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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc Facility:
{{#Wiki_filter:Appendix D                                     Scenario Outline                                     Form ES-D-1 Facility:         CPNPP 1 & 2                   Scenario No.:         1   Op Test No.:   July 2010 NRC Examiners:                                                 Operators:
CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.:
Initial Conditions:
1 Op Test No.: July 2010 NRC Examiners:
* 100% power MOL - RCS Boron is 910 ppm by Chemistry sample.
Operators:
* Train A Emergency Diesel Generator is OOS for governor repair.
Initial Conditions: 100% power MOL - RCS Boron is 910 ppm by Chemistry sample. Train A Emergency Diesel Generator is OOS for governor repair. Turnover: Maintain steady-state 100% power conditions.
Turnover:             Maintain steady-state 100% power conditions.
Critical Tasks: Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps Upon Loss of Subcooling.
Critical Tasks:
Manually Initiate Containment Isolation Phase A Upon Failure to Automatically Actuate.
* Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps Upon Loss of Subcooling.
Maintain Core Cooling During a Loss of Cold Leg Recirculation.
* Manually Initiate Containment Isolation Phase A Upon Failure to Automatically Actuate.
Event No.
* Maintain Core Cooling During a Loss of Cold Leg Recirculation.
Malf. No.
Event No.     Malf. No.     Event Type*                                 Event Description 1       RP06A       I (RO, SRO)           Loop 1 N-16 Channel I (1-JI-411A/B) Fails High.
Event Type* Event Description 1 +5 min RP06A I (RO, SRO)
  +5 min                  TS (SRO) 2      RX18        I (BOP, SRO)          Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) Fails High.
TS (SRO) Loop 1 N-16 Channel I (1-JI-411A/B) Fails High.   
+10 min 3      CH03        C (BOP, SRO)          Neutron Detector Well Fan (FN-09) Motor Overcurrent.
+15 min 4      RX05B      I (RO, SRO)            Pressurizer Level Channel (LT-460) Fails Low.
+25 min                  TS (SRO) 5      RC17A      M (RO, BOP, SRO) Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (60 second ramp).
  +30 min 6      RP09A      C (BOP)                Phase A Containment Isolation Trains A and B Fail to Automatically
+35 min      RP09B                              Actuate.
7      RH01B      C (BOP)                Residual Heat Removal Pump (1-02) Trip Upon SI Sequencer
+35 min                                        Start.
8      RHR15      C (RO)                Containment Sump to Residual Heat Removal Pump (1-01) Suction
+50 min                                        Isolation Valve (1-8811A) Will Not Open.
    *    (N)ormal,  (R)eactivity,  (I)nstrument,  (C)omponent,    (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


2 +10 min RX18 I (BOP, SRO) Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) Fails High.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 SCENARIO  
 
3 +15 min CH03 C (BOP, SRO) Neutron Detector Well Fan (FN-09) Motor Overcurrent.
4 +25 min RX05B I (RO, SRO)
TS (SRO) Pressurizer Level Channel (LT-460) Fails Low.
5 +30 min RC17A M (RO, BOP, SRO)Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (60 second ramp).
6 +35 min RP09A RP09B C (BOP)
Phase A Containment Isolation Trains A and B Fail to Automatically Actuate. 7 +35 min RH01B C (BOP) Residual Heat Removal Pump (1-02) Trip Upon SI Sequencer Start. 8 +50 min RHR15 C (RO) Containment Sump to Residual Heat Removal Pump (1-01) Suction Isolation Valve (1-8811A) Will Not Open.
* (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor,  (TS)Technical Specifications
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc SCENARIO  


==SUMMARY==
==SUMMARY==
NRC #1 The crew will assume the watch and maintain steady-state conditions per IPO-003A, Power Operations. Train A Emergency Diesel Generator is out of service for governor repair.
NRC #1 The crew will assume the watch and maintain steady-state conditions per IPO-003A, Power Operations. Train A Emergency Diesel Generator is out of service for governor repair.
The first event is a high failure of Loop 1 N-16 Channel I. Operator actions are per ABN-704, Tc/N-16 Instrumentation Malfunction, and include placing Rod Control in Manual and identifying the failed channel. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.  
The first event is a high failure of Loop 1 N-16 Channel I. Operator actions are per ABN-704, Tc/N-16 Instrumentation Malfunction, and include placing Rod Control in Manual and identifying the failed channel. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
 
Once Technical Specifications are addressed, a Feedwater Header Pressure Transmitter fails high causing Main Feed Pump speed to decrease resulting in a drop in Feedwater flow. Operator actions are per ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 5.0, and require manual Feedwater Header pressure control until repairs are made.
Once Technical Specifications are addressed, a Feedwater Header Pressure Transmitter fails high causing Main Feed Pump speed to decrease resulting in a drop in Feedwater flow. Operator actions are per ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 5.0, and require manual Feedwater Header pressure control until repairs are made.  
When Feedwater Header pressure is stable, the running Neutron Detector Well Fan will trip. Actions are per ALM-0031A, 1-ALB-3A, Window 2.1 - CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP. The BOP will start the standby Neutron Detector Well Fan per SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System, and monitor for proper operation.
 
When Feedwater Header pressure is stable, the running Neutron Detector Well Fan will trip. Actions are per ALM-0031A, 1-ALB-3A, Window 2.1 - CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP. The BOP will start the standby Neutron Detector Well Fan per SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System, and monitor for proper operation.  
 
The next event is a Pressurizer Level instrument failure. Actions are per ABN-706, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Malfunction. The RO will take manual control of Pressurizer level or Charging flow to maintain Pressurizer Level on program. When the failed instrument is identified, an alternate controlling channel is selected and Charging flow and Pressurizer Level control will be returned to Automatic.
The next event is a Pressurizer Level instrument failure. Actions are per ABN-706, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Malfunction. The RO will take manual control of Pressurizer level or Charging flow to maintain Pressurizer Level on program. When the failed instrument is identified, an alternate controlling channel is selected and Charging flow and Pressurizer Level control will be returned to Automatic.
Letdown flow will be restored per the Job Aid. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
Letdown flow will be restored per the Job Aid. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
When Letdown flow is restored, a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident develops inside Containment resulting in generation of signals for Safety Injection, Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B.
When Letdown flow is restored, a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident develops inside Containment resulting in generation of signals for Safety Injection, Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B.
Train B Residual Heat Removal Pump will trip upon pump start and the Train A Containment Sump to RHR Pump Suction Isolation Valve will NOT open.
Train B Residual Heat Removal Pump will trip upon pump start and the Train A Containment Sump to RHR Pump Suction Isolation Valve will NOT open. Reactor Coolant Pumps must be manually tripped due to a loss of subcooling and Containment Isolation Phase A must be manually initiated.
Reactor Coolant Pumps must be manually tripped due to a loss of subcooling and Containment Isolation Phase A must be manually initiated.
The crew enters EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and at Step 14, transitions to EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. While in EOP-1.0A, the crew should recognize and transition to ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, at Step 11. When in ECA-1.1A, the crew will secure Containment Spray Pumps as required per Containment pressure conditions.
The crew enters EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and at Step 14, transitions to EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. While in EOP-1.0A, the crew should recognize and transition to ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, at Step 11. When in ECA-1.1A, the crew will secure Containment Spray Pumps as required per Containment pressure conditions.
The scenario is terminated when Containment Spray flow is reduced in ECA-1.1A or when the conditions of FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure, have been met.  
The scenario is terminated when Containment Spray flow is reduced in ECA-1.1A or when the conditions of FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure, have been met.
Risk Significance:
* Risk important components out of service:        Train A Emergency Diesel Generator
* Risk significant core damage sequence:            LBLOCA with Loss of Coolant Recirculation
* Risk significant operator actions:                Manually Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps Manually Initiate Containment Isolation Manually Secure Containment Spray Pumps CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


Risk Significance
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 BOOTH OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC #18 and Event File for NRC Scenario #1.
:  Risk important components out of service: Train A Emergency Diesel Generator Risk significant core damage sequence: LBLOCA with Loss of Coolant Recirculation Risk significant operator actions:
EVENT TYPE MALF #                      DESCRIPTION                    DEMAND      INITIATING VALUE      PARAMETER SETUP          -      Train A EDG OOS                                PULLOUT          -
Manually Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps Manually Initiate Containment Isolation Manually Secure Containment Spray Pumps
RHR15      CNTMT Sump to RHRP 1-01 SUC ISOL VLV            RACKOUT      Conditional Breaker 1-8811A rackout                                      on Rx Trip RP09A      Containment Isolation Train A actuation failure      -          K0 RP09B      Containment Isolation Train B actuation failure      -          K0 1        RP06A      Loop 1 N-16 Channel I failure                      150          K1 2          RX18      Feed Header Press (PT-508) transmitter failure    1500          K2 3        CH03      Neutron Detector Well Fan Motor overcurrent        TRIP          K3 3        AN3A 02    CB03 1-ALB-3A Window 2.1 Alarm OFF                TRIP          K9 4        RX05B      Pressurizer Level Channel (LT-460) fails low        0%          K4 5        RC17A      Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident            5,000 gpm        K5 (60 second ramp) 6        RP09A      Containment Isolation Train A actuation failure      -          K0 6        RP09B      Containment Isolation Train B actuation failure      -          K0 7        RH01B      RHR Pump (1-02) trip                              TRIP          K0 upon SI 8        RHR15      CNTMT Sump to RHRP 1-01 SUC ISOL VLV            RACKOUT      Conditional Breaker 1-8811A rackout                                      on Rx Trip CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc BOOTH OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC #18 and Event File for NRC Scenario #1.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 Booth Operator: INITIALIZE to IC #18 and NRC Scenario #1 SETUP file.
EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND VALUE INITIATING PARAMETER SETUP  - Train A EDG OOS PULLOUT -  RHR15 CNTMT Sump to RHRP 1-01 SUC ISOL VLV Breaker 1-8811A rackout RACKOUT Conditional on Rx Trip RP09A Containment Isolation Train A actuation failure - K0  RP09B Containment Isolation Train B actuation failure - K0  1  RP06A Loop 1 N-16 Channel I failure 150 K1  2  RX18 Feed Header Press (PT-508) transmitter failure 1500 K2  3  CH03 Neutron Detector Well Fan Motor overcurrent TRIP K3 3  AN3A 02 CB03 1-ALB-3A Window 2.1 Alarm OFF TRIP K9  4  RX05B Pressurizer Level Channel (LT-460) fails low 0% K4  5  RC17A Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident 5,000 gpm K5 (60 second ramp) 6  RP09A Containment Isolation Train A actuation failure - K0 6  RP09B Containment Isolation Train B actuation failure - K0  7  RH01B RHR Pump (1-02) trip TRIP K0 upon SI  8  RHR15 CNTMT Sump to RHRP 1-01 SUC ISOL VLV Breaker 1-8811A rackout RACKOUT Conditional on Rx Trip
ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.
 
ENSURE Control Board Tags are hung:
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc Booth Operator: INITIALIZE to IC #18 and NRC Scenario #1 SETUP file. ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.
                - Red tag Train A Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01 & Breaker DG1 BKR 1EG1.
ENSURE Control Board Tags are hung:  
- Red tag Train A Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01 & Breaker DG1 BKR 1EG1.
ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions.
ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions.
ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 215 steps. ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed. ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.
ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 215 steps.
ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.  
ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.
 
ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.
ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk: - COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load.
ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.
Significant Control Room Annunciators in Alarm
ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:
: PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX  10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK  
                - COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load.
 
Significant Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:
10B-1.8 - DG 1 DISABLED  
PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX  10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 10B-1.8 - DG 1 DISABLED CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 5 of 22 Event
Appendix D                                       Operator Action                           Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #     1     Event #             1       Page 5   of 22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Loop 1 N-16 Channel I Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1. - RP06A, Loop 1 N-16 Channel I (1-JI-411A/B) fails high.
Loop 1 N-16 Channel I Failure Time         Position                           Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1.
Indications Available
                      - RP06A, Loop 1 N-16 Channel I (1-JI-411A/B) fails high.
: 5C-1.5 - ANY N 16 DEV HI/LO 5C-2.5 - 1 OF 4 OT N 16 HI  
Indications Available:
 
5C-1.5 - ANY N 16 DEV HI/LO 5C-2.5 - 1 OF 4 OT N 16 HI 5C-3.5 - ANY TAVE DEV HI/LO 5C-2.6 - 1 OF 4 OP N 16 HI 6D-1.10 - ANY TAVE TREF DEV 6D-2.13 - 1 OF 4 OP N 16 ROD STOP & TURB RUNBACK 6D-3.14 - 1 OF 4 OT N 16 ROD STOP & TURB RUNBACK 6D-1.7 - ANY ROD BANK AT LO LIMIT (May come in depending on time rods are in AUTO)
5C-3.5 - ANY TAVE DEV HI/LO 5C-2.6 - 1 OF 4 OP N 16 HI  
+30 secs        RO        RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RECOGNIZE Loop 1 N-16 Channel failure at JI-411A/B on CB-05 and/or RO CB-07.
DIRECT performance of ABN-704, Tc / N16 Instrumentation Malfunction, US Section 2.0.
RO        PLACE 1/1-RBSS Control Rod Bank Select Switch in MANUAL.
RO        PLACE 1-TS-412T, Tave CHAN DEFEAT in LOOP 1 position.
BOP      VERIFY Steam Dump System is NOT actuated and NOT armed.
RO        RESTORE TAVE to within 1ºF of TREF.
RO        SELECT LOOP 1 on 1/1-JS-411E, N16 Power Channel Defeat.
ENSURE a valid N16 channel supplying recorder on 1/1-TS-411E, 1-TR-411 RO CHAN SELECT.
VERIFY Steam Dump System is NOT armed by OBSERVING PCIP-3.4 BOP alarm not LIT.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


6D-1.10 - ANY TAVE T REF DEV 6D-2.13 - 1 OF 4 OP N 16 ROD STOP & TURB RUNBACK 6D-3.14 - 1 OF 4 OT N 16 ROD STOP & TURB RUNBACK 6D-1.7 - ANY ROD BANK AT LO LIMIT (May come in depending on time rods are in AUTO)
Appendix D                                       Operator Action                           Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #     1     Event #             1       Page 6     of 22 Event
+30 secs RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RO RECOGNIZE Loop 1 N-16 Channel failure at JI-411A/B on CB-05 and/or CB-07. US  DIRECT performance of ABN-704, Tc / N16 Instrumentation Malfunction, Section 2.0.
RO  PLACE 1/1-RBSS Control Rod Bank Select Switch in MANUAL.
RO  PLACE 1-TS-412T, Tave CHAN DEFEAT in LOOP 1 position.
BOP VERIFY Steam Dump System is NOT actuated and NOT armed.
RO RESTORE T AVE to within 1ºF of T REF. RO SELECT LOOP 1 on 1/1-JS-411E, N16 Power Channel Defeat.
RO ENSURE a valid N16 channel supplying recorder on 1/1-TS-411E, 1-TR-411 CHAN SELECT.
BOP VERIFY Steam Dump System is NOT armed by OBSERVING PCIP-3.4
 
alarm not LIT.
 
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 6 of 22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Loop 1 N-16 Channel I Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc
Loop 1 N-16 Channel I Failure Time         Position                           Applicants Actions or Behavior
  +5 min US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.
  +5 min           US       EVALUATE Technical Specifications.
LCO 3.3.1.E, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation CONDITION E - One channel INOPERABLE. ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours or be in MODE 3 within 78 hours.
* LCO 3.3.1.E, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.  
* CONDITION E - One channel INOPERABLE.
* ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours or be in MODE 3 within 78 hours.
When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 7 of 22 Event
Appendix D                                       Operator Action                           Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #     1       Event #             2       Page 7   of 22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Feed Header Pressure Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2. - RX18, Feed Header Pressure (PT-508) transmitter fails high.
Feed Header Pressure Failure Time         Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2.
Indications Available
                      - RX18, Feed Header Pressure (PT-508) transmitter fails high.
: 8A-1.8 - SG 1 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 8A-2.8 - SG 2 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 8A-3.8 - SG 3 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 8A-4.8 - SG 4 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 9A-3.2 - HDP 1 DISCH PRESS HI 9A-7.2 - HDP 2 DISCH PRESS HI 1-PI-508, Feed Header Pressure Indication pegged high  
Indications Available:
+1 min BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
8A-1.8 - SG 1 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 8A-2.8 - SG 2 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 8A-3.8 - SG 3 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 8A-4.8 - SG 4 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 9A-3.2 - HDP 1 DISCH PRESS HI 9A-7.2 - HDP 2 DISCH PRESS HI 1-PI-508, Feed Header Pressure Indication pegged high
BOP RECOGNIZE Feed Header Pressure 1-PT-508 transmitter failure.
  +1 min         BOP       RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
US  DIRECT performance of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header  
BOP       RECOGNIZE Feed Header Pressure 1-PT-508 transmitter failure.
DIRECT performance of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header US      Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 5.0.
BOP      PLACE 1-SK-509A, FWPT Master Speed Controller in MANUAL.
ADJUST 1-SK-509A, FWPT Master Speed Controller to maintain 80 psig to BOP 170 psig between FWP discharge pressure and steam line pressure.
  +5 min          US      INITIATE a Work Request per STA-606.
When manual control of feedwater is attained, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


Pressure, Turbine 1 st-Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 5.0.
Appendix D                                           Operator Action                           Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #       1       Event #             3       Page 8   of 22 Event
BOP PLACE 1-SK-509A, FWPT Master Speed Controller in MANUAL.
BOP ADJUST 1-SK-509A, FWPT Master Speed Controller to maintain 80 psig to 170 psig between FWP discharge pressure and steam line pressure.
+5 min US INITIATE a Work Request per STA-606.
When manual control of feedwater is attained, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to
 
Event 3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 8 of 22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Neutron Detector Well Fan Motor Overcurrent Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3. - CH03, Neutron Detector Well Fan (1-09) overcurrent trip.
Neutron Detector Well Fan Motor Overcurrent Time         Position                               Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3.
Indications Available
                      - CH03, Neutron Detector Well Fan (1-09) overcurrent trip.
: 3A-2.1 - CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP 11A-1.5 - NEUT DET WELL CH WTR RET FLO LO (on Panel CV-01) 1-HS-5435, NEUT DET WELL FN CLR FN 9 & DMPR green DAMPER & FAN and white TRIP lights illuminated  
Indications Available:
+1 min BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
3A-2.1 - CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP 11A-1.5 - NEUT DET WELL CH WTR RET FLO LO (on Panel CV-01) 1-HS-5435, NEUT DET WELL FN CLR FN 9 & DMPR green DAMPER & FAN and white TRIP lights illuminated
BOP RECOGNIZE Neutron Detector Well Fan 1-09 tripped.
  +1 min         BOP       RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
US  DIRECT performance of ALM-0031A, 1-ALB-3A, Window 2.1 - CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP.
BOP       RECOGNIZE Neutron Detector Well Fan 1-09 tripped.
Examiner Note: BOP may start fan per assumed operator knowledge prior to referencing the ALM. BOP If NO fans are in service, START Neutron Detector Well Fan 10 per SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System.
DIRECT performance of ALM-0031A, 1-ALB-3A, Window 2.1 - CNTMT FN US MASTER TRIP.
Examiner Note: BOP may start fan per assumed operator knowledge prior to referencing the ALM.
If NO fans are in service, START Neutron Detector Well Fan 10 per BOP SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System.
Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System.
Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System.
BOP DETERMINE Prerequisites in Section 2.2 of SOP-801A are met.
BOP       DETERMINE Prerequisites in Section 2.2 of SOP-801A are met.
BOP PLACE 1-HS-5440, NEUT DET WELL FN CLR, FN 10 and DMPR in START.
BOP       PLACE 1-HS-5440, NEUT DET WELL FN CLR, FN 10 and DMPR in START.
VERIFY Fan 10 Suction Damper OPEN and Fan 9 Suction Damper CLOSED. BOP VERIFY 1-HS-6079, NEUT DET WELL FN CLR 10 CH WTR RET VLV automatically OPENS on Panel CV-01.
* VERIFY Fan 10 Suction Damper OPEN and Fan 9 Suction Damper CLOSED.
BOP ENSURE 1-HS-6084, CH WTR SPLY ISOL VLV ORC is OPEN.  
VERIFY 1-HS-6079, NEUT DET WELL FN CLR 10 CH WTR RET VLV BOP automatically OPENS on Panel CV-01.
BOP       ENSURE 1-HS-6084, CH WTR SPLY ISOL VLV ORC is OPEN.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 9 of 22 Event
Appendix D                                           Operator Action                           Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #       1       Event #             3       Page 9   of 22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Neutron Detector Well Fan Motor Overcurrent Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc Examiner Note: The following steps are from Window 2.1 - CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP.
Neutron Detector Well Fan Motor Overcurrent Time         Position                               Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: The following steps are from Window 2.1 - CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP.
BOP PLACE 1-HS-5435, NEUT DET WELL FN CLR FN 9 & DMPR in PULLOUT/STOP.
PLACE 1-HS-5435, NEUT DET WELL FN CLR FN 9 & DMPR in BOP PULLOUT/STOP.
Booth Operator: When contacted, WAIT one minute then REPORT Fan 9 Breaker appears to have tripped due to overload.
Booth Operator: When contacted, WAIT one minute then REPORT Fan 9 Breaker appears to have tripped due to overload.
US DISPATCH an operator to Fan 9 Breaker to determine cause of trip.
US       DISPATCH an operator to Fan 9 Breaker to determine cause of trip.
US When conditions permit, PERFORM a Containment Entry per STA-620 to determine cause of fan failure.  
When conditions permit, PERFORM a Containment Entry per STA-620 to US determine cause of fan failure.
  +5 min US INITIATE a work request per STA-606.
  +5 min           US       INITIATE a work request per STA-606.
When Neutron Detector Well cooling is restored, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to  
When Neutron Detector Well cooling is restored, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


Event 4. 
Appendix D                                            Operator Action                            Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :        NRC        Scenario #        1      Event #            4       Page 10    of  22 Event


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 10 of 22 Event
== Description:==
Pressurizer Level Transmitter Failure Time          Position                                Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4.
                      - RX05B, Pressurizer Level Transmitter (LT-460) fails low.
Indications Available:
5B-1.4 - PRZR HTR GRP C CTRL TRBL 5B-3.6 - PRZR LVL LO 6A-3.8 - CVCS HELB PS-5385A 6A-4.8 - CVCS HELB PS-5385 1-LI-460A, PRZR LVL CHAN II indication failed low
+30 secs        RO        RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RECOGNIZE Letdown isolated and all PRZR Heaters deenergized and RO DETERMINE Pressurizer Level Channel (LT-460) malfunction.
RO        REPORT Pressurizer Level Channel I (LT-460) failed low.
DIRECT performance of ABN-706, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation US Malfunction, Section 2.0.
PLACE PZR Level Control or Charging Flow in MANUAL to maintain level on RO program using one of the following controllers:
* 1-LK-459, PRZR LVL CTRL
* 1-FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL TRANSFER 1/1-LS-459D, PZR Level Control Channel Select to an RO OPERABLE channel.
TRANSFER 1/1-LS-459E, 1/1-LR-459 PZR Level Select to an OPERABLE RO channel.
RO        RESTORE Letdown per Job Aid.
* OPEN or VERIFY OPEN both Letdown Isolation Valves.
* ENSURE 1-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL in MANUAL and 30%
(75 gpm) or 50% (120 gpm) DEMAND.
* ENSURE 1-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL in MANUAL and 50%
DEMAND.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


== Description:==
Appendix D                                             Operator Action                           Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #         1     Event #             4       Page 11   of 22 Event
Pressurizer Level Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4. - RX05B, Pressurizer Level Transmitter (LT-460) fails low.
Indications Available
: 5B-1.4 - PRZR HTR GRP C CTRL TRBL 5B-3.6 - PRZR LVL LO 6A-3.8 - CVCS HELB PS-5385A 6A-4.8 - CVCS HELB PS-5385 1-LI-460A, PRZR LVL CHAN II indication failed low
+30 secs RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RO RECOGNIZE Letdown isolated and all PRZR Heaters deenergized and DETERMINE Pressurizer Level Channel (LT-460) malfunction.
RO REPORT Pressurizer Level Channel I (LT-460) failed low.
US DIRECT performance of ABN-706, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Malfunction, Section 2.0.
RO PLACE PZR Level Control or Charging Flow in MANUAL to maintain level on program using one of the following controllers:
1-LK-459, PRZR LVL CTRL 1-FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL RO TRANSFER 1/1-LS-459D, PZR Level Control Channel Select to an OPERABLE channel.
RO TRANSFER 1/1-LS-459E, 1/1-LR-459 PZR Level Select to an OPERABLE channel. RO RESTORE Letdown per Job Aid
. OPEN or VERIFY OPEN both Letdown Isolation Valves.
ENSURE 1-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL in MANUAL and 30% (75 gpm) or 50% (120 gpm) DEMAND.
ENSURE 1-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL in MANUAL and 50% DEMAND.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 11 of 22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Pressurizer Level Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc ADJUST Charging to desired flow and MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 and 13 gpm.
Pressurizer Level Transmitter Failure Time         Position                                 Applicants Actions or Behavior
OPEN the desired Orifice Isolation Valves.
* ADJUST Charging to desired flow and MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 and 13 gpm.
ADJUST 1-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL to ~310 psig on 1-PI-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS then PLACE in AUTO.
* OPEN the desired Orifice Isolation Valves.
ADJUST 1-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL to obtain ~95ºF on 1-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP, then place in AUTOMATIC.
* ADJUST 1-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL to ~310 psig on 1-PI-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS then PLACE in AUTO.
RO RESTORE PZR Control Heater Group C.
* ADJUST 1-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL to obtain ~95ºF on 1-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP, then place in AUTOMATIC.
RO       RESTORE PZR Control Heater Group C.
Examiner Note: AUTO Pressurizer Level Control will not be restored until level is manually returned to program.
Examiner Note: AUTO Pressurizer Level Control will not be restored until level is manually returned to program.
RO RESTORE PZR Level Control or Charging Flow Control to AUTO as desired.
RO       RESTORE PZR Level Control or Charging Flow Control to AUTO as desired.
RO VERIFY instruments on common instrument line - NORMAL.
RO       VERIFY instruments on common instrument line - NORMAL.
DETERMINE PT-0456 and PT-0458 readings are NORMAL.  
* DETERMINE PT-0456 and PT-0458 readings are NORMAL.
+10 min US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.
+10 min           US       EVALUATE Technical Specifications.
LCO 3.3.1.M, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
* LCO 3.3.1.M, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
CONDITION M - One channel inoperable. ACTION M.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours.
* CONDITION M - One channel inoperable.
* ACTION M.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours.
When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Events 5, 6, 7, and 8.
When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Events 5, 6, 7, and 8.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 12 of 22 Event
Appendix D                                         Operator Action                                   Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #     1       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8     Page   12     of     22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 5, 6, 7, and 8. - RC17A, Loss of Coolant Accident @ 5,000 gpm on 60 second ramp. - RP09A, Containment Isolation Train A actuation failure.  
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time         Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 5, 6, 7, and 8.
- RP09B, Containment Isolation Train B actuation failure.  
                      - RC17A, Loss of Coolant Accident @ 5,000 gpm on 60 second ramp.
- RH01B, Residual Heat Removal Pump (1-02) trip. - RH15, Containment Sump to RHR Pump (1-01) Suction Isolation Valve Breaker 1-8811A trip.
                      - RP09A, Containment Isolation Train A actuation failure.
Indications Available
                      - RP09B, Containment Isolation Train B actuation failure.
: Numerous Reactor Trip and Safety Injection related alarms  
                      - RH01B, Residual Heat Removal Pump (1-02) trip.
  +10 secs RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
                      - RH15, Containment Sump to RHR Pump (1-01) Suction Isolation Valve Breaker 1-8811A trip.
RO RECOGNIZE PRZR pressure decreasing.
Indications Available:
RO/BOP INITIATE a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.
Numerous Reactor Trip and Safety Injection related alarms
US DIRECT performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
  +10 secs         RO       RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:
RO       RECOGNIZE PRZR pressure decreasing.
DETERMINE Reactor trip breakers - OPEN.
RO/BOP     INITIATE a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.
DETERMINE Neutron flux - DECREASING.
US       DIRECT performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
RO DETERMINE all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - ON.
RO       VERIFY Reactor Trip:
BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:
* DETERMINE Reactor trip breakers - OPEN.
DETERMINE all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.
* DETERMINE Neutron flux - DECREASING.
BOP VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses:
RO       DETERMINE all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - ON.
DETERMINE both AC Safeguards Buses - ENERGIZED.
BOP       VERIFY Turbine Trip:
RO DETERMINE both Trains of SI actuated.  
* DETERMINE all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.
BOP       VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses:
* DETERMINE both AC Safeguards Buses - ENERGIZED.
RO       DETERMINE both Trains of SI actuated.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 13 of 22 Event
Appendix D                                         Operator Action                                   Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :         NRC       Scenario #   1       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8     Page   13     of     22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc Examiner Note: EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps performed by BOP are identified later in the scenario.
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time           Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps performed by BOP are identified later in the scenario.
US/BOP INITIATE Proper Safeguards Equipment Operation Per Attachment 2.
US/BOP     INITIATE Proper Safeguards Equipment Operation Per Attachment 2.
RO VERIFY AFW Alignment:
RO       VERIFY AFW Alignment:
DETERMINE both MDAFW Pumps - RUNNING.
* DETERMINE both MDAFW Pumps - RUNNING.
DETERMINE Turbine Driven AFW Pump - RUNNING.
* DETERMINE Turbine Driven AFW Pump - RUNNING.
DETERMINE AFW total flow - GREATER THAN 460 GPM.
* DETERMINE AFW total flow - GREATER THAN 460 GPM.
DETERMINE AFW valve alignment - PROPER ALIGNMENT.
* DETERMINE AFW valve alignment - PROPER ALIGNMENT.
RO VERIFY Containment Spray Not Required:
RO       VERIFY Containment Spray Not Required:
VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 1-8, CS ACT NOT illuminated.
* VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 1-8, CS ACT NOT illuminated.
VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT NOT illuminated.
* VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT NOT illuminated.
VERIFY Containment pressure < 18.0 PSIG.
* VERIFY Containment pressure < 18.0 PSIG.
VERIFY Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Outlet Valves - CLOSED.
* VERIFY Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Outlet Valves - CLOSED.
VERIFY all Containment Spray Pumps - RUNNING.
* VERIFY all Containment Spray Pumps - RUNNING.
Examiner Note: Operators may manually isolate the Main Steam Lines in anticipation of Containment HI-2 pressure (6.2 psig) prior to automatic isolation. If not performed here the isolation will occur later as Containment pressure rises.
Examiner Note: Operators may manually isolate the Main Steam Lines in anticipation of Containment HI-2 pressure (6.2 psig) prior to automatic isolation. If not performed here the isolation will occur later as Containment pressure rises.
RO DETERMINE Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:
RO       DETERMINE Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:
VERIFY Main Steam Isolation complete:
* VERIFY Main Steam Isolation complete:
DETERMINE Main Steam Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
* DETERMINE Main Steam Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
DETERMINE before MSIV Drippot Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
* DETERMINE before MSIV Drippot Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
RO CHECK RCS Temperature -
RO       CHECK RCS Temperature -
DETERMINE RCS AVERAGE TEMPERATURE less than 557&deg;F.
* DETERMINE RCS AVERAGE TEMPERATURE less than 557&deg;F.
RO STOP dumping steam.
RO       STOP dumping steam.
RO REDUCE total AFW flow to minimize the cooldown:
RO       REDUCE total AFW flow to minimize the cooldown:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 14 of 22 Event
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc
 
Appendix D                                         Operator Action                                   Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #     1       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8     Page   14     of     22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc MAINTAIN a minimum of 460 gpm UNTIL narrow range level greater than 50% in at least one SG.
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time         Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior
VERIFY Turbine Driven AFW Pump - STOPPED.
* MAINTAIN a minimum of 460 gpm UNTIL narrow range level greater than 50% in at least one SG.
RO CHECK PRZR Valve Status:
* VERIFY Turbine Driven AFW Pump - STOPPED.
DETERMINE PRZR Safeties - CLOSED.
RO       CHECK PRZR Valve Status:
DETERMINE PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED.
* DETERMINE PRZR Safeties - CLOSED.
DETERMINE PORVs - CLOSED.
* DETERMINE PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED.
DETERMINE power to both PORV Block Valves - AVAILABLE.
* DETERMINE PORVs - CLOSED.
DETERMINE both PORV Block Valves - OPEN.
* DETERMINE power to both PORV Block Valves - AVAILABLE.
US/RO CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:
* DETERMINE both PORV Block Valves - OPEN.
DETERMINE all ECCS Pumps - RUNNING.
US/RO     CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:
DETERMINE RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25&#xba;F (55 &#xba;F adverse).
* DETERMINE all ECCS Pumps - RUNNING.
CRITICAL TASK STATEMENT Manually Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps due to Loss of Subcooling Prior to Exiting EOP-0.0A.
* DETERMINE RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25&#xba;F (55 &#xba;F adverse).
CRITICAL TASK RO DETERMINE RCS subcooling less than 25&#xba;F (55&#xba;F adverse) and STOP all RCPs. RO/BOP CHECK if Any Steam Generator Is Faulted:
CRITICAL TASK           Manually Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps due to Loss of Subcooling Prior to STATEMENT            Exiting EOP-0.0A.
DETERMINE pressure in all Steam Generators - NORMAL.
CRITICAL                   DETERMINE RCS subcooling less than 25&#xba;F (55&#xba;F adverse) and STOP all TASK            RO RCPs.
RO/BOP CHECK if any Steam Generator is Ruptured:
RO/BOP     CHECK if Any Steam Generator Is Faulted:
DETERMINE radiation levels in all Steam Generators - NORMAL.
* DETERMINE pressure in all Steam Generators - NORMAL.
RO/BOP CHECK if RCS is intact:
RO/BOP     CHECK if any Steam Generator is Ruptured:
DETERMINE Containment pressure, radiation level and sump levels increasing.  
* DETERMINE radiation levels in all Steam Generators - NORMAL.
  +10 min US TRANSITION to EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Step 1.  
RO/BOP     CHECK if RCS is intact:
* DETERMINE Containment pressure, radiation level and sump levels increasing.
  +10 min         US       TRANSITION to EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Step 1.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 15 of 22 Event
Appendix D                                         Operator Action                                   Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #     1       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8     Page   15     of     22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc Examiner Note: These steps are performed by the BOP as required per EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2. EOP-1.0A steps are identified later in the scenario.
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time         Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: These steps are performed by the BOP as required per EOP-0.0A, Attachment
BOP VERIFY SSW Alignment:
: 2. EOP-1.0A steps are identified later in the scenario.
DETERMINE both SSW Pumps - RUNNING.
BOP       VERIFY SSW Alignment:
VERIFY Train B Diesel Generator Cooler SSW return flow.
* DETERMINE both SSW Pumps - RUNNING.
BOP VERIFY Safety Injection Pumps - RUNNING.
* VERIFY Train B Diesel Generator Cooler SSW return flow.
DETERMINE both Safety Injection Pumps - RUNNING.
BOP       VERIFY Safety Injection Pumps - RUNNING.
CRITICAL TASK STATEMENT Manually Initiate Containment Isolation Phase A due to Failure to Automatically Actuate Prior to Exiting EOP-0.0A.
* DETERMINE both Safety Injection Pumps - RUNNING.
CRITICAL TASK BOP Manually INITIATE both Trains of Containment Isolation Phase A.
CRITICAL TASK           Manually Initiate Containment Isolation Phase A due to Failure to STATEMENT            Automatically Actuate Prior to Exiting EOP-0.0A.
PLACE 1/1-CIPAA1 CNTMT ISOL - PHASE A CONT VENT ISOL Switch in ACT position.
CRITICAL TASK BOP       Manually INITIATE both Trains of Containment Isolation Phase A.
BOP VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A.
* PLACE 1/1-CIPAA1 CNTMT ISOL - PHASE A CONT VENT ISOL Switch in ACT position.
BOP VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation.
BOP       VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A.
BOP VERIFY both CCW Pumps - RUNNING.
BOP       VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation.
DETERMINE both CCW Pumps - RUNNING.
BOP       VERIFY both CCW Pumps - RUNNING.
BOP VERIFY both RHR Pumps - RUNNING.
* DETERMINE both CCW Pumps - RUNNING.
DETERMINE Train A RHR Pump - RUNNING.
BOP       VERIFY both RHR Pumps - RUNNING.
DETERMINE Train B RHR Pump - TRIPPED.
* DETERMINE Train A RHR Pump - RUNNING.
BOP VERIFY Proper CVCS Alignment:
* DETERMINE Train B RHR Pump - TRIPPED.
DETERMINE both CCPs - RUNNING.
BOP       VERIFY Proper CVCS Alignment:
VERIFY Letdown Relief Valve isolation:
* DETERMINE both CCPs - RUNNING.
DETERMINE Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
* VERIFY Letdown Relief Valve isolation:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 16 of 22 Event
* DETERMINE Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc
 
Appendix D                                         Operator Action                                   Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC         Scenario #   1       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8     Page   16     of   22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc DETERMINE Letdown Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time         Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior
BOP VERIFY ECCS flow:
* DETERMINE Letdown Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
VERIFY CCP SI flow indicated.
BOP       VERIFY ECCS flow:
VERIFY RCS pressure < 1800 PSIG.
* VERIFY CCP SI flow indicated.
VERIFY SIP discharge flow indicators.
* VERIFY RCS pressure < 1800 PSIG.
DETERMINE RCS pressure < 425 PSIG.
* VERIFY SIP discharge flow indicators.
RHR to Cold Leg Injection Flow Indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW DETERMINE Train A RHR flow - INDICATED.
* DETERMINE RCS pressure < 425 PSIG.
BOP VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Complete:
* RHR to Cold Leg Injection Flow Indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW
VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
* DETERMINE Train A RHR flow - INDICATED.
VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Bypass Valves - CLOSED.
BOP       VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Complete:
VERIFY Feedwater Bypass Control Valves - CLOSED.
* VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
VERIFY Feedwater Control Valves - CLOSED.
* VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Bypass Valves - CLOSED.
BOP VERIFY Train B Diesel Generator - RUNNING.
* VERIFY Feedwater Bypass Control Valves - CLOSED.
BOP VERIFY Monitor Lights For SI Load Shedding illuminated.
* VERIFY Feedwater Control Valves - CLOSED.
BOP VERIFY Proper SI alignment per MLB light indication.
BOP       VERIFY Train B Diesel Generator - RUNNING.
BOP VERIFY Components Properly Aligned per Table 1.
BOP       VERIFY Monitor Lights For SI Load Shedding illuminated.
Location Equipment Description Condition CB-03 X-HS-5534 H2 PRG SPLY FN 4 STOPPED CB-03 X-HS-5532 H2 PRG SPLY FN 3 STOPPED CB-04 1/1-8716A RHRP 1 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-04 1/1-8716B RHRP 2 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-06 1/1-8153 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-06 1/1-8154 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-07 1/1-RTBAL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-RTBBL RX TRIP BKR OPEN Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 17 of 22 Event
BOP       VERIFY Proper SI alignment per MLB light indication.
BOP       VERIFY Components Properly Aligned per Table 1.
Location   Equipment           Description                         Condition CB-03     X-HS-5534       H2 PRG SPLY FN 4                         STOPPED CB-03     X-HS-5532       H2 PRG SPLY FN 3                         STOPPED CB-04     1/1-8716A       RHRP 1 XTIE VLV                           OPEN CB-04     1/1-8716B       RHRP 2 XTIE VLV                           OPEN CB-06       1/1-8153       XS LTDN ISOL VLV                         CLOSED CB-06       1/1-8154       XS LTDN ISOL VLV                         CLOSED CB-07     1/1-RTBAL           RX TRIP BKR                           OPEN CB-07     1/1-RTBBL           RX TRIP BKR                           OPEN CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc
 
Appendix D                                         Operator Action                                   Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #     1       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8     Page   17   of     22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc CB-07 1/1-BBAL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-07 1/1-BBBL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-08 1-HS-2397A SG 1 BLDN HELB ISOL VLVCLOSED  CB-08 1-HS-2398A SG 2 BLDN HELB ISOL VLVCLOSED  CB-08 1-HS-2399A SG 3 BLDN HELB ISOL VLVCLOSED  CB-08 1-HS-2400A SG 4 BLDN HELB ISOL VLVCLOSED  CB-08 1-HS-2111C FWPT A TRIP TRIPPED CB-08 1-HS-2112C FWPT B TRIP TRIPPED CB-09 1-HS-2490 CNDS XFER PUMP STOPPED (MCC deenergized on SI) CV-01 X-HS-6181 PRI PLT SPLY FN 17 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6188 PRI PLT SPLY FN 18 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6195 PRI PLT SPLY FN 19 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6202 PRI PLT SPLY FN 20 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6209 PRI PLT SPLY FN 21 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6216 PRI PLT SPLY FN 22 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6223 PRI PLT SPLY FN 23 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6230 PRI PLT SPLY FN 24 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-3631 UPS & DISTR RM A
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time         Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior CB-07   1/1-BBAL         RX TRIP BYP BKR                   OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-07   1/1-BBBL         RX TRIP BYP BKR                   OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-08 1-HS-2397A     SG 1 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV                      CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2398A     SG 2 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV                      CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2399A     SG 3 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV                      CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2400A     SG 4 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV                      CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2111C             FWPT A TRIP                         TRIPPED CB-08 1-HS-2112C             FWPT B TRIP                         TRIPPED CB-09   1-HS-2490         CNDS XFER PUMP                 STOPPED (MCC deenergized on SI)
/C FN 1 & BSTR FN 42 STARTED  CV-01 X-HS-3632 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 2 &
CV-01   X-HS-6181     PRI PLT SPLY FN 17 & INTK             STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01   X-HS-6188     PRI PLT SPLY FN 18 & INTK             STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01   X-HS-6195     PRI PLT SPLY FN 19 & INTK             STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01   X-HS-6202     PRI PLT SPLY FN 20 & INTK             STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01   X-HS-6209     PRI PLT SPLY FN 21 & INTK             STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01   X-HS-6216     PRI PLT SPLY FN 22 & INTK             STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01   X-HS-6223     PRI PLT SPLY FN 23 & INTK             STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01   X-HS-6230     PRI PLT SPLY FN 24 & INTK             STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01   X-HS-3631     UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 1 &                     STARTED BSTR FN 42 CV-01   X-HS-3632     UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 2 &                     STARTED BSTR FN 43 CV-01   1-HS-5600       ELEC AREA EXH FN 1                 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01   1-HS-5601       ELEC AREA EXH FN 2                 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01   1-HS-5602       MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 3 & EXH DMPR CV-01   1-HS-5603       MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 4 & EXH DMPR CV-01   1-HS-5618     MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 17 CV-01   1-HS-5620     MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 18 CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc
BSTR FN 43 STARTED  CV-01 1-HS-5600 ELEC AREA EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5601 ELEC AREA EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5602 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH FN 3 & EXH DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5603 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH FN 4 & EXH DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5618 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY FN 17 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5620 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY FN 18 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 18 of 22 Event
 
Appendix D                                         Operator Action                                   Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #     1       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8     Page   18     of     22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc CV-03 X-HS-5855 CR EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5856 CR EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5731 SFP EXH FN 33 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5733 SFP EXH FN 34 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5727 SFP EXH FN 35 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5729 SFP EXH FN 36 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED Examiner Note: The next four (4) steps would be performed on Unit 2.
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time         Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior CV-03   X-HS-5855             CR EXH FN 1                 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03   X-HS-5856             CR EXH FN 2                 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03   X-HS-5731           SFP EXH FN 33                 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03   X-HS-5733           SFP EXH FN 34                 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03   X-HS-5727           SFP EXH FN 35                 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03   X-HS-5729           SFP EXH FN 36                 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED Examiner Note: The next four (4) steps would be performed on Unit 2.
CB-03 2-HS-5538 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5539 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5537 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPRCLOSED  CB-03 2-HS-5536 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPRCLOSED  BOP NOTIFY Unit Supervisor Attachment instructions complete and to IMPLEMENT FRGs as required.
CB-03   2-HS-5538       AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR                       CLOSED CB-03   2-HS-5539       AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR                       CLOSED CB-03   2-HS-5537     AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR                      CLOSED CB-03   2-HS-5536     AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR                      CLOSED BOP       NOTIFY Unit Supervisor Attachment instructions complete and to IMPLEMENT FRGs as required.
Examiner Note: EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, steps begin here. Steps for FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure, are identified later in the scenario.
Examiner Note: EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, steps begin here. Steps for FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure, are identified later in the scenario.
US CHECK if RCPs Should Be Stopped:
US       CHECK if RCPs Should Be Stopped:
DETERMINE all RCPs STOPPED.
* DETERMINE all RCPs STOPPED.
US CHECK if Any Steam Generator Is Faulted:
US       CHECK if Any Steam Generator Is Faulted:
DETERMINE pressure in all Steam Generators - NORMAL.
* DETERMINE pressure in all Steam Generators - NORMAL.
US CHECK Intact Steam Generator Levels:
US       CHECK Intact Steam Generator Levels:
DETERMINE Narrow range levels - GREATER THAN 50%.
* DETERMINE Narrow range levels - GREATER THAN 50%.
CONTROL AFW flow to maintain NR level between 50% and 60%.
* CONTROL AFW flow to maintain NR level between 50% and 60%.
US CHECK Secondary Radiation NORMAL:
US       CHECK Secondary Radiation NORMAL:
DETERMINE no Steam Generator tubes ruptured.  
* DETERMINE no Steam Generator tubes ruptured.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 19 of 22 Event
Appendix D                                         Operator Action                                   Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #     1       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8     Page   19     of     22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc US CHECK PRZR PORVs and Block Valves:
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time         Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior US       CHECK PRZR PORVs and Block Valves:
DETERMINE power to both PORV Block Valves - AVAILABLE.
* DETERMINE power to both PORV Block Valves - AVAILABLE.
DETERMINE PORVs - CLOSED.
* DETERMINE PORVs - CLOSED.
DETERMINE both PORV Block Valves - OPEN.
* DETERMINE both PORV Block Valves - OPEN.
US/RO DETERMINE ECCS Flow Should NOT Be Reduced:
US/RO     DETERMINE ECCS Flow Should NOT Be Reduced:
VERIFY Secondary heat sink:
* VERIFY Secondary heat sink:
DETERMINE total AFW flow to intact SGs > 460 GPM.
* DETERMINE total AFW flow to intact SGs > 460 GPM.
DETERMINE Narrow range level in all SGs > 50%.
* DETERMINE Narrow range level in all SGs > 50%.
DETERMINE RCS subcooling < 25&#xba;F (55&#xba;F adverse).
* DETERMINE RCS subcooling < 25&#xba;F (55&#xba;F adverse).
RO/BOP RESET ESF Actuation Signals.
RO/BOP     RESET ESF Actuation Signals.
RO/BOP PLACE Train B Diesel Generator EMERG STOP/START Handswitch in START. RO/BOP RESET SI. RO/BOP RESET SI Sequencers.
RO/BOP     PLACE Train B Diesel Generator EMERG STOP/START Handswitch in START.
RO/BOP RESET Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B.
RO/BOP     RESET SI.
RO/BOP RESET Containment Spray Signal.
RO/BOP     RESET SI Sequencers.
US CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped.
RO/BOP     RESET Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B.
DETERMINE RCS pressure > 325 PSIG (425 PSIG adverse).
RO/BOP     RESET Containment Spray Signal.
STOP RHR Pump 1-01and PLACE in standby.
US       CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped.
RESET RHR Auto Switchover.
* DETERMINE RCS pressure > 325 PSIG (425 PSIG adverse).
US CHECK RCS and SG Pressures.
* STOP RHR Pump 1-01and PLACE in standby.
DETERMINE RCS pressure STABLE or DECREASING, AND Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 20 of 22 Event
* RESET RHR Auto Switchover.
US       CHECK RCS and SG Pressures.
* DETERMINE RCS pressure STABLE or DECREASING, AND CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc
 
Appendix D                                         Operator Action                                   Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #     1       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8     Page   20     of     22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc DETERMINE all SG pressures are STABLE or INCREASING.
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time         Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior
RO/BOP DETERMINE AC Safeguards Buses ENERGIZED by Offsite Power.
* DETERMINE all SG pressures are STABLE or INCREASING.
PLACE Train B DG EMERG STOP/START Handswitch in STOP.
RO/BOP       DETERMINE AC Safeguards Buses ENERGIZED by Offsite Power.
Booth Operator: When contacted, WAIT five minutes then REPORT Train B RHR Pump has Phase B 50/51 overcurrent relay flags dropped and the motor has an acrid odor. Booth Operator: If contacted to investigate breaker status for 1/1-8811A, WAIT three minutes and REPORT breaker is tripped free and will not reset. If dispatched to locally open 1/1-8811A, REPORT that RP will not allow entry into area due to high  
* PLACE Train B DG EMERG STOP/START Handswitch in STOP.
Booth Operator: When contacted, WAIT five minutes then REPORT Train B RHR Pump has Phase B 50/51 overcurrent relay flags dropped and the motor has an acrid odor.
Booth Operator: If contacted to investigate breaker status for 1/1-8811A, WAIT three minutes and REPORT breaker is tripped free and will not reset. If dispatched to locally open 1/1-8811A, REPORT that RP will not allow entry into area due to high radiation levels.
US        INITIATE Evaluation of Plant Status:
* DETERMINE Cold Leg Recirculation Capability - NOT AVAILABLE.
* DETERMINE 1-8811A, Containment Sump to Train A RHR Pump Suction Isolation Valve will NOT open.
* DETERMINE Train B RHR Pump - TRIPPED.
+20 min          US        TRANSITION to ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, Step 1.
Examiner Note: ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, steps begin here.
US        CHECK If Emergency Coolant Recirculation Equipment - AVAILABLE PER ATTACHMENT 2.
* ATTEMPT to restore at least one train.
US        VERIFY Train B EDG - STOPPED.
RO/BOP      VERIFY SI reset.
RO/BOP      VERIFY SI Sequencers reset.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


radiation levels.
Appendix D                                         Operator Action                                   Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #     1       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8     Page   21     of     22 Event
US INITIATE Evaluation of Plant Status:
DETERMINE Cold Leg Recirculation Capability - NOT AVAILABLE.
DETERMINE 1-8811A, Containment Sump to Train A RHR Pump Suction Isolation Valve will NOT open.
DETERMINE Train B RHR Pump - TRIPPED.
+20 min US TRANSITION to ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, Step 1. Examiner Note: ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, steps begin here.
US CHECK If Emergency Coolant Recirculation Equipment - AVAILABLE PER ATTACHMENT 2.
ATTEMPT to restore at least one train.
US VERIFY Train B EDG - STOPPED.
RO/BOP VERIFY SI reset.
RO/BOP VERIFY SI Sequencers reset.
 
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 21 of 22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc RO/BOP VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B reset.
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time         Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/BOP     VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B reset.
RO/BOP VERIFY Containment Spray Signal reset.
RO/BOP     VERIFY Containment Spray Signal reset.
RO/BOP RESET RHR Auto Switchover.
RO/BOP     RESET RHR Auto Switchover.
US NOTIFY Plant Staff to DETERMINE if Containment Fan Coolers should be started. US CHECK RWST Level - GREATER THAN RWST EMPTY.
US       NOTIFY Plant Staff to DETERMINE if Containment Fan Coolers should be started.
US/RO DETERMINE Containment Spray Requirements:
US       CHECK RWST Level - GREATER THAN RWST EMPTY.
DETERMINE Containment Spray Pump suction - ALIGNED TO RWST.
US/RO     DETERMINE Containment Spray Requirements:
DETERMINE Containment pressure - less than 18 PSIG AND LOWERING.
* DETERMINE Containment Spray Pump suction - ALIGNED TO RWST.
DETERMINE zero (0) Containment Spray Pumps REQUIRED from Table 1. CRITICAL TASK STATEMENT Determine Cold Leg Recirculation Capability Does NOT Exist and Maintain Core Cooling Prior to Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Reaching 0%.
* DETERMINE Containment pressure - less than 18 PSIG AND LOWERING.
CRITICAL TASK BOP STOP all Containment Spray Pumps.
* DETERMINE zero (0) Containment Spray Pumps REQUIRED from Table 1.
CRITICAL TASK           Determine Cold Leg Recirculation Capability Does NOT Exist and Maintain STATEMENT            Core Cooling Prior to Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Reaching 0%.
CRITICAL TASK BOP       STOP all Containment Spray Pumps.
Examiner Note: FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure, steps begin here.
Examiner Note: FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure, steps begin here.
US ENTER FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure, due to an ORANGE Path.
ENTER FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure, due to an US ORANGE Path.
US DETERMINE Containment Pressure NOT GREATER THAN 50 PSIG and alignment was NOT verified in EOP-0.0A.
DETERMINE Containment Pressure NOT GREATER THAN 50 PSIG and US alignment was NOT verified in EOP-0.0A.
RO/BOP VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A - APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT INDICATION.  
VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A - APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT RO/BOP INDICATION.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 22 of 22 Event
Appendix D                                         Operator Action                                   Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #     1       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8     Page   22     of     22 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc RO/BOP VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation - APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT INDICATION.
Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time         Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation - APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT RO/BOP INDICATION.
RO/BOP CHECK If Containment Spray Is Required:
RO/BOP     CHECK If Containment Spray Is Required:
DETERMINE Containment pressure was >18.0 PSIG.
* DETERMINE Containment pressure was >18.0 PSIG.
DETERMINE Containment Spray AND Phase B Actuation - INITIATED.
* DETERMINE Containment Spray AND Phase B Actuation - INITIATED.
DETERMINE all RCPs - STOPPED.
* DETERMINE all RCPs - STOPPED.
DETERMINE ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, is in effect. OPERATE Containment Spray per ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.
* DETERMINE ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, is in effect.
RO/BOP VERIFY Main Steam Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
* OPERATE Containment Spray per ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.
US DETERMINE Feed Flow Should NOT Be Isolated To Any SG.  
RO/BOP     VERIFY Main Steam Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
  +30 min US RETURN To Procedure And Step In Effect.
US       DETERMINE Feed Flow Should NOT Be Isolated To Any SG.
When Containment Spray flow is secured or the actions of FRZ are complete, TERMINATE the scenario.  
  +30 min           US       RETURN To Procedure And Step In Effect.
When Containment Spray flow is secured or the actions of FRZ are complete, TERMINATE the scenario.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc


Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc Facility:
Appendix D                                     Scenario Outline                                     Form ES-D-1 Facility:         CPNPP 1 & 2                   Scenario No.:         2     Op Test No.:     July 2010 NRC Examiners:                                                 Operators:
CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.:
Initial Conditions:
2 Op Test No.: July 2010 NRC Examiners:
* 72% power MOL - RCS Boron is 916 ppm by Chemistry sample.
Operators:
* Train A Emergency Diesel Generator is OOS for governor repair.
Initial Conditions: 72% power MOL - RCS Boron is 916 ppm by Chemistry sample. Train A Emergency Diesel Generator is OOS for governor repair. Turnover: Maintaining 72% power per Load Controller direction. Rod Control in AUTO.
Turnover:             Maintaining 72% power per Load Controller direction. Rod Control in AUTO.
Critical Tasks: Emergency Borate Required for Two Stuck Control Rods.
Critical Tasks:
Perform Actions to Identify and Isolate Faulted Steam Generator.
* Emergency Borate Required for Two Stuck Control Rods.
Perform Actions to Initiate Feed Isolation to Faulted Steam Generator.
* Perform Actions to Identify and Isolate Faulted Steam Generator.
Event No.
* Perform Actions to Initiate Feed Isolation to Faulted Steam Generator.
Malf. No.
Event No.     Malf. No.     Event Type*                                   Event Description 1       RX09A       I (RO, BOP, SRO)       Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) Fails Low.
Event Type* Event Description 1 +10 min RX09A I (RO, BOP, SRO)TS (SRO) Main Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) Fails Low.
+10 min                 TS (SRO) 2      CC02A       C (BOP, SRO)           Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (1-01) Trip.
2 +20 min CC02A CC03A C (BOP, SRO)
+20 min      CC03A      TS (SRO)              Train B Component Cooling Water Pump (1-02) Auto Start Failure.
TS (SRO) Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (1-01) Trip.
3       RX08A       I (RO, SRO)           Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-455) Fails Low.
Train B Component Cooling Water Pump (1-02) Auto Start Failure.
+30 min                 TS (SRO) 4      RX04A       I (BOP, SRO)           Steam Generator (1-01) Level Channel (LT-551) Fails High.
3 +30 min RX08A I (RO, SRO)
+40 min                 TS (SRO) 5      MS03A       M (RO, BOP, SRO) Steam Generator (1-01) Steam Line Break Outside Containment
TS (SRO) Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-455) Fails Low.
+45 min                                        Before Main Steam Isolation Valve (300 second ramp).
4 +40 min RX04A I (BOP, SRO) TS (SRO) Steam Generator (1-01) Level Channel (LT-551) Fails High.
6       RD04K6     C (RO)                 Two Control Rods Fail to Insert Upon Reactor Trip.
5 +45 min MS03A M (RO, BOP, SRO)Steam Generator (1-01) Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before Main Steam Isolation Valve (300 second ramp).
+45 min      RD04K8                            Emergency Boration Required.
6 +45 min RD04K6 RD04K8 C (RO)
7       SI04D       C (BOP)               Safety Injection Pump (1-02) Fails to Start.
Two Control Rods Fail to Insert Upon Reactor Trip.
+55 min 8      FW38       C (BOP)               Feed Line Isolation Valves (HV-2134 to HV-2137) Fail to Close.
Emergency Boration Required.
+55 min      A/B/C/D
7 +55 min SI04D C (BOP) Safety Injection Pump (1-02) Fails to Start.
    *   (N)ormal,   (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,     (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc
8 +55 min FW38 A/B/C/D C (BOP) Feed Line Isolation Valves (HV-2134 to HV-2137) Fail to Close. * (N)ormal,   (R)eactivity,   (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,   (M)ajor,   (TS)Technical Specifications  


Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc SCENARIO  
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 SCENARIO  


==SUMMARY==
==SUMMARY==
NRC #2 The crew will assume the watch at 72% power with no scheduled activities per IPO-003A, Power Operations. The Grid Controller has requested that power remain at this level due to transmission line overload until further notice. Train A Emergency Diesel Generator is out of service for governor repair.
NRC #2 The crew will assume the watch at 72% power with no scheduled activities per IPO-003A, Power Operations. The Grid Controller has requested that power remain at this level due to transmission line overload until further notice. Train A Emergency Diesel Generator is out of service for governor repair.
The first event is a Main Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure Transmitter failure. The crew responds per ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 4.0. Several actions are required on the part of the RO and BOP to stabilize plant conditions. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
The first event is a Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter failure. The crew responds per ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 4.0. Several actions are required on the part of the RO and BOP to stabilize plant conditions. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
When plant conditions are stable, the Train A Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump will trip and the Train B CCW Pump will fail to automatically start. The crew will respond per ABN-502, Component Cooling Water System Malfunctions, Section 2.0, and manually start Train B CCW Pump and perform equipment adjustments as required by procedure. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
When plant conditions are stable, the Train A Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump will trip and the Train B CCW Pump will fail to automatically start. The crew will respond per ABN-502, Component Cooling Water System Malfunctions, Section 2.0, and manually start Train B CCW Pump and perform equipment adjustments as required by procedure. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
When ABN-502 actions are complete, a Pressurizer Pressure Channel will fail low. Response is per ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction, Section 2.0, to ensure Pressurizer Heaters are controlled and Power Operated Relief Valves remain closed. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.  
When ABN-502 actions are complete, a Pressurizer Pressure Channel will fail low. Response is per ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction, Section 2.0, to ensure Pressurizer Heaters are controlled and Power Operated Relief Valves remain closed. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
Once systems are stable, a Steam Generator Level Transmitter fails high. ABN-710, Steam Generator Level Instrumentation Malfunction is referenced and the BOP takes Manual control of the Feedwater Control Valve to prevent a Unit trip on low Steam Generator level. Once identified, an Alternate Channel is selected and Automatic control restored. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
When Technical Specifications have been addressed, a Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment before the Main Steam Isolation Valve will ramp in over five minutes on Steam Generator 1-01. With lowering Pressurizer pressure and Reactor Coolant System temperature, the Unit Supervisor will direct a Reactor and Turbine Trip.
The crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to EOP-2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, at Step 12. While performing the actions of EOP-0.0A, the RO will be required to manually initiate an Emergency Boration due to two stuck Control Rods and the BOP will start a Safety Injection Pump and manually close the Feed Line Isolation Valves while in Attachment 2.
Once the faulted Steam Generator is isolated, the Unit Supervisor will transition to EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination. The scenario is terminated after EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, is entered and the actions to secure Safety Injection flow are performed.
Risk Significance:
* Risk important components out of service:      Train A Emergency Diesel Generator
* Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Train A Component Cooling Water System
* Risk significant core damage sequence:          Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment
* Risk significant operator actions:              Emergency Borate Due to Two Stuck Rods Isolate Faulted Steam Generator Isolate Feedwater to Faulted SG CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


Once systems are stable, a Steam Generator Level Transmitter fails high. ABN-710, Steam Generator Level Instrumentation Malfunction is referenced and the BOP takes Manual control of the Feedwater Control Valve to prevent a Unit trip on low Steam Generator level. Once identified, an Alternate Channel is selected and Automatic control restored. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.  
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 BOOTH OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC #50 and Event File for NRC Scenario #2. Rods in AUTO.
EVENT TYPE MALF #                        DESCRIPTION                    DEMAND      INITIATING VALUE    PARAMETER SETUP            -      Train A EDG OOS                                  PULLOUT          -
RD04K6      Control Rod fails to insert                      12 Steps        K0 RD04K8      Control Rod fails to insert                      228 Steps        K0 COND      Feed Line Isolation Valves close with handswitch  CLOSE          K0 DIFWHS 2134.Value=0          DMF FW 38A DIFWHS 2135.Value=0          DMF FW 38B DIFWHS 2136.Value=0          DMF FW 38C DIFWHS 2137.Value=0          DMF FW 38D SI04D      Safety Injection Pump 1-02 auto start failure        -          K0 1          RX09A      Turbine 1st Stage PT-505 failure                    0%          K1 2          CC02A      Train A CCW Pump 1-01 trip                          TRIP          K2 2          CC03A      Train B CCW Pump 1-02 auto start failure          START          K2 FAILURE 3          RX08A      Pressurizer Pressure Channel PT-455 failure      1700 psig        K3 4          RX04A      SG 1-01 Level Transmitter LT-551 fails high         100%          K4 5          MS03A      Steam Generator 1-01 Main Steam Line Break          9.5 ft2      K5 Outside Containment before MSIV                            (300 sec ramp) 6        RD04K6      Control Rod fails to insert                      12 Steps        K0 6        RD04K8      Control Rod fails to insert                      228 Steps        K0 7          SI04D      Safety Injection Pump 1-02 auto start failure        -          K0 8          FW38      Feed Line Isolation Valves fail to close          OPEN          K0 A/B/C/D CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


When Technical Specifications have been addressed, a Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment before the Main Steam Isolation Valve will ramp in over five minutes on Steam Generator 1-01. With lowering Pressurizer pressure and Reactor Coolant System temperature, the Unit Supervisor will direct a Reactor and Turbine Trip.  
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 Booth Operator: INITIALIZE to IC #50 and NRC Scenario #2 SETUP file.
 
ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.
The crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to EOP-2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, at Step 12. While performing the actions of EOP-0.0A, the RO will be required to manually initiate an Emergency Boration due to two stuck Control Rods and the BOP will start a Safety Injection Pump and manually close the Feed Line Isolation Valves while in Attachment 2.  
ENSURE Control Board Tags are hung:
                - Red tag Train A Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01& Breaker DG1 BKR 1EG1.
ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions.
ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.
ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.
ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.
ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:
                - COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load.
ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO at 179 steps.
Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:
PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX  10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 10B-1.8 - DG 1 DISABLED CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


Once the faulted Steam Generator is isolated, the Unit Supervisor will transition to EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination. The scenario is terminated after EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, is entered and the actions to secure Safety Injection flow are performed.
Appendix D                                           Operator Action                             Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #       2       Event #             1       Page 5   of 23 Event
Risk Significance
:  Risk important components out of service: Train A Emergency Diesel Generator Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Train A Component Cooling Water System Risk significant core damage sequence: Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Risk significant operator actions: Emergency Borate Due to Two Stuck Rods Isolate Faulted Steam Generator Isolate Feedwater to Faulted SG Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc BOOTH OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC #50 and Event File for NRC Scenario #2. Rods in AUTO.
EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND VALUE INITIATING PARAMETER SETUP  - Train A EDG OOS PULLOUT -  RD04K6 Control Rod fails to insert 12 Steps K0  RD04K8 Control Rod fails to insert 228 Steps K0  COND Feed Line Isolation Valves close with handswitchDIFWHS 2134.Value=0  DMF FW 38A DIFWHS 2135.Value=0  DMF FW 38B DIFWHS 2136.Value=0  DMF FW 38C DIFWHS 2137.Value=0  DMF FW 38D CLOSE K0  SI04D Safety Injection Pump 1-02 auto start failure
- K0  1  RX09A Turbine 1 st Stage PT-505 failure 0% K1  2  CC02A Train A CCW Pump 1-01 trip TRIP K2 2  CC03A Train B CCW Pump 1-02 auto start failure START FAILURE K2  3  RX08A Pressurizer Pressure Channel PT-455 failure 1700 psig K3  4  RX04A SG 1-01 Level Transmitter LT-551 fails high 100% K4  5  MS03A Steam Generator 1-01 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment before MSIV 9.5 ft 2 K5 (300 sec ramp) 6  RD04K6 Control Rod fails to insert 12 Steps K0 6  RD04K8 Control Rod fails to insert 228 Steps K0  7  SI04D Safety Injection Pump 1-02 auto start failure
- K0  8  FW38 A/B/C/D Feed Line Isolation Valves fail to close OPEN K0 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc Booth Operator: INITIALIZE to IC #50 and NRC Scenario #2 SETUP file. ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.
ENSURE Control Board Tags are hung:
- Red tag Train A Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01& Breaker DG1 BKR 1EG1.
ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions. ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed. ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.
ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.
 
ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:
-  COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at  Constant Turbine Load. ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO at 179 steps.
Control Room Annunciators in Alarm
: PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX  10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK  PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 10B-1.8 - DG 1 DISABLED
 
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 5 of 23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Main Turbine Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1. - RX09A, Main Turbine Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) fails low.
Main Turbine Pressure Transmitter Failure Time         Position                                 Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1.
Indications Available
                      - RX09A, Main Turbine Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) fails low.
: 6D-1.10 - AVE TAVE T REF DEV PCIP-2.4 - LO TURB PWR ROD WITHDRW BLK C-5 1-PI-505 - Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I indication fails low 1-TI-412A - Ave TAVE T REF Deviation indication to maximum  
Indications Available:
+30 secs RO/BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
6D-1.10 - AVE TAVE TREF DEV PCIP-2.4 - LO TURB PWR ROD WITHDRW BLK C-5 1-PI-505 - Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I indication fails low 1-TI-412A - Ave TAVE TREF Deviation indication to maximum
RO/BOP RECOGNIZE Control Rods INSERTING due to Turbine Impulse Pressure Instrument failure.
+30 secs       RO/BOP     RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RO/BOP REPORT PT-505, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I has failed low.
RECOGNIZE Control Rods INSERTING due to Turbine Impulse Pressure RO/BOP Instrument failure.
US DIRECT implementation of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header  
RO/BOP     REPORT PT-505, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I has failed low.
 
DIRECT implementation of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header US      Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 4.0.
Pressure, Turbine 1 st-Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 4.0.
DETERMINE Control Rods INSERTING in AUTO and PLACE 1/1-RBSS RO Control Rod Bank Select Switch in MANUAL.
RO DETERMINE Control Rods INSERTING in AUTO and PLACE 1/1-RBSS Control Rod Bank Select Switch in MANUAL.
BOP       DETERMINE Steam Dumps - CLOSED with 100% DEMAND.
BOP DETERMINE Steam Dumps - CLOSED with 100% DEMAND.
* OBSERVE 1-UI-500, STM DMP DEMAND indicates 100% DEMAND.
OBSERVE 1-UI-500, STM DMP DEMAND indicates 100% DEMAND.
BOP       PLACE at least one (1) Steam Dump Interlock Switch in OFF.
BOP PLACE at least one (1) Steam Dump Interlock Switch in OFF.
Examiner Note: The following five (5) steps are from ABN-709, Attachment 7, Transferring Steam Dumps and are performed using the Job Aid.
Examiner Note: The following five (5) steps are from ABN-709, Attachment 7, Transferring Steam Dumps and are performed using the Job Aid.
BOP ENSURE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL is in MANUAL.
BOP       ENSURE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL is in MANUAL.
BOP MATCH 1-PK-507, STM DUMP PRESS CTRL demand to current Steam Dump Valve position.  
MATCH 1-PK-507, STM DUMP PRESS CTRL demand to current Steam BOP Dump Valve position.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 6 of 23 Event
Appendix D                                           Operator Action                             Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #       2       Event #             1       Page 6   of   23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Main Turbine Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc BOP VERIFY window PCIP-1.4, CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 is ON.
Main Turbine Pressure Transmitter Failure Time         Position                                 Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP       VERIFY window PCIP-1.4, CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 is ON.
BOP PLACE 43/1-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT in STM PRESS.
BOP       PLACE 43/1-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT in STM PRESS.
BOP ENSURE both STM DMP INTLK SELECT switches are ON.
BOP       ENSURE both STM DMP INTLK SELECT switches are ON.
US DIRECT transfer of 1-PS-505Z, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel Select to PT-506. RO PLACE PT-506, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel II in service.
DIRECT transfer of 1-PS-505Z, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel Select to US PT-506.
RO       PLACE PT-506, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel II in service.
Examiner Note: Crew should hold reactivity brief to establish plan for restoring rods to pre-event position (179 steps on Control Bank D).
Examiner Note: Crew should hold reactivity brief to establish plan for restoring rods to pre-event position (179 steps on Control Bank D).
RO ENSURE TAVE within 1&#xba;F of T REF then PLACE 1/1-RBSS Control Rod Bank Select Switch in AUTO.
ENSURE TAVE within 1&#xba;F of TREF then PLACE 1/1-RBSS Control Rod Bank RO Select Switch in AUTO.
Examiner Note: Performing the next step meets the REQUIRED ACTION for Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1. A Procedure Enhancement will be submitted for ABN-709 specifically identifying Technical Specifications should be referenced to ensure compliance with the LCO.
Examiner Note: Performing the next step meets the REQUIRED ACTION for Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1. A Procedure Enhancement will be submitted for ABN-709 specifically identifying Technical Specifications should be referenced to ensure compliance with the LCO.
US Within 1 hour, VERIFY PCIP Window 4.6, TURB  10% PWR P-13, in proper state for existing plant conditions (DARK).
Within 1 hour, VERIFY PCIP Window 4.6, TURB  10% PWR P-13, in proper US state for existing plant conditions (DARK).
US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.
US       EVALUATE Technical Specifications.
LCO 3.3.1.T, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
* LCO 3.3.1.T, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
CONDITION T - One or more required channels inoperable. ACTION T.1 - Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within one (1) hour.  
* CONDITION T - One or more required channels inoperable.
* ACTION T.1 - Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within one (1) hour.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 7 of 23 Event
Appendix D                                           Operator Action                             Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #       2       Event #             1       Page 7   of 23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Main Turbine Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc US VERIFY PCIP Window 1.3, AMSAC BLK TURB < 40% PWR C-20 (LIT).
Main Turbine Pressure Transmitter Failure Time         Position                                 Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY PCIP Window 1.3, AMSAC BLK TURB < 40% PWR US C-20 (LIT).
If AMSAC actuation blocked and Turbine power >40%, ENSURE Automatic Actions of ALB-9B Window 3.7, AMSAC ACT TURB TRIP as necessary.  
* If AMSAC actuation blocked and Turbine power >40%, ENSURE Automatic Actions of ALB-9B Window 3.7, AMSAC ACT TURB TRIP as necessary.
  +10 min US INITIATE a Work Request per STA-606.
  +10 min           US       INITIATE a Work Request per STA-606.
When the Turbine impulse pressure transmitter act ions are addressed, or at Lead Evaluator's discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.
When the Turbine impulse pressure transmitter actions are addressed, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 8 of 23 Event
Appendix D                                           Operator Action                           Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #       2     Event #             2       Page 8   of 23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Train A CCW Pump Trip / Train B CCW Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2. - CC02A, Train A CCW Pump (1-01) trip. - CC03A, Train B CCW Pump (1-02) start failure.
Train A CCW Pump Trip / Train B CCW Pump Start Failure Time         Position                               Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2.
Indications Available
                      - CC02A, Train A CCW Pump (1-01) trip.
: 3C-1.6 - CSP 1 & 3 SEAL CLR CCW RET FLO LO
                      - CC03A, Train B CCW Pump (1-02) start failure.
 
Indications Available:
3C-1.8 - SFP HX 1 CCW RET FLO LO 3C-1.14 - RCDT HX CCW RET FLO LO 3C-1.16 - SEAL WTR HX CCW RET FLO LO  
3C-1.6 - CSP 1 & 3 SEAL CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-1.8 - SFP HX 1 CCW RET FLO LO 3C-1.14 - RCDT HX CCW RET FLO LO 3C-1.16 - SEAL WTR HX CCW RET FLO LO 3C-2.3 - CCWP 1 / 2 OVLD TRIP 3C-2.6 - CSP 2 & 4 SEAL CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-2.12 - ANY RCP MTR CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-3.3 - CCW TRAIN B SFGD LOOP PRESS LO 3C-3.11 - ANY RCP THBR CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-3.12 - ANY RCP UP BRG L/O CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-4.7 - RHRP 2 SEAL CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-4.12 - ANY RCP LOW BRG L/O CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-4.13 - XS LTDN HX CCW RET FLO LO 4A-1.7 - SFTY CH WTR TR A/B TRBL/TRIP 01-1.10 - SSW TO CCW TRN A HX P LO 01-2.10 - SSW TO CCW TRN B HX P LO
+1 min            BOP      RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RECOGNIZE Train A CCW Pump trip with failure of Train B CCW Pump to BOP start.
DIRECT implementation of ABN-502, Component Cooling Water System US Malfunctions, Section 2.0.
DETERMINE Train B CCW Pump did NOT auto start and START CCW BOP Pump 1-02.
BOP      VERIFY Train B Station Service Water Pump running.
RO/BOP      VERIFY Train B Safety Chiller Recirc Pump 1-06 is running.
BOP      VERIFY CCW heat exchanger outlet flow < 17,500 gpm per heat exchanger.
* 1-FI-4536A, CCW Heat Exchanger #1 Outlet Flow
* 1-FI-4537A, CCW Heat Exchanger #2 Outlet Flow CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


3C-2.3 - CCWP 1 / 2 OVLD TRIP
Appendix D                                           Operator Action                           Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #       2     Event #             2       Page 9   of 23 Event
 
3C-2.6 - CSP 2 & 4 SEAL CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-2.12 - ANY RCP MTR CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-3.3 - CCW TRAIN B SFGD LOOP PRESS LO 3C-3.11 - ANY RCP THBR CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-3.12 - ANY RCP UP BRG L/O CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-4.7 - RHRP 2 SEAL CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-4.12 - ANY RCP LOW BRG L/O CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-4.13 - XS LTDN HX CCW RET FLO LO 4A-1.7 - SFTY CH WTR TR A/B TRBL/TRIP 01-1.10 - SSW TO CCW TRN A HX P LO 01-2.10 - SSW TO CCW TRN B HX P LO  +1 min BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
BOP RECOGNIZE Train A CCW Pump trip with failure of Train B CCW Pump to start. US  DIRECT implementation of ABN-502, Component Cooling Water System Malfunctions, Section 2.0.
BOP DETERMINE Train B CCW Pump did NOT auto start and START CCW Pump 1-02.
BOP VERIFY Train B Station Service Water Pump running.
RO/BOP VERIFY Train B Safety Chiller Recirc Pump 1-06 is running.
BOP VERIFY CCW heat exchanger outlet flow < 17,500 gpm per heat exchanger.
1-FI-4536A, CCW Heat Exchanger #1 Outlet Flow 1-FI-4537A, CCW Heat Exchanger #2 Outlet Flow Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 9 of 23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Train A CCW Pump Trip / Train B CCW Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc BOP STOP equipment on Train A as necessary for plant conditions.
Train A CCW Pump Trip / Train B CCW Pump Start Failure Time         Position                               Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP       STOP equipment on Train A as necessary for plant conditions.
BOP VERIFY CCW Heat Exchanger outlet temperature did NOT exceed 122&#xba;F with pump running.
VERIFY CCW Heat Exchanger outlet temperature did NOT exceed 122&#xba;F BOP with pump running.
US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.
US       EVALUATE Technical Specifications.
LCO 3.7.7.A, Component Cooling Water System.
* LCO 3.7.7.A, Component Cooling Water System.
CONDITION A - One CCW train inoperable. ACTION A.1 - Restore CCW train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours.  +10 min US INITIATE a Work Request per STA-606.
* CONDITION A - One CCW train inoperable.
When the Technical Specification actions are addressed, or at Lead Evaluator's discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.
* ACTION A.1 - Restore CCW train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours.
  +10 min           US       INITIATE a Work Request per STA-606.
When the Technical Specification actions are addressed, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 10 of 23 Event
Appendix D                                           Operator Action                               Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #       2         Event #             3       Page 10   of 23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3. - RX08A, Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-455) fails low.
Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter Failure Time         Position                                   Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3.
Indications Available
                      - RX08A, Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-455) fails low.
: 5B-3.4 - PRZR 1 OF 4 PRESS LO 5B-4.4 - PRZR 1 OF 4 SI PRESS LO 5C-3.3 - PRZR PRESS LO BACKUP HTRS ON 5C-3.6 - CORE CLG MICRO PROC TRN A SYS FAIL  
Indications Available:
+1 min RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
5B-3.4 - PRZR 1 OF 4 PRESS LO 5B-4.4 - PRZR 1 OF 4 SI PRESS LO 5C-3.3 - PRZR PRESS LO BACKUP HTRS ON 5C-3.6 - CORE CLG MICRO PROC TRN A SYS FAIL
RO RECOGNIZE PRZR pressure rising with PRZR heaters ON.
  +1 min         RO       RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
US  DIRECT performance of ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction, Section 2.0.
RO       RECOGNIZE PRZR pressure rising with PRZR heaters ON.
DIRECT performance of ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction, US Section 2.0.
Examiner Note: The next three (3) steps are Initial Operator Actions.
Examiner Note: The next three (3) steps are Initial Operator Actions.
RO VERIFY PORV closed.
RO       VERIFY PORV closed.
RO PLACE 1-PK-455A, PRZR Master Pressure Control in MANUAL.
RO       PLACE 1-PK-455A, PRZR Master Pressure Control in MANUAL.
RO ADJUST 1-PK-455A for current RCS pressure.
RO       ADJUST 1-PK-455A for current RCS pressure.
RO TRANSFER to an alternate controlling channel, 1/1-PS-455F, PRZR Press Control Channel Select.
TRANSFER to an alternate controlling channel, 1/1-PS-455F, PRZR Press RO Control Channel Select.
RO PLACE 1-PK-455A in AUTO.
RO       PLACE 1-PK-455A in AUTO.
RO VERIFY automatic control restoring Pressurizer pressure to 2235 psig.
RO       VERIFY automatic control restoring Pressurizer pressure to 2235 psig.
RO ENSURE a valid channel selected to recorder 1/1-PS-455G, 1-PR-455 PRZR Pressure Select.  
ENSURE a valid channel selected to recorder 1/1-PS-455G, 1-PR-455 PRZR RO Pressure Select.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 11 of 23 Event
Appendix D                                           Operator Action                               Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #       2         Event #             3       Page 11   of 23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc Examiner Note: Performing the next step meets the REQUIRED ACTION for Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1. A Procedure Enhancement will be submitted for ABN-705 specifically identifying Technical Specifications should be referenced to ensure compliance with the LCO.
Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter Failure Time         Position                                   Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Performing the next step meets the REQUIRED ACTION for Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1. A Procedure Enhancement will be submitted for ABN-705 specifically identifying Technical Specifications should be referenced to ensure compliance with the LCO.
US Within 1 hour, VERIFY PCIP window 2.6, PRZR PRESS SI BLK PERM P-11 in required state for current pressure (DARK).
Within 1 hour, VERIFY PCIP window 2.6, PRZR PRESS SI BLK PERM P-11 US in required state for current pressure (DARK).
US/RO VERIFY other instruments on common instrument line - NORMAL.
US/RO     VERIFY other instruments on common instrument line - NORMAL.
DETERMINE LT-459, LT-459F, and PT-455F readings are NORMAL.  
* DETERMINE LT-459, LT-459F, and PT-455F readings are NORMAL.
  +10 min US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.
  +10 min           US       EVALUATE Technical Specifications.
LCO 3.3.1.E, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
* LCO 3.3.1.E, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
CONDITION E - One channel inoperable. ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours.
* CONDITION E - One channel inoperable.
LCO 3.3.1.M, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
* ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours.
CONDITION M - One channel inoperable. ACTION M.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours.
* LCO 3.3.1.M, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
LCO 3.3.2.L, ESFAS Instrumentation
* CONDITION M - One channel inoperable.
. CONDITION L - One channel inoperable. ACTION L.1- Verify interlock in required state for existing condition within 1 hour.
* ACTION M.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours.
LCO 3.3.2.D, ESFAS Instrumentation
* LCO 3.3.2.L, ESFAS Instrumentation.
. CONDITION D - One channel inoperable. ACTION D.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours.
* CONDITION L - One channel inoperable.
When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to  
* ACTION L.1- Verify interlock in required state for existing condition within 1 hour.
* LCO 3.3.2.D, ESFAS Instrumentation.
* CONDITION D - One channel inoperable.
* ACTION D.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours.
When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


Event 4.
Appendix D                                           Operator Action                             Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #       2       Event #             4       Page 12   of 23 Event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 12 of 23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Steam Generator Level Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4. - RX04A, SG 1-01 Level Transmitter (LT-551) fails high.
Steam Generator Level Transmitter Failure Time         Position                                 Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4.
Indications Available
                      - RX04A, SG 1-01 Level Transmitter (LT-551) fails high.
: 8A-1.12 - SG 1 LVL DEV 8A-1.8 - SG 1 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 9A-3.2 - HDP 1 DISCH PRESS HI 9A-7.2 - HDP 2 DISCH PRESS HI 1-LI-551, SG 1 LVL (NR) CHAN I indication fails high 1-FK-510, SG 1 FW FLO CTRL VLV starts to close  
Indications Available:
  +30 sec BOP REFER to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
8A-1.12 - SG 1 LVL DEV 8A-1.8 - SG 1 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 9A-3.2 - HDP 1 DISCH PRESS HI 9A-7.2 - HDP 2 DISCH PRESS HI 1-LI-551, SG 1 LVL (NR) CHAN I indication fails high 1-FK-510, SG 1 FW FLO CTRL VLV starts to close
BOP RECOGNIZE Steam Generator 1-01 Level Transmitter (LT-551) failed high.
  +30 sec         BOP       REFER to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
US  DIRECT implementation of ABN-710, Steam Generator Level Instrumentation Malfunction, Section 2.0.
BOP       RECOGNIZE Steam Generator 1-01 Level Transmitter (LT-551) failed high.
BOP DETERMINE controlling level channel has failed.
DIRECT implementation of ABN-710, Steam Generator Level US Instrumentation Malfunction, Section 2.0.
BOP PLACE 1-FK-510, SG 1 FW FLO CTRL in MANUAL and OPEN valve to CONTROL level.
BOP       DETERMINE controlling level channel has failed.
BOP VERIFY instruments on common instrument line - NORMAL.
PLACE 1-FK-510, SG 1 FW FLO CTRL in MANUAL and OPEN valve to BOP CONTROL level.
DETERMINE LT-501 reading is NORMAL.
BOP       VERIFY instruments on common instrument line - NORMAL.
RO VERIFY all HI-HI level bistable Windows on TSLB-3 for SG 1 DARK.
* DETERMINE LT-501 reading is NORMAL.
DETERMINE Windows 2.2, 3.2, and 4.2 are DARK.
RO       VERIFY all HI-HI level bistable Windows on TSLB-3 for SG 1 DARK.
BOP VERIFY automatic SG 1-01 level control AVAILABLE and DESIRED:
* DETERMINE Windows 2.2, 3.2, and 4.2 are DARK.
DETERMINE Alternate Level Control Channel responding normally.
BOP       VERIFY automatic SG 1-01 level control AVAILABLE and DESIRED:
BOP SELECT an alternate channel.
* DETERMINE Alternate Level Control Channel responding normally.
PLACE 1-LS-519C, SG 1 LVL CHAN SELECT to 1-LY-519 position.
BOP       SELECT an alternate channel.
BOP VERIFY Steam Generator 1-01 ready for AUTO Level Control:
* PLACE 1-LS-519C, SG 1 LVL CHAN SELECT to 1-LY-519 position.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 13 of 23 Event
BOP       VERIFY Steam Generator 1-01 ready for AUTO Level Control:
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc
 
Appendix D                                           Operator Action                             Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #       2       Event #             4       Page 13   of 23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Steam Generator Level Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc DETERMINE Feedwater and Steam Flows matched.
Steam Generator Level Transmitter Failure Time         Position                                 Applicants Actions or Behavior
VERIFY Steam Generator level stable at program.
* DETERMINE Feedwater and Steam Flows matched.
BOP PLACE 1-FK-510, SG 1 FW FLO CTRL in AUTO and MONITOR operation.
* VERIFY Steam Generator level stable at program.
US INITIATE repairs per STA-606.  
BOP       PLACE 1-FK-510, SG 1 FW FLO CTRL in AUTO and MONITOR operation.
  +10 min US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.
US       INITIATE repairs per STA-606.
LCO 3.3.1.E, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
  +10 min           US       EVALUATE Technical Specifications.
CONDITION E - One channel inoperable. ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours.
* LCO 3.3.1.E, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
LCO 3.3.2.D, ESFAS Instrumentation.
* CONDITION E - One channel inoperable.
CONDITION D - One channel inoperable. ACTION D.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours.
* ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours.
LCO 3.3.2.I, ESFAS Instrumentation.
* LCO 3.3.2.D, ESFAS Instrumentation.
CONDITION I - One channel inoperable. ACTION I.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours.
* CONDITION D - One channel inoperable.
When Feedwater Control is restored, or at Lead Evaluator's discretion, PROCEED to Events 5, 6, 7, and 8.
* ACTION D.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours.
* LCO 3.3.2.I, ESFAS Instrumentation.
* CONDITION I - One channel inoperable.
* ACTION I.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours.
When Feedwater Control is restored, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Events 5, 6, 7, and 8.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 14 of 23 Event
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                             Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC           Scenario #         2       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 14     of     23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 5, 6, 7, and 8. - MS03A, Steam Generator (1-01) Steam Line Break outside Containment. - RD04K6 @ 12 steps, Control Rod fails to insert upon Reactor trip. - RD04K8 @ 228 steps, Control Rod fails to insert upon Reactor trip.  
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 5, 6, 7, and 8.
- SI04D, Safety Injection Pump (1-02) fails to auto start.  
                      - MS03A, Steam Generator (1-01) Steam Line Break outside Containment.
- FW38A/B/C/D, Feed Line Isolation Valves (HV-2134 to HV-2137) fail to close.
                      - RD04K6 @ 12 steps, Control Rod fails to insert upon Reactor trip.
Indications Available
                      - RD04K8 @ 228 steps, Control Rod fails to insert upon Reactor trip.
: 6C-3.7 - MSL PRESS LO SI ACT Numerous plant trip alarms  
                      - SI04D, Safety Injection Pump (1-02) fails to auto start.
  +30 secs RO/BOP RECOGNIZE lowering RCS temperature and pressure.
                      - FW38A/B/C/D, Feed Line Isolation Valves (HV-2134 to HV-2137) fail to close.
RO/BOP DETERMINE Reactor Trip required and manually TRIP Reactor.
Indications Available:
US DIRECT performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
6C-3.7 - MSL PRESS LO SI ACT Numerous plant trip alarms
RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:
  +30 secs       RO/BOP         RECOGNIZE lowering RCS temperature and pressure.
DETERMINE Reactor trip breakers - OPEN.
RO/BOP         DETERMINE Reactor Trip required and manually TRIP Reactor.
DETERMINE Neutron flux - DECREASING.
US         DIRECT performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
RO DETERMINE all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - NOT LIT (two (2) stuck rods).
RO         VERIFY Reactor Trip:
BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:
* DETERMINE Reactor trip breakers - OPEN.
DETERMINE all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.
* DETERMINE Neutron flux - DECREASING.
BOP VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses:
DETERMINE all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - NOT LIT RO (two (2) stuck rods).
DETERMINE both AC Safeguards Buses - ENERGIZED.
BOP         VERIFY Turbine Trip:
RO DETERMINE both Trains of Safety Injection actuated.
* DETERMINE all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.
CRITICAL TASK STATEMENT Initiate Emergency Boration with Two or More Stuck Control Rods Prior to Exiting EOP-0.0.  
BOP         VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses:
* DETERMINE both AC Safeguards Buses - ENERGIZED.
RO         DETERMINE both Trains of Safety Injection actuated.
CRITICAL TASK             Initiate Emergency Boration with Two or More Stuck Control Rods Prior to STATEMENT                Exiting EOP-0.0.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 15 of 23 Event
Appendix D                                                 Operator Action                             Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :         NRC             Scenario #       2       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 15     of     23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc CRITICAL TASK RO INITIATE Emergency Boration of 3600 gallons of Boric Acid.
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time           Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK RO           INITIATE Emergency Boration of 3600 gallons of Boric Acid.
ENSURE a Charging Pump is RUNNING.
* ENSURE a Charging Pump is RUNNING.
START either Boric Acid Transfer Pump.
* START either Boric Acid Transfer Pump.
PLACE 1/1-APBA1, BA XFER PMP 1 in START.
* PLACE 1/1-APBA1, BA XFER PMP 1 in START.
PLACE 1/1-APBA1, BA XFER PMP 2 in START.
* PLACE 1/1-APBA1, BA XFER PMP 2 in START.
PLACE 1/1-8104, EMER BORATE VLV in OPEN.
* PLACE 1/1-8104, EMER BORATE VLV in OPEN.
VERIFY flow on 1-FI-183A, EMER BORATE FLO.
* VERIFY flow on 1-FI-183A, EMER BORATE FLO.
VERIFY flow on 1-FI-121A, CHRG FLO.
* VERIFY flow on 1-FI-121A, CHRG FLO.
Examiner Note: EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2, steps performed by BOP are identified later in the scenario. Ensure CRITICAL TASK listed is performed during Attachment 2.
Examiner Note: EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2, steps performed by BOP are identified later in the scenario. Ensure CRITICAL TASK listed is performed during Attachment 2.
US/BOP INITIATE Proper Safeguards Equipment Operation Per Attachment 2.
US/BOP         INITIATE Proper Safeguards Equipment Operation Per Attachment 2.
RO VERIFY AFW Alignment:
RO           VERIFY AFW Alignment:
DETERMINE both MDAFW Pumps - RUNNING.
* DETERMINE both MDAFW Pumps - RUNNING.
PLACE Turbine Driven AFW Pump in PULL-OUT per Foldout Page.
* PLACE Turbine Driven AFW Pump in PULL-OUT per Foldout Page.
CONTROL AFW Flow as follows:
* CONTROL AFW Flow as follows:
CONTROL AFW flow as necessary to maintain narrow range level >
* CONTROL AFW flow as necessary to maintain narrow range level >
43% in any SG or total AFW flow > 460 gpm per Foldout Page.
43% in any SG or total AFW flow > 460 gpm per Foldout Page.
STOP AFW flow to Faulted SG 1-01 per Foldout Page.
* STOP AFW flow to Faulted SG 1-01 per Foldout Page.
MAINTAIN proper AFW valve alignment.
* MAINTAIN proper AFW valve alignment.
RO VERIFY Containment Spray Not Required:
RO           VERIFY Containment Spray Not Required:
VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 1-8, CS ACT NOT illuminated.
* VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 1-8, CS ACT NOT illuminated.
VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT NOT illuminated.
* VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT NOT illuminated.
VERIFY Containment pressure remained < 18.0 PSIG.
* VERIFY Containment pressure remained < 18.0 PSIG.
VERIFY Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Outlet Valves - CLOSED.
* VERIFY Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Outlet Valves - CLOSED.
VERIFY all Containment Spray Pumps - RUNNING.  
* VERIFY all Containment Spray Pumps - RUNNING.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 16 of 23 Event
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                             Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC             Scenario #       2       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 16     of     23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc RO DETERMINE Main Steam Lines Should be Isolated and PERFORM the following:
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior RO         DETERMINE Main Steam Lines Should be Isolated and PERFORM the following:
VERIFY Main Steam Isolation Complete:
* VERIFY Main Steam Isolation Complete:
DETERMINE Main Steam Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
* DETERMINE Main Steam Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
DETERMINE Before MSIV Drip Pot Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
* DETERMINE Before MSIV Drip Pot Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
RO CHECK RCS Temperature -
RO         CHECK RCS Temperature -
DETERMINE RCS Average Temperature less than 557&#xba;F.
* DETERMINE RCS Average Temperature less than 557&#xba;F.
RO VERIFY NOT dumping steam.
RO         VERIFY NOT dumping steam.
RO REDUCE total AFW flow to minimize the cooldown:
RO         REDUCE total AFW flow to minimize the cooldown:
MAINTAIN a minimum of 460 gpm UNTIL narrow range level greater than 43% in at least one SG.
* MAINTAIN a minimum of 460 gpm UNTIL narrow range level greater than 43% in at least one SG.
If necessary, STOP Turbine Driven AFW Pump.
* If necessary, STOP Turbine Driven AFW Pump.
RO CHECK PRZR Valve Status:
RO         CHECK PRZR Valve Status:
VERIFY PRZR Safeties - CLOSED.
* VERIFY PRZR Safeties - CLOSED.
VERIFY Normal PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED.
* VERIFY Normal PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED.
VERIFY PORVs - CLOSED.
* VERIFY PORVs - CLOSED.
VERIFY Power to at least one Block Valve - AVAILABLE.
* VERIFY Power to at least one Block Valve - AVAILABLE.
VERIFY Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.
* VERIFY Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.
RO CHECK if RCPs Should Be Stopped:
RO         CHECK if RCPs Should Be Stopped:
DETERMINE all ECCS Pumps - RUNNING.
* DETERMINE all ECCS Pumps - RUNNING.
DETERMINE RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 25&#xba;F.
* DETERMINE RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 25&#xba;F.
Continue RUNNING Reactor Coolant Pumps.
* Continue RUNNING Reactor Coolant Pumps.
RO CHECK If Any SG Is Faulted:
RO         CHECK If Any SG Is Faulted:
DETERMINE SG 1-01 completely DEPRESSURIZED.  
* DETERMINE SG 1-01 completely DEPRESSURIZED.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 17 of 23 Event
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                             Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC           Scenario #         2       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 17     of     23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc US TRANSITION to EOP 2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Step 1.
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior US         TRANSITION to EOP 2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Step 1.
Examiner Note: These steps are performed by the BOP as required per EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2. EOP-2.0A steps are identified later in the scenario.
Examiner Note: These steps are performed by the BOP as required per EOP-0.0A, Attachment
BOP VERIFY SSW Alignment:
: 2. EOP-2.0A steps are identified later in the scenario.
VERIFY both SSW Pumps - RUNNING.
BOP         VERIFY SSW Alignment:
VERIFY Train B Diesel Generator Cooler SSW return flow.
* VERIFY both SSW Pumps - RUNNING.
BOP VERIFY Safety Injection Pumps - RUNNING.
* VERIFY Train B Diesel Generator Cooler SSW return flow.
DETERMINE Safety Injection Pump 1-02 failed to start and MANUALLY START Safety Injection Pump 1-02.
BOP         VERIFY Safety Injection Pumps - RUNNING.
BOP VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A.
* DETERMINE Safety Injection Pump 1-02 failed to start and MANUALLY START Safety Injection Pump 1-02.
BOP VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation.
BOP         VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A.
BOP VERIFY CCW Pump 1 RUNNING.
BOP         VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation.
BOP VERIFY both RHR Pumps - RUNNING.
BOP         VERIFY CCW Pump 1 RUNNING.
BOP VERIFY Proper CVCS Alignment:
BOP         VERIFY both RHR Pumps - RUNNING.
DETERMINE both CCPs - RUNNING.
BOP         VERIFY Proper CVCS Alignment:
VERIFY Letdown Relief Valve isolation:
* DETERMINE both CCPs - RUNNING.
DETERMINE Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
* VERIFY Letdown Relief Valve isolation:
DETERMINE Letdown Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
* DETERMINE Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
BOP VERIFY ECCS flow:
* DETERMINE Letdown Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
VERIFY CCP SI flow indicated.
BOP         VERIFY ECCS flow:
VERIFY RCS pressure < 1700 PSIG (1800 PSIG adverse).
* VERIFY CCP SI flow indicated.
VERIFY SIP discharge flow indicators.
* VERIFY RCS pressure < 1700 PSIG (1800 PSIG adverse).
DETERMINE RCS pressure > 325 PSIG (425 PSIG adverse).
* VERIFY SIP discharge flow indicators.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 18 of 23 Event
* DETERMINE RCS pressure > 325 PSIG (425 PSIG adverse).
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc
 
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                                 Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC           Scenario #         2       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8 Page   18     of 23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc CRITICAL TASK STATEMENT Isolate Feedwater Flow to a Faulted Steam Generator Prior to Exiting From EOP-2.0. CRITICAL TASK BOP DETERMINE Feedwater Isolation Valv es NOT closed and manually CLOSE Valves to all Steam Generators.
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK             Isolate Feedwater Flow to a Faulted Steam Generator Prior to Exiting From STATEMENT                EOP-2.0.
HV-2134 - CLOSED.
CRITICAL                       DETERMINE Feedwater Isolation Valves NOT closed and manually CLOSE TASK            BOP Valves to all Steam Generators.
HV-2135 - CLOSED.
* HV-2134 - CLOSED.
HV-2136 - CLOSED.
* HV-2135 - CLOSED.
HV-2137 - CLOSED.
* HV-2136 - CLOSED.
BOP VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Complete:
* HV-2137 - CLOSED.
VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
BOP         VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Complete:
VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Bypass Valves - CLOSED.
* VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
VERIFY Feedwater Bypass Control Valves - CLOSED.
* VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Bypass Valves - CLOSED.
VERIFY Feedwater Control Valves - CLOSED.
* VERIFY Feedwater Bypass Control Valves - CLOSED.
BOP VERIFY Train B Diesel Generator - RUNNING.
* VERIFY Feedwater Control Valves - CLOSED.
BOP VERIFY Monitor Lights For SI Load Shedding illuminated.
BOP         VERIFY Train B Diesel Generator - RUNNING.
BOP VERIFY Proper SI alignment per MLB light indication.
BOP         VERIFY Monitor Lights For SI Load Shedding illuminated.
BOP VERIFY Components Properly Aligned per Table 1.
BOP         VERIFY Proper SI alignment per MLB light indication.
Location Equipment Description Condition CB-03 X-HS-5534 H2 PRG SPLY FN 4 STOPPED CB-03 X-HS-5532 H2 PRG SPLY FN 3 STOPPED CB-04 1/1-8716A RHRP 1 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-04 1/1-8716B RHRP 2 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-06 1/1-8153 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-06 1/1-8154 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-07 1/1-RTBAL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-RTBBL RX TRIP BKR OPEN Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 19 of 23 Event
BOP         VERIFY Components Properly Aligned per Table 1.
Location     Equipment                 Description                   Condition CB-03       X-HS-5534           H2 PRG SPLY FN 4                     STOPPED CB-03       X-HS-5532           H2 PRG SPLY FN 3                     STOPPED CB-04       1/1-8716A             RHRP 1 XTIE VLV                     OPEN CB-04       1/1-8716B             RHRP 2 XTIE VLV                     OPEN CB-06       1/1-8153           XS LTDN ISOL VLV                     CLOSED CB-06       1/1-8154           XS LTDN ISOL VLV                     CLOSED CB-07       1/1-RTBAL               RX TRIP BKR                       OPEN CB-07       1/1-RTBBL               RX TRIP BKR                       OPEN CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc
 
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                                   Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC           Scenario #         2       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8   Page   19   of 23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc CB-07 1/1-BBAL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-07 1/1-BBBL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-08 1-HS-2397A SG 1 BLDN HELB ISOL VLVCLOSED  CB-08 1-HS-2398A SG 2 BLDN HELB ISOL VLVCLOSED  CB-08 1-HS-2399A SG 3 BLDN HELB ISOL VLVCLOSED  CB-08 1-HS-2400A SG 4 BLDN HELB ISOL VLVCLOSED  CB-08 1-HS-2111C FWPT A TRIP TRIPPED CB-08 1-HS-2112C FWPT B TRIP TRIPPED CB-09 1-HS-2490 CNDS XFER PUMP STOPPED (MCC deenergized on SI) CV-01 X-HS-6181 PRI PLT SPLY FN 17 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6188 PRI PLT SPLY FN 18 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6195 PRI PLT SPLY FN 19 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6202 PRI PLT SPLY FN 20 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6209 PRI PLT SPLY FN 21 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6216 PRI PLT SPLY FN 22 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6223 PRI PLT SPLY FN 23 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6230 PRI PLT SPLY FN 24 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-3631 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 1 &
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior CB-07       1/1-BBAL             RX TRIP BYP BKR                 OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-07       1/1-BBBL             RX TRIP BYP BKR                 OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-08     1-HS-2397A       SG 1 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV                    CLOSED CB-08     1-HS-2398A       SG 2 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV                    CLOSED CB-08     1-HS-2399A       SG 3 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV                    CLOSED CB-08     1-HS-2400A       SG 4 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV                    CLOSED CB-08     1-HS-2111C               FWPT A TRIP                       TRIPPED CB-08     1-HS-2112C               FWPT B TRIP                       TRIPPED CB-09       1-HS-2490           CNDS XFER PUMP                 STOPPED (MCC deenergized on SI)
BSTR FN 42 STARTED  CV-01 X-HS-3632 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 2 &
CV-01       X-HS-6181       PRI PLT SPLY FN 17 & INTK           STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01       X-HS-6188       PRI PLT SPLY FN 18 & INTK           STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01       X-HS-6195       PRI PLT SPLY FN 19 & INTK           STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01       X-HS-6202       PRI PLT SPLY FN 20 & INTK           STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01       X-HS-6209       PRI PLT SPLY FN 21 & INTK           STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01       X-HS-6216       PRI PLT SPLY FN 22 & INTK           STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01       X-HS-6223       PRI PLT SPLY FN 23 & INTK           STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01       X-HS-6230       PRI PLT SPLY FN 24 & INTK           STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01       X-HS-3631       UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 1 &                   STARTED BSTR FN 42 CV-01       X-HS-3632       UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 2 &                   STARTED BSTR FN 43 CV-01       1-HS-5600         ELEC AREA EXH FN 1               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01       1-HS-5601         ELEC AREA EXH FN 2               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01       1-HS-5602         MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH             STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 3 & EXH DMPR CV-01       1-HS-5603         MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH             STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 4 & EXH DMPR CV-01       1-HS-5618       MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY             STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 17 CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc
BSTR FN 43 STARTED  CV-01 1-HS-5600 ELEC AREA EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5601 ELEC AREA EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5602 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH FN 3 & EXH DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5603 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH FN 4 & EXH DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5618 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY FN 17 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 20 of 23 Event
 
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                                 Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC           Scenario #         2       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8   Page   20   of   23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc CV-01 1-HS-5620 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY FN 18 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5855 CR EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5856 CR EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5731 SFP EXH FN 33 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5733 SFP EXH FN 34 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5727 SFP EXH FN 35 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5729 SFP EXH FN 36 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED Examiner Note: The next four (4) steps would be performed on Unit 2.
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior CV-01       1-HS-5620       MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY             STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 18 CV-03       X-HS-5855               CR EXH FN 1               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03       X-HS-5856               CR EXH FN 2               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03       X-HS-5731             SFP EXH FN 33               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03       X-HS-5733             SFP EXH FN 34               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03       X-HS-5727             SFP EXH FN 35               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03       X-HS-5729             SFP EXH FN 36               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED Examiner Note: The next four (4) steps would be performed on Unit 2.
CB-03 2-HS-5538 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5539 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5537 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPRCLOSED  CB-03 2-HS-5536 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPRCLOSED  BOP NOTIFY Unit Supervisor attachment instructions complete and to IMPLEMENT FRGs as required.
CB-03       2-HS-5538         AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR                   CLOSED CB-03       2-HS-5539         AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR                   CLOSED CB-03       2-HS-5537       AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR                    CLOSED CB-03       2-HS-5536       AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR                    CLOSED BOP         NOTIFY Unit Supervisor attachment instructions complete and to IMPLEMENT FRGs as required.
Examiner Note: EOP-2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation steps begin here.  
Examiner Note: EOP-2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation steps begin here.
+15 min US/RO CHECK Main Steam line Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
+15 min         US/RO         CHECK Main Steam line Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
US/RO CHECK at Least One Steam Generator Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
US/RO         CHECK at Least One Steam Generator Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
US/RO IDENTIFY Faulted Steam Generator 1-01.
US/RO         IDENTIFY Faulted Steam Generator 1-01.
CRITICAL TASK STATEMENT Perform Actions to Identify and Isolate Faulted Steam Generator Prior to exiting EOP-2.0A.
CRITICAL TASK             Perform Actions to Identify and Isolate Faulted Steam Generator Prior to STATEMENT                exiting EOP-2.0A.
CRITICAL TASK RO/BOP ISOLATE Faulted Steam Generator 1-01. ISOLATE Main Feed Line to Steam Generator 1-01. ISOLATE AFW flow to Steam Generator 1-01. ISOLATE Blowdown and Sample Lines to Steam Generator 1-01.
CRITICAL TASK RO/BOP         ISOLATE Faulted Steam Generator 1-01.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 21 of 23 Event
* ISOLATE Main Feed Line to Steam Generator 1-01.
* ISOLATE AFW flow to Steam Generator 1-01.
* ISOLATE Blowdown and Sample Lines to Steam Generator 1-01.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc
 
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                             Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC           Scenario #         2       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 21     of     23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc ENSURE 1-HS-2452-2, AFWPT STM SPLY VLV MSL 1 in PULL OUT.
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior
ENSURE Steam Generator 1-01 Atmospheric Valve - CLOSED.
* ENSURE 1-HS-2452-2, AFWPT STM SPLY VLV MSL 1 in PULL OUT.
ENSURE Main Steam Line Drip Pot Isolation Valve - CLOSED.
* ENSURE Steam Generator 1-01 Atmospheric Valve - CLOSED.
RO CHECK CST Level - GREATER THAN 10%.
* ENSURE Main Steam Line Drip Pot Isolation Valve - CLOSED.
RO         CHECK CST Level - GREATER THAN 10%.
Examiner Note: EOP-2.0A, Attachment 2 actions are performed outside of the Control Room.
Examiner Note: EOP-2.0A, Attachment 2 actions are performed outside of the Control Room.
US/BOP VERIFY Faulted Steam Generator 1-01 Break Outside Containment.
US/BOP         VERIFY Faulted Steam Generator 1-01 Break Outside Containment.
DIRECT performance of EOP-2.0A, Attachment 2.
* DIRECT performance of EOP-2.0A, Attachment 2.
US/RO CHECK Secondary Radiation:
US/RO         CHECK Secondary Radiation:
REQUEST periodic activity samples of all Steam Generators.
* REQUEST periodic activity samples of all Steam Generators.
CHECK available Secondary Radiation Monitors - NORMAL.
* CHECK available Secondary Radiation Monitors - NORMAL.
US/RO CHECK if ECCS Flow to Should Be Reduced:
US/RO         CHECK if ECCS Flow to Should Be Reduced:
VERIFY Secondary heat sink:
* VERIFY Secondary heat sink:
DETERMINE Total AFW Flow to intact SGs > 460 GPM.
* DETERMINE Total AFW Flow to intact SGs > 460 GPM.
DETERMINE Narrow Range Level in SGs 1-02, 1-03, & 1-04
* DETERMINE Narrow Range Level in SGs 1-02, 1-03, & 1-04 > 43%.
> 43%. VERIFY RCS subcooling > 25&#xba;F.
* VERIFY RCS subcooling > 25&#xba;F.
VERIFY RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
* VERIFY RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
VERIFY PRZR level > 13%.
* VERIFY PRZR level > 13%.
US DETERMINE ECCS flow should be reduced and TRANSITION to EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, Step 1.
US         DETERMINE ECCS flow should be reduced and TRANSITION to EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, Step 1.
Examiner Note: EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, steps begin here.
Examiner Note: EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, steps begin here.
Examiner Note: The following six (6) steps are performed per EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.D.
Examiner Note: The following six (6) steps are performed per EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.D.
BOP [1.D] PLACE Train B Diesel EMER START/STOP Handswitch in START.  
BOP         [1.D] PLACE Train B Diesel EMER START/STOP Handswitch in START.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 22 of 23 Event
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                             Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC           Scenario #         2       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 22     of     23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc BOP [1.D] RESET SI.
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP         [1.D] RESET SI.
BOP [1.D] RESET SI Sequencers.
BOP         [1.D] RESET SI Sequencers.
BOP [1.D] RESET Containment Isolation Phase A and B.
BOP         [1.D] RESET Containment Isolation Phase A and B.
BOP [1.D] RESET Containment Spray Signal.
BOP         [1.D] RESET Containment Spray Signal.
BOP/RO [1.D] ESTABLISH Instrument Air and Nitrogen to Containment.
BOP/RO         [1.D] ESTABLISH Instrument Air and Nitrogen to Containment.
RO STOP one CCP and PLACE in Standby.
RO         STOP one CCP and PLACE in Standby.
US/RO CHECK RCS Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
US/RO         CHECK RCS Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
Examiner Note: The following two (2) steps are performed per EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.J.
Examiner Note: The following two (2) steps are performed per EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.J.
RO [1.J] ISOLATE CCP Injection Line Flow Path:
RO         [1.J] ISOLATE CCP Injection Line Flow Path:
VERIFY CCP - SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST.
* VERIFY CCP - SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST.
ALIGN CCP Miniflow Valves:
* ALIGN CCP Miniflow Valves:
OPEN 1/1-8110 and 1/1-8111, CCP Miniflow Valves.
* OPEN 1/1-8110 and 1/1-8111, CCP Miniflow Valves.
CLOSE 1/1-8511A and 1/1-8511B, CCP Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves. PLACE Charging Flow Control Valve in MANUAL and 35% demand.
* CLOSE 1/1-8511A and 1/1-8511B, CCP Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves.
CLOSE 1/1-8801A and 1/1-8801B, CCP Injection Line Isolation Valves.  
* PLACE Charging Flow Control Valve in MANUAL and 35% demand.
* CLOSE 1/1-8801A and 1/1-8801B, CCP Injection Line Isolation Valves.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 23 of 23 Event
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                             Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC           Scenario #         2       Event #       5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 23     of     23 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc RO [1.J] ESTABLISH Charging Flow Path:
Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior RO         [1.J] ESTABLISH Charging Flow Path:
OPEN 1/1-8105 and 1/1-8106, Charging Line Isolation Valves.
* OPEN 1/1-8105 and 1/1-8106, Charging Line Isolation Valves.
ADJUST Charging Flow Control Valve to establish Charging flow.
* ADJUST Charging Flow Control Valve to establish Charging flow.
ADJUST RCP seal flow to maintain between 6 gpm and 13 gpm.
* ADJUST RCP seal flow to maintain between 6 gpm and 13 gpm.
When EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, Attachment 1.J is complete, TERMINATE the scenario.  
When EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, Attachment 1.J is complete, TERMINATE the scenario.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc


CP 2010-07 Retake Exam (Scenarios Only, No JPMs)
CP 2010-07 Retake Exam (Scenarios Only, No JPMs)
Shift turnover sheets for both scenarios follow this cover sheet.  
Shift turnover sheets for both scenarios follow this cover sheet.


CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Shift Relief Checklist R.doc UNIT: 1 UNIT SUPERVISOR RELIEF CHECKLIST
UNIT:     1                     UNIT SUPERVISOR RELIEF CHECKLIST (NRC Scenario #1)
((N N R R C C  S S c c e e n n a a r r i i o o  ##1 1))  PART I TO BE PREPARED BY THE OFF-GOING UNIT SUPERVISOR.
PART I       TO BE PREPARED BY THE OFF-GOING UNIT SUPERVISOR.
1.0 SHIFT ACTIVITIES
1.0     SHIFT ACTIVITIES:
:  1.1 Activities Completed This Shift:None       1.2 Activities In-Progress: None       1.3 Planned Activities:   None         2.0 PLANT AND EQUIPMENT STATUS
1.1   Activities Completed This Shift:       None 1.2   Activities In-Progress:                 None 1.3   Planned Activities:                     None 2.0     PLANT AND EQUIPMENT STATUS:
:    2.1 Technical Specification Related Equipment Summary:
2.1 Technical Specification Related Equipment Summary:
Train A Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01 out-of-service for Governor repair.
Train A Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01 out-of-service for Governor repair.
Estimated Return-to-Service time is four (4) hours.
Estimated Return-to-Service time is four (4) hours.
2.2 Non-Technical Specification Equipment Summary:
2.2   Non-Technical Specification Equipment Summary:
3.0 GENERAL INFORMATION
3.0     GENERAL INFORMATION:
:  Maintain steady state conditions per IPO-003A, Power Operation.
Maintain steady state conditions per IPO-003A, Power Operation.
Diluted 45 gallons three (3) times last shift.
Diluted 45 gallons three (3) times last shift.
4.0 END OF SHIFT REVIEW
4.0     END OF SHIFT REVIEW:
:    LOGS - RO/BOP X LOGS-PEO XCLOSED eLCOARs ARCHIVED X   OPTS COMPLETED X DAILY ACTIVITIES LIST XLCOARs REVIEWED X PART II TO BE COMPLETED BY THE ON-COMING UNIT SUPERVISOR.
LOGS - RO/BOP               X   LOGS-PEO                 X  CLOSED eLCOARs ARCHIVED       X OPTS COMPLETED             X   DAILY ACTIVITIES LIST   X  LCOARs REVIEWED               X PART II     TO BE COMPLETED BY THE ON-COMING UNIT SUPERVISOR.
1.0 CRITICAL PARAMETERS:
1.0     CRITICAL PARAMETERS:
MODE: 1 REACTOR POWER: 100% MWE: 1264 RCS TAVE: 585 F CONTROL ROD POSITION 215 ON BANK D C b: 910 ppm RCS PRESS:       2235 psig X Protected Train - Train A XUnit 2 is in Mode 1 @ 100% power X Risk Assessment - GREEN XBAT C B = 7447 ppm  
MODE:           1         REACTOR POWER:         100%           MWE:           1264 RCS                       CONTROL ROD TAVE:         585 &deg;F       POSITION                 215           ON BANK         D RCS Cb:           910 ppm PRESS:                       2235   psig X   Protected Train - Train A                         X  Unit 2 is in Mode 1 @ 100% power X   Risk Assessment - GREEN                           X  BAT CB = 7447 ppm CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Shift Relief Checklist R.doc
 
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Shift Relief Checklist R.docc UNIT: 1 UNIT SUPERVISOR RELIEF CHECKLIST
((N N R R C C  S S c c e e n n a a r r i i o o  ##2 2))  PART I TO BE PREPARED BY THE OFF-GOING UNIT SUPERVISOR.
1.0 SHIFT ACTIVITIES
:  1.1 Activities Completed This Shift:None        1.2 Activities In-Progress: None        1.3 Planned Activities:  None        2.0 PLANT AND EQUIPMENT STATUS
:    2.1 Technical Specification Related Equipment Summary:


UNIT:    1                      UNIT SUPERVISOR RELIEF CHECKLIST (NRC Scenario #2)
PART I      TO BE PREPARED BY THE OFF-GOING UNIT SUPERVISOR.
1.0    SHIFT ACTIVITIES:
1.1    Activities Completed This Shift:        None 1.2    Activities In-Progress:                None 1.3    Planned Activities:                    None 2.0    PLANT AND EQUIPMENT STATUS:
2.1 Technical Specification Related Equipment Summary:
Train A Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01 out-of-service for Governor repair.
Train A Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01 out-of-service for Governor repair.
Estimated Return-to-Service time is four (4) hours.
Estimated Return-to-Service time is four (4) hours.
2.2 Non-Technical Specification Equipment Summary:
2.2   Non-Technical Specification Equipment Summary:
3.0 GENERAL INFORMATION
3.0     GENERAL INFORMATION:
:  Maintaining 875 MWe in accordance with Load Controller direction per IPO-003A, Po wer Operation.
Maintaining 875 MWe in accordance with Load Controller direction per IPO-003A, Power Operation.
Diluted 35 gallons three (3) times last shift.
Diluted 35 gallons three (3) times last shift.
4.0 END OF SHIFT REVIEW
4.0     END OF SHIFT REVIEW:
:    LOGS - RO/BOP X LOGS-PEO XCLOSED eLCOARs ARCHIVED X   OPTS COMPLETED X DAILY ACTIVITIES LIST XLCOARs REVIEWED X PART II TO BE COMPLETED BY THE ON-COMING UNIT SUPERVISOR.
LOGS - RO/BOP               X   LOGS-PEO                 X  CLOSED eLCOARs ARCHIVED       X OPTS COMPLETED             X   DAILY ACTIVITIES LIST   X  LCOARs REVIEWED               X PART II     TO BE COMPLETED BY THE ON-COMING UNIT SUPERVISOR.
1.0 CRITICAL PARAMETERS:
1.0     CRITICAL PARAMETERS:
MODE: 1 REACTOR POWER: 72% MWE: 875 RCS TAVE: 577 F CONTROL ROD POSITION 179 ON BANK D C b: 916 ppm RCS PRESS:       2235 psig X Protected Train - Train A XUnit 2 is in Mode 1 @ 100% power X Risk Assessment - GREEN XBAT C B = 7447 ppm  
MODE:           1         REACTOR POWER:         72%           MWE:           875 RCS                       CONTROL ROD TAVE:         577 &deg;F       POSITION               179           ON BANK         D RCS Cb:           916 ppm PRESS:                       2235   psig X   Protected Train - Train A                         X  Unit 2 is in Mode 1 @ 100% power X   Risk Assessment - GREEN                           X  BAT CB = 7447 ppm CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Shift Relief Checklist R.docc
 
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc Facility:
CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 3 (Spare)  Op Test No.: July 2010 NRC Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:  ~1X10-8 amps BOL - RCS Boron is 1545 ppm by Chemistry sample. Steam Dump System in service for RCS Temperature Control. Turnover: Raise Power to 2% in preparation for plant startup to 100% power.
Critical Tasks:  Restore Feedwater Flow to any Affected Steam Generator.
Determine Inadvertent Safety Injection & Secure Charging Prior to Pressurizer Overfill.
Determine Loss of Coolant Accident in Progress and Reinitiate Safety Injection.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type* Event Description 1 +20 min  R (RO) N (BOP, SRO) Raise Reactor power to 2%.
2 +30 min FW24A C (BOP)  TS (SRO) Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (1-01) Trip.
3 +35 min RP17D TS (SRO) Containment Pressure Transmitter (PT-937) Fails High.
4 +40 min MS13B I (BOP, SRO)


Atmospheric Relief Valve (1-02) Fails Open due to Steam Pressure Transmitter (PT-2326) Failure.
Appendix D                                  Scenario Outline                                      Form ES-D-1 Facility:        CPNPP 1 & 2                  Scenario No.: 3            Op Test No.:    July 2010 NRC (Spare)
5 +45 min RP14A M (RO, BOP, SRO)Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal.  
Examiners:                                              Operators:
Initial Conditions:    *    ~1X10-8 amps BOL - RCS Boron is 1545 ppm by Chemistry sample.
* Steam Dump System in service for RCS Temperature Control.
Turnover:              Raise Power to 2% in preparation for plant startup to 100% power.
Critical Tasks:
* Restore Feedwater Flow to any Affected Steam Generator.
* Determine Inadvertent Safety Injection & Secure Charging Prior to Pressurizer Overfill.
* Determine Loss of Coolant Accident in Progress and Reinitiate Safety Injection.
Event No.      Malf. No.      Event Type*                                Event Description 1                  R (RO)              Raise Reactor power to 2%.
+20 min                  N (BOP, SRO) 2      FW24A      C (BOP)              Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (1-01) Trip.
+30 min                  TS (SRO) 3      RP17D      TS (SRO)            Containment Pressure Transmitter (PT-937) Fails High.
+35 min 4      MS13B      I (BOP, SRO)        Atmospheric Relief Valve (1-02) Fails Open due to Steam Pressure
+40 min                                      Transmitter (PT-2326) Failure.
5       RP14A       M (RO, BOP, SRO) Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal.
+45 min 6      CV01B      C (RO)              Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-01) Trip.
+45 min      CV01E                            Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-02) SI Sequencer Start Failure.
7      RC17C      C (RO)              Loss of Coolant Accident at 1700 gpm Following Isolation of High
+60 min                                      Head Injection.
    *    (N)ormal,  (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument,  (C)omponent,    (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc


6 +45 min CV01B CV01E C (RO) Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-01) Trip.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #3 SCENARIO  
Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-02) SI Sequencer Start Failure.
7 +60 min RC17C C (RO) Loss of Coolant Accident at 1700 gpm Following Isolation of High Head Injection. * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor,  (TS)Technical Specifications
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #3 CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc SCENARIO  


==SUMMARY==
==SUMMARY==
NRC #3 The crew will assume the watch with a Plant Startup in progress and will continue raising power to approximately 2% per IPO-002A, Plant Startup from Hot Standby.
NRC #3 The crew will assume the watch with a Plant Startup in progress and will continue raising power to approximately 2% per IPO-002A, Plant Startup from Hot Standby.
When conditions are stable, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-01 will trip. The crew will refer to ABN-305, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunction, Section 3.0, and determine that Steam Generator levels are slowly decreasing and start the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
When conditions are stable, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-01 will trip. The crew will refer to ABN-305, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunction, Section 3.0, and determine that Steam Generator levels are slowly decreasing and start the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
When the Steam Generator levels are stable, a Containment Pressure Transmitter will fail high. Crew response will be per ALM-0022A, 1-ALB-2B, Window 3.10, CNTMT 1 OF 4 PRESS HI-3, and include verifying that only one channel is affected. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.  
When the Steam Generator levels are stable, a Containment Pressure Transmitter will fail high. Crew response will be per ALM-0022A, 1-ALB-2B, Window 3.10, CNTMT 1 OF 4 PRESS HI-3, and include verifying that only one channel is affected. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
 
When Technical Specifications have been referenced, a Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve (ARV) fails open due to a Main Steam Pressure Transmitter failure. This event is recognized by a Reactor power increase and the ARV Controller indicating 100% demand. The BOP will place the affected Controller in Manual and close the ARV. ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 2.0, will be referenced.
When Technical Specifications have been referenced, a Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve (ARV) fails open due to a Main Steam Pressure Transmitter failure. This event is recognized by a Reactor power increase and the ARV Controller indicating 100% demand. The BOP will place the  
 
affected Controller in Manual and close the ARV. ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 2.0, will be referenced.
The major event begins with a spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal. The crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and perform immediate actions including actuation of both Trains of Safety Injection.
The major event begins with a spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal. The crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and perform immediate actions including actuation of both Trains of Safety Injection.
When it is determined that a spurious Safety Injection actuation has occurred, the crew will transition to EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination. During the event the Train A Centrifugal Charging Pump will trip and the Train B Centrifugal Charging Pump will fail to auto start on the Safety Injection Sequencer.
When it is determined that a spurious Safety Injection actuation has occurred, the crew will transition to EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination. During the event the Train A Centrifugal Charging Pump will trip and the Train B Centrifugal Charging Pump will fail to auto start on the Safety Injection Sequencer.
When the high head injection alignment is secured in EOS-1.1A, a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident will occur. This will require re-initiation of Safety Injection flow per the Foldout Page Criteria of EOS-1.1A.
When the high head injection alignment is secured in EOS-1.1A, a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident will occur. This will require re-initiation of Safety Injection flow per the Foldout Page Criteria of EOS-1.1A.
Event termination will occur when the crew has reinitiated Safety Injection and transitioned to EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Event termination will occur when the crew has reinitiated Safety Injection and transitioned to EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Risk Significance
Risk Significance:
:  Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Loss of MDAFW Pump  
* Failure of risk important system prior to trip:     Loss of MDAFW Pump SG Atmospheric Relief Valve Failure
 
* Risk significant core damage sequence:               Small Break LOCA Following SI Termination
SG Atmospheric Relief Valve Failure Risk significant core damage sequence: Small Break LOCA Following SI Termination Risk significant operator actions: Initiate Charging Flow upon Safety Injection Secure Charging Prior To Pressurizer Overfill Reinitiate Safety Injection Flow  
* Risk significant operator actions:                   Initiate Charging Flow upon Safety Injection Secure Charging Prior To Pressurizer Overfill Reinitiate Safety Injection Flow CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #3 CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc BOOTH OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC #8 and Event File for NRC Scenario #3.
EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND VALUE INITIATING PARAMETER SETUP  CV01E Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-02) start failure - K0  1  N/A Raise Reactor power to 2% - -  2  FW24A Train A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (1-01) trip TRIP K2  3  RP17D Containment pressure channel (PT-937) failure 60 psig K3  4  MS13B PT-2326 failure fails ARV 1-02 open 1300 psig K4  5  RP14A Spurious Train A Safety Injection actuation  - K5  6  CV01B Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-01) trip (NOTE 1) TRIP K6 6  CV01E Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-02) start failure START FAILURE K0 NOTE 1: Initiate K6 after EOP-0.0A Immediate Actions are complete.
7  RC17C Loss of Coolant Accident (NOTE 2) 1700 gpm K7 NOTE 2: Initiate K7 after RHR Pumps are stopped at Step 13 of EOS-1.1A.


Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #3 CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc Booth Operator: INITIALIZE to IC #8 and NRC Scenario #3 SETUP file. ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE. VERIFY all Control Board Tags are removed.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #3 BOOTH OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC #8 and Event File for NRC Scenario #3.
ENSURE Control Rods are in MANUAL with Control Rod Bank C @ 215 steps
EVENT TYPE MALF #                      DESCRIPTION                    DEMAND    INITIATING VALUE  PARAMETER SETUP     CV01E      Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-02) start failure        -        K0 1        N/A      Raise Reactor power to 2%                              -        -
2        FW24A      Train A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (1-01) trip        TRIP        K2 3        RP17D      Containment pressure channel (PT-937) failure      60 psig      K3 4        MS13B      PT-2326 failure fails ARV 1-02 open              1300 psig      K4 5        RP14A      Spurious Train A Safety Injection actuation          -        K5 6        CV01B    Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-01) trip (NOTE 1)      TRIP        K6 6        CV01E    Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-02) start failure      START        K0 FAILURE NOTE 1: Initiate K6 after EOP-0.0A Immediate Actions are complete.
7        RC17C      Loss of Coolant Accident (NOTE 2)                1700 gpm      K7 NOTE 2: Initiate K7 after RHR Pumps are stopped at Step 13 of EOS-1.1A.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc


and Bank D @ 100 steps. ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed. PLACE Plant Computer, right hand RO and US Computer screens for MODE 2.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #3 Booth Operator: INITIALIZE to IC #8 and NRC Scenario #3 SETUP file.
ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.
VERIFY all Control Board Tags are removed.
ENSURE Control Rods are in MANUAL with Control Rod Bank C @ 215 steps and Bank D @ 100 steps.
ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.
PLACE Plant Computer, right hand RO and US Computer screens for MODE 2.
ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions.
ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions.
ENSURE all PRZR Heaters energized.
ENSURE all PRZR Heaters energized.
ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.
ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.
ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk: - COPY of IPO-002A, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Section 5.4, Increasing Reactor Power to ~2% Following Reactor Startup.
ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:
Significant Control Room Annunciators in Alarm
                - COPY of IPO-002A, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Section 5.4, Increasing Reactor Power to ~2% Following Reactor Startup.
: PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.3 - AMSAC BLK TURB <40% PWR C-20 PCIP-1.4 - CNDNSR AVAIL STM DUMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.7 - RX  50% PWR TURB TRIP PERM P-9 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.4 - LO TURB PWR ROD WTHDRWL BLK C-5 PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.5 - RX & TURB  10% PWR P-7 PCIP-4.5 - RX  48% PWR 3-LOOP FLO PERM P-8 PCIP-4.6 - TURB  10% PWR P-13 6D-1.1 - SR HI VOLT FAIL 6D-1.3 - SR SHTDN FLUX ALM BLK 7B-1.6 - FW FLUSH VLV NOT CLOSE HV-2166 7B-4.8 - FWP A / B RECIRC VLV NOT CLOSED 8A-1.3 - FWPT B TRIP 8A-1.10 - 1 OF 4 TURB STOP VLV CLOSE Numerous 9A Feedwater alarms  
Significant Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:
PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.3 - AMSAC BLK TURB <40% PWR C-20 PCIP-1.4 - CNDNSR AVAIL STM DUMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.7 - RX  50% PWR TURB TRIP PERM P-9 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.4 - LO TURB PWR ROD WTHDRWL BLK C-5 PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.5 - RX & TURB  10% PWR P-7 PCIP-4.5 - RX  48% PWR 3-LOOP FLO PERM P-8 PCIP-4.6 - TURB  10% PWR P-13 6D-1.1 - SR HI VOLT FAIL 6D-1.3 - SR SHTDN FLUX ALM BLK 7B-1.6 - FW FLUSH VLV NOT CLOSE HV-2166 7B-4.8 - FWP A / B RECIRC VLV NOT CLOSED 8A-1.3 - FWPT B TRIP 8A-1.10 - 1 OF 4 TURB STOP VLV CLOSE Numerous 9A Feedwater alarms CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 5 of 20 Event
Appendix D                                     Operator Action                           Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #   3       Event #             1       Page 5   of 20 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Power Ascension to ~2% Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc Booth Operator: ENSURE Simulator in RUN when crew is ready to assume the watch.  
Power Ascension to ~2%
  +1 min US DIRECT performance of IPO-002A, Plant Startup from Hot Standby.
Time         Position                           Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: ENSURE Simulator in RUN when crew is ready to assume the watch.
RO ESTABLISH a startup rate of ~ 0.5 DPM to increase Reactor power to ~ 2%.
  +1 min           US       DIRECT performance of IPO-002A, Plant Startup from Hot Standby.
RO Gradually REDUCE startup rate to ~0.2 DPM as the Intermediate Range channels approach 3x10
RO       ESTABLISH a startup rate of ~ 0.5 DPM to increase Reactor power to ~ 2%.
-6 amps. RO VERIFY Power Range channels begin to respond when the Intermediate Range Channels are between 3x10
Gradually REDUCE startup rate to ~0.2 DPM as the Intermediate Range RO channels approach 3x10-6 amps.
-6 amps and 5x10
VERIFY Power Range channels begin to respond when the Intermediate RO Range Channels are between 3x10-6 amps and 5x10-6 amps.
-6 amps. BOP VERIFY Steam Dump operations maintain RCS temperature at 557&#xba;F and Main Steam pressure at 1092 psig.
VERIFY Steam Dump operations maintain RCS temperature at 557&#xba;F and BOP Main Steam pressure at 1092 psig.
RO VERIFY annunciator alarm PCIP-3.6, TAVE LO LO P-12 is DARK.
RO       VERIFY annunciator alarm PCIP-3.6, TAVE LO LO P-12 is DARK.
RO MAINTAIN Reactor power between 2% and 3%.
RO       MAINTAIN Reactor power between 2% and 3%.
BOP ADJUST Auxiliary Feedwater flow as necessary to maintain SG levels between 60% and 75%.
ADJUST Auxiliary Feedwater flow as necessary to maintain SG levels BOP between 60% and 75%.
When power has been raised to 2 - 3%, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.
When power has been raised to 2 - 3%, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 6 of 20 Event
Appendix D                                           Operator Action                           Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #       3       Event #           2       Page 6   of 20 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2. - FW24A, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-01 trip.
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip Time         Position                               Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2.
Indications Available
                      - FW24A, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-01 trip.
: 8B-4.3 - MD AFWP 1 / 2 OVRLOAD / TRIP 1-PI-2453A, MD AFWP 1 DISCH PRESS indication reading 0 psig 1-FI-2456A, MD AFWP 1 DISCH FLO indication reading 0 gpm 1-HS-2450A, MD AFWP 1 white TRIP light lit  
Indications Available:
+1 min BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedure.
8B-4.3 - MD AFWP 1 / 2 OVRLOAD / TRIP 1-PI-2453A, MD AFWP 1 DISCH PRESS indication reading 0 psig 1-FI-2456A, MD AFWP 1 DISCH FLO indication reading 0 gpm 1-HS-2450A, MD AFWP 1 white TRIP light lit
BOP RECOGNIZE Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-01 trip.
  +1 min         BOP       RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedure.
US DIRECT performance of ABN-305, Aux iliary Feedwater System Malfunction, Section 3.0.
BOP       RECOGNIZE Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-01 trip.
BOP DETERMINE MDAFW Pump 1-02 running and PLACE MDAFW Pump 1-01 in STOP or PULLOUT.
DIRECT performance of ABN-305, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunction, US Section 3.0.
BOP DETERMINE Steam Generator Levels trending down.
DETERMINE MDAFW Pump 1-02 running and PLACE MDAFW Pump 1-01 BOP in STOP or PULLOUT.
CRITICAL TASK STATEMENT Restore Feedwater Flow to Steam Generators 1-01 and 1-02 Prior to Reaching 0% Wide Range Steam Generator Level.
BOP       DETERMINE Steam Generator Levels trending down.
CRITICAL TASK BOP START the TDAFW Pump and FEED Steam Generators 1-01 and 1-02.
CRITICAL TASK           Restore Feedwater Flow to Steam Generators 1-01 and 1-02 Prior to Reaching STATEMENT            0% Wide Range Steam Generator Level.
OPEN 1-HS-2452-1, AFWPT STM SPLY VLV MSL 4 from SG 1-04.
CRITICAL TASK BOP       START the TDAFW Pump and FEED Steam Generators 1-01 and 1-02.
OPEN 1-HS-2452-2, AFWPT STM SPLY VLV MSL 1 from SG 1-01.
* OPEN 1-HS-2452-1, AFWPT STM SPLY VLV MSL 4 from SG 1-04.
RO/BOP DISPATCH a Plant Equipment Operator to check breaker status of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-01.
* OPEN 1-HS-2452-2, AFWPT STM SPLY VLV MSL 1 from SG 1-01.
1EA1/5/BKR, 1APMD1, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-01 BKR.
DISPATCH a Plant Equipment Operator to check breaker status of Auxiliary RO/BOP Feedwater Pump 1-01.
* 1EA1/5/BKR, 1APMD1, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-01 BKR.
Booth Operator: When contacted about the condition of the MDAFW Pump breaker, REPORT an acrid smell and overcurrent flag on Phase B 50/51 relays.
Booth Operator: When contacted about the condition of the MDAFW Pump breaker, REPORT an acrid smell and overcurrent flag on Phase B 50/51 relays.
BOP VERIFY MDAFW Pump suction pressure  10 psig.
BOP       VERIFY MDAFW Pump suction pressure  10 psig.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 7 of 20 Event
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc
 
Appendix D                                           Operator Action                           Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #       3       Event #           2       Page 7   of 20 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc RO/BOP DISPATCH a Nuclear Equipment Operator to check Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-01.
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip Time         Position                               Applicants Actions or Behavior DISPATCH a Nuclear Equipment Operator to check Auxiliary Feedwater RO/BOP Pump 1-01.
Booth Operator: When contacted about the condition of MDAFW Pump 1-01, REPORT that the pump motor is hot.  
Booth Operator: When contacted about the condition of MDAFW Pump 1-01, REPORT that the pump motor is hot.
  +10 min US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.
  +10 min           US       EVALUATE Technical Specifications.
LCO 3.7.5.B, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System.
* LCO 3.7.5.B, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System.
CONDITION B - One AFW train inoperable for reasons other than Condition A. ACTION B.1 - Restore AFW train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to  
* CONDITION B - One AFW train inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.
* ACTION B.1 - Restore AFW train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours.
When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc


Event 3.    
Appendix D                                          Operator Action                            Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :        NRC        Scenario #      3        Event #            3       Page 8   of  20 Event


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 8 of 20 Event
== Description:==
Containment Pressure Transmitter Failure Time          Position                                Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3.
                      - RP17D, Containment Pressure Transmitter (PT-937) fails high.
Indications Available:
2B-3.10 - CNTMT 1 OF 4 PRESS HI-3 1-PT-937, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN I Containment pressure transmitter indication failed high
+30 secs        RO        RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RECOGNIZE Containment pressure transmitter 1-PT-937, CNTMT PRESS RO (IR) CHAN I failed high.
DIRECT performance of ALM-0022A, 1-ALB-2B, Window 3.10, CNTMT 1 OF US 4 PRESS HI-3.
RO        MONITOR Containment pressure.
* 1-PI-934, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN IV
* 1-PI-935, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN III
* 1-PI-936, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN II
* 1-PI-937, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN I DETERMINE 1-PI-937, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN I is reading greater than RO or equal to 2.5 psig from the other channels.
RO        REPORT to Unit Supervisor to REFER to Technical Specifications.
US      EVALUATE Technical Specifications.
* LCO 3.3.2.E, ESFAS Instrumentation.
* CONDITION E - One Containment Pressure channel inoperable.
* ACTION E.1 - Place channel in bypass within 72 hours.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc
 
Appendix D                                           Operator Action                             Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #       3       Event #             3       Page 9    of 20 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Containment Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3. - RP17D, Containment Pressure Transmitter (PT-937) fails high.
Containment Pressure Transmitter Failure Time         Position                                 Applicants Actions or Behavior
Indications Available
  +5 min            US       CORRECT the condition or INITIATE a Work Request per STA-606.
: 2B-3.10 - CNTMT 1 OF 4 PRESS HI-3 1-PT-937, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN I Containment pressure transmitter indication failed high
When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.
  +30 secs RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc
RO RECOGNIZE Containment pressure transmitter 1-PT-937, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN I failed high.
US DIRECT performance of ALM-0022A, 1-ALB-2B, Window 3.10, CNTMT 1 OF 4 PRESS HI-3.
RO  MONITOR Containment pressure.
1-PI-934, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN IV 1-PI-935, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN III 1-PI-936, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN II 1-PI-937, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN I RO  DETERMINE 1-PI-937, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN I is reading greater than or equal to 2.5 psig from the other channels.
RO REPORT to Unit Supervisor to REFER to Technical Specifications.
US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.
LCO 3.3.2.E, ESFAS Instrumentation.
CONDITION E - One Containment Pressure channel inoperable. ACTION E.1 - Place channel in bypass within 72 hours.


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 9 of 20 Event
Appendix D                                           Operator Action                   Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC       Scenario #         3     Event #   4      Page   10    of 20 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Containment Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc
Steam Pressure Control Channel Fails High Time         Position   Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4.
+5 min US CORRECT the condition or INITIATE a Work Request per STA-606.
                      -MS13B, Steam Pressure Channel (PT-2326) fails high.
When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.  
Indications Available:
1-PI-2326, MSL 2 PRESS pegged high 1-ZL-2326, SG 2 ATMOS RLF VLV read OPEN light LIT Y6845D Plant Computer alarm
  +1 min          BOP      RESPOND to Dynamic Alarm Display (DAD) Alarm.
RECOGNIZE Steam Generator 1-02 Steam Pressure Transmitter (PT-2326)
BOP failed high.
DIRECT performance of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header US      Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 2.0.
BOP      DETERMINE Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve - OPEN.
US      DIRECT closing of Steam Generator 1-02, Atmospheric Relief Valve.
PLACE 1-PK-2326, SG 2 ATMOS RLF VLV CTRL in MANUAL and 0%
BOP DEMAND to CLOSE Valve.
  +5 min           US       NOTIFY Chemistry that a release has occurred.
When the Atmospheric Relief Valve is closed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Events 5, 6, and 7.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 10 of 20 Event
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                                     Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC         Scenario #         3         Event #         5, 6, & 7      Page     11    of   20 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Steam Pressure Control Channel Fails High Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4. -MS13B, Steam Pressure Channel (PT-2326) fails high.
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 5.
Indications Available
                      - RP14A, Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal.
: 1-PI-2326, MSL 2 PRESS pegged high 1-ZL-2326, SG 2 ATMOS RLF VLV read OPEN light LIT Y6845D Plant Computer alarm
Indications Available:
  +1 min BOP RESPOND to Dynamic Alarm Display (DAD) Alarm.
6C-1.1 - MAN RX TRIP Numerous plant trip alarms
BOP RECOGNIZE Steam Generator 1-02 Steam Pressure Transmitter (PT-2326) failed high.
  +30 secs      RO/BOP       RECOGNIZE Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.
US DIRECT performance of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 2.0.
US       DIRECT performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
BOP DETERMINE Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve - OPEN.
RO        VERIFY Reactor Trip:
US DIRECT closing of Steam Generator 1-02, Atmospheric Relief Valve.
* DETERMINE Reactor Trip Breakers - OPEN.
BOP PLACE 1-PK-2326, SG 2 ATMOS RLF VLV CTRL in MANUAL and 0%
* DETERMINE Neutron flux - DECREASING.
DEMAND to CLOSE Valve.  
RO        DETERMINE all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - ON.
+5 min US NOTIFY Chemistry that a release has occurred.
BOP       VERIFY Turbine Trip:
When the Atmospheric Relief Valve is closed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to
* DETERMINE all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.
BOP      VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses:
* DETERMINE both AC Safeguard Buses - ENERGIZED.
RO        CHECK if SI is Actuated:
* DETERMINE SI is actuated on Train A.
* Manually ACTUATE SI to initiate dual train SI.
* PLACE 1/1-SI2, SI MAN ACT Switch to ACT position.
RO        VERIFY both Trains of Safety Injection actuated.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc


Events 5, 6, and 7.
Appendix D                                                Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :        NRC          Scenario #        3        Event #        5, 6, & 7     Page    12    of    20 Event


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 11 of 20 Event
== Description:==
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time          Position                                    Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When EOP-0.0A, Step 4 has been verbally verified AND the Master Silence Alarm has timed out, EXECUTE Event 6.
                      - CV01B, Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-01) trip.
                      - CV01E, Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-02) fails to start.
RO        RECOGNIZE CCP 1-01 trip.
* START CCP 1-02.
* VERIFY at least one CCP - RUNNING.
* VERIFY Seal Injection Flow to each RCP -BETWEEN 6 GPM AND 13 GPM.
Examiner Note: EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps performed by BOP are identified later in the scenario.
US/BOP      INITIATE Proper Safeguards Equipment Operation Per Attachment 2.
RO        VERIFY AFW Alignment:
* DETERMINE MDAFW Pump 1 RUNNING.
* DETERMINE Turbine Driven AFW Pump - RUNNING.
* DETERMINE AFW total flow - GREATER THAN 460 GPM.
* DETERMINE AFW valve alignment - PROPER ALIGNMENT.
RO        VERIFY Containment Spray NOT Required:
* VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 1-8, CS ACT NOT illuminated.
* VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT NOT illuminated.
* DETERMINE Containment pressure remained < 18.0 PSIG.
* VERIFY Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Outlet Valves - CLOSED.
* VERIFY all Containment Spray Pumps - RUNNING.
RO        DETERMINE Main Steam Lines Should NOT Be Isolated:
* VERIFY Containment pressure < 6 PSIG.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc
 
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                                     Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC         Scenario #         3         Event #         5, 6, & 7     Page     13    of   20 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 5. - RP14A, Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal.
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior
Indications Available
* VERIFY Main Steam Line pressure > 610 PSIG.
: 6C-1.1 - MAN RX TRIP Numerous plant trip alarms
RO        CHECK RCS Temperature:
+30 secs RO/BOP RECOGNIZE Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.
* DETERMINE RCS average temperature stable at or trending to 557&#xba;F.
US DIRECT performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
RO        CHECK PRZR Valve Status:
RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:
* VERIFY PRZR Safeties - CLOSED.
DETERMINE Reactor Trip Breakers - OPEN.
* VERIFY Normal PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED.
DETERMINE Neutron flux - DECREASING.
* VERIFY PORVs - CLOSED.
RO DETERMINE all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - ON.
* VERIFY Power to at least one Block Valve - AVAILABLE.
BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:
* VERIFY Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.
DETERMINE all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.
RO       CHECK if RCPs Should Be Stopped:
BOP VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses:
* DETERMINE both SI Pumps - RUNNING.
DETERMINE both AC Safeguard Buses - ENERGIZED.
* DETERMINE Train A CCP Pump 1 TRIPPED.
RO CHECK if SI is Actuated:
* START Train B CCP Pump 1-02.
DETERMINE SI is actuated on Train A.
* DETERMINE RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 25&#xba;F (55&#xba;F adverse).
Manually ACTUATE SI to initiate dual train SI.
* Continue RUNNING Reactor Coolant Pumps.
PLACE 1/1-SI2, SI MAN ACT Switch to ACT position.
RO/BOP       CHECK if Any Steam Generator Is Faulted:
RO VERIFY both Trains of Safety Injection actuated.  
* DETERMINE pressure in all Steam Generators - NORMAL.
RO/BOP       CHECK if any Steam Generator is Ruptured:
* DETERMINE radiation levels in all Steam Generators - NORMAL.
RO/BOP      CHECK if RCS is intact:
* DETERMINE Containment pressure, radiation level and sump levels - NORMAL.
US/RO      CHECK if ECCS Flow to Should Be Reduced:
* VERIFY Secondary heat sink:
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 12 of 20 Event
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                                     Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC         Scenario #         3         Event #         5, 6, & 7     Page     14    of   20 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc Booth Operator:  When EOP-0.0A, Step 4 has been verbally verified AND the Master Silence Alarm has timed out, EXECUTE Event 6. - CV01B, Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-01) trip.
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior
- CV01E, Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-02) fails to start.
* DETERMINE Total AFW Flow to intact SGs > 460 GPM.
RO RECOGNIZE CCP 1-01 trip.
* DETERMINE Narrow Range Level in SGs > 43%.
START CCP 1-02.
* VERIFY RCS subcooling > 25&#xba;F.
VERIFY at least one CCP - RUNNING.
* VERIFY RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
VERIFY Seal Injection Flow to each RCP -BETWEEN 6 GPM AND 13 GPM. Examiner Note: EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps performed by BOP are identified later in the scenario.
* VERIFY PRZR level > 13%.
US/BOP INITIATE Proper Safeguards Equipment Operation Per Attachment 2.
US      DETERMINE ECCS flow should be reduced and TRANSITION to EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination.
RO VERIFY AFW Alignment:
Examiner Note: These steps are performed by the BOP as required per EOP-0.0A, Attachment
DETERMINE MDAFW Pump 1 RUNNING.
: 2. EOS-1.1A steps are identified later in the scenario.
DETERMINE Turbine Driven AFW Pump - RUNNING.
BOP       VERIFY SSW Alignment:
DETERMINE AFW total flow - GREATER THAN 460 GPM.
* VERIFY both SSW Pumps - RUNNING.
DETERMINE AFW valve alignment - PROPER ALIGNMENT.
* VERIFY Diesel Generator Cooler SSW return flow.
RO VERIFY Containment Spray NOT Required:
BOP      VERIFY both Safety Injection Pumps - RUNNING.
VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 1-8, CS ACT NOT illuminated.
BOP      VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A.
VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT NOT illuminated.
BOP      VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation.
DETERMINE Containment pressure remained < 18.0 PSIG.
BOP      VERIFY both CCW Pumps - RUNNING.
VERIFY Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Outlet Valves - CLOSED.
BOP      VERIFY both RHR Pumps - RUNNING.
VERIFY all Containment Spray Pumps - RUNNING.
BOP      VERIFY Proper CVCS Alignment:
RO DETERMINE Main Steam Lines Should NOT Be Isolated:
* DETERMINE Train A CCP Pump - TRIPPED.
VERIFY Containment pressure < 6 PSIG.
* If secured, START Train B CCP Pump.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 13 of 20 Event
* VERIFY CCP 1 RUNNING.
* VERIFY Letdown Relief Valve isolation:
* DETERMINE Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc
 
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                                     Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC           Scenario #       3         Event #         5, 6, & 7     Page     15    of   20 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc VERIFY Main Steam Line pressure > 610 PSIG.
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior
RO CHECK RCS Temperature:
* DETERMINE Letdown Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
DETERMINE RCS average temperature stable at or trending to 557&#xba;F.
BOP      VERIFY ECCS flow:
RO CHECK PRZR Valve Status:
* DETERMINE Train B CCP SI flow indicated.
VERIFY PRZR Safeties - CLOSED.
* DETERMINE RCS pressure > 1700 PSIG (1800 PSIG adverse).
VERIFY Normal PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED.
* DETERMINE NO SI Pump flow indicated.
VERIFY PORVs - CLOSED.
* DETERMINE RCS pressure > 325 PSIG (425 PSIG adverse).
VERIFY Power to at least one Block Valve - AVAILABLE.
BOP      VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Complete:
VERIFY Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.
* VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
RO CHECK if RCPs Should Be Stopped:
* VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Bypass Valves - CLOSED.
DETERMINE both SI Pumps - RUNNING.
* VERIFY Feedwater Bypass Control Valves - CLOSED.
DETERMINE Train A CCP Pump 1 TRIPPED.
* VERIFY Feedwater Control Valves - CLOSED.
START Train B CCP Pump 1-02.
BOP      VERIFY both Diesel Generators - RUNNING.
DETERMINE RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 25&#xba;F (55&#xba;F adverse).
BOP      VERIFY Monitor Lights For SI Load Shedding illuminated.
Continue RUNNING Reactor Coolant Pumps.
BOP      VERIFY Proper SI alignment per MLB light indication.
RO/BOP CHECK if Any Steam Generator Is Faulted:
BOP      VERIFY Components Properly Aligned per Table 1.
DETERMINE pressure in all Steam Generators - NORMAL.
Location    Equipment                  Description                        Condition CB-03      X-HS-5534            H2 PRG SPLY FN 4                        STOPPED CB-03      X-HS-5532            H2 PRG SPLY FN 3                        STOPPED CB-04      1/1-8716A              RHRP 1 XTIE VLV                          OPEN CB-04      1/1-8716B              RHRP 2 XTIE VLV                          OPEN CB-06      1/1-8153            XS LTDN ISOL VLV                        CLOSED CB-06      1/1-8154            XS LTDN ISOL VLV                        CLOSED CB-07      1/1-RTBAL                RX TRIP BKR                            OPEN CB-07      1/1-RTBBL                RX TRIP BKR                            OPEN CB-07      1/1-BBAL              RX TRIP BYP BKR                  OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-07      1/1-BBBL              RX TRIP BYP BKR                  OPEN/DEENERGIZED CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc
RO/BOP CHECK if any Steam Generator is Ruptured:
DETERMINE radiation levels in all Steam Generators - NORMAL.
RO/BOP CHECK if RCS is intact:
DETERMINE Containment pressure, radiation level and sump levels - NORMAL.
US/RO CHECK if ECCS Flow to Should Be Reduced:
VERIFY Secondary heat sink:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 14 of 20 Event


== Description:==
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                                     Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC         Scenario #         3         Event #         5, 6, & 7     Page     16    of   20 Event
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc DETERMINE Total AFW Flow to intact SGs > 460 GPM.
DETERMINE Narrow Range Level in SGs > 43%.
VERIFY RCS subcooling > 25&#xba;F.
VERIFY RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
VERIFY PRZR level > 13%.
US DETERMINE ECCS flow should be reduced and TRANSITION to  EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination.
Examiner Note: These steps are performed by the BOP as required per EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2. EOS-1.1A steps are identified later in the scenario.
BOP VERIFY SSW Alignment:
VERIFY both SSW Pumps - RUNNING.
VERIFY Diesel Generator Cooler SSW return flow.
BOP VERIFY both Safety Injection Pumps - RUNNING.
BOP VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A.
BOP VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation.
BOP VERIFY both CCW Pumps - RUNNING.
BOP VERIFY both RHR Pumps - RUNNING.
BOP VERIFY Proper CVCS Alignment:
DETERMINE Train A CCP Pump - TRIPPED.
If secured, START Train B CCP Pump.
VERIFY CCP 1 RUNNING.
VERIFY Letdown Relief Valve isolation:
DETERMINE Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 15 of 20 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc DETERMINE Letdown Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior CB-08    1-HS-2397A        SG 1 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV                      CLOSED CB-08    1-HS-2398A        SG 2 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV                      CLOSED CB-08    1-HS-2399A        SG 3 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV                      CLOSED CB-08    1-HS-2400A        SG 4 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV                      CLOSED CB-08    1-HS-2111C                FWPT A TRIP                          TRIPPED CB-08    1-HS-2112C                FWPT B TRIP                          TRIPPED CB-09      1-HS-2490            CNDS XFER PUMP                STOPPED (MCC deenergized on SI)
BOP VERIFY ECCS flow:
CV-01      X-HS-6181      PRI PLT SPLY FN 17 & INTK            STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01      X-HS-6188      PRI PLT SPLY FN 18 & INTK            STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01      X-HS-6195      PRI PLT SPLY FN 19 & INTK            STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01      X-HS-6202      PRI PLT SPLY FN 20 & INTK            STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01      X-HS-6209      PRI PLT SPLY FN 21 & INTK            STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01      X-HS-6216      PRI PLT SPLY FN 22 & INTK            STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01      X-HS-6223      PRI PLT SPLY FN 23 & INTK            STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01      X-HS-6230      PRI PLT SPLY FN 24 & INTK            STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01      X-HS-3631      UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 1 &                    STARTED BSTR FN 42 CV-01      X-HS-3632      UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 2 &                    STARTED BSTR FN 43 CV-01      1-HS-5600          ELEC AREA EXH FN 1               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01      1-HS-5601          ELEC AREA EXH FN 2              STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01      1-HS-5602        MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH              STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 3 & EXH DMPR CV-01      1-HS-5603        MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH              STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 4 & EXH DMPR CV-01     1-HS-5618        MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY              STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 17 CV-01      1-HS-5620        MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY              STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 18 CV-03      X-HS-5855                CR EXH FN 1                STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc
DETERMINE Train B CCP SI flow indicated.
DETERMINE RCS pressure > 1700 PSIG (1800 PSIG adverse).
DETERMINE NO SI Pump flow indicated.
DETERMINE RCS pressure > 325 PSIG (425 PSIG adverse).
BOP VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Complete:
VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Bypass Valves - CLOSED.
VERIFY Feedwater Bypass Control Valves - CLOSED.
VERIFY Feedwater Control Valves - CLOSED.
BOP VERIFY both Diesel Generators - RUNNING.
BOP VERIFY Monitor Lights For SI Load Shedding illuminated.
BOP VERIFY Proper SI alignment per MLB light indication.
BOP VERIFY Components Properly Aligned per Table 1.
Location Equipment Description Condition  CB-03 X-HS-5534 H2 PRG SPLY FN 4 STOPPED CB-03 X-HS-5532 H2 PRG SPLY FN 3 STOPPED CB-04 1/1-8716A RHRP 1 XTIE VLV OPEN  CB-04 1/1-8716B RHRP 2 XTIE VLV OPEN  CB-06 1/1-8153 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED  CB-06 1/1-8154 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED  CB-07 1/1-RTBAL RX TRIP BKR OPEN  CB-07 1/1-RTBBL RX TRIP BKR OPEN  CB-07 1/1-BBAL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-07 1/1-BBBL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 16 of 20 Event


== Description:==
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                                     Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC         Scenario #         3         Event #         5, 6, & 7     Page     17     of   20 Event
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc CB-08 1-HS-2397A SG 1 BLDN HELB ISOL VLVCLOSED  CB-08 1-HS-2398A SG 2 BLDN HELB ISOL VLVCLOSED  CB-08 1-HS-2399A SG 3 BLDN HELB ISOL VLVCLOSED  CB-08 1-HS-2400A SG 4 BLDN HELB ISOL VLVCLOSED  CB-08 1-HS-2111C FWPT A TRIP TRIPPED  CB-08 1-HS-2112C FWPT B TRIP TRIPPED  CB-09 1-HS-2490 CNDS XFER PUMP STOPPED (MCC deenergized on SI)  CV-01 X-HS-6181 PRI PLT SPLY FN 17 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6188 PRI PLT SPLY FN 18 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6195 PRI PLT SPLY FN 19 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6202 PRI PLT SPLY FN 20 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6209 PRI PLT SPLY FN 21 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6216 PRI PLT SPLY FN 22 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6223 PRI PLT SPLY FN 23 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6230 PRI PLT SPLY FN 24 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-3631 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 1 &
BSTR FN 42 STARTED  CV-01 X-HS-3632 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 2 &
BSTR FN 43 STARTED  CV-01 1-HS-5600 ELEC AREA EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5601 ELEC AREA EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5602 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH FN 3 & EXH DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5603 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH FN 4 & EXH DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5618 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY FN 17 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5620 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY FN 18 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5855 CR EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 17 of 20 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc CV-03 X-HS-5856 CR EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5731 SFP EXH FN 33 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5733 SFP EXH FN 34 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5727 SFP EXH FN 35 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5729 SFP EXH FN 36 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED Examiner Note: The next four (4) steps would be performed on Unit 2.
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior CV-03     X-HS-5856               CR EXH FN 2                 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03     X-HS-5731               SFP EXH FN 33               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03     X-HS-5733               SFP EXH FN 34               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03     X-HS-5727               SFP EXH FN 35               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03     X-HS-5729               SFP EXH FN 36               STOPPED/DEENERGIZED Examiner Note: The next four (4) steps would be performed on Unit 2.
CB-03 2-HS-5538 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5539 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5537 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPRCLOSED  CB-03 2-HS-5536 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPRCLOSED  BOP NOTIFY Unit Supervisor attachment instructions complete and to IMPLEMENT FRGs as required.
CB-03     2-HS-5538         AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR                       CLOSED CB-03     2-HS-5539         AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR                       CLOSED CB-03     2-HS-5537       AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR                      CLOSED CB-03     2-HS-5536       AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR                      CLOSED BOP       NOTIFY Unit Supervisor attachment instructions complete and to IMPLEMENT FRGs as required.
Examiner Note: EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination steps begin here.
Examiner Note: EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination steps begin here.
Examiner Note: The following six (6) steps are performed per EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.D.
Examiner Note: The following six (6) steps are performed per EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.D.
BOP [1.D] PLACE Train B Diesel EMER START/STOP Handswitch in START.
BOP       [1.D] PLACE Train B Diesel EMER START/STOP Handswitch in START.
BOP [1.D] RESET SI.
BOP       [1.D] RESET SI.
BOP [1.D] RESET SI Sequencers.
BOP       [1.D] RESET SI Sequencers.
BOP [1.D] RESET Containment Isolation Phase A and B.
BOP       [1.D] RESET Containment Isolation Phase A and B.
BOP [1.D] RESET Containment Spray Signal.
BOP       [1.D] RESET Containment Spray Signal.
BOP/RO [1.D] ESTABLISH Instrument Air and Nitrogen to Containment.
BOP/RO       [1.D] ESTABLISH Instrument Air and Nitrogen to Containment.
RO DETERMINE CCP 1 RUNNING.  
RO       DETERMINE CCP 1 RUNNING.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 18 of 20 Event
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                                     Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC         Scenario #         3         Event #         5, 6, & 7     Page     18     of   20 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc US/RO CHECK RCS Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior US/RO       CHECK RCS Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
Examiner Note: The following two (2) steps are performed per EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.J.
Examiner Note: The following two (2) steps are performed per EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.J.
CRITICAL TASK STATEMENT Determine Inadvertent Safety Injection & Terminate ECCS flow prior to exiting EOS-1.1A.
CRITICAL TASK           Determine Inadvertent Safety Injection & Terminate ECCS flow prior to exiting STATEMENT              EOS-1.1A.
CRITICAL TASK RO [1.J] ISOLATE CCP Injection Line Flow Path:
CRITICAL TASK RO       [1.J] ISOLATE CCP Injection Line Flow Path:
VERIFY CCP - SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST.
* VERIFY CCP - SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST.
ALIGN CCP Miniflow Valves:
* ALIGN CCP Miniflow Valves:
OPEN 1/1-8110 and 1/1-8111, CCP Miniflow Valves.
* OPEN 1/1-8110 and 1/1-8111, CCP Miniflow Valves.
CLOSE 1/1-8511A and 1/1-8511B, CCP Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves. PLACE Charging Flow Control Valve in MANUAL and 35% demand.
* CLOSE 1/1-8511A and 1/1-8511B, CCP Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves.
CLOSE 1/1-8801A and 1/1-8801B, CCP Injection Line Isolation Valves.
* PLACE Charging Flow Control Valve in MANUAL and 35% demand.
RO [1.J] ESTABLISH Charging Flow Path:
* CLOSE 1/1-8801A and 1/1-8801B, CCP Injection Line Isolation Valves.
OPEN 1/1-8105 and 1/1-8106, Charging Line Isolation Valves.
RO       [1.J] ESTABLISH Charging Flow Path:
ADJUST Charging Flow Control Valve to establish Charging flow.
* OPEN 1/1-8105 and 1/1-8106, Charging Line Isolation Valves.
ADJUST RCP seal flow to maintain between 6 gpm and 13 gpm.
* ADJUST Charging Flow Control Valve to establish Charging flow.
RO CONTROL Charging Flow to maintain PRZR Level.
* ADJUST RCP seal flow to maintain between 6 gpm and 13 gpm.
RO CHECK If SI Pumps Should Be Stopped:
RO       CONTROL Charging Flow to maintain PRZR Level.
CHECK RCS pressure:
RO       CHECK If SI Pumps Should Be Stopped:
DETERMINE RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
* CHECK RCS pressure:
DETERMINE RCS pressure > 1700 PSIG.
* DETERMINE RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
STOP both SI Pumps and PLACE in Standby.
* DETERMINE RCS pressure > 1700 PSIG.
RO CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:
* STOP both SI Pumps and PLACE in Standby.
DETERMINE RHR Pumps RUNNING with suction aligned to RWST.
RO       CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 19 of 20 Event
* DETERMINE RHR Pumps RUNNING with suction aligned to RWST.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc
 
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                                     Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC         Scenario #         3         Event #         5, 6, & 7     Page     19     of   20 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc STOP both RHR Pumps and PLACE in Standby.
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior
RESET RHR Auto Switchover.
* STOP both RHR Pumps and PLACE in Standby.
Booth Operator: When RHR Pumps are stopped and RHR Auto Switchover is reset, EXECUTE Event 7. - RC17C, Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident @ 1700 gpm.  
* RESET RHR Auto Switchover.
+20 min US/RO RECOGNIZE PZR level and subcooling lowering and TRANSITION to EOP-1.0.A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Booth Operator: When RHR Pumps are stopped and RHR Auto Switchover is reset, EXECUTE Event 7.
Examiner Note: Crew may choose to start ECCS Pumps, open High Head Injection Valves or initiate Safety Injection. Any of these actions meets the CPNPP EOP  
                      - RC17C, Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident @ 1700 gpm.
 
+20 min         US/RO       RECOGNIZE PZR level and subcooling lowering and TRANSITION to EOP-1.0.A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Guidelines.
Examiner Note: Crew may choose to start ECCS Pumps, open High Head Injection Valves or initiate Safety Injection. Any of these actions meets the CPNPP EOP Guidelines.
CRITICAL TASK STATEMENT Manually Initiate Safety Injection Flow Prior to exiting EOS-1.1A.
CRITICAL TASK Manually Initiate Safety Injection Flow Prior to exiting EOS-1.1A.
CRITICAL TASK RO/BOP START ECCS Pumps and/or REALIGN High Head Injection Valves and/or manually INITIATE Safety Injection.
STATEMENT CRITICAL                     START ECCS Pumps and/or REALIGN High Head Injection Valves and/or TASK          RO/BOP manually INITIATE Safety Injection.
Examiner Note: EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, steps begin here.
Examiner Note: EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, steps begin here.
RO CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:
RO       CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:
DETERMINE ECCS Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.
* DETERMINE ECCS Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.
DETERMINE RCS subcooling < 25&#xba;F (55&#xba;F adverse).
* DETERMINE RCS subcooling < 25&#xba;F (55&#xba;F adverse).
STOP all RCPs.
* STOP all RCPs.
RO DETERMINE That NO Steam Generator Is Faulted.
RO       DETERMINE That NO Steam Generator Is Faulted.
BOP CHECK Intact SG Levels:
BOP       CHECK Intact SG Levels:
DETERMINE Steam Generator narrow range levels > 43% (50%
* DETERMINE Steam Generator narrow range levels > 43% (50%
adverse).
adverse).
CONTROL AFW Flow to maintain level between 50% and 60%.  
* CONTROL AFW Flow to maintain level between 50% and 60%.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 20 of 20 Event
Appendix D                                               Operator Action                                     Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :       NRC         Scenario #         3         Event #         5, 6, & 7     Page     20     of   20 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc RO/BOP CHECK Secondary Radiation - NORMAL.
Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time         Position                                     Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/BOP       CHECK Secondary Radiation - NORMAL.
RO CHECK PRZR PORVs And Block Valves - AVAILABLE.  
RO       CHECK PRZR PORVs And Block Valves - AVAILABLE.
  +40 min US DETERMINE ECCS Flow Should NOT Be Reduced.
  +40 min           US       DETERMINE ECCS Flow Should NOT Be Reduced.
When High Head Safety Injection flow is restored, TERMINATE the scenario.  
When High Head Safety Injection flow is restored, TERMINATE the scenario.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc


ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 CPNPP July 2010 NRC ES-301-5 Transient and Event Checklist R.doc Facility: CPNPP 1 and 2 Date of Ex am: 07/07/10 Operating Test No.: NRC A P P L I C A N T E V E N T  T Y P
ES-301                                       Transient and Event Checklist                                 Form ES-301-5 Facility:     CPNPP 1 and 2                             Date of Exam:     07/07/10       Operating Test No.:     NRC A           E SCENARIOS P           V P           E CPNPP #1             CPNPP #2         CPNPP #3 (Spare)
E SCENARIOS CPNPP #1 CPNPP #2 CPNPP #3 (Spare)
L          N T       MINIMUM(*)
T O T A L MINIMUM(*)
I          T CREW                CREW                  CREW            CREW         O C
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P R I U  SROI-1 RX - - - - - -       0 1 1 0 NOR - - - - - -       0 1 1 1 I/C 1,2,3, 4 - - - 1,3, 6 -       7 4 4 2 MAJ 5 - -      2 2 2 1 TS 1,4 - - - - -       2 0 2 2 RO-1 RX - - - - - -       0 1 1 0 NOR - - - - - -       0 1 1 1 I/C - 1,4, 8 - - - 1,2, 4, 7,8      8 4 4 2 MAJ - - 5       2 2 2 1 TS - - - - - -       0 0 2 2 Instructions:
POSITION             POSITION             POSITION         POSITION       T A          T A
: 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position. 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
N          Y      S      A      B      S       A      B    S      A    B    S      A    B R     T      O     R      T       O     R     T    O   R      T     O   L      R    I    U T          P E      O     C     P    O       C      P     O     C     P    O     C    P RX       -     -       -     -       -       -                                         0     1     1     0 NOR       -     -       -     -       -       -                                         0     1    1     1 SROI-1       I/C   1,2,3,   -       -     -     1,3,     -
: 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.  
7     4     4     2 4                            6 MAJ       5     -      -     -      5      -                                          2     2     2     1 TS     1,4     -       -     -       -       -                                         2     0     2     2 RX       -     -       -     -       -       -                                         0     1     1     0 NOR       -     -       -     -       -       -                                         0     1     1     1 RO-1        I/C     -     1,4,     -     -       -   1,2, 4, 8     4     4     2 8                            7,8 MAJ       -    5      -    -       -       5                                         2     2     2     1 TS       -     -       -     -       -       -                                         0     0     2     2 Instructions:
: 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
: 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
: 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC ES-301-5 Transient and Event Checklist R.doc


ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 CPNPP July 2010 NRC ES-301-6 Competencies Checklist Rev c.doc Facility:
ES-301                                         Competencies Checklist                         Form ES-301-6 Facility:     CPNPP           Date of Examination:             07/07/10     Operating Test No. NRC 1, 2, 3 Applicants SROI-1                             RO-1 Competencies                 SCENARIO                         SCENARIO                 SCENARIO 1     2                         1     2 Interpret/Diag-1,2,3, 1,3,                     1,4,5, 1,2,4, nose Events              4,5    5,6                        8    5,7,8 and Conditions Comply With 1,3,                     1,4,5, 1,2,4, and Use                  ALL 5,6                        8    5,7,8 Procedures (1)
CPNPP Date of Examination:
Operate 1,3,                     1,4,5, 1,2,4, Control Boards          N/A 5,6                        8    5,7,8 (2)
07/07/10 Operating Test No. NRC 1, 2, 3 Applicants SROI-1 RO-1 Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2   1 2       Interpret/Diag-nose Events and Conditions 1,2,3, 4,5 1,3, 5,6  1,4,5, 8 1,2,4,5,7,8       Comply With and Use Procedures (1)
Communicate 1,2,3,                    1,4,5, 1,2,4, and                      ALL 5,6                      6,7,8 5,7,8 Interact Demonstrate Supervisory             ALL   N/A                       N/A   N/A Ability (3)
ALL 1,3, 5,6  1,4,5, 8 1,2,4,5,7,8       Operate  Control Boards (2) N/A 1,3, 5,6  1,4,5, 8 1,2,4,5,7,8       Communicate and  Interact ALL 1,2,3, 5,6  1,4,5,6,7,8 1,2,4,5,7,8       Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3)
Comply With and Use Tech.             1,4   N/A                       N/A   N/A Specs. (3)
ALL N/A   N/A N/A       Comply With and Use Tech.
Notes:
Specs. (3) 1,4 N/A   N/A N/A       Notes: (1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.
(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.
(2) Optional for an SRO-U.
(2) Optional for an SRO-U.
(3) Only applicable to SROs.}}
(3) Only applicable to SROs.
CPNPP July 2010 NRC ES-301-6 Competencies Checklist Rev c.doc}}

Revision as of 15:37, 13 November 2019

2010-07 Final Operating Test
ML102080297
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  
Issue date: 07/15/2010
From: Kelly Clayton
NRC Region 4
To:
Luminant Generation Co
References
50-445/10-302, 50-446/10-302 50-445/10-302, 50-446/10-302
Download: ML102080297 (70)
v • d • e


Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: July 2010 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

  • 100% power MOL - RCS Boron is 910 ppm by Chemistry sample.

Turnover: Maintain steady-state 100% power conditions.

Critical Tasks:

  • Manually Initiate Containment Isolation Phase A Upon Failure to Automatically Actuate.
  • Maintain Core Cooling During a Loss of Cold Leg Recirculation.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 RP06A I (RO, SRO) Loop 1 N-16 Channel I (1-JI-411A/B) Fails High.

+5 min TS (SRO) 2 RX18 I (BOP, SRO) Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) Fails High.

+10 min 3 CH03 C (BOP, SRO) Neutron Detector Well Fan (FN-09) Motor Overcurrent.

+15 min 4 RX05B I (RO, SRO) Pressurizer Level Channel (LT-460) Fails Low.

+25 min TS (SRO) 5 RC17A M (RO, BOP, SRO) Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (60 second ramp).

+30 min 6 RP09A C (BOP) Phase A Containment Isolation Trains A and B Fail to Automatically

+35 min RP09B Actuate.

7 RH01B C (BOP) Residual Heat Removal Pump (1-02) Trip Upon SI Sequencer

+35 min Start.

8 RHR15 C (RO) Containment Sump to Residual Heat Removal Pump (1-01) Suction

+50 min Isolation Valve (1-8811A) Will Not Open.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #1 The crew will assume the watch and maintain steady-state conditions per IPO-003A, Power Operations. Train A Emergency Diesel Generator is out of service for governor repair.

The first event is a high failure of Loop 1 N-16 Channel I. Operator actions are per ABN-704, Tc/N-16 Instrumentation Malfunction, and include placing Rod Control in Manual and identifying the failed channel. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

Once Technical Specifications are addressed, a Feedwater Header Pressure Transmitter fails high causing Main Feed Pump speed to decrease resulting in a drop in Feedwater flow. Operator actions are per ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 5.0, and require manual Feedwater Header pressure control until repairs are made.

When Feedwater Header pressure is stable, the running Neutron Detector Well Fan will trip. Actions are per ALM-0031A, 1-ALB-3A, Window 2.1 - CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP. The BOP will start the standby Neutron Detector Well Fan per SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System, and monitor for proper operation.

The next event is a Pressurizer Level instrument failure. Actions are per ABN-706, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Malfunction. The RO will take manual control of Pressurizer level or Charging flow to maintain Pressurizer Level on program. When the failed instrument is identified, an alternate controlling channel is selected and Charging flow and Pressurizer Level control will be returned to Automatic.

Letdown flow will be restored per the Job Aid. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

When Letdown flow is restored, a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident develops inside Containment resulting in generation of signals for Safety Injection, Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B.

Train B Residual Heat Removal Pump will trip upon pump start and the Train A Containment Sump to RHR Pump Suction Isolation Valve will NOT open. Reactor Coolant Pumps must be manually tripped due to a loss of subcooling and Containment Isolation Phase A must be manually initiated.

The crew enters EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and at Step 14, transitions to EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. While in EOP-1.0A, the crew should recognize and transition to ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, at Step 11. When in ECA-1.1A, the crew will secure Containment Spray Pumps as required per Containment pressure conditions.

The scenario is terminated when Containment Spray flow is reduced in ECA-1.1A or when the conditions of FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure, have been met.

Risk Significance:

  • Risk significant core damage sequence: LBLOCA with Loss of Coolant Recirculation
  • Risk significant operator actions: Manually Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps Manually Initiate Containment Isolation Manually Secure Containment Spray Pumps CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 BOOTH OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC #18 and Event File for NRC Scenario #1.

EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND INITIATING VALUE PARAMETER SETUP - Train A EDG OOS PULLOUT -

RHR15 CNTMT Sump to RHRP 1-01 SUC ISOL VLV RACKOUT Conditional Breaker 1-8811A rackout on Rx Trip RP09A Containment Isolation Train A actuation failure - K0 RP09B Containment Isolation Train B actuation failure - K0 1 RP06A Loop 1 N-16 Channel I failure 150 K1 2 RX18 Feed Header Press (PT-508) transmitter failure 1500 K2 3 CH03 Neutron Detector Well Fan Motor overcurrent TRIP K3 3 AN3A 02 CB03 1-ALB-3A Window 2.1 Alarm OFF TRIP K9 4 RX05B Pressurizer Level Channel (LT-460) fails low 0% K4 5 RC17A Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident 5,000 gpm K5 (60 second ramp) 6 RP09A Containment Isolation Train A actuation failure - K0 6 RP09B Containment Isolation Train B actuation failure - K0 7 RH01B RHR Pump (1-02) trip TRIP K0 upon SI 8 RHR15 CNTMT Sump to RHRP 1-01 SUC ISOL VLV RACKOUT Conditional Breaker 1-8811A rackout on Rx Trip CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 Booth Operator: INITIALIZE to IC #18 and NRC Scenario #1 SETUP file.

ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.

ENSURE Control Board Tags are hung:

- Red tag Train A Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01 & Breaker DG1 BKR 1EG1.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions.

ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 215 steps.

ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.

ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.

ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:

- COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load.

Significant Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:

PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX 10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 10B-1.8 - DG 1 DISABLED CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 5 of 22 Event

Description:

Loop 1 N-16 Channel I Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1.

- RP06A, Loop 1 N-16 Channel I (1-JI-411A/B) fails high.

Indications Available:

5C-1.5 - ANY N 16 DEV HI/LO 5C-2.5 - 1 OF 4 OT N 16 HI 5C-3.5 - ANY TAVE DEV HI/LO 5C-2.6 - 1 OF 4 OP N 16 HI 6D-1.10 - ANY TAVE TREF DEV 6D-2.13 - 1 OF 4 OP N 16 ROD STOP & TURB RUNBACK 6D-3.14 - 1 OF 4 OT N 16 ROD STOP & TURB RUNBACK 6D-1.7 - ANY ROD BANK AT LO LIMIT (May come in depending on time rods are in AUTO)

+30 secs RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RECOGNIZE Loop 1 N-16 Channel failure at JI-411A/B on CB-05 and/or RO CB-07.

DIRECT performance of ABN-704, Tc / N16 Instrumentation Malfunction, US Section 2.0.

RO PLACE 1/1-RBSS Control Rod Bank Select Switch in MANUAL.

RO PLACE 1-TS-412T, Tave CHAN DEFEAT in LOOP 1 position.

BOP VERIFY Steam Dump System is NOT actuated and NOT armed.

RO RESTORE TAVE to within 1ºF of TREF.

RO SELECT LOOP 1 on 1/1-JS-411E, N16 Power Channel Defeat.

ENSURE a valid N16 channel supplying recorder on 1/1-TS-411E, 1-TR-411 RO CHAN SELECT.

VERIFY Steam Dump System is NOT armed by OBSERVING PCIP-3.4 BOP alarm not LIT.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 6 of 22 Event

Description:

Loop 1 N-16 Channel I Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

+5 min US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 7 of 22 Event

Description:

Feed Header Pressure Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2.

- RX18, Feed Header Pressure (PT-508) transmitter fails high.

Indications Available:

8A-1.8 - SG 1 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 8A-2.8 - SG 2 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 8A-3.8 - SG 3 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 8A-4.8 - SG 4 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 9A-3.2 - HDP 1 DISCH PRESS HI 9A-7.2 - HDP 2 DISCH PRESS HI 1-PI-508, Feed Header Pressure Indication pegged high

+1 min BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE Feed Header Pressure 1-PT-508 transmitter failure.

DIRECT performance of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header US Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 5.0.

BOP PLACE 1-SK-509A, FWPT Master Speed Controller in MANUAL.

ADJUST 1-SK-509A, FWPT Master Speed Controller to maintain 80 psig to BOP 170 psig between FWP discharge pressure and steam line pressure.

+5 min US INITIATE a Work Request per STA-606.

When manual control of feedwater is attained, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 8 of 22 Event

Description:

Neutron Detector Well Fan Motor Overcurrent Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3.

- CH03, Neutron Detector Well Fan (1-09) overcurrent trip.

Indications Available:

3A-2.1 - CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP 11A-1.5 - NEUT DET WELL CH WTR RET FLO LO (on Panel CV-01) 1-HS-5435, NEUT DET WELL FN CLR FN 9 & DMPR green DAMPER & FAN and white TRIP lights illuminated

+1 min BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE Neutron Detector Well Fan 1-09 tripped.

DIRECT performance of ALM-0031A, 1-ALB-3A, Window 2.1 - CNTMT FN US MASTER TRIP.

Examiner Note: BOP may start fan per assumed operator knowledge prior to referencing the ALM.

If NO fans are in service, START Neutron Detector Well Fan 10 per BOP SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System.

Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System.

BOP DETERMINE Prerequisites in Section 2.2 of SOP-801A are met.

BOP PLACE 1-HS-5440, NEUT DET WELL FN CLR, FN 10 and DMPR in START.

  • VERIFY Fan 10 Suction Damper OPEN and Fan 9 Suction Damper CLOSED.

VERIFY 1-HS-6079, NEUT DET WELL FN CLR 10 CH WTR RET VLV BOP automatically OPENS on Panel CV-01.

BOP ENSURE 1-HS-6084, CH WTR SPLY ISOL VLV ORC is OPEN.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 9 of 22 Event

Description:

Neutron Detector Well Fan Motor Overcurrent Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: The following steps are from Window 2.1 - CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP.

PLACE 1-HS-5435, NEUT DET WELL FN CLR FN 9 & DMPR in BOP PULLOUT/STOP.

Booth Operator: When contacted, WAIT one minute then REPORT Fan 9 Breaker appears to have tripped due to overload.

US DISPATCH an operator to Fan 9 Breaker to determine cause of trip.

When conditions permit, PERFORM a Containment Entry per STA-620 to US determine cause of fan failure.

+5 min US INITIATE a work request per STA-606.

When Neutron Detector Well cooling is restored, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 10 of 22 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4.

- RX05B, Pressurizer Level Transmitter (LT-460) fails low.

Indications Available:

5B-1.4 - PRZR HTR GRP C CTRL TRBL 5B-3.6 - PRZR LVL LO 6A-3.8 - CVCS HELB PS-5385A 6A-4.8 - CVCS HELB PS-5385 1-LI-460A, PRZR LVL CHAN II indication failed low

+30 secs RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RECOGNIZE Letdown isolated and all PRZR Heaters deenergized and RO DETERMINE Pressurizer Level Channel (LT-460) malfunction.

RO REPORT Pressurizer Level Channel I (LT-460) failed low.

DIRECT performance of ABN-706, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation US Malfunction, Section 2.0.

PLACE PZR Level Control or Charging Flow in MANUAL to maintain level on RO program using one of the following controllers:

  • 1-LK-459, PRZR LVL CTRL
  • 1-FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL TRANSFER 1/1-LS-459D, PZR Level Control Channel Select to an RO OPERABLE channel.

TRANSFER 1/1-LS-459E, 1/1-LR-459 PZR Level Select to an OPERABLE RO channel.

RO RESTORE Letdown per Job Aid.

  • OPEN or VERIFY OPEN both Letdown Isolation Valves.
  • ENSURE 1-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL in MANUAL and 30%

(75 gpm) or 50% (120 gpm) DEMAND.

  • ENSURE 1-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL in MANUAL and 50%

DEMAND.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 11 of 22 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • ADJUST Charging to desired flow and MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 and 13 gpm.
  • OPEN the desired Orifice Isolation Valves.
  • ADJUST 1-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL to ~310 psig on 1-PI-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS then PLACE in AUTO.
  • ADJUST 1-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL to obtain ~95ºF on 1-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP, then place in AUTOMATIC.

RO RESTORE PZR Control Heater Group C.

Examiner Note: AUTO Pressurizer Level Control will not be restored until level is manually returned to program.

RO RESTORE PZR Level Control or Charging Flow Control to AUTO as desired.

RO VERIFY instruments on common instrument line - NORMAL.

  • DETERMINE PT-0456 and PT-0458 readings are NORMAL.

+10 min US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • ACTION M.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Events 5, 6, 7, and 8.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 12 of 22 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 5, 6, 7, and 8.

- RC17A, Loss of Coolant Accident @ 5,000 gpm on 60 second ramp.

- RP09A, Containment Isolation Train A actuation failure.

- RP09B, Containment Isolation Train B actuation failure.

- RH01B, Residual Heat Removal Pump (1-02) trip.

- RH15, Containment Sump to RHR Pump (1-01) Suction Isolation Valve Breaker 1-8811A trip.

Indications Available:

Numerous Reactor Trip and Safety Injection related alarms

+10 secs RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO RECOGNIZE PRZR pressure decreasing.

RO/BOP INITIATE a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.

US DIRECT performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:

  • DETERMINE Neutron flux - DECREASING.

RO DETERMINE all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - ON.

BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:

  • DETERMINE all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses:

  • DETERMINE both AC Safeguards Buses - ENERGIZED.

RO DETERMINE both Trains of SI actuated.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 13 of 22 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps performed by BOP are identified later in the scenario.

US/BOP INITIATE Proper Safeguards Equipment Operation Per Attachment 2.

RO VERIFY AFW Alignment:

  • DETERMINE both MDAFW Pumps - RUNNING.
  • DETERMINE Turbine Driven AFW Pump - RUNNING.
  • DETERMINE AFW total flow - GREATER THAN 460 GPM.
  • DETERMINE AFW valve alignment - PROPER ALIGNMENT.

RO VERIFY Containment Spray Not Required:

  • VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 1-8, CS ACT NOT illuminated.
  • VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT NOT illuminated.
  • VERIFY Containment pressure < 18.0 PSIG.

Examiner Note: Operators may manually isolate the Main Steam Lines in anticipation of Containment HI-2 pressure (6.2 psig) prior to automatic isolation. If not performed here the isolation will occur later as Containment pressure rises.

RO DETERMINE Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:

  • DETERMINE before MSIV Drippot Isolation Valves - CLOSED.

RO CHECK RCS Temperature -

  • DETERMINE RCS AVERAGE TEMPERATURE less than 557°F.

RO STOP dumping steam.

RO REDUCE total AFW flow to minimize the cooldown:

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 14 of 22 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • MAINTAIN a minimum of 460 gpm UNTIL narrow range level greater than 50% in at least one SG.
  • VERIFY Turbine Driven AFW Pump - STOPPED.

RO CHECK PRZR Valve Status:

  • DETERMINE PRZR Safeties - CLOSED.
  • DETERMINE PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED.
  • DETERMINE PORVs - CLOSED.
  • DETERMINE power to both PORV Block Valves - AVAILABLE.
  • DETERMINE both PORV Block Valves - OPEN.

US/RO CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

  • DETERMINE all ECCS Pumps - RUNNING.
  • DETERMINE RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25ºF (55 ºF adverse).

CRITICAL TASK Manually Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps due to Loss of Subcooling Prior to STATEMENT Exiting EOP-0.0A.

CRITICAL DETERMINE RCS subcooling less than 25ºF (55ºF adverse) and STOP all TASK RO RCPs.

RO/BOP CHECK if Any Steam Generator Is Faulted:

RO/BOP CHECK if any Steam Generator is Ruptured:

RO/BOP CHECK if RCS is intact:

  • DETERMINE Containment pressure, radiation level and sump levels increasing.

+10 min US TRANSITION to EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Step 1.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 15 of 22 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: These steps are performed by the BOP as required per EOP-0.0A, Attachment

2. EOP-1.0A steps are identified later in the scenario.

BOP VERIFY SSW Alignment:

  • DETERMINE both SSW Pumps - RUNNING.
  • VERIFY Train B Diesel Generator Cooler SSW return flow.

BOP VERIFY Safety Injection Pumps - RUNNING.

  • DETERMINE both Safety Injection Pumps - RUNNING.

CRITICAL TASK Manually Initiate Containment Isolation Phase A due to Failure to STATEMENT Automatically Actuate Prior to Exiting EOP-0.0A.

CRITICAL TASK BOP Manually INITIATE both Trains of Containment Isolation Phase A.

  • PLACE 1/1-CIPAA1 CNTMT ISOL - PHASE A CONT VENT ISOL Switch in ACT position.

BOP VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A.

BOP VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation.

BOP VERIFY both CCW Pumps - RUNNING.

  • DETERMINE both CCW Pumps - RUNNING.

BOP VERIFY both RHR Pumps - RUNNING.

  • DETERMINE Train A RHR Pump - RUNNING.
  • DETERMINE Train B RHR Pump - TRIPPED.

BOP VERIFY Proper CVCS Alignment:

  • DETERMINE both CCPs - RUNNING.
  • VERIFY Letdown Relief Valve isolation:
  • DETERMINE Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves - CLOSED.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 16 of 22 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • DETERMINE Letdown Isolation Valves - CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY ECCS flow:

  • VERIFY CCP SI flow indicated.
  • VERIFY SIP discharge flow indicators.
  • RHR to Cold Leg Injection Flow Indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW
  • DETERMINE Train A RHR flow - INDICATED.

BOP VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Complete:

  • VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Bypass Valves - CLOSED.
  • VERIFY Feedwater Bypass Control Valves - CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY Train B Diesel Generator - RUNNING.

BOP VERIFY Monitor Lights For SI Load Shedding illuminated.

BOP VERIFY Proper SI alignment per MLB light indication.

BOP VERIFY Components Properly Aligned per Table 1.

Location Equipment Description Condition CB-03 X-HS-5534 H2 PRG SPLY FN 4 STOPPED CB-03 X-HS-5532 H2 PRG SPLY FN 3 STOPPED CB-04 1/1-8716A RHRP 1 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-04 1/1-8716B RHRP 2 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-06 1/1-8153 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-06 1/1-8154 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-07 1/1-RTBAL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-RTBBL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 17 of 22 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CB-07 1/1-BBAL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-07 1/1-BBBL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-08 1-HS-2397A SG 1 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2398A SG 2 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2399A SG 3 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2400A SG 4 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2111C FWPT A TRIP TRIPPED CB-08 1-HS-2112C FWPT B TRIP TRIPPED CB-09 1-HS-2490 CNDS XFER PUMP STOPPED (MCC deenergized on SI)

CV-01 X-HS-6181 PRI PLT SPLY FN 17 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6188 PRI PLT SPLY FN 18 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6195 PRI PLT SPLY FN 19 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6202 PRI PLT SPLY FN 20 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6209 PRI PLT SPLY FN 21 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6216 PRI PLT SPLY FN 22 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6223 PRI PLT SPLY FN 23 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6230 PRI PLT SPLY FN 24 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-3631 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 1 & STARTED BSTR FN 42 CV-01 X-HS-3632 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 2 & STARTED BSTR FN 43 CV-01 1-HS-5600 ELEC AREA EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5601 ELEC AREA EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5602 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 3 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5603 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 4 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5618 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 17 CV-01 1-HS-5620 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 18 CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 18 of 22 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CV-03 X-HS-5855 CR EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5856 CR EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5731 SFP EXH FN 33 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5733 SFP EXH FN 34 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5727 SFP EXH FN 35 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5729 SFP EXH FN 36 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED Examiner Note: The next four (4) steps would be performed on Unit 2.

CB-03 2-HS-5538 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5539 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5537 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5536 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED BOP NOTIFY Unit Supervisor Attachment instructions complete and to IMPLEMENT FRGs as required.

Examiner Note: EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, steps begin here. Steps for FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure, are identified later in the scenario.

US CHECK if RCPs Should Be Stopped:

  • DETERMINE all RCPs STOPPED.

US CHECK if Any Steam Generator Is Faulted:

US CHECK Intact Steam Generator Levels:

  • DETERMINE Narrow range levels - GREATER THAN 50%.
  • CONTROL AFW flow to maintain NR level between 50% and 60%.

US CHECK Secondary Radiation NORMAL:

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 19 of 22 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US CHECK PRZR PORVs and Block Valves:

  • DETERMINE power to both PORV Block Valves - AVAILABLE.
  • DETERMINE PORVs - CLOSED.
  • DETERMINE both PORV Block Valves - OPEN.

US/RO DETERMINE ECCS Flow Should NOT Be Reduced:

  • VERIFY Secondary heat sink:
  • DETERMINE total AFW flow to intact SGs > 460 GPM.
  • DETERMINE Narrow range level in all SGs > 50%.
  • DETERMINE RCS subcooling < 25ºF (55ºF adverse).

RO/BOP RESET ESF Actuation Signals.

RO/BOP PLACE Train B Diesel Generator EMERG STOP/START Handswitch in START.

RO/BOP RESET SI.

RO/BOP RESET SI Sequencers.

RO/BOP RESET Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B.

RO/BOP RESET Containment Spray Signal.

US CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped.

  • STOP RHR Pump 1-01and PLACE in standby.
  • RESET RHR Auto Switchover.

US CHECK RCS and SG Pressures.

  • DETERMINE RCS pressure STABLE or DECREASING, AND CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 20 of 22 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • DETERMINE all SG pressures are STABLE or INCREASING.

RO/BOP DETERMINE AC Safeguards Buses ENERGIZED by Offsite Power.

  • PLACE Train B DG EMERG STOP/START Handswitch in STOP.

Booth Operator: When contacted, WAIT five minutes then REPORT Train B RHR Pump has Phase B 50/51 overcurrent relay flags dropped and the motor has an acrid odor.

Booth Operator: If contacted to investigate breaker status for 1/1-8811A, WAIT three minutes and REPORT breaker is tripped free and will not reset. If dispatched to locally open 1/1-8811A, REPORT that RP will not allow entry into area due to high radiation levels.

US INITIATE Evaluation of Plant Status:

  • DETERMINE Cold Leg Recirculation Capability - NOT AVAILABLE.
  • DETERMINE 1-8811A, Containment Sump to Train A RHR Pump Suction Isolation Valve will NOT open.
  • DETERMINE Train B RHR Pump - TRIPPED.

+20 min US TRANSITION to ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, Step 1.

Examiner Note: ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, steps begin here.

US CHECK If Emergency Coolant Recirculation Equipment - AVAILABLE PER ATTACHMENT 2.

  • ATTEMPT to restore at least one train.

US VERIFY Train B EDG - STOPPED.

RO/BOP VERIFY SI reset.

RO/BOP VERIFY SI Sequencers reset.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 21 of 22 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/BOP VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B reset.

RO/BOP VERIFY Containment Spray Signal reset.

RO/BOP RESET RHR Auto Switchover.

US NOTIFY Plant Staff to DETERMINE if Containment Fan Coolers should be started.

US CHECK RWST Level - GREATER THAN RWST EMPTY.

US/RO DETERMINE Containment Spray Requirements:

  • DETERMINE Containment pressure - less than 18 PSIG AND LOWERING.

CRITICAL TASK Determine Cold Leg Recirculation Capability Does NOT Exist and Maintain STATEMENT Core Cooling Prior to Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Reaching 0%.

CRITICAL TASK BOP STOP all Containment Spray Pumps.

Examiner Note: FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure, steps begin here.

ENTER FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure, due to an US ORANGE Path.

DETERMINE Containment Pressure NOT GREATER THAN 50 PSIG and US alignment was NOT verified in EOP-0.0A.

VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A - APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT RO/BOP INDICATION.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 22 of 22 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA / Phase A Containment Isolation Failure / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation - APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT RO/BOP INDICATION.

RO/BOP CHECK If Containment Spray Is Required:

  • DETERMINE Containment pressure was >18.0 PSIG.
  • DETERMINE all RCPs - STOPPED.
  • DETERMINE ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, is in effect.

RO/BOP VERIFY Main Steam Isolation Valves - CLOSED.

US DETERMINE Feed Flow Should NOT Be Isolated To Any SG.

+30 min US RETURN To Procedure And Step In Effect.

When Containment Spray flow is secured or the actions of FRZ are complete, TERMINATE the scenario.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Rev c.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: July 2010 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

  • 72% power MOL - RCS Boron is 916 ppm by Chemistry sample.

Turnover: Maintaining 72% power per Load Controller direction. Rod Control in AUTO.

Critical Tasks:

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 RX09A I (RO, BOP, SRO) Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) Fails Low.

+10 min TS (SRO) 2 CC02A C (BOP, SRO) Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (1-01) Trip.

+20 min CC03A TS (SRO) Train B Component Cooling Water Pump (1-02) Auto Start Failure.

3 RX08A I (RO, SRO) Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-455) Fails Low.

+30 min TS (SRO) 4 RX04A I (BOP, SRO) Steam Generator (1-01) Level Channel (LT-551) Fails High.

+40 min TS (SRO) 5 MS03A M (RO, BOP, SRO) Steam Generator (1-01) Steam Line Break Outside Containment

+45 min Before Main Steam Isolation Valve (300 second ramp).

6 RD04K6 C (RO) Two Control Rods Fail to Insert Upon Reactor Trip.

+45 min RD04K8 Emergency Boration Required.

7 SI04D C (BOP) Safety Injection Pump (1-02) Fails to Start.

+55 min 8 FW38 C (BOP) Feed Line Isolation Valves (HV-2134 to HV-2137) Fail to Close.

+55 min A/B/C/D

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #2 The crew will assume the watch at 72% power with no scheduled activities per IPO-003A, Power Operations. The Grid Controller has requested that power remain at this level due to transmission line overload until further notice. Train A Emergency Diesel Generator is out of service for governor repair.

The first event is a Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter failure. The crew responds per ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 4.0. Several actions are required on the part of the RO and BOP to stabilize plant conditions. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

When plant conditions are stable, the Train A Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump will trip and the Train B CCW Pump will fail to automatically start. The crew will respond per ABN-502, Component Cooling Water System Malfunctions, Section 2.0, and manually start Train B CCW Pump and perform equipment adjustments as required by procedure. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

When ABN-502 actions are complete, a Pressurizer Pressure Channel will fail low. Response is per ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction, Section 2.0, to ensure Pressurizer Heaters are controlled and Power Operated Relief Valves remain closed. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

Once systems are stable, a Steam Generator Level Transmitter fails high. ABN-710, Steam Generator Level Instrumentation Malfunction is referenced and the BOP takes Manual control of the Feedwater Control Valve to prevent a Unit trip on low Steam Generator level. Once identified, an Alternate Channel is selected and Automatic control restored. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

When Technical Specifications have been addressed, a Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment before the Main Steam Isolation Valve will ramp in over five minutes on Steam Generator 1-01. With lowering Pressurizer pressure and Reactor Coolant System temperature, the Unit Supervisor will direct a Reactor and Turbine Trip.

The crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to EOP-2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, at Step 12. While performing the actions of EOP-0.0A, the RO will be required to manually initiate an Emergency Boration due to two stuck Control Rods and the BOP will start a Safety Injection Pump and manually close the Feed Line Isolation Valves while in Attachment 2.

Once the faulted Steam Generator is isolated, the Unit Supervisor will transition to EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination. The scenario is terminated after EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, is entered and the actions to secure Safety Injection flow are performed.

Risk Significance:

  • Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Train A Component Cooling Water System
  • Risk significant core damage sequence: Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment
  • Risk significant operator actions: Emergency Borate Due to Two Stuck Rods Isolate Faulted Steam Generator Isolate Feedwater to Faulted SG CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 BOOTH OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC #50 and Event File for NRC Scenario #2. Rods in AUTO.

EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND INITIATING VALUE PARAMETER SETUP - Train A EDG OOS PULLOUT -

RD04K6 Control Rod fails to insert 12 Steps K0 RD04K8 Control Rod fails to insert 228 Steps K0 COND Feed Line Isolation Valves close with handswitch CLOSE K0 DIFWHS 2134.Value=0 DMF FW 38A DIFWHS 2135.Value=0 DMF FW 38B DIFWHS 2136.Value=0 DMF FW 38C DIFWHS 2137.Value=0 DMF FW 38D SI04D Safety Injection Pump 1-02 auto start failure - K0 1 RX09A Turbine 1st Stage PT-505 failure 0% K1 2 CC02A Train A CCW Pump 1-01 trip TRIP K2 2 CC03A Train B CCW Pump 1-02 auto start failure START K2 FAILURE 3 RX08A Pressurizer Pressure Channel PT-455 failure 1700 psig K3 4 RX04A SG 1-01 Level Transmitter LT-551 fails high 100% K4 5 MS03A Steam Generator 1-01 Main Steam Line Break 9.5 ft2 K5 Outside Containment before MSIV (300 sec ramp) 6 RD04K6 Control Rod fails to insert 12 Steps K0 6 RD04K8 Control Rod fails to insert 228 Steps K0 7 SI04D Safety Injection Pump 1-02 auto start failure - K0 8 FW38 Feed Line Isolation Valves fail to close OPEN K0 A/B/C/D CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 Booth Operator: INITIALIZE to IC #50 and NRC Scenario #2 SETUP file.

ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.

ENSURE Control Board Tags are hung:

- Red tag Train A Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01& Breaker DG1 BKR 1EG1.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions.

ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.

ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.

ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:

- COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load.

ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO at 179 steps.

Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:

PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX 10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 10B-1.8 - DG 1 DISABLED CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 5 of 23 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1.

- RX09A, Main Turbine Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) fails low.

Indications Available:

6D-1.10 - AVE TAVE TREF DEV PCIP-2.4 - LO TURB PWR ROD WITHDRW BLK C-5 1-PI-505 - Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I indication fails low 1-TI-412A - Ave TAVE TREF Deviation indication to maximum

+30 secs RO/BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RECOGNIZE Control Rods INSERTING due to Turbine Impulse Pressure RO/BOP Instrument failure.

RO/BOP REPORT PT-505, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I has failed low.

DIRECT implementation of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header US Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 4.0.

DETERMINE Control Rods INSERTING in AUTO and PLACE 1/1-RBSS RO Control Rod Bank Select Switch in MANUAL.

BOP DETERMINE Steam Dumps - CLOSED with 100% DEMAND.

  • OBSERVE 1-UI-500, STM DMP DEMAND indicates 100% DEMAND.

BOP PLACE at least one (1) Steam Dump Interlock Switch in OFF.

Examiner Note: The following five (5) steps are from ABN-709, Attachment 7, Transferring Steam Dumps and are performed using the Job Aid.

BOP ENSURE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL is in MANUAL.

MATCH 1-PK-507, STM DUMP PRESS CTRL demand to current Steam BOP Dump Valve position.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 6 of 23 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFY window PCIP-1.4, CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 is ON.

BOP PLACE 43/1-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT in STM PRESS.

BOP ENSURE both STM DMP INTLK SELECT switches are ON.

DIRECT transfer of 1-PS-505Z, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel Select to US PT-506.

RO PLACE PT-506, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel II in service.

Examiner Note: Crew should hold reactivity brief to establish plan for restoring rods to pre-event position (179 steps on Control Bank D).

ENSURE TAVE within 1ºF of TREF then PLACE 1/1-RBSS Control Rod Bank RO Select Switch in AUTO.

Examiner Note: Performing the next step meets the REQUIRED ACTION for Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1. A Procedure Enhancement will be submitted for ABN-709 specifically identifying Technical Specifications should be referenced to ensure compliance with the LCO.

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, VERIFY PCIP Window 4.6, TURB 10% PWR P-13, in proper US state for existing plant conditions (DARK).

US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • CONDITION T - One or more required channels inoperable.
  • ACTION T.1 - Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within one (1) hour.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 7 of 23 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY PCIP Window 1.3, AMSAC BLK TURB < 40% PWR US C-20 (LIT).

  • If AMSAC actuation blocked and Turbine power >40%, ENSURE Automatic Actions of ALB-9B Window 3.7, AMSAC ACT TURB TRIP as necessary.

+10 min US INITIATE a Work Request per STA-606.

When the Turbine impulse pressure transmitter actions are addressed, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 8 of 23 Event

Description:

Train A CCW Pump Trip / Train B CCW Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2.

- CC02A, Train A CCW Pump (1-01) trip.

- CC03A, Train B CCW Pump (1-02) start failure.

Indications Available:

3C-1.6 - CSP 1 & 3 SEAL CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-1.8 - SFP HX 1 CCW RET FLO LO 3C-1.14 - RCDT HX CCW RET FLO LO 3C-1.16 - SEAL WTR HX CCW RET FLO LO 3C-2.3 - CCWP 1 / 2 OVLD TRIP 3C-2.6 - CSP 2 & 4 SEAL CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-2.12 - ANY RCP MTR CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-3.3 - CCW TRAIN B SFGD LOOP PRESS LO 3C-3.11 - ANY RCP THBR CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-3.12 - ANY RCP UP BRG L/O CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-4.7 - RHRP 2 SEAL CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-4.12 - ANY RCP LOW BRG L/O CLR CCW RET FLO LO 3C-4.13 - XS LTDN HX CCW RET FLO LO 4A-1.7 - SFTY CH WTR TR A/B TRBL/TRIP 01-1.10 - SSW TO CCW TRN A HX P LO 01-2.10 - SSW TO CCW TRN B HX P LO

+1 min BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RECOGNIZE Train A CCW Pump trip with failure of Train B CCW Pump to BOP start.

DIRECT implementation of ABN-502, Component Cooling Water System US Malfunctions, Section 2.0.

DETERMINE Train B CCW Pump did NOT auto start and START CCW BOP Pump 1-02.

BOP VERIFY Train B Station Service Water Pump running.

RO/BOP VERIFY Train B Safety Chiller Recirc Pump 1-06 is running.

BOP VERIFY CCW heat exchanger outlet flow < 17,500 gpm per heat exchanger.

  • 1-FI-4536A, CCW Heat Exchanger #1 Outlet Flow
  • 1-FI-4537A, CCW Heat Exchanger #2 Outlet Flow CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 9 of 23 Event

Description:

Train A CCW Pump Trip / Train B CCW Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP STOP equipment on Train A as necessary for plant conditions.

VERIFY CCW Heat Exchanger outlet temperature did NOT exceed 122ºF BOP with pump running.

US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • ACTION A.1 - Restore CCW train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

+10 min US INITIATE a Work Request per STA-606.

When the Technical Specification actions are addressed, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 10 of 23 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3.

- RX08A, Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-455) fails low.

Indications Available:

5B-3.4 - PRZR 1 OF 4 PRESS LO 5B-4.4 - PRZR 1 OF 4 SI PRESS LO 5C-3.3 - PRZR PRESS LO BACKUP HTRS ON 5C-3.6 - CORE CLG MICRO PROC TRN A SYS FAIL

+1 min RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO RECOGNIZE PRZR pressure rising with PRZR heaters ON.

DIRECT performance of ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction, US Section 2.0.

Examiner Note: The next three (3) steps are Initial Operator Actions.

RO VERIFY PORV closed.

RO PLACE 1-PK-455A, PRZR Master Pressure Control in MANUAL.

RO ADJUST 1-PK-455A for current RCS pressure.

TRANSFER to an alternate controlling channel, 1/1-PS-455F, PRZR Press RO Control Channel Select.

RO PLACE 1-PK-455A in AUTO.

RO VERIFY automatic control restoring Pressurizer pressure to 2235 psig.

ENSURE a valid channel selected to recorder 1/1-PS-455G, 1-PR-455 PRZR RO Pressure Select.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 11 of 23 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Performing the next step meets the REQUIRED ACTION for Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1. A Procedure Enhancement will be submitted for ABN-705 specifically identifying Technical Specifications should be referenced to ensure compliance with the LCO.

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, VERIFY PCIP window 2.6, PRZR PRESS SI BLK PERM P-11 US in required state for current pressure (DARK).

US/RO VERIFY other instruments on common instrument line - NORMAL.

  • DETERMINE LT-459, LT-459F, and PT-455F readings are NORMAL.

+10 min US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
  • ACTION M.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
  • ACTION L.1- Verify interlock in required state for existing condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
  • ACTION D.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 12 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Level Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4.

- RX04A, SG 1-01 Level Transmitter (LT-551) fails high.

Indications Available:

8A-1.12 - SG 1 LVL DEV 8A-1.8 - SG 1 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 9A-3.2 - HDP 1 DISCH PRESS HI 9A-7.2 - HDP 2 DISCH PRESS HI 1-LI-551, SG 1 LVL (NR) CHAN I indication fails high 1-FK-510, SG 1 FW FLO CTRL VLV starts to close

+30 sec BOP REFER to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE Steam Generator 1-01 Level Transmitter (LT-551) failed high.

DIRECT implementation of ABN-710, Steam Generator Level US Instrumentation Malfunction, Section 2.0.

BOP DETERMINE controlling level channel has failed.

PLACE 1-FK-510, SG 1 FW FLO CTRL in MANUAL and OPEN valve to BOP CONTROL level.

BOP VERIFY instruments on common instrument line - NORMAL.

  • DETERMINE LT-501 reading is NORMAL.

RO VERIFY all HI-HI level bistable Windows on TSLB-3 for SG 1 DARK.

  • DETERMINE Windows 2.2, 3.2, and 4.2 are DARK.

BOP VERIFY automatic SG 1-01 level control AVAILABLE and DESIRED:

  • DETERMINE Alternate Level Control Channel responding normally.

BOP SELECT an alternate channel.

  • PLACE 1-LS-519C, SG 1 LVL CHAN SELECT to 1-LY-519 position.

BOP VERIFY Steam Generator 1-01 ready for AUTO Level Control:

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 13 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Level Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

BOP PLACE 1-FK-510, SG 1 FW FLO CTRL in AUTO and MONITOR operation.

US INITIATE repairs per STA-606.

+10 min US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
  • ACTION D.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
  • ACTION I.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

When Feedwater Control is restored, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Events 5, 6, 7, and 8.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 14 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 5, 6, 7, and 8.

- MS03A, Steam Generator (1-01) Steam Line Break outside Containment.

- RD04K6 @ 12 steps, Control Rod fails to insert upon Reactor trip.

- RD04K8 @ 228 steps, Control Rod fails to insert upon Reactor trip.

- SI04D, Safety Injection Pump (1-02) fails to auto start.

- FW38A/B/C/D, Feed Line Isolation Valves (HV-2134 to HV-2137) fail to close.

Indications Available:

6C-3.7 - MSL PRESS LO SI ACT Numerous plant trip alarms

+30 secs RO/BOP RECOGNIZE lowering RCS temperature and pressure.

RO/BOP DETERMINE Reactor Trip required and manually TRIP Reactor.

US DIRECT performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:

  • DETERMINE Neutron flux - DECREASING.

DETERMINE all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - NOT LIT RO (two (2) stuck rods).

BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:

  • DETERMINE all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses:

  • DETERMINE both AC Safeguards Buses - ENERGIZED.

RO DETERMINE both Trains of Safety Injection actuated.

CRITICAL TASK Initiate Emergency Boration with Two or More Stuck Control Rods Prior to STATEMENT Exiting EOP-0.0.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 15 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK RO INITIATE Emergency Boration of 3600 gallons of Boric Acid.

  • ENSURE a Charging Pump is RUNNING.
  • PLACE 1/1-APBA1, BA XFER PMP 1 in START.
  • PLACE 1/1-APBA1, BA XFER PMP 2 in START.
  • PLACE 1/1-8104, EMER BORATE VLV in OPEN.
  • VERIFY flow on 1-FI-183A, EMER BORATE FLO.
  • VERIFY flow on 1-FI-121A, CHRG FLO.

Examiner Note: EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2, steps performed by BOP are identified later in the scenario. Ensure CRITICAL TASK listed is performed during Attachment 2.

US/BOP INITIATE Proper Safeguards Equipment Operation Per Attachment 2.

RO VERIFY AFW Alignment:

  • DETERMINE both MDAFW Pumps - RUNNING.
  • PLACE Turbine Driven AFW Pump in PULL-OUT per Foldout Page.
  • CONTROL AFW Flow as follows:
  • CONTROL AFW flow as necessary to maintain narrow range level >

43% in any SG or total AFW flow > 460 gpm per Foldout Page.

  • STOP AFW flow to Faulted SG 1-01 per Foldout Page.
  • MAINTAIN proper AFW valve alignment.

RO VERIFY Containment Spray Not Required:

  • VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 1-8, CS ACT NOT illuminated.
  • VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT NOT illuminated.
  • VERIFY Containment pressure remained < 18.0 PSIG.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 16 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO DETERMINE Main Steam Lines Should be Isolated and PERFORM the following:

  • DETERMINE Before MSIV Drip Pot Isolation Valves - CLOSED.

RO CHECK RCS Temperature -

  • DETERMINE RCS Average Temperature less than 557ºF.

RO VERIFY NOT dumping steam.

RO REDUCE total AFW flow to minimize the cooldown:

  • MAINTAIN a minimum of 460 gpm UNTIL narrow range level greater than 43% in at least one SG.
  • If necessary, STOP Turbine Driven AFW Pump.

RO CHECK PRZR Valve Status:

  • VERIFY PRZR Safeties - CLOSED.
  • VERIFY Normal PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED.
  • VERIFY Power to at least one Block Valve - AVAILABLE.
  • VERIFY Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

RO CHECK if RCPs Should Be Stopped:

  • DETERMINE all ECCS Pumps - RUNNING.
  • DETERMINE RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 25ºF.

RO CHECK If Any SG Is Faulted:

  • DETERMINE SG 1-01 completely DEPRESSURIZED.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 17 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US TRANSITION to EOP 2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Step 1.

Examiner Note: These steps are performed by the BOP as required per EOP-0.0A, Attachment

2. EOP-2.0A steps are identified later in the scenario.

BOP VERIFY SSW Alignment:

  • VERIFY both SSW Pumps - RUNNING.
  • VERIFY Train B Diesel Generator Cooler SSW return flow.

BOP VERIFY Safety Injection Pumps - RUNNING.

  • DETERMINE Safety Injection Pump 1-02 failed to start and MANUALLY START Safety Injection Pump 1-02.

BOP VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A.

BOP VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation.

BOP VERIFY CCW Pump 1 RUNNING.

BOP VERIFY both RHR Pumps - RUNNING.

BOP VERIFY Proper CVCS Alignment:

  • DETERMINE both CCPs - RUNNING.
  • VERIFY Letdown Relief Valve isolation:
  • DETERMINE Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
  • DETERMINE Letdown Isolation Valves - CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY ECCS flow:

  • VERIFY CCP SI flow indicated.
  • VERIFY SIP discharge flow indicators.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 18 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK Isolate Feedwater Flow to a Faulted Steam Generator Prior to Exiting From STATEMENT EOP-2.0.

CRITICAL DETERMINE Feedwater Isolation Valves NOT closed and manually CLOSE TASK BOP Valves to all Steam Generators.

  • HV-2134 - CLOSED.
  • HV-2135 - CLOSED.
  • HV-2136 - CLOSED.
  • HV-2137 - CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Complete:

  • VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Bypass Valves - CLOSED.
  • VERIFY Feedwater Bypass Control Valves - CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY Train B Diesel Generator - RUNNING.

BOP VERIFY Monitor Lights For SI Load Shedding illuminated.

BOP VERIFY Proper SI alignment per MLB light indication.

BOP VERIFY Components Properly Aligned per Table 1.

Location Equipment Description Condition CB-03 X-HS-5534 H2 PRG SPLY FN 4 STOPPED CB-03 X-HS-5532 H2 PRG SPLY FN 3 STOPPED CB-04 1/1-8716A RHRP 1 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-04 1/1-8716B RHRP 2 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-06 1/1-8153 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-06 1/1-8154 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-07 1/1-RTBAL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-RTBBL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 19 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CB-07 1/1-BBAL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-07 1/1-BBBL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-08 1-HS-2397A SG 1 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2398A SG 2 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2399A SG 3 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2400A SG 4 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2111C FWPT A TRIP TRIPPED CB-08 1-HS-2112C FWPT B TRIP TRIPPED CB-09 1-HS-2490 CNDS XFER PUMP STOPPED (MCC deenergized on SI)

CV-01 X-HS-6181 PRI PLT SPLY FN 17 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6188 PRI PLT SPLY FN 18 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6195 PRI PLT SPLY FN 19 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6202 PRI PLT SPLY FN 20 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6209 PRI PLT SPLY FN 21 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6216 PRI PLT SPLY FN 22 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6223 PRI PLT SPLY FN 23 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6230 PRI PLT SPLY FN 24 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-3631 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 1 & STARTED BSTR FN 42 CV-01 X-HS-3632 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 2 & STARTED BSTR FN 43 CV-01 1-HS-5600 ELEC AREA EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5601 ELEC AREA EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5602 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 3 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5603 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 4 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5618 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 17 CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 20 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CV-01 1-HS-5620 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 18 CV-03 X-HS-5855 CR EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5856 CR EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5731 SFP EXH FN 33 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5733 SFP EXH FN 34 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5727 SFP EXH FN 35 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5729 SFP EXH FN 36 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED Examiner Note: The next four (4) steps would be performed on Unit 2.

CB-03 2-HS-5538 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5539 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5537 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5536 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED BOP NOTIFY Unit Supervisor attachment instructions complete and to IMPLEMENT FRGs as required.

Examiner Note: EOP-2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation steps begin here.

+15 min US/RO CHECK Main Steam line Isolation Valves - CLOSED.

US/RO CHECK at Least One Steam Generator Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.

US/RO IDENTIFY Faulted Steam Generator 1-01.

CRITICAL TASK Perform Actions to Identify and Isolate Faulted Steam Generator Prior to STATEMENT exiting EOP-2.0A.

CRITICAL TASK RO/BOP ISOLATE Faulted Steam Generator 1-01.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 21 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • ENSURE 1-HS-2452-2, AFWPT STM SPLY VLV MSL 1 in PULL OUT.

RO CHECK CST Level - GREATER THAN 10%.

Examiner Note: EOP-2.0A, Attachment 2 actions are performed outside of the Control Room.

US/BOP VERIFY Faulted Steam Generator 1-01 Break Outside Containment.

  • DIRECT performance of EOP-2.0A, Attachment 2.

US/RO CHECK Secondary Radiation:

  • CHECK available Secondary Radiation Monitors - NORMAL.

US/RO CHECK if ECCS Flow to Should Be Reduced:

  • VERIFY Secondary heat sink:
  • DETERMINE Total AFW Flow to intact SGs > 460 GPM.
  • DETERMINE Narrow Range Level in SGs 1-02, 1-03, & 1-04 > 43%.
  • VERIFY RCS subcooling > 25ºF.
  • VERIFY RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
  • VERIFY PRZR level > 13%.

US DETERMINE ECCS flow should be reduced and TRANSITION to EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, Step 1.

Examiner Note: EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, steps begin here.

Examiner Note: The following six (6) steps are performed per EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.D.

BOP [1.D] PLACE Train B Diesel EMER START/STOP Handswitch in START.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 22 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP [1.D] RESET SI.

BOP [1.D] RESET SI Sequencers.

BOP [1.D] RESET Containment Isolation Phase A and B.

BOP [1.D] RESET Containment Spray Signal.

BOP/RO [1.D] ESTABLISH Instrument Air and Nitrogen to Containment.

RO STOP one CCP and PLACE in Standby.

US/RO CHECK RCS Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.

Examiner Note: The following two (2) steps are performed per EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.J.

RO [1.J] ISOLATE CCP Injection Line Flow Path:

  • VERIFY CCP - SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST.
  • ALIGN CCP Miniflow Valves:
  • OPEN 1/1-8110 and 1/1-8111, CCP Miniflow Valves.
  • CLOSE 1/1-8511A and 1/1-8511B, CCP Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves.
  • PLACE Charging Flow Control Valve in MANUAL and 35% demand.
  • CLOSE 1/1-8801A and 1/1-8801B, CCP Injection Line Isolation Valves.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 23 of 23 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Outside Containment Before MSIV / Two Stuck Control Rods / Safety Injection Pump Start Failure / Feed Line Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO [1.J] ESTABLISH Charging Flow Path:

  • OPEN 1/1-8105 and 1/1-8106, Charging Line Isolation Valves.
  • ADJUST Charging Flow Control Valve to establish Charging flow.
  • ADJUST RCP seal flow to maintain between 6 gpm and 13 gpm.

When EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, Attachment 1.J is complete, TERMINATE the scenario.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Rev d.doc

CP 2010-07 Retake Exam (Scenarios Only, No JPMs)

Shift turnover sheets for both scenarios follow this cover sheet.

UNIT: 1 UNIT SUPERVISOR RELIEF CHECKLIST (NRC Scenario #1)

PART I TO BE PREPARED BY THE OFF-GOING UNIT SUPERVISOR.

1.0 SHIFT ACTIVITIES:

1.1 Activities Completed This Shift: None 1.2 Activities In-Progress: None 1.3 Planned Activities: None 2.0 PLANT AND EQUIPMENT STATUS:

2.1 Technical Specification Related Equipment Summary:

Train A Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01 out-of-service for Governor repair.

Estimated Return-to-Service time is four (4) hours.

2.2 Non-Technical Specification Equipment Summary:

3.0 GENERAL INFORMATION:

Maintain steady state conditions per IPO-003A, Power Operation.

Diluted 45 gallons three (3) times last shift.

4.0 END OF SHIFT REVIEW:

LOGS - RO/BOP X LOGS-PEO X CLOSED eLCOARs ARCHIVED X OPTS COMPLETED X DAILY ACTIVITIES LIST X LCOARs REVIEWED X PART II TO BE COMPLETED BY THE ON-COMING UNIT SUPERVISOR.

1.0 CRITICAL PARAMETERS:

MODE: 1 REACTOR POWER: 100% MWE: 1264 RCS CONTROL ROD TAVE: 585 °F POSITION 215 ON BANK D RCS Cb: 910 ppm PRESS: 2235 psig X Protected Train - Train A X Unit 2 is in Mode 1 @ 100% power X Risk Assessment - GREEN X BAT CB = 7447 ppm CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #1 Shift Relief Checklist R.doc

UNIT: 1 UNIT SUPERVISOR RELIEF CHECKLIST (NRC Scenario #2)

PART I TO BE PREPARED BY THE OFF-GOING UNIT SUPERVISOR.

1.0 SHIFT ACTIVITIES:

1.1 Activities Completed This Shift: None 1.2 Activities In-Progress: None 1.3 Planned Activities: None 2.0 PLANT AND EQUIPMENT STATUS:

2.1 Technical Specification Related Equipment Summary:

Train A Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01 out-of-service for Governor repair.

Estimated Return-to-Service time is four (4) hours.

2.2 Non-Technical Specification Equipment Summary:

3.0 GENERAL INFORMATION:

Maintaining 875 MWe in accordance with Load Controller direction per IPO-003A, Power Operation.

Diluted 35 gallons three (3) times last shift.

4.0 END OF SHIFT REVIEW:

LOGS - RO/BOP X LOGS-PEO X CLOSED eLCOARs ARCHIVED X OPTS COMPLETED X DAILY ACTIVITIES LIST X LCOARs REVIEWED X PART II TO BE COMPLETED BY THE ON-COMING UNIT SUPERVISOR.

1.0 CRITICAL PARAMETERS:

MODE: 1 REACTOR POWER: 72% MWE: 875 RCS CONTROL ROD TAVE: 577 °F POSITION 179 ON BANK D RCS Cb: 916 ppm PRESS: 2235 psig X Protected Train - Train A X Unit 2 is in Mode 1 @ 100% power X Risk Assessment - GREEN X BAT CB = 7447 ppm CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #2 Shift Relief Checklist R.docc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: July 2010 NRC (Spare)

Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: * ~1X10-8 amps BOL - RCS Boron is 1545 ppm by Chemistry sample.

  • Steam Dump System in service for RCS Temperature Control.

Turnover: Raise Power to 2% in preparation for plant startup to 100% power.

Critical Tasks:

  • Determine Inadvertent Safety Injection & Secure Charging Prior to Pressurizer Overfill.
  • Determine Loss of Coolant Accident in Progress and Reinitiate Safety Injection.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 R (RO) Raise Reactor power to 2%.

+20 min N (BOP, SRO) 2 FW24A C (BOP) Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (1-01) Trip.

+30 min TS (SRO) 3 RP17D TS (SRO) Containment Pressure Transmitter (PT-937) Fails High.

+35 min 4 MS13B I (BOP, SRO) Atmospheric Relief Valve (1-02) Fails Open due to Steam Pressure

+40 min Transmitter (PT-2326) Failure.

5 RP14A M (RO, BOP, SRO) Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal.

+45 min 6 CV01B C (RO) Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-01) Trip.

+45 min CV01E Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-02) SI Sequencer Start Failure.

7 RC17C C (RO) Loss of Coolant Accident at 1700 gpm Following Isolation of High

+60 min Head Injection.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #3 The crew will assume the watch with a Plant Startup in progress and will continue raising power to approximately 2% per IPO-002A, Plant Startup from Hot Standby.

When conditions are stable, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-01 will trip. The crew will refer to ABN-305, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunction, Section 3.0, and determine that Steam Generator levels are slowly decreasing and start the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

When the Steam Generator levels are stable, a Containment Pressure Transmitter will fail high. Crew response will be per ALM-0022A, 1-ALB-2B, Window 3.10, CNTMT 1 OF 4 PRESS HI-3, and include verifying that only one channel is affected. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

When Technical Specifications have been referenced, a Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve (ARV) fails open due to a Main Steam Pressure Transmitter failure. This event is recognized by a Reactor power increase and the ARV Controller indicating 100% demand. The BOP will place the affected Controller in Manual and close the ARV. ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 2.0, will be referenced.

The major event begins with a spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal. The crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and perform immediate actions including actuation of both Trains of Safety Injection.

When it is determined that a spurious Safety Injection actuation has occurred, the crew will transition to EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination. During the event the Train A Centrifugal Charging Pump will trip and the Train B Centrifugal Charging Pump will fail to auto start on the Safety Injection Sequencer.

When the high head injection alignment is secured in EOS-1.1A, a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident will occur. This will require re-initiation of Safety Injection flow per the Foldout Page Criteria of EOS-1.1A.

Event termination will occur when the crew has reinitiated Safety Injection and transitioned to EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Risk Significance:

  • Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Loss of MDAFW Pump SG Atmospheric Relief Valve Failure
  • Risk significant core damage sequence: Small Break LOCA Following SI Termination
  • Risk significant operator actions: Initiate Charging Flow upon Safety Injection Secure Charging Prior To Pressurizer Overfill Reinitiate Safety Injection Flow CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #3 BOOTH OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC #8 and Event File for NRC Scenario #3.

EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND INITIATING VALUE PARAMETER SETUP CV01E Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-02) start failure - K0 1 N/A Raise Reactor power to 2% - -

2 FW24A Train A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (1-01) trip TRIP K2 3 RP17D Containment pressure channel (PT-937) failure 60 psig K3 4 MS13B PT-2326 failure fails ARV 1-02 open 1300 psig K4 5 RP14A Spurious Train A Safety Injection actuation - K5 6 CV01B Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-01) trip (NOTE 1) TRIP K6 6 CV01E Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-02) start failure START K0 FAILURE NOTE 1: Initiate K6 after EOP-0.0A Immediate Actions are complete.

7 RC17C Loss of Coolant Accident (NOTE 2) 1700 gpm K7 NOTE 2: Initiate K7 after RHR Pumps are stopped at Step 13 of EOS-1.1A.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #3 Booth Operator: INITIALIZE to IC #8 and NRC Scenario #3 SETUP file.

ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.

VERIFY all Control Board Tags are removed.

ENSURE Control Rods are in MANUAL with Control Rod Bank C @ 215 steps and Bank D @ 100 steps.

ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.

PLACE Plant Computer, right hand RO and US Computer screens for MODE 2.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions.

ENSURE all PRZR Heaters energized.

ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:

- COPY of IPO-002A, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Section 5.4, Increasing Reactor Power to ~2% Following Reactor Startup.

Significant Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:

PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.3 - AMSAC BLK TURB <40% PWR C-20 PCIP-1.4 - CNDNSR AVAIL STM DUMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.7 - RX 50% PWR TURB TRIP PERM P-9 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.4 - LO TURB PWR ROD WTHDRWL BLK C-5 PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.5 - RX & TURB 10% PWR P-7 PCIP-4.5 - RX 48% PWR 3-LOOP FLO PERM P-8 PCIP-4.6 - TURB 10% PWR P-13 6D-1.1 - SR HI VOLT FAIL 6D-1.3 - SR SHTDN FLUX ALM BLK 7B-1.6 - FW FLUSH VLV NOT CLOSE HV-2166 7B-4.8 - FWP A / B RECIRC VLV NOT CLOSED 8A-1.3 - FWPT B TRIP 8A-1.10 - 1 OF 4 TURB STOP VLV CLOSE Numerous 9A Feedwater alarms CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 5 of 20 Event

Description:

Power Ascension to ~2%

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: ENSURE Simulator in RUN when crew is ready to assume the watch.

+1 min US DIRECT performance of IPO-002A, Plant Startup from Hot Standby.

RO ESTABLISH a startup rate of ~ 0.5 DPM to increase Reactor power to ~ 2%.

Gradually REDUCE startup rate to ~0.2 DPM as the Intermediate Range RO channels approach 3x10-6 amps.

VERIFY Power Range channels begin to respond when the Intermediate RO Range Channels are between 3x10-6 amps and 5x10-6 amps.

VERIFY Steam Dump operations maintain RCS temperature at 557ºF and BOP Main Steam pressure at 1092 psig.

RO VERIFY annunciator alarm PCIP-3.6, TAVE LO LO P-12 is DARK.

RO MAINTAIN Reactor power between 2% and 3%.

ADJUST Auxiliary Feedwater flow as necessary to maintain SG levels BOP between 60% and 75%.

When power has been raised to 2 - 3%, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 6 of 20 Event

Description:

Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2.

- FW24A, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-01 trip.

Indications Available:

8B-4.3 - MD AFWP 1 / 2 OVRLOAD / TRIP 1-PI-2453A, MD AFWP 1 DISCH PRESS indication reading 0 psig 1-FI-2456A, MD AFWP 1 DISCH FLO indication reading 0 gpm 1-HS-2450A, MD AFWP 1 white TRIP light lit

+1 min BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedure.

BOP RECOGNIZE Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-01 trip.

DIRECT performance of ABN-305, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunction, US Section 3.0.

DETERMINE MDAFW Pump 1-02 running and PLACE MDAFW Pump 1-01 BOP in STOP or PULLOUT.

BOP DETERMINE Steam Generator Levels trending down.

CRITICAL TASK Restore Feedwater Flow to Steam Generators 1-01 and 1-02 Prior to Reaching STATEMENT 0% Wide Range Steam Generator Level.

CRITICAL TASK BOP START the TDAFW Pump and FEED Steam Generators 1-01 and 1-02.

  • OPEN 1-HS-2452-1, AFWPT STM SPLY VLV MSL 4 from SG 1-04.
  • OPEN 1-HS-2452-2, AFWPT STM SPLY VLV MSL 1 from SG 1-01.

DISPATCH a Plant Equipment Operator to check breaker status of Auxiliary RO/BOP Feedwater Pump 1-01.

Booth Operator: When contacted about the condition of the MDAFW Pump breaker, REPORT an acrid smell and overcurrent flag on Phase B 50/51 relays.

BOP VERIFY MDAFW Pump suction pressure 10 psig.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 7 of 20 Event

Description:

Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DISPATCH a Nuclear Equipment Operator to check Auxiliary Feedwater RO/BOP Pump 1-01.

Booth Operator: When contacted about the condition of MDAFW Pump 1-01, REPORT that the pump motor is hot.

+10 min US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • CONDITION B - One AFW train inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.
  • ACTION B.1 - Restore AFW train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 8 of 20 Event

Description:

Containment Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3.

- RP17D, Containment Pressure Transmitter (PT-937) fails high.

Indications Available:

2B-3.10 - CNTMT 1 OF 4 PRESS HI-3 1-PT-937, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN I Containment pressure transmitter indication failed high

+30 secs RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RECOGNIZE Containment pressure transmitter 1-PT-937, CNTMT PRESS RO (IR) CHAN I failed high.

DIRECT performance of ALM-0022A, 1-ALB-2B, Window 3.10, CNTMT 1 OF US 4 PRESS HI-3.

RO MONITOR Containment pressure.

  • 1-PI-934, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN IV
  • 1-PI-935, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN III
  • 1-PI-936, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN II
  • 1-PI-937, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN I DETERMINE 1-PI-937, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN I is reading greater than RO or equal to 2.5 psig from the other channels.

RO REPORT to Unit Supervisor to REFER to Technical Specifications.

US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • CONDITION E - One Containment Pressure channel inoperable.
  • ACTION E.1 - Place channel in bypass within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 9 of 20 Event

Description:

Containment Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

+5 min US CORRECT the condition or INITIATE a Work Request per STA-606.

When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 10 of 20 Event

Description:

Steam Pressure Control Channel Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4.

-MS13B, Steam Pressure Channel (PT-2326) fails high.

Indications Available:

1-PI-2326, MSL 2 PRESS pegged high 1-ZL-2326, SG 2 ATMOS RLF VLV read OPEN light LIT Y6845D Plant Computer alarm

+1 min BOP RESPOND to Dynamic Alarm Display (DAD) Alarm.

RECOGNIZE Steam Generator 1-02 Steam Pressure Transmitter (PT-2326)

BOP failed high.

DIRECT performance of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header US Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 2.0.

BOP DETERMINE Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve - OPEN.

US DIRECT closing of Steam Generator 1-02, Atmospheric Relief Valve.

PLACE 1-PK-2326, SG 2 ATMOS RLF VLV CTRL in MANUAL and 0%

BOP DEMAND to CLOSE Valve.

+5 min US NOTIFY Chemistry that a release has occurred.

When the Atmospheric Relief Valve is closed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Events 5, 6, and 7.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 11 of 20 Event

Description:

Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 5.

- RP14A, Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal.

Indications Available:

6C-1.1 - MAN RX TRIP Numerous plant trip alarms

+30 secs RO/BOP RECOGNIZE Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.

US DIRECT performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:

  • DETERMINE Neutron flux - DECREASING.

RO DETERMINE all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - ON.

BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:

  • DETERMINE all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses:

  • DETERMINE both AC Safeguard Buses - ENERGIZED.

RO CHECK if SI is Actuated:

  • DETERMINE SI is actuated on Train A.
  • Manually ACTUATE SI to initiate dual train SI.
  • PLACE 1/1-SI2, SI MAN ACT Switch to ACT position.

RO VERIFY both Trains of Safety Injection actuated.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 12 of 20 Event

Description:

Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When EOP-0.0A, Step 4 has been verbally verified AND the Master Silence Alarm has timed out, EXECUTE Event 6.

- CV01B, Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-01) trip.

- CV01E, Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-02) fails to start.

RO RECOGNIZE CCP 1-01 trip.

  • START CCP 1-02.
  • VERIFY at least one CCP - RUNNING.
  • VERIFY Seal Injection Flow to each RCP -BETWEEN 6 GPM AND 13 GPM.

Examiner Note: EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps performed by BOP are identified later in the scenario.

US/BOP INITIATE Proper Safeguards Equipment Operation Per Attachment 2.

RO VERIFY AFW Alignment:

  • DETERMINE MDAFW Pump 1 RUNNING.
  • DETERMINE Turbine Driven AFW Pump - RUNNING.
  • DETERMINE AFW total flow - GREATER THAN 460 GPM.
  • DETERMINE AFW valve alignment - PROPER ALIGNMENT.

RO VERIFY Containment Spray NOT Required:

  • VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 1-8, CS ACT NOT illuminated.
  • VERIFY 1-ALB-2B Window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT NOT illuminated.
  • DETERMINE Containment pressure remained < 18.0 PSIG.

RO DETERMINE Main Steam Lines Should NOT Be Isolated:

  • VERIFY Containment pressure < 6 PSIG.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 13 of 20 Event

Description:

Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

RO CHECK RCS Temperature:

  • DETERMINE RCS average temperature stable at or trending to 557ºF.

RO CHECK PRZR Valve Status:

  • VERIFY PRZR Safeties - CLOSED.
  • VERIFY Normal PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED.
  • VERIFY Power to at least one Block Valve - AVAILABLE.
  • VERIFY Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

RO CHECK if RCPs Should Be Stopped:

  • DETERMINE both SI Pumps - RUNNING.
  • DETERMINE Train A CCP Pump 1 TRIPPED.
  • START Train B CCP Pump 1-02.
  • DETERMINE RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 25ºF (55ºF adverse).

RO/BOP CHECK if Any Steam Generator Is Faulted:

RO/BOP CHECK if any Steam Generator is Ruptured:

RO/BOP CHECK if RCS is intact:

  • DETERMINE Containment pressure, radiation level and sump levels - NORMAL.

US/RO CHECK if ECCS Flow to Should Be Reduced:

  • VERIFY Secondary heat sink:

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 14 of 20 Event

Description:

Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • DETERMINE Total AFW Flow to intact SGs > 460 GPM.
  • DETERMINE Narrow Range Level in SGs > 43%.
  • VERIFY RCS subcooling > 25ºF.
  • VERIFY RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
  • VERIFY PRZR level > 13%.

US DETERMINE ECCS flow should be reduced and TRANSITION to EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination.

Examiner Note: These steps are performed by the BOP as required per EOP-0.0A, Attachment

2. EOS-1.1A steps are identified later in the scenario.

BOP VERIFY SSW Alignment:

  • VERIFY both SSW Pumps - RUNNING.
  • VERIFY Diesel Generator Cooler SSW return flow.

BOP VERIFY both Safety Injection Pumps - RUNNING.

BOP VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A.

BOP VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation.

BOP VERIFY both CCW Pumps - RUNNING.

BOP VERIFY both RHR Pumps - RUNNING.

BOP VERIFY Proper CVCS Alignment:

  • DETERMINE Train A CCP Pump - TRIPPED.
  • If secured, START Train B CCP Pump.
  • VERIFY CCP 1 RUNNING.
  • VERIFY Letdown Relief Valve isolation:
  • DETERMINE Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves - CLOSED.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 15 of 20 Event

Description:

Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • DETERMINE Letdown Isolation Valves - CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY ECCS flow:

  • DETERMINE Train B CCP SI flow indicated.
  • DETERMINE RCS pressure > 1700 PSIG (1800 PSIG adverse).
  • DETERMINE NO SI Pump flow indicated.

BOP VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Complete:

  • VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Bypass Valves - CLOSED.
  • VERIFY Feedwater Bypass Control Valves - CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY both Diesel Generators - RUNNING.

BOP VERIFY Monitor Lights For SI Load Shedding illuminated.

BOP VERIFY Proper SI alignment per MLB light indication.

BOP VERIFY Components Properly Aligned per Table 1.

Location Equipment Description Condition CB-03 X-HS-5534 H2 PRG SPLY FN 4 STOPPED CB-03 X-HS-5532 H2 PRG SPLY FN 3 STOPPED CB-04 1/1-8716A RHRP 1 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-04 1/1-8716B RHRP 2 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-06 1/1-8153 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-06 1/1-8154 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-07 1/1-RTBAL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-RTBBL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-BBAL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-07 1/1-BBBL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 16 of 20 Event

Description:

Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CB-08 1-HS-2397A SG 1 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2398A SG 2 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2399A SG 3 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2400A SG 4 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2111C FWPT A TRIP TRIPPED CB-08 1-HS-2112C FWPT B TRIP TRIPPED CB-09 1-HS-2490 CNDS XFER PUMP STOPPED (MCC deenergized on SI)

CV-01 X-HS-6181 PRI PLT SPLY FN 17 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6188 PRI PLT SPLY FN 18 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6195 PRI PLT SPLY FN 19 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6202 PRI PLT SPLY FN 20 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6209 PRI PLT SPLY FN 21 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6216 PRI PLT SPLY FN 22 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6223 PRI PLT SPLY FN 23 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6230 PRI PLT SPLY FN 24 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-3631 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 1 & STARTED BSTR FN 42 CV-01 X-HS-3632 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 2 & STARTED BSTR FN 43 CV-01 1-HS-5600 ELEC AREA EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5601 ELEC AREA EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5602 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 3 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5603 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 4 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5618 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 17 CV-01 1-HS-5620 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 18 CV-03 X-HS-5855 CR EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 17 of 20 Event

Description:

Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CV-03 X-HS-5856 CR EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5731 SFP EXH FN 33 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5733 SFP EXH FN 34 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5727 SFP EXH FN 35 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5729 SFP EXH FN 36 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED Examiner Note: The next four (4) steps would be performed on Unit 2.

CB-03 2-HS-5538 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5539 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5537 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5536 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED BOP NOTIFY Unit Supervisor attachment instructions complete and to IMPLEMENT FRGs as required.

Examiner Note: EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination steps begin here.

Examiner Note: The following six (6) steps are performed per EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.D.

BOP [1.D] PLACE Train B Diesel EMER START/STOP Handswitch in START.

BOP [1.D] RESET SI.

BOP [1.D] RESET SI Sequencers.

BOP [1.D] RESET Containment Isolation Phase A and B.

BOP [1.D] RESET Containment Spray Signal.

BOP/RO [1.D] ESTABLISH Instrument Air and Nitrogen to Containment.

RO DETERMINE CCP 1 RUNNING.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 18 of 20 Event

Description:

Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US/RO CHECK RCS Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.

Examiner Note: The following two (2) steps are performed per EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.J.

CRITICAL TASK Determine Inadvertent Safety Injection & Terminate ECCS flow prior to exiting STATEMENT EOS-1.1A.

CRITICAL TASK RO [1.J] ISOLATE CCP Injection Line Flow Path:

  • VERIFY CCP - SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST.
  • ALIGN CCP Miniflow Valves:
  • OPEN 1/1-8110 and 1/1-8111, CCP Miniflow Valves.
  • CLOSE 1/1-8511A and 1/1-8511B, CCP Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves.
  • PLACE Charging Flow Control Valve in MANUAL and 35% demand.
  • CLOSE 1/1-8801A and 1/1-8801B, CCP Injection Line Isolation Valves.

RO [1.J] ESTABLISH Charging Flow Path:

  • OPEN 1/1-8105 and 1/1-8106, Charging Line Isolation Valves.
  • ADJUST Charging Flow Control Valve to establish Charging flow.
  • ADJUST RCP seal flow to maintain between 6 gpm and 13 gpm.

RO CONTROL Charging Flow to maintain PRZR Level.

RO CHECK If SI Pumps Should Be Stopped:

  • CHECK RCS pressure:
  • DETERMINE RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
  • DETERMINE RCS pressure > 1700 PSIG.
  • STOP both SI Pumps and PLACE in Standby.

RO CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

  • DETERMINE RHR Pumps RUNNING with suction aligned to RWST.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 19 of 20 Event

Description:

Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • STOP both RHR Pumps and PLACE in Standby.
  • RESET RHR Auto Switchover.

Booth Operator: When RHR Pumps are stopped and RHR Auto Switchover is reset, EXECUTE Event 7.

- RC17C, Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident @ 1700 gpm.

+20 min US/RO RECOGNIZE PZR level and subcooling lowering and TRANSITION to EOP-1.0.A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Examiner Note: Crew may choose to start ECCS Pumps, open High Head Injection Valves or initiate Safety Injection. Any of these actions meets the CPNPP EOP Guidelines.

CRITICAL TASK Manually Initiate Safety Injection Flow Prior to exiting EOS-1.1A.

STATEMENT CRITICAL START ECCS Pumps and/or REALIGN High Head Injection Valves and/or TASK RO/BOP manually INITIATE Safety Injection.

Examiner Note: EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, steps begin here.

RO CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

  • DETERMINE ECCS Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.
  • DETERMINE RCS subcooling < 25ºF (55ºF adverse).

RO DETERMINE That NO Steam Generator Is Faulted.

BOP CHECK Intact SG Levels:

adverse).

  • CONTROL AFW Flow to maintain level between 50% and 60%.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 20 of 20 Event

Description:

Spurious Train A Safety Injection Actuation Signal / Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip / Centrifugal Charging Pump Start Failure / Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/BOP CHECK Secondary Radiation - NORMAL.

RO CHECK PRZR PORVs And Block Valves - AVAILABLE.

+40 min US DETERMINE ECCS Flow Should NOT Be Reduced.

When High Head Safety Injection flow is restored, TERMINATE the scenario.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC Sim Scenario #3 Rev b.doc

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: CPNPP 1 and 2 Date of Exam: 07/07/10 Operating Test No.: NRC A E SCENARIOS P V P E CPNPP #1 CPNPP #2 CPNPP #3 (Spare)

L N T MINIMUM(*)

I T CREW CREW CREW CREW O C

POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION T A T A

N Y S A B S A B S A B S A B R T O R T O R T O R T O L R I U T P E O C P O C P O C P O C P RX - - - - - - 0 1 1 0 NOR - - - - - - 0 1 1 1 SROI-1 I/C 1,2,3, - - - 1,3, -

7 4 4 2 4 6 MAJ 5 - - - 5 - 2 2 2 1 TS 1,4 - - - - - 2 0 2 2 RX - - - - - - 0 1 1 0 NOR - - - - - - 0 1 1 1 RO-1 I/C - 1,4, - - - 1,2, 4, 8 4 4 2 8 7,8 MAJ - 5 - - - 5 2 2 2 1 TS - - - - - - 0 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC ES-301-5 Transient and Event Checklist R.doc

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: CPNPP Date of Examination: 07/07/10 Operating Test No. NRC 1, 2, 3 Applicants SROI-1 RO-1 Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 1 2 Interpret/Diag-1,2,3, 1,3, 1,4,5, 1,2,4, nose Events 4,5 5,6 8 5,7,8 and Conditions Comply With 1,3, 1,4,5, 1,2,4, and Use ALL 5,6 8 5,7,8 Procedures (1)

Operate 1,3, 1,4,5, 1,2,4, Control Boards N/A 5,6 8 5,7,8 (2)

Communicate 1,2,3, 1,4,5, 1,2,4, and ALL 5,6 6,7,8 5,7,8 Interact Demonstrate Supervisory ALL N/A N/A N/A Ability (3)

Comply With and Use Tech. 1,4 N/A N/A N/A Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

CPNPP July 2010 NRC ES-301-6 Competencies Checklist Rev c.doc

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