ML17285A657

LER 89-029-00:on 890703,RWCU & RCIC Sys Isolation Occurred When RWCU-V-1 Closed as Part of Group 7 Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Isolation.Caused by Inadequate Preparation & Review of Surveillance Test procedure.W/890801 Ltr

ML17285A657
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	08/01/1989
From:	Fies C, Powers C WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-029, LER-89-29, NUDOCS 8908140101
Download: ML17285A657 (6)

Text

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ACCELERATED l%TR1BUTION DEMOYSOXTIOY SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8908140101 DOC.DATE: 89/08/01 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FIES,C.L. Washington Public Power Supply System POWERS,C.M. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIPIENT AFFILIATION NOTES';

RECIP.NAME

SUBJECT:

LER 89-029-00:on 890703,RWCU & RCIC sys isolations caused by I inadequate test/surveillance procedure.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 3Incident ENCL I SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Rpt, etc.

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES h ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 D, SAMWORTH,R 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE 1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DS P 2 2 DEDRO 1 1 IRM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB .8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/PEB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 1 RPB 10 2 2 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 REG 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RES/DSR/PRAB 1 1 RGN5 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS,S 4 4 FORD BLDG HOY,A 1 1 R L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 I NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 S

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HELP US IO RECCE %ASTE! CXNTACI'HE DOQ3MENI'GHIBOL DESK, KXM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) K) ELIKQRTH KKR NMB FR% MPHtZBUTZCH LISTS FOR DOCUMEKIS RXJ DGNPT NEZDt FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF. COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 41 ENCL 41

ti WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George washington 11'ay ~ Richland, 11'ashinglon 99352 Docket No. 50-397 August 1, 1989 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.89-029

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.89-029 for the WNP-2 Plant.

This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours, C.M. Powers (M/D 927M)

WNP-2 Plant Manager CMP:lg

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No.89-029 cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V Mr. C.J. Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)

INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr. D.L. Williams, BPA (M/D 399) 35'0=140i %9080i pop ADOCK 05000-~97 pDC S

NAC Form 388 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9.8 3 I APPAOVEO OMB NO, 31500104 EXPIAESI BI3)i88 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE 13)

Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 03 97 > oF0 4

""'"'Reactor Water Cleanup and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Isolations caused by Inade uate Test/Surveillance Procedure EVFNT DATE 15) LEA NUMBER (8) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (SI SEQUENTIAL RE"G~ OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI MONTH DAY YE.AR YEAR NUM8% R NUMBER MONT~

0 5 0 0 0 0 7 0 3 8 9 8 9 029 00 08 01 8 9 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (): ICnece one or more of tne foriowintl Ill)

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On July 3, 1989 at 1022 hours a Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation occured when RWCU-V-1 closed as part of a Group 7 Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NS4) isolation. At 1026 hours a similar Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System isolation occurred when RCIC-V-63 closed. Both these isolations occurred as a result of Technical Specification Surveillance Testing per Plant Procedure 7.4.3.2. 1.6, Leak Detection Monitor Division II Channel Calibration (CC )/Channel Functional Test (CFT).

The root cause of this ESF actuation was less than adequate preparation and review of a surveillance test procedure which had been rewritten to support a plant modification.

This modification had recently been completed during a refueling outage.

Immediate corrective action consisted of prompt action by the plant operators to return the impacted systems to service. The surveillance test procedure was also corrected and deviated.

Further corrective action will be taken by plant maintenance to strengthen their procedure modification process. In addition, testing and project management procedures will be modified to require, when practical, a more complete check of the modified surveillance prior to plant operation and to allow more time for review and preparation of procedures associated with outage work.

Since all ESF systems responded as designed there is no safety significance associated with this event.

NRC Form 388 (9 83)

NRC Form 388A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9.83)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMB NO, 3150&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/8$

FACILITY NAME (() DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEOUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER shin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 9 0 2 9 0 0 0 2 OF TEXT ///mOre epeee/4 rei/Oiied. Fee eddr'O'OOe/NRC FOnn 3SSA'4) (11)

Plant Conditions a) Power Level - 83%

b) Plant Mode - 1 (Power Operation)

Event Descri tion On July 3, 1989 at 1022 hours0.0118 days <br />0.284 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.88871e-4 months <br /> and again at 1026 hours0.0119 days <br />0.285 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.90393e-4 months <br /> primary containment isolation valves closed on an isolation signal. Both these events occurred during power ascension following the fourth refueling outage. The first event, a Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation occurred when RI4:U-V-1 (the inboard containment isolation valve between the reactor vessel and the RNCU System) closed on an NS4 RWCU area high temperature simulated signal causing the operating pump (RWCU-P-lA) to trip. Plant Operators immediately began an investigation into the cause of the isolation which can be the result of any of several events. During their investigation, at 1026 hours0.0119 days <br />0.285 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.90393e-4 months <br />, a Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Isolation occurred on an RCIC Pump Room High Temperature simulated signal causing RCIC-V-63 to close. At that time plant operators traced both isolations to Technical Specification Surveillance (TSS) Testing on the Leak Detection System which had been in progress since 0729 hours0.00844 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.773845e-4 months <br />. The specific test being performed was TSS 7.4.3.2. 1.6, Leak Detection Monitor Division II Channel Calibration (CC )/Channel Functional Test (CFT) for Leak Detection Monitors LD-MON-18 and LD-MON-28. The Instrument ana Control ( IKC) Technicians had completed Section "AR of the procedure which calibrates LD-MON-18, and were proceeding with Section "BR which tests the relay trip logic on LD-MON-18. Steps 1 and 2 of Section RBR of the pr'ocedure required bypass key locks for LD-RMS-S3C, LD-RMS-S3D and LD-RMS-S48, to be in the test position. The test position should have placed the downstream trip logic for LD-MON-18 in a configuration where relays RKlBR and RK28R could be tested without an ESF actuation. The I8C Technicians, following procedures as written, proceeded through step 10 of the procedure which simulated a high temperature in the RKU pump and heat exchanger areas, places the leak detection RKlR relay in the RTrip" condition and tests for the proper functioning of the downstream RK1BR relay. With these steps complete they proceeded with steps ll through 15 of the procedure which simulates a high RCIC Equipment Area or Differential Temperature, places the Leak detection RK2" relay in the "trip" condition and tests for proper functioning of the downstream RK28R relay. The Control Room Operators stopped the surveillance testing at this time since it had obviously caused the isolations.

Immediate Corrective Action Investigation by the Plant Operators and I8C Technicians revealed that the wrong switches had been called out in Steps 1 and 2 of Section RBR of the procedure.

Consequently the testing of LD-MON-18 caused the RWCU and RCIC isolation. The switches identified were those needed for Section RE" of the procedure and were associated with LD-MON-28. The procedure was deviated to call out the correct switches, LD-RMS-S18 and LD-RMS-S28. Part 8 of the procedure was then completed successfully. The entire surveillance was successfully completed at 1627 hours0.0188 days <br />0.452 hours <br />0.00269 weeks <br />6.190735e-4 months <br />.

NRC FORM SBBA 'V.ST CPOI 1988 f20-SS9 (9 83)

RC Farm 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 94)3)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMB NO. 3160&)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) OOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEGVSNZIAL REVISION NVMSSR NVMSSR Washin ton Nuclear TEXT (Ifmore space js rerfoiied, rrse additional Plant - Unit ffRC Form 3664's) (12) 2 <<<< o 3 9 7 8 9 0 2 9 0 0 0 3 OF The RCIC System was returned to Standby Status at 1039 hours0.012 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.953395e-4 months <br />. The RNCU system was brought back into service at 1515 hours0.0175 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.764575e-4 months <br /> after the required verification of pump bowl temperatures prior to pump restart. There was a delay in gaining access to the RKU, pump room caused by an inadvertently removed step off pad.

Further Evaluation and Corrective Action A. Further Evaluation

1. This event is being reported per the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an "event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF). . .

2. There were no structures, components or systems that were inoperable at the start of this event that contributed to the event.

3. The root cause of this event was less than adequate attention to detail in the preparation and review of the surveillance procedure. A contributing factor was the fact that the surveillance procedure was drafted and reviewed during the outage when schedule and time constraints are very intense.

a) The initial draft of the procedures by the Project Engineer had the correct by-pass switches called out for LD-MON-1B. A subsequent revision to the draft by the I&C Engineer caused the incorrect switches to be placed in Section "B" of the procedure.

b) Reviews of this revision by the Project Engineer and the I&C Engineers did not discover the deficiency in Section RBU. A contributing factor to this less than adequate review was the ongoing outage which started in mid April when the I&C Engineers had a large number of competing outage tasks to perform.

c) Temporary Test Procedure 8.3.139, WNP-2 Leak Detection Moni tor Preoperational Test was written in May 1989 to check out operation of the NUNC Leak Detection Moni tors being installed during the refueling outage. The test included the performance of TSS Test 7.4.3.2.1.6 as part of its procedure. The test was completed on June 10, 1989 without discovering the error associated with the bypass switches associated with LD-MON-1B. A review of the test showed that the procedure calls for the bypassing of all ten isolation functions associated with the Leak Detection System. These bypasses were in place prior to and during the performance of the surveillance test part of the procedure. Thus, individual operation of the bypass switches in the manner they were intended to be used in the subsequent surveillance were not verified during the performance of the test.

d) The review of the surveillance contained in the test procedure should have identified and corrected the error with the bypass switches.

NRC FORM 36SA 'V.S. CPOI 1966 920 $ 69r00010 (94)31

NRC Form 388A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (94)3)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OM8 NO, 3150&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) OOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEOI/ENTIAL REVISION 99 .v NUMBER NUMBER Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 9 0 2 9 000 4 OF 0 4 TEXT ///moro 4poco /4/or/IIPod. Ir>> odd/dorM//VRC Form SSSAS/ (17)

B. Further Corrective Action

1. Maintenance Engineers will receive additional training on the use of the "Maintenance Department Procedure Writers Guide."

2. Plant Procedure PPM 1.5.7, Post Maintenance/Modification Testing will be modified. Where practical, in situations where a plant modification resul ts in a change to an Operations or Surveillance Test performed as a Section of the preoperational test.

it will be

3. Project management procedures (1.16 Series) will be modified to require more advance planning for plant modification work. Where practical, draft revisions to test and surveillance procedures will be scheduled and completed prior to the start of the refueling outage. This will provide improved management visibility of the procedure/software modification workload allowing appropriate time for preparation and review.

Safety Si nificance There is no safety significance associated with the event. During all tests that were performed associated with the installation of the new leak detection equipment the equipment and the downstream logic performed its safety function as designed.

This event posed no threat to the health and safety of the public or Plant personnel.

Similar Events A review of previous LERs identified 87-009 as a similar event. It involved an ESF actuation caused by an oversight associated with a procedure revision as a result of a plant modification. Corrective action was very specific to the event.

EIIS Information Text Reference EI IS Reference System Component Reactor Water Cleanup CE Reactor Core Isolation Cooling BN Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System BD RWCU-V-1 CE V RWCU-P-lA CE P Leak Detection IJ RC IC- V-63 BN V LD-MON-18 IJ MON LD-MON-28 IJ MON LO-RMS-53C IJ HS LD-RMS-53D IJ HS LD-RMS-548 IJ HS LD-RMS-518 IJ HS LD-RMS-528 IJ HS NRC FORM 300A *V.ST CPOI 1988 520-589 000)0 19 33)