole body exposure. | ||
The licensees evaluation had failed to consider properly and account for the potential for | |||
substantial dose to personnel from the high-activity particles. Specifically, the 15-minute worker | |||
stay time was not adequate to prevent potential overexposures from the particles known to be | stay time was not adequate to prevent potential overexposures from the particles known to be | ||
present in and around the refueling floor. | present in and around the refueling floor. The stay time would have allowed both SDE and total | ||
effective dose equivalent (TEDE) annual exposure limits to be exceeded. | effective dose equivalent (TEDE) annual exposure limits to be exceeded. | ||
exceeded in 25 seconds to 2 minutes, and the SDE limit exceeded in 6 to 21 seconds, depending on the activity of the individual particle.In response to the NRC findings and a 0.17 Sv (17 rem) SDE exposure on December 6 from | Four of the particles found ranged from 0.7 to 2.78 Gbq (19 to 75 mCi). Had the particles been | ||
directly on the workers PCs, the TEDE annual limit of 0.05 Sv (5 rem) could have been | |||
exceeded in 25 seconds to 2 minutes, and the SDE limit exceeded in 6 to 21 seconds, depending on the activity of the individual particle. | |||
In response to the NRC findings and a 0.17 Sv (17 rem) SDE exposure on December 6 from a | |||
particle on a workers boot, licensee management stopped all high-risk work, initiated a | |||
comprehensive events evaluation, requested on-site assistance by an industry expert team, and | comprehensive events evaluation, requested on-site assistance by an industry expert team, and | ||
implemented improved training and communication of lessons learned in this area. | implemented improved training and communication of lessons learned in this area. Discussion | ||
During previous similar processing of irradiated components at Susquehanna in 1991, radioactive particles had been identified with external gamma dose rates greater than | |||
100 rem/hr. However, the plant failed to incorporate fully this previous experience and industry- wide experience into the planning for the 2000 fuel pool clean out project. (NRC Information | |||
Notice No. 90-33, Sources of Unexpected Occupational Radiation Exposures at Spent Fuel | |||
potential radiological challenges posed by these extremely high activity particles. | Storage Pools, also concerns highly radioactive particles.) | ||
Prior to the NRC baseline inspection, after the initial event, the work controls that the licensee | |||
had implemented were not sufficient under the circumstances to evaluate and control the | |||
potential radiological challenges posed by these extremely high activity particles. A Notice of | |||
Violation (failure to conduct adequate evaluation and survey) associated with a White finding | Violation (failure to conduct adequate evaluation and survey) associated with a White finding | ||
(using the Significance Determination Process) was issued. | (using the Significance Determination Process) was issued. These actions were taken because | ||
of the substantial potential for exposure in excess of the annual limit for TEDE even though no | of the substantial potential for exposure in excess of the annual limit for TEDE even though no | ||
worker dose limits were exceeded.During the regulatory conference for this violation, the licensee stated that it needed to | worker dose limits were exceeded. | ||
During the regulatory conference for this violation, the licensee stated that it needed to improve | |||
its hot particle surveying, identification, handling, and control. The improvements included | |||
more effective use of remote handling techniques, proactive staging of particle control zones, and aggressive treatment of potential sources of particles by using decontamination and | more effective use of remote handling techniques, proactive staging of particle control zones, and aggressive treatment of potential sources of particles by using decontamination and | ||
filtration on systems that communicate with the spent fuel pool.The licensee noted that in cases like this where a contractor was used for a | filtration on systems that communicate with the spent fuel pool. | ||
The licensee noted that in cases like this where a contractor was used for a challenging | |||
radiological evolution, plant management oversight was essential. That oversight must focus | |||
on, and have sufficient resources to implement and maintain a sense of an acceptable radiation | on, and have sufficient resources to implement and maintain a sense of an acceptable radiation | ||
culture and acceptable practices and standards for radiation work. | culture and acceptable practices and standards for radiation work. According to the licensee, this can best be accomplished by direct ownership for significant, high-risk projects | ||
demonstrated by the visible presence and direct oversight of the work by utility managers. | demonstrated by the visible presence and direct oversight of the work by utility managers. | ||
Most importantly, this occurrence demonstrated a need to strengthen procedural controls to | |||
important lesson learned from the | focus attention on the large potential doses from these challenging radiological work | ||
environments. The worker training program and job oversight must emphasize the most | |||
important lesson learned from the eventthat radioactive particles can present not only | |||
shallow-dose risks but, at higher activity levels, whole body dose risks, which can be much | shallow-dose risks but, at higher activity levels, whole body dose risks, which can be much | ||
more significant. This information notice requires no specific action or written response. | more significant. This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any | ||
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager./RA/William D. Beckner, Program Director | questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts | ||
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. | |||
/RA/ | |||
William D. Beckner, Program Director | |||
Operating Reactor Improvements Program | |||
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs | Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs | ||
Office of Nuclear Reactor | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | ||
Technical contacts: James E. Wigginton, NRR James D. Noggle, Region I | |||
301-415-1059 610-337-5063 E-mail: jew2@nrc.gov E-mail: jdn@nrc.gov | |||
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | |||
ML011790547 | |||
*See previous concurrence | |||
OFFICE REXB Tech Ed IOLB SC:REXB RORP | |||
NAME EGoodwin* PKleene* GTracy* JTappert* Wbeckner* | |||
DATE 12/20/2001 6/19/2001 8/20/2001 6/26/2001 01/08/2002 | |||
Attachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED | |||
(PWRs), except those who have | NRC INFORMATION NOTICES | ||
_____________________________________________________________________________________ | |||
Information Date of | |||
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to | |||
_____________________________________________________________________________________ | |||
2002-02 Recent Experience with 01/08/2002 All holders of operating licenses | |||
Plugged Steam Generator for pressurized-water reactors | |||
Tubes (PWRs), except those who have | |||
permanently ceased operations | permanently ceased operations | ||
Line 155: | Line 241: | ||
been permanently removed from | been permanently removed from | ||
the reactor.2002- | the reactor. | ||
2002-01 Metalclad Switchgear Failures 01/08/2002 All holders of licenses for nuclear | |||
and Consequent Losses of power reactors. | |||
Offsite Power | |||
2001-19 Improper Maintenance and 12/17/2001 All holders of operating licenses | |||
Reassembly of Automatic Oil for nuclear power reactors, Bubblers except those who have | |||
permanently ceased operations | permanently ceased operations | ||
Line 167: | Line 259: | ||
been permanently removed from | been permanently removed from | ||
the reactor vessel. | the reactor vessel. | ||
2001-18 Degraded or Failed Automated 12/14/2001 All uranium fuel conversion, Electronic Monitoring, Control, enrichment, and fabrication | |||
licensees and certificate holders | Alarming, Response, and licensees and certificate holders | ||
authorized to receive safeguards | Communications Needed for authorized to receive safeguards | ||
information. | Safety and/or Safeguards information. Information notice is | ||
not available to the public | not available to the public | ||
Line 184: | Line 273: | ||
because it contains safeguards | because it contains safeguards | ||
information. | information. | ||
2001-17 Degraded and Failed 12/14/2001 All uranium fuel conversion, Performance of Essential enrichment, and fabrication | |||
licensees and certificate holders | Utilities Needed for Safety and licensees and certificate holders | ||
authorized to receive safeguards | Safeguards authorized to receive safeguards | ||
information. | information. Information notice is | ||
not available to the public | not available to the public | ||
Line 199: | Line 287: | ||
because it contains safeguards | because it contains safeguards | ||
information.2001-08, | information. | ||
2001-08, Update on Radiation Therapy 11/20/2001 All medical licensees. | |||
===Sup. 2 Overexposures in Panama=== | |||
2001-16 Recent Foreign and Domestic steam Tubes and Internals | |||
Experience with Degradation of Generator | |||
______________________________________________________________________________________ | |||
OL = Operating License | |||
CP = Construction Permit}} | |||
{{Information notice-Nav}} | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Latest revision as of 05:48, 24 November 2019
ML011790547 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Issue date: | 01/10/2002 |
From: | Beckner W Operational Experience and Non-Power Reactors Branch |
To: | |
References | |
TAC MB1382 IN-02-003 | |
Download: ML011790547 (7) | |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 January 10, 2002 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-03: HIGHLY RADIOACTIVE PARTICLE CONTROL
PROBLEMS DURING SPENT FUEL POOL
CLEANOUT
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, holders of licenses for permanently
shutdown facilities with fuel onsite, and holders of licenses for non-power reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert
addressees to recent issues involving evaluation and control of radioactive particles generated
during removal of material from a spent fuel pool prior to shipping the material offsite for
disposal. The issue emphasized in this notice is that highly radioactive (hot) particles represent
a radiological hazard not just in terms of shallow dose to the skin or an extremity but also as a
deep or whole-body dose. It is expected that recipients will review the information for
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
Toward the end of a 5-month spent fuel pool cleaning project, the Susquehanna Steam Electric
Station completed compacting irradiated components that had been temporarily stored in the
pool. Working under water remotely, the licensee had used an advanced crusher and shearer
(ACS) unit to compact control rod blades and local power range monitors. On October 12,
2000, the ACS was removed from the cask storage pit with a crane after apparently inadequate
cleaning with a high-pressure spray Hydrolazer. The ACS was moved over the refueling floor
and into the reactor head washdown area for further decontamination prior to shipment offsite.
The ACS was not totally wrapped or sealed during this movement. Also, access to the ACS
pathway over the refueling floor was not radiologically controlled during the move.
During the movement of the ACS, the refueling floor local area radiation monitor began to
alarm. The cause was a previously unidentified highly radioactive particle which had fallen from
the ACS. The particle was later determined to be a 2.78 gigabecquerel (Gbq) [75 millicuries
(mCi)] Co-60 particle, reading approximately 8 sievert/h (Sv/h) (800 rem/h) at contact.
The licensee stopped work, shielded and captured the particle, and initiated radioactive particle
control zone coverage for the entire refueling floor. Additional actions undertaken at that time
included formation of a root cause event review team. The teams work led to upgraded
controls, surveying, more management oversight and more detailed planning and work
procedures for handling high specific activity particles.
A search was then begun for additional hot particles on the refueling floor. Workers in particle
control zones were surveyed for particles every 15 minutes, and more protective clothing (PC)
was required for certain work activities. The 15-minute control was a default stay time, and not
based on dose calculations for the high-activity particles known to be present.
During the cleanup activities, more than 30 radioactive particles were found on the refueling
floor. Two high activity radioactive particles found on September 9 and December 6, 2000, had
resulted in shallow-dose equivalent (SDE) exposures of 0.12 and 0.17 Sv (12 and 17 rem),
which is below the annual SDE limit of 50 rem. The licensee discovered two more high-activity
particles, a 0.78 Gbq (21 mCi) particle on November 28, and a 0.7 Gbq (19 mCi) particle on
December 4, 2000; these particles did not result in significant exposure to personnel. No actual
exposures in excess of any annual dose limits occurred during the cleanup activities.
During a scheduled NRC health physics, rad-waste transportation, baseline inspection during
December 11-15, 2000 (Inspection Report Nos. 05000387/2000-009 and 05000388/2000-009, ADAMS Accession No. ML010250469), the NRC inspector identified significant weaknesses in
the licensees particle control program. The inspector noted that the licensee had failed to
identify that conventional hand-held survey instruments using standard survey methods were
underestimating the contact dose rates of the particles, thus underestimating the radiological
hazards not just to the skin but in terms of whole body exposure.
The licensees evaluation had failed to consider properly and account for the potential for
substantial dose to personnel from the high-activity particles. Specifically, the 15-minute worker
stay time was not adequate to prevent potential overexposures from the particles known to be
present in and around the refueling floor. The stay time would have allowed both SDE and total
effective dose equivalent (TEDE) annual exposure limits to be exceeded.
Four of the particles found ranged from 0.7 to 2.78 Gbq (19 to 75 mCi). Had the particles been
directly on the workers PCs, the TEDE annual limit of 0.05 Sv (5 rem) could have been
exceeded in 25 seconds to 2 minutes, and the SDE limit exceeded in 6 to 21 seconds, depending on the activity of the individual particle.
In response to the NRC findings and a 0.17 Sv (17 rem) SDE exposure on December 6 from a
particle on a workers boot, licensee management stopped all high-risk work, initiated a
comprehensive events evaluation, requested on-site assistance by an industry expert team, and
implemented improved training and communication of lessons learned in this area. Discussion
During previous similar processing of irradiated components at Susquehanna in 1991, radioactive particles had been identified with external gamma dose rates greater than
100 rem/hr. However, the plant failed to incorporate fully this previous experience and industry- wide experience into the planning for the 2000 fuel pool clean out project. (NRC Information
Notice No. 90-33, Sources of Unexpected Occupational Radiation Exposures at Spent Fuel
Storage Pools, also concerns highly radioactive particles.)
Prior to the NRC baseline inspection, after the initial event, the work controls that the licensee
had implemented were not sufficient under the circumstances to evaluate and control the
potential radiological challenges posed by these extremely high activity particles. A Notice of
Violation (failure to conduct adequate evaluation and survey) associated with a White finding
(using the Significance Determination Process) was issued. These actions were taken because
of the substantial potential for exposure in excess of the annual limit for TEDE even though no
worker dose limits were exceeded.
During the regulatory conference for this violation, the licensee stated that it needed to improve
its hot particle surveying, identification, handling, and control. The improvements included
more effective use of remote handling techniques, proactive staging of particle control zones, and aggressive treatment of potential sources of particles by using decontamination and
filtration on systems that communicate with the spent fuel pool.
The licensee noted that in cases like this where a contractor was used for a challenging
radiological evolution, plant management oversight was essential. That oversight must focus
on, and have sufficient resources to implement and maintain a sense of an acceptable radiation
culture and acceptable practices and standards for radiation work. According to the licensee, this can best be accomplished by direct ownership for significant, high-risk projects
demonstrated by the visible presence and direct oversight of the work by utility managers.
Most importantly, this occurrence demonstrated a need to strengthen procedural controls to
focus attention on the large potential doses from these challenging radiological work
environments. The worker training program and job oversight must emphasize the most
important lesson learned from the eventthat radioactive particles can present not only
shallow-dose risks but, at higher activity levels, whole body dose risks, which can be much
more significant. This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
/RA/
William D. Beckner, Program Director
Operating Reactor Improvements Program
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: James E. Wigginton, NRR James D. Noggle, Region I
301-415-1059 610-337-5063 E-mail: jew2@nrc.gov E-mail: jdn@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- See previous concurrence
OFFICE REXB Tech Ed IOLB SC:REXB RORP
NAME EGoodwin* PKleene* GTracy* JTappert* Wbeckner*
DATE 12/20/2001 6/19/2001 8/20/2001 6/26/2001 01/08/2002
Attachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
_____________________________________________________________________________________
2002-02 Recent Experience with 01/08/2002 All holders of operating licenses
Plugged Steam Generator for pressurized-water reactors
Tubes (PWRs), except those who have
permanently ceased operations
and have certified that fuel has
been permanently removed from
the reactor.
2002-01 Metalclad Switchgear Failures 01/08/2002 All holders of licenses for nuclear
and Consequent Losses of power reactors.
Offsite Power
2001-19 Improper Maintenance and 12/17/2001 All holders of operating licenses
Reassembly of Automatic Oil for nuclear power reactors, Bubblers except those who have
permanently ceased operations
and have certified that fuel has
been permanently removed from
the reactor vessel.
2001-18 Degraded or Failed Automated 12/14/2001 All uranium fuel conversion, Electronic Monitoring, Control, enrichment, and fabrication
Alarming, Response, and licensees and certificate holders
Communications Needed for authorized to receive safeguards
Safety and/or Safeguards information. Information notice is
not available to the public
because it contains safeguards
information.
2001-17 Degraded and Failed 12/14/2001 All uranium fuel conversion, Performance of Essential enrichment, and fabrication
Utilities Needed for Safety and licensees and certificate holders
Safeguards authorized to receive safeguards
information. Information notice is
not available to the public
because it contains safeguards
information.
2001-08, Update on Radiation Therapy 11/20/2001 All medical licensees.
Sup. 2 Overexposures in Panama
2001-16 Recent Foreign and Domestic steam Tubes and Internals
Experience with Degradation of Generator
______________________________________________________________________________________
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit