GNRO-2016/00006, Notification of Full Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049 Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049): Difference between revisions
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| issue date = 05/24/2016 | | issue date = 05/24/2016 | ||
| title = Notification of Full Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049 Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) | | title = Notification of Full Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049 Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) | ||
| author name = Mulligan K | | author name = Mulligan K | ||
| author affiliation = Entergy Operations, Inc | | author affiliation = Entergy Operations, Inc | ||
| addressee name = | | addressee name = | ||
| Line 85: | Line 85: | ||
Vert.GGNS12.99.75.2 4.1 2.5 2.4 North&South Storage Buildings Attachment3to GNRO-2016/00006Page1of1AuditOpenItemGGNSStorageBuilding SeismicDesign-ResponsetoNRCOpenItemISECI 3.1.1.1.ALicenseeInputNeeded:TheNRC staff requestthatthelicenseemake available an evaluationoftheabilityoftheFSBstosurviveasafeshutdown earthquake.AuditOpenItemResponse:TheGrandGulf NuclearStation(GGNS)FLEX storagebuildingswere designedviathe2012 InternationalBuildingCode(IBC).IBCinvokesASCE7-10 throughout the document.TheseismicdesigninputspectrawasobtainedfromASCE7-10whichisin accordancewithNEI12-06Section5.3.1.1.b.ASCE7-10 provides a spectrawithlowerspectral accelerationsthantheGGNSsafe shutdown earthquake(SSE).Atthe requestoftheNRC,theabilityofthe structuretoresistplant SSE accelerationswasevaluated.TheASCE7-10basedseismicreactionsobtainedfromtheFLEXstoragebuilding vendor were increased accordinglyforthisevaluation.Inorderto determine the acceptabilityoftheexistingdesigntothe higher accelerations, these higher seismic reactionswerethen comparedtothewindreactions.Thedesigninputwindspeedof165mph significantly exceedstheASCE7-10 requirements. | Vert.GGNS12.99.75.2 4.1 2.5 2.4 North&South Storage Buildings Attachment3to GNRO-2016/00006Page1of1AuditOpenItemGGNSStorageBuilding SeismicDesign-ResponsetoNRCOpenItemISECI 3.1.1.1.ALicenseeInputNeeded:TheNRC staff requestthatthelicenseemake available an evaluationoftheabilityoftheFSBstosurviveasafeshutdown earthquake.AuditOpenItemResponse:TheGrandGulf NuclearStation(GGNS)FLEX storagebuildingswere designedviathe2012 InternationalBuildingCode(IBC).IBCinvokesASCE7-10 throughout the document.TheseismicdesigninputspectrawasobtainedfromASCE7-10whichisin accordancewithNEI12-06Section5.3.1.1.b.ASCE7-10 provides a spectrawithlowerspectral accelerationsthantheGGNSsafe shutdown earthquake(SSE).Atthe requestoftheNRC,theabilityofthe structuretoresistplant SSE accelerationswasevaluated.TheASCE7-10basedseismicreactionsobtainedfromtheFLEXstoragebuilding vendor were increased accordinglyforthisevaluation.Inorderto determine the acceptabilityoftheexistingdesigntothe higher accelerations, these higher seismic reactionswerethen comparedtothewindreactions.Thedesigninputwindspeedof165mph significantly exceedstheASCE7-10 requirements. | ||
A thoroughreviewofthedesign determinedthatthe reactionsfromtheexcesswindspeedgovernoverSSEloading.Theexistingdesignis therefore acceptable.Thetablebelow summarizes the governing design element(Braces)ratiosbetweenwindandSSEreactions.Notethattheindividualbuilding framesandendwall membersalsohavemarginoverSSEreactionsbeyondwhatisshownbelow.PerGGNSUFSAR,section2.5.2.5,duetothe conservatismoftheSSEdesign spectrumwiththepeak acceleration characterizedforthesoilcolumn,noadditionalanalysistotake accountforthesitesoilcolumnisnecessary.Table1:Windand Seismic SSE Comparison for Governing Design Element Wind Reactions SSE Reactions(kip)Wind capacityoverSSE (kip)forces (Wind reaction/SSE reaction)Horiz.Vert.Horiz.Vert.Horiz. | A thoroughreviewofthedesign determinedthatthe reactionsfromtheexcesswindspeedgovernoverSSEloading.Theexistingdesignis therefore acceptable.Thetablebelow summarizes the governing design element(Braces)ratiosbetweenwindandSSEreactions.Notethattheindividualbuilding framesandendwall membersalsohavemarginoverSSEreactionsbeyondwhatisshownbelow.PerGGNSUFSAR,section2.5.2.5,duetothe conservatismoftheSSEdesign spectrumwiththepeak acceleration characterizedforthesoilcolumn,noadditionalanalysistotake accountforthesitesoilcolumnisnecessary.Table1:Windand Seismic SSE Comparison for Governing Design Element Wind Reactions SSE Reactions(kip)Wind capacityoverSSE (kip)forces (Wind reaction/SSE reaction)Horiz.Vert.Horiz.Vert.Horiz. | ||
Vert.GGNS12.99.75.2 4.1 2.5 2.4 North&South Storage Buildings Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006ISEOpenand ConfirmatoryItemResponses Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006ISEOpenand ConfirmatoryItemResponses Attachment4toGNRO-20 16/00006Page1of12InterimStaffEvaluationOpenItemand Confirmatory Item ResponsesOnFebruary19,2014,theNRCissuedtheInterimStaffEvaluation(ISE)forGrandGulfNuclearStation(GGNS)Unit1( | Vert.GGNS12.99.75.2 4.1 2.5 2.4 North&South Storage Buildings Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006ISEOpenand ConfirmatoryItemResponses Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006ISEOpenand ConfirmatoryItemResponses Attachment4toGNRO-20 16/00006Page1of12InterimStaffEvaluationOpenItemand Confirmatory Item ResponsesOnFebruary19,2014,theNRCissuedtheInterimStaffEvaluation(ISE)forGrandGulfNuclearStation(GGNS)Unit1(ML14007A718).Inthat document,oneopenitemand seventeen confirmatoryitemswereidentified.ANRConsiteauditwas conductedatGGNSduringtheweek of October19,2015,duringwhichallofthe confirmatoryandopenitemswereclosed,withtheexceptionoftheitem discussed in Attachment3,as documentedintheauditreport.ListedbelowaretheEntergy responsestotheISEopenand confirmatoryitemsinadditiontotheoneprovided in Attachment3.These responseswereprovidedtotheNRCbeforeandduringtheonsiteaudit.ISEOpen Item 3.1.2.A SincetheGGNS Probable Maximum Precipitation is greater than the grade elevation and sandbags are needed to protect against flooding,itis unclear howGGNScanbe designatedasa"dry" site.Since the licensee identifiedGGNSasa dry site, licensee information related toNEI12-06 guidelines identified in this report, Sections3.1.2.1,3.1.2.2,and3.1.2.3 (storage, deployment, and proceduralinterfaces,respectively) are not discussed. | ||
If the resolution of this Open Item resultsinGGNS not being categorizedasa"dry" site, the guidelines of the NE112-06 Sections related to these report sections willneedtobe addressed by the licensee as part of that resolution.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014( | If the resolution of this Open Item resultsinGGNS not being categorizedasa"dry" site, the guidelines of the NE112-06 Sections related to these report sections willneedtobe addressed by the licensee as part of that resolution.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014(ML14059A080):Theexternalfloodhazard assessment for GGNS is discussedonOIPpage1of69.Thesitewas originally designatedasadrysiteforFLEX becausetheGGNSUFSAR,in Appendix3A,identifiedtheplantasadrysitebasedontheplantgrade elevationbeing30feet greaterthantheprobablemaximumflood(PMF)level.However, after considerationoftheupdatedfloodlevelduetoprobablemaximum precipitation(PMP),theneedforfloodbarriersforPMP,andthe guidance ofNEI12-06,Entergyhas determinedthatGGNSwillbe classifiedasawetsiteforbeyonddesignbasisevents.Assuch,theGGNSFLEX strategy incorporates, as applicable, the guidance ofNE12-06,Revision0, sections6.2.2and6.2.3 (including sub-sections6.2.3.1through6.2.3.4).EC50287,Revision0,"FLEX StorageBuildings"section3.6.2and calculation CC-N1 FLEX-14002,Rev.0,section2.0, documentthatduetothe6"curbinstalledontheFLEX Storage Buildings(FSBs),theyare protected from boundingfloodingduetolocalintense precipitation(LIP).The"effective top-of-slab"elevationof163.5feetfortheNorthFSB(Site1)and133.7feetfortheSouthFSB(Site4)arebothabovethe projected maximum flood elevationsatthebuildinglocationsduetolocalintense precipitation(LIP)of163.2feetand133.5feet,respectively. | ||
Deployment Paths: The deploymentpathfromtheNorthFSB(Site1)dipsto6ftbelowtheStreamAmaximum reevaluated probablemaximumfloodlevelof132.5feet(including wind-wave effects)documentedinML13071A457 preventing the deploymentoftheFLEX equipmentfromtheNorthFSBforthisspecificfloodingscenario.Forthe timelineofthis predictableinitiatingeventtheSouthFSB deploymentpathremains accessible allowing deploymentoftheFLEX equipment.Similarly,fortheprojectedmaximumfloodelevationalongthe deploymentpathfromtheSouthFSBduetoLIP, the deploymentpathcould experience a transientmaximumwaterdepthof1.5ft.ML13071A457 Attachment4toGNRO-20 16/00006Page1of12InterimStaffEvaluationOpenItemand Confirmatory Item ResponsesOnFebruary19,2014,theNRCissuedtheInterimStaffEvaluation(ISE)forGrandGulfNuclearStation(GGNS)Unit1( | Deployment Paths: The deploymentpathfromtheNorthFSB(Site1)dipsto6ftbelowtheStreamAmaximum reevaluated probablemaximumfloodlevelof132.5feet(including wind-wave effects)documentedinML13071A457 preventing the deploymentoftheFLEX equipmentfromtheNorthFSBforthisspecificfloodingscenario.Forthe timelineofthis predictableinitiatingeventtheSouthFSB deploymentpathremains accessible allowing deploymentoftheFLEX equipment.Similarly,fortheprojectedmaximumfloodelevationalongthe deploymentpathfromtheSouthFSBduetoLIP, the deploymentpathcould experience a transientmaximumwaterdepthof1.5ft.ML13071A457 Attachment4toGNRO-20 16/00006Page1of12InterimStaffEvaluationOpenItemand Confirmatory Item ResponsesOnFebruary19,2014,theNRCissuedtheInterimStaffEvaluation(ISE)forGrandGulfNuclearStation(GGNS)Unit1(ML14007A718).Inthat document,oneopenitemand seventeen confirmatoryitemswereidentified.ANRConsiteauditwas conductedatGGNSduringtheweek of October19,2015,duringwhichallofthe confirmatoryandopenitemswereclosed,withtheexceptionoftheitem discussed in Attachment3,as documentedintheauditreport.ListedbelowaretheEntergy responsestotheISEopenand confirmatoryitemsinadditiontotheoneprovided in Attachment3.These responseswereprovidedtotheNRCbeforeandduringtheonsiteaudit.ISEOpen Item 3.1.2.A SincetheGGNS Probable Maximum Precipitation is greater than the grade elevation and sandbags are needed to protect against flooding,itis unclear howGGNScanbe designatedasa"dry" site.Since the licensee identifiedGGNSasa dry site, licensee information related toNEI12-06 guidelines identified in this report, Sections3.1.2.1,3.1.2.2,and3.1.2.3 (storage, deployment, and proceduralinterfaces,respectively) are not discussed. | ||
If the resolution of this Open Item resultsinGGNS not being categorizedasa"dry" site, the guidelines of the NE112-06 Sections related to these report sections willneedtobe addressed by the licensee as part of that resolution.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014( | If the resolution of this Open Item resultsinGGNS not being categorizedasa"dry" site, the guidelines of the NE112-06 Sections related to these report sections willneedtobe addressed by the licensee as part of that resolution.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014(ML14059A080):Theexternalfloodhazard assessment for GGNS is discussedonOIPpage1of69.Thesitewas originally designatedasadrysiteforFLEX becausetheGGNSUFSAR,in Appendix3A,identifiedtheplantasadrysitebasedontheplantgrade elevationbeing30feet greaterthantheprobablemaximumflood(PMF)level.However, after considerationoftheupdatedfloodlevelduetoprobablemaximum precipitation(PMP),theneedforfloodbarriersforPMP,andthe guidance ofNEI12-06,Entergyhas determinedthatGGNSwillbe classifiedasawetsiteforbeyonddesignbasisevents.Assuch,theGGNSFLEX strategy incorporates, as applicable, the guidance ofNE12-06,Revision0, sections6.2.2and6.2.3 (including sub-sections6.2.3.1through6.2.3.4).EC50287,Revision0,"FLEX StorageBuildings"section3.6.2and calculation CC-N1 FLEX-14002,Rev.0,section2.0, documentthatduetothe6"curbinstalledontheFLEX Storage Buildings(FSBs),theyare protected from boundingfloodingduetolocalintense precipitation(LIP).The"effective top-of-slab"elevationof163.5feetfortheNorthFSB(Site1)and133.7feetfortheSouthFSB(Site4)arebothabovethe projected maximum flood elevationsatthebuildinglocationsduetolocalintense precipitation(LIP)of163.2feetand133.5feet,respectively. | ||
Deployment Paths: The deploymentpathfromtheNorthFSB(Site1)dipsto6ftbelowtheStreamAmaximum reevaluated probablemaximumfloodlevelof132.5feet(including wind-wave effects)documentedinML13071A457 preventing the deploymentoftheFLEX equipmentfromtheNorthFSBforthisspecificfloodingscenario.Forthe timelineofthis predictableinitiatingeventtheSouthFSB deploymentpathremains accessible allowing deploymentoftheFLEX equipment.Similarly,fortheprojectedmaximumfloodelevationalongthe deploymentpathfromtheSouthFSBduetoLIP, the deploymentpathcould experience a transientmaximumwaterdepthof1.5ft.ML13071A457 Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page2of12 documentsthatthis maximumfloodlevel drops significantly(toabout one-halfmax)within2hoursandFLEX equipment deploymentwouldnotbeneededuntilabout6hours. | Deployment Paths: The deploymentpathfromtheNorthFSB(Site1)dipsto6ftbelowtheStreamAmaximum reevaluated probablemaximumfloodlevelof132.5feet(including wind-wave effects)documentedinML13071A457 preventing the deploymentoftheFLEX equipmentfromtheNorthFSBforthisspecificfloodingscenario.Forthe timelineofthis predictableinitiatingeventtheSouthFSB deploymentpathremains accessible allowing deploymentoftheFLEX equipment.Similarly,fortheprojectedmaximumfloodelevationalongthe deploymentpathfromtheSouthFSBduetoLIP, the deploymentpathcould experience a transientmaximumwaterdepthof1.5ft.ML13071A457 Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page2of12 documentsthatthis maximumfloodlevel drops significantly(toabout one-halfmax)within2hoursandFLEX equipment deploymentwouldnotbeneededuntilabout6hours. | ||
Therefore,fortheGGNSfloodinginitiatingevents documentedinML13071A457theSouthFSBisprovidedand remains accessiblewithafull complementofFLEX equipment to implement the mitigating strategies. | Therefore,fortheGGNSfloodinginitiatingevents documentedinML13071A457theSouthFSBisprovidedand remains accessiblewithafull complementofFLEX equipment to implement the mitigating strategies. | ||
ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.1.1.A Confirm that the storage facilities and plans will conform to the guidance in NEI12-06, Section 5.3.1, for protection from seismic events.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014update(ML14059A080) and Attachment3tothis submittal:Whileonsite,NRCstaffreviewedtheGrandGulf NuclearStation(GGNS) strategyforprotecting FLEX equipment from seismichazards.EC50287,Revision0,"FLEX StorageBuildings"section3.6.1installedtwo pre-engineered metal buildingswhich.are designedforseismicloadsperNEI12-06,Revision0,section 5.3.1.1.b(ASCE7-10andlocalbuildingcodes).Soilboringshavebeentakenalongthe primarytravelpathfromeachbuildingtothe deployment(staging)locationstoensurethatatleastone pathwaywillnotbe susceptibletosoil liquefaction, which satisfiesNEI06,Section5.3.2.1forsoil liquefaction. | ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.1.1.A Confirm that the storage facilities and plans will conform to the guidance in NEI12-06, Section 5.3.1, for protection from seismic events.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014update(ML14059A080) and Attachment3tothis submittal:Whileonsite,NRCstaffreviewedtheGrandGulf NuclearStation(GGNS) strategyforprotecting FLEX equipment from seismichazards.EC50287,Revision0,"FLEX StorageBuildings"section3.6.1installedtwo pre-engineered metal buildingswhich.are designedforseismicloadsperNEI12-06,Revision0,section 5.3.1.1.b(ASCE7-10andlocalbuildingcodes).Soilboringshavebeentakenalongthe primarytravelpathfromeachbuildingtothe deployment(staging)locationstoensurethatatleastone pathwaywillnotbe susceptibletosoil liquefaction, which satisfiesNEI06,Section5.3.2.1forsoil liquefaction. | ||
ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.3.1.A Confirm that at least one of the two FLEX equipment storage buildings would not be damaged by tornado missiles, based on the guidance in NEI12-06, Section 7.3.1.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014update( | ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.3.1.A Confirm that at least one of the two FLEX equipment storage buildings would not be damaged by tornado missiles, based on the guidance in NEI12-06, Section 7.3.1.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014update(ML14059A080)andEngineeringReport GGNS-SA-14-00004,Revision1:Whileonsite,theNRCstaffreviewedtheGGNS strategy for protecting FLEX equipmentformhighwindand tornadomissilehazards.EC50287,Revision0,"FLEX StorageBuildings"section3.6.3 documentsthatGGNShastwo pre-engineered metal buildingswhichare designed in accordance with NEI12-06,Revision0,section 7.3.1.1.c(ASCE7-10andlocalbuildingcodes)to address highwinddesigncriteria. | ||
Specifically, the storage buildings locations are separatedtoprovide reasonable assurancethatatleastoneofthe storage buildingswouldnotbe damaged by tornadowindsand tornado-generatedmissiles.A tornado separationevaluationforthetwostoragebuildingshasbeen completed (GGNS-SA-14-00004,Revision1).Basedonthisevaluation,the licensee concludedthat90th percentile tornadois990feetwideandtravelsfromthe southwest to northeastdirection.TheFLEX storage buildingsarelocatedover1500feetapartonthis southwest to northeastaxistoensure adequate separation. | Specifically, the storage buildings locations are separatedtoprovide reasonable assurancethatatleastoneofthe storage buildingswouldnotbe damaged by tornadowindsand tornado-generatedmissiles.A tornado separationevaluationforthetwostoragebuildingshasbeen completed (GGNS-SA-14-00004,Revision1).Basedonthisevaluation,the licensee concludedthat90th percentile tornadois990feetwideandtravelsfromthe southwest to northeastdirection.TheFLEX storage buildingsarelocatedover1500feetapartonthis southwest to northeastaxistoensure adequate separation. | ||
ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.3.2.A Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page2of12 documentsthatthis maximumfloodlevel drops significantly(toabout one-halfmax)within2hoursandFLEX equipment deploymentwouldnotbeneededuntilabout6hours. | ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.3.2.A Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page2of12 documentsthatthis maximumfloodlevel drops significantly(toabout one-halfmax)within2hoursandFLEX equipment deploymentwouldnotbeneededuntilabout6hours. | ||
Therefore,fortheGGNSfloodinginitiatingevents documentedinML13071A457theSouthFSBisprovidedand remains accessiblewithafull complementofFLEX equipment to implement the mitigating strategies. | Therefore,fortheGGNSfloodinginitiatingevents documentedinML13071A457theSouthFSBisprovidedand remains accessiblewithafull complementofFLEX equipment to implement the mitigating strategies. | ||
ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.1.1.A Confirm that the storage facilities and plans will conform to the guidance in NEI12-06, Section 5.3.1, for protection from seismic events.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014update(ML14059A080) and Attachment3tothis submittal:Whileonsite,NRCstaffreviewedtheGrandGulf NuclearStation(GGNS) strategyforprotecting FLEX equipment from seismichazards.EC50287,Revision0,"FLEX StorageBuildings"section3.6.1installedtwo pre-engineered metal buildingswhich.are designedforseismicloadsperNEI12-06,Revision0,section 5.3.1.1.b(ASCE7-10andlocalbuildingcodes).Soilboringshavebeentakenalongthe primarytravelpathfromeachbuildingtothe deployment(staging)locationstoensurethatatleastone pathwaywillnotbe susceptibletosoil liquefaction, which satisfiesNEI06,Section5.3.2.1forsoil liquefaction. | ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.1.1.A Confirm that the storage facilities and plans will conform to the guidance in NEI12-06, Section 5.3.1, for protection from seismic events.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014update(ML14059A080) and Attachment3tothis submittal:Whileonsite,NRCstaffreviewedtheGrandGulf NuclearStation(GGNS) strategyforprotecting FLEX equipment from seismichazards.EC50287,Revision0,"FLEX StorageBuildings"section3.6.1installedtwo pre-engineered metal buildingswhich.are designedforseismicloadsperNEI12-06,Revision0,section 5.3.1.1.b(ASCE7-10andlocalbuildingcodes).Soilboringshavebeentakenalongthe primarytravelpathfromeachbuildingtothe deployment(staging)locationstoensurethatatleastone pathwaywillnotbe susceptibletosoil liquefaction, which satisfiesNEI06,Section5.3.2.1forsoil liquefaction. | ||
ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.3.1.A Confirm that at least one of the two FLEX equipment storage buildings would not be damaged by tornado missiles, based on the guidance in NEI12-06, Section 7.3.1.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014update( | ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.3.1.A Confirm that at least one of the two FLEX equipment storage buildings would not be damaged by tornado missiles, based on the guidance in NEI12-06, Section 7.3.1.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014update(ML14059A080)andEngineeringReport GGNS-SA-14-00004,Revision1:Whileonsite,theNRCstaffreviewedtheGGNS strategy for protecting FLEX equipmentformhighwindand tornadomissilehazards.EC50287,Revision0,"FLEX StorageBuildings"section3.6.3 documentsthatGGNShastwo pre-engineered metal buildingswhichare designed in accordance with NEI12-06,Revision0,section 7.3.1.1.c(ASCE7-10andlocalbuildingcodes)to address highwinddesigncriteria. | ||
Specifically, the storage buildings locations are separatedtoprovide reasonable assurancethatatleastoneofthe storage buildingswouldnotbe damaged by tornadowindsand tornado-generatedmissiles.A tornado separationevaluationforthetwostoragebuildingshasbeen completed (GGNS-SA-14-00004,Revision1).Basedonthisevaluation,the licensee concludedthat90th percentile tornadois990feetwideandtravelsfromthe southwest to northeastdirection.TheFLEX storage buildingsarelocatedover1500feetapartonthis southwest to northeastaxistoensure adequate separation. | Specifically, the storage buildings locations are separatedtoprovide reasonable assurancethatatleastoneofthe storage buildingswouldnotbe damaged by tornadowindsand tornado-generatedmissiles.A tornado separationevaluationforthetwostoragebuildingshasbeen completed (GGNS-SA-14-00004,Revision1).Basedonthisevaluation,the licensee concludedthat90th percentile tornadois990feetwideandtravelsfromthe southwest to northeastdirection.TheFLEX storage buildingsarelocatedover1500feetapartonthis southwest to northeastaxistoensure adequate separation. | ||
ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.3.2.A Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page3of12 Confirm that procedures address UHS usability when wind generated debris is present in the UHS.GGNSResponse: | ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.3.2.A Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page3of12 Confirm that procedures address UHS usability when wind generated debris is present in the UHS.GGNSResponse: | ||
Whileonsite,theNRCstaffreviewedtheGGNS strategy for addressing wind-generateddebrisintheultimateheatsink(UHS).To preclude ingestion and transportoflarge debrisintotheRPVorSFP,EC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasis Engineering Change(EC)",section3.1.40andtheGGNSFLEXSupport Guidelines (05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0and 05-S-01-FSG-003,Revision0) documentthattheGGNS strategy includesuseofasuctiondebris strainerforthePhase2FLEXpump.Smalldebrisand dissolvedmaterialhasbeen evaluatedtonot impedecoolingbythe BWROG in BWROG-TP-14-006.TheGGNS strategyfollowsthe recommendation in14-006toinjectwaterintothecoreshroudregion. | Whileonsite,theNRCstaffreviewedtheGGNS strategy for addressing wind-generateddebrisintheultimateheatsink(UHS).To preclude ingestion and transportoflarge debrisintotheRPVorSFP,EC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasis Engineering Change(EC)",section3.1.40andtheGGNSFLEXSupport Guidelines (05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0and 05-S-01-FSG-003,Revision0) documentthattheGGNS strategy includesuseofasuctiondebris strainerforthePhase2FLEXpump.Smalldebrisand dissolvedmaterialhasbeen evaluatedtonot impedecoolingbythe BWROG in BWROG-TP-14-006.TheGGNS strategyfollowsthe recommendation in14-006toinjectwaterintothecoreshroudregion. | ||
ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.1.A Confirm that the final Modular Accident Analysis Program Revision4(MAAP4)analysis of the RCS response conforms to the NEI position paper dated June 2013, entitled"Useof Modular Accident Analysis Program(MAAP)in Support of Post-Fukushima Applications" (ADAMS Accession NumberML13190A201)and the MAAP4 limitations of the NRC endorsement letter, dated October 3,2013 (ADAMS AccessionNo.ML13275A318).GGNSResponse:TheMAAP4analysis containedinCaseBof Appendix9of calculation XC-Q1111-14005, Revision0,"GrandGulfCoreand ContainmentAnalysisofFLEX Strategies" determines the conditions intheGGNS containment,drywell,andreactorvessel followingabeyonddesignbasisexternalevent(BDBEE)resultinginan extendedlossofAlCpower(ELAP).TheModular Accident AnalysisProgram(MAAP)Version4.0.6BWR(Boiling WaterReactor)isusedforthisanalysis.Thiscalculationwas developed consistentwiththe guidelines containedinthe2013EPRITechnical Report 3002001785 ( | ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.1.A Confirm that the final Modular Accident Analysis Program Revision4(MAAP4)analysis of the RCS response conforms to the NEI position paper dated June 2013, entitled"Useof Modular Accident Analysis Program(MAAP)in Support of Post-Fukushima Applications" (ADAMS Accession NumberML13190A201)and the MAAP4 limitations of the NRC endorsement letter, dated October 3,2013 (ADAMS AccessionNo.ML13275A318).GGNSResponse:TheMAAP4analysis containedinCaseBof Appendix9of calculation XC-Q1111-14005, Revision0,"GrandGulfCoreand ContainmentAnalysisofFLEX Strategies" determines the conditions intheGGNS containment,drywell,andreactorvessel followingabeyonddesignbasisexternalevent(BDBEE)resultinginan extendedlossofAlCpower(ELAP).TheModular Accident AnalysisProgram(MAAP)Version4.0.6BWR(Boiling WaterReactor)isusedforthisanalysis.Thiscalculationwas developed consistentwiththe guidelines containedinthe2013EPRITechnical Report 3002001785 (ML13190A201), with regardstotheuseofMAAP4in supportof Fukushima applications. | ||
Appendix5ofthe calculation containsaGGNSresponsetotheletterof October3,2013fromJackDavis(NRR)toJoePollock(NEI)( | Appendix5ofthe calculation containsaGGNSresponsetotheletterof October3,2013fromJackDavis(NRR)toJoePollock(NEI)(ML13275A318)regardinguseofMAAP4in simulatingELAPeventsforBWRs, addressingeachoneofthe limitationsstatedonthe NRC endorsement letter.ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.2.A Confirm that the MAAP4 analysis includes appropriate recirculation pumpsealleakage.GGNSResponseRecirculationpumpseal leakage is includedinsection5.0oftheMAAP4analysiscontainedinCaseBof Appendix9of calculation XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0,"GrandGulfCoreand ContainmentAnalysisofFLEX Strategies".TheinitialGGNS recirculationpumpsealleakageinCaseBis18gallonsperminute(gpm)perpumpsealand30gpmallowed Technical Specification pressure boundary leakageforatotal leakageof66gpmatnormal operatingreactorpressure.Primarysystem leakageismodeledtostartattimezeroandvarieswithreactorpressure.TheRPVleakagelocationissetatthereactor recirculationpumpsuctionnozzleelevationtosimulate Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page3of12 Confirm that procedures address UHS usability when wind generated debris is present in the UHS.GGNSResponse: | ||
Whileonsite,theNRCstaffreviewedtheGGNS strategy for addressing wind-generateddebrisintheultimateheatsink(UHS).To preclude ingestion and transportoflarge debrisintotheRPVorSFP,EC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasis Engineering Change(EC)",section3.1.40andtheGGNSFLEXSupport Guidelines (05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0and 05-S-01-FSG-003,Revision0) documentthattheGGNS strategy includesuseofasuctiondebris strainerforthePhase2FLEXpump.Smalldebrisand dissolvedmaterialhasbeen evaluatedtonot impedecoolingbythe BWROG in BWROG-TP-14-006.TheGGNS strategyfollowsthe recommendation in14-006toinjectwaterintothecoreshroudregion. | Whileonsite,theNRCstaffreviewedtheGGNS strategy for addressing wind-generateddebrisintheultimateheatsink(UHS).To preclude ingestion and transportoflarge debrisintotheRPVorSFP,EC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasis Engineering Change(EC)",section3.1.40andtheGGNSFLEXSupport Guidelines (05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0and 05-S-01-FSG-003,Revision0) documentthattheGGNS strategy includesuseofasuctiondebris strainerforthePhase2FLEXpump.Smalldebrisand dissolvedmaterialhasbeen evaluatedtonot impedecoolingbythe BWROG in BWROG-TP-14-006.TheGGNS strategyfollowsthe recommendation in14-006toinjectwaterintothecoreshroudregion. | ||
ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.1.A Confirm that the final Modular Accident Analysis Program Revision4(MAAP4)analysis of the RCS response conforms to the NEI position paper dated June 2013, entitled"Useof Modular Accident Analysis Program(MAAP)in Support of Post-Fukushima Applications" (ADAMS Accession NumberML13190A201)and the MAAP4 limitations of the NRC endorsement letter, dated October 3,2013 (ADAMS AccessionNo.ML13275A318).GGNSResponse:TheMAAP4analysis containedinCaseBof Appendix9of calculation XC-Q1111-14005, Revision0,"GrandGulfCoreand ContainmentAnalysisofFLEX Strategies" determines the conditions intheGGNS containment,drywell,andreactorvessel followingabeyonddesignbasisexternalevent(BDBEE)resultinginan extendedlossofAlCpower(ELAP).TheModular Accident AnalysisProgram(MAAP)Version4.0.6BWR(Boiling WaterReactor)isusedforthisanalysis.Thiscalculationwas developed consistentwiththe guidelines containedinthe2013EPRITechnical Report 3002001785 ( | ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.1.A Confirm that the final Modular Accident Analysis Program Revision4(MAAP4)analysis of the RCS response conforms to the NEI position paper dated June 2013, entitled"Useof Modular Accident Analysis Program(MAAP)in Support of Post-Fukushima Applications" (ADAMS Accession NumberML13190A201)and the MAAP4 limitations of the NRC endorsement letter, dated October 3,2013 (ADAMS AccessionNo.ML13275A318).GGNSResponse:TheMAAP4analysis containedinCaseBof Appendix9of calculation XC-Q1111-14005, Revision0,"GrandGulfCoreand ContainmentAnalysisofFLEX Strategies" determines the conditions intheGGNS containment,drywell,andreactorvessel followingabeyonddesignbasisexternalevent(BDBEE)resultinginan extendedlossofAlCpower(ELAP).TheModular Accident AnalysisProgram(MAAP)Version4.0.6BWR(Boiling WaterReactor)isusedforthisanalysis.Thiscalculationwas developed consistentwiththe guidelines containedinthe2013EPRITechnical Report 3002001785 (ML13190A201), with regardstotheuseofMAAP4in supportof Fukushima applications. | ||
Appendix5ofthe calculation containsaGGNSresponsetotheletterof October3,2013fromJackDavis(NRR)toJoePollock(NEI)( | Appendix5ofthe calculation containsaGGNSresponsetotheletterof October3,2013fromJackDavis(NRR)toJoePollock(NEI)(ML13275A318)regardinguseofMAAP4in simulatingELAPeventsforBWRs, addressingeachoneofthe limitationsstatedonthe NRC endorsement letter.ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.2.A Confirm that the MAAP4 analysis includes appropriate recirculation pumpsealleakage.GGNSResponseRecirculationpumpseal leakage is includedinsection5.0oftheMAAP4analysiscontainedinCaseBof Appendix9of calculation XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0,"GrandGulfCoreand ContainmentAnalysisofFLEX Strategies".TheinitialGGNS recirculationpumpsealleakageinCaseBis18gallonsperminute(gpm)perpumpsealand30gpmallowed Technical Specification pressure boundary leakageforatotal leakageof66gpmatnormal operatingreactorpressure.Primarysystem leakageismodeledtostartattimezeroandvarieswithreactorpressure.TheRPVleakagelocationissetatthereactor recirculationpumpsuctionnozzleelevationtosimulate Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page4of12leakagefromthe recirculationpumpseals. | ||
Additionally, to determine the impactofincreasedsealleakageonRPVLevel;drywelland containment temperature;anddrywelland containmentpressure;CaseFof Appendix9of calculation XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0,alsoanalyzesthe FLEX strategyofCaseBof Appendix9withaninitial increased seal leakagebetween100-gpmto184gpmpriortoRPVinjectionwiththeFLEXpump.Primarysystem leakageandpressureareincludedinthe evaluationoftheFLEX make-up pump requirementswhenRPV depressurization is performed. | Additionally, to determine the impactofincreasedsealleakageonRPVLevel;drywelland containment temperature;anddrywelland containmentpressure;CaseFof Appendix9of calculation XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0,alsoanalyzesthe FLEX strategyofCaseBof Appendix9withaninitial increased seal leakagebetween100-gpmto184gpmpriortoRPVinjectionwiththeFLEXpump.Primarysystem leakageandpressureareincludedinthe evaluationoftheFLEX make-up pump requirementswhenRPV depressurization is performed. | ||
ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.3.A Confirm that the final Sequence of Events (SOE)reflects the results of the final MAAP4 analysis of the RCS response and the licensee provides reasonable assurance by some means(e.g.by walkthrough) that the timing of the actions in theSOEis achievable.GGNSResponse:ThefinalSOEof Appendix9,CaseBof calculation XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0isincludedintheTable3-4timelineinSection3.1.8ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC"andtheSOETimelinein Attachment1to transmittal CIN2016-00023. | ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.3.A Confirm that the final Sequence of Events (SOE)reflects the results of the final MAAP4 analysis of the RCS response and the licensee provides reasonable assurance by some means(e.g.by walkthrough) that the timing of the actions in theSOEis achievable.GGNSResponse:ThefinalSOEof Appendix9,CaseBof calculation XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0isincludedintheTable3-4timelineinSection3.1.8ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC"andtheSOETimelinein Attachment1to transmittal CIN2016-00023. | ||
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Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page7of12GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedGGNS calculation, XC-Q1111-14003, Revision0,"GGNSRCICPumpRoom Heat-upforELAP".Figure1forCase1ofsection2.0oftheanalysis,GGNSNormalEvent Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",andGGNSFLEX Support Guideline 05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDCBusLoadShedandManagement"confirmand support the capabilityoftheGGNSFLEX strategytomaintainan acceptableRCICroom temperature including considerationoftheroomheatloadduetotheSBO required operator responseinGGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-4,Revision50,"LossofACPower"toloadshedtheDCpowersupplytotheRCICsteamturbineglandseal compressor to conserve battery power.GGNS performed GOTHIC calculation, XC-Q1111-14003,Revision0,"GGNSRCICPumpRoomHeat-upforExtendedLossofACPower,"to determine the temperatureintheRCICpumproomfor120hoursfollowinganELAP.This calculation incorporates applicableheatloadsincludingthesteamleakageheatloadfromthestation blackout(SBO)required operatorresponsetoinitiallyloadshedtheDCpowersupplytotheRCICsteamturbineglandseal compressor.TheanalysisshowstheRCICroom temperature approaches193°Fat 11 hours aftertheinitiatingeventforCase1,atwhichtimetheRCICroom temperaturedropsandremainsbelow150°Fduetothe OperatorrestorationofglandsealairtotheRCICturbinewhenthestation battery chargers arereenergizedbythe480VAC300kW battery charger portable diesel generator. | Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page7of12GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedGGNS calculation, XC-Q1111-14003, Revision0,"GGNSRCICPumpRoom Heat-upforELAP".Figure1forCase1ofsection2.0oftheanalysis,GGNSNormalEvent Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",andGGNSFLEX Support Guideline 05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDCBusLoadShedandManagement"confirmand support the capabilityoftheGGNSFLEX strategytomaintainan acceptableRCICroom temperature including considerationoftheroomheatloadduetotheSBO required operator responseinGGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-4,Revision50,"LossofACPower"toloadshedtheDCpowersupplytotheRCICsteamturbineglandseal compressor to conserve battery power.GGNS performed GOTHIC calculation, XC-Q1111-14003,Revision0,"GGNSRCICPumpRoomHeat-upforExtendedLossofACPower,"to determine the temperatureintheRCICpumproomfor120hoursfollowinganELAP.This calculation incorporates applicableheatloadsincludingthesteamleakageheatloadfromthestation blackout(SBO)required operatorresponsetoinitiallyloadshedtheDCpowersupplytotheRCICsteamturbineglandseal compressor.TheanalysisshowstheRCICroom temperature approaches193°Fat 11 hours aftertheinitiatingeventforCase1,atwhichtimetheRCICroom temperaturedropsandremainsbelow150°Fduetothe OperatorrestorationofglandsealairtotheRCICturbinewhenthestation battery chargers arereenergizedbythe480VAC300kW battery charger portable diesel generator. | ||
Additionally,becausethe equivalent leakagerateof0.5gpmfromtheglandsealsissmallandoflimitedduration,theglandseal leakagewillnotcause adversefloodingas evaluatedinSection3.1.28ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC".TheGGNSanalysis demonstratesthattheFLEX strategy maintainstheRCICroom temperaturebelowthe established SBO acceptance criteria of 212°FduringthetimethatRCICiscreditedintheFLEX strategy(lessthan72hours)andbeyond.Althoughnot precluded as indicatedinsection3.2.5and Attachment1oftheGGNS Off-NormalEventProcedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",nolocal operatoractionsarerequiredinsidetheRCICroomfortheFLEX mitigatingstrategy,thus personnel habitabilityisnotanissuewithDCpoweravailable. | Additionally,becausethe equivalent leakagerateof0.5gpmfromtheglandsealsissmallandoflimitedduration,theglandseal leakagewillnotcause adversefloodingas evaluatedinSection3.1.28ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC".TheGGNSanalysis demonstratesthattheFLEX strategy maintainstheRCICroom temperaturebelowthe established SBO acceptance criteria of 212°FduringthetimethatRCICiscreditedintheFLEX strategy(lessthan72hours)andbeyond.Althoughnot precluded as indicatedinsection3.2.5and Attachment1oftheGGNS Off-NormalEventProcedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",nolocal operatoractionsarerequiredinsidetheRCICroomfortheFLEX mitigatingstrategy,thus personnel habitabilityisnotanissuewithDCpoweravailable. | ||
ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.4.A Confirm that any required upgrades to the site's communications systemshavebeen completed, as noted in the NRC's review of the GGNS communications assessment (ADAMS Accession No.Ml13129A132).GGNSResponse:EC50711,Revision0,"EP Communications System EnhancementstoComplywithNEI12-01"Section1.3 documentstherequired upgradestothesite's communications systems forcompliancewiththe requirementsofNEI12-01,asnotedintheNRC'sreviewoftheGGNS communications assessment ( | ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.4.A Confirm that any required upgrades to the site's communications systemshavebeen completed, as noted in the NRC's review of the GGNS communications assessment (ADAMS Accession No.Ml13129A132).GGNSResponse:EC50711,Revision0,"EP Communications System EnhancementstoComplywithNEI12-01"Section1.3 documentstherequired upgradestothesite's communications systems forcompliancewiththe requirementsofNEI12-01,asnotedintheNRC'sreviewoftheGGNS communications assessment (ML13129A132).PerEC50711therequired upgradestothesite's EP communication systemsensurethatthe credited EP Communication equipment associatedwithtwo(2)Radio Channels, handheldradios,andsatellitephoneshasthe necessarypowerand Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page7of12GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedGGNS calculation, XC-Q1111-14003, Revision0,"GGNSRCICPumpRoom Heat-upforELAP".Figure1forCase1ofsection2.0oftheanalysis,GGNSNormalEvent Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",andGGNSFLEX Support Guideline 05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDCBusLoadShedandManagement"confirmand support the capabilityoftheGGNSFLEX strategytomaintainan acceptableRCICroom temperature including considerationoftheroomheatloadduetotheSBO required operator responseinGGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-4,Revision50,"LossofACPower"toloadshedtheDCpowersupplytotheRCICsteamturbineglandseal compressor to conserve battery power.GGNS performed GOTHIC calculation, XC-Q1111-14003,Revision0,"GGNSRCICPumpRoomHeat-upforExtendedLossofACPower,"to determine the temperatureintheRCICpumproomfor120hoursfollowinganELAP.This calculation incorporates applicableheatloadsincludingthesteamleakageheatloadfromthestation blackout(SBO)required operatorresponsetoinitiallyloadshedtheDCpowersupplytotheRCICsteamturbineglandseal compressor.TheanalysisshowstheRCICroom temperature approaches193°Fat 11 hours aftertheinitiatingeventforCase1,atwhichtimetheRCICroom temperaturedropsandremainsbelow150°Fduetothe OperatorrestorationofglandsealairtotheRCICturbinewhenthestation battery chargers arereenergizedbythe480VAC300kW battery charger portable diesel generator. | ||
Additionally,becausethe equivalent leakagerateof0.5gpmfromtheglandsealsissmallandoflimitedduration,theglandseal leakagewillnotcause adversefloodingas evaluatedinSection3.1.28ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC".TheGGNSanalysis demonstratesthattheFLEX strategy maintainstheRCICroom temperaturebelowthe established SBO acceptance criteria of 212°FduringthetimethatRCICiscreditedintheFLEX strategy(lessthan72hours)andbeyond.Althoughnot precluded as indicatedinsection3.2.5and Attachment1oftheGGNS Off-NormalEventProcedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",nolocal operatoractionsarerequiredinsidetheRCICroomfortheFLEX mitigatingstrategy,thus personnel habitabilityisnotanissuewithDCpoweravailable. | Additionally,becausethe equivalent leakagerateof0.5gpmfromtheglandsealsissmallandoflimitedduration,theglandseal leakagewillnotcause adversefloodingas evaluatedinSection3.1.28ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC".TheGGNSanalysis demonstratesthattheFLEX strategy maintainstheRCICroom temperaturebelowthe established SBO acceptance criteria of 212°FduringthetimethatRCICiscreditedintheFLEX strategy(lessthan72hours)andbeyond.Althoughnot precluded as indicatedinsection3.2.5and Attachment1oftheGGNS Off-NormalEventProcedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",nolocal operatoractionsarerequiredinsidetheRCICroomfortheFLEX mitigatingstrategy,thus personnel habitabilityisnotanissuewithDCpoweravailable. | ||
ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.4.A Confirm that any required upgrades to the site's communications systemshavebeen completed, as noted in the NRC's review of the GGNS communications assessment (ADAMS Accession No.Ml13129A132).GGNSResponse:EC50711,Revision0,"EP Communications System EnhancementstoComplywithNEI12-01"Section1.3 documentstherequired upgradestothesite's communications systems forcompliancewiththe requirementsofNEI12-01,asnotedintheNRC'sreviewoftheGGNS communications assessment ( | ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.4.A Confirm that any required upgrades to the site's communications systemshavebeen completed, as noted in the NRC's review of the GGNS communications assessment (ADAMS Accession No.Ml13129A132).GGNSResponse:EC50711,Revision0,"EP Communications System EnhancementstoComplywithNEI12-01"Section1.3 documentstherequired upgradestothesite's communications systems forcompliancewiththe requirementsofNEI12-01,asnotedintheNRC'sreviewoftheGGNS communications assessment (ML13129A132).PerEC50711therequired upgradestothesite's EP communication systemsensurethatthe credited EP Communication equipment associatedwithtwo(2)Radio Channels, handheldradios,andsatellitephoneshasthe necessarypowerand Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page8of12 connectivitytoremain operational followingaBDBEE.Section3.2oftheNRC'sreviewofthe GGNS communications assessment (ML13129A132), provides the guidancethatpriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredfor subsequent changestothe upgradestothesite's communications systems for compliancewithNEI12-01as described in Attachment 1, paragraph4.12andTable3 of GNR02012/00131 (ML12306A245) and GNR02013/00014 (ML13053A091).PerEC50711Revision0,therequired upgradestothesite's communication systemsarecomplete. | ||
ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.8.A Confirm that the licensee's analyses for size and loading of FLEX generators shows acceptable results.GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedGGNS calculation, EC-Q1111-14002,Revision0,"FLEX Strategy-PortableDiesel GeneratorSystemSizing".Section6of calculation EC-Q1111-14002; Sections3.1.4.1,3.1.4.5,and 3.1.4.7ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC";Section3.1.2.5ofEC50711,Revision0,"EP Communications System Enhancements to ComplywithNEI12-01"; | ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.8.A Confirm that the licensee's analyses for size and loading of FLEX generators shows acceptable results.GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedGGNS calculation, EC-Q1111-14002,Revision0,"FLEX Strategy-PortableDiesel GeneratorSystemSizing".Section6of calculation EC-Q1111-14002; Sections3.1.4.1,3.1.4.5,and 3.1.4.7ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC";Section3.1.2.5ofEC50711,Revision0,"EP Communications System Enhancements to ComplywithNEI12-01"; | ||
GGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)";and GGNS FLEX Support Guidelines (05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDCBusLoadShedand Management", 05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0,"Initial AssessmentandFLEX Equipment Staging", 05-S-01-FSG-007,Revision0,"LossofControl 1 InstrumentationPower", S-01-FSG-001,Revision0,"LongTerm ReactorCooling",and 05-S-01-FSG-101,Revision1,"Emergency CommunicationforBDBEEs")confirmand supportthesizeandloading capability ofeachofthefollowing portable diesel generators(PDGs)utilizedfortheGGNSFLEXandGGNS EP communication strategies: | GGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)";and GGNS FLEX Support Guidelines (05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDCBusLoadShedand Management", 05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0,"Initial AssessmentandFLEX Equipment Staging", 05-S-01-FSG-007,Revision0,"LossofControl 1 InstrumentationPower", S-01-FSG-001,Revision0,"LongTerm ReactorCooling",and 05-S-01-FSG-101,Revision1,"Emergency CommunicationforBDBEEs")confirmand supportthesizeandloading capability ofeachofthefollowing portable diesel generators(PDGs)utilizedfortheGGNSFLEXandGGNS EP communication strategies: | ||
o480VAC300kW generators selectedtopowertheDivision1andDivision2 battery chargersanda battery room exhaust fan (EC-Q1111-14002), o240VAC15kW generators selectedtopowereitherdivisionofhydrogen igniters (EC50275), o 240/120VAC6kW generatorsselectedtopowertheportableFLEXcontrolroomventilationfans (EC-Q1111-14002), o4160VAC1MWNationalSAFER Response Center (NSRC)generators14002),and o120VAC7.5kW generators selectedtopowerEP communications equipment (EC50711).TheFLEXelectrical guidance and strategies supporting the maintenanceorrestorationofcore cooling, containmentintegrity,andspentfuelpool(SFP)cooling capabilitiesaredetailed further insection2.3.11and throughoutthefinal integratedplan(FIP)(GNR02016-00006 Attachment 5).Specificloads supportedbytheeachofthe portable diesel generators(PDGs)utilizedfortheGGNSFLEXandGGNSEP communication strategies follow:One480VAC300kW portable diesel generatorisusedtorepowerClass1ELoad Centers 15BA6and16BB6asshownontheoneline diagramofdrawingE1020,Revision11.A dedicated breaker(52-15605)isinstalledonDivisionI480VACLoad Center15BA6to re-power battery charger1DA4andBatteryRoom ExhaustFan1Z77C001A;a dedicated breaker(52-16605)is installed onDivisionII480VACLoad Center16BB6to re-power battery charger1DB4;andanew dedicated fused disconnect(89-171102A)isinstalledfor repoweringtheHPCSDGFuelOil Storage Tank Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page8of12 connectivitytoremain operational followingaBDBEE.Section3.2oftheNRC'sreviewofthe GGNS communications assessment ( | o480VAC300kW generators selectedtopowertheDivision1andDivision2 battery chargersanda battery room exhaust fan (EC-Q1111-14002), o240VAC15kW generators selectedtopowereitherdivisionofhydrogen igniters (EC50275), o 240/120VAC6kW generatorsselectedtopowertheportableFLEXcontrolroomventilationfans (EC-Q1111-14002), o4160VAC1MWNationalSAFER Response Center (NSRC)generators14002),and o120VAC7.5kW generators selectedtopowerEP communications equipment (EC50711).TheFLEXelectrical guidance and strategies supporting the maintenanceorrestorationofcore cooling, containmentintegrity,andspentfuelpool(SFP)cooling capabilitiesaredetailed further insection2.3.11and throughoutthefinal integratedplan(FIP)(GNR02016-00006 Attachment 5).Specificloads supportedbytheeachofthe portable diesel generators(PDGs)utilizedfortheGGNSFLEXandGGNSEP communication strategies follow:One480VAC300kW portable diesel generatorisusedtorepowerClass1ELoad Centers 15BA6and16BB6asshownontheoneline diagramofdrawingE1020,Revision11.A dedicated breaker(52-15605)isinstalledonDivisionI480VACLoad Center15BA6to re-power battery charger1DA4andBatteryRoom ExhaustFan1Z77C001A;a dedicated breaker(52-16605)is installed onDivisionII480VACLoad Center16BB6to re-power battery charger1DB4;andanew dedicated fused disconnect(89-171102A)isinstalledfor repoweringtheHPCSDGFuelOil Storage Tank Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page8of12 connectivitytoremain operational followingaBDBEE.Section3.2oftheNRC'sreviewofthe GGNS communications assessment (ML13129A132), provides the guidancethatpriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredfor subsequent changestothe upgradestothesite's communications systems for compliancewithNEI12-01as described in Attachment 1, paragraph4.12andTable3 of GNR02012/00131 (ML12306A245) and GNR02013/00014 (ML13053A091).PerEC50711Revision0,therequired upgradestothesite's communication systemsarecomplete. | ||
ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.8.A Confirm that the licensee's analyses for size and loading of FLEX generators shows acceptable results.GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedGGNS calculation, EC-Q1111-14002,Revision0,"FLEX Strategy-PortableDiesel GeneratorSystemSizing".Section6of calculation EC-Q1111-14002; Sections3.1.4.1,3.1.4.5,and 3.1.4.7ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC";Section3.1.2.5ofEC50711,Revision0,"EP Communications System Enhancements to ComplywithNEI12-01"; | ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.8.A Confirm that the licensee's analyses for size and loading of FLEX generators shows acceptable results.GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedGGNS calculation, EC-Q1111-14002,Revision0,"FLEX Strategy-PortableDiesel GeneratorSystemSizing".Section6of calculation EC-Q1111-14002; Sections3.1.4.1,3.1.4.5,and 3.1.4.7ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC";Section3.1.2.5ofEC50711,Revision0,"EP Communications System Enhancements to ComplywithNEI12-01"; | ||
GGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)";and GGNS FLEX Support Guidelines (05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDCBusLoadShedand Management", 05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0,"Initial AssessmentandFLEX Equipment Staging", 05-S-01-FSG-007,Revision0,"LossofControl 1 InstrumentationPower", S-01-FSG-001,Revision0,"LongTerm ReactorCooling",and 05-S-01-FSG-101,Revision1,"Emergency CommunicationforBDBEEs")confirmand supportthesizeandloading capability ofeachofthefollowing portable diesel generators(PDGs)utilizedfortheGGNSFLEXandGGNS EP communication strategies: | GGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)";and GGNS FLEX Support Guidelines (05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDCBusLoadShedand Management", 05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0,"Initial AssessmentandFLEX Equipment Staging", 05-S-01-FSG-007,Revision0,"LossofControl 1 InstrumentationPower", S-01-FSG-001,Revision0,"LongTerm ReactorCooling",and 05-S-01-FSG-101,Revision1,"Emergency CommunicationforBDBEEs")confirmand supportthesizeandloading capability ofeachofthefollowing portable diesel generators(PDGs)utilizedfortheGGNSFLEXandGGNS EP communication strategies: | ||
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&BatteryRoomVentilation3.28GGNSTechnical SpecificationsandBases, Amendment 202 3.29 04-1-01-E51-1,Rev.132,SystemOperatingInstructionReactorCoreIsolationCoolingSystem3.30EPRITechnicalReport 3002001785,"Useof ModularAccidentAnalysisProgram(MAAP)inSupportof Post-Fukushima Applications"June20133.31MAAP4ApplicationGuidance,DesktopReferenceforUsingMAAP4Software,Revision2"(ElectricPowerResearchInstituteReport1020236),July20103.32NEDC-33771PRev2GEHEvaluationofFLEX Implementation Guidelines3.33NRCGenericLetter91-07:GI-23,"ReactorCoolantPumpSealFailures"anditsPossibleEffectonStationBlackout3.34GNRI92-00024,SafetyEvaluationofResponsetoStationBlackoutRule TAC-M68549 3.35 NEAD-92-SR-045,GGNSStationBlackoutAnalysisUsingGOTHIC,Rev.0 3.36 MC-Q1111-14003,Rev.000,GrandGulfNuclearStationWaterRequirementsandAvailabilityforaBeyondDesignBasisExternalEvent 3.37 05-1-02-111-1,Revision039,InadequateDecayHeatRemoval3.38EC50286,GGNSpentFuelPoolLevel Instrumentation Upgrade3.39BWROGTechnicalReport,Rev.1,BWR ContainmentVenting,dated 10/29/2013(NRCADAMSAccessionNo.ML13352A057)3.40NRCLettertoNEIdated January 9,2014,EndorsingBWROGTechnicalReport,Rev.1,BWR ContainmentVenting,dated 10/29/2013(NRCADAMSAccessionNo.ML13358A206) 3.41 GGNS-NE-10-00034,Rev.001,GGNSEPUStationBlackout3.42CC-Q1 M10-14001,Rev.000,Evaluationof ContainmentWallforFLEX Strategy 3.43 05-S-01-STRATEGY,AlternateStrategy,Revision012Page115of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear Station3.44PC-N1 M41-14001,Rev.000, NumberofNitrogenBottlesRequiredtoSupport FLEX Strategy for Operationofthe ContainmentCoolingSystem(M41) | &BatteryRoomVentilation3.28GGNSTechnical SpecificationsandBases, Amendment 202 3.29 04-1-01-E51-1,Rev.132,SystemOperatingInstructionReactorCoreIsolationCoolingSystem3.30EPRITechnicalReport 3002001785,"Useof ModularAccidentAnalysisProgram(MAAP)inSupportof Post-Fukushima Applications"June20133.31MAAP4ApplicationGuidance,DesktopReferenceforUsingMAAP4Software,Revision2"(ElectricPowerResearchInstituteReport1020236),July20103.32NEDC-33771PRev2GEHEvaluationofFLEX Implementation Guidelines3.33NRCGenericLetter91-07:GI-23,"ReactorCoolantPumpSealFailures"anditsPossibleEffectonStationBlackout3.34GNRI92-00024,SafetyEvaluationofResponsetoStationBlackoutRule TAC-M68549 3.35 NEAD-92-SR-045,GGNSStationBlackoutAnalysisUsingGOTHIC,Rev.0 3.36 MC-Q1111-14003,Rev.000,GrandGulfNuclearStationWaterRequirementsandAvailabilityforaBeyondDesignBasisExternalEvent 3.37 05-1-02-111-1,Revision039,InadequateDecayHeatRemoval3.38EC50286,GGNSpentFuelPoolLevel Instrumentation Upgrade3.39BWROGTechnicalReport,Rev.1,BWR ContainmentVenting,dated 10/29/2013(NRCADAMSAccessionNo.ML13352A057)3.40NRCLettertoNEIdated January 9,2014,EndorsingBWROGTechnicalReport,Rev.1,BWR ContainmentVenting,dated 10/29/2013(NRCADAMSAccessionNo.ML13358A206) 3.41 GGNS-NE-10-00034,Rev.001,GGNSEPUStationBlackout3.42CC-Q1 M10-14001,Rev.000,Evaluationof ContainmentWallforFLEX Strategy 3.43 05-S-01-STRATEGY,AlternateStrategy,Revision012Page115of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear Station3.44PC-N1 M41-14001,Rev.000, NumberofNitrogenBottlesRequiredtoSupport FLEX Strategy for Operationofthe ContainmentCoolingSystem(M41) | ||
Operated Valves3.45EC50282,Rev.0,Flex ContainmentCoolingSystem(M41)VentPathto Atmosphere 3.46 EC-Q1111-14002,Rev.1,FLEX Strategy-Port-able Diesel Generator System Sizing3.47CC-Q1 M10-10001,Rev.0,Evaluationof ContainmentWallforExtendedPowerUprate3.48MC-Q11 | Operated Valves3.45EC50282,Rev.0,Flex ContainmentCoolingSystem(M41)VentPathto Atmosphere 3.46 EC-Q1111-14002,Rev.1,FLEX Strategy-Port-able Diesel Generator System Sizing3.47CC-Q1 M10-10001,Rev.0,Evaluationof ContainmentWallforExtendedPowerUprate3.48MC-Q11 | ||
,11-14001,Rev.000,GrandGulf NuclearStationReactorCoreIsolationCoolingNetPositiveSuctionHeadAvailable CalculationforaBeyondDesignBasisExternalEvent3.49EC50287,Rev.0,GGNSFLEXStorageBuilding3.50NRCLetter IIRequestfor InformationPursuanttoTitle10oftheCodeof Federal Regulations50.54(f)Regarding Recommendations2.1,2.3,and9.3oftheNear-TermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromtheFukushimaDai-ichiAccident",datedMarch12,2012( | ,11-14001,Rev.000,GrandGulf NuclearStationReactorCoreIsolationCoolingNetPositiveSuctionHeadAvailable CalculationforaBeyondDesignBasisExternalEvent3.49EC50287,Rev.0,GGNSFLEXStorageBuilding3.50NRCLetter IIRequestfor InformationPursuanttoTitle10oftheCodeof Federal Regulations50.54(f)Regarding Recommendations2.1,2.3,and9.3oftheNear-TermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromtheFukushimaDai-ichiAccident",datedMarch12,2012(ML12053A340)3.51EntergyLettertoNRC, Entergy SeismicHazardand Screening Report(CEUSSites),ResponsetoNRCRequestfor InformationPursuantto10CFR50.54(f)Regarding Recommendation2.1oftheNear-TermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromthe FukushimaDai-ichiAccident,GrandGulf NuclearStation,Unit1,datedMarch31,2014(GGNSLetter GNRO-2014/00027)(ML14090A098)3.52EPRIReport1025287,"Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details(SPID)fortheResolutionof FukushimaNear-TermTaskForce Recommendation2.1:Seismic",datedFebruary20133.53GrandGulf NuclearStationLettertoNRC,"RequiredResponse2forTermTaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Flooding-Hazard ReevaluationReport",datedMarch11,2013(GGNSLetter GNRO-2013/00020)(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML13071A457) 3.54 05-1-02-VI-2,Revision127,Hurricanes, Tornados,andSevere Weather3.55CC-N1 FLEX-14001,Rev.000,SlidingandRockingEvaluationofFLEXStorageBuilding EquipmentPage116of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear Station3.44PC-N1 M41-14001,Rev.000, NumberofNitrogenBottlesRequiredtoSupport FLEX Strategy for Operationofthe ContainmentCoolingSystem(M41) | ||
Operated Valves3.45EC50282,Rev.0,Flex ContainmentCoolingSystem(M41)VentPathto Atmosphere 3.46 EC-Q1111-14002,Rev.1,FLEX Strategy-Port-able Diesel Generator System Sizing3.47CC-Q1 M10-10001,Rev.0,Evaluationof ContainmentWallforExtendedPowerUprate3.48MC-Q11 | Operated Valves3.45EC50282,Rev.0,Flex ContainmentCoolingSystem(M41)VentPathto Atmosphere 3.46 EC-Q1111-14002,Rev.1,FLEX Strategy-Port-able Diesel Generator System Sizing3.47CC-Q1 M10-10001,Rev.0,Evaluationof ContainmentWallforExtendedPowerUprate3.48MC-Q11 | ||
,11-14001,Rev.000,GrandGulf NuclearStationReactorCoreIsolationCoolingNetPositiveSuctionHeadAvailable CalculationforaBeyondDesignBasisExternalEvent3.49EC50287,Rev.0,GGNSFLEXStorageBuilding3.50NRCLetter IIRequestfor InformationPursuanttoTitle10oftheCodeof Federal Regulations50.54(f)Regarding Recommendations2.1,2.3,and9.3oftheNear-TermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromtheFukushimaDai-ichiAccident",datedMarch12,2012( | ,11-14001,Rev.000,GrandGulf NuclearStationReactorCoreIsolationCoolingNetPositiveSuctionHeadAvailable CalculationforaBeyondDesignBasisExternalEvent3.49EC50287,Rev.0,GGNSFLEXStorageBuilding3.50NRCLetter IIRequestfor InformationPursuanttoTitle10oftheCodeof Federal Regulations50.54(f)Regarding Recommendations2.1,2.3,and9.3oftheNear-TermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromtheFukushimaDai-ichiAccident",datedMarch12,2012(ML12053A340)3.51EntergyLettertoNRC, Entergy SeismicHazardand Screening Report(CEUSSites),ResponsetoNRCRequestfor InformationPursuantto10CFR50.54(f)Regarding Recommendation2.1oftheNear-TermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromthe FukushimaDai-ichiAccident,GrandGulf NuclearStation,Unit1,datedMarch31,2014(GGNSLetter GNRO-2014/00027)(ML14090A098)3.52EPRIReport1025287,"Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details(SPID)fortheResolutionof FukushimaNear-TermTaskForce Recommendation2.1:Seismic",datedFebruary20133.53GrandGulf NuclearStationLettertoNRC,"RequiredResponse2forTermTaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Flooding-Hazard ReevaluationReport",datedMarch11,2013(GGNSLetter GNRO-2013/00020)(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML13071A457) 3.54 05-1-02-VI-2,Revision127,Hurricanes, Tornados,andSevere Weather3.55CC-N1 FLEX-14001,Rev.000,SlidingandRockingEvaluationofFLEXStorageBuilding EquipmentPage116of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016--------------- | ||
-------GrandGulf Nuclear Station3.56ASCE43-05,"SeismicDesignCriteriaforStructures,Systems,and Components in Nuclear Facilities"3.57ASCE7-10,MinimumDesignLoadsonBuildingsand Other Structures 3.58 N1FLEX-14002,Rev.0,DrainageAnalysisforFLEXStorageBuildings3.59SpecificationE100.0,Rev.007, Environment ParametersforGGNS 3.60 XC-Q1111-14001,Rev.1,ControlRoomHeatupforExtendedLossofAC Power3.61DrawingA-0012,Rev.15,Units1 | -------GrandGulf Nuclear Station3.56ASCE43-05,"SeismicDesignCriteriaforStructures,Systems,and Components in Nuclear Facilities"3.57ASCE7-10,MinimumDesignLoadsonBuildingsand Other Structures 3.58 N1FLEX-14002,Rev.0,DrainageAnalysisforFLEXStorageBuildings3.59SpecificationE100.0,Rev.007, Environment ParametersforGGNS 3.60 XC-Q1111-14001,Rev.1,ControlRoomHeatupforExtendedLossofAC Power3.61DrawingA-0012,Rev.15,Units1 | ||
&2,Gen.FI.Plan-FI.PlanatEI.133'-0",136'-0",139'-0",144'-3"&148'-0"3.62DrawingA-0015,Rev9,Units1 | &2,Gen.FI.Plan-FI.PlanatEI.133'-0",136'-0",139'-0",144'-3"&148'-0"3.62DrawingA-0015,Rev9,Units1 | ||
| Line 460: | Line 460: | ||
+NonClass1E Battery3.68E1267SH021,Rev.002, SchematicDiagramZ77Safeguard Switchgear | +NonClass1E Battery3.68E1267SH021,Rev.002, SchematicDiagramZ77Safeguard Switchgear | ||
&BatteryRoomExhaustFanQ1Z77C001A-A 3.69 04-1-01-Z77-1,Rev.024,Safeguard SwitchgearandBatteryRoomVent System3.70SDC-P41,Rev.004,SystemDesignCriteriafor Standby Service Water System 3.71 IP-CALC-13-00058,Rev.001,FreezingofUnit3CoolantSourcesforFLEXEvent(EC45784)3.72EN-OP-115-01,Revision000, Operator RoundsPage117of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station 3.73 02-S-01-32, Revision 030, Control Building Rounds 3.74 02-S-01-31, Revision 034, Control Room Rounds 3.75 GGNS Letter GNRO-2012/00131, dated October 31,2012, Entergy's ResponsetotheMarch12, 2012 Information Request Pursuantto10CFR 50.54(f)Regarding Recommendation9.3for Completing Emergency Communication Assessments, Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station,Unit1 3.76 GGNS Letter GNRO-2013/00014, dated February 21,2013, Entergy's ResponsetoNRC Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee CommunicationSubmittalsAssociated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3, Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station,Unit13.77NEI12-01,Rev.1, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities3.78EC 50711,Rev.0, GGNS FLEX EmergencyPlan(EP)Communications System Enhancements3.79NRC letter'toAll Power Reactor Licensees and holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status,"Follow-up Letter on Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation9.3(TACNo. | &BatteryRoomExhaustFanQ1Z77C001A-A 3.69 04-1-01-Z77-1,Rev.024,Safeguard SwitchgearandBatteryRoomVent System3.70SDC-P41,Rev.004,SystemDesignCriteriafor Standby Service Water System 3.71 IP-CALC-13-00058,Rev.001,FreezingofUnit3CoolantSourcesforFLEXEvent(EC45784)3.72EN-OP-115-01,Revision000, Operator RoundsPage117of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station 3.73 02-S-01-32, Revision 030, Control Building Rounds 3.74 02-S-01-31, Revision 034, Control Room Rounds 3.75 GGNS Letter GNRO-2012/00131, dated October 31,2012, Entergy's ResponsetotheMarch12, 2012 Information Request Pursuantto10CFR 50.54(f)Regarding Recommendation9.3for Completing Emergency Communication Assessments, Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station,Unit1 3.76 GGNS Letter GNRO-2013/00014, dated February 21,2013, Entergy's ResponsetoNRC Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee CommunicationSubmittalsAssociated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3, Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station,Unit13.77NEI12-01,Rev.1, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities3.78EC 50711,Rev.0, GGNS FLEX EmergencyPlan(EP)Communications System Enhancements3.79NRC letter'toAll Power Reactor Licensees and holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status,"Follow-up Letter on Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation9.3(TACNo. | ||
ME7951)," dated January 23, 2013 (ADAMS AccessionNo.ML1301OA162) 3.80 Nuclear Energy Institute position paper entitled"Position Paper: Shutdown/Refueling Modes," dated September 18, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. | ME7951)," dated January 23, 2013 (ADAMS AccessionNo.ML1301OA162) 3.80 Nuclear Energy Institute position paper entitled"Position Paper: Shutdown/Refueling Modes," dated September 18, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.ML13273A514) 3.81 United States NRC Endorsement Letterofthe Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)Position Paper entitled"Position Paper: Shutdown/Refueling Modes," dated September 30,2013(ADAMS AccessionNo.ML13267A382)3.82 M1088E,Rev.020,Piping& | ||
Instrumentation DiagramFuelPool Cooling&Cleanup System 3.83 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station LettertoNRC,"ResponsetoMarch12,2012, Request for Information (RFI)PursuanttoTitle10ofthe Code of FederalRegulation50.54(f) | Instrumentation DiagramFuelPool Cooling&Cleanup System 3.83 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station LettertoNRC,"ResponsetoMarch12,2012, Request for Information (RFI)PursuanttoTitle10ofthe Code of FederalRegulation50.54(f) | ||
Regarding Recommendationsofthe Near-Term Task Force (NTTF)Review of Insightsfromthe Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, Enclosure 5 Recommendation 9.3, Emergency Preparedness | Regarding Recommendationsofthe Near-Term Task Force (NTTF)Review of Insightsfromthe Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, Enclosure 5 Recommendation 9.3, Emergency Preparedness | ||
-Staffing, Requested Information Items1,2,and6-Phase 2 Staffing Assessment," dated 10/21/15 (GNR02015-00054)Page118of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station 3.73 02-S-01-32, Revision 030, Control Building Rounds 3.74 02-S-01-31, Revision 034, Control Room Rounds 3.75 GGNS Letter GNRO-2012/00131, dated October 31,2012, Entergy's ResponsetotheMarch12, 2012 Information Request Pursuantto10CFR 50.54(f)Regarding Recommendation9.3for Completing Emergency Communication Assessments, Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station,Unit1 3.76 GGNS Letter GNRO-2013/00014, dated February 21,2013, Entergy's ResponsetoNRC Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee CommunicationSubmittalsAssociated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3, Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station,Unit13.77NEI12-01,Rev.1, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities3.78EC 50711,Rev.0, GGNS FLEX EmergencyPlan(EP)Communications System Enhancements3.79NRC letter'toAll Power Reactor Licensees and holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status,"Follow-up Letter on Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation9.3(TACNo. | -Staffing, Requested Information Items1,2,and6-Phase 2 Staffing Assessment," dated 10/21/15 (GNR02015-00054)Page118of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station 3.73 02-S-01-32, Revision 030, Control Building Rounds 3.74 02-S-01-31, Revision 034, Control Room Rounds 3.75 GGNS Letter GNRO-2012/00131, dated October 31,2012, Entergy's ResponsetotheMarch12, 2012 Information Request Pursuantto10CFR 50.54(f)Regarding Recommendation9.3for Completing Emergency Communication Assessments, Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station,Unit1 3.76 GGNS Letter GNRO-2013/00014, dated February 21,2013, Entergy's ResponsetoNRC Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee CommunicationSubmittalsAssociated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3, Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station,Unit13.77NEI12-01,Rev.1, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities3.78EC 50711,Rev.0, GGNS FLEX EmergencyPlan(EP)Communications System Enhancements3.79NRC letter'toAll Power Reactor Licensees and holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status,"Follow-up Letter on Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation9.3(TACNo. | ||
ME7951)," dated January 23, 2013 (ADAMS AccessionNo.ML1301OA162) 3.80 Nuclear Energy Institute position paper entitled"Position Paper: Shutdown/Refueling Modes," dated September 18, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. | ME7951)," dated January 23, 2013 (ADAMS AccessionNo.ML1301OA162) 3.80 Nuclear Energy Institute position paper entitled"Position Paper: Shutdown/Refueling Modes," dated September 18, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.ML13273A514) 3.81 United States NRC Endorsement Letterofthe Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)Position Paper entitled"Position Paper: Shutdown/Refueling Modes," dated September 30,2013(ADAMS AccessionNo.ML13267A382)3.82 M1088E,Rev.020,Piping& | ||
Instrumentation DiagramFuelPool Cooling&Cleanup System 3.83 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station LettertoNRC,"ResponsetoMarch12,2012, Request for Information (RFI)PursuanttoTitle10ofthe Code of FederalRegulation50.54(f) | Instrumentation DiagramFuelPool Cooling&Cleanup System 3.83 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station LettertoNRC,"ResponsetoMarch12,2012, Request for Information (RFI)PursuanttoTitle10ofthe Code of FederalRegulation50.54(f) | ||
Regarding Recommendationsofthe Near-Term Task Force (NTTF)Review of Insightsfromthe Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, Enclosure 5 Recommendation 9.3, Emergency Preparedness | Regarding Recommendationsofthe Near-Term Task Force (NTTF)Review of Insightsfromthe Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, Enclosure 5 Recommendation 9.3, Emergency Preparedness | ||
Revision as of 04:16, 20 June 2019
| ML16145A523 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 05/24/2016 |
| From: | Kevin Mulligan Entergy Operations |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| EA-12-049, GNRO-2016/00006, TAC MF0954, TAC MF0955 | |
| Download: ML16145A523 (144) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:*-==-Entergy GNRO-2016/00006 May 24,2016U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,DC20555-0001 Entergy Operations, Inc.P.O.Box756PortGibson,MS39150 Kevin MulliganSiteVice PresidentGrandGulfNuclearStationTel.(601)437-7500
SUBJECT:
NotificationofFullCompliancewithNRCOrderEA-12-049OrderModifyingLicenseswithRegardtoRequirementsforMitigationStrategies for Beyond-Design-BasisExternalEvents(OrderNumberEA-12-049)GrandGulfNuclearStation,Unit1DocketNo.50-416LicenseNo.NPF-29
REFERENCES:
1.NRCOrderNumberEA-12-049, OrdertoModify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,datedMarch12,2012(ML12054A735)2.EntergyLettertoNRC, Overall IntegratedPlanin ResponsetoMarch12,2012, Commission Order Modifying License with Regard to RequirementsforMitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049),datedFebruary 27,2013 (GNRO-2013/00015,ML13059A316)3.NRCLettertoEntergy,GrandGulfNuclearStation,Unit1-Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall IntegratedPlanin Response to Order EA-12-049 (Mitigation Strategies)(TACNo.MF0954), datedFebruary19,20144.NRCLettertoEntergy,GrandGulfNuclearStation,Unit1-Report fortheOnsite Audit Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies andReliableSpentFuelPool Instrumentation RelatedtoOrders EA-12-049andEA-12-051(TACNos.MF0954andMF0955) ,datedNovember24,2015(ML15308A298)
DearSirorMadam:
ThepurposeofthisletteristonotifytheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)thatEntergyOperations,Inc.(Entergy)isincompliancewithOrderEA-12-049forGrandGulfNuclearStation(GGNS),Unit1.OnMarch12,2012,theNRCissuedOrderEA-12-049(Reference
- -==-Entergy GNRO-2016/00006 May 24,2016U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,DC20555-0001 Entergy Operations, Inc.P.O.Box756PortGibson,MS39150 Kevin MulliganSiteVice PresidentGrandGulfNuclearStationTel.(601)437-7500
SUBJECT:
NotificationofFullCompliancewithNRCOrderEA-12-049OrderModifyingLicenseswithRegardtoRequirementsforMitigationStrategies for Beyond-Design-BasisExternalEvents(OrderNumberEA-12-049)GrandGulfNuclearStation,Unit1DocketNo.50-416LicenseNo.NPF-29
REFERENCES:
1.NRCOrderNumberEA-12-049, OrdertoModify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,datedMarch12,2012(ML12054A735)2.EntergyLettertoNRC, Overall IntegratedPlanin ResponsetoMarch12,2012, Commission Order Modifying License with Regard to RequirementsforMitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049),datedFebruary 27,2013 (GNRO-2013/00015,ML13059A316)3.NRCLettertoEntergy,GrandGulfNuclearStation,Unit1-Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall IntegratedPlanin Response to Order EA-12-049 (Mitigation Strategies)(TACNo.MF0954), datedFebruary19,20144.NRCLettertoEntergy,GrandGulfNuclearStation,Unit1-Report fortheOnsite Audit Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies andReliableSpentFuelPool Instrumentation RelatedtoOrders EA-12-049andEA-12-051(TACNos.MF0954andMF0955) ,datedNovember24,2015(ML15308A298)
DearSirorMadam:
ThepurposeofthisletteristonotifytheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)thatEntergyOperations,Inc.(Entergy)isincompliancewithOrderEA-12-049forGrandGulfNuclearStation(GGNS),Unit1.OnMarch12,2012,theNRCissuedOrderEA-12-049(Reference GNRO-2016/00006Page2of3 1), Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to RequirementsforMitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis ExternalEvents(BDBEEs)toEntergy. Reference1was immediately effective and directed Entergy to develop, implement, and maintain guidance and strategies to maintain or restorecorecooling, containment, and spentfuelpool(SFP)cooling capabilitiesinthe eventofa beyond-design-basis external event.GGNS submitted the Overall IntegratedPlan(OIP)totheNRCon February27,2013 (Reference 2).Changes totheOIPhavebeen submitted pursuant to Section IV, ConditionC.2.of Reference1,withthe issuance of six-month status reports.In Reference3,theNRCissuedaninterim staff evaluation(ISE)for Order EA-12-049, which identifiedopenand confirmatory items requiring resolutionbyEntergy. In Reference4,TheNRCissueda reportforanaudit conducted at GGNS regarding implementation of mitigating strategies and reliable SFP instrumentationrelatedto Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051, ReportfortheOnsite Audit Regarding Implementation of Mitigating StrategiesandReliableSpentFuelPool Instrumentation RelatedtoOrders049andEA-12-051.Theaudit included a review and closure of Entergy's responses for GGNStotheISEopenand confirmatoryitemsas documented in Reference4and Attachment4tothis submittal. Order EA-12-049, Section IV.A.2, requires full implementation no laterthantworefueling cycles after submittaloftheOIPor December 31,2016, whichever comesfirst.Inaddition, Section IV.C.3 of Order EA-12-049 requires that licensees reporttotheNRCwhenfull compliance is achieved.OnMarch25,2016 Grand Gulf enteredMode2 (startup)atwhich time GGNSwasinfull compliance with Order EA-12-049. This letter containsnonew regulatory commitments. Shouldyouhaveany questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr.JamesJ.Nadeau, Regulatory AssuranceManager,at(601) 437-2103.I declare under penalty of perjurythatthe foregoingistrueandcorrect; executedonMay24, 2016.KJM/sas Attachments: 1.Compliance with Order EA-12-049 2.Order EA-12-049 Compliance Elements Summary 3.AuditOpenItem Response4.ISEOpenand Confirmatory Item Responses5.Final Integrated Plan GNRO-2016/00006Page2of3 1), Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to RequirementsforMitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis ExternalEvents(BDBEEs)toEntergy. Reference1was immediately effective and directed Entergy to develop, implement, and maintain guidance and strategies to maintain or restorecorecooling, containment, and spentfuelpool(SFP)cooling capabilitiesinthe eventofa beyond-design-basis external event.GGNS submitted the Overall IntegratedPlan(OIP)totheNRCon February27,2013 (Reference 2).Changes totheOIPhavebeen submitted pursuant to Section IV, ConditionC.2.of Reference1,withthe issuance of six-month status reports.In Reference3,theNRCissuedaninterim staff evaluation(ISE)for Order EA-12-049, which identifiedopenand confirmatory items requiring resolutionbyEntergy. In Reference4,TheNRCissueda reportforanaudit conducted at GGNS regarding implementation of mitigating strategies and reliable SFP instrumentationrelatedto Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051, ReportfortheOnsite Audit Regarding Implementation of Mitigating StrategiesandReliableSpentFuelPool Instrumentation RelatedtoOrders049andEA-12-051.Theaudit included a review and closure of Entergy's responses for GGNStotheISEopenand confirmatoryitemsas documented in Reference4and Attachment4tothis submittal. Order EA-12-049, Section IV.A.2, requires full implementation no laterthantworefueling cycles after submittaloftheOIPor December 31,2016, whichever comesfirst.Inaddition, Section IV.C.3 of Order EA-12-049 requires that licensees reporttotheNRCwhenfull compliance is achieved.OnMarch25,2016 Grand Gulf enteredMode2 (startup)atwhich time GGNSwasinfull compliance with Order EA-12-049. This letter containsnonew regulatory commitments. Shouldyouhaveany questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr.JamesJ.Nadeau, Regulatory AssuranceManager,at(601) 437-2103.I declare under penalty of perjurythatthe foregoingistrueandcorrect; executedonMay24, 2016.KJM/sas Attachments: 1.Compliance with Order EA-12-049 2.Order EA-12-049 Compliance Elements Summary 3.AuditOpenItem Response4.ISEOpenand Confirmatory Item Responses5.Final Integrated Plan GNRO-2016/00006Page3of3cc:U.S.Nuclear Regulatory CommissionATTN:Mr.JimKim, NRR/DORL (w/2)MailStopOWFN8B1Rockville,MD 20852-2738U.S.Nuclear Regulatory CommissionATTN:Mr.MarcDapas(w/2) Regional Administrator,RegionIV1600EastLamarBoulevardArlington,TX76011-4511Mr.B.J.SmithDirector,DivisionofRadiologicalHealthMississippiState DepartmentofHealthDivisionof Radiological Health3150LawsonStreetJackson,MS39213NRCSeniorResident InspectorGrandGulfNuclearStationPortGibson,MS39150 GNRO-2016/00006Page3of3cc:U.S.Nuclear Regulatory CommissionATTN:Mr.JimKim, NRR/DORL (w/2)MailStopOWFN8B1Rockville,MD 20852-2738U.S.Nuclear Regulatory CommissionATTN:Mr.MarcDapas(w/2) Regional Administrator,RegionIV1600EastLamarBoulevardArlington,TX76011-4511Mr.B.J.SmithDirector,DivisionofRadiologicalHealthMississippiState DepartmentofHealthDivisionof Radiological Health3150LawsonStreetJackson,MS39213NRCSeniorResident InspectorGrandGulfNuclearStationPortGibson,MS39150 Attachment1to GNRO-2016/00006 Compliance with Order EA-12-049 Attachment1to GNRO-2016/00006 Compliance with Order EA-12-049 Attachment1to GNRO-2016/00006Page1of1 Compliance with Order EA-12-049OnMarch12,2012,theNRCissued Order EA-12-049, Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (BDBEEs).This Order was effective immediately and directedsitestodevelopand implement strategies and guidancetomaintainorrestorecorecooling, containment,andspentfuelpool cooling capabilitiesintheeventofaBDBEE.GrandGulf NuclearStation(GGNS) developedaFinal Integrated Plan (Attachment 5), documentingthediverseandflexible strategies(FLEX),inresponsetoNRCOrderEA-12-049. The informationprovidedherein documents full compliancewiththe OrderforGrandGulf NuclearStation,Unit1.GGNShasafinalizedresponsetotheAuditReportOpenItemwhichis summarized in Attachment 3.Milestone Completion Date Submit60Day Status ReportOct2012 Submit Overall Integrated PlanFeb2013 Submit Six-Month Updates:Report1Aug2013Report2Feb2014Report3Aug2014Report4Feb2015Report5Aug2015Report6Feb2016Report7 Deleted Perform Staffing AnalysisOct2015 ModificationsMar2016 On-site FLEX EquipmentDec2015 Off-site FLEX EquipmentSept2015 ProceduresMar2016 TrainingFeb2016 Attachment1to GNRO-2016/00006Page1of1 Compliance with Order EA-12-049OnMarch12,2012,theNRCissued Order EA-12-049, Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (BDBEEs).This Order was effective immediately and directedsitestodevelopand implement strategies and guidancetomaintainorrestorecorecooling, containment,andspentfuelpool cooling capabilitiesintheeventofaBDBEE.GrandGulf NuclearStation(GGNS) developedaFinal Integrated Plan (Attachment 5), documentingthediverseandflexible strategies(FLEX),inresponsetoNRCOrderEA-12-049. The informationprovidedherein documents full compliancewiththe OrderforGrandGulf NuclearStation,Unit1.GGNShasafinalizedresponsetotheAuditReportOpenItemwhichis summarized in Attachment 3.Milestone Completion Date Submit60Day Status ReportOct2012 Submit Overall Integrated PlanFeb2013 Submit Six-Month Updates:Report1Aug2013Report2Feb2014Report3Aug2014Report4Feb2015Report5Aug2015Report6Feb2016Report7 Deleted Perform Staffing AnalysisOct2015 ModificationsMar2016 On-site FLEX EquipmentDec2015 Off-site FLEX EquipmentSept2015 ProceduresMar2016 TrainingFeb2016 Attachment2to GNRO-2016/00006 Order EA-12-049 Compliance Elements Summary Attachment2to GNRO-2016/00006 Order EA-12-049 Compliance Elements Summary Attachment2to GNRO-2016/00006Page1of2 Order EA-12-049 Compliance Elements SummaryTheelementsidentifiedbelowareincludedintheGrandGulfNuclearStationFinalIntegratedPlan(FIP)(Attachment5)and demonstrate compliancewithOrderEA-12-049. Strategies -CompleteGGNSstrategiesarein compliancewithOrderEA-12-049andare documentedintheFIP.Staffing-CompleteThestaffingstudyforGGNShasbeen completed in accordancewith10CFR50.54(f),"Requestfor InformationPursuanttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederal Recommendations 2.1,2.3,and9.3,ofthe Near-TermTaskForcereviewofInsightsfromthe Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," Recommendation9.3,datedMarch 12,2012.GGNSsubmittedthePhase2staffing assessmentinresponsetothe50.54(f)letteron October21,2015 (GNRO-2015/00054). Modifications -Complete The modificationsrequiredtosupportthediverseandflexible strategies (FLEX)strategies documentedintheFIPforGGNShavebeen implemented in accordancewiththestationdesigncontrolprocess. Equipment-Procured and Maintenance &Testing-Complete The equipmentrequiredto implementtheFLEX strategiesforGGNSwasprocuredinaccordancewithNuclearEnergyInstitute(NEI)12-06,Sections11.1, Quality Attributes, and 11.2, Equipment Design, initially tested/performanceverifiedin accordancewithNEI12-06,Section11.5, Maintenance and Testing,andisavailableforuse.AsdiscussedintheFIP, maintenanceandtestingis conductedthroughtheuseoftheGGNS preventive maintenanceprogramsuchthat equipmentreliabilityisachieved. Protected Storage-CompleteThestoragefacilitiesrequiredto implementtheFLEX strategiesforGGNShavebeencompletedandprovideprotectionfromthe applicablesitehazards,as discussedintheFIP.The equipmentrequiredinorderto implementtheFLEX strategies for GGNSisstoredinits protected configurations. Procedures -CompleteFLEXSupport Guidelines(FSGs)forGGNShavebeendeveloped,and integratedwithexistingprocedures.TheFSGsand procedureshavebeenvalidatedperNEI12-06,Section11.4.3, Development GuidanceforFSGs,andhavebeenissuedforuse'in accordancewiththesiteprocedurecontrol program.Attachment2to GNRO-2016/00006Page1of2 Order EA-12-049 Compliance Elements SummaryTheelementsidentifiedbelowareincludedintheGrandGulfNuclearStationFinalIntegratedPlan(FIP)(Attachment5)and demonstrate compliancewithOrderEA-12-049. Strategies -CompleteGGNSstrategiesarein compliancewithOrderEA-12-049andare documentedintheFIP.Staffing-CompleteThestaffingstudyforGGNShasbeen completed in accordancewith10CFR50.54(f),"Requestfor InformationPursuanttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederal Recommendations 2.1,2.3,and9.3,ofthe Near-TermTaskForcereviewofInsightsfromthe Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," Recommendation9.3,datedMarch 12,2012.GGNSsubmittedthePhase2staffing assessmentinresponsetothe50.54(f)letteron October21,2015 (GNRO-2015/00054). Modifications -Complete The modificationsrequiredtosupportthediverseandflexible strategies (FLEX)strategies documentedintheFIPforGGNShavebeen implemented in accordancewiththestationdesigncontrolprocess. Equipment-Procured and Maintenance &Testing-Complete The equipmentrequiredto implementtheFLEX strategiesforGGNSwasprocuredinaccordancewithNuclearEnergyInstitute(NEI)12-06,Sections11.1, Quality Attributes, and 11.2, Equipment Design, initially tested/performanceverifiedin accordancewithNEI12-06,Section11.5, Maintenance and Testing,andisavailableforuse.AsdiscussedintheFIP, maintenanceandtestingis conductedthroughtheuseoftheGGNS preventive maintenanceprogramsuchthat equipmentreliabilityisachieved. Protected Storage-CompleteThestoragefacilitiesrequiredto implementtheFLEX strategiesforGGNShavebeencompletedandprovideprotectionfromthe applicablesitehazards,as discussedintheFIP.The equipmentrequiredinorderto implementtheFLEX strategies for GGNSisstoredinits protected configurations. Procedures -CompleteFLEXSupport Guidelines(FSGs)forGGNShavebeendeveloped,and integratedwithexistingprocedures.TheFSGsand procedureshavebeenvalidatedperNEI12-06,Section11.4.3, Development GuidanceforFSGs,andhavebeenissuedforuse'in accordancewiththesiteprocedurecontrol program. Attachment2to GNRO-2016/00006Page2of2 Training-CompleteInitialcompliancetraininghasbeen completed in accordancewithan accepted trainingprocessas recommendedinNEI12-06,Section11.6, Training.National SAFER Response Centers-CompleteEntergyhas established a contractwithPooled Equipment Inventory Company(PEICo)andhasjoinedthe StrategicAllianceforFLEX EmergencyResponse(SAFER)Team EquipmentCommitteeforoffsitefacility coordination.PEICoisreadytosupportGGNSwithPhase3equipmentstoredintheNationalSAFERResponse Centers in accordancewiththesitespecificSAFERResponsePlan. Validation -CompleteEntergyhascompleted performanceofvalidation activities in accordancewithindustrydevelopedguidancetoassurerequiredtasksandmanualactionsforFLEX strategies arefeasibleandmaybeexecutedwithinthe constraintsidentifiedintheFIP (Attachment5)forOrderEA-12-049. FLEX Program Document-EstablishedTheGGNSFLEXprogram document, EN-OP-201-02,"DiverseandFlexibleCopingStrategies(FLEX)FleetProgram Document,"hasbeen developedandissuedin accordancewiththerequirementsofNEI12-06.Attachment2to GNRO-2016/00006Page2of2 Training-CompleteInitialcompliancetraininghasbeen completed in accordancewithan accepted trainingprocessas recommendedinNEI12-06,Section11.6, Training.National SAFER Response Centers-CompleteEntergyhas established a contractwithPooled Equipment Inventory Company(PEICo)andhasjoinedthe StrategicAllianceforFLEX EmergencyResponse(SAFER)Team EquipmentCommitteeforoffsitefacility coordination.PEICoisreadytosupportGGNSwithPhase3equipmentstoredintheNationalSAFERResponse Centers in accordancewiththesitespecificSAFERResponsePlan. Validation -CompleteEntergyhascompleted performanceofvalidation activities in accordancewithindustrydevelopedguidancetoassurerequiredtasksandmanualactionsforFLEX strategies arefeasibleandmaybeexecutedwithinthe constraintsidentifiedintheFIP (Attachment5)forOrderEA-12-049. FLEX Program Document-EstablishedTheGGNSFLEXprogram document, EN-OP-201-02,"DiverseandFlexibleCopingStrategies(FLEX)FleetProgram Document,"hasbeen developedandissuedin accordancewiththerequirementsofNEI12-06. Attachment3to GNRO-2016/00006AuditOpenItemResponse Attachment3to GNRO-2016/00006AuditOpenItemResponse Attachment3to GNRO-2016/00006Page1of1AuditOpenItemGGNSStorageBuilding SeismicDesign-ResponsetoNRCOpenItemISECI 3.1.1.1.ALicenseeInputNeeded:TheNRC staff requestthatthelicenseemake available an evaluationoftheabilityoftheFSBstosurviveasafeshutdown earthquake.AuditOpenItemResponse:TheGrandGulf NuclearStation(GGNS)FLEX storagebuildingswere designedviathe2012 InternationalBuildingCode(IBC).IBCinvokesASCE7-10 throughout the document.TheseismicdesigninputspectrawasobtainedfromASCE7-10whichisin accordancewithNEI12-06Section5.3.1.1.b.ASCE7-10 provides a spectrawithlowerspectral accelerationsthantheGGNSsafe shutdown earthquake(SSE).Atthe requestoftheNRC,theabilityofthe structuretoresistplant SSE accelerationswasevaluated.TheASCE7-10basedseismicreactionsobtainedfromtheFLEXstoragebuilding vendor were increased accordinglyforthisevaluation.Inorderto determine the acceptabilityoftheexistingdesigntothe higher accelerations, these higher seismic reactionswerethen comparedtothewindreactions.Thedesigninputwindspeedof165mph significantly exceedstheASCE7-10 requirements. A thoroughreviewofthedesign determinedthatthe reactionsfromtheexcesswindspeedgovernoverSSEloading.Theexistingdesignis therefore acceptable.Thetablebelow summarizes the governing design element(Braces)ratiosbetweenwindandSSEreactions.Notethattheindividualbuilding framesandendwall membersalsohavemarginoverSSEreactionsbeyondwhatisshownbelow.PerGGNSUFSAR,section2.5.2.5,duetothe conservatismoftheSSEdesign spectrumwiththepeak acceleration characterizedforthesoilcolumn,noadditionalanalysistotake accountforthesitesoilcolumnisnecessary.Table1:Windand Seismic SSE Comparison for Governing Design Element Wind Reactions SSE Reactions(kip)Wind capacityoverSSE (kip)forces (Wind reaction/SSE reaction)Horiz.Vert.Horiz.Vert.Horiz. Vert.GGNS12.99.75.2 4.1 2.5 2.4 North&South Storage Buildings Attachment3to GNRO-2016/00006Page1of1AuditOpenItemGGNSStorageBuilding SeismicDesign-ResponsetoNRCOpenItemISECI 3.1.1.1.ALicenseeInputNeeded:TheNRC staff requestthatthelicenseemake available an evaluationoftheabilityoftheFSBstosurviveasafeshutdown earthquake.AuditOpenItemResponse:TheGrandGulf NuclearStation(GGNS)FLEX storagebuildingswere designedviathe2012 InternationalBuildingCode(IBC).IBCinvokesASCE7-10 throughout the document.TheseismicdesigninputspectrawasobtainedfromASCE7-10whichisin accordancewithNEI12-06Section5.3.1.1.b.ASCE7-10 provides a spectrawithlowerspectral accelerationsthantheGGNSsafe shutdown earthquake(SSE).Atthe requestoftheNRC,theabilityofthe structuretoresistplant SSE accelerationswasevaluated.TheASCE7-10basedseismicreactionsobtainedfromtheFLEXstoragebuilding vendor were increased accordinglyforthisevaluation.Inorderto determine the acceptabilityoftheexistingdesigntothe higher accelerations, these higher seismic reactionswerethen comparedtothewindreactions.Thedesigninputwindspeedof165mph significantly exceedstheASCE7-10 requirements. A thoroughreviewofthedesign determinedthatthe reactionsfromtheexcesswindspeedgovernoverSSEloading.Theexistingdesignis therefore acceptable.Thetablebelow summarizes the governing design element(Braces)ratiosbetweenwindandSSEreactions.Notethattheindividualbuilding framesandendwall membersalsohavemarginoverSSEreactionsbeyondwhatisshownbelow.PerGGNSUFSAR,section2.5.2.5,duetothe conservatismoftheSSEdesign spectrumwiththepeak acceleration characterizedforthesoilcolumn,noadditionalanalysistotake accountforthesitesoilcolumnisnecessary.Table1:Windand Seismic SSE Comparison for Governing Design Element Wind Reactions SSE Reactions(kip)Wind capacityoverSSE (kip)forces (Wind reaction/SSE reaction)Horiz.Vert.Horiz.Vert.Horiz. Vert.GGNS12.99.75.2 4.1 2.5 2.4 North&South Storage Buildings Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006ISEOpenand ConfirmatoryItemResponses Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006ISEOpenand ConfirmatoryItemResponses Attachment4toGNRO-20 16/00006Page1of12InterimStaffEvaluationOpenItemand Confirmatory Item ResponsesOnFebruary19,2014,theNRCissuedtheInterimStaffEvaluation(ISE)forGrandGulfNuclearStation(GGNS)Unit1(ML14007A718).Inthat document,oneopenitemand seventeen confirmatoryitemswereidentified.ANRConsiteauditwas conductedatGGNSduringtheweek of October19,2015,duringwhichallofthe confirmatoryandopenitemswereclosed,withtheexceptionoftheitem discussed in Attachment3,as documentedintheauditreport.ListedbelowaretheEntergy responsestotheISEopenand confirmatoryitemsinadditiontotheoneprovided in Attachment3.These responseswereprovidedtotheNRCbeforeandduringtheonsiteaudit.ISEOpen Item 3.1.2.A SincetheGGNS Probable Maximum Precipitation is greater than the grade elevation and sandbags are needed to protect against flooding,itis unclear howGGNScanbe designatedasa"dry" site.Since the licensee identifiedGGNSasa dry site, licensee information related toNEI12-06 guidelines identified in this report, Sections3.1.2.1,3.1.2.2,and3.1.2.3 (storage, deployment, and proceduralinterfaces,respectively) are not discussed. If the resolution of this Open Item resultsinGGNS not being categorizedasa"dry" site, the guidelines of the NE112-06 Sections related to these report sections willneedtobe addressed by the licensee as part of that resolution.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014(ML14059A080):Theexternalfloodhazard assessment for GGNS is discussedonOIPpage1of69.Thesitewas originally designatedasadrysiteforFLEX becausetheGGNSUFSAR,in Appendix3A,identifiedtheplantasadrysitebasedontheplantgrade elevationbeing30feet greaterthantheprobablemaximumflood(PMF)level.However, after considerationoftheupdatedfloodlevelduetoprobablemaximum precipitation(PMP),theneedforfloodbarriersforPMP,andthe guidance ofNEI12-06,Entergyhas determinedthatGGNSwillbe classifiedasawetsiteforbeyonddesignbasisevents.Assuch,theGGNSFLEX strategy incorporates, as applicable, the guidance ofNE12-06,Revision0, sections6.2.2and6.2.3 (including sub-sections6.2.3.1through6.2.3.4).EC50287,Revision0,"FLEX StorageBuildings"section3.6.2and calculation CC-N1 FLEX-14002,Rev.0,section2.0, documentthatduetothe6"curbinstalledontheFLEX Storage Buildings(FSBs),theyare protected from boundingfloodingduetolocalintense precipitation(LIP).The"effective top-of-slab"elevationof163.5feetfortheNorthFSB(Site1)and133.7feetfortheSouthFSB(Site4)arebothabovethe projected maximum flood elevationsatthebuildinglocationsduetolocalintense precipitation(LIP)of163.2feetand133.5feet,respectively. Deployment Paths: The deploymentpathfromtheNorthFSB(Site1)dipsto6ftbelowtheStreamAmaximum reevaluated probablemaximumfloodlevelof132.5feet(including wind-wave effects)documentedinML13071A457 preventing the deploymentoftheFLEX equipmentfromtheNorthFSBforthisspecificfloodingscenario.Forthe timelineofthis predictableinitiatingeventtheSouthFSB deploymentpathremains accessible allowing deploymentoftheFLEX equipment.Similarly,fortheprojectedmaximumfloodelevationalongthe deploymentpathfromtheSouthFSBduetoLIP, the deploymentpathcould experience a transientmaximumwaterdepthof1.5ft.ML13071A457 Attachment4toGNRO-20 16/00006Page1of12InterimStaffEvaluationOpenItemand Confirmatory Item ResponsesOnFebruary19,2014,theNRCissuedtheInterimStaffEvaluation(ISE)forGrandGulfNuclearStation(GGNS)Unit1(ML14007A718).Inthat document,oneopenitemand seventeen confirmatoryitemswereidentified.ANRConsiteauditwas conductedatGGNSduringtheweek of October19,2015,duringwhichallofthe confirmatoryandopenitemswereclosed,withtheexceptionoftheitem discussed in Attachment3,as documentedintheauditreport.ListedbelowaretheEntergy responsestotheISEopenand confirmatoryitemsinadditiontotheoneprovided in Attachment3.These responseswereprovidedtotheNRCbeforeandduringtheonsiteaudit.ISEOpen Item 3.1.2.A SincetheGGNS Probable Maximum Precipitation is greater than the grade elevation and sandbags are needed to protect against flooding,itis unclear howGGNScanbe designatedasa"dry" site.Since the licensee identifiedGGNSasa dry site, licensee information related toNEI12-06 guidelines identified in this report, Sections3.1.2.1,3.1.2.2,and3.1.2.3 (storage, deployment, and proceduralinterfaces,respectively) are not discussed. If the resolution of this Open Item resultsinGGNS not being categorizedasa"dry" site, the guidelines of the NE112-06 Sections related to these report sections willneedtobe addressed by the licensee as part of that resolution.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014(ML14059A080):Theexternalfloodhazard assessment for GGNS is discussedonOIPpage1of69.Thesitewas originally designatedasadrysiteforFLEX becausetheGGNSUFSAR,in Appendix3A,identifiedtheplantasadrysitebasedontheplantgrade elevationbeing30feet greaterthantheprobablemaximumflood(PMF)level.However, after considerationoftheupdatedfloodlevelduetoprobablemaximum precipitation(PMP),theneedforfloodbarriersforPMP,andthe guidance ofNEI12-06,Entergyhas determinedthatGGNSwillbe classifiedasawetsiteforbeyonddesignbasisevents.Assuch,theGGNSFLEX strategy incorporates, as applicable, the guidance ofNE12-06,Revision0, sections6.2.2and6.2.3 (including sub-sections6.2.3.1through6.2.3.4).EC50287,Revision0,"FLEX StorageBuildings"section3.6.2and calculation CC-N1 FLEX-14002,Rev.0,section2.0, documentthatduetothe6"curbinstalledontheFLEX Storage Buildings(FSBs),theyare protected from boundingfloodingduetolocalintense precipitation(LIP).The"effective top-of-slab"elevationof163.5feetfortheNorthFSB(Site1)and133.7feetfortheSouthFSB(Site4)arebothabovethe projected maximum flood elevationsatthebuildinglocationsduetolocalintense precipitation(LIP)of163.2feetand133.5feet,respectively. Deployment Paths: The deploymentpathfromtheNorthFSB(Site1)dipsto6ftbelowtheStreamAmaximum reevaluated probablemaximumfloodlevelof132.5feet(including wind-wave effects)documentedinML13071A457 preventing the deploymentoftheFLEX equipmentfromtheNorthFSBforthisspecificfloodingscenario.Forthe timelineofthis predictableinitiatingeventtheSouthFSB deploymentpathremains accessible allowing deploymentoftheFLEX equipment.Similarly,fortheprojectedmaximumfloodelevationalongthe deploymentpathfromtheSouthFSBduetoLIP, the deploymentpathcould experience a transientmaximumwaterdepthof1.5ft.ML13071A457 Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page2of12 documentsthatthis maximumfloodlevel drops significantly(toabout one-halfmax)within2hoursandFLEX equipment deploymentwouldnotbeneededuntilabout6hours. Therefore,fortheGGNSfloodinginitiatingevents documentedinML13071A457theSouthFSBisprovidedand remains accessiblewithafull complementofFLEX equipment to implement the mitigating strategies. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.1.1.A Confirm that the storage facilities and plans will conform to the guidance in NEI12-06, Section 5.3.1, for protection from seismic events.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014update(ML14059A080) and Attachment3tothis submittal:Whileonsite,NRCstaffreviewedtheGrandGulf NuclearStation(GGNS) strategyforprotecting FLEX equipment from seismichazards.EC50287,Revision0,"FLEX StorageBuildings"section3.6.1installedtwo pre-engineered metal buildingswhich.are designedforseismicloadsperNEI12-06,Revision0,section 5.3.1.1.b(ASCE7-10andlocalbuildingcodes).Soilboringshavebeentakenalongthe primarytravelpathfromeachbuildingtothe deployment(staging)locationstoensurethatatleastone pathwaywillnotbe susceptibletosoil liquefaction, which satisfiesNEI06,Section5.3.2.1forsoil liquefaction. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.3.1.A Confirm that at least one of the two FLEX equipment storage buildings would not be damaged by tornado missiles, based on the guidance in NEI12-06, Section 7.3.1.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014update(ML14059A080)andEngineeringReport GGNS-SA-14-00004,Revision1:Whileonsite,theNRCstaffreviewedtheGGNS strategy for protecting FLEX equipmentformhighwindand tornadomissilehazards.EC50287,Revision0,"FLEX StorageBuildings"section3.6.3 documentsthatGGNShastwo pre-engineered metal buildingswhichare designed in accordance with NEI12-06,Revision0,section 7.3.1.1.c(ASCE7-10andlocalbuildingcodes)to address highwinddesigncriteria. Specifically, the storage buildings locations are separatedtoprovide reasonable assurancethatatleastoneofthe storage buildingswouldnotbe damaged by tornadowindsand tornado-generatedmissiles.A tornado separationevaluationforthetwostoragebuildingshasbeen completed (GGNS-SA-14-00004,Revision1).Basedonthisevaluation,the licensee concludedthat90th percentile tornadois990feetwideandtravelsfromthe southwest to northeastdirection.TheFLEX storage buildingsarelocatedover1500feetapartonthis southwest to northeastaxistoensure adequate separation. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.3.2.A Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page2of12 documentsthatthis maximumfloodlevel drops significantly(toabout one-halfmax)within2hoursandFLEX equipment deploymentwouldnotbeneededuntilabout6hours. Therefore,fortheGGNSfloodinginitiatingevents documentedinML13071A457theSouthFSBisprovidedand remains accessiblewithafull complementofFLEX equipment to implement the mitigating strategies. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.1.1.A Confirm that the storage facilities and plans will conform to the guidance in NEI12-06, Section 5.3.1, for protection from seismic events.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014update(ML14059A080) and Attachment3tothis submittal:Whileonsite,NRCstaffreviewedtheGrandGulf NuclearStation(GGNS) strategyforprotecting FLEX equipment from seismichazards.EC50287,Revision0,"FLEX StorageBuildings"section3.6.1installedtwo pre-engineered metal buildingswhich.are designedforseismicloadsperNEI12-06,Revision0,section 5.3.1.1.b(ASCE7-10andlocalbuildingcodes).Soilboringshavebeentakenalongthe primarytravelpathfromeachbuildingtothe deployment(staging)locationstoensurethatatleastone pathwaywillnotbe susceptibletosoil liquefaction, which satisfiesNEI06,Section5.3.2.1forsoil liquefaction. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.3.1.A Confirm that at least one of the two FLEX equipment storage buildings would not be damaged by tornado missiles, based on the guidance in NEI12-06, Section 7.3.1.GGNSResponse:Seesection4of Entergy'sSecondSix-MonthStatusReportinFeb2014update(ML14059A080)andEngineeringReport GGNS-SA-14-00004,Revision1:Whileonsite,theNRCstaffreviewedtheGGNS strategy for protecting FLEX equipmentformhighwindand tornadomissilehazards.EC50287,Revision0,"FLEX StorageBuildings"section3.6.3 documentsthatGGNShastwo pre-engineered metal buildingswhichare designed in accordance with NEI12-06,Revision0,section 7.3.1.1.c(ASCE7-10andlocalbuildingcodes)to address highwinddesigncriteria. Specifically, the storage buildings locations are separatedtoprovide reasonable assurancethatatleastoneofthe storage buildingswouldnotbe damaged by tornadowindsand tornado-generatedmissiles.A tornado separationevaluationforthetwostoragebuildingshasbeen completed (GGNS-SA-14-00004,Revision1).Basedonthisevaluation,the licensee concludedthat90th percentile tornadois990feetwideandtravelsfromthe southwest to northeastdirection.TheFLEX storage buildingsarelocatedover1500feetapartonthis southwest to northeastaxistoensure adequate separation. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.1.3.2.A Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page3of12 Confirm that procedures address UHS usability when wind generated debris is present in the UHS.GGNSResponse: Whileonsite,theNRCstaffreviewedtheGGNS strategy for addressing wind-generateddebrisintheultimateheatsink(UHS).To preclude ingestion and transportoflarge debrisintotheRPVorSFP,EC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasis Engineering Change(EC)",section3.1.40andtheGGNSFLEXSupport Guidelines (05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0and 05-S-01-FSG-003,Revision0) documentthattheGGNS strategy includesuseofasuctiondebris strainerforthePhase2FLEXpump.Smalldebrisand dissolvedmaterialhasbeen evaluatedtonot impedecoolingbythe BWROG in BWROG-TP-14-006.TheGGNS strategyfollowsthe recommendation in14-006toinjectwaterintothecoreshroudregion. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.1.A Confirm that the final Modular Accident Analysis Program Revision4(MAAP4)analysis of the RCS response conforms to the NEI position paper dated June 2013, entitled"Useof Modular Accident Analysis Program(MAAP)in Support of Post-Fukushima Applications" (ADAMS Accession NumberML13190A201)and the MAAP4 limitations of the NRC endorsement letter, dated October 3,2013 (ADAMS AccessionNo.ML13275A318).GGNSResponse:TheMAAP4analysis containedinCaseBof Appendix9of calculation XC-Q1111-14005, Revision0,"GrandGulfCoreand ContainmentAnalysisofFLEX Strategies" determines the conditions intheGGNS containment,drywell,andreactorvessel followingabeyonddesignbasisexternalevent(BDBEE)resultinginan extendedlossofAlCpower(ELAP).TheModular Accident AnalysisProgram(MAAP)Version4.0.6BWR(Boiling WaterReactor)isusedforthisanalysis.Thiscalculationwas developed consistentwiththe guidelines containedinthe2013EPRITechnical Report 3002001785 (ML13190A201), with regardstotheuseofMAAP4in supportof Fukushima applications. Appendix5ofthe calculation containsaGGNSresponsetotheletterof October3,2013fromJackDavis(NRR)toJoePollock(NEI)(ML13275A318)regardinguseofMAAP4in simulatingELAPeventsforBWRs, addressingeachoneofthe limitationsstatedonthe NRC endorsement letter.ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.2.A Confirm that the MAAP4 analysis includes appropriate recirculation pumpsealleakage.GGNSResponseRecirculationpumpseal leakage is includedinsection5.0oftheMAAP4analysiscontainedinCaseBof Appendix9of calculation XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0,"GrandGulfCoreand ContainmentAnalysisofFLEX Strategies".TheinitialGGNS recirculationpumpsealleakageinCaseBis18gallonsperminute(gpm)perpumpsealand30gpmallowed Technical Specification pressure boundary leakageforatotal leakageof66gpmatnormal operatingreactorpressure.Primarysystem leakageismodeledtostartattimezeroandvarieswithreactorpressure.TheRPVleakagelocationissetatthereactor recirculationpumpsuctionnozzleelevationtosimulate Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page3of12 Confirm that procedures address UHS usability when wind generated debris is present in the UHS.GGNSResponse: Whileonsite,theNRCstaffreviewedtheGGNS strategy for addressing wind-generateddebrisintheultimateheatsink(UHS).To preclude ingestion and transportoflarge debrisintotheRPVorSFP,EC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasis Engineering Change(EC)",section3.1.40andtheGGNSFLEXSupport Guidelines (05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0and 05-S-01-FSG-003,Revision0) documentthattheGGNS strategy includesuseofasuctiondebris strainerforthePhase2FLEXpump.Smalldebrisand dissolvedmaterialhasbeen evaluatedtonot impedecoolingbythe BWROG in BWROG-TP-14-006.TheGGNS strategyfollowsthe recommendation in14-006toinjectwaterintothecoreshroudregion. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.1.A Confirm that the final Modular Accident Analysis Program Revision4(MAAP4)analysis of the RCS response conforms to the NEI position paper dated June 2013, entitled"Useof Modular Accident Analysis Program(MAAP)in Support of Post-Fukushima Applications" (ADAMS Accession NumberML13190A201)and the MAAP4 limitations of the NRC endorsement letter, dated October 3,2013 (ADAMS AccessionNo.ML13275A318).GGNSResponse:TheMAAP4analysis containedinCaseBof Appendix9of calculation XC-Q1111-14005, Revision0,"GrandGulfCoreand ContainmentAnalysisofFLEX Strategies" determines the conditions intheGGNS containment,drywell,andreactorvessel followingabeyonddesignbasisexternalevent(BDBEE)resultinginan extendedlossofAlCpower(ELAP).TheModular Accident AnalysisProgram(MAAP)Version4.0.6BWR(Boiling WaterReactor)isusedforthisanalysis.Thiscalculationwas developed consistentwiththe guidelines containedinthe2013EPRITechnical Report 3002001785 (ML13190A201), with regardstotheuseofMAAP4in supportof Fukushima applications. Appendix5ofthe calculation containsaGGNSresponsetotheletterof October3,2013fromJackDavis(NRR)toJoePollock(NEI)(ML13275A318)regardinguseofMAAP4in simulatingELAPeventsforBWRs, addressingeachoneofthe limitationsstatedonthe NRC endorsement letter.ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.2.A Confirm that the MAAP4 analysis includes appropriate recirculation pumpsealleakage.GGNSResponseRecirculationpumpseal leakage is includedinsection5.0oftheMAAP4analysiscontainedinCaseBof Appendix9of calculation XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0,"GrandGulfCoreand ContainmentAnalysisofFLEX Strategies".TheinitialGGNS recirculationpumpsealleakageinCaseBis18gallonsperminute(gpm)perpumpsealand30gpmallowed Technical Specification pressure boundary leakageforatotal leakageof66gpmatnormal operatingreactorpressure.Primarysystem leakageismodeledtostartattimezeroandvarieswithreactorpressure.TheRPVleakagelocationissetatthereactor recirculationpumpsuctionnozzleelevationtosimulate Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page4of12leakagefromthe recirculationpumpseals. Additionally, to determine the impactofincreasedsealleakageonRPVLevel;drywelland containment temperature;anddrywelland containmentpressure;CaseFof Appendix9of calculation XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0,alsoanalyzesthe FLEX strategyofCaseBof Appendix9withaninitial increased seal leakagebetween100-gpmto184gpmpriortoRPVinjectionwiththeFLEXpump.Primarysystem leakageandpressureareincludedinthe evaluationoftheFLEX make-up pump requirementswhenRPV depressurization is performed. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.3.A Confirm that the final Sequence of Events (SOE)reflects the results of the final MAAP4 analysis of the RCS response and the licensee provides reasonable assurance by some means(e.g.by walkthrough) that the timing of the actions in theSOEis achievable.GGNSResponse:ThefinalSOEof Appendix9,CaseBof calculation XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0isincludedintheTable3-4timelineinSection3.1.8ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC"andtheSOETimelinein Attachment1to transmittal CIN2016-00023. CIN2016-00023 documentsthatthetimelinehasbeen validated in accordancewiththe elements of AppendixEtoNEI12-06,Revision1,"Validation Guidance"andincludes considerationoftherequired staffing documented in transmittal CIN2016-00031,"GGNSNEI12-01Phase2 Staffing Assessment(Revision1)". ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.4.A Confirm that operation with the suppression pool temperature at its calculated maximum temperature will not impact the mitigation strategies, especially RCIC operation and structural integrity of the suppression pool.GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedtheGGNSMAAP4 containment analysis, XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0, (specificallyCaseBof Appendix9).Section1.0(1)of Appendix9totheanalysis, GGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",andtheGGNSFLEX Support Guideline (05-S-01-FSG-002,Revision0,"AlternateRCICSuctionSource")confirmtheGGNS strategy to manuallyrealigntheReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)systempumpsuctionfromthe SuppressionPool(SP)totheUpper ContainmentPool(UCP)whentheSP temperaturereaches170°F.ThisiswellinadvanceofanyRCICpumpnetpositivesuctionhead(NPSH) concerns as further documentedinsection2.0and Attachment 2ofcalculation MC-Q1111-14001,Revision0,"GGNSRCICNPSHAvailableforaBDBEE".TheSPandUCP temperaturesaremodelledtoinitiallybeatthemaximum Technical Specificationallowablevaluesof95°Fand125°F, respectively,atthetimeoftheinitiatingevent. Therefore, the increasing temperaturesintheSPandUCPdonotimpactRCICoperation.CaseBof Appendix9oftheGGNS containment analysisforthe mitigating strategies,14005,showsthatdrywell temperature,drywellpressure, containmentpressure,core temperature,andRPVwaterlevelallremainwithin acceptabledesignvalues.The analysisshowedthatthe peak containment temperatureof233FandthepeakSPwater temperatureof226Farelimitedtoslightlyabovetheirdesignvaluesof 215°Fby18°Fand11°F,respectively.GGNS confirmed Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page4of12leakagefromthe recirculationpumpseals. Additionally, to determine the impactofincreasedsealleakageonRPVLevel;drywelland containment temperature;anddrywelland containmentpressure;CaseFof Appendix9of calculation XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0,alsoanalyzesthe FLEX strategyofCaseBof Appendix9withaninitial increased seal leakage between 100-gpmto184gpmpriortoRPVinjectionwiththeFLEXpump.Primarysystem leakageandpressureareincludedinthe evaluationoftheFLEX make-up pump requirementswhenRPV depressurization is performed. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.3.A Confirm that the final Sequence of Events (SOE)reflects the results of the final MAAP4 analysis of the RCS response and the licensee provides reasonable assurance by some means(e.g.by walkthrough) that the timing of the actions in theSOEis achievable.GGNSResponse:ThefinalSOEof Appendix9,CaseBof calculation XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0isincludedintheTable3-4timelineinSection3.1.8ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC"andtheSOETimelinein Attachment1to transmittal CIN2016-00023. CIN2016-00023 documentsthatthetimelinehasbeen validated in accordancewiththe elements of AppendixEtoNEI12-06,Revision1,"Validation Guidance"andincludes considerationoftherequired staffing documented in transmittal CIN2016-00031,"GGNSNEI12-01Phase2 Staffing Assessment(Revision1)". ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.4.A Confirm that operation with the suppression pool temperature at its calculated maximum temperature will not impact the mitigation strategies, especially RCIC operation and structural integrity of the suppression pool.GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedtheGGNSMAAP4 containment analysis, XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0, (specificallyCaseBof Appendix9).Section1.0(1)of Appendix9totheanalysis, GGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",andtheGGNSFLEX Support Guideline (05-S-01-FSG-002,Revision0,"AlternateRCICSuctionSource")confirmtheGGNS strategy to manuallyrealigntheReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)systempumpsuctionfromthe SuppressionPool(SP)totheUpper ContainmentPool(UCP)whentheSP temperaturereaches170°F.ThisiswellinadvanceofanyRCICpumpnetpositivesuctionhead(NPSH) concerns as further documentedinsection2.0and Attachment 2ofcalculation MC-Q1111-14001,Revision0,"GGNSRCICNPSHAvailableforaBDBEE".TheSPandUCP temperaturesaremodelledtoinitiallybeatthemaximum Technical Specificationallowablevaluesof95°Fand125°F, respectively,atthetimeoftheinitiatingevent. Therefore, the increasing temperaturesintheSPandUCPdonotimpactRCICoperation.CaseBof Appendix9oftheGGNS containment analysisforthe mitigating strategies,14005,showsthatdrywell temperature,drywellpressure, containmentpressure,core temperature,andRPVwaterlevelallremainwithin acceptabledesignvalues.The analysisshowedthatthe peak containment temperatureof233FandthepeakSPwater temperatureof226Farelimitedtoslightlyabovetheirdesignvaluesof 215°Fby18°Fand11°F,respectively.GGNS confirmed Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page5of12 continued containment integrityatthese temperaturesinGGNS calculation CC-Q1 M1 0-14001,Revision0,"Evaluation of ContainmentWallforFLEX Strategy"andinEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC". ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.8.A Confirm that the hydraulic calculations for the FLEX pumps demonstrate that the required flow ratescanbe achieved.GGNSResponse: Calculations MC-Q1111-14008,Revision0,"GGNSFLEXPhase2PumpSizing"and14007,Revision0,"GGNSFLEXPumpNPSHA",alongwiththeFIP (GNR02016-00006 Attachment5)and XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0,"GrandGulfCoreand ContainmentAnalysisof FLEX Strategies"providetheportable/FLEXpumphead/flow characteristics,suctionand dischargelosses,system backpressure, elevation differences,pipinglosses,andtherequiredwaterflowratesto support the mitigating strategies. Whileonsite,theNRCstaffreviewedtheGGNS hydraulic analysisoftheFLEXpumpingsystemwhichprovidescoolingand makeupwatertotheRPVandSFP. Calculation MC-Q1111-14008 determinestheminimum capabilityneededforthePhase2FLEXpumpto simultaneously providetherequiredflowratesofthe strategyforbothRPV makeupandSFPspray.Theresultsofthisanalysisshowthatapumpcapableof delivering500gpm(250gpmforRPVmakeupand250gpmforSFPspray)atatotal dynamicheadof337ft(146psi)isrequiredtoprovidemakeup-totheRPVandSFP.EC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC", confirmsthehead/flow characteristics ofthespecifiedHale ModeIIPH1250/175DJ-TCpumpmeetthese requirements. GGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)"andGGNSFLEXSupportGuidelines (05-S-01-FSG-003,Revision0,"AlternateReactorVesselCooling", 05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0,"Initial AssessmentandFLEX EquipmentStaging",and 05-S-01-FSG-011,Revision0,"AlternateSpentFuelMakeupandCooling")providetheprocedural controlsfortheGGNS strategy to simultaneouslyprovidetherequiredboundingflowratesforbothRPV makeupandSFPspray. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.2.A Confirm that theSFParea ventilation calculation demonstrates that portable ventilation is not required in theSFParea, or that the licensee provides a strategy to use portable ventilation.GGNSResponse:PriortoSFPboiling (approximately5hoursforafullcore offload and approximately12hoursforadesignbasisheatload),GGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",andGGNSFLEX Support Guideline 05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0,"Initial AssessmentandFLEX EquipmentStaging"establishaventpathwayto minimize condensationofsteaminthe AuxiliaryBuildingfromtheboilingSFP.LocalAuxiliaryBuildinginteriordoor1A601(locatedatthe -208ftelevationoftheSFP)and exteriordoor1A605(locatedatthe229ftroofelevation)areopenedtoventtheSFPareathroughstairwell1A10tothe Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page5of12 continued containment integrityatthese temperaturesinGGNS calculation CC-Q1 M1 0-14001,Revision0,"Evaluation of ContainmentWallforFLEX Strategy"andinEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC". ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.8.A Confirm that the hydraulic calculations for the FLEX pumps demonstrate that the required flow ratescanbe achieved.GGNSResponse: Calculations MC-Q1111-14008,Revision0,"GGNSFLEXPhase2PumpSizing"and14007,Revision0,"GGNSFLEXPumpNPSHA",alongwiththeFIP (GNR02016-00006 Attachment5)and XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0,"GrandGulfCoreand ContainmentAnalysisof FLEX Strategies"providetheportable/FLEXpumphead/flow characteristics,suctionand dischargelosses,system backpressure, elevation differences,pipinglosses,andtherequiredwaterflowratesto support the mitigating strategies. Whileonsite,theNRCstaffreviewedtheGGNS hydraulic analysisoftheFLEXpumpingsystemwhichprovidescoolingand makeupwatertotheRPVandSFP. Calculation MC-Q1111-14008 determinestheminimum capabilityneededforthePhase2FLEXpumpto simultaneously providetherequiredflowratesofthe strategyforbothRPV makeupandSFPspray.Theresultsofthisanalysisshowthatapumpcapableof delivering500gpm(250gpmforRPVmakeupand250gpmforSFPspray)atatotal dynamicheadof337ft(146psi)isrequiredtoprovide makeup-to theRPVandSFP.EC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC", confirmsthehead/flow characteristics ofthespecifiedHale ModeIIPH1250/175DJ-TCpumpmeetthese requirements. GGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)"andGGNSFLEXSupportGuidelines (05-S-01-FSG-003,Revision0,"AlternateReactorVesselCooling", 05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0,"Initial AssessmentandFLEX EquipmentStaging",and 05-S-01-FSG-011,Revision0,"AlternateSpentFuelMakeupandCooling")providetheprocedural controlsfortheGGNS strategy to simultaneouslyprovidetherequiredboundingflowratesforbothRPV makeupandSFPspray. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.2.A Confirm that theSFParea ventilation calculation demonstrates that portable ventilation is not required in theSFParea, or that the licensee provides a strategy to use portable ventilation.GGNSResponse:PriortoSFPboiling (approximately5hoursforafullcore offload and approximately12hoursforadesignbasisheatload),GGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",andGGNSFLEX Support Guideline 05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0,"Initial AssessmentandFLEX EquipmentStaging"establishaventpathwayto minimize condensationofsteaminthe AuxiliaryBuildingfromtheboilingSFP.LocalAuxiliaryBuildinginteriordoor1A601(locatedatthe -208ftelevationoftheSFP)and exteriordoor1A605(locatedatthe229ftroofelevation)areopenedtoventtheSFPareathroughstairwell1A10tothe Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page6of12 atmosphere. An evaluation was performedinEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC",section3.1.30that confirms the selectedventpathfortheSFPareaprovidesaflow capacitythatexceedstheSFPboiloffratewithnorelianceon additionalportableventilation equipment.InONEP05-1-02-1-7an operator is directedtoopenthesedoorstocreatetheSFPareaventpathwayat4hours.ForthedesignbasisheatloadtheSFPisnotexpectedtostartboilinguntil12hoursaftertheinitiatingevent.Thusthereis sufficient amount of conservatisminthe timeframe in which operators can completethisaction. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.3.A Confirm that the licensee's strategy for maintaining containment capabilities considers the results of the final MAAP4 analysis for ReS leakage and the containment venting strategy.GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedtheGGNSMAAP4 containment analysis, XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0,"Coreand Containment AnalysisofFLEX Strategies" (specificallyCaseBofAppendix9).CaseBofsection2.0of Appendix9totheanalysis,theGGNS Off-NormalEventProcedure05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",andtheGGNSFLEXSupport Guideline (05-S-01-FSG-012,Revision0,"Alternate ContainmentCoolingandHydrogenControl")confirmand support the capabilityoftheGGNS containment venting strategytomaintain containment integrity including considerationofthereactor coolantsystem(RCS)leakageofsection5.0of Appendix9tothe analysis(alsoseetheGGNSResponsetoISE Confirmatory Items 3.2.1.2.A and 3.2.1.3.Aofthis submittal).TheGGNSfinal containment analysis, XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0,"Coreand ContainmentAnalysisofFLEX Strategies", documentstheMAAP4 calculations performedtoevaluatethe containment pressure and temperature responsefor240hoursduringanELAPevent.CaseBofAppendix9isthe specificMAAPrunthat representstheGGNSELAP scenario as described insection2.5andthe SequenceofEvent(SOE)Table6ofsection2.17ofthefinal integrated plan (FIP)(GNR02016-00006 Attachment 5).Appendix9(CaseB)of calculation XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0, specifically documents theinputsand assumptionsusedinthe analysis to developthemitigating strategies containment performanceresponse.Theresultsofthe containmentanalysisshowthatthedrywellandcontainmentpressuresremainwellbelowthedesignvaluesof30psigand15psig,respectively.Thedrywell temperaturealsoremainswellbelowitsdesignvalueof330°F.Theresultsofthe containment analysisshowthe containment temperatureincreaseislimitedto18.1 ofabovethedesignvalueof 215°Fandthe suppression pool temperature increaseislimitedto10.8°Fabovethedesignvalueof 215°F(alsoseetheGGNSResponsetoISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.4.A).GGNSconfirmed continued containment integrityatthese temperaturesinGGNS calculationQ1 M10-14001,Revision0,"Evaluation of ContainmentWallforFLEXStrategy"andinEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC". ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.2.A Confirm that the RCIC room heat up calculation for ELAP uses appropriate heat loads and shows an acceptable room temperature. Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page6of12 atmosphere. An evaluation was performedinEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC",section3.1.30that confirms the selectedventpathfortheSFPareaprovidesaflow capacitythatexceedstheSFPboiloffratewithnorelianceon additionalportableventilation equipment.InONEP05-1-02-1-7an operator is directedtoopenthesedoorstocreatetheSFPareaventpathwayat4hours.ForthedesignbasisheatloadtheSFPisnotexpectedtostartboilinguntil12hoursaftertheinitiatingevent.Thusthereis sufficient amount of conservatisminthe timeframe in which operators can completethisaction. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.3.A Confirm that the licensee's strategy for maintaining containment capabilities considers the results of the final MAAP4 analysis for ReS leakage and the containment venting strategy.GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedtheGGNSMAAP4 containment analysis, XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0,"Coreand Containment AnalysisofFLEX Strategies" (specificallyCaseBofAppendix9).CaseBofsection2.0of Appendix9totheanalysis,theGGNS Off-NormalEventProcedure05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",andtheGGNSFLEXSupport Guideline (05-S-01-FSG-012,Revision0,"Alternate ContainmentCoolingandHydrogenControl")confirmand support the capabilityoftheGGNS containment venting strategytomaintain containment integrity including considerationofthereactor coolantsystem(RCS)leakageofsection5.0of Appendix9tothe analysis(alsoseetheGGNSResponsetoISE Confirmatory Items 3.2.1.2.A and 3.2.1.3.Aofthis submittal).TheGGNSfinal containment analysis, XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0,"Coreand ContainmentAnalysisofFLEX Strategies", documentstheMAAP4 calculations performedtoevaluatethe containment pressure and temperature responsefor240hoursduringanELAPevent.CaseBofAppendix9isthe specificMAAPrunthat representstheGGNSELAP scenario as described insection2.5andthe SequenceofEvent(SOE)Table6ofsection2.17ofthefinal integrated plan (FIP)(GNR02016-00006 Attachment 5).Appendix9(CaseB)of calculation XC-Q1111-14005,Revision0, specifically documents theinputsand assumptionsusedinthe analysis to developthemitigating strategies containment performanceresponse.Theresultsofthe containmentanalysisshowthatthedrywellandcontainmentpressuresremainwellbelowthedesignvaluesof30psigand15psig,respectively.Thedrywell temperaturealsoremainswellbelowitsdesignvalueof330°F.Theresultsofthe containment analysisshowthe containment temperatureincreaseislimitedto18.1 ofabovethedesignvalueof 215°Fandthe suppression pool temperature increaseislimitedto10.8°Fabovethedesignvalueof 215°F(alsoseetheGGNSResponsetoISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.1.4.A).GGNSconfirmed continued containment integrityatthese temperaturesinGGNS calculationQ1 M10-14001,Revision0,"Evaluation of ContainmentWallforFLEXStrategy"andinEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC". ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.2.A Confirm that the RCIC room heat up calculation for ELAP uses appropriate heat loads and shows an acceptable room temperature. Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page7of12GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedGGNS calculation, XC-Q1111-14003, Revision0,"GGNSRCICPumpRoom Heat-upforELAP".Figure1forCase1ofsection2.0oftheanalysis,GGNSNormalEvent Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",andGGNSFLEX Support Guideline 05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDCBusLoadShedandManagement"confirmand support the capabilityoftheGGNSFLEX strategytomaintainan acceptableRCICroom temperature including considerationoftheroomheatloadduetotheSBO required operator responseinGGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-4,Revision50,"LossofACPower"toloadshedtheDCpowersupplytotheRCICsteamturbineglandseal compressor to conserve battery power.GGNS performed GOTHIC calculation, XC-Q1111-14003,Revision0,"GGNSRCICPumpRoomHeat-upforExtendedLossofACPower,"to determine the temperatureintheRCICpumproomfor120hoursfollowinganELAP.This calculation incorporates applicableheatloadsincludingthesteamleakageheatloadfromthestation blackout(SBO)required operatorresponsetoinitiallyloadshedtheDCpowersupplytotheRCICsteamturbineglandseal compressor.TheanalysisshowstheRCICroom temperature approaches193°Fat 11 hours aftertheinitiatingeventforCase1,atwhichtimetheRCICroom temperaturedropsandremainsbelow150°Fduetothe OperatorrestorationofglandsealairtotheRCICturbinewhenthestation battery chargers arereenergizedbythe480VAC300kW battery charger portable diesel generator. Additionally,becausethe equivalent leakagerateof0.5gpmfromtheglandsealsissmallandoflimitedduration,theglandseal leakagewillnotcause adversefloodingas evaluatedinSection3.1.28ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC".TheGGNSanalysis demonstratesthattheFLEX strategy maintainstheRCICroom temperaturebelowthe established SBO acceptance criteria of 212°FduringthetimethatRCICiscreditedintheFLEX strategy(lessthan72hours)andbeyond.Althoughnot precluded as indicatedinsection3.2.5and Attachment1oftheGGNS Off-NormalEventProcedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",nolocal operatoractionsarerequiredinsidetheRCICroomfortheFLEX mitigatingstrategy,thus personnel habitabilityisnotanissuewithDCpoweravailable. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.4.A Confirm that any required upgrades to the site's communications systemshavebeen completed, as noted in the NRC's review of the GGNS communications assessment (ADAMS Accession No.Ml13129A132).GGNSResponse:EC50711,Revision0,"EP Communications System EnhancementstoComplywithNEI12-01"Section1.3 documentstherequired upgradestothesite's communications systems forcompliancewiththe requirementsofNEI12-01,asnotedintheNRC'sreviewoftheGGNS communications assessment (ML13129A132).PerEC50711therequired upgradestothesite's EP communication systemsensurethatthe credited EP Communication equipment associatedwithtwo(2)Radio Channels, handheldradios,andsatellitephoneshasthe necessarypowerand Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page7of12GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedGGNS calculation, XC-Q1111-14003, Revision0,"GGNSRCICPumpRoom Heat-upforELAP".Figure1forCase1ofsection2.0oftheanalysis,GGNSNormalEvent Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",andGGNSFLEX Support Guideline 05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDCBusLoadShedandManagement"confirmand support the capabilityoftheGGNSFLEX strategytomaintainan acceptableRCICroom temperature including considerationoftheroomheatloadduetotheSBO required operator responseinGGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-4,Revision50,"LossofACPower"toloadshedtheDCpowersupplytotheRCICsteamturbineglandseal compressor to conserve battery power.GGNS performed GOTHIC calculation, XC-Q1111-14003,Revision0,"GGNSRCICPumpRoomHeat-upforExtendedLossofACPower,"to determine the temperatureintheRCICpumproomfor120hoursfollowinganELAP.This calculation incorporates applicableheatloadsincludingthesteamleakageheatloadfromthestation blackout(SBO)required operatorresponsetoinitiallyloadshedtheDCpowersupplytotheRCICsteamturbineglandseal compressor.TheanalysisshowstheRCICroom temperature approaches193°Fat 11 hours aftertheinitiatingeventforCase1,atwhichtimetheRCICroom temperaturedropsandremainsbelow150°Fduetothe OperatorrestorationofglandsealairtotheRCICturbinewhenthestation battery chargers arereenergizedbythe480VAC300kW battery charger portable diesel generator. Additionally,becausethe equivalent leakagerateof0.5gpmfromtheglandsealsissmallandoflimitedduration,theglandseal leakagewillnotcause adversefloodingas evaluatedinSection3.1.28ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC".TheGGNSanalysis demonstratesthattheFLEX strategy maintainstheRCICroom temperaturebelowthe established SBO acceptance criteria of 212°FduringthetimethatRCICiscreditedintheFLEX strategy(lessthan72hours)andbeyond.Althoughnot precluded as indicatedinsection3.2.5and Attachment1oftheGGNS Off-NormalEventProcedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",nolocal operatoractionsarerequiredinsidetheRCICroomfortheFLEX mitigatingstrategy,thus personnel habitabilityisnotanissuewithDCpoweravailable. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.4.A Confirm that any required upgrades to the site's communications systemshavebeen completed, as noted in the NRC's review of the GGNS communications assessment (ADAMS Accession No.Ml13129A132).GGNSResponse:EC50711,Revision0,"EP Communications System EnhancementstoComplywithNEI12-01"Section1.3 documentstherequired upgradestothesite's communications systems forcompliancewiththe requirementsofNEI12-01,asnotedintheNRC'sreviewoftheGGNS communications assessment (ML13129A132).PerEC50711therequired upgradestothesite's EP communication systemsensurethatthe credited EP Communication equipment associatedwithtwo(2)Radio Channels, handheldradios,andsatellitephoneshasthe necessarypowerand Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page8of12 connectivitytoremain operational followingaBDBEE.Section3.2oftheNRC'sreviewofthe GGNS communications assessment (ML13129A132), provides the guidancethatpriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredfor subsequent changestothe upgradestothesite's communications systems for compliancewithNEI12-01as described in Attachment 1, paragraph4.12andTable3 of GNR02012/00131 (ML12306A245) and GNR02013/00014 (ML13053A091).PerEC50711Revision0,therequired upgradestothesite's communication systemsarecomplete. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.8.A Confirm that the licensee's analyses for size and loading of FLEX generators shows acceptable results.GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedGGNS calculation, EC-Q1111-14002,Revision0,"FLEX Strategy-PortableDiesel GeneratorSystemSizing".Section6of calculation EC-Q1111-14002; Sections3.1.4.1,3.1.4.5,and 3.1.4.7ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC";Section3.1.2.5ofEC50711,Revision0,"EP Communications System Enhancements to ComplywithNEI12-01"; GGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)";and GGNS FLEX Support Guidelines (05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDCBusLoadShedand Management", 05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0,"Initial AssessmentandFLEX Equipment Staging", 05-S-01-FSG-007,Revision0,"LossofControl 1 InstrumentationPower", S-01-FSG-001,Revision0,"LongTerm ReactorCooling",and 05-S-01-FSG-101,Revision1,"Emergency CommunicationforBDBEEs")confirmand supportthesizeandloading capability ofeachofthefollowing portable diesel generators(PDGs)utilizedfortheGGNSFLEXandGGNS EP communication strategies: o480VAC300kW generators selectedtopowertheDivision1andDivision2 battery chargersanda battery room exhaust fan (EC-Q1111-14002), o240VAC15kW generators selectedtopowereitherdivisionofhydrogen igniters (EC50275), o 240/120VAC6kW generatorsselectedtopowertheportableFLEXcontrolroomventilationfans (EC-Q1111-14002), o4160VAC1MWNationalSAFER Response Center (NSRC)generators14002),and o120VAC7.5kW generators selectedtopowerEP communications equipment (EC50711).TheFLEXelectrical guidance and strategies supporting the maintenanceorrestorationofcore cooling, containmentintegrity,andspentfuelpool(SFP)cooling capabilitiesaredetailed further insection2.3.11and throughoutthefinal integratedplan(FIP)(GNR02016-00006 Attachment 5).Specificloads supportedbytheeachofthe portable diesel generators(PDGs)utilizedfortheGGNSFLEXandGGNSEP communication strategies follow:One480VAC300kW portable diesel generatorisusedtorepowerClass1ELoad Centers 15BA6and16BB6asshownontheoneline diagramofdrawingE1020,Revision11.A dedicated breaker(52-15605)isinstalledonDivisionI480VACLoad Center15BA6to re-power battery charger1DA4andBatteryRoom ExhaustFan1Z77C001A;a dedicated breaker(52-16605)is installed onDivisionII480VACLoad Center16BB6to re-power battery charger1DB4;andanew dedicated fused disconnect(89-171102A)isinstalledfor repoweringtheHPCSDGFuelOil Storage Tank Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page8of12 connectivitytoremain operational followingaBDBEE.Section3.2oftheNRC'sreviewofthe GGNS communications assessment (ML13129A132), provides the guidancethatpriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredfor subsequent changestothe upgradestothesite's communications systems for compliancewithNEI12-01as described in Attachment 1, paragraph4.12andTable3 of GNR02012/00131 (ML12306A245) and GNR02013/00014 (ML13053A091).PerEC50711Revision0,therequired upgradestothesite's communication systemsarecomplete. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.8.A Confirm that the licensee's analyses for size and loading of FLEX generators shows acceptable results.GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedGGNS calculation, EC-Q1111-14002,Revision0,"FLEX Strategy-PortableDiesel GeneratorSystemSizing".Section6of calculation EC-Q1111-14002; Sections3.1.4.1,3.1.4.5,and 3.1.4.7ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC";Section3.1.2.5ofEC50711,Revision0,"EP Communications System Enhancements to ComplywithNEI12-01"; GGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)";and GGNS FLEX Support Guidelines (05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDCBusLoadShedand Management", 05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0,"Initial AssessmentandFLEX Equipment Staging", 05-S-01-FSG-007,Revision0,"LossofControl 1 InstrumentationPower", S-01-FSG-001,Revision0,"LongTerm ReactorCooling",and 05-S-01-FSG-101,Revision1,"Emergency CommunicationforBDBEEs")confirmand supportthesizeandloading capability ofeachofthefollowing portable diesel generators(PDGs)utilizedfortheGGNSFLEXandGGNS EP communication strategies: o480VAC300kW generators selectedtopowertheDivision1andDivision2 battery chargersanda battery room exhaust fan (EC-Q1111-14002), o240VAC15kW generators selectedtopowereitherdivisionofhydrogen igniters (EC50275), o 240/120VAC6kW generatorsselectedtopowertheportableFLEXcontrolroomventilationfans (EC-Q1111-14002), o4160VAC1MWNationalSAFER Response Center (NSRC)generators14002),and o120VAC7.5kW generators selectedtopowerEP communications equipment (EC50711).TheFLEXelectrical guidance and strategies supporting the maintenanceorrestorationofcore cooling, containmentintegrity,andspentfuelpool(SFP)cooling capabilitiesaredetailed further insection2.3.11and throughoutthefinal integratedplan(FIP)(GNR02016-00006 Attachment 5).Specificloads supportedbytheeachofthe portable diesel generators(PDGs)utilizedfortheGGNSFLEXandGGNSEP communication strategies follow:One480VAC300kW portable diesel generatorisusedtorepowerClass1ELoad Centers 15BA6and16BB6asshownontheoneline diagramofdrawingE1020,Revision11.A dedicated breaker(52-15605)isinstalledonDivisionI480VACLoad Center15BA6to re-power battery charger1DA4andBatteryRoom ExhaustFan1Z77C001A;a dedicated breaker(52-16605)is installed onDivisionII480VACLoad Center16BB6to re-power battery charger1DB4;andanew dedicated fused disconnect(89-171102A)isinstalledfor repoweringtheHPCSDGFuelOil Storage Tank Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page9of12 TransferPumpin accordancewithGGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)"andGGNSFLEX Support GuidelineFSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDC 8usLoadShedand Management".Thereisalsoa120VAC receptacle availableatthe auxiliarypanelofthe300kWportableOGforrepoweringthePhase2 Containment Vent UninterruptiblePowerSupply(UPS) (1M41PS01)shownondrawing040,Revision0,"FLEXM41VentPathControl"in accordancewithGGNS Off-Normal EventProcedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)"andGGNSFLEXSupport Guideline (05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDC 8usLoadShedand Management".Atotaloftwo480VAC,300kW portable diesel generatorsarestoredandavailable for deployment,oneineachoftheFLEX storage buildings.One240VAC15kW portable diesel generatorisusedtorepoweronetrainofhydrogenignitersin accordancewithGGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)"andGGNSFLEX Support Guideline (05-S-01-FSG-012,Revision0,"Alternate ContainmentCoolingand HydrogenControl".Atotaloftwo240VAC15kWPOGsarestoredand available for deployment,oneineachoftheFLEXstorage buildings.One240VAC6kW portable diesel generatorisusedtopowertwo portable MCR ventilation fans in accordancewithGGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)"andGGNSFLEXSupport Guideline (05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0,"Initial AssessmentandFLEX EquipmentStaging".Atotaloftwo240VAC15kWPOGsarestoredand available for deployment,oneineachoftheFLEX storage buildings.Two4160VAC1MWNationalSAFERResponse Center (NSRC)portable diesel generators willbeusedtorepowerthe"8"RHRPump (01 E12C0028-8)andRoom Cooler (01T51 8004);"8"FPCCPUMP (01G41C001 8-8)andRoom Cooler (01 T51 80078);8attery Charger 1084, MCC 16831,SSW"8"fans (1P41C003C and 1P41C0030), 18 and 28 ESF Coolers (1T4680018 and 1T4680028),CRAlC compressors (OS251 80028),CRAlCfans(OS251 80028),CRAlCauxiliaries(OS251 80028), CR standbyfreshairsystemfans(OS251 00028),andCR standbyfreshairsystemheatingcoils(OS251 00028)in accordancewithGGNS Off-Normal EventProcedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)"andGGNSFLEXSupport Guideline (05-S-01-FSG-001,Revision1,"LongTermReactorVesselCooling".Three120VAC7.5kW portable diesel generatorsareusedtorepowerEP communications equipment in accordancewithGGNS Off-NormalEventProcedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision 0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)" Attachment2andGGNSFLEX Support Guideline01-FSG-101,Revision1,"Emergency Communication for 808EEs".Atotalofsix120VAC7.5kWPOGsarestoredand available for deployment,threeineachoftheFLEX storage buildings. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.8.8 Confirm that the licensee's final proposed connections of FLEX Phase2and3 electrical equipment to the permanent plant equipment are acceptable.GGNSResponse:Thefinal integratedplan(FIP)(GNR02016-00006 Attachment5)defined connectionsof"FLEXPhase2and3electrical equipmenttothe permanent plant equipment" are addressedbythe Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page9of12 TransferPumpin accordancewithGGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)"andGGNSFLEX Support GuidelineFSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDC 8usLoadShedand Management".Thereisalsoa120VAC receptacle availableatthe auxiliarypanelofthe300kWportableOGforrepoweringthePhase2 Containment Vent UninterruptiblePowerSupply(UPS) (1M41PS01)shownondrawing040,Revision0,"FLEXM41VentPathControl"in accordancewithGGNS Off-Normal EventProcedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)"andGGNSFLEXSupport Guideline (05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDC 8usLoadShedand Management".Atotaloftwo480VAC,300kW portable diesel generatorsarestoredandavailable for deployment,oneineachoftheFLEX storage buildings.One240VAC15kW portable diesel generatorisusedtorepoweronetrainofhydrogenignitersin accordancewithGGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)"andGGNSFLEX Support Guideline (05-S-01-FSG-012,Revision0,"Alternate ContainmentCoolingand HydrogenControl".Atotaloftwo240VAC15kWPOGsarestoredand available for deployment,oneineachoftheFLEXstorage buildings.One240VAC6kW portable diesel generatorisusedtopowertwo portable MCR ventilation fans in accordancewithGGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)"andGGNSFLEXSupport Guideline (05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0,"Initial AssessmentandFLEX EquipmentStaging".Atotaloftwo240VAC15kWPOGsarestoredand available for deployment,oneineachoftheFLEX storage buildings.Two4160VAC1MWNationalSAFERResponse Center (NSRC)portable diesel generators willbeusedtorepowerthe"8"RHRPump (01 E12C0028-8)andRoom Cooler (01T51 8004);"8"FPCCPUMP (01G41C001 8-8)andRoom Cooler (01 T51 80078);8attery Charger 1084, MCC 16831,SSW"8"fans (1P41C003C and 1P41C0030), 18 and 28 ESF Coolers (1T4680018 and 1T4680028),CRAlC compressors (OS251 80028),CRAlCfans(OS251 80028),CRAlCauxiliaries(OS251 80028), CR standbyfreshairsystemfans(OS251 00028),andCR standbyfreshairsystemheatingcoils(OS251 00028)in accordancewithGGNS Off-Normal EventProcedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)"andGGNSFLEXSupport Guideline (05-S-01-FSG-001,Revision1,"LongTermReactorVesselCooling".Three120VAC7.5kW portable diesel generatorsareusedtorepowerEP communications equipment in accordancewithGGNS Off-NormalEventProcedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision 0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)" Attachment2andGGNSFLEX Support Guideline01-FSG-101,Revision1,"Emergency Communication for 808EEs".Atotalofsix120VAC7.5kWPOGsarestoredand available for deployment,threeineachoftheFLEX storage buildings. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.8.8 Confirm that the licensee's final proposed connections of FLEX Phase2and3 electrical equipment to the permanent plant equipment are acceptable.GGNSResponse:Thefinal integratedplan(FIP)(GNR02016-00006 Attachment5)defined connectionsof"FLEXPhase2and3electrical equipmenttothe permanent plant equipment" are addressedbythe Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page10of12 design documentsofEC50283,Revision0,"FLEXElectricalEC"andEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC".TheFIP designsforthefacility modificationsoutlinedintheinitial submittaloftheoverall integratedplan(OIP)havebeen implemented as amendedbythesixmonthstatusreports.Thefacility design changes were screened to documentthatthereisclearbasisthatthereisnoadverse effectonanUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)/CaskFinalSafetyAnalysisReport (CFSAR)describeddesignfunctionandthedesign changesdonotrequireadetailed10CFR50.59evaluation,10CFR72.48Evaluation,oralicense amendment. The modificationsmadetothefacilityas definedintheFIPdonotimpairthe safety functionsofplant structures, systems and componentsthatare designatedforthe mitigation of anticipated operational occurrences and postulated accidents currentlyinthelicenseddesignbasis.TheFLEXelectrical guidance and strategies supporting the maintenanceorrestorationofcore cooling, containmentintegrity,andspentfuelpool(SFP)cooling capabilitiesaredetailed throughouttheFIP.Forthespecific connectionofloads supportedbytheeachoftheportable diesel generators(PDGs)utilizedfortheFIPGGNSFLEXandGGNSEP communication strategiesseetheGGNSResponsetoISE Confirmatory Items 3.2.4.8.Aofthissubmittal: ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.9.A Confirm that the licensee has plans to refuel FLEX equipment based on the fuel oil consumption rates.GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,theNRCstaffreviewedtheGGNSFLEX equipment refueling strategy documented in Attachment6.005ofEC50275.Section3.1.26and Attachment6.005ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC";Section3.1.2.5ofEC50711,Revision0,"EP Communications System Enhancements to ComplywithNEI12-01";GGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure (ONEP)1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)";andGGNSFLEX Support Guidelines01-FSG-005,Revision0,"Initial AssessmentandFLEX EquipmentStaging"and001,Revision1,"LongTermReactorVesselCooling")confirmand supporttheFLEX equipmentrefuelingstrategy.TheFLEX equipment refueling guidance and strategy supporting the maintenance or restoration ofcorecooling, containmentintegrity,andspentfuelpool(SFP)cooling capabilitiesisdetailed furtherinsection2.9.4ofthefinal integratedplan(FIP)(GNR02016-00006 Attachment 5).EC50275,Revision2, Attachment 6.005 documentstheevaluation performedtodevelopthe strategyforrefuelingportable, diesel-driven FLEX equipmentfollowingthe declarationofanELAP.Toensure adequatefuelexiststomeetthestrategy,all diesel-driven FLEX equipmentstoredintheFLEXstorage buildings is maintainedwithafulltankofdieselfuel.FueloilgravitydrainedfromtheHPCSDGDay Tank (1P81A002),as necessaryandadditionalfueloilfromtheHPCSDGfueloilstoragetank (1P81A001)isavailablewhen accessedbyrepoweringtheHPCSDGfueloilstoragetankpump (1P81C001).Whenrepoweredthepump transfersdieselfuelfromthe storagetanktoaportable500gallonfueltrailerviaflexible1.5" diameter hose connectedtodrainlineHBD-558.The500gallonfueltraileristowedtothe various equipment staging locationstorefillthefueltanksasoutlinedin Attachment6.005ofEC5'0275Revision2.ADC motor-driven fuel Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page10of12 design documentsofEC50283,Revision0,"FLEXElectricalEC"andEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC".TheFIP designsforthefacility modificationsoutlinedintheinitial submittaloftheoverall integratedplan(OIP)havebeen implemented as amendedbythesixmonthstatusreports.Thefacility design changes were screened to documentthatthereisclearbasisthatthereisnoadverse effect on anUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)/CaskFinalSafetyAnalysisReport (CFSAR)describeddesignfunctionandthedesign changesdonotrequireadetailed10CFR50.59evaluation,10CFR72.48Evaluation,oralicense amendment. The modificationsmadetothefacilityas definedintheFIPdonotimpairthe safety functionsofplant structures, systems and componentsthatare designatedforthe mitigation of anticipated operational occurrences and postulated accidents currentlyinthelicenseddesignbasis.TheFLEXelectrical guidance and strategies supporting the maintenanceorrestorationofcore cooling, containmentintegrity,andspentfuelpool(SFP)cooling capabilitiesaredetailed throughouttheFIP.Forthespecific connectionofloads supportedbytheeachoftheportable diesel generators(PDGs)utilizedfortheFIPGGNSFLEXandGGNSEP communication strategiesseetheGGNSResponsetoISE Confirmatory Items 3.2.4.8.Aofthissubmittal: ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.9.A Confirm that the licensee has plans to refuel FLEX equipment based on the fuel oil consumption rates.GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,theNRCstaffreviewedtheGGNSFLEX equipment refueling strategy documented in Attachment6.005ofEC50275.Section3.1.26and Attachment6.005ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC";Section3.1.2.5ofEC50711,Revision0,"EP Communications System Enhancements to ComplywithNEI12-01";GGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure (ONEP)1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)";andGGNSFLEX Support Guidelines01-FSG-005,Revision0,"Initial AssessmentandFLEX EquipmentStaging"and001,Revision1,"LongTermReactorVesselCooling")confirmand supporttheFLEX equipmentrefuelingstrategy.TheFLEX equipment refueling guidance and strategy supporting the maintenance or restoration ofcorecooling, containmentintegrity,andspentfuelpool(SFP)cooling capabilitiesisdetailed furtherinsection2.9.4ofthefinal integratedplan(FIP)(GNR02016-00006 Attachment 5).EC50275,Revision2, Attachment 6.005 documentstheevaluation performedtodevelopthe strategyforrefuelingportable, diesel-driven FLEX equipmentfollowingthe declarationofanELAP.Toensure adequatefuelexiststomeetthestrategy,all diesel-driven FLEX equipmentstoredintheFLEXstorage buildings is maintainedwithafulltankofdieselfuel.FueloilgravitydrainedfromtheHPCSDGDay Tank (1P81A002),as necessaryandadditionalfueloilfromtheHPCSDGfueloilstoragetank (1P81A001)isavailablewhen accessedbyrepoweringtheHPCSDGfueloilstoragetankpump (1P81C001).Whenrepoweredthepump transfersdieselfuelfromthe storagetanktoaportable500gallonfueltrailerviaflexible1.5" diameter hose connectedtodrainlineHBD-558.The500gallonfueltraileristowedtothe various equipment staging locationstorefillthefueltanksasoutlinedin Attachment6.005ofEC5'0275Revision2.ADC motor-driven fuel Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page11of12pumponthe500gallon trailer-mountedtankisusedtopumpfuelfromthe trailer-mountedtankto FLEX equipmentfueltanks. In Attachment6.005,"DieselFuel StrategyEvaluation"toEC50275,Revision2,thefueloilevaluationis conservativelybasedonthe commerciallyavailablefuel consumptionratesoftheFLEXequipment, assumes conservativeloading,and assumes conservativestarttimesforthePhase2 diesel-driven equipment.The480VAC300kW battery chargerPDG,thePhase2portabledieseldrivenpump,andthe240VAC15kWhydrogenigniterPDGareeachassumedtostart11hoursaftertheevent.ForthePhase2portabledieseldrivenpumpthisis approximately 9hoursearlierthananalyzed 1required.The120VAC7.5kWEP communication diesel generators are conservativelyassumedtostart8hours aftertheeventwhichis approximately16hoursearlierthanexpected 1 needed.The 240/120VAC6kWMainControlRoom(MCR)portablefans portable diesel generator, whichisassumedtostartat10hoursaftertheinitiatingevent,hasasmallfueltankandisthefirst equipmentthatrequiresrefilling approximately5.9hours afteritstarts operating.Therefueling equipmentineachFLEXstoragebuilding,whichincludesfour portable28galloncarttanksandone500gallonportabletankaresuitablefor ensuringalldieseldriven equipmentremainsfueled throughouttheevent.Attachment6.005ofEC50275,Revision2, documentsthattheFLEX equipmentisevaluatedto consume approximately51.75gallonsofdieselfuelperhour,orabout1,242gallonsperday,when all equipmentisrunning post-BDBEE.Theminimumrequireddieselfueloil storage capacity oftheHPCSdiesel generatorfueloil storagetank1P81A001is44,616gallons(GGNSUFSARSection9.5.4.2,March2014,andMC-Q1 P81-90188,Revision3,"DieselFuel Storage RequirementfortheDivisionIIIDiesel Generator").TheHPCSDGfueloil storagetankistheprimarysourceofdieselfuelfortheFLEX equipment and contains sufficientfueltorunthedieseldrivenFLEX equipment for approximately35.9daysfollowingaBDBEE,basedonthefuel consumptionrateof1,242gallonsperday.GGNSusesitsexistingfueloil vendortosupplyanindefinitesupplyoffuelbeyond35days. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.10.A Confirm the acceptability of RCIC operation without the gland seal compressorenergized 30 minutes after loss ofallac power).GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedGGNScalculation, XC-Q1111-14003,Revision0,"GGNSRCICPumpRoomHeat-upforELAP".Figure1forCase1ofsection2.0oftheanalysis,GGNSNormalEventProcedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",andGGNSFLEX Support Guideline 05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDCBusLoadShedand Management"confirmand support the capabilityoftheGGNSFLEX strategytomaintainan acceptableRCICroom temperature including considerationoftheroomheatloadduetotheSBO required operatorresponseinGGNS Off-NormalEventProcedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-4,Revision50,"LossofACPower"toloadshedthe,DCpowersupplytotheRCICsteamturbineglandseal compressortoconserve batterypower(alsoseetheGGNSResponsetoISE Confirmatory Items 3.2.4.2.Aofthissubmittal). Attachment4to GNRO-2016/00006Page11of12pumponthe500gallon trailer-mountedtankisusedtopumpfuelfromthe trailer-mountedtankto FLEX equipmentfueltanks. In Attachment6.005,"DieselFuel StrategyEvaluation"toEC50275,Revision2,thefueloilevaluationis conservativelybasedonthe commerciallyavailablefuel consumptionratesoftheFLEXequipment, assumes conservativeloading,and assumes conservativestarttimesforthePhase2 diesel-driven equipment.The480VAC300kW battery chargerPDG,thePhase2portabledieseldrivenpump,andthe240VAC15kWhydrogenigniterPDGareeachassumedtostart11hoursaftertheevent.ForthePhase2portabledieseldrivenpumpthisis approximately 9hoursearlierthananalyzed 1required.The120VAC7.5kWEP communication diesel generators are conservativelyassumedtostart8hours aftertheeventwhichis approximately16hoursearlierthanexpected 1 needed.The 240/120VAC6kWMainControlRoom(MCR)portablefans portable diesel generator, whichisassumedtostartat10hoursaftertheinitiatingevent,hasasmallfueltankandisthefirst equipmentthatrequiresrefilling approximately5.9hours afteritstarts operating.Therefueling equipmentineachFLEXstoragebuilding,whichincludesfour portable28galloncarttanksandone500gallonportabletankaresuitablefor ensuringalldieseldriven equipmentremainsfueled throughouttheevent.Attachment6.005ofEC50275,Revision2, documentsthattheFLEX equipmentisevaluatedto consume approximately51.75gallonsofdieselfuelperhour,orabout1,242gallonsperday,when all equipmentisrunning post-BDBEE.Theminimumrequireddieselfueloil storage capacity oftheHPCSdiesel generatorfueloil storagetank1P81A001is44,616gallons(GGNSUFSARSection9.5.4.2,March2014,andMC-Q1 P81-90188,Revision3,"DieselFuel Storage RequirementfortheDivisionIIIDiesel Generator").TheHPCSDGfueloil storagetankistheprimarysourceofdieselfuelfortheFLEX equipment and contains sufficientfueltorunthedieseldrivenFLEX equipment for approximately35.9daysfollowingaBDBEE,basedonthefuel consumptionrateof1,242gallonsperday.GGNSusesitsexistingfueloil vendortosupplyanindefinitesupplyoffuelbeyond35days. ISE Confirmatory Item 3.2.4.10.A Confirm the acceptability of RCIC operation without the gland seal compressorenergized 30 minutes after loss ofallac power).GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedGGNScalculation, XC-Q1111-14003,Revision0,"GGNSRCICPumpRoomHeat-upforELAP".Figure1forCase1ofsection2.0oftheanalysis,GGNSNormalEventProcedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",andGGNSFLEX Support Guideline 05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDCBusLoadShedand Management"confirmand support the capabilityoftheGGNSFLEX strategytomaintainan acceptableRCICroom temperature including considerationoftheroomheatloadduetotheSBO required operatorresponseinGGNS Off-NormalEventProcedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-4,Revision50,"LossofACPower"toloadshedthe,DCpowersupplytotheRCICsteamturbineglandseal compressortoconserve batterypower(alsoseetheGGNSResponsetoISE Confirmatory Items 3.2.4.2.Aofthissubmittal). Attachment4toGNRO-20 16/00006Page12of12 GGNS performed GOTHIC calculation, XC-Q1111-14003,Revision0,"GGNSRCICPumpRoomHeat-upforExtendedLossofACPower,"to determine the temperatureintheRCICpumproomfor120hoursfollowinganELAP.This calculation incorporates applicableheatloadsincludingthe steam leakageheatloadfromthestation blackout(SBO)required operatorresponsetoinitiallyloadshedtheDCpower supplytotheRCICsteamturbineglandseal compressor.TheanalysisshowstheRCICroom temperature approaches193°Fat11hours aftertheinitiatingeventforCase1,atwhichtimetheRCICroom temperaturedropsandremainsbelow150°Fduetothe OperatorrestorationofglandsealairtotheRCICturbinewhenthestationbattery chargers arereenergizedbythe480VAC300kW battery charger portable diesel generator. Additionally,becausethe equivalent leakagerateof0.5gpmfromtheglandsealsissmallandoflimitedduration,theglandseal leakagewillnotcauseadverse flooding as evaluatedinSection3.1.28ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC".TheGGNSanalysis demonstratesthattheFLEX strategy maintainstheRCICroom temperaturebelowthe established SBO acceptance criteriaof212°FduringthetimethatRCICiscreditedintheFLEX strategy(lessthan72hours)andbeyond. ISE ConfirmatoryItem3.2.4.10.B 'Confirm that the calculations regarding battery sizing which show that Vital Batteries can provide required loads for at least 11 hours (considering load shedding)are acceptable.GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedGGNS calculation, EC-Q1111-14001,Revision0,"StationDivisionIBattery1A3andDivisionIIBattery1B3 Discharge CapacityduringELAP".Section7oftheanalysis,GGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",andGGNSFLEX Support Guidelines (05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDCBusLoadShedand Management" and 05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0,"Initial Assessment and FLEX EquipmentStaging")confirmand support the capabilityofDCload shedding in accordancewiththeGGNSFLEX Support Guidelinestoextendthe discharge capacityoftheDivisionI battery1A3to12hoursandtoextendthe discharge capacityoftheDivisionII battery1B3to14hours.The480VAC300kW battery chargerPDGis deployed, connected,andplacedintoserviceator before 11hourstosupplytherequiredloadsandtobegin rechargingtheDivisionIandDivisionIIbatteries.BasedontheloadshedandFLEX equipment deployment actions thatarereflectedin 05-S-01-FSG-004, 05-S-01-FSG-005,andONEP05-1-02-1-7, slightly greaterthan1hourofmarginisprovidedbetweenthe1A3minimum battery discharge capacityof12hoursandpoweringthedivisional battery charger1DA4atorpriorto11hours aftertheinitiatingevent.TheFLEXelectrical guidance and strategies supporting the maintenanceorrestorationofcore cooling, containment integrity,andspentfuelpool(SFP)cooling capabilitiesaredetailed further insection2.3.11and throughoutthefinal integratedplan(FIP)(GNR02016-00006 Attachment 5).Attachment4toGNRO-20 16/00006Page12of12 GGNS performed GOTHIC calculation, XC-Q1111-14003,Revision0,"GGNSRCICPumpRoomHeat-upforExtendedLossofACPower,"to determine the temperatureintheRCICpumproomfor120hoursfollowinganELAP.This calculation incorporates applicableheatloadsincludingthe steam leakageheatloadfromthestation blackout(SBO)required operatorresponsetoinitiallyloadshedtheDCpower supplytotheRCICsteamturbineglandseal compressor.TheanalysisshowstheRCICroom temperature approaches193°Fat11hours aftertheinitiatingeventforCase1,atwhichtimetheRCICroom temperaturedropsandremainsbelow150°Fduetothe OperatorrestorationofglandsealairtotheRCICturbinewhenthestationbattery chargers arereenergizedbythe480VAC300kW battery charger portable diesel generator. Additionally,becausethe equivalent leakagerateof0.5gpmfromtheglandsealsissmallandoflimitedduration,theglandseal leakagewillnotcauseadverse flooding as evaluatedinSection3.1.28ofEC50275,Revision2,"FLEXBasisEC".TheGGNSanalysis demonstratesthattheFLEX strategy maintainstheRCICroom temperaturebelowthe established SBO acceptance criteriaof212°FduringthetimethatRCICiscreditedintheFLEX strategy(lessthan72hours)andbeyond. ISE ConfirmatoryItem3.2.4.10.B 'Confirm that the calculations regarding battery sizing which show that Vital Batteries can provide required loads for at least 11 hours (considering load shedding)are acceptable.GGNSResponse:Whileonsite,thestaffreviewedGGNS calculation, EC-Q1111-14001,Revision0,"StationDivisionIBattery1A3andDivisionIIBattery1B3 Discharge CapacityduringELAP".Section7oftheanalysis,GGNS Off-Normal Event Procedure(ONEP)05-1-02-1-7,Revision0,"ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)",andGGNSFLEX Support Guidelines (05-S-01-FSG-004,Revision0,"ELAPDCBusLoadShedand Management" and 05-S-01-FSG-005,Revision0,"Initial Assessment and FLEX EquipmentStaging")confirmand support the capabilityofDCload shedding in accordancewiththeGGNSFLEX Support Guidelinestoextendthe discharge capacityoftheDivisionI battery1A3to12hoursandtoextendthe discharge capacityoftheDivisionII battery1B3to14hours.The480VAC300kW battery chargerPDGis deployed, connected,andplacedintoserviceator before 11hourstosupplytherequiredloadsandtobegin rechargingtheDivisionIandDivisionIIbatteries.BasedontheloadshedandFLEX equipment deployment actions thatarereflectedin 05-S-01-FSG-004, 05-S-01-FSG-005,andONEP05-1-02-1-7, slightly greaterthan1hourofmarginisprovidedbetweenthe1A3minimum battery discharge capacityof12hoursandpoweringthedivisional battery charger1DA4atorpriorto11hours aftertheinitiatingevent.TheFLEXelectrical guidance and strategies supporting the maintenanceorrestorationofcore cooling, containment integrity,andspentfuelpool(SFP)cooling capabilitiesaredetailed further insection2.3.11and throughoutthefinal integratedplan(FIP)(GNR02016-00006 Attachment 5). Attachment5to GNRO-2016/00006 Final Integrated Plan Attachment5to GNRO-2016/00006 Final Integrated Plan FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016 FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN DOCUMENT Grand Gulf Nuclear Station GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION April 2016Page1of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016 FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN DOCUMENT Grand Gulf Nuclear Station GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION April 2016Page1of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation Table of Contents 1.Background 42.NRC OrderEA-12-049-Mitigation Strategies (FLEX)52.1GeneralElements 52.1.1Assumptions 52.2Strategies 92.3ReactorCoreCoolingandHeatRemovalStrategy 112.3.1Phase1ReactorCoreCoolingStrategy 122.3.2Phase2ReactorCoreCoolingStrategy 152.3.3Phase3ReactorCoreCooling Strategy 202.3.4Systems,Structures,Components 212.3.5FLEXConnections 262.3.6KeyReactorParameters 292.3.7ThermalHydraulicAnalyses 312.3.8RecirculationPumpSealLeakage 332.3.9ShutdownMarginAnalysis 342.3.10FlexPumpsandWaterSupplies 342.3.11ElectricalAnalysis372.4SpentFuelPoolCooling/Inventory 39 2.4.1Phase1Strategy 392.4.2Phase2Strategy 402.4.3Phase3Strategy 432.4.4Structures,Systems,andComponents .442.4.5KeyReactorParameters 462.4.6Thermal-HydraulicAnalyses 472.4.7FlexPumpandWaterSupplies .482.4.8ElectricalAnalysis 502.5ContainmentIntegrity 51 2.5.1PhaseI 512.5.2Phase2 522.5.3Phase3 532.5.4Structures,Systems,Components 542.5.5KeyContainmentParameters 562.5.6Thermal-HydraulicAnalyses 582.5.7FLEXPumpandWaterSupplies 592.5.8ElectricalAnalysis 602.6CharacterizationofExternalHazards 61 2.6.1 Seismic 612.6.2ExternalFlooding 622.6.3SevereStormswithHighWind 622.6.4Ice,SnowandExtremeCold 632.6.5HighTemperatures 63Page2of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation Table of Contents 1.Background 42.NRC OrderEA-12-049-Mitigation Strategies (FLEX)52.1GeneralElements 52.1.1Assumptions 52.2Strategies 92.3ReactorCoreCoolingandHeatRemovalStrategy 112.3.1Phase1ReactorCoreCoolingStrategy 122.3.2Phase2ReactorCoreCoolingStrategy 152.3.3Phase3ReactorCoreCooling Strategy 202.3.4Systems,Structures,Components 212.3.5FLEXConnections 262.3.6KeyReactorParameters 292.3.7ThermalHydraulicAnalyses 312.3.8RecirculationPumpSealLeakage 332.3.9ShutdownMarginAnalysis 342.3.10FlexPumpsandWaterSupplies 342.3.11ElectricalAnalysis372.4SpentFuelPoolCooling/Inventory 39 2.4.1Phase1Strategy 392.4.2Phase2Strategy 402.4.3Phase3Strategy 432.4.4Structures,Systems,andComponents .442.4.5KeyReactorParameters 462.4.6Thermal-HydraulicAnalyses 472.4.7FlexPumpandWaterSupplies .482.4.8ElectricalAnalysis 502.5ContainmentIntegrity 51 2.5.1PhaseI 512.5.2Phase2 522.5.3Phase3 532.5.4Structures,Systems,Components 542.5.5KeyContainmentParameters 562.5.6Thermal-HydraulicAnalyses 582.5.7FLEXPumpandWaterSupplies 592.5.8ElectricalAnalysis 602.6CharacterizationofExternalHazards 61 2.6.1 Seismic 612.6.2ExternalFlooding 622.6.3SevereStormswithHighWind 622.6.4Ice,SnowandExtremeCold 632.6.5HighTemperatures 63Page2of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.7PlannedProtectionofFlexEquipment 642.8PlannedDeploymentofFLEXEquipment 722.8.1HaulPathsandAccessibility 722.9Deploymentofstrategies 742.9.1RCSPrimaryMakeupStrategy 742.9.2AlternateRCSMakeupStrategy 752.9.3ElectricalStrategy 752.9.4FuelingofEquipment. 762.10OffsiteResources 802.10.1NationalSAFERResponseCenter 802.10.2EquipmentList.80 2.11HabitabilityandOperations 852.11.1EquipmentOperatingConditions 852.11.2HeatTracing 882.12PersonnelHabitability 892.13Lighting 892.14Communications 902.15Watersources 932.16ShutdownandRefuelingAnalysis 962.17SequenceofEvents 992.18ProgrammaticElements1052.18.1OverallProgramDocument.. 1052.18.2ProceduralGuidance 1052.18.3Staffing1072.18.4Training1082.18.5EquipmentList. 1092.18.6EquipmentMaintenanceandTesting 111 3.References 111Page3of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.7PlannedProtectionofFlexEquipment 642.8PlannedDeploymentofFLEXEquipment 722.8.1HaulPathsandAccessibility 722.9Deploymentofstrategies 742.9.1RCSPrimaryMakeupStrategy 742.9.2AlternateRCSMakeupStrategy 752.9.3ElectricalStrategy 752.9.4FuelingofEquipment. 762.10OffsiteResources 802.10.1NationalSAFERResponseCenter 802.10.2EquipmentList.80 2.11HabitabilityandOperations 852.11.1EquipmentOperatingConditions 852.11.2HeatTracing 882.12PersonnelHabitability 892.13Lighting 892.14Communications 902.15Watersources 932.16ShutdownandRefuelingAnalysis 962.17SequenceofEvents 992.18ProgrammaticElements1052.18.1OverallProgramDocument.. 1052.18.2ProceduralGuidance 1052.18.3Staffing1072.18.4Training1082.18.5EquipmentList. 1092.18.6EquipmentMaintenanceandTesting 111 3.References 111Page3of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation 1.BackgroundIn2011,anearthquake-inducedtsunamicausedBeyond-Design-Basis(BOB)floodingattheFukushimaDai-ichiNuclearPowerStationinJapan.Thefloodingcausedtheemergencypowersuppliesandelectricaldistributionsystemstobeinoperable,resultinginanextendedlossofalternatingcurrent(ac)power(ELAP)infiveofthesixunitsonthesite.TheELAPledto(1)thelossofcorecooling,(2)lossofspentfuelpoolcoolingcapabilities,and(3)asignificantchallengetomaintainingcontainmentintegrity.Alldirectcurrent(dc)powerwaslostearlyintheeventonUnits1and2andaftersomeperiodoftimeattheotherunits.Coredamageoccurredinthreeoftheunitsalongwithalossofcontainmentintegrityresultinginareleaseofradioactivematerialtothesurroundingenvironment.TheUSNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)assembledaNear-TermTaskForce(NTTF)toadvisetheCommissiononactionstheUSnuclearindustryshouldtaketoprecludecoredamageandareleaseofradioactivematerialafteranaturaldisastersuchasthatseenatFukushima.TheNTTFreport(Reference3.1)containedmanyrecommendationstofulfillthischarter,includingassessingextremeexternaleventhazardsandstrengtheningstationcapabilitiesforrespondingtobasisexternalevents.BasedonNTTFRecommendation4.2,theNRCissuedOrderEA-12-049(Reference3.2)onMarch12,2012toimplementmitigationstrategiesforDesign-Basis(BOB)ExternalEvents(BDBEEs).TheorderprovidedthefollowingrequirementsforstrategiestomitigateBDBEEs:1.Licenseesshalldevelop,implement,andmaintainguidanceandstrategiestomaintainorrestorecorecooling,containment,andspentfuelpool(SFP)coolingcapabilitiesfollowinga beyond-design-basisexternalevent.2.Thesestrategiesmustbecapableofmitigatingasimultaneouslossofallacpowerandlossofnormalaccesstothenormalheatsinkandhaveadequatecapacitytoaddresschallengestocorecooling,containmentandSFPcoolingcapabilitiesatallunitsonasitesubjecttotheOrder.3.Licenseesmustprovidereasonableprotectionfortheassociatedequipmentfromexternalevents.Suchprotectionmustdemonstratethatthereisadequatecapacitytoaddresschallengestocorecooling,containment,andSFPcoolingcapabilitiesatallunitsonasitesubjecttotheOrder.4.Licenseesmustbecapableofimplementingthestrategiesinallmodes.5.Fullcomplianceshallincludeprocedures,guidance,training,andacquisition,stagingorinstallingofequipmentneededforthestrategies.Page4of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation 1.BackgroundIn2011,anearthquake-inducedtsunamicausedBeyond-Design-Basis(BOB)floodingattheFukushimaDai-ichiNuclearPowerStationinJapan.Thefloodingcausedtheemergencypowersuppliesandelectricaldistributionsystemstobeinoperable,resultinginanextendedlossofalternatingcurrent(ac)power(ELAP)infiveofthesixunitsonthesite.TheELAPledto(1)thelossofcorecooling,(2)lossofspentfuelpoolcoolingcapabilities,and(3)asignificantchallengetomaintainingcontainmentintegrity.Alldirectcurrent(dc)powerwaslostearlyintheeventonUnits1and2andaftersomeperiodoftimeattheotherunits.Coredamageoccurredinthreeoftheunitsalongwithalossofcontainmentintegrityresultinginareleaseofradioactivematerialtothesurroundingenvironment.TheUSNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)assembledaNear-TermTaskForce(NTTF)toadvisetheCommissiononactionstheUSnuclearindustryshouldtaketoprecludecoredamageandareleaseofradioactivematerialafteranaturaldisastersuchasthatseenatFukushima.TheNTTFreport(Reference3.1)containedmanyrecommendationstofulfillthischarter,includingassessingextremeexternaleventhazardsandstrengtheningstationcapabilitiesforrespondingtobasisexternalevents.BasedonNTTFRecommendation4.2,theNRCissuedOrderEA-12-049(Reference3.2)onMarch12,2012toimplementmitigationstrategiesforDesign-Basis(BOB)ExternalEvents(BDBEEs).TheorderprovidedthefollowingrequirementsforstrategiestomitigateBDBEEs:1.Licenseesshalldevelop,implement,andmaintainguidanceandstrategiestomaintainorrestorecorecooling,containment,andspentfuelpool(SFP)coolingcapabilitiesfollowinga beyond-design-basisexternalevent.2.Thesestrategiesmustbecapableofmitigatingasimultaneouslossofallacpowerandlossofnormalaccesstothenormalheatsinkandhaveadequatecapacitytoaddresschallengestocorecooling,containmentandSFPcoolingcapabilitiesatallunitsonasitesubjecttotheOrder.3.Licenseesmustprovidereasonableprotectionfortheassociatedequipmentfromexternalevents.Suchprotectionmustdemonstratethatthereisadequatecapacitytoaddresschallengestocorecooling,containment,andSFPcoolingcapabilitiesatallunitsonasitesubjecttotheOrder.4.Licenseesmustbecapableofimplementingthestrategiesinallmodes.5.Fullcomplianceshallincludeprocedures,guidance,training,andacquisition,stagingorinstallingofequipmentneededforthestrategies.Page4of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationTheorderspecifiesathree-phaseapproachforstrategiestomitigateBDBEEs:*Phase1-Theinitialphaserequirestheuseofinstalledequipmentandresourcestomaintainorrestorecorecooling,containmentandspentfuelpool(SFP)coolingcapabilities.*Phase2-Thetransitionphaserequiresprovidingsufficient,portable,onsiteequipmentandconsumablestomaintainorrestorethesefunctionsuntiltheycanbeaccomplishedwithresourcesbroughtfromoffsite.*Phase3-Thefinalphaserequiresobtainingsufficientoffsiteresourcestosustainthosefunctionsindefinitely.NRCOrderEA-12-049(Reference3.2)requiredlicenseesofoperatingreactorstosubmitanoverallintegratedplan,includingadescriptionofhowcompliancewiththeserequirementswouldbeachievedbyFebruary28,2013.TheOrderalsorequiredlicenseestocompleteimplementationoftherequirementsnolaterthantworefuelingcyclesaftersubmittaloftheoverallintegratedplanorDecember31,2016,whichevercomesfirst.TheNuclearEnergyInstitute(NEI)developedNEI12-06(Reference3.3),whichprovidesguidelinesfornuclearstationstoassessextremeexternaleventhazardsandimplementthemitigationstrategiesspecifiedinNRCOrderEA-12-049.TheNRCissuedInterimStaffGuidanceJLD-ISG-2012-01(Reference3.4),datedAugust29,2012,whichendorsedNEI12-06withclarificationsondeterminingbaselinecopingcapabilityandequipmentquality.NRCOrderEA-12-051(Reference3.5)requiredlicenseestoinstallreliableSFPinstrumentationwithspecificdesignfeaturesformonitoringSFPwaterlevel.ThisorderwaspromptedbyNTTFRecommendation 7.1(Reference3.1).NEI12-02(Reference3.6)providesguidanceforcompliancewithOrder EA-12-051andtheNRCdeterminedthat,withtheexceptionsandclarificationsprovidedinISG-2012-03(Reference3.7),conformancewiththeguidanceinNEI12-02isanacceptablemethodforsatisfyingtherequirementsinOrderEA-12-051.2.NRC Order EA-12-049-Mitigation Strategies (FLEX)2.1GeneralElements 2.1.1 AssumptionsTheassumptionsusedfortheevaluationsofaGrandGulfNuclearStation(GGNS)ELAP/LossofUltimateHeatSink(LUHS)eventandPage5of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationTheorderspecifiesathree-phaseapproachforstrategiestomitigateBDBEEs:*Phase1-Theinitialphaserequirestheuseofinstalledequipmentandresourcestomaintainorrestorecorecooling,containmentandspentfuelpool(SFP)coolingcapabilities.*Phase2-Thetransitionphaserequiresprovidingsufficient,portable,onsiteequipmentandconsumablestomaintainorrestorethesefunctionsuntiltheycanbeaccomplishedwithresourcesbroughtfromoffsite.*Phase3-Thefinalphaserequiresobtainingsufficientoffsiteresourcestosustainthosefunctionsindefinitely.NRCOrderEA-12-049(Reference3.2)requiredlicenseesofoperatingreactorstosubmitanoverallintegratedplan,includingadescriptionofhowcompliancewiththeserequirementswouldbeachievedbyFebruary28,2013.TheOrderalsorequiredlicenseestocompleteimplementationoftherequirementsnolaterthantworefuelingcyclesaftersubmittaloftheoverallintegratedplanorDecember31,2016,whichevercomesfirst.TheNuclearEnergyInstitute(NEI)developedNEI12-06(Reference3.3),whichprovidesguidelinesfornuclearstationstoassessextremeexternaleventhazardsandimplementthemitigationstrategiesspecifiedinNRCOrderEA-12-049.TheNRCissuedInterimStaffGuidanceJLD-ISG-2012-01(Reference3.4),datedAugust29,2012,whichendorsedNEI12-06withclarificationsondeterminingbaselinecopingcapabilityandequipmentquality.NRCOrderEA-12-051(Reference3.5)requiredlicenseestoinstallreliableSFPinstrumentationwithspecificdesignfeaturesformonitoringSFPwaterlevel.ThisorderwaspromptedbyNTTFRecommendation 7.1(Reference3.1).NEI12-02(Reference3.6)providesguidanceforcompliancewithOrder EA-12-051andtheNRCdeterminedthat,withtheexceptionsandclarificationsprovidedinISG-2012-03(Reference3.7),conformancewiththeguidanceinNEI12-02isanacceptablemethodforsatisfyingtherequirementsinOrderEA-12-051.2.NRC Order EA-12-049-Mitigation Strategies (FLEX)2.1GeneralElements 2.1.1 AssumptionsTheassumptionsusedfortheevaluationsofaGrandGulfNuclearStation(GGNS)ELAP/LossofUltimateHeatSink(LUHS)eventandPage5of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationthedevelopmentofdiverseandflexiblecoping(FLEX)strategiesarestatedbelow.KeyassumptionsassociatedwithimplementationofFLEXStrategiesforGGNSaredescribedbelow:*Floodandseismicre-evaluationspursuanttothe10CFR50.54(f)letterofMarch12,2012(Reference3.8)havebeencompletedandthereforeconsidered.Whereappropriate,resultshavebeenincorporatedintothemodificationsimplementingtheFLEXstrategies.*Thefollowingconditionsexistforthebaselinecase: oSeismicallydesigneddirectcurrent(DC)batterybanksare available. oSeismicallydesignedalternatingcurrent(AC)andDCdistributionsystemsareavailable. oPlantinitialresponseisthesameasaStationBlack-Out(SBO)event. oBestestimateanalysisanddecayheatisusedtoestablishoperatortimeandaction. oNosinglefailureofsystems,structures,orcomponents(SSCs)isassumedexceptthoseinthebaseassumptionsoftheevent(Le.,emergencydieselgenerator(EDG)operation,andmotiveforceoftheHeatSink(UHS)pumps).Therefore,theReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)systemwillperformeitherviaautomaticcontrolorwithmanualoperationcapabilitypertheguidanceinNEI12-06.*Thedesignedhardenedconnectionsareprotectedagainstapplicableexternaleventsorareestablishedatmultipleanddiverselocations.*FLEXcomponentsaredesignedtobecapableofperforminginresponseto"screenedin"hazardsinaccordancewithNEI06.PortableFLEXcomponentsareprocuredcommerciallyandunderaugmentedqualityrequirementsfortestingwhere appropriate.Page6of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationthedevelopmentofdiverseandflexiblecoping(FLEX)strategiesarestatedbelow.KeyassumptionsassociatedwithimplementationofFLEXStrategiesforGGNSaredescribedbelow:*Floodandseismicre-evaluationspursuanttothe10CFR50.54(f)letterofMarch12,2012(Reference3.8)havebeencompletedandthereforeconsidered.Whereappropriate,resultshavebeenincorporatedintothemodificationsimplementingtheFLEXstrategies.*Thefollowingconditionsexistforthebaselinecase: oSeismicallydesigneddirectcurrent(DC)batterybanksare available. oSeismicallydesignedalternatingcurrent(AC)andDCdistributionsystemsareavailable. oPlantinitialresponseisthesameasaStationBlack-Out(SBO)event. oBestestimateanalysisanddecayheatisusedtoestablishoperatortimeandaction. oNosinglefailureofsystems,structures,orcomponents(SSCs)isassumedexceptthoseinthebaseassumptionsoftheevent(Le.,emergencydieselgenerator(EDG)operation,andmotiveforceoftheHeatSink(UHS)pumps).Therefore,theReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)systemwillperformeitherviaautomaticcontrolorwithmanualoperationcapabilitypertheguidanceinNEI12-06.*Thedesignedhardenedconnectionsareprotectedagainstapplicableexternaleventsorareestablishedatmultipleanddiverselocations.*FLEXcomponentsaredesignedtobecapableofperforminginresponseto"screenedin"hazardsinaccordancewithNEI06.PortableFLEXcomponentsareprocuredcommerciallyandunderaugmentedqualityrequirementsfortestingwhere appropriate.Page6of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation*MarginisinherentinnucleardesignprocessessuchthatFLEXcomponentsandhardconnectionpointshavemargintoanticipatepossiblefutureadditionalrequirementsiffloodingandseismicre-evaluationwarrants.InterimfloodingandseismicevaluationimpactsontheFLEXstrategieshavebeenperformedwithnoadverseimpactsidentified.*AllPhase2FLEXcomponentsarestoredatthesiteandwillbeprotectedagainstthe IIscreenedin"hazardsinaccordancewithNEI12-06.AtleastNsetsofFLEXequipmentthatdirectlysupportsmaintenanceofakeysafetyfunctionwillbeavailableaftertheeventtheyweredesignedtomitigate ..Non-creditedbackup/replacementPhase2FLEXequipmentwillbeavailablefromaNationalSAFERResponseCenter(NSRC).*Deploymentstrategiesanddeploymentroutesareassessedforhazardsimpact.*Phase3FLEXequipmentwillbeprovidedbyaNSRC.*Additionalstaffresourcesareexpectedtobeginarrivingat6hoursandthesitewillbefullystaffed24hoursaftertheevent(References3.83and3.88).*Maximumenvironmentalroomtemperaturesforhabitability/accessibilityorequipmentavailabilityisbasedonNUMARC00(Reference3.9)guidanceifotherdesignbasisinformationorindustryguidanceisnotavailable.Extremehightemperaturesarenotexpectedtoimpacttheutilizationofoff-siteresourcesortheabilityofpersonneltoimplementtherequiredFLEX strategies.*Thisplandefinesstrategiescapableofmitigatingasimultaneouslossofallalternatingcurrent(ac)powerandlossofnormalaccesstotheultimateheatsink(characterizedasalossofmotiveforceoftheUltimateHeatSink(UHS)pumps)resultingfromabeyonddesignbasisexternalevent(BDBEE)byprovidingadequatecapabilitytomaintainorrestorecorecooling,containment,andSFPcoolingcapabilitiesatallunitsonthesite.Thoughspecificstrategieshavebeendeveloped,duetotheinabilitytoanticipateallpossiblescenarios,thestrategiesarealsodiverseandflexibletoencompassawiderangeofpossiblePage7of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation*MarginisinherentinnucleardesignprocessessuchthatFLEXcomponentsandhardconnectionpointshavemargintoanticipatepossiblefutureadditionalrequirementsiffloodingandseismicre-evaluationwarrants.InterimfloodingandseismicevaluationimpactsontheFLEXstrategieshavebeenperformedwithnoadverseimpactsidentified.*AllPhase2FLEXcomponentsarestoredatthesiteandwillbeprotectedagainstthe IIscreenedin"hazardsinaccordancewithNEI12-06.AtleastNsetsofFLEXequipmentthatdirectlysupportsmaintenanceofakeysafetyfunctionwillbeavailableaftertheeventtheyweredesignedtomitigate ..Non-creditedbackup/replacementPhase2FLEXequipmentwillbeavailablefromaNationalSAFERResponseCenter(NSRC).*Deploymentstrategiesanddeploymentroutesareassessedforhazardsimpact.*Phase3FLEXequipmentwillbeprovidedbyaNSRC.*Additionalstaffresourcesareexpectedtobeginarrivingat6hoursandthesitewillbefullystaffed24hoursaftertheevent(References3.83and3.88).
- Maximumenvironmentalroomtemperaturesforhabitability/accessibilityorequipmentavailabilityisbasedonNUMARC00(Reference3.9)guidanceifotherdesignbasisinformationorindustryguidanceisnotavailable.Extremehightemperaturesarenotexpectedtoimpacttheutilizationofoff-siteresourcesortheabilityofpersonneltoimplementtherequiredFLEX strategies.*Thisplandefinesstrategiescapableofmitigatingasimultaneouslossofallalternatingcurrent(ac)powerandlossofnormalaccesstotheultimateheatsink(characterizedasalossofmotiveforceoftheUltimateHeatSink(UHS)pumps)resultingfromabeyonddesignbasisexternalevent(BDBEE)byprovidingadequatecapabilitytomaintainorrestorecorecooling,containment,andSFPcoolingcapabilitiesatallunitsonthesite.Thoughspecificstrategieshavebeendeveloped,duetotheinabilitytoanticipateallpossiblescenarios,thestrategiesarealsodiverseandflexibletoencompassawiderangeofpossiblePage7of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationconditions.Thesepre-plannedstrategiesdevelopedtoprotectthepublichealthandsafetyhavebeenintegratedwiththeunitemergencyoperatingprocedures(EOP)inaccordancewithestablishedEOPchangeprocessesandthefacilitymodificationsrequiredtosupportthesestrategiesareevaluatedunder10CFR50.59forimpactonthedesignbasisoftheunit.*TheplantTechnicalSpecificationscontainthelimitingconditionsfornormalunitoperationstoensurethatdesignsafetyfeaturesareavailabletorespondtoadesignbasisaccidentanddirecttherequiredactionstobetakenwhenthelimitingconditionsarenotmet.Theresultofthe beyond-design-basiseventmayplacetheplantinaconditionwhereitcannotcomplywithcertainTechnicalSpecificationsand/orwithitsSecurityPlan,and,assuch,maywarrantinvocationof10CFR50.54(x)and/or10CFR73.55(p).(Reference3.10)*TheassumptionslistedinNEI12-06(Reference3.3),Section3.2.1,GeneralCriteriaandBaselineAssumptions,areapplicabletothestrategiesdevelopedforGGNS.Page8of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationconditions.Thesepre-plannedstrategiesdevelopedtoprotectthepublichealthandsafetyhavebeenintegratedwiththeunitemergencyoperatingprocedures(EOP)inaccordancewithestablishedEOPchangeprocessesandthefacilitymodificationsrequiredtosupportthesestrategiesareevaluatedunder10CFR50.59forimpactonthedesignbasisoftheunit.*TheplantTechnicalSpecificationscontainthelimitingconditionsfornormalunitoperationstoensurethatdesignsafetyfeaturesareavailabletorespondtoadesignbasisaccidentanddirecttherequiredactionstobetakenwhenthelimitingconditionsarenotmet.Theresultofthe beyond-design-basiseventmayplacetheplantinaconditionwhereitcannotcomplywithcertainTechnicalSpecificationsand/orwithitsSecurityPlan,and,assuch,maywarrantinvocationof10CFR50.54(x)and/or10CFR73.55(p).(Reference3.10)
- TheassumptionslistedinNEI12-06(Reference3.3),Section3.2.1,GeneralCriteriaandBaselineAssumptions,areapplicabletothestrategiesdevelopedforGGNS.Page8of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.2StrategiesTheobjectiveoftheFLEXStrategiesistoestablishanindefinitecopingcapabilityinorderto1)preventdamagetothefuelinthereactor,2)maintainthecontainmentfunctionalintegrityand3)preventdamagetofuelinthespentfuelpool(SFP)usinginstalledequipment,on-siteportableequipment,andoff-siteresources.Thisindefinitecopingcapabilitywilladdressanextendedlossofallacpower(ELAP)-lossofoff-sitepower,emergencydieselgeneratorsandanyalternateacsource(asdefinedin10CFR50.2)butnotthelossofacpowertobusesfedbystationbatteriesthroughinverters-withasimultaneouslossofaccesstotheultimateheatsink(LUHS)(characterizedasalossofmotiveforceoftheUltimateHeatSink(UHS) pumps).Theplantindefinitecopingcapabilityisattainedthroughtheimplementationofpre-determinedstrategies(FLEXstrategies)thatarefocusedonmaintainingorrestoringkeyplantsafetyfunctions.TheFLEXstrategiesarenottiedtoanyspecificdamagestateormechanisticassessmentofexternalevents.Rather,thestrategiesaredevelopedtomaintainthekeyplantsafetyfunctionsbasedontheevaluationofplantresponsetothecoincidentELAP/LUHSevent.Asafetyfunction-based approachprovidesconsistencywith,andallowscoordinationwith,existingplantemergencyoperatingprocedures(EOPs),off-normaleventprocedures(ONEPs),andalternatestrategy(8.5.b)procedures.FLEXstrateqiesareimplementedinsupportofEOPsandONEPsusingFLEXSupportGuidelines(FSGs).ThestrategiesforcopingwiththeplantconditionsthatresultfromanELAP/LUHSeventinvolveathree-phaseapproach:*Phase1-Initiallycopebyrelyingoninstalledplantequipmentandsiteresources.*Phase2-Transitionfrominstalledplantequipmenttoon-siteFLEX equipment.*Phase3-Obtainadditionalcapabilityandredundancyfromoff-siteequipmentandresourcesuntilpower,water,andcoolantinjectionsystemsarerestoredorcommissioned.ThedurationofeachphaseisspecifictotheinstalledandportableequipmentutilizedfortheparticularFLEXstrategyemployedtomitigatetheplant condition.Page9of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.2StrategiesTheobjectiveoftheFLEXStrategiesistoestablishanindefinitecopingcapabilityinorderto1)preventdamagetothefuelinthereactor,2)maintainthecontainmentfunctionalintegrityand3)preventdamagetofuelinthespentfuelpool(SFP)usinginstalledequipment,on-siteportableequipment,andoff-siteresources.Thisindefinitecopingcapabilitywilladdressanextendedlossofallacpower(ELAP)-lossofoff-sitepower,emergencydieselgeneratorsandanyalternateacsource(asdefinedin10CFR50.2)butnotthelossofacpowertobusesfedbystationbatteriesthroughinverters-withasimultaneouslossofaccesstotheultimateheatsink(LUHS)(characterizedasalossofmotiveforceoftheUltimateHeatSink(UHS) pumps).Theplantindefinitecopingcapabilityisattainedthroughtheimplementationofpre-determinedstrategies(FLEXstrategies)thatarefocusedonmaintainingorrestoringkeyplantsafetyfunctions.TheFLEXstrategiesarenottiedtoanyspecificdamagestateormechanisticassessmentofexternalevents.Rather,thestrategiesaredevelopedtomaintainthekeyplantsafetyfunctionsbasedontheevaluationofplantresponsetothecoincidentELAP/LUHSevent.Asafetyfunction-based approachprovidesconsistencywith,andallowscoordinationwith,existingplantemergencyoperatingprocedures(EOPs),off-normaleventprocedures(ONEPs),andalternatestrategy(8.5.b)procedures.FLEXstrateqiesareimplementedinsupportofEOPsandONEPsusingFLEXSupportGuidelines(FSGs).ThestrategiesforcopingwiththeplantconditionsthatresultfromanELAP/LUHSeventinvolveathree-phaseapproach:*Phase1-Initiallycopebyrelyingoninstalledplantequipmentandsiteresources.*Phase2-Transitionfrominstalledplantequipmenttoon-siteFLEX equipment.*Phase3-Obtainadditionalcapabilityandredundancyfromoff-siteequipmentandresourcesuntilpower,water,andcoolantinjectionsystemsarerestoredorcommissioned.ThedurationofeachphaseisspecifictotheinstalledandportableequipmentutilizedfortheparticularFLEXstrategyemployedtomitigatetheplant condition.Page9of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationThestrategiesdescribedinSections2.3,2.4and2.5belowarecapableofmitigatinganELAP/LUHSresultingfromaBDBEEbyprovidingadequatecapabilitytomaintainorrestorecorecooling,containmentintegrity,andSFPcoolingcapabilitiesatGGNS.Thoughspecificstrategieshavebeendeveloped,duetotheinabilitytoanticipateallpossiblescenarios,thestrategiesarealsodiverseandflexibletoencompassawiderangeofpossibleconditions.Thesepre-plannedstrategies,developedtoprotectthepublichealthandsafety,areintegratedwiththeGGNSemergencyoperatingproceduresinaccordancewithestablishedEOPchangeprocesses,andtheirinterfacewiththedesignbasiscapabilitiesoftheunitevaluatedunder10CFR 50.59.Page10of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationThestrategiesdescribedinSections2.3,2.4and2.5belowarecapableofmitigatinganELAP/LUHSresultingfromaBDBEEbyprovidingadequatecapabilitytomaintainorrestorecorecooling,containmentintegrity,andSFPcoolingcapabilitiesatGGNS.Thoughspecificstrategieshavebeendeveloped,duetotheinabilitytoanticipateallpossiblescenarios,thestrategiesarealsodiverseandflexibletoencompassawiderangeofpossibleconditions.Thesepre-plannedstrategies,developedtoprotectthepublichealthandsafety,areintegratedwiththeGGNSemergencyoperatingproceduresinaccordancewithestablishedEOPchangeprocesses,andtheirinterfacewiththedesignbasiscapabilitiesoftheunitevaluatedunder10CFR 50.59.Page10of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.3ReactorCoreCoolingStrategyImmediatelyafterashutdowncausedbytheBDEEE,thereactorremainsisolatedandpressurized.Tomitigatethepostulated ElAPeventGGNSwillinitiallyremovecoredecayheatbyusingtheDCpoweredReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)system.Thesteam-drivenRCICpumpwillinitiallysupplywatertothereactorfromthecondensatestoragetank(CST)or,iftheCSTisnotavailableduetotheBDBEE,theRCICsuctionwillautomaticallytransfertothesuppressionpoolonDCpoweredinstrumentation,valvesandcontrollogic.Operatorstakeactiontoreduceloadonthestationbatteriesbysheddingnon-criticalelectricalloadswithactionscompletedin2hoursaftertheinitial BDBEE.Steamfromthereactorpressurevessel(RPV)willdrivetheRCICturbineandwillbedischargedthroughtheinvertersuppliedACpowered,airassistedmainsteamsafetyreliefvalves(SRVs)tothesuppressionpooltoremovedecayheat.OperatorswilldepressurizetheRPVtomaintainoperationinthesaferegionoftheheatcapacitytemperaturelimit (HCTl)curve.RPVdepressurizationwillbestoppedatapressureofabout200to400poundspersquareinchgauge(psig)tomaintainsufficientsteampressureforcontinuedRCICoperation.Whenthesuppressionpooltemperaturereachesapproximately170°F(inabout3hoursaftertheinitialBDBEE)theRCICsuctionwillbelocallymanuallyalignedtotheuppercontainmentpool(UCP)inordertomaintainacoolsourceofcoolingwatersupplytotheRCICpumpandturbineaswellastomaintainnetpositivesuctionheadfortheRCICpump.PriortodepletionoftheUCPinventorysupportingRCICinjection(inabout20hoursaftertheinitialBDBEE)RPVdepressurizationwill continuetoallowinitiationofRPVinjectionwiththeFLEXpumpfordecayheatremoval.AsdescribedintheGGNScontainmentintegritystrategybelow,beforethesuppressionpooltemperatureexceedsapproximately190°F,(inabout4hoursaftertheinitialBDBEE)thesuppression pool/containmentwillbeventedtotheatmosphereviathemodified20"EOPcontainmentventpathtolimitcontainmentpressurizationandminimizethecontainmenttemperature increase.FollowingFLEXpump (1 FlEXC001or1 FlEXC002)deploymentfromeitherrespectiveonsitestoragebuilding,completionoflocalmanualvalvealignments,andwiththeFLEXpumpcapableofinjectionwithsuctionalignedPage11of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.3ReactorCoreCoolingStrategyImmediatelyafterashutdowncausedbytheBDEEE,thereactorremainsisolatedandpressurized.Tomitigatethepostulated ElAPeventGGNSwillinitiallyremovecoredecayheatbyusingtheDCpoweredReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)system.Thesteam-drivenRCICpumpwillinitiallysupplywatertothereactorfromthecondensatestoragetank(CST)or,iftheCSTisnotavailableduetotheBDBEE,theRCICsuctionwillautomaticallytransfertothesuppressionpoolonDCpoweredinstrumentation,valvesandcontrollogic.Operatorstakeactiontoreduceloadonthestationbatteriesbysheddingnon-criticalelectricalloadswithactionscompletedin2hoursaftertheinitial BDBEE.Steamfromthereactorpressurevessel(RPV)willdrivetheRCICturbineandwillbedischargedthroughtheinvertersuppliedACpowered,airassistedmainsteamsafetyreliefvalves(SRVs)tothesuppressionpooltoremovedecayheat.OperatorswilldepressurizetheRPVtomaintainoperationinthesaferegionoftheheatcapacitytemperaturelimit (HCTl)curve.RPVdepressurizationwillbestoppedatapressureofabout200to400poundspersquareinchgauge(psig)tomaintainsufficientsteampressureforcontinuedRCICoperation.Whenthesuppressionpooltemperaturereachesapproximately170°F(inabout3hoursaftertheinitialBDBEE)theRCICsuctionwillbelocallymanuallyalignedtotheuppercontainmentpool(UCP)inordertomaintainacoolsourceofcoolingwatersupplytotheRCICpumpandturbineaswellastomaintainnetpositivesuctionheadfortheRCICpump.PriortodepletionoftheUCPinventorysupportingRCICinjection(inabout20hoursaftertheinitialBDBEE)RPVdepressurizationwill continuetoallowinitiationofRPVinjectionwiththeFLEXpumpfordecayheatremoval.AsdescribedintheGGNScontainmentintegritystrategybelow,beforethesuppressionpooltemperatureexceedsapproximately190°F,(inabout4hoursaftertheinitialBDBEE)thesuppression pool/containmentwillbeventedtotheatmosphereviathemodified20"EOPcontainmentventpathtolimitcontainmentpressurizationandminimizethecontainmenttemperature increase.FollowingFLEXpump (1 FlEXC001or1 FlEXC002)deploymentfromeitherrespectiveonsitestoragebuilding,completionoflocalmanualvalvealignments,andwiththeFLEXpumpcapableofinjectionwithsuctionalignedPage11of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationtoastandbyservicewater(SSW)coolingtowerbasin(theultimateheatsink[UHS]),theFLEXpumpwillbeavailable(inabout 11hoursaftertheinitialBDBEE)toinjectwaterintotheRPVtomaintainRPVlevel.AnadditionalsuctionstrainerisprovidedforeachFLEXpumptoallowforswappingoutof strainers.AFLEXgenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)initiallydeployedfromeitherrespectiveonsitestoragebuildingwillbeusedtoreenergizetheinstalledbatterychargers(inabout 11hoursaftertheinitialBDBEEversustheapproximate12hoursofbatteryavailabilitywithnocharging)tokeepthenecessaryDCbusesenergized,whichwillkeepimportantinvertersupplied120voltACequipmentandinstrumentsenergizedandavailable.TheFLEXpump,withsuctionfromaSSWbasin,willcontinuetoprovidecorecoolingwellpast72hourswithoutbasinmakeup.PriortodepletionoftheSSWbasininventory,offsitesuppliedpumpsand/orwatertransportationequipmentwillprovidewaterfromtheMississippiRiverviapublicaccessroadsfromthePortofPortGibson,fromGrandGulfMilitaryPark,orfromtheownercontrolledaccessroadfromthesitebargeslip.Optionally,theNSRCequipmentmaybeutilized,asnecessary,forthelongtermwatermakeuptotheultimateheatsink.Thisoptionalstrategyrequiresdeploymentofapproximately9900ftofoffsitesuppliedflexiblehosefromtherivertotheSSWBasin.Asresourcesbecomeavailable,recoveryactionswillbetakentotransitiontotheNSRCsuppliedequipmenttoestablishshutdowncoolingfortheRPV.TheNSRC4160voltACgenerators,4160voltdistribution,andNSRCpumpswillbeusedtoenergizeandcoolaresidualheatremoval(RHR)pump,UHScoolingtowerfans,plantvalves,supportsystems,etc.neededtotransferdecayheattotheUHSandfromtheUHStotheenvironmentusingtheinstalledRHRheatexchangerandUHScoolingtowerfanswithoutrelianceontheinstalledSSWpumps.AdescriptionofthesequenceofeventsforrequiredoperatoractionsisprovidedinSection2.17andthemajorportableequipmentrequiredtosupporttheFLEXcopingstrategiesisprovidedinSection2.18.5.
2.3.1Phase1ReactorCoreCoolingStrategyThePhase1strategyforreactorcorecoolingistousetheRCICsystempumptoprovidecoolingwaterflowtothereactorvesselandtousetheRCICsystemturbinetoassistindepressurizationoftheRPV.NormalalignmentforRCICsuctionisfromthenon-seismic/non-Page12of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationtoastandbyservicewater(SSW)coolingtowerbasin(theultimateheatsink[UHS]),theFLEXpumpwillbeavailable(inabout 11hoursaftertheinitialBDBEE)toinjectwaterintotheRPVtomaintainRPVlevel.AnadditionalsuctionstrainerisprovidedforeachFLEXpumptoallowforswappingoutof strainers.AFLEXgenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)initiallydeployedfromeitherrespectiveonsitestoragebuildingwillbeusedtoreenergizetheinstalledbatterychargers(inabout 11hoursaftertheinitialBDBEEversustheapproximate12hoursofbatteryavailabilitywithnocharging)tokeepthenecessaryDCbusesenergized,whichwillkeepimportantinvertersupplied120voltACequipmentandinstrumentsenergizedandavailable.TheFLEXpump,withsuctionfromaSSWbasin,willcontinuetoprovidecorecoolingwellpast72hourswithoutbasinmakeup.PriortodepletionoftheSSWbasininventory,offsitesuppliedpumpsand/orwatertransportationequipmentwillprovidewaterfromtheMississippiRiverviapublicaccessroadsfromthePortofPortGibson,fromGrandGulfMilitaryPark,orfromtheownercontrolledaccessroadfromthesitebargeslip.Optionally,theNSRCequipmentmaybeutilized,asnecessary,forthelongtermwatermakeuptotheultimateheatsink.Thisoptionalstrategyrequiresdeploymentofapproximately9900ftofoffsitesuppliedflexiblehosefromtherivertotheSSWBasin.Asresourcesbecomeavailable,recoveryactionswillbetakentotransitiontotheNSRCsuppliedequipmenttoestablishshutdowncoolingfortheRPV.TheNSRC4160voltACgenerators,4160voltdistribution,andNSRCpumpswillbeusedtoenergizeandcoolaresidualheatremoval(RHR)pump,UHScoolingtowerfans,plantvalves,supportsystems,etc.neededtotransferdecayheattotheUHSandfromtheUHStotheenvironmentusingtheinstalledRHRheatexchangerandUHScoolingtowerfanswithoutrelianceontheinstalledSSWpumps.AdescriptionofthesequenceofeventsforrequiredoperatoractionsisprovidedinSection2.17andthemajorportableequipmentrequiredtosupporttheFLEXcopingstrategiesisprovidedinSection2.18.5. 2.3.1Phase1ReactorCoreCoolingStrategyThePhase1strategyforreactorcorecoolingistousetheRCICsystempumptoprovidecoolingwaterflowtothereactorvesselandtousetheRCICsystemturbinetoassistindepressurizationoftheRPV.NormalalignmentforRCICsuctionisfromthenon-seismic/non-Page12of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationmissileprotectedCST.IfpriortoorduringtheinitiatingeventstheCSTinventorybecomesunavailable,theRCICsuctionisautomaticallytransferredtothesuppressionpoolviatheuseofqualifieddc-poweredinstrumentationintheAuxiliaryBuilding.Theautomatictransferfunctionisasafetyrelatedfunction;nomodificationsarenecessarytoachievethesuctionswaptothesuppressionpool(Reference3.11)duringan ElAPduetoaBDBEE.Untilmanuallybypassed,allrequiredRCICtrips,interlocks,andassociatedequipment(fedbybatterychargers,per Refe'rence3.12)willremainfunctionalduringan ElAPeventandtheassociatedDCloadshed.NecessarytripandinterlocksrequiringbypassearlyintheSBOpriortodeclarationofan ElAP, toallowcontinuedoperationofRCICduringPhase1(e.g., low RCICSteamSupplyPressure),willbecompletedinaccordancewithcurrentoffnormaleventprocedures.TheDCpoweredairassistedSRVscontrolreactorpressureinaccordancewiththelow-lowsetmodeofSRVoperation(Reference3.13).TheSRVshaveadequateairandDCpowertomaintainthisfunctionasdocumentedinReference3.21,Section3.1.4.8.Asthe ElAPprogresses,thesuppressionpoolheatsupduetoRCICinjection,RCICturbineexhaust,normalprimarysystemleakage,andSRVcycling.Atapproximatelytwohoursaftertheevent,theheatcapacitytemperaturelimit (HCTl)curveisreached(Reference3.13).Atthispoint,reactorpressureisreducedtoandmaintainedinarangebetween200and400psig(tomaintainRCICoperation)bySRVoperationfromtheMCRwhilemaintainingthetechnicalspecification 1 OO°F/hrcooldownlimit.BasedonavoidanceofRCICNPSHanddurabilitymarginconcernswithahightemperaturesuctionsource,theRCICsuctionwillbeswappedtotheUCPwhichisacoolersuctionsourceandisatahigherelevationthanthesuppressionpool(Reference3.13).Thecoreandcontainmentanalysis(Reference3.13,CaseB),determinedthatapproximatelythreehoursaftertheevent,thesuppressionpooltemperaturereaches170°F.Justificationforusingupto170°FsuppressionpoolwaterfortheRCICsystemisprovidedinTP-14-018(Reference3.15),SDC E51Section4.12and4.13(Reference3.11),andGGNS-SA-14-00003(Reference3.16)whilejustificationforPhase1RCICfunctionalityandPhase2mitigatingactionforincreasedroomtemperatureisprovidedinXC-Q1111-14003(Reference3.17).Page13of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationmissileprotectedCST.IfpriortoorduringtheinitiatingeventstheCSTinventorybecomesunavailable,theRCICsuctionisautomaticallytransferredtothesuppressionpoolviatheuseofqualifieddc-poweredinstrumentationintheAuxiliaryBuilding.Theautomatictransferfunctionisasafetyrelatedfunction;nomodificationsarenecessarytoachievethesuctionswaptothesuppressionpool(Reference3.11)duringan ElAPduetoaBDBEE.Untilmanuallybypassed,allrequiredRCICtrips,interlocks,andassociatedequipment(fedbybatterychargers,per Refe'rence3.12)willremainfunctionalduringan ElAPeventandtheassociatedDCloadshed.NecessarytripandinterlocksrequiringbypassearlyintheSBOpriortodeclarationofan ElAP, toallowcontinuedoperationofRCICduringPhase1(e.g., low RCICSteamSupplyPressure),willbecompletedinaccordancewithcurrentoffnormaleventprocedures.TheDCpoweredairassistedSRVscontrolreactorpressureinaccordancewiththelow-lowsetmodeofSRVoperation(Reference3.13).TheSRVshaveadequateairandDCpowertomaintainthisfunctionasdocumentedinReference3.21,Section3.1.4.8.Asthe ElAPprogresses,thesuppressionpoolheatsupduetoRCICinjection,RCICturbineexhaust,normalprimarysystemleakage,andSRVcycling.Atapproximatelytwohoursaftertheevent,the heat capacitytemperaturelimit (HCTl)curveisreached(Reference3.13).Atthispoint,reactorpressureisreducedtoandmaintainedinarangebetween200and400psig(tomaintainRCICoperation)bySRVoperationfromtheMCRwhilemaintainingthetechnicalspecification 1 OO°F/hrcooldownlimit.BasedonavoidanceofRCICNPSHanddurabilitymarginconcernswithahightemperaturesuctionsource,theRCICsuctionwillbeswappedtotheUCPwhichisacoolersuctionsourceandisatahigherelevationthanthesuppressionpool(Reference3.13).Thecoreandcontainmentanalysis(Reference3.13,CaseB),determinedthatapproximatelythreehoursaftertheevent,thesuppressionpooltemperaturereaches170°F.Justificationforusingupto170°FsuppressionpoolwaterfortheRCICsystemisprovidedinTP-14-018(Reference3.15),SDC E51Section4.12and4.13(Reference3.11),andGGNS-SA-14-00003(Reference3.16)whilejustificationforPhase1RCICfunctionalityandPhase2mitigatingactionforincreasedroomtemperatureisprovidedinXC-Q1111-14003(Reference3.17).Page13of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationWhentheUCPtoRCICflowpathisopenedatapproximately3hoursaftereventinitiation,RPVwaterlevelisnotchallengedandtheUCPvolumewillcontinuetoprovideanadequateRCICsuctionsourceforapproximately17additionalhours(Reference3.13).Similarly,duringthistimeperiodandfollowingcompletionofaDCloadshedapproximately2hoursaftertheevent,thestationbatteriesandinstalledClass1EDCdistributionsystemcontinuestoprovidepowerforRCICsystemoperationandmonitoringinstrumentation(Reference3.12).Theinstalledbatteriesmaintainvoltageaboveminimumrequirementsforgreaterthan12hoursfollowingtheevent(Reference3.12),priortowhich,aPhase2dieselgenerator (1FLEXS009or 1 FLEXS010)willbedeployedandconnectedtorechargetheDivisionIandDivisionIIbatteriesasdiscussedinSection2.3.2below.ToallowtheRCICpumptousetheUCPasasuctionsourceforBDBEEmitigation,twomodificationswererequiredandimplemented.ForBDBEEmitigationonly,onemodificationreplacedtheexistingmanualoperatoronUCPdraininboardcontainmentisolationvalve 1 G41 F201withabatterypoweredDCmotor-operatorthatiscontrolledfromanewpanel (1H22P003)installedinAuxiliaryBuildingroom1A318(ElectricalPenetrationRoom)locatedonelevation139'-0".Tomaintainlicensingbasisregulatorycompliance,operationof1 G41 F201willcontinuetobeviamanualmeansforalldesignbasisfunctions.ThesecondmodificationprovidedthenecessarypipingconfigurationsfortheFLEXmitigatingstrategiesforcorecooling,includingthepipinginstalledtoallowBDBEEalignmentoftheRCICpumpsuctiontotheUCPdrainline.TheflowpathfromtheUCPtoRCIChasbeenevaluatedtoensuresufficientNPSHexistsforcontinuedRCICoperationduringPhase1forapproximately20hours(Reference3.13)followingtheevent.TheflowpathandpressureboundaryfortheUCPtoRCICsuctionforRPVmakeupareshowninFigure1.BasedontheMAAP4coreandcontainmentanalysisperformedin 01111-14005(Reference3.13),theminimumRPVwaterlevelforthepostulatedeventisapproximately2.9ft.abovethetopofactivefuelshortlyafterRPVdepressurizationforPhase2coremakeupapproximately20hoursfollowingtheevent.TheBoilingWaterReactorOwnersGroup(BWROG)issuedRevision3oftheBWROGEmergencyProcedureandSevereAccidentGuidelines.TherevisedBWROGguidanceallowsoperatorstoremainatmid-rangepressures,suchasdirectedintheGGNSFLEXstrategy,Page14of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationWhentheUCPtoRCICflowpathisopenedatapproximately3hoursaftereventinitiation,RPVwaterlevelisnotchallengedandtheUCPvolumewillcontinuetoprovideanadequateRCICsuctionsourceforapproximately17additionalhours(Reference3.13).Similarly,duringthistimeperiodandfollowingcompletionofaDCloadshedapproximately2hoursaftertheevent,thestationbatteriesandinstalledClass1EDCdistributionsystemcontinuestoprovidepowerforRCICsystemoperationandmonitoringinstrumentation(Reference3.12).Theinstalledbatteriesmaintainvoltageaboveminimumrequirementsforgreaterthan12hoursfollowingtheevent(Reference3.12),priortowhich,aPhase2dieselgenerator (1FLEXS009or 1 FLEXS010)willbedeployedandconnectedtorechargetheDivisionIandDivisionIIbatteriesasdiscussedinSection2.3.2below.ToallowtheRCICpumptousetheUCPasasuctionsourceforBDBEEmitigation,twomodificationswererequiredandimplemented.ForBDBEEmitigationonly,onemodificationreplacedtheexistingmanualoperatoronUCPdraininboardcontainmentisolationvalve 1 G41 F201withabatterypoweredDCmotor-operatorthatiscontrolledfromanewpanel (1H22P003)installedinAuxiliaryBuildingroom1A318(ElectricalPenetrationRoom)locatedonelevation139'-0".Tomaintainlicensingbasisregulatorycompliance,operationof1 G41 F201willcontinuetobeviamanualmeansforalldesignbasisfunctions.ThesecondmodificationprovidedthenecessarypipingconfigurationsfortheFLEXmitigatingstrategiesforcorecooling,includingthepipinginstalledtoallowBDBEEalignmentoftheRCICpumpsuctiontotheUCPdrainline.TheflowpathfromtheUCPtoRCIChasbeenevaluatedtoensuresufficientNPSHexistsforcontinuedRCICoperationduringPhase1forapproximately20hours(Reference3.13)followingtheevent.TheflowpathandpressureboundaryfortheUCPtoRCICsuctionforRPVmakeupareshowninFigure1.BasedontheMAAP4coreandcontainmentanalysisperformedin 01111-14005(Reference3.13),theminimumRPVwaterlevelforthepostulatedeventisapproximately2.9ft.abovethetopofactivefuelshortlyafterRPVdepressurizationforPhase2coremakeupapproximately20hoursfollowingtheevent.TheBoilingWaterReactorOwnersGroup(BWROG)issuedRevision3oftheBWROGEmergencyProcedureandSevereAccidentGuidelines.TherevisedBWROGguidanceallowsoperatorstoremainatmid-rangepressures,suchasdirectedintheGGNSFLEXstrategy,Page14of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationwithoutperformingemergencydepressurization(Reference3.86).BasedontheBWROGnewguidance,emergencydepressurizationisnotappropriateifadequatecorecoolingwillnotbemaintainedasaresult(e.g.ifdepressurizationwouldresultinlossofinjectionrequiredforcorecoolingprovidedbythesteamturbinedrivenRCICpump).ThisnewguidancehasbeenincorporatedintothelatestrevisionoftheGGNSEOPs.Atapproximately20hoursafterthestartoftheevent,theUCP supply'availableforRCICsuctionisdepleted(withnooperatoractionstakentomanuallymaintainRPVwaterlevelbelowlevel8)duetoRPVmakeupwithautomaticcontroloftheRCICinjectionvalvebetweenLevel2andlevel8andtheautomaticoperationoftheRCICminimumflowcontrolvalve.PriortodepletionoftheUCPinventoryafter -20hoursandafterconfirmationthattheportableFLEXpump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)isavailable(theFLEXpumpisdeployed,abletofunctionintheSFPmakeupmodeasdiscussedinSection2.4[at-11hours],andconnectedhosestotheprimaryoralternateRPVinjectionconnectionsintheAuxiliaryBuildingareventedandpressurized),twoSRVsareopenedtodepressurizethereactorandRCICissecured.Thereactorwillbedepressurizedtolessthan100psigtoinitiateRPVinjectionwiththeportableFLEXpump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002). Electrical IInstrumentation-Loadsheddingofnon-essentialloadsiscompletedwithin2hoursaftertheoccurrenceofanELAP/LUHS.Withthisloadshedding,theusablestationClass1Ebatterylifeisextendedbeyondtwelve(12)hoursandthePhase2dieselgenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)willhaverepoweredtheDCBatteryChargerswithinthattimeframe,beforethebatteriesaredepletedtoacapacitywheretheycannolongersustainthesupportedloads.(SeeSection2.3.11).2.3.2Phase2ReactorCoreCoolingStrategy Primary Strategy Core CoolingForcontinuedRCICoperation,aPhase2FLEXdieselgenerator (1FLEXS009or1FLEXS010)isdeployedtorepowerloadcenters15BA6and16BB6.TheseloadcentersrepowerthebatterychargerstoensurethatboththeRCICsystemandthecriticalinstrumentationcontinuetohaveadequateDCpower.DivisionIandII,batterychargers1DA4and1DB4,respectively,willberepoweredaspartofPage15of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationwithoutperformingemergencydepressurization(Reference3.86).BasedontheBWROGnewguidance,emergencydepressurizationisnotappropriateifadequatecorecoolingwillnotbemaintainedasaresult(e.g.ifdepressurizationwouldresultinlossofinjectionrequiredforcorecoolingprovidedbythesteamturbinedrivenRCICpump).ThisnewguidancehasbeenincorporatedintothelatestrevisionoftheGGNSEOPs.Atapproximately20hoursafterthestartoftheevent,theUCP supply'availableforRCICsuctionisdepleted(withnooperatoractionstakentomanuallymaintainRPVwaterlevelbelowlevel8)duetoRPVmakeupwithautomaticcontroloftheRCICinjectionvalvebetweenLevel2andlevel8andtheautomaticoperationoftheRCICminimumflowcontrolvalve.PriortodepletionoftheUCPinventoryafter -20hoursandafterconfirmationthattheportableFLEXpump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)isavailable(theFLEXpumpisdeployed,abletofunctionintheSFPmakeupmodeasdiscussedinSection2.4 [at-11hours],andconnectedhosestotheprimaryoralternateRPVinjectionconnectionsintheAuxiliaryBuildingareventedandpressurized),twoSRVsareopenedtodepressurizethereactorandRCICissecured.Thereactorwillbedepressurizedtolessthan100psigtoinitiateRPVinjectionwiththeportableFLEXpump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002). Electrical IInstrumentation-Loadsheddingofnon-essentialloadsiscompletedwithin2hoursaftertheoccurrenceofanELAP/LUHS.Withthisloadshedding,theusablestationClass1Ebatterylifeisextendedbeyondtwelve(12)hoursandthePhase2dieselgenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)willhaverepoweredtheDCBatteryChargerswithinthattimeframe,beforethebatteriesaredepletedtoacapacitywheretheycannolongersustainthesupportedloads.(SeeSection2.3.11).2.3.2Phase2ReactorCoreCoolingStrategy Primary Strategy Core CoolingForcontinuedRCICoperation,aPhase2FLEXdieselgenerator (1FLEXS009or1FLEXS010)isdeployedtorepowerloadcenters15BA6and16BB6.TheseloadcentersrepowerthebatterychargerstoensurethatboththeRCICsystemandthecriticalinstrumentationcontinuetohaveadequateDCpower.DivisionIandII,batterychargers1DA4and1DB4,respectively,willberepoweredaspartofPage15of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationthestrategy.Additionally,BatteryRoomExhaustFan1 Z77C001Awillberepoweredvialoadcenter15BA6.FollowingmanualtransferoftheRCICsuctionfromthesuppressionpool,corecoolingwillbemaintainedusingRCICfromtheUCPwiththeoperatoradjustingtheRCICflowcontrollertomaintainlevel.PriortothedepletionofthevolumeintheUCPavailableforRCICsuction,aportable,dieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)willbedeployedtoeitherSSWBasinA(primary)orB(alternate).Thispumpwillbedeployedearlyintheevent (-11hours)fortheSFPmakeupcapabilitypriortowhenitwillberequiredforreactorcore cooling (-20hours[withnooperatoractionstakentomanuallymaintainRPVwaterlevelbelowlevel8]).AsuctionhoseandstrainerwillbeloweredintothebasintoprovidesuctiontotheportableFLEX pump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).AnadditionalsuctionstrainerisprovidedforeachFLEXpumptoallowforswappingoutofstrainers.Diverseconnectionpointsfortheportablepumpareprovidedtoestablishthecapabilitytoinjectthroughtwoseparatesystems;RHRC(primary)andlowpressurecorespray(LPCS)(alternate)usingacombinationofinstalledpipingandhosesdescribedbelow.Basedoninitialconditionsassumedatthetimeoftheeventinitiation,thelowpressurecoresprayandresidualheatremovalflowpathsintothecoreareopenandarenotsubjecttobeingisolatedbasedonplant conditions.TheprimarystrategyforPhase2reactorcorecoolingisviaanewhoseandahoseconnectionontheHPCSServiceWater(SW)systemreturnlineintheStandbyServiceWaterBasin"A"valveroom.Withtheportable,dieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)deployedandconnectedviathehoseconnectioninthevalveroom,thesafetyrelatedundergroundpipingbetweentheBasin"A"valveroomandanewhoseconnectionintheHPCSDieselGeneratorRoomwillbeusedtodeliverwatertoeitherofthenewRHRCorLPCSsystemshoseconnectionsintheAuxiliaryBuildingviadeployedflexiblehose.TheflexiblehosefromtheHPCSSWreturnlineintheHPCSDieselGeneratorRoomwillberoutedtoahoseconnectionontheCondensateandRefuelingWaterStorageandTransfer(CRWST)systempipingupstreamofvalve1E12F063C.ThispermanenttieinallowsRPVinjectionviatheRHR"C"system.TheflowpathandPage16of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationthestrategy.Additionally,BatteryRoomExhaustFan1 Z77C001Awillberepoweredvialoadcenter15BA6.FollowingmanualtransferoftheRCICsuctionfromthesuppressionpool,corecoolingwillbemaintainedusingRCICfromtheUCPwiththeoperatoradjustingtheRCICflowcontrollertomaintainlevel.PriortothedepletionofthevolumeintheUCPavailableforRCICsuction,aportable,dieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)willbedeployedtoeitherSSWBasinA(primary)orB(alternate).Thispumpwillbedeployedearlyintheevent (-11hours)fortheSFPmakeupcapabilitypriortowhenitwillberequiredforreactorcore cooling (-20hours[withnooperatoractionstakentomanuallymaintainRPVwaterlevelbelowlevel8]).AsuctionhoseandstrainerwillbeloweredintothebasintoprovidesuctiontotheportableFLEX pump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).AnadditionalsuctionstrainerisprovidedforeachFLEXpumptoallowforswappingoutofstrainers.Diverseconnectionpointsfortheportablepumpareprovidedtoestablishthecapabilitytoinjectthroughtwoseparatesystems;RHRC(primary)andlowpressurecorespray(LPCS)(alternate)usingacombinationofinstalledpipingandhosesdescribedbelow.Basedoninitialconditionsassumedatthetimeoftheeventinitiation,thelowpressurecoresprayandresidualheatremovalflowpathsintothecoreareopenandarenotsubjecttobeingisolatedbasedonplant conditions.TheprimarystrategyforPhase2reactorcorecoolingisviaanewhoseandahoseconnectionontheHPCSServiceWater(SW)systemreturnlineintheStandbyServiceWaterBasin"A"valveroom.Withtheportable,dieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)deployedandconnectedviathehoseconnectioninthevalveroom,thesafetyrelatedundergroundpipingbetweentheBasin"A"valveroomandanewhoseconnectionintheHPCSDieselGeneratorRoomwillbeusedtodeliverwatertoeitherofthenewRHRCorLPCSsystemshoseconnectionsintheAuxiliaryBuildingviadeployedflexiblehose.TheflexiblehosefromtheHPCSSWreturnlineintheHPCSDieselGeneratorRoomwillberoutedtoahoseconnectionontheCondensateandRefuelingWaterStorageandTransfer(CRWST)systempipingupstreamofvalve1E12F063C.ThispermanenttieinallowsRPVinjectionviatheRHR"C"system.TheflowpathandPage16of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationpressureboundariesfortheprimarycorecoolingmakeuppathtotheRHRloop"C"injectionlineareshowninFigure1.Thehoses,pipes,andvalvesthatprovidetheprimaryflowpathandpressureboundaryhavebeenevaluatedtoconfirmtheyaredesignedforthedischargepressureofthePhase2FLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).ImplementationofthisPhase2strategyrequiresdeploymentofapproximately225ftofflexible,5"hose.Thisincludestwo50fthosesectionsfromthepumpstaginglocationtotheSSWBasin"A"valveroomhoseconnection,two,50fthosesectionsfromthehoseconnectionintheHPCSDGRoomintotheAuxiliaryBuilding,andone25fthosesectiontoeithertheprimary(RHRC)oralternate(LPCS)corecoolinghoseconnectionlocation.CalculationMC-Q1111-14008(Reference3.18;seeSection2.3.10.1forsummary)evaluatedtheseflowpathstoensuretheselectedPhase2pumpiscapableofprovidingadequatepressureandflowtotheRPV.Additionally,implementationofthePhase2strategywillrequirethataportablenitrogenbottle(s)bedeployedfromeitherFLEXstoragebuildingandconnectedatapproximately40hoursaftereventinitiationtoreplenishtheautomaticdepressurizationsystem(ADS)safetyreliefvalve(SRV) airaccumulatorsandreceiversaccordancewithexistingplantprocedurestomaintainADSandlow-lowsetSRVsfunctionality.ReplenishmentisbasedontheinitialopeningoftheSRVsasthereactorscramsattheinitiationoftheevent,theuseofthelow-lowsetfunctionoftheSRVstocontrolRPVpressure,andtheuseoftwoSRVstodepressurizetheRPVforPhase2makeupwiththedieseldrivenFLEXpumpforatotalof79SRVactuations(References3.13and3.14).Thisanalysisisbasedonutilizingboth"trains"ofaccumulators/receivers.Duringtheevent,asiscurrentpracticetorotateSRVstoallowevenheatingofthesuppressionpool,operatorsensurethatSRVsarerotatedsuchthatasingletrainofaccumulators/receiversisnotdrainedofairbeforetheother.NitrogenbottlesfortheSRVsforoff-normalandemergencyresponsearestoredinarackbehindtheUnit1warehouse(ChemicalStorageFacility).Four(4)nitrogenbottlesequivalentto(orlargerthan)theexistingbottleswillbestoredineachFLEXstoragebuilding (1 FLEXZ001and1FLEXZ002)toensureadequateSRVairsupply.Thetoolsandpressureregulatorsnecessarytoperformthisstrategyarecontainedinaseismicallyrestrainedtoolboxonelevation139',Area9insidethesafetyrelatedAuxiliaryBuilding.Page17of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationpressureboundariesfortheprimarycorecoolingmakeuppathtotheRHRloop"C"injectionlineareshowninFigure1.Thehoses,pipes,andvalvesthatprovidetheprimaryflowpathandpressureboundaryhavebeenevaluatedtoconfirmtheyaredesignedforthedischargepressureofthePhase2FLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).ImplementationofthisPhase2strategyrequiresdeploymentofapproximately225ftofflexible,5"hose.Thisincludestwo50fthosesectionsfromthepumpstaginglocationtotheSSWBasin"A"valveroomhoseconnection,two,50fthosesectionsfromthehoseconnectionintheHPCSDGRoomintotheAuxiliaryBuilding,andone25fthosesectiontoeithertheprimary(RHRC)oralternate(LPCS)corecoolinghoseconnectionlocation.CalculationMC-Q1111-14008(Reference3.18;seeSection2.3.10.1forsummary)evaluatedtheseflowpathstoensuretheselectedPhase2pumpiscapableofprovidingadequatepressureandflowtotheRPV.Additionally,implementationofthePhase2strategywillrequirethataportablenitrogenbottle(s)bedeployedfromeitherFLEXstoragebuildingandconnectedatapproximately40hoursaftereventinitiationtoreplenishtheautomaticdepressurizationsystem(ADS)safetyreliefvalve(SRV) airaccumulatorsandreceiversaccordancewithexistingplantprocedurestomaintainADSandlow-lowsetSRVsfunctionality.ReplenishmentisbasedontheinitialopeningoftheSRVsasthereactorscramsattheinitiationoftheevent,theuseofthelow-lowsetfunctionoftheSRVstocontrolRPVpressure,andtheuseoftwoSRVstodepressurizetheRPVforPhase2makeupwiththedieseldrivenFLEXpumpforatotalof79SRVactuations(References3.13and3.14).Thisanalysisisbasedonutilizingboth"trains"ofaccumulators/receivers.Duringtheevent,asiscurrentpracticetorotateSRVstoallowevenheatingofthesuppressionpool,operatorsensurethatSRVsarerotatedsuchthatasingletrainofaccumulators/receiversisnotdrainedofairbeforetheother.NitrogenbottlesfortheSRVsforoff-normalandemergencyresponsearestoredinarackbehindtheUnit1warehouse(ChemicalStorageFacility).Four(4)nitrogenbottlesequivalentto(orlargerthan)theexistingbottleswillbestoredineachFLEXstoragebuilding (1 FLEXZ001and1FLEXZ002)toensureadequateSRVairsupply.Thetoolsandpressureregulatorsnecessarytoperformthisstrategyarecontainedinaseismicallyrestrainedtoolboxonelevation139',Area9insidethesafetyrelatedAuxiliaryBuilding.Page17of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationDuringPhase2,theinventoryofwaterwithintheSSWBasinswillbeutilizedtomaintainreactorcorecooling.SeeSection2.3.10and2.15fordiscussionofutilizationoftheSSWbasinwaterforreactorcore cooling.Alternate Strategy Core CoolingAnalternateflowpathforPhase2reactorcorecoolingisatie-inlocationupstreamof1 E21F025alsointheCRWSTSystem.Thistie-inallowsRPVinjectionviatheLPCSsystem.TheflowpathandpressureboundariesforthealternatecorecoolingmakeuppathtotheLPCSinjectionlineareshowninFigure1.Thehoses,pipes,andvalvesthatprovidethealternateflowpathandpressureboundaryhavebeenevaluatedtoconfirmtheyaredesignedforthedischargepressureofthePhase2FLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).AnadditionalalternatestrategyconsidersthatiftheHPCSSWsystempipingbetweentheSSWbasinsandtheHPCSDGBuildingisunavailable,700feetofflexiblehosestoredineachstoragebuildingwillberoutedfromeitherservicewaterbasindirectlytoeitherconnectionpointfortheRHRCorLPCShoseconnectionsontheCRWSTSystempipingintheAuxiliaryBuilding. Phase 2 Strategy to Repower Battery ChargersOneportabledieselgenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)willbeusedtorepowerClass1ELoadCenters15BA6and16BB6.Anew,dedicatedbreakerhasbeeninstalledonDivisionI480VLoadCenter15BA6tore-powerbatterycharger1DA4andBatteryRoomExhaustFan1Z77C001A,anew,dedicatedbreakerhasbeeninstalledonDivisionII480VLoadCenter16BB6tore-powerbatterycharger1DB4,andanewdedicatedfuseddisconnecthasbeeninstalledforrepoweringtheHPCSDGFuelOilStorageTankTransferPump.Therearealso120VreceptaclesavailableattheportableDGauxiliarypanelforrepoweringthePhase2ContainmentVentUninterruptiblePowerSupply(UPS) (1 M41PS01)discussedinSection2.3.11.Atotaloftwo480VAC,300kWportabledieselgenerators (1FLEXS009or 1 FLEXS010)willbestoredandavailablefordeployment,oneineachoftheFLEXstoragebuildings,inordertomeettheNEI12-06requirementsofN+1setsofequipment.Page18of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationDuringPhase2,theinventoryofwaterwithintheSSWBasinswillbeutilizedtomaintainreactorcorecooling.SeeSection2.3.10and2.15fordiscussionofutilizationoftheSSWbasinwaterforreactorcore cooling.Alternate Strategy Core CoolingAnalternateflowpathforPhase2reactorcorecoolingisatie-inlocationupstreamof1 E21F025alsointheCRWSTSystem.Thistie-inallowsRPVinjectionviatheLPCSsystem.TheflowpathandpressureboundariesforthealternatecorecoolingmakeuppathtotheLPCSinjectionlineareshowninFigure1.Thehoses,pipes,andvalvesthatprovidethealternateflowpathandpressureboundaryhavebeenevaluatedtoconfirmtheyaredesignedforthedischargepressureofthePhase2FLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).AnadditionalalternatestrategyconsidersthatiftheHPCSSWsystempipingbetweentheSSWbasinsandtheHPCSDGBuildingisunavailable,700feetofflexiblehosestored ineachstoragebuildingwillberoutedfromeitherservicewaterbasindirectlytoeitherconnectionpointfortheRHRCorLPCShoseconnectionsontheCRWSTSystempipingintheAuxiliaryBuilding. Phase 2 Strategy to Repower Battery ChargersOneportabledieselgenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)willbeusedtorepowerClass1ELoadCenters15BA6and16BB6.Anew,dedicatedbreakerhasbeeninstalledonDivisionI480VLoadCenter15BA6tore-powerbatterycharger1DA4andBatteryRoomExhaustFan1Z77C001A,anew,dedicatedbreakerhasbeeninstalledonDivisionII480VLoadCenter16BB6tore-powerbatterycharger1DB4,andanewdedicatedfuseddisconnecthasbeeninstalledforrepoweringtheHPCSDGFuelOilStorageTankTransferPump.Therearealso120VreceptaclesavailableattheportableDGauxiliarypanelforrepoweringthePhase2ContainmentVentUninterruptiblePowerSupply(UPS) (1 M41PS01)discussedinSection2.3.11.Atotaloftwo480VAC,300kWportabledieselgenerators (1FLEXS009or 1 FLEXS010)willbestoredandavailablefordeployment,oneineachoftheFLEXstoragebuildings,inordertomeettheNEI12-06requirementsofN+1setsofequipment.Page18of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation Phase 2 FLEX Portable Diesel Generator Deployment Strategy Tra.nsitionfromPhase1(relianceonstationbatteries)toPhase2poweringstationbatterychargers)willbemadeusingaFLEXportable480VDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010).AlthoughthedecisiontodeploytheFLEXportable480VDGwillbemadeduringtheinitialresponsephase,withloadsheddingthestationbatterydurationsarecalculatedtolastbeyond12hours.Duringtheinitialresponsephase,theoperatorisdirectedtotakestepstobeginminimizingtheloadonthestationbatteriesbysheddingunnecessaryloadsinaccordancewiththestation SBa procedure(Reference3.19).Additionalloadsheddingiscompletedwithin2hours.Thisensuresthestationbatterieswillhavegreaterthan12hourscapabilityandwillbeavailableuntiltheFLEX480VDGisplacedinserviceonorbefore 11hours.Thetwo(2)required(N+1)FLEX480V300kWDGswillbemaintainedinon-siteFLEXstoragebuildings (1FLEXZ001and1FLEXZ002).ForthesingleBWR6reactorsitedatGGNS,Nequalsone[1].WiththedeploymentandconnectionoftheFLEXportable480VDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010),thebatterychargers1DA4and1DB4arerepoweredtosupporttheconnectedloadsandtostartrechargingthestationbatteries1A3and1B3.Asingle300kWgeneratoriscapableofrepoweringthetwo125Vbatterychargers,theHPCSDGfueloilstoragetanktransferpump (1 P81C001),theContainmentVentUPS(1M41PS01),andabatteryroomexhaustfan (Q1Z77C001A).OnceinsidethePA,theportable480VDGwillbedeployedtoeithertheprimaryoralternatestaginglocation.Theprimarystaginglocationforthe480VDG (1FLEXS009and1 FLEXS010)isatgradelevel,justwestoftheControlBuilding.ThealternatestaginglocationisatgradelevelonthesouthwestcorneroftheUnit1AuxiliaryBuilding.ThestaginglocationsfortheFLEXDGsareshowninFigure2.TheFLEXportable480V300kWDG (1FLEXS009or1FLEXS010)willbetransferredfromastoragebuildinganddeployedviaspecifichaul paths/pre-definedroutes(seeFigure2andFigure3)evaluatedforimpactofexternalhazards.Removalofdebrisalongtheprimaryandalternatedeploymentrouteshasbeenevaluated.Thedebrisremovalassessmentconcludedthatafront-endloaderwouldbesufficienttoremoveanydebrisby6hoursaftertheevent.Therefore,thefront-endPage19of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation Phase 2 FLEX Portable Diesel Generator Deployment Strategy Tra.nsitionfromPhase1(relianceonstationbatteries)toPhase2poweringstationbatterychargers)willbemadeusingaFLEXportable480VDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010).AlthoughthedecisiontodeploytheFLEXportable480VDGwillbemadeduringtheinitialresponsephase,withloadsheddingthestationbatterydurationsarecalculatedtolastbeyond12hours.Duringtheinitialresponsephase,theoperatorisdirectedtotakestepstobeginminimizingtheloadonthestationbatteriesbysheddingunnecessaryloadsinaccordancewiththestation SBa procedure(Reference3.19).Additionalloadsheddingiscompletedwithin2hours.Thisensuresthestationbatterieswillhavegreaterthan12hourscapabilityandwillbeavailableuntiltheFLEX480VDGisplacedinserviceonorbefore 11hours.Thetwo(2)required(N+1)FLEX480V300kWDGswillbemaintainedinon-siteFLEXstoragebuildings (1FLEXZ001and1FLEXZ002).ForthesingleBWR6reactorsitedatGGNS,Nequalsone[1].WiththedeploymentandconnectionoftheFLEXportable480VDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010),thebatterychargers1DA4and1DB4arerepoweredtosupporttheconnectedloadsandtostartrechargingthestationbatteries1A3and1B3.Asingle300kWgeneratoriscapableofrepoweringthetwo125Vbatterychargers,theHPCSDGfueloilstoragetanktransferpump (1 P81C001),theContainmentVentUPS(1M41PS01),andabatteryroomexhaustfan (Q1Z77C001A).OnceinsidethePA,theportable480VDGwillbedeployedtoeithertheprimaryoralternatestaginglocation.Theprimarystaginglocationforthe480VDG (1FLEXS009and1 FLEXS010)isatgradelevel,justwestoftheControlBuilding.ThealternatestaginglocationisatgradelevelonthesouthwestcorneroftheUnit1AuxiliaryBuilding.ThestaginglocationsfortheFLEXDGsareshowninFigure2.TheFLEXportable480V300kWDG (1FLEXS009or1FLEXS010)willbetransferredfromastoragebuildinganddeployedviaspecifichaulpaths/pre-definedroutes(seeFigure2andFigure3)evaluatedforimpactofexternalhazards.Removalofdebrisalongtheprimaryandalternatedeploymentrouteshasbeenevaluated.Thedebrisremovalassessmentconcludedthatafront-endloaderwouldbesufficienttoremoveanydebrisby6hoursaftertheevent.Therefore,thefront-endPage19of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationloaderstoredineachFLEXStorageBuilding (1 FLEXE001 or1FLEXE002)willbesufficienttomeetthedeploymenttimeline.Figure4showsablockdiagramfortheprimaryandalternateconnectionspointsfortheFLEXportable480V300kWDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010).ThisconfigurationpermitsthepoweringofDivisionIBatteryCharger1DA4,DivisionIIBatteryCharger1DB4,andBatteryRoomExhaustFan1Z77C001AfromnewBreakers15605and52-16605inloadcenters15BA6and16BB6,respectively.Thebreakerswillbeback-fedfromtheFLEXdieselgenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010).DivisionIBatteryCharger1DA4ispowereddirectlyfromLoadCenter15BA6Breaker52-15602,DivisionIIBatteryCharger1DB4isdirectlypoweredfromLoadCenter16BB6Breaker52-16602,andtheSwitchgearandBatteryRoomExhaustFan1Z77C001AispoweredfromMCC 15B61Breaker20(52-156120)downstreamofLoadCenter15BA6.NormallyoneSwitchgearandBatteryRoomExhaustFanoperatestoventilatebothbatteryrooms.2.3.3Phase3ReactorCoreCoolingStrategy Primary Strategy Core CoolingThestrategyforPhase3reactorcorecoolingwillbecontinueduseofthePhase2strategywithadditionalcapabilitiesprovidedbyoffsiteequipment.Withoutreplenishment,afterapproximately99hours(Reference3.20),thelevelintheSSWBasinwilldecreasesuchthattheNPSHaofthePhase2FLEXpump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)willnolongerbesufficienttoprovideRPVmakeup.Anymethodtoprovidebasinmakeupisacceptableprovidedatleast23,000gallonsperhourcanbeprovidedby99hoursaftereventinitiation(Reference3.21).Offsitesuppliedpumpsand/orwatertransportationequipmentwillprovidewaterfromtheMississippiRiverviapublicaccessroadsfromthePortofPortGibson,fromGrandGulfMilitaryPark,orfromtheownercontrolledaccessroadfromthesitebargeslip.Additionally,theNSRCsuppliedSSWbasinmakeuppumpandsubmersiblepumpcanbedeployedtotherivertoprovidemakeuptotheSSWBasinforindefinitecorecooling.Thisstrategyrequiresdeploymentofapproximately9900ftofoffsitesuppliedflexiblehosefromtherivertotheSSWBasins.AnevaluationhasdeterminedthattheseoptionalNSRCsuppliedpumpsareadequatetoprovideaboundingflowof500gpmforRPVmakeupandSFPspray.Page20of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationloaderstoredineachFLEXStorageBuilding (1 FLEXE001 or1FLEXE002)willbesufficienttomeetthedeploymenttimeline.Figure4showsablockdiagramfortheprimaryandalternateconnectionspointsfortheFLEXportable480V300kWDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010).ThisconfigurationpermitsthepoweringofDivisionIBatteryCharger1DA4,DivisionIIBatteryCharger1DB4,andBatteryRoomExhaustFan1Z77C001AfromnewBreakers15605and52-16605inloadcenters15BA6and16BB6,respectively.Thebreakerswillbeback-fedfromtheFLEXdieselgenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010).DivisionIBatteryCharger1DA4ispowereddirectlyfromLoadCenter15BA6Breaker52-15602,DivisionIIBatteryCharger1DB4isdirectlypoweredfromLoadCenter16BB6Breaker52-16602,andtheSwitchgearandBatteryRoomExhaustFan1Z77C001AispoweredfromMCC 15B61Breaker20(52-156120)downstreamofLoadCenter15BA6.NormallyoneSwitchgearandBatteryRoomExhaustFanoperatestoventilatebothbatteryrooms.2.3.3Phase3ReactorCoreCoolingStrategy Primary Strategy Core CoolingThestrategyforPhase3reactorcorecoolingwillbecontinueduseofthePhase2strategywithadditionalcapabilitiesprovidedbyoffsiteequipment.Withoutreplenishment,afterapproximately99hours(Reference3.20),thelevelintheSSWBasinwilldecreasesuchthattheNPSHaofthePhase2FLEXpump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)willnolongerbesufficienttoprovideRPVmakeup.Anymethodtoprovidebasinmakeupisacceptableprovidedatleast23,000gallonsperhourcanbeprovidedby99hoursaftereventinitiation(Reference3.21).Offsitesuppliedpumpsand/orwatertransportationequipmentwillprovidewaterfromtheMississippiRiverviapublicaccessroadsfromthePortofPortGibson,fromGrandGulfMilitaryPark,orfromtheownercontrolledaccessroadfromthesitebargeslip.Additionally,theNSRCsuppliedSSWbasinmakeuppumpandsubmersiblepumpcanbedeployedtotherivertoprovidemakeuptotheSSWBasinforindefinitecorecooling.Thisstrategyrequiresdeploymentofapproximately9900ftofoffsitesuppliedflexiblehosefromtherivertotheSSWBasins.AnevaluationhasdeterminedthattheseoptionalNSRCsuppliedpumpsareadequatetoprovideaboundingflowof500gpmforRPVmakeupandSFPspray.Page20of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation Alternate Phase 3 Reactor Core Cooling StrategyAsresourcesbecomeavailable,recoveryactionscanbetakentotransitionawayfromextendedPhase2coping.ANSRCsuppliedSSWbasinmakeuppump(NSRCPO201307),submersiblepump(NSRCPO201320),lowpressure/highflowpump(NSRCPO201308),4160Vgenerator(s)(NSRCPO201310),and4160Vdistribution(NSRCPO201349),asnecessary,canbeutilizedtoregainflowthroughservicewaterpipingalongwithrepoweringRHRPump Band necessaryMotorOperatedValves(MOVs)forRHRoperation.TheconnectionlocationfortheNSRC4160V generatortotheinstalled4160VdistributionsystemisdiscussedinSections2.3.11and2.10.TheNSRCsupplied,2500gpmSSWbasinmakeuppumpand1000 gpm submersiblepumpwouldbedeployedtoprovidemakeuptotheSSWbasinsuchthatthe5000gpmNSRCpumpcouldprovidecoolingflowtositeheatloadsviatheStandbyServiceWaterloop"B"systempiping(Reference3.22).Aflanged adapterisrequiredtoconnectthedischargeoftheNSRChighflowpumptotheSSWpiping;thefabricatedadapterconsistsofa24"carbonsteelflangedcontainingsix5"Storzconnections.Thedesignofthe adapterfacilitatesitbeingboltedtothelocationwheretheUnit2SSWpumpwastobelocatedsinceconstructionofUnit2wasnotcompleted.FollowingtheBDBEEandifthealternatestrategyisrequired,the adapterwouldbeboltedintoplace.Sincetheonsitewatersupplyisavailablefor approximately99hourspriortorequiringreplenishment,thereissufficienttimetofabricatethe adapteraftertheevent.Alternatively,eachstoragebuildingcouldstoreoneofthesefabricatedflanged adapters.Inaddition,aspoolpiecewouldbeboltedintothelocationontheUnit2Division2servicewatercrosstiepiping (20"-HBC-1,72)inbetweentheboltedflangesandtheUnit1Division2servicewaterpiping. Calculation MC-Q1111-14010(Reference3.23)determinedthepumpdischargeheadandNetPositiveSuctionHeadavailable(NPSHa)fortheNSRCPhase3highflowpump.2.3.4Systems,Structures, Components2.3.4.1ReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)TheReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)systemconsistsofaturbine,pump,pipinq,valves,accessories,and instrumentationdesignedto ensure'thatsufficientreactorwaterinventoryismaintainedinthereactorvesseltopermitPage21of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation Alternate Phase 3 Reactor Core Cooling StrategyAsresourcesbecomeavailable,recoveryactionscanbetakentotransitionawayfromextendedPhase2coping.ANSRCsuppliedSSWbasinmakeuppump(NSRCPO201307),submersiblepump(NSRCPO201320),lowpressure/highflowpump(NSRCPO201308),4160Vgenerator(s)(NSRCPO201310),and4160Vdistribution(NSRCPO201349),asnecessary,canbeutilizedtoregainflowthroughservicewaterpipingalongwithrepoweringRHRPump Band necessaryMotorOperatedValves(MOVs)forRHRoperation.TheconnectionlocationfortheNSRC4160V generatortotheinstalled4160VdistributionsystemisdiscussedinSections2.3.11and2.10.TheNSRCsupplied,2500gpmSSWbasinmakeuppumpand1000 gpm submersiblepumpwouldbedeployedtoprovidemakeuptotheSSWbasinsuchthatthe5000gpmNSRCpumpcouldprovidecoolingflowtositeheatloadsviatheStandbyServiceWaterloop"B"systempiping(Reference3.22).Aflanged adapterisrequiredtoconnectthedischargeoftheNSRChighflowpumptotheSSWpiping;thefabricatedadapterconsistsofa24"carbonsteelflangedcontainingsix5"Storzconnections.Thedesignofthe adapterfacilitatesitbeingboltedtothelocationwheretheUnit2SSWpumpwastobelocatedsinceconstructionofUnit2wasnotcompleted.FollowingtheBDBEEandifthealternatestrategyisrequired,the adapterwouldbeboltedintoplace.Sincetheonsitewatersupplyisavailablefor approximately99hourspriortorequiringreplenishment,thereissufficienttimetofabricatethe adapteraftertheevent.Alternatively,eachstoragebuildingcouldstoreoneofthesefabricatedflanged adapters.Inaddition,aspoolpiecewouldbeboltedintothelocationontheUnit2Division2servicewatercrosstiepiping (20"-HBC-1,72)inbetweentheboltedflangesandtheUnit1Division2servicewaterpiping. Calculation MC-Q1111-14010(Reference3.23)determinedthepumpdischargeheadandNetPositiveSuctionHeadavailable(NPSHa)fortheNSRCPhase3highflowpump.2.3.4Systems,Structures, Components2.3.4.1ReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)TheReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)systemconsistsofaturbine,pump,pipinq,valves,accessories,and instrumentationdesignedto ensure'thatsufficientreactorwaterinventoryismaintainedinthereactorvesseltopermitPage21of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationadequatecorecoolingtotakeplaceduringthefollowingconditions(Reference3.24,Section5.4.6.2.1.1):*Shouldthevesselbeisolatedandmaintainedinthehotstandbycondition;*Shouldthevesselbeisolatedandaccompaniedbylossofcoolantflowfromthereactorfeedwatersystem;or*Shouldacompleteplantshutdown,underconditionsofalossofnormalfeedwaterflow,bestartedbeforethereactorisdepressurizedtoalevelwheretheRHRsystemshutdowncoolingmodecanbeplacedinto operation.RefertoGGNSUFSAR(Reference3.24)Section5.4.6foradescriptionanddiscussionofcapabilitiesoftheRCICpump.TheRCICPumpandTurbinearesafetyrelated,SeismicCategoryIcomponentslocatedintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhichisaSeismicCategoryItornado-resistantstructure(Reference3.24,Table 3.2-1andTable3.3-1).2.3.4.2StandbyServiceWaterCoolingTowerBasinsThetwo(2)StandbyServiceWater(SSW)coolingtowerbasinsconsistof(Reference3.24,Section3.8.4.1.1.4):*Amakeupwaterstoragebasin*Apumphouse*Pipeandvalveroom*MechanicaldraftSSWcoolingtowers*Naturaldraftcoolingtowers(HPCSSSWonly)RefertoGGNSUFSAR(Reference3.24)Section 9.2.1foradescriptionoftheSSWsystemandbasins.TheSSWcoolingtowerbasinsareSeismicCategoryItornado-resistantstructures(Reference3.24,Table 3.2-1andTable3.3-1).Page22of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationadequatecorecoolingtotakeplaceduringthefollowingconditions(Reference3.24,Section5.4.6.2.1.1):
- Shouldthevesselbeisolatedandmaintainedinthehotstandbycondition;*Shouldthevesselbeisolatedandaccompaniedbylossofcoolantflowfromthereactorfeedwatersystem;or*Shouldacompleteplantshutdown,underconditionsofalossofnormalfeedwaterflow,bestartedbeforethereactorisdepressurizedtoalevelwheretheRHRsystemshutdowncoolingmodecanbeplacedinto operation.RefertoGGNSUFSAR(Reference3.24)Section5.4.6foradescriptionanddiscussionofcapabilitiesoftheRCICpump.TheRCICPumpandTurbinearesafetyrelated,SeismicCategoryIcomponentslocatedintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhichisaSeismicCategoryItornado-resistantstructure(Reference3.24,Table 3.2-1andTable3.3-1).2.3.4.2StandbyServiceWaterCoolingTowerBasinsThetwo(2)StandbyServiceWater(SSW)coolingtowerbasinsconsistof(Reference3.24,Section3.8.4.1.1.4):*Amakeupwaterstoragebasin*Apumphouse*Pipeandvalveroom*MechanicaldraftSSWcoolingtowers*Naturaldraftcoolingtowers(HPCSSSWonly)RefertoGGNSUFSAR(Reference3.24)Section 9.2.1foradescriptionoftheSSWsystemandbasins.TheSSWcoolingtowerbasinsareSeismicCategoryItornado-resistantstructures(Reference3.24,Table 3.2-1andTable3.3-1).Page22of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.3.4.3StandbyServiceWaterSystemTheSSWsystem,containingtheplantultimateheatsink,isanessentialauxiliarysupportingsystemwhichisdesignedtoremoveheatfromplantauxiliariesthatarerequiredforasafereactorshutdown.Allsafety-relatedcomponentsrequiringanexternalsourceofcoolingwaterareservedbytheSSWsystem.TheSSWsystemisdividedintothreeloopsbasedonEmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)divisionalseparationrequirements.SSWloopCisdesignedtosupportonlytheHPCSsystemandtheHPCSdieselgenerator.(Reference3.24,Section9.2.1).RefertoGGNSUFSAR(Reference3.24)Section 9.2.1foradescriptionoftheSSWsystem.TheSSWsystemisasafety-related,SeismicCategorysystem(Reference3.24,Table 3.2-1andTable3.3-1).2.3.4.4AutomaticDepressurizationSystemTheautomaticdepressurizationsystem(ADS)isa I safetyrelatedsystemandutilizesselectedsafety/reliefvalvesfordepressurizationofthereactor.Eachofthesafety/reliefvalvesutilizedforautomaticdepressurizationisequippedwithtwoairaccumulatorsandassociatedinletcheckvalves.Twoairreceiversareutilizedtorechargeeachdivisionofairaccumulators.Powerfromthe125VDCsystemisusedtooperatetheSRVsolenoidvalves.Theairreceivers/airaccumulatorscanberechargedbyutilizingcompressedairandthetestconnectionprovidedoutsidethecontainmentintheAuxiliaryBuildingonthe instrument.airsupplypenetrationpiping(Reference3.24,Section5.2.2.4andReference3.25).RefertoGGNSUFSAR(Reference3.24)Section5.2.2and 7.3.1.1.1.4foradescriptionoftheautomaticdepressurizationsystem.Thesafety/reliefvalvesaredesignedandconstructedtotherequirementsofASMESectionIII,Class1,areSeismicCategoryIandtornadomissileprotected.Theairreceivers,airaccumulators,interconnectingpiping,andassociatedPage23of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.3.4.3StandbyServiceWaterSystemTheSSWsystem,containingtheplantultimateheatsink,isanessentialauxiliarysupportingsystemwhichisdesignedtoremoveheatfromplantauxiliariesthatarerequiredforasafereactorshutdown.Allsafety-relatedcomponentsrequiringanexternalsourceofcoolingwaterareservedbytheSSWsystem.TheSSWsystemisdividedintothreeloopsbasedonEmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)divisionalseparationrequirements.SSWloopCisdesignedtosupportonlytheHPCSsystemandtheHPCSdieselgenerator.(Reference3.24,Section9.2.1).RefertoGGNSUFSAR(Reference3.24)Section 9.2.1foradescriptionoftheSSWsystem.TheSSWsystemisasafety-related,SeismicCategorysystem(Reference3.24,Table 3.2-1andTable3.3-1).2.3.4.4AutomaticDepressurizationSystemTheautomaticdepressurizationsystem(ADS)isa I safetyrelatedsystemandutilizesselectedsafety/reliefvalvesfordepressurizationofthereactor.Eachofthesafety/reliefvalvesutilizedforautomaticdepressurizationisequippedwithtwoairaccumulatorsandassociatedinletcheckvalves.Twoairreceiversareutilizedtorechargeeachdivisionofairaccumulators.Powerfromthe125VDCsystemisusedtooperatetheSRVsolenoidvalves.Theairreceivers/airaccumulatorscanberechargedbyutilizingcompressedairandthetestconnectionprovidedoutsidethecontainmentintheAuxiliaryBuildingonthe instrument.airsupplypenetrationpiping(Reference3.24,Section5.2.2.4andReference3.25).RefertoGGNSUFSAR(Reference3.24)Section5.2.2and 7.3.1.1.1.4foradescriptionoftheautomaticdepressurizationsystem.Thesafety/reliefvalvesaredesignedandconstructedtotherequirementsofASMESectionIII,Class1,areSeismicCategoryIandtornadomissileprotected.Theairreceivers,airaccumulators,interconnectingpiping,andassociatedPage23of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationvalvingaredesignedtotherequirementsofASMESectionIII,Class3,areSeismicCategoryIandtornadomissileprotected(Reference3.24,Table 3.2-1 landTable3.3-1).2.3.4.5CondensateandRefuelingWaterStorageandTransfer SystemTheCondensateandRefuelingWaterStorageandTransfer(CRWST)systemisdesignedtopumpandstorecondensatefortheRCICandHPCSsystems,maintainthelevelofcondensateinthecondenserhotwell,andprovidecondensatetootherplantsystems,whererequired.The condensatestorageandtransfersubsystemconsistsofastainlesssteelstoragetankwithacapacityof300,000gallons,twocondensatetransferpumps,andnecessarypiping,valves,andinstrumentation(Reference3.24,Section9.2.6).TheCRWSTsystemalsoconnectstheuppercontainmentpool(UCP)withtheCondensateStorageTank (CST).2.3.4.6ACPowerDistributionSystemTheClass1EACpowerdistributionsystemisthepowersourceusedin(orassociatedwith)shuttingdownthereactorandpreventingthereleaseofradioactivematerialfollowingadesignbasisevent(Reference3.24,Section8.3.1).Thesystemisdividedintothreeindependentdivisions.ThedelineationofClass1EACpowersystemdivisionsandtheassociatedengineeredsafetyfeaturesswitchgears,loadcenters,andmotorcontrolcentersareshownonUFSARFigure8.1-1(Reference3.24).TheequipmentutilizedintheFLEXstrategiesisSeismicCategoryIandislocatedintornado-resistantSeismicCategoryIstructures(Reference3.24Tables 3.2-1and3.3-1).2.3.4.7DivisionIBatteryCharger1DA4andDivisionIIBatteryCharger1DB4TheClass1E480VACsystemnormallypowersthe125VDCsystembatterychargersincludingchargers1DA4and1DB4(Reference3.24,Section8.3.2andReference3.26).TheClass1E125VDCbatteriesareprovidedwithtwochargers.Each125VDCbatteryisseparatelyhousedinaPage24of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationvalvingaredesignedtotherequirementsofASMESectionIII,Class3,areSeismicCategoryIandtornadomissileprotected(Reference3.24,Table 3.2-1 landTable3.3-1).2.3.4.5CondensateandRefuelingWaterStorageandTransfer SystemTheCondensateandRefuelingWaterStorageandTransfer(CRWST)systemisdesignedtopumpandstorecondensatefortheRCICandHPCSsystems,maintainthelevelofcondensateinthecondenserhotwell,andprovidecondensatetootherplantsystems,whererequired.The condensatestorageandtransfersubsystemconsistsofastainlesssteelstoragetankwithacapacityof300,000gallons,twocondensatetransferpumps,andnecessarypiping,valves,andinstrumentation(Reference3.24,Section9.2.6).TheCRWSTsystemalsoconnectstheuppercontainmentpool(UCP)withtheCondensateStorageTank (CST).2.3.4.6ACPowerDistributionSystemTheClass1EACpowerdistributionsystemisthepowersourceusedin(orassociatedwith)shuttingdownthereactorandpreventingthereleaseofradioactivematerialfollowingadesignbasisevent(Reference3.24,Section8.3.1).Thesystemisdividedintothreeindependentdivisions.ThedelineationofClass1EACpowersystemdivisionsandtheassociatedengineeredsafetyfeaturesswitchgears,loadcenters,andmotorcontrolcentersareshownonUFSARFigure8.1-1(Reference3.24).TheequipmentutilizedintheFLEXstrategiesisSeismicCategoryIandislocatedintornado-resistantSeismicCategoryIstructures(Reference3.24Tables 3.2-1and3.3-1).2.3.4.7DivisionIBatteryCharger1DA4andDivisionIIBatteryCharger1DB4TheClass1E480VACsystemnormallypowersthe125VDCsystembatterychargersincludingchargers1DA4and1DB4(Reference3.24,Section8.3.2andReference3.26).TheClass1E125VDCbatteriesareprovidedwithtwochargers.Each125VDCbatteryisseparatelyhousedinaPage24of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationventilatedroomapartfromitschargeranddistributioncenter.Eachbatteryisinaseparatebatteryroom.AllcomponentsoftheClass1E125VDCsystemsarehousedinseismicCategoryIstructuresandtornado-resistantenclosures(Reference3.24Tables 3.2-1and3.3-1).2.3.4.8SafeguardSwitchgear
&BatteryRoomVentilationSystemThesafeguardswitchgearandbatteryroomventilationsystemisasafetyrelatedSeismicCategoryIsystemandhousedinseismicCategoryIandtornado-resistantenclosures(Reference3.24,Tables 3.2-1and3.3-1).Thesystemcontainsfour 50%capacityexhaustfans(sizedfor2units)intheControlBuilding(Reference3.24,Section9.4.5andReference3.27,Section4.17).Onefancanoperateat 100%capacityinordertoremoveheatandhydrogenfromtheindividualareasofoneunit(Reference3.27,Section4.17).Theswitchgearandbatteryroomairisnotrecirculatedbutisexhaustedbyoneoftworedundantfansfromeachroomtotheoutside.Theexhaustsystemmaintainsthehydrogenconcentrationlevelinthebatteryroomswellbelowtheexplosivelimitsduringbatterycharging.Automaticdampersareprovidedattheinletandoutletofthehandlingunitsandexhaustfanstofacilitatetheisolationoftheunitswhennecessary.Thesedampersfailopenuponlossofairorpower(Reference3.27,Section4.21.1).2.3.4.9SuppressionPoolThesuppressionpoolisaconcentricopencontainerofwaterwithastainlesssteellinerthatislocatedinsideandatthebottomoftheprimarycontainment.Thesuppressionpoolisdesignedtoabsorbthedecayheatandsensibleheatreleasedduringareactorblowdownfromsafety/reliefvalvedischargesorfromalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).ThesuppressionpoolmustalsocondensesteamfromtheReactorCoreIsolationCoolingSystemturbineexhaustandprovidesthemainemergencywatersupplysourceforthereactorvessel(Reference3.28,TSBases3.6.2.1).Thesuppressionpoolvolumerangesbetween 135,291 ft3atthelowwaterlevellimitof18ft4-1/12inchesand 138,701 ft3 atPage25of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationventilatedroomapartfromitschargeranddistribution center.Eachbatteryisinaseparatebatteryroom.AllcomponentsoftheClass1E125VDCsystemsarehousedinseismicCategoryIstructuresandtornado-resistantenclosures(Reference3.24Tables 3.2-1and3.3-1).2.3.4.8SafeguardSwitchgear &BatteryRoomVentilationSystemThesafeguardswitchgearandbatteryroomventilationsystemisasafetyrelatedSeismicCategoryIsystemandhousedinseismicCategoryIandtornado-resistantenclosures(Reference3.24,Tables 3.2-1and3.3-1).Thesystemcontainsfour 50%capacityexhaustfans(sizedfor2units)intheControlBuilding(Reference3.24,Section9.4.5andReference3.27,Section4.17).Onefancanoperateat 100%capacityinordertoremoveheatandhydrogenfromtheindividualareasofoneunit(Reference3.27,Section4.17).Theswitchgearandbatteryroomairisnotrecirculatedbutisexhaustedbyoneoftworedundantfansfromeachroomtotheoutside.Theexhaustsystemmaintainsthehydrogenconcentrationlevelinthebatteryroomswellbelowtheexplosivelimitsduringbatterycharging.Automaticdampersareprovidedattheinletandoutletofthehandlingunitsandexhaustfanstofacilitatetheisolationoftheunitswhennecessary.Thesedampersfailopenuponlossofairorpower(Reference3.27,Section4.21.1).2.3.4.9SuppressionPoolThesuppressionpoolisaconcentricopencontainerofwaterwithastainlesssteellinerthatislocatedinsideandatthebottomoftheprimarycontainment.Thesuppressionpoolisdesignedtoabsorbthedecayheatandsensibleheatreleasedduringareactorblowdownfromsafety/reliefvalvedischargesorfromalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).ThesuppressionpoolmustalsocondensesteamfromtheReactorCoreIsolationCoolingSystemturbineexhaustandprovidesthemainemergencywatersupplysourceforthereactorvessel(Reference3.28,TSBases3.6.2.1).Thesuppressionpoolvolumerangesbetween 135,291 ft3atthelowwaterlevellimitof18ft4-1/12inchesand 138,701 ft3 atPage25of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationthehighwaterlevellimitof18ft9-3/4inches(Reference3.28,TSBases3.6.2.2).2.3.4.10UltimateHeatSinkTheUHSispartoftheSSWsystemandconsistsoftwocoolingtowerswithtworequiredfancellspertower,eachwithaconcretemakeupwatercoolingtowerbasin.Thesetwocoolingtowerbasinsareinterconnectedbyasiphonline(totransferwaterbetweenthem)andtogetherconstitutetheUHSbasin.ThecombinedUHSbasinvolumeissizedsuchthatsufficientwaterinventoryis'availableforallSSWSystempostLOCAcoolingrequirementsfora30dayperiodwithnoexternalmakeupwatersourceavailable.NormalmakeupforeachcoolingtowerbasinisprovidedautomaticallybythePlantServiceWaterSystem(Reference3.28,TSBases3.7.1).2.3.4.11UpperContainmentPoolSpentfuelisstoredintheAuxiliaryBuildingspentfuelpoolandintheuppercontainmentpool(UCP)duringoutages.NofuelisstoredintheUCPduringplantoperation(Reference3.24,Section3.1.2.6.2).TheUCPisalsousedasawatersourceforthesuppressionpoolfollowingaLOCA(Reference3.24,Section6.2.7)2.3.5FLEXConnections2.3.5.1PrimaryCoreCoolingPhase2ConnectionPointA6"suctionhoseandstrainerwillbeloweredintoaservicewaterbasintoprovidesuctiontotheportableFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).FLEXpumpdischargefittingsallowconnectionofa5"flexiblehosetoahoseconnectionontheHPCSSWreturnlineatvalve1 P41F397.ThehoseconnectionislocatedintheSSWBasinAvalveroom.To minimize flexiblehoselengthanddeploymenttime,theprimarystrategiesforcorecoolingandSFPrelyupontheinstalled,protected(underground)returnpipingofthesafetyrelatedHPCSSWsystemastheflowpathfromthehoseconnectioninthevalveroomtotheDGBuilding,wherea5"hoseconnectionandisolationvalveareinstalled.FromtheDGbuildinghoseconnectionatvalve1 P41F400,5" flexible,Page26of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationthehighwaterlevellimitof18ft9-3/4inches(Reference3.28,TSBases3.6.2.2).2.3.4.10UltimateHeatSinkTheUHSispartoftheSSWsystemandconsistsoftwocoolingtowerswithtworequiredfancellspertower,eachwithaconcretemakeupwatercoolingtowerbasin.Thesetwocoolingtowerbasinsareinterconnectedbyasiphonline(totransferwaterbetweenthem)andtogetherconstitutetheUHSbasin.ThecombinedUHSbasinvolumeissizedsuchthatsufficientwaterinventoryis'availableforallSSWSystempostLOCAcoolingrequirementsfora30dayperiod withnoexternalmakeupwatersourceavailable.NormalmakeupforeachcoolingtowerbasinisprovidedautomaticallybythePlantServiceWaterSystem(Reference3.28,TSBases3.7.1).2.3.4.11UpperContainmentPoolSpentfuelisstoredintheAuxiliaryBuildingspentfuelpoolandintheuppercontainmentpool(UCP)duringoutages.NofuelisstoredintheUCPduringplantoperation(Reference3.24,Section3.1.2.6.2).TheUCPisalsousedasawatersourceforthesuppressionpoolfollowingaLOCA(Reference3.24,Section6.2.7)2.3.5FLEXConnections2.3.5.1PrimaryCoreCoolingPhase2ConnectionPointA6"suctionhoseandstrainerwillbeloweredintoaservicewaterbasintoprovidesuctiontotheportableFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).FLEXpumpdischargefittingsallowconnectionofa5"flexiblehosetoahoseconnectionontheHPCSSWreturnlineatvalve1 P41F397.ThehoseconnectionislocatedintheSSWBasinAvalveroom.To minimize flexiblehoselengthanddeploymenttime,theprimarystrategiesforcorecoolingandSFPrelyupontheinstalled,protected(underground)returnpipingofthesafetyrelatedHPCSSWsystemastheflowpathfromthehoseconnectioninthevalveroomtotheDGBuilding,wherea5"hoseconnectionandisolationvalveareinstalled.FromtheDGbuildinghoseconnectionatvalve1 P41F400,5" flexible,Page26of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationhosewillberoutedtotheCorridor,thenupa6footflightofstairsandintotheAuxiliaryBuilding.OnceinsidetheAuxiliaryBuilding,thehosewillbefittedwithagatedwyetoallowdiversionofflowforcorecoolingandSFPcooling.TheprimaryandalternateconnectionlocationsforreactorcorecoolingarelocatedinsidetheRPVInstrumentTestRoomintheAuxiliaryBuilding.A5"flexiblehosewillbeconnectedtooneofthetwohoseconnectionsonthegatedwyeandthenconnectedtoeithertheprimary (1 P11F438)or alternate (1 P11F445)corecoolinghoseconnectionvalvelocationslocatedapproximately25feetfromthegatedwye.TheprimarycorecoolingconnectionallowsRPVinjectionviatheRHR"C"systemthrough1E12F063Catthehoseconnectionvalve1 P11F438.TheflowpathandpressureboundariesfortheprimarycorecoolingmakeuppathtotheRHRloop"C"injectionlineareshowninFigure1.2.3.5.2AlternateCoreCoolingPhase2ConnectionPointThealternatepathforPhase2reactorcorecoolingisatie-inlocationupstreamof1 E21F025alsointheCRWSTSystematthehoseconnectionvalve1 P11F445.Thistie-inallowsRPVinjectionviatheLPCSsystem.TheflowpathandpressureboundariesforthealternatecorecoolingmakeuppathtotheLPCSinjectionlineareshowninFigure1.2.3.5.3PrimaryElectricalConnectionTheprimaryPhase2PortableDieselGenerator(PDG) (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)staginglocationiswestoftheControlBuilding.Figure2showsthestagingareaforthis,PDG.Aprimary480VPDGConnectionCabinet (1R20P016)isinstalledinsidetheControlBuilding.Figure4showsablockdiagramfortheprimaryconnectionspointsfortheFLEXdieselgenerator.Acombinationofonsiteportable(FLEX)cableandpermanentcable/conduitisprovidedtoallowconnectionstobemadebetweentheFLEXPDG (1FLEXS009or 1 FLEXS010atthestagingarea),theprimary480VACFLEXConnectionCabinet(Panel1R20P016),andthedivisional480VACLoadCenters15BA6and16BB6.Thiswillre-Page27of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationhosewillberoutedtotheCorridor,thenupa6footflightofstairsandintotheAuxiliaryBuilding.OnceinsidetheAuxiliaryBuilding,thehosewillbefittedwithagatedwyetoallowdiversionofflowforcorecoolingandSFPcooling.TheprimaryandalternateconnectionlocationsforreactorcorecoolingarelocatedinsidetheRPVInstrumentTestRoomintheAuxiliaryBuilding.A5"flexiblehosewillbeconnectedtooneofthetwohoseconnectionsonthegatedwyeandthenconnectedtoeithertheprimary (1 P11F438)or alternate (1 P11F445)corecoolinghoseconnectionvalvelocationslocatedapproximately25feetfromthegatedwye.TheprimarycorecoolingconnectionallowsRPVinjectionviatheRHR"C"systemthrough1E12F063Catthehoseconnectionvalve1 P11F438.TheflowpathandpressureboundariesfortheprimarycorecoolingmakeuppathtotheRHRloop"C"injectionlineareshowninFigure1.2.3.5.2AlternateCoreCoolingPhase2ConnectionPointThealternatepathforPhase2reactorcorecoolingisatie-inlocationupstreamof1 E21F025alsointheCRWSTSystematthehoseconnectionvalve1 P11F445.Thistie-inallowsRPVinjectionviatheLPCSsystem.TheflowpathandpressureboundariesforthealternatecorecoolingmakeuppathtotheLPCSinjectionlineareshowninFigure1.2.3.5.3PrimaryElectricalConnectionTheprimaryPhase2PortableDieselGenerator(PDG) (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)staginglocationiswestoftheControlBuilding.Figure2showsthestagingareaforthis,PDG.Aprimary480VPDGConnectionCabinet (1R20P016)isinstalledinsidetheControlBuilding.Figure4showsablockdiagramfortheprimaryconnectionspointsfortheFLEXdieselgenerator.Acombinationofonsiteportable(FLEX)cableandpermanentcable/conduitisprovidedtoallowconnectionstobemadebetweentheFLEXPDG (1FLEXS009or 1 FLEXS010atthestagingarea),theprimary480VACFLEXConnectionCabinet(Panel1R20P016),andthedivisional480VACLoadCenters15BA6and16BB6.Thiswillre-Page27of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation.powerthe480VACLoadCentersandMotorControlCenters(specifically,twobatterychargers,onebatteryroomexhaustfan,andtheHPCSDGFuelOilStorageTankfueloiltransferpump)thatareutilizedduringPhase2ofa BDBEE.TheprimarystrategyforPhase2utilizesanew,dedicatedbreakeronDivisionI480VLoadCenter15BA6tore-powerbatterycharger1DA4andBatteryRoomExhaustFan1Z77C001A.TheprimarystrategyforPhase2alsoutilizesanew,dedicatedbreakeronDivisionII480VLoadCenter16BB6tore-powerbatterycharger1DB4.Anew,dedicatedfuseddisconnecthasalsobeenutilizedtorepowertheHPCSDGFuelOilStorageTankPump.PowerisprovidedfromasingleFLEXPDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS01 0).TomaintaindesignbasisdivisionalseparationduringBDBEEs,portableFLEXcablesmustbeusedduring BDBEEstoconnecttwoofthenewFLEXconnectioncabinets(panels) (1R20P018and1R20P019)toprovideFLEXPDGpowertotheDivisionIILCduringdeploymentoftheFLEXPDGtoeitheronlytheprimaryoralternatestaging location.PermanentconnectionsareprovidedtoallowFLEXportabledieselgenerators (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)tobeconnectedtotheFLEXloadsrequiredtobeoperationalfollowingaBDBEE.Thefollowingmodificationsweremadetoprovidetheconnections:*InstallationofaprimaryFLEXconnectioncabinet (1R20P016)onthewestwallinthenorthwestcorneroftheControlBuildingDivisionIISwitchgearArea,aFLEXconnectioncabinet (1R20P019)onthesouthwallinthesouthwestcorneroftheControlBuildingDivisionIISwitchgearArea,aFLEXconnectioncabinet (1R20P018)oneastwallinthesoutheastcorneroftheControlBuildingDivisionISwitchgearArea,andcables/conduitsintheControlBuildingatElevation111'toallowcable/conduitconnectionstoLoadCenters16BB6and 15BA6.Page28of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation .powerthe480VACLoadCentersandMotorControlCenters(specifically,twobatterychargers,onebatteryroomexhaustfan,andtheHPCSDGFuelOilStorageTankfueloiltransferpump)thatareutilizedduringPhase2ofa BDBEE.TheprimarystrategyforPhase2utilizesanew,dedicatedbreakeronDivisionI480VLoadCenter15BA6tore-powerbatterycharger1DA4andBatteryRoomExhaustFan1Z77C001A.TheprimarystrategyforPhase2alsoutilizesanew,dedicatedbreakeronDivisionII480VLoadCenter16BB6tore-powerbatterycharger1DB4.Anew,dedicatedfuseddisconnecthasalsobeenutilizedtorepowertheHPCSDGFuelOilStorageTankPump.PowerisprovidedfromasingleFLEXPDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS01 0).TomaintaindesignbasisdivisionalseparationduringBDBEEs,portableFLEXcablesmustbeusedduringBDBEEstoconnecttwoofthenewFLEXconnectioncabinets(panels) (1R20P018and1R20P019)toprovideFLEXPDGpowertotheDivisionIILCduringdeploymentoftheFLEXPDGtoeitheronlytheprimaryoralternatestaging location.PermanentconnectionsareprovidedtoallowFLEXportabledieselgenerators (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)tobeconnectedtotheFLEXloadsrequiredtobeoperationalfollowingaBDBEE.Thefollowingmodificationsweremadetoprovidetheconnections:*InstallationofaprimaryFLEXconnectioncabinet (1R20P016)onthewestwallinthenorthwestcorneroftheControlBuildingDivisionIISwitchgearArea,aFLEXconnectioncabinet (1R20P019)onthesouthwallinthesouthwestcorneroftheControlBuildingDivisionIISwitchgearArea,aFLEXconnectioncabinet (1R20P018)oneastwallinthesoutheastcorneroftheControlBuildingDivisionISwitchgearArea,andcables/conduitsintheControlBuildingatElevation111'toallowcable/conduitconnectionstoLoadCenters16BB6and 15BA6.Page28of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANGrandGulfNuclearStationApril2016*InstallationofanalternateFLEXconnectioncabinet (1R20P017)onthenorthwallintheAuxiliaryBuildingMisc.EquipmentAreaatElevation119'.*InstallationofFLEXcablestoragechestsintheControlBuildingatElevation111' (1 FLEXD001 through1FLEXD003)andintheAuxiliaryBuildingatElevations 119'(1FLEXD004through1FLEXD007).*Installationofconduitsandterminationofcablesto480VLoadCenterBus15BA6throughnewBreaker52-15605.*Installationofconduitsandterminationofcablesto480VLoadCenterBus16BB6throughnewBreaker52-16605.*InstallationofconduitandcablesthroughanexistingpenetrationfromAuxiliaryBuildingElevation119'toControlBuildingElevation111'2.3.5.4AlternateElectricalConnectionThealternativestrategytore-powertheFLEXrequiredloadsistousetheFLEXPDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)inthealternatestagingareasouth-westoftheAuxiliaryBuilding(seeFigure2)toconnecttothealternateFLEXconnectioncabinet(panel1R20P017)intheAuxiliaryBuildingusingonsiteportableFLEXcables.Figure4showsablockdiagramforthealternateconnectionspointsfortheFLEXdieselgenerator.SeediscussioninSection2.3.5.3aboveregardingthedetailsofthealternateandcommonconnections.2.3.6KeyParametersThefollowingcriticalreactorparameterswillbemonitoredthroughouttheevent:*ReactorPressureVesselwaterlevel*ReactorPressureVesselpressure*SuppressionPoolwaterlevel*SuppressionPooltemperaturePage29of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANGrandGulfNuclearStationApril2016*InstallationofanalternateFLEXconnectioncabinet (1R20P017)onthenorthwallintheAuxiliaryBuildingMisc.EquipmentAreaatElevation119'.*InstallationofFLEXcablestoragechestsintheControlBuildingatElevation111' (1 FLEXD001 through1FLEXD003)andintheAuxiliaryBuildingatElevations 119'(1FLEXD004through1FLEXD007).*Installationofconduitsandterminationofcablesto480VLoadCenterBus15BA6throughnewBreaker52-15605.*Installationofconduitsandterminationofcablesto480VLoadCenterBus16BB6throughnewBreaker52-16605.*InstallationofconduitandcablesthroughanexistingpenetrationfromAuxiliaryBuildingElevation119'toControlBuildingElevation111'2.3.5.4AlternateElectricalConnectionThealternativestrategytore-powertheFLEXrequiredloadsistousetheFLEXPDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)inthealternatestagingareasouth-westoftheAuxiliaryBuilding(seeFigure2)toconnecttothealternateFLEXconnectioncabinet(panel1R20P017)intheAuxiliaryBuildingusingonsiteportableFLEXcables.Figure4showsablockdiagramforthealternateconnectionspointsfortheFLEXdieselgenerator.SeediscussioninSection2.3.5.3aboveregardingthedetailsofthealternateandcommonconnections.2.3.6KeyParametersThefollowingcriticalreactorparameterswillbemonitoredthroughouttheevent:*ReactorPressureVesselwaterlevel*ReactorPressureVesselpressure*SuppressionPoolwaterlevel*SuppressionPooltemperaturePage29of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation The instrumentsandtheirassociatedpowersuppliesformonitoringthecriticalreactor parameters(NEI12-06,Section3.2.1.10)abovearepresentedinTable1. Instrumentsforalternatemonitoring(NEI12-06,Section5.3.3,Item1)arenotedinTable1withanasterisk (*).Table 1 Function Instrument Transmitter Power Supplies RPV Level B21-UR-R623A B21-LT-N091A*Loop:11DA; 72-11A18 Wide Range Recorder:1Y89;08-1 Y89-06 B21-UR-R623B B21-LT-N091B*Loop:11DB;72-11B14 Wide Range Recorder:1Y84;08-1 Y84-06 B21-UR-R615A B21-L T-N027 ALoop:11DA;72-11A29 Shutdown Range Recorder:1Y89;08-1 Y89-06 B21-UR-R615B B21-L T-N027B Loop: 11DB;72-11B32 Shutdown Range Recorder:1Y84;08-1 Y84-06 B21-UR-R615A B21-L T-N044C Loop: 11DA;72-11A29 Fuel Range Recorder:1Y89;08-1 Y89-06 B21-UR-R615B B21-LT-N044DLoop:11DB;72-11B32 Fuel Range Recorder:1Y84;08-1 Y84-06 RPV B21-UR-R623A B21-PT-N062A*Loop:11DA; 72-11A18 Pressure Recorder:1Y89;08-1 Y89-06 B21-UR-R623B B21-PT-N062B*Loop:11DB;72-11B14 Recorder:1Y84;08-1 Y84-06 SP Level E30-LR-R600A E30-L T-N003C*Loop:11DA;72-11A29 Recorder:11DA;72-11A29 E30-LR-R600B E30-L T-N003D*Loop:11DB;72-11B32 Recorder:11DB;72-11B32 SP M71-TR-R605A M71-TE-N012A*RecordersA&C:11DA;72-Temperature M71-TR-R605C M71-TE-N022A*11A29 M71-TE-N023A* Temp sensors:1Y89;08-1Y89-M71-TE-N024A*15 M71-TE-N025A*M71-TE-N026A* M71-TR-R605B M71-TE-N012B*RecordersB&D:11DB;72-M71-TR-R605D M71-TE-N022B*11B32 M71-TE-N023B* Temp sensors:1Y84;08-1Y84-M71-TE-N024B*15 M71-TE-N025B*M71-TE-N026B*Theabove instrumentationisavailablepriortoandafterloadsheddingofthedcbusesduringPhase1.ContinuedavailabilityduringPhases2Page30of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation The instrumentsandtheirassociatedpowersuppliesformonitoringthecriticalreactor parameters(NEI12-06,Section3.2.1.10)abovearepresentedinTable1. Instrumentsforalternatemonitoring(NEI12-06,Section5.3.3,Item1)arenotedinTable1withanasterisk (*).Table 1 Function Instrument Transmitter Power Supplies RPV Level B21-UR-R623A B21-LT-N091A*Loop:11DA; 72-11A18 Wide Range Recorder:1Y89;08-1 Y89-06 B21-UR-R623B B21-LT-N091B*Loop:11DB;72-11B14 Wide Range Recorder:1Y84;08-1 Y84-06 B21-UR-R615A B21-L T-N027 ALoop:11DA;72-11A29 Shutdown Range Recorder:1Y89;08-1 Y89-06 B21-UR-R615B B21-L T-N027B Loop: 11DB;72-11B32 Shutdown Range Recorder:1Y84;08-1 Y84-06 B21-UR-R615A B21-L T-N044C Loop: 11DA;72-11A29 Fuel Range Recorder:1Y89;08-1 Y89-06 B21-UR-R615B B21-LT-N044DLoop:11DB;72-11B32 Fuel Range Recorder:1Y84;08-1 Y84-06 RPV B21-UR-R623A B21-PT-N062A*Loop:11DA; 72-11A18 Pressure Recorder:1Y89;08-1 Y89-06 B21-UR-R623B B21-PT-N062B*Loop:11DB;72-11B14 Recorder:1Y84;08-1 Y84-06 SP Level E30-LR-R600A E30-L T-N003C*Loop:11DA;72-11A29 Recorder:11DA;72-11A29 E30-LR-R600B E30-L T-N003D*Loop:11DB;72-11B32 Recorder:11DB;72-11B32 SP M71-TR-R605A M71-TE-N012A*RecordersA&C:11DA;72-Temperature M71-TR-R605C M71-TE-N022A*11A29 M71-TE-N023A* Temp sensors:1Y89;08-1Y89-M71-TE-N024A*15 M71-TE-N025A*M71-TE-N026A* M71-TR-R605B M71-TE-N012B*RecordersB&D:11DB;72-M71-TR-R605D M71-TE-N022B*11B32 M71-TE-N023B* Temp sensors:1Y84;08-1Y84-M71-TE-N024B*15 M71-TE-N025B*M71-TE-N026B*Theabove instrumentationisavailablepriortoandafterloadsheddingofthedcbusesduringPhase1.ContinuedavailabilityduringPhases2Page30of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationand3is maintainedbyrepoweringthe125VDCbatterychargersforthestation125VDC batteriesusingeitherFLEXPortableDiesel Generator (1 FLEXS009or1FLEXS010).PortableFLEX equipmentissuppliedwiththelocal instrumentationneededtooperatetheequipment.Theuseofthese instruments isdetailedinthe associatedFSGsforuseoftheequipment.These proceduresarebasedoninputsfromthe equipment suppliers, operation experience, and expected equipmentfunctioninanELAP.FLEXsupport guidelinesareprovidedfor alternatemonitoringofthe critical parameterslocallyin accordancewiththe guidelinesofNEI06Section5.3.3.1. 2.3.7 Thermal Hydraulic AnalysesTheGGNSFLEX Strategy Timeline is supportedbytheresultsofaplantspecificMAAP4coreand containmentanalysisperformedin Q1111-14005 (Reference3.13)andvariousothercalculations.CaseBof Appendix9oftheMAAP4analysis (Reference 3.13)representstheoptimalmethodforcontrollingreactorwaterlevelwhich represents the scenarioutilizedinthe developmentoftheGGNSFLEX Strategy.Theanalysis contained in calculation XC-Q1111-14005 (Reference3.13)is conservativewithrespecttothe parametersofinterestin developingthecoping timeline(Le.,UCP inventoryandbatterycapacity).The analysis modelsRCICtoprovidethedesignbasisflowof800gpmwhenalignedtothevessel.Atthisflowrate,reactorvessellevelquicklyreachesLevel8,atwhichpointRCIC discharge isdivertedtothe suppressionpoolatarateof163gpm.Thisflowrateistherequiredflowratefor continuousRCICoperationatturbinespeedsofbetween2000rpmand2500rpm(Reference3.29).Bymodellingin the analysisthattheRCICflowrateisalways800gpmtothevesselor163gpmtothe suppressionpool,vesselwaterlevelis maintainedbetweenlevel2andlevel8andthetimedurationtheUCPvolumeis availableforuseis minimized.SincetheUCPvolumewillbedepleted earlierintheeventtheanalysisis conservative,RCICsystem operationinthe manneranalyzedinthe calculation also maximizesoperationoftheRCICinjectionvalve (1E51F013)andtheminimumflowlineisolationvalve (1E51F019),resultinginincreasedloadsonthe station batteriesduringPhase1.TheseincreasedbatteryloadsduetoPage31of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationand3is maintainedbyrepoweringthe125VDCbatterychargersforthestation125VDC batteriesusingeitherFLEXPortableDiesel Generator (1 FLEXS009or1FLEXS010).PortableFLEX equipmentissuppliedwiththelocal instrumentationneededtooperatetheequipment.Theuseofthese instruments isdetailedinthe associatedFSGsforuseoftheequipment.These proceduresarebasedoninputsfromthe equipment suppliers, operation experience, and expected equipmentfunctioninanELAP.FLEXsupport guidelinesareprovidedfor alternatemonitoringofthe critical parameterslocallyin accordancewiththe guidelinesofNEI06Section5.3.3.1. 2.3.7 Thermal Hydraulic AnalysesTheGGNSFLEX Strategy Timeline is supportedbytheresultsofaplantspecificMAAP4coreand containmentanalysisperformedin Q1111-14005 (Reference3.13)andvariousothercalculations.CaseBof Appendix9oftheMAAP4analysis (Reference 3.13)representstheoptimalmethodforcontrollingreactorwaterlevelwhich represents the scenarioutilizedinthe developmentoftheGGNSFLEX Strategy.Theanalysis contained in calculation XC-Q1111-14005 (Reference3.13)is conservativewithrespecttothe parametersofinterestin developingthecoping timeline(Le.,UCP inventoryandbatterycapacity).The analysis modelsRCICtoprovidethedesignbasisflowof800gpmwhenalignedtothevessel.Atthisflowrate,reactorvessellevelquicklyreachesLevel8,atwhichpointRCIC discharge isdivertedtothe suppressionpoolatarateof163gpm.Thisflowrateistherequiredflowratefor continuousRCICoperationatturbinespeedsofbetween2000rpmand2500rpm(Reference3.29).Bymodellingin the analysisthattheRCICflowrateisalways800gpmtothevesselor163gpmtothe suppressionpool,vesselwaterlevelis maintainedbetweenlevel2andlevel8andthetimedurationtheUCPvolumeis availableforuseis minimized.SincetheUCPvolumewillbedepleted earlierintheeventtheanalysisis conservative,RCICsystem operationinthe manneranalyzedinthe calculation also maximizesoperationoftheRCICinjectionvalve (1E51F013)andtheminimumflowlineisolationvalve (1E51F019),resultinginincreasedloadsonthe station batteriesduringPhase1.TheseincreasedbatteryloadsduetoPage31of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationoperationofthevalvesduringPhase1hasbeenincludedintheDCbatterycapacitycalculation EC-Q1111-14001(Reference3.12)andisthusconservativesincethetimedurationthestationbatteriesareavailableisreduced.FLEXsupportsguidelinesareprovidedtominimizediversionoftheUCPinventorytothesuppressionpoolbymaintainingvessellevelconstantifpossible(matchingRCICmakeuptoboiloff)thusextendingthetimedurationtheUCPvolumeandstationbatterieswouldbeavailableforuse.However,asstated,analyticallynocreditistakenforthisoperatoraction.ThefollowingrepresentsthesequenceofeventsforreactorcorecoolingbasedontheMAAP4analysis(Reference3.13):*Atapproximatelytwohoursaftertheeventinitiation,theheatcapacitytemperaturelimit(HCTL)curveisreached.Atthispoint,reactorpressureisreducedtoandmaintainedinarangebetween200and400psig(tomaintainRCICoperation)bySRVoperationfromtheMCRwhilemaintainingthetechnicalspecification1 OO°F/hrcooldownlimit.*Atapproximatelythreehoursaftertheeventinitiation,whensuppressionpooltemperatureexceeds170°F,theUCPtoRCICflowpathisopened;RPVwaterlevelisnotchallengedandtheUCPvolumewillcontinuetoprovideanadequateRCICsuctionsourceforapproximately17additionalhours.*Atapproximatelyfourhoursaftertheeventinitiation,suppressionpooltemperatureexceeds190 OF.ThemodifiedEOPcontainmentventisopenedandismaintainedopenedforthedurationoftheevent..*Atapproximately20hoursaftertheeventinitiation,theUCPsupplyavailableforRCICsuctionisdepleted.PriortodepletionoftheUCPinventoryandafterconfirmationthattheportableFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)isavailable,twoSRVsareopenedtodepressurizethereactorandRCICissecured.Thereactorwillbedepressurizedtolessthan100psiginordertoallowinitiationofRPVinjectionwiththeportableFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).Page32of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationoperationofthevalvesduringPhase1hasbeenincludedintheDCbatterycapacitycalculation EC-Q1111-14001(Reference3.12)andisthusconservativesincethetimedurationthestationbatteriesareavailableisreduced.FLEXsupportsguidelinesareprovidedtominimizediversionoftheUCPinventorytothesuppressionpoolbymaintainingvessellevelconstantifpossible(matchingRCICmakeuptoboiloff)thusextendingthetimedurationtheUCPvolumeandstationbatterieswouldbeavailableforuse.However,asstated,analyticallynocreditistakenforthisoperatoraction.ThefollowingrepresentsthesequenceofeventsforreactorcorecoolingbasedontheMAAP4analysis(Reference3.13):
- Atapproximatelytwohoursaftertheeventinitiation,theheatcapacitytemperaturelimit(HCTL)curveisreached.Atthispoint,reactorpressureisreducedtoandmaintainedinarangebetween200and400psig(tomaintainRCICoperation)bySRVoperationfromtheMCRwhilemaintainingthetechnicalspecification1 OO°F/hrcooldownlimit.
- Atapproximatelythreehoursaftertheeventinitiation,whensuppressionpooltemperatureexceeds170°F,theUCPtoRCICflowpathisopened;RPVwaterlevelisnotchallengedandtheUCPvolumewillcontinuetoprovideanadequateRCICsuctionsourceforapproximately17additionalhours.
- Atapproximatelyfourhoursaftertheeventinitiation,suppressionpooltemperatureexceeds190 OF.ThemodifiedEOPcontainmentventisopenedandismaintainedopenedforthedurationoftheevent.
.*Atapproximately20hoursaftertheeventinitiation,theUCPsupplyavailableforRCICsuctionisdepleted.PriortodepletionoftheUCPinventoryandafterconfirmationthattheportableFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)isavailable,twoSRVsareopenedtodepressurizethereactorandRCICissecured.Thereactorwillbedepressurizedtolessthan100psiginordertoallowinitiationofRPVinjectionwiththeportableFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).Page32of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016\GrandGulf Nuclear Statiori*TheminimumRPV waterlevelforthepostulatedeventis approximately 2.9 ft.abovethetopofactivefuelshortlyafter RPV depressurizationforPhase2coremakeup. These analysessupporttheFLEX strategies discussed in subsections2.3.1,2.3.2and2.3.3.UtilizationoftheMAAP4Code:MAAP4Code benchmarkingforthe program'suseinsupportof Fukushima applicationsisdiscussedindetailinSection5ofEPRI Report 3002001785"Useof Modular AccidentAnalysisProgram(MAAP)inSupportof Post-Fukushima Applications" (Reference 3.30),whichincludes MELCORCoderesult comparisonsaswellasdirect result comparisonstoactualplantpressureand temperaturedatafrom FukushimaDai-ichiUnits1,2,and3.TheEPRIreport concludes thattheMAAP4codeis acceptableforusein supportoftheindustryresponseto Order EA-12-049.TheGGNSMAAP4 analysis was performed in accordance with Sections4.1,4.2,4.3,4.4and4.5oftheJune2013positionpaper, EPRI Technical Report 3002001785.Keymodeling parameterscitedinTables4-1through4-6ofthe IIMAAP4 Application Guidance,DesktopReferenceforUsingMAAP4Software,Revision2 11(ElectricPowerResearchInstituteReport1020236,Reference3.31)are specifically addressedintheMAAP4 Analysis (Reference3.13).Thereactorvesseland containment nodalization followed standardschemesthataredescribed.TheMAAP4Codeisreadilycapableofanalyzingthe two-phase flow conditionsfromtheRPV,and validationswereperformedforthekey parametersthatarecheckedforthese two-phaselevelandflowconditions.Modelingofheat transferandlossesfromtheRPV,decayheat,andthe plant-specificinputsarealso describedandfollowedstandardpractices.2.3.8RecirculationPumpSealLeakageTheGGNSMAAP4analysis (Reference3.13)usesaninitialleakrateof66gpmatnormalRPVoperatingpressuretoaccountforprimarysystemleakage.The66gpmleakageisthesameasthatin Assumption8forBWRl6,MarkIIIanalysisinSection4.5.1.5of33771P (Reference3.32).This assumption is applicablesinceGGNSPage33of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016\GrandGulf Nuclear Statiori*The minimum RPV waterlevelforthepostulatedeventis approximately 2.9 ft.abovethetopofactivefuelshortlyafter RPV depressurizationforPhase2coremakeup. These analysessupporttheFLEX strategies discussed in subsections2.3.1,2.3.2and2.3.3.UtilizationoftheMAAP4Code:MAAP4Code benchmarkingforthe program'suseinsupportof Fukushima applicationsisdiscussedindetailinSection5ofEPRI Report 3002001785"Useof Modular AccidentAnalysisProgram(MAAP)inSupportof Post-Fukushima Applications" (Reference 3.30),whichincludes MELCORCoderesult comparisonsaswellasdirect result comparisonstoactualplantpressureand temperaturedatafrom FukushimaDai-ichiUnits1,2,and3.TheEPRIreport concludes thattheMAAP4codeis acceptableforusein supportoftheindustryresponseto Order EA-12-049.TheGGNSMAAP4 analysis was performed in accordance with Sections4.1,4.2,4.3,4.4and4.5oftheJune2013positionpaper, EPRI Technical Report 3002001785.Keymodeling parameterscitedinTables4-1through4-6ofthe IIMAAP4 Application Guidance,DesktopReferenceforUsingMAAP4Software,Revision2 11(ElectricPowerResearchInstituteReport1020236,Reference3.31)are specifically addressedintheMAAP4 Analysis (Reference3.13).Thereactorvesseland containment nodalization followed standardschemesthataredescribed.TheMAAP4Codeisreadilycapableofanalyzingthe two-phase flow conditionsfromtheRPV, and validationswereperformedforthekey parametersthatarecheckedforthese two-phaselevelandflowconditions.Modelingofheat transferandlosses fromtheRPV,decayheat,andthe plant-specificinputsarealso describedandfollowedstandardpractices.2.3.8RecirculationPumpSealLeakageTheGGNSMAAP4analysis (Reference3.13)usesaninitialleakrateof66gpmatnormalRPVoperatingpressuretoaccountforprimarysystemleakage.The66gpmleakageisthesameasthatin Assumption8forBWRl6,MarkIIIanalysisinSection4.5.1.5of33771P (Reference3.32).This assumption is applicablesinceGGNSPage33of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationisaBWRl6MarkIIIplant.Thisincludes18gpmsealleakageperreactorrecirculationpumpplustheTechnicalSpecificationLCO3.4.5allowableleakagerateof30gpm(Reference3.28).TheSBOanalysisleakagerateof18gpm/pumphasbeendeterminedbytheNRCinGenericLetter91-07(Reference3.33)andacceptedpertheNRCsacceptanceof GNR192-00024(Reference3.34).ThisleakagerateisassumedtostartatthetimezeroandvarywithreactorpressureconsistentwiththemannerinwhichbreakflowismodeledinReference3.35.TheRPVleakagelocationissetattheReactorRecirculation(RR)PumpsuctionnozzleelevationZSRRanditwasiterativelydeterminedthataleakagearea(ALOCA)of1.02E-03fewouldprovidetheassumedinitialleakageof66gpmatnormalreactorpressure(Reference3.13).Theleakageisdeterminedusinganareainordertoallowvariationsintheleakagevaluedependingonprimarysidepressureconditions.Theprimarysystemleakageisinitially66gpmbutincreasestoamaximumofapproximately136gpmduringthefirsthourastheamountofRPVsubcoolingincreasesduetoRCICinjection.TheleakagethendecreaseswhentheRPVisdepressurizedattwohoursandremainsbetweenapproximately28and80gpm.TheRPVisfurtherdepressurizedtolessthan100psigatapproximately20hourstoallowinjectionusingtheFLEXpump;theleakageatthispressureisapproximately17gpm(Reference3.13).Flowfromtherecirculationpumpsealwillbesingle-phaseliquidduetothelocationofthebreakwhichislowintheRPVwithRPVlevelcontinuedtobemaintainedaboveTAF.UponexitingtheRPV,thesealleakagewillflashaportionoftheflowtosteambasedonsaturatedconditionsinthedrywell,creatingasteamsourceanda liquidwatersourcetothe drywell.2.3.9ShutdownMarginAnalysisNotapplicabletoBWRsforFLEX.2.3.10FlexPumpsandWaterSupplies2.3.10.1FLEXInjectionPumpsConsistentwithNEI12-06,AppendixC,Phase2RPVwaterinjectioncapabilityisprovidedusingaportableFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)throughaprimaryoralternateconnection(seeSections2.3.5.1and2.3.5.2).Page34of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationisaBWRl6MarkIIIplant.Thisincludes18gpmsealleakageperreactorrecirculationpumpplustheTechnicalSpecificationLCO3.4.5allowableleakagerateof30gpm(Reference3.28).TheSBOanalysisleakagerateof18gpm/pumphasbeendeterminedbytheNRCinGenericLetter91-07(Reference3.33)andacceptedpertheNRCsacceptanceof GNR192-00024(Reference3.34).ThisleakagerateisassumedtostartatthetimezeroandvarywithreactorpressureconsistentwiththemannerinwhichbreakflowismodeledinReference3.35.TheRPVleakagelocationissetattheReactorRecirculation(RR)PumpsuctionnozzleelevationZSRRanditwasiterativelydeterminedthataleakagearea(ALOCA)of1.02E-03 fewouldprovidetheassumedinitialleakageof66gpmatnormalreactorpressure(Reference3.13).Theleakageisdeterminedusinganareainordertoallowvariationsintheleakagevaluedependingonprimarysidepressureconditions.Theprimarysystemleakageisinitially66gpmbutincreasestoamaximumofapproximately136gpmduringthefirsthourastheamountofRPVsubcoolingincreasesduetoRCICinjection.TheleakagethendecreaseswhentheRPVisdepressurizedattwohoursandremainsbetweenapproximately28and80gpm.TheRPVisfurtherdepressurizedtolessthan100psigatapproximately20hourstoallowinjectionusingtheFLEXpump;theleakageatthispressureisapproximately17gpm(Reference3.13).Flowfromtherecirculationpumpsealwillbesingle-phaseliquidduetothelocationof the breakwhichislowintheRPVwithRPVlevelcontinuedtobemaintainedaboveTAF.UponexitingtheRPV,thesealleakagewillflashaportionoftheflowtosteambasedonsaturatedconditionsinthedrywell,creatingasteamsourceanda liquidwatersourcetothe drywell.2.3.9ShutdownMarginAnalysisNotapplicabletoBWRsforFLEX.2.3.10FlexPumpsandWaterSupplies2.3.10.1FLEXInjectionPumpsConsistentwithNEI12-06,AppendixC,Phase2RPVwaterinjectioncapabilityisprovidedusingaportableFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)throughaprimaryoralternateconnection(seeSections2.3.5.1and2.3.5.2).Page34of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationAtapproximately20hours,theUCPsupplyavailableforRCICsuctionisnearingdepletion.TwoSRVsarethenopenedtodepressurizethereactortolessthan100psigandallowinitiationofPhase2flowfromthedieseldrivenFLEX pump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)tostartfeedingthereactor(Reference3.18).OneportabledieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001 or1FLEXC002)willbeusedtoprovidemakeupwaterforPhase2reactorcorecoolingandinventorycontrol,aswellasSFPcoolingandinventorycontrol.ThispumpwilltakesuctionfromoneoftheSSWbasins.SizingfortheFLEXpumpisprovidedinMC-Q1111-14008(Reference3.18).Thiscalculationdeterminesthetotaldynamichead(TDH)requiredforthePhase2FLEXpump (1 FLEXC001 and1FLEXC002)totakesuctionfromaSSWbasinandpumpmakeupwatertotheRPVandSFP.ResultsofthiscalculationdemonstratethataFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001 or1FLEXC002)capableofproviding500gpmatatotaldynamicheadof320 ft(139psig)willbesufficienttosimultaneouslymeettherequirementsforRPVmakeupandSFPmakeup.TheFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)iscapableofdraftingfromtheSSWbasinwithoutexternalmakeupfromoffsitesuppliedwatertransportationequipmentand/orpumpslorPhase3NSRCequipmentforapproximately99hoursbeforecavitationoccursduetoinsufficientNPSHavailable(Reference3.20).AddingwatertotheSSWBasinswillsupportindefiniteoperationofthePhase2FLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).AtotaloftwodieseldrivenFLEXpumpswillbestoredinFLEXstoragefacilities(i.e.onepumpineachstoragebuilding)inordertomeettheNEI12-06requirementsofN+1setsofequipment.ThetrailermountedFLEXInjection Pumps (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)willbetransferredandstagedviahaulroutesandstagingareasevaluatedforimpactfromapplicableexternalhazards.ProgramsandtrainingwillbeimplementedtosupportthedeploymentandoperationoftheFLEXInjectionPumps (1 FLEXC001 or1FLEXC002).Page35of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationAtapproximately20hours,theUCPsupplyavailableforRCICsuctionisnearingdepletion.TwoSRVsarethenopenedtodepressurizethereactortolessthan100psigandallowinitiationofPhase2flowfromthedieseldrivenFLEX pump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)tostartfeedingthereactor(Reference3.18).OneportabledieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001 or1FLEXC002)willbeusedtoprovidemakeupwaterforPhase2reactorcorecoolingandinventorycontrol,aswellasSFPcoolingandinventorycontrol.ThispumpwilltakesuctionfromoneoftheSSWbasins.SizingfortheFLEXpumpisprovidedinMC-Q1111-14008(Reference3.18).Thiscalculationdeterminesthetotaldynamichead(TDH) requiredforthePhase2FLEXpump (1 FLEXC001 and1FLEXC002)totakesuctionfromaSSWbasinandpumpmakeupwatertotheRPVandSFP.ResultsofthiscalculationdemonstratethataFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001 or1FLEXC002)capableofproviding500gpmatatotaldynamicheadof320 ft(139psig)willbesufficienttosimultaneouslymeettherequirementsforRPVmakeupandSFPmakeup.TheFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)iscapableofdraftingfromtheSSWbasinwithoutexternalmakeupfromoffsitesuppliedwatertransportationequipmentand/orpumpslorPhase3NSRCequipmentforapproximately99hoursbeforecavitationoccursduetoinsufficientNPSHavailable(Reference3.20).AddingwatertotheSSWBasinswillsupportindefiniteoperationofthePhase2FLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).AtotaloftwodieseldrivenFLEXpumpswillbestoredinFLEXstoragefacilities(i.e.onepumpineachstoragebuilding)inordertomeettheNEI12-06requirementsofN+1setsofequipment.ThetrailermountedFLEXInjection Pumps (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)willbetransferredandstagedviahaulroutesandstagingareasevaluatedforimpactfromapplicableexternalhazards.ProgramsandtrainingwillbeimplementedtosupportthedeploymentandoperationoftheFLEXInjectionPumps (1 FLEXC001 or1FLEXC002).Page35of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril20162.3.10.2MakeupWaterSuppliesSuppressionPoolGrandGulfNuclearStationBecausetheCSTisnotseismicallyqualified(Reference3.24,Table3.2-1),itisconsideredunavailablefortheBDBEE;however,ifitwereavailableitwouldbeusedasasuctionsourceforRCIC.IftheCSTisnotavailableduetotheBDBEE,theRCICsuctionwillautomaticallytransfertothesuppressionpoolutilizingDCpoweredinstrumentation,valvesandcontrollogic.Thesuppressionpoolvolumerangesbetween135,291ft 3atthelowwaterlevellimitof18ft4-1/12inchesand 138,701 ft3atthehighwaterlevellimitof18ft9-3/4inches(Reference3.28,TSBases3.6.2.2).Additionally,seeSection2.3.4.9.UpperContainmentPoolAtapproximatelythreehoursaftertheeventinitiation,thesuppressionpooltemperatureexceeds170°FandtheRCICsuctionwillbelocallymanuallyalignedtotheuppercontainmentpoolinordertomaintainacoolsourceofcoolingwatersupplytotheRCICpumpandturbineaswellastomaintainnetpositivesuctionheadfortheRCICpumpwithoutcreditforcontainmentoverpressure.TheUCP volume..willprovideanadequateRCICsuctionsourceforapproximately17additionalhours(Reference3.13).Additionally,seeSections2.3.4.11and2.3.7.UltimateHeatSink(SSWBasins)PriortodepletionoftheUCPinventory(inabout20hoursaftertheinitialBDBEE),RPVdepressurizationtolessthan100psigwillcontinuetoallowinitiationofRPVinjectionwiththeFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)fordecayheatremoval.WhentheprimarysystempressureislowenoughfortheFLEXpumptoinject,themaximuminjectionratewillbeginatavalueof 250.gpm.Whenlevel8hasbeenrestoredinthevessel,theFLEXpumpflowratewillbereducedtoavalueroughlyequivalenttotherateatwhichmassisleavingtheprimarysystem,tomaintainastablewaterlevelnearlevel8.TheFLEXpumpiscapableofdraftingfromtheSSWbasinforapproximately99hoursPage36of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril20162.3.10.2MakeupWaterSuppliesSuppressionPoolGrandGulfNuclearStationBecausetheCSTisnotseismicallyqualified(Reference3.24,Table3.2-1),itisconsideredunavailablefortheBDBEE;however,ifitwereavailableitwouldbeusedasasuctionsourceforRCIC.IftheCSTisnotavailableduetotheBDBEE,theRCICsuctionwillautomaticallytransfertothesuppressionpoolutilizingDCpoweredinstrumentation,valvesandcontrollogic.Thesuppressionpoolvolumerangesbetween135,291ft 3atthelowwaterlevellimitof18ft4-1/12inchesand 138,701 ft3atthehighwaterlevellimitof18ft9-3/4inches(Reference3.28,TSBases3.6.2.2).Additionally,seeSection2.3.4.9.UpperContainmentPoolAtapproximatelythreehoursaftertheeventinitiation,thesuppressionpooltemperatureexceeds170°FandtheRCICsuctionwillbelocallymanuallyalignedtotheuppercontainmentpoolinordertomaintainacoolsourceofcoolingwatersupplytotheRCICpumpandturbineaswellastomaintainnetpositivesuctionheadfortheRCICpumpwithoutcreditforcontainmentoverpressure.TheUCP volume..willprovideanadequateRCICsuctionsourceforapproximately17additionalhours(Reference3.13).Additionally,seeSections2.3.4.11and2.3.7.UltimateHeatSink(SSWBasins)PriortodepletionoftheUCPinventory(inabout20hoursaftertheinitialBDBEE),RPVdepressurizationtolessthan100psigwillcontinuetoallowinitiationofRPVinjectionwiththeFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)fordecayheatremoval.WhentheprimarysystempressureislowenoughfortheFLEXpumptoinject,themaximuminjectionratewillbeginatavalueof 250.gpm.Whenlevel8hasbeenrestoredinthevessel,theFLEXpumpflowratewillbereducedtoavalueroughlyequivalenttotherateatwhichmassisleavingtheprimarysystem,tomaintainastablewaterlevelnearlevel8.TheFLEXpumpiscapableofdraftingfromtheSSWbasinforapproximately99hoursPage36of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationbeforecavitationoccursduetoinsufficientNPSHavailable(Reference3.20).AddingwatertotheSSWBasinswillsupportindefiniteoperationofthePhase2FLEXpump.Additionally,seeSections2.3.4.10and2.15.2.3.10.3BoratedWaterSuppliesNotapplicabletoBWRsforFLEX.2.3.11ElectricalAnalysisThestationbatteriesandinstalledClass1EDCdistributionsystemprovidespowerforRCICsystemoperationandmonitoringinstrumentation.Attheonsetoftheevent,theoperatorisdirectedtotakestepstobeginminimizingtheloadonthestationbatteriesbysheddingunnecessaryloadsinaccordancewithstationSBOprocedure(Reference3.19).Additionalloadsheddingiscompletedwithin2hours.Asaresultofthesheddingofnon-essentialloads,theStationDivisionIBattery1A3andDivisionIIBattery1B3willmaintainvoltageaboveminimumrequirementsandwillbecapableofsupplyingpowertotherequiredloadsforapproximately12hoursand14hours,respectively,andpriortobatterydepletion(Reference3.12).TransitionfromPhase1(relianceonstationbatteries)toPhase2(repoweringstationbatterychargers)willbemadeusingaFLEXportable480VDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010).ThedecisiontodeploytheFLEXportable480VDGwillbemadeduringtheinitialresponsephase.Withloadshedding,theusablestationClass1Ebatterylifeisextendedbeyondtwelve(12)hoursandthePhase2FLEX480Vdieselgenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)willbeplacedintoserviceatorbefore 11hourstorechargetheDivisionIandDivisionIIbatteriesasdiscussedinSection2.3.2.Therefore,thetimemarginbetweenthecalculatedbatterydurationfortheFLEXstrategyandtheexpecteddeploymenttimeforFLEXequipmenttosupplythedcloadsisgreaterthan1hour.Asingle300kWgenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)iscapableofrepoweringtwo125Vbatterychargers(oneperdivision),anassociatedbatteryroomexhaustfan,theContainmentVentUPS (1 M41PS01),andtheHPCSDGFuelOilStorageTankfueltransferpump (1 P81 C001).EachofthetwoFLEX480V300kWdieselgeneratorisequippedwitha500gallondieselfueltankwhichsupportsapproximately22hoursruntimeatfullload(Reference3.21).SeeSection2.9.4regardingPage37of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationbeforecavitationoccursduetoinsufficientNPSHavailable(Reference3.20).AddingwatertotheSSWBasinswillsupportindefiniteoperationofthePhase2FLEXpump.Additionally,seeSections2.3.4.10and2.15.2.3.10.3BoratedWaterSuppliesNotapplicabletoBWRsforFLEX.2.3.11ElectricalAnalysisThestationbatteriesandinstalledClass1EDCdistributionsystemprovidespowerforRCICsystemoperationandmonitoringinstrumentation.Attheonsetoftheevent,theoperatorisdirectedtotakestepstobeginminimizingtheloadonthestationbatteriesbysheddingunnecessaryloadsinaccordancewithstationSBOprocedure(Reference3.19).Additionalloadsheddingiscompletedwithin2hours.Asaresultofthesheddingofnon-essentialloads,theStationDivisionIBattery1A3andDivisionIIBattery1B3willmaintainvoltageaboveminimumrequirementsandwillbecapableofsupplyingpowertotherequiredloadsforapproximately12hoursand14hours,respectively,andpriortobatterydepletion(Reference3.12).TransitionfromPhase1(relianceonstationbatteries)toPhase2(repoweringstationbatterychargers)willbemadeusingaFLEXportable480VDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010).ThedecisiontodeploytheFLEXportable480VDGwillbemadeduringtheinitialresponsephase.Withloadshedding,theusablestationClass1Ebatterylifeisextendedbeyondtwelve(12)hoursandthePhase2FLEX480Vdieselgenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)willbeplacedintoserviceatorbefore 11hourstorechargetheDivisionIandDivisionIIbatteriesasdiscussedinSection2.3.2.Therefore,thetimemarginbetweenthecalculatedbatterydurationfortheFLEXstrategyandtheexpecteddeploymenttimeforFLEXequipmenttosupplythedcloadsisgreaterthan1hour.Asingle300kWgenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)iscapableofrepoweringtwo125Vbatterychargers(oneperdivision),anassociatedbatteryroomexhaustfan,theContainmentVentUPS (1 M41PS01),andtheHPCSDGFuelOilStorageTankfueltransferpump (1 P81 C001).EachofthetwoFLEX480V300kWdieselgeneratorisequippedwitha500gallondieselfueltankwhichsupportsapproximately22hoursruntimeatfullload(Reference3.21).SeeSection2.9.4regardingPage37of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationrefuelingofdieseldrivenFLEX equipmentandtheassumedamountoffuelcontainedineachpieceofessentialdieseldriven equipmentatthebeginningoftheevent. Additional non-creditedbackup/replacement480VAC generators areavailablefromtheNSRC.TheratingsfortheNSRC equipment arelistedinTable4.Page38of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationrefuelingofdieseldrivenFLEX equipmentandtheassumedamountoffuelcontainedineachpieceofessentialdieseldriven equipmentatthebeginningoftheevent. Additional non-creditedbackup/replacement480VAC generators areavailablefromtheNSRC.TheratingsfortheNSRC equipment arelistedinTable4.Page38of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.4SpentFuelPoolCooling/InventoryDuringthepostulatedELAPevent,theSFPwillinitiallyheatupduetotheunavailabilityofthenormalcoolingsystem.Priortopoolboiling,theFLEXhosesandspraymonitornozzlesstoredintheSFPareawillbesetup,local AuxiliaryBuildingdoorswillbeopenedtoventtheSFPareatoatmosphere,andtheFLEXhoseswillberoutedoutoftheSFPareainpreparationforSFPinventorymakeup;thiswillbecompletedinabout4hoursaftertheBDBEEhasoccurred.TheFLEXpumpdeployedandalignedforreactorcorecooling/ injection (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)issizedtoallowtheconcurrentadditionofwatertotheSFPfromtheUHSforinventorymakeupastheSFPboilsortoprovidespraycapability.Thebackup/replacementNSRCgeneratorsandpumpsinstalledduringrecoveryfordecayheatremovalwillbeutilized,asnecessary,forthelonqtermre-establishmentofSFPcoolingusingtheinstalledSFPcoolingequipmentasitbecomesavailable.Inaddition,SFPlevelinstrumentation (1G41-LE-N040A/1G41-LI-R040Aand 1/1G41-LI-R040B)addedinresponsetoNRCOrder051,Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation(Reference3.5)providestheoperatorswithSFPlevelindicationfordecisionmakingpurposes.TheUCPisalsousedforinterimstorageandcoolingofspentfuelassembliesandifnecessarydefectivefuelstoragecontainers(withfuel)duringrefuelingoperations.ThespentfuelassembliesaretransferredtothespentfuelpoolintheAuxiliaryBuildingforlong-termstorage.Nofueliscontainedintheuppercontainmentpoolduringnormalpoweroperationoftheplant.MakeuptotheUCPduringrefuelingwouldbehandledviatheShutdownandRefuelingstrategiesincludingtheShutdownSafetyManagementProgram(Reference3.103)(Section2.16addressestheUCP). 2.4.1Phase1StrategyFollowinganextendedlossofACpower,therearenocapabilitiestoprovideSFPmakeupduringPhase1;ThePhase1strategycreditstheplantdesigntomaintaincoolingforthespentfuelintheSFPviathelargeinventoryandheatcapacityofwaterintheSFP.GGNSTechnicalSpecifications(Reference3.28)LCO3.7.6requirestheSFPwaterleveltobemaintainedgreaterthanorequalto23 ftoverthetopofirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthespentfuelstoragepoolanduppercontainmentfuelstoragepoolracks.Atthislevel,theearliestthatfuelintheSFPcouldbeuncoveredfromboil-offfortheworstcasefullcoreoffload(outageconditionsonly)isapproximately57hourswhichisthelatestmakeupcouldstartperstationanalysisMC-Q1111-Page39of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.4SpentFuelPoolCooling/InventoryDuringthepostulatedELAPevent,theSFPwillinitiallyheatupduetotheunavailabilityofthenormalcoolingsystem.Priortopoolboiling,theFLEXhosesandspraymonitornozzlesstoredintheSFPareawillbesetup,local AuxiliaryBuildingdoorswillbeopenedtoventtheSFPareatoatmosphere,andtheFLEXhoseswillberoutedoutoftheSFPareainpreparationforSFPinventorymakeup;thiswillbecompletedinabout4hoursaftertheBDBEEhasoccurred.TheFLEXpumpdeployedandalignedforreactorcorecooling/ injection (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)issizedtoallowtheconcurrentadditionofwatertotheSFPfromtheUHSforinventorymakeupastheSFPboilsortoprovidespraycapability.Thebackup/replacementNSRCgeneratorsandpumpsinstalledduringrecoveryfordecayheatremovalwillbeutilized,asnecessary,forthelonqtermre-establishmentofSFPcoolingusingtheinstalledSFPcoolingequipmentasitbecomesavailable.Inaddition,SFPlevelinstrumentation (1G41-LE-N040A/1G41-LI-R040Aand 1/1G41-LI-R040B)addedinresponsetoNRCOrder051,Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation(Reference3.5)providestheoperatorswithSFPlevelindicationfordecisionmakingpurposes.TheUCPisalsousedforinterimstorageandcoolingofspentfuelassembliesandifnecessarydefectivefuelstoragecontainers(withfuel)duringrefuelingoperations.ThespentfuelassembliesaretransferredtothespentfuelpoolintheAuxiliaryBuildingforlong-termstorage.Nofueliscontainedintheuppercontainmentpoolduringnormalpoweroperationoftheplant.MakeuptotheUCPduringrefuelingwouldbehandledviatheShutdownandRefuelingstrategiesincludingtheShutdownSafetyManagementProgram(Reference3.103)(Section2.16addressestheUCP). 2.4.1Phase1StrategyFollowinganextendedlossofACpower,therearenocapabilitiestoprovideSFPmakeupduringPhase 1;ThePhase1strategycreditstheplantdesigntomaintaincoolingforthespentfuelintheSFPviathelargeinventoryandheatcapacityofwaterintheSFP.GGNSTechnicalSpecifications(Reference3.28)LCO3.7.6requirestheSFPwaterleveltobemaintainedgreaterthanorequalto23 ftoverthetopofirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthespentfuelstoragepoolanduppercontainmentfuelstoragepoolracks.Atthislevel,theearliestthatfuelintheSFPcouldbeuncoveredfromboil-offfortheworstcasefullcoreoffload(outageconditionsonly)isapproximately57hourswhichisthelatestmakeupcouldstartperstationanalysisMC-Q1111-Page39of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation14003(Reference3.36).TheearliestthatfuelintheSFPcouldbeuncoveredfromanormalcoreoffload(designbasisheatload)isapproximately132hours(Reference3.36).TheBWROGissuedEPGissue1302relatedtospentfuelpoolinventorythermalexpansion.Duetothetemperatureincreaseinthespentfuelpool,thewatervolumewillexpandandcouldcausewatertoenterthespentfuelpoolsweepventilationducts.Tomitigatethisconcern,spentfuelpooldraintankvalve1 G41F214willbeopenedatapproximately5hoursfollowingtheBDBEEtoensurethatthewaterdrainstotheequipmentdrainsumpratherthantheventilationducts(Reference3.21).TheinitialcopingstrategyforSFPcoolingistoremotelymonitorSFPlevelusinginstrumentation (1G41-LE-N040A/1G41-LI-R040Aand1G41-LE-N040B/1G41-LI-R040B)installedasrequiredbyNRCOrder EA-12-051(Reference3.5).NoadditionalactionsarerequiredduringPhase1forSFPcoolingexceptthatpriortoSFPboiling(approximately5hoursforafullcoreoffloadandapproximately12hoursforadesignbasisheatload),aventpathwayisestablishedtominimizecondensation ofsteamfromtheboilingSFPandtheflexiblehoses/portablemonitornozzlesstoredintheSFPareawillbedeployedontheSFPareafloortoensurethesecomponentsareinplacebeforetheareabecomesinaccessibleduetosteam,temperature,orradiation.Makeuptothepoolisnotrequiredpriortopoolboiling,butthehoseswillberoutedoutsideoftheSFPareafloortoanareathatwillnotbecomeinaccessibleafterboilingcommences.OpeninglocalAuxiliaryBuildingdoors1 A601and1A605(Reference3.62)asshownonFigure1providesadequateventilationtominimizecondensationofsteamintheAuxiliaryBuilding.2.4.2Phase2StrategyFromstationanalysis(Reference3.36),usingtheworstcasedesignbasisheatloadandworstcasefullcoreoffloadtiming,bulkpoolboilingwilloccur5.17hoursfollowinglossofpoolcooling.Atthisheatload,amakeuprateof90gpmisrequiredtomaintainlevelinthepool.Usingthedesignbasisheatloadandanormalrefuelingoutagetimeof20days,theSFPwillstartboiling 11.91hoursafterlossofpoolcooling.Amakeuprateof39gpmisrequiredundertheseconditions.NotethatthelimitingSFPtimetoboil(5.17hours)isforafullcoreoffload.ForaBDBEEinthisplantconfiguration,actionsandresourcesrequiredforPage40of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation14003(Reference3.36).TheearliestthatfuelintheSFPcouldbeuncoveredfromanormalcoreoffload(designbasisheatload)isapproximately132hours(Reference3.36).TheBWROGissuedEPGissue1302relatedtospentfuelpoolinventorythermalexpansion.Duetothetemperatureincreaseinthespentfuelpool,thewatervolumewillexpandandcouldcausewatertoenterthespentfuelpoolsweepventilationducts.Tomitigatethisconcern,spentfuelpooldraintankvalve1 G41F214willbeopenedatapproximately5hoursfollowingtheBDBEEtoensurethatthewaterdrainstotheequipmentdrainsumpratherthantheventilationducts(Reference3.21).TheinitialcopingstrategyforSFPcoolingistoremotelymonitorSFPlevelusinginstrumentation (1G41-LE-N040A/1G41-LI-R040Aand1G41-LE-N040B/1G41-LI-R040B)installedasrequiredbyNRCOrder EA-12-051(Reference3.5).NoadditionalactionsarerequiredduringPhase1forSFPcoolingexceptthatpriortoSFPboiling(approximately5hoursforafullcoreoffloadandapproximately12hoursforadesignbasisheatload),aventpathwayisestablishedtominimizecondensation ofsteamfromtheboilingSFPandtheflexiblehoses/portablemonitornozzlesstoredintheSFPareawillbedeployedontheSFPareafloortoensurethesecomponentsareinplacebeforetheareabecomesinaccessibleduetosteam,temperature,orradiation.Makeuptothepoolisnotrequiredpriortopoolboiling,butthehoseswillberoutedoutsideoftheSFPareafloortoanareathatwillnotbecomeinaccessibleafterboilingcommences.OpeninglocalAuxiliaryBuildingdoors1 A601and1A605(Reference3.62)asshownonFigure1providesadequateventilationtominimizecondensationofsteamintheAuxiliaryBuilding.2.4.2Phase2StrategyFromstationanalysis(Reference3.36),usingtheworstcasedesignbasisheatloadandworstcasefullcoreoffloadtiming,bulkpoolboilingwilloccur5.17hoursfollowinglossofpoolcooling.Atthisheatload,a makeup rateof90gpmisrequiredtomaintainlevelinthepool.Usingthedesignbasisheatloadandanormalrefuelingoutagetimeof20days,theSFPwillstartboiling 11.91hoursafterlossofpoolcooling.Amakeuprateof39gpmisrequiredundertheseconditions.NotethatthelimitingSFPtimetoboil(5.17hours)isforafullcoreoffload.ForaBDBEEinthisplantconfiguration,actionsandresourcesrequiredforPage40of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationcorecoolingandcontainmentwouldbedivertedtoSFPcoolingsincetherewouldbenofuelinthereactorvessel.Afullcoreoffloadwouldoccurduringaplannedorforcedoutagewhenadditionalresources,significantlymorethantheminimumstaffinglevelassumedforthepowerscenario,wouldbeavailabletoassistindebrisremovalandequipmentstaging.PriortoSFPboiling(approximately5hoursforafullcoreoffloadandapproximately12hoursforadesignbasisheatload),forSFPMakeupStrategyMethods1(Hose)and2(Spray)describedbelow,flexiblehosesandportablemonitornozzlesstoredintheSFPareawillbedeployedintheSFPareatoensurethesecomponentsareinplacebeforetheareabecomesinaccessibleduetosteam,temperature,orradiation.Makeuptothepoolisnotrequiredpriortopoolboiling,butthehoseswillberoutedoutsideoftheSFPareatoanareathatwillnotbecomeinaccessibleafterboilingcommences.ForSFPMakeupStrategyMethod3(SFPCoolingPiping)describedbelow,accesstotheSFPareaisnotrequiredtoinitiateSFPmakeup.ForthethreeSFPmakeupstrategymethodsdescribedbelow(SFPmakeupstrategymethodsarenotutilizedsimultaneously)adieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)willbedeployedtotakesuctionfromtheSSWBasin.DischargeflowoftheFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)willberoutedfromtheSSWBasin"A"ValveroomtotheHPCSDieselGeneratorRoomthroughSSWundergroundpiping,whereanewhoseconnectionandhosewilldeliverthewaterintotheAuxiliaryBuilding,asdiscussedaboveforreactorcorecooling(seeSection2.3.5.1).IntheAuxiliaryBuilding,agatedwyewithtwo5"hoseconnectionswillbeprovided;oneconnectionforreactorcorecoolingmakeupandoneforSFPmakeup.TheFLEXpumpiscapableofproviding250gpmofflowtothemonitornozzles(Section2.3.10.1),whichboundsthe90gpmmakeupraterequiredundertheworstcaseheatloadconditions.Thediesel-drivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)issizedtosimultaneouslyprovidetherequiredmakeupflowsforreactorcorecoolingandSFPcooling(Reference3.18).ThefollowingPhase2actionsshownonFigure1arerequiredtomeetthebaselinecopingcapabilitiesandmaintainSFPcooling.Page41of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationcorecoolingandcontainmentwouldbedivertedtoSFPcoolingsincetherewouldbenofuelinthereactorvessel.Afullcoreoffloadwouldoccurduringaplannedorforcedoutagewhenadditionalresources,significantlymorethantheminimumstaffinglevelassumed forthepowerscenario,wouldbeavailabletoassistindebrisremovalandequipmentstaging.PriortoSFPboiling(approximately5hoursforafullcoreoffloadandapproximately12hoursforadesignbasisheatload),forSFPMakeupStrategyMethods1(Hose)and2(Spray)describedbelow,flexiblehosesandportablemonitornozzlesstoredintheSFPareawillbedeployedintheSFPareatoensurethesecomponentsareinplacebeforetheareabecomesinaccessibleduetosteam,temperature,orradiation.Makeuptothepoolisnotrequiredpriortopoolboiling,butthehoseswillberoutedoutsideoftheSFPareatoanareathatwillnotbecomeinaccessibleafterboilingcommences.ForSFPMakeupStrategyMethod3(SFPCoolingPiping)describedbelow,accesstotheSFPareaisnotrequiredtoinitiateSFPmakeup.ForthethreeSFPmakeupstrategymethodsdescribedbelow(SFPmakeupstrategymethodsarenotutilizedsimultaneously)adieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)willbedeployedtotakesuctionfromtheSSWBasin.DischargeflowoftheFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)willberoutedfromtheSSWBasin"A"ValveroomtotheHPCSDieselGeneratorRoomthroughSSWundergroundpiping,whereanewhoseconnectionandhosewilldeliverthewaterintotheAuxiliaryBuilding,asdiscussedaboveforreactorcorecooling(seeSection2.3.5.1).IntheAuxiliaryBuilding,agatedwyewithtwo5"hoseconnectionswillbeprovided;oneconnectionforreactorcorecoolingmakeupandoneforSFPmakeup.TheFLEXpumpiscapableofproviding250gpmofflowtothemonitornozzles(Section2.3.10.1),whichboundsthe90gpmmakeupraterequiredundertheworstcaseheatloadconditions.Thediesel-drivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)issizedtosimultaneouslyprovidetherequiredmakeupflowsforreactorcorecoolingandSFPcooling(Reference3.18).ThefollowingPhase2actionsshownonFigure1arerequiredtomeetthebaselinecopingcapabilitiesandmaintainSFPcooling.Page41of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016 Makeup Strategy Method 1 (Hose)GrandGulfNuclearStationFlexiblehosewillbeconnectedtooneofthetwogatedwyehoseconnectionsatthe139'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuilding.ThehosewillthenberoutedtoconnecttothehosedeployedfromtheSFPareaforcompletionoftheflexiblehoseflowpathfordirectmakeuptotheSFP.Priortocompletionoftheflexiblehoseflowpathanadditionalgatedwyewillbeinstalledatthe185'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuildingformakeupstrategyMethod3(SFPcoolingpipingconnectionlocatedatthatelevation).ImplementationofMethod1ofthisPhase2SFPcoolingstrategyrequiresdeploymentofhosefromthegatedwyeonelevation139'totheSFPareaonelevation208'-10".Foreaseofhoseroutingpriortotheonsetofpoolboiling,multiplesetsofhosearecurrentlystoredinB.5.blockersandanadditionalFLEXequipmentstoragelocker (1 FLEXD010)onelevation208'-10"ofAuxiliaryBuildingaswellasanadditionalFLEXequipmentstoragelocker (1 FLEXD009)onelevation139'.ThisequipmentisprotectedfromexternalhazardssuchthatitwillbeusedfollowingaBDBEE.ThemultiplemethodsofSFPmakeuparenotrequiredsimultaneously.Therefore,thehosesroutedfordirectSFPmakeupandSFPsprayareinterchangeable(i.e.,separatehosesforeachstrategyarenotrequired). Makeup Strategy Method 2 (Spray)AswithMethod1,flexiblehosewillbeconnectedtooneofthetwogatedwyehoseconnectionsatthe139'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuilding.ThehosewillthenberoutedtoconnecttothehosedeployedfromtheSFPareaforcompletionoftheflexiblehoseflowpathforspray/makeuptotheSFP.AswithMethod1,priortocompletionoftheflexiblehoseflowpathforsprayanadditionalgatedwyewillbeinstalledatthe185'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuildingformakeupstrategymethod3(SFPcoolingpiping)connectionlocatedatthatelevation).ImplementationofMethod2ofthisPhase2SFPcoolingstrategyrequiresdeploymentof2 Y2"hosesconnectedtotwospraymonitornozzlessecuredtohandrailsoneachsideofthepoolinaccordancewith 05-1-02-111-1(Reference3.37).Foreaseofhoseroutingpriortotheonsetofpoolboiling,as with.Method1multiplesetsofhose,gatedwye,andhoseStorzconnectionsarestoredinB.5.blockersandanadditionalFLEXequipmentstoragelocker (1 FLEXD010)onelevation208'10"oftheAuxiliaryBuilding.AswithMethod1,aFLEXequipmentstoragelocker (1FLEXD009)hasbeenlocatedonelevation139'.TwospraymonitornozzlesarestoredonthePage42of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016 Makeup Strategy Method 1 (Hose)GrandGulfNuclearStationFlexiblehosewillbeconnectedtooneofthetwogatedwyehoseconnectionsatthe139'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuilding.ThehosewillthenberoutedtoconnecttothehosedeployedfromtheSFPareaforcompletionoftheflexiblehoseflowpathfordirectmakeuptotheSFP.Priortocompletionoftheflexiblehoseflowpathanadditionalgatedwyewillbeinstalledatthe185'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuildingformakeupstrategyMethod3(SFPcoolingpipingconnectionlocatedatthatelevation).ImplementationofMethod1ofthisPhase2SFPcoolingstrategyrequiresdeploymentofhosefromthegatedwyeonelevation139'totheSFPareaon elevation208'-10".Foreaseofhoseroutingpriortotheonsetofpoolboiling,multiplesetsofhosearecurrentlystoredinB.5.blockersandanadditionalFLEXequipmentstoragelocker (1 FLEXD010)onelevation208'-10"ofAuxiliaryBuildingaswellasanadditionalFLEXequipmentstoragelocker (1 FLEXD009)onelevation139'.ThisequipmentisprotectedfromexternalhazardssuchthatitwillbeusedfollowingaBDBEE.ThemultiplemethodsofSFPmakeuparenotrequiredsimultaneously.Therefore,thehosesroutedfordirectSFPmakeupandSFPsprayareinterchangeable(i.e.,separatehosesforeachstrategyarenotrequired). Makeup Strategy Method 2 (Spray)AswithMethod1,flexiblehosewillbeconnectedtooneofthetwogatedwyehoseconnectionsatthe139'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuilding.ThehosewillthenberoutedtoconnecttothehosedeployedfromtheSFPareaforcompletionoftheflexiblehoseflowpathforspray/makeuptotheSFP.AswithMethod1,priortocompletionoftheflexiblehoseflowpathforsprayanadditionalgatedwyewillbeinstalledatthe185'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuildingformakeupstrategymethod3(SFPcoolingpiping)connectionlocatedatthatelevation).ImplementationofMethod2ofthisPhase2SFPcoolingstrategyrequiresdeploymentof2 Y2"hosesconnectedtotwospraymonitornozzlessecuredtohandrailsoneachsideofthepoolinaccordancewith 05-1-02-111-1(Reference3.37).Foreaseofhoseroutingpriortotheonsetofpoolboiling,as with.Method1multiplesetsofhose,gatedwye,andhoseStorzconnectionsarestoredinB.5.blockersandanadditionalFLEXequipmentstoragelocker (1 FLEXD010)onelevation208'10"oftheAuxiliaryBuilding.AswithMethod1,aFLEXequipmentstoragelocker (1FLEXD009)hasbeenlocatedonelevation139'.TwospraymonitornozzlesarestoredonthePage42of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationAuxiliaryBuildingrefuelingflooradjacenttoeachofthetwo(2)B.5.blockersonelevation208'10".Thisequipmentisprotectedfrom.applicableexternalhazardssuchthatitmaybeusedfollowingaBDBEE.ThemultiplemethodsofSFPmakeuparenotrequiredsimultaneously.Therefore,thehosesroutedfordirectSFPmakeupandSFPsprayareinterchangeable(i.e.,separatehosesforeachstrategyarenotrequired). Makeup Strategy Method 3(SFPCoolingPiping)AswithMethods1or2,flexible5"hosewillbeconnectedtooneofthetwo5"hoseconnectionsofthegatedwyeatthe139'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuilding.Thehosewillthenberoutedtoconnecttoagatedwyeinstalledatthe185'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuildingformakeupstrategyMethod3.Atthe185'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuildingthe5"hosewillbereducedandconnectedtoanexistingflushconnectionlocatedontheFuelPoolCoolingandCleanup(FPCCU)pipingjustdownstreamofvalve1 G41F247AasshownonFigure1.ImplementationofMethod3ofthisthisPhase2SFPcoolingstrategyrequiresdeploymentofapproximately300 ftof5"hosefromthegatedwyeonelevation139'tothehoseconnectiononelevation185'oftheAuxiliaryBuilding.AswithMethod1and2,aFLEXequipmentstorage locker (1FLEXD009)hasbeenlocatedonelevation139'foreaseofhoserouting.ThisequipmentisprotectedfromexternalhazardssuchthatitmaybeusedfollowingaBDBEE.ThemultiplemethodsofSFPmakeuparenotrequiredsimultaneously.Therefore,thehosesroutedfordirectSFPmakeupandSFPsprayareinterchangeable(i.e.,separatehosesforeachstrategyarenotrequired).2.4.3Phase3StrategyThestrategiesoutlinedaboveduringPhase2canbecontinuedindefinitelytomaintainSFPcoolinguntiloffsitesuppliedwatertransportationequipmentand/orpumpsortheoptionalPhase3NSRCsuppliedequipmentisusedtorefilltheSSWbasin.Onceconditionspermit,additionalresourcesareavailable,andadditionalcopingcapabilitiesfromtheNSRCareavailable(e.g.,ServiceWaterflowrestored),theSFPcoolingpumpsandheatexchangerscanbereturnedtoservice.Additionalnon-creditedcapabilitieswillbeavailablefromtheNSRCasabackup/replacementtotheon-siteFLEXequipment.Page43of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationAuxiliaryBuildingrefuelingflooradjacenttoeachofthetwo(2)B.5.blockersonelevation208'10".Thisequipmentisprotectedfrom.applicableexternalhazardssuchthatitmaybeusedfollowingaBDBEE.ThemultiplemethodsofSFPmakeuparenotrequiredsimultaneously.Therefore,thehosesroutedfordirectSFPmakeupandSFPsprayareinterchangeable(i.e.,separatehosesforeachstrategyarenotrequired). Makeup Strategy Method 3(SFPCoolingPiping)AswithMethods1or2,flexible5"hosewillbeconnectedtooneofthetwo5"hoseconnectionsofthegatedwyeatthe139'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuilding.Thehosewillthenberoutedtoconnecttoagatedwyeinstalledatthe185'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuildingformakeupstrategyMethod3.Atthe185'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuildingthe5"hosewillbereducedandconnectedtoanexistingflushconnectionlocatedontheFuelPoolCoolingandCleanup(FPCCU)pipingjustdownstreamofvalve1 G41F247AasshownonFigure1.ImplementationofMethod3ofthisthisPhase2SFPcoolingstrategyrequiresdeploymentofapproximately300 ftof5"hosefromthegatedwyeonelevation139'tothehoseconnectiononelevation185'oftheAuxiliaryBuilding.AswithMethod1and2,aFLEXequipmentstorage locker (1FLEXD009)hasbeenlocatedonelevation139'foreaseofhoserouting.ThisequipmentisprotectedfromexternalhazardssuchthatitmaybeusedfollowingaBDBEE.ThemultiplemethodsofSFPmakeuparenotrequiredsimultaneously.Therefore,thehosesroutedfordirectSFPmakeupandSFPsprayareinterchangeable(i.e.,separatehosesforeachstrategyarenotrequired).2.4.3Phase3StrategyThestrategiesoutlinedaboveduringPhase2canbecontinuedindefinitelytomaintainSFPcoolinguntiloffsitesuppliedwatertransportationequipmentand/orpumpsortheoptionalPhase3NSRCsuppliedequipmentisusedtorefilltheSSWbasin.Onceconditionspermit,additionalresourcesareavailable,andadditionalcopingcapabilitiesfromtheNSRCareavailable(e.g.,ServiceWaterflowrestored),theSFPcoolingpumpsandheatexchangerscanbereturnedtoservice.Additionalnon-creditedcapabilitieswillbeavailablefromtheNSRCasabackup/replacementtotheon-siteFLEXequipment.Page43of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril20162.4.4Structures.Systems.andComponentsGrandGulfNuclearStation2.4.4.1PrimaryConnectionThemakeupsourceforSFPinventoryisthesameasforreactorcorecooling.SeeSection 2.3.5.1or2.4.2foradescriptionofthemakeupsourceandthemethodoftransferringthewaterfromtheSSWBasintotheAuxiliaryBuildingwheretheSFPMakeupStrategiesconnect.IntheAuxiliaryBuilding,agatedwyewithtwo5"hoseconnectionsisprovided;oneconnectionforreactorcorecoolingmakeupandoneforSFPmakeup.AllhoseconnectionlocationsareenclosedinseismiccategoryI/tornadomissileprotectedstructuresandarethereforeprotectedfromapplicableexternalhazardssuchthattheywillbeavailablefollowinga BDBEE.Makeup Strategy Method 1 (Hose)Flexiblehosewillbeconnectedtooneofthetwo5"hoseconnectionsofthegatedwyeatthe139'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuilding.ThishosewillthenberoutedtotheSFPareafordirecthosemakeuptotheSFP.ImplementationofthisPhase2SFPcoolingstrategyrequiresdeploymentofapproximately250 ftof5"hosefromthehosewyeonelevation139'toahosewyeonelevation185'and150 ft of4"hosefromthehosewyeonelevation185'totheSFP.ThesehoseconnectionlocationsandhoseroutesareenclosedinaseismiccategoryI/tornadomissileprotectedstructureandarethereforeprotectedfromapplicableexternalhazardssuchthattheywillbeavailablefollowinga BDBEE.Makeup Strategy Method 2 (Spray)Flexiblehosewillbeconnectedtooneofthetwo5"hoseconnectionsofthegatedwyeatthe139'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuilding.ThishosewillthenberoutedtotheSFPareafordirectspraymonitormakeuptotheSFP.ImplementationofthisPhase2SFPcoolingstrategyrequiresdeploymentofapproximately250 ftof5"hosefromthehosewyeonelevation139'toahosewyeonelevation185',150 ftof4"hosefromthehosewyeonelevation185'Page44of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril20162.4.4Structures.Systems.andComponentsGrandGulfNuclearStation2.4.4.1PrimaryConnectionThemakeupsourceforSFPinventoryisthesameasforreactorcorecooling.SeeSection 2.3.5.1or2.4.2foradescriptionofthemakeupsourceandthemethodoftransferringthewaterfromtheSSWBasintotheAuxiliaryBuildingwheretheSFPMakeupStrategiesconnect.IntheAuxiliaryBuilding,agatedwyewithtwo5"hoseconnectionsisprovided;oneconnectionforreactorcorecoolingmakeupandoneforSFPmakeup.AllhoseconnectionlocationsareenclosedinseismiccategoryI/tornadomissileprotectedstructuresandarethereforeprotectedfromapplicableexternalhazardssuch thattheywillbeavailablefollowinga BDBEE.Makeup Strategy Method 1 (Hose)Flexiblehosewillbeconnectedtooneofthetwo5"hoseconnectionsofthegatedwyeatthe139'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuilding.ThishosewillthenberoutedtotheSFPareafordirecthosemakeuptotheSFP.ImplementationofthisPhase2SFPcoolingstrategyrequiresdeploymentofapproximately250 ftof5"hosefromthehosewyeonelevation139'toahosewyeonelevation185'and150 ft of4"hosefromthehosewyeonelevation185'totheSFP.ThesehoseconnectionlocationsandhoseroutesareenclosedinaseismiccategoryI/tornadomissileprotectedstructureandarethereforeprotectedfromapplicableexternalhazardssuchthattheywillbeavailablefollowinga BDBEE.Makeup Strategy Method 2 (Spray)Flexiblehosewillbeconnectedtooneofthetwo5"hoseconnectionsofthegatedwyeatthe139'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuilding.ThishosewillthenberoutedtotheSFPareafordirectspraymonitormakeuptotheSFP.ImplementationofthisPhase2SFPcoolingstrategyrequiresdeploymentofapproximately250 ftof5"hosefromthehosewyeonelevation139'toahosewyeonelevation185',150 ftof4"hosefromthehosewyeonelevation185'Page44of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationtotheSFParea,and50 ftof2 Y2"hosetoeachoftwospraymonitorsattheSFP.ThesehoseconnectionlocationsandhoseroutesareenclosedinaseismiccategoryI/tornado missileprotectedstructureandarethereforeprotectedfromapplicableexternalhazardssuchthattheywillbeavailablefollowingaBDBEE. Makeup Strategy Method 3 (SFP cooling piping)Flexiblehosewillbeconnectedtooneofthetwo5"hoseconnectionsofthegatedwyeatthe139'elevationofthe Auxiliary BUilding.Thishosewillthenberoutedtothe185'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuildingfordirectconnectiontoinstalledFPCCUpipingformakeuptotheSFP.ImplementationofthisPhase2SFPcoolingstrategyrequiresdeploymentofapproximately250 ftof5"hosefromthehosewyeonelevation139'toahosewyeonelevation185'and50ftof5"hosefromthehosewyetotheexistingflushconnectionlocatedontheFPCCUpipingjustdownstreamofvalve1 G41F247A.FollowingaBDBEE,a5"to3"Storzadapteranda3"Storzto2"150#ANSIflangeadapterwillbeusedtoconnectthe5"hosetotheexistingseismicallydesignedandmissileprotectedpiping.ThesehoseconnectionlocationsandhoseroutesareenclosedinaseismiccategoryI/tornadomissileprotectedstructureandarethereforeprotectedfromapplicableexternalhazardssuchthattheywillbeavailablefollowingaBDBEE.2.4.4.2AlternateConnectionIftheHPCSSWsystempipingbetweentheSSWbasinAvalveroomandtheHPCSDGBuildingisunavailable,700feetofflexiblehosestoredineachstoragebuildingwillbeavailabletobedeployedandroutedfromtheFLEXpump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)discharge(whenlocatedateitherservicewaterbasin)tothegatedwyehoseconnectionpointintheAuxiliaryBuildingatthe139'elevationforanyofthethreeSFPmakeupstrategiesandforthereactorcorecoolingprimaryoralternatemakeupstrategy.Additionally,foranyofthethreeSFPmakeupstrategiesandfortheRCSprimaryoralternatemakeupstrategiesminorvariations/equivalenthoseconfigurationsandfittingsare.Page45of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationtotheSFParea,and50 ftof2 Y2"hosetoeachoftwospraymonitorsattheSFP.ThesehoseconnectionlocationsandhoseroutesareenclosedinaseismiccategoryI/tornadomissileprotectedstructureandarethereforeprotectedfromapplicableexternalhazardssuchthattheywillbeavailablefollowingaBDBEE. Makeup Strategy Method 3 (SFP cooling piping)Flexiblehosewillbeconnectedtooneofthetwo5"hoseconnectionsofthegatedwyeatthe139'elevationofthe Auxiliary BUilding.Thishosewillthenberoutedtothe185'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuildingfordirectconnectiontoinstalledFPCCUpipingformakeuptotheSFP.ImplementationofthisPhase2SFPcoolingstrategyrequiresdeploymentofapproximately250 ftof5"hosefromthehosewyeonelevation139'toahosewyeonelevation185'and50ftof5"hosefromthehosewyetotheexistingflushconnectionlocatedontheFPCCUpipingjustdownstreamofvalve1 G41F247A.FollowingaBDBEE,a5"to3"Storzadapteranda3"Storzto2"150#ANSIflangeadapterwillbeusedtoconnectthe5"hosetotheexistingseismicallydesignedandmissileprotectedpiping.ThesehoseconnectionlocationsandhoseroutesareenclosedinaseismiccategoryI/tornadomissileprotectedstructureandarethereforeprotectedfromapplicableexternalhazardssuchthattheywillbeavailablefollowingaBDBEE.2.4.4.2AlternateConnectionIftheHPCSSWsystempipingbetweentheSSWbasinAvalveroomandtheHPCSDGBuildingisunavailable,700feetofflexiblehosestoredineachstoragebuildingwillbeavailabletobedeployedandroutedfromtheFLEXpump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)discharge(whenlocatedateitherservicewaterbasin)tothegatedwyehoseconnectionpointintheAuxiliaryBuildingatthe139'elevationforanyofthethreeSFPmakeupstrategiesandforthereactorcorecoolingprimaryoralternatemakeupstrategy.Additionally,foranyofthethreeSFPmakeupstrategiesandfortheRCSprimaryoralternatemakeupstrategiesminorvariations/equivalenthoseconfigurationsandfittingsare .Page45of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationallowedprovidedthatthehydraulicheadlossesofthealternateinstalledconfigurationsaredocumentedinapprovedprocedurestobewithinthecapabilityoftheFLEX pump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).2.4.4.3VentilationPriortoSFPboiling(approximately5hoursforafullcoreoffloadandapproximately12hoursforadesignbasisheatload),aventpathwayisestablishedtominimizecondensationofsteamintheAuxiliaryBuildingfromtheboilingSFP.LocalAuxiliaryBuildingdoors1 A601 and1A605(Reference3.62)asshownonFigure1willbeopenedtoventtheSFPareatoatmosphere,whichwillprovideadequateventilationtominimizecondensationofsteamintheAuxiliaryBuilding.AnevaluationwasperformedtoensurethattheselectedventpathprovidesaflowratethatexceedstheSFPboiloffrate(Reference3.21).Inadditiontoprovidinga ventllatlonpathpriortoSFPboiling(approximately5hoursforafullcoreoffloadandapproximately12hoursforadesignbasisheatload),thespraymonitornozzlesandhosesstoredintheSFPareawillbepositionedandroutedoutsideoftheSFPareapriortoSFPboiling.Sincemakeuptothepoolisnotrequiredpriortopoolboiling,theSFPareahosesdonotrequirecompleteroutingorconnectiontotheassociatedFLEXsupplyhosepriortoSFPboiling.TakingthisactionpriortoSFPboilingwillprovidethecapabilityforSFPsprayandmakeupviahoseswithoutenteringtherefuelingfloorlaterintheeventwhentheareamaybecomeinaccessible.2.4.5KeyReactorParametersThekeyparameterfortheSFPMake-upstrategyistheSFPwaterlevel.TheSFPwaterlevelisremotelymonitoredbythe instrumentation (1G41-LE-N040A/1G41-LI-R040Aand1N040B/1G41-LI-R040B)thatwasinstalled(Reference3.38)inresponsetoOrderEA-12-051,ReliableSpentFuelPoolLevel Instrumentation(Reference3.5).Page46of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationallowedprovidedthatthehydraulicheadlossesofthealternateinstalledconfigurationsaredocumentedinapprovedprocedurestobewithinthecapabilityoftheFLEX pump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).2.4.4.3VentilationPriortoSFPboiling(approximately5hoursforafullcoreoffloadandapproximately12hoursforadesignbasisheatload),aventpathwayisestablishedtominimizecondensationofsteamintheAuxiliaryBuildingfromtheboilingSFP.LocalAuxiliaryBuildingdoors1 A601 and1A605(Reference3.62)asshownonFigure1willbeopenedtoventtheSFPareatoatmosphere,whichwillprovideadequateventilationtominimizecondensationofsteamintheAuxiliaryBuilding.AnevaluationwasperformedtoensurethattheselectedventpathprovidesaflowratethatexceedstheSFPboiloffrate(Reference3.21).Inadditiontoprovidinga ventllatlonpathpriortoSFPboiling(approximately5hoursforafullcoreoffloadandapproximately12hoursforadesignbasisheatload),thespraymonitornozzlesandhosesstoredintheSFPareawillbepositionedandroutedoutsideoftheSFPareapriortoSFPboiling.Sincemakeuptothepoolisnotrequiredpriortopoolboiling,theSFPareahosesdonotrequirecompleteroutingorconnectiontotheassociatedFLEXsupplyhosepriortoSFPboiling.TakingthisactionpriortoSFPboilingwillprovidethecapabilityforSFPsprayandmakeupviahoseswithoutenteringtherefuelingfloorlaterintheeventwhentheareamaybecomeinaccessible.2.4.5KeyReactorParametersThekeyparameterfortheSFPMake-upstrategyistheSFPwaterlevel.TheSFPwaterlevelisremotelymonitoredbythe instrumentation (1G41-LE-N040A/1G41-LI-R040Aand1N040B/1G41-LI-R040B)thatwasinstalled(Reference3.38)inresponsetoOrderEA-12-051,ReliableSpentFuelPoolLevel Instrumentation(Reference3.5).Page46of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril20162.4.6Thermal-HydraulicAnalyses SpentFuelPoolGrandGulfNuclearStationAnanalyses(Reference3.36)wasperformedthatdeterminedwithnooperatoractionfollowingalossofSFPcoolingatthemaximumrefuelingoutagedesignheatload,theSFPwillreach212°Finapproximately5hoursandwillreachthelevelofthetopofthespentfuelracks[NEI,12-02Level3(Reference3.6)]inapproximately57 ".hoursifnoadditionalwaterissuppliedtotheSFP.Duringnon-outageconditions,thetimetoboilinginthepoolisapproximately 11 hours,andboilofftothelevelofthetopofthespentfuelracks(NEI12-02Level3)isapproximately5.5daysifnoadditionalwaterissuppliedtotheSFP.TheinitialcopingstrategyforSFPcoolingistomonitorSFPlevelusinginstrumentation (1G41-LE-N040A/1G41-LI-R040Aand1G41-LE-N040B/1G41-LI-R040B)installedasrequiredbyNRCOrder EA-12-051.Aflowof90gpmwillreplenishthewaterbeingboiledforthemostlimitingrefuelingoutageheatloadcase.DeploymentofanyoftheSFPmakeupstrategieswithaflowratethatboundstheboil-offrate(90gpmforthelimitingcase)willprovideforadequatemakeuptorestoretheSFPlevelandmaintainanacceptablelevelofwaterforshieldingpurposes.Thediesel-drivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)creditedfortheSFPmakeupiscapableofproviding250gpmofflowtothemonitornozzles(Section2.3.10.1),whichboundsthe90gpmmakeupraterequiredundertheworstcaseheatloadconditions.Thediesel-drivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001and1FLEXC002)issizedtosimultaneouslyprovidetherequiredmakeupflowsforreactorcorecoolingandSFPcooling(Reference3.18).Belowisasummaryoftimetoboil,boiloffrateandtimetotopoffuelforboilofffortheSFPforfullcoreoffloadandnormalcoreoffloadfromstationanalysisMC-Q1111-14003(Reference3.36): Parameter Full Core Offload Normal Offload Duringa20Day OutageTimetoboil5.17hours 11.91 hoursBoil-offrate90gpm39.07gpmTimetotopoffuel57.37hours132.16hoursPage47of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril20162.4.6Thermal-HydraulicAnalyses SpentFuelPoolGrandGulfNuclearStationAnanalyses(Reference3.36)wasperformedthatdeterminedwithnooperatoractionfollowingalossofSFPcoolingatthemaximumrefuelingoutagedesignheatload,theSFPwillreach212°Finapproximately5hoursandwillreachthelevelofthetopofthespentfuelracks[NEI,12-02Level3(Reference3.6)]inapproximately57 ".hoursifnoadditionalwaterissuppliedtotheSFP.Duringnon-outageconditions,thetimetoboilinginthepoolisapproximately 11 hours, and boilofftothelevelofthetopofthespentfuelracks(NEI12-02Level3)isapproximately5.5daysifnoadditionalwaterissuppliedtotheSFP.TheinitialcopingstrategyforSFPcoolingistomonitorSFPlevelusinginstrumentation (1G41-LE-N040A/1G41-LI-R040Aand1G41-LE-N040B/1G41-LI-R040B)installedasrequiredbyNRCOrder EA-12-051.Aflowof90gpmwillreplenishthewaterbeingboiledforthemostlimitingrefuelingoutageheatloadcase.DeploymentofanyoftheSFPmakeupstrategieswithaflowratethatboundstheboil-offrate(90gpmforthelimitingcase)willprovideforadequatemakeuptorestoretheSFPlevelandmaintainanacceptablelevelofwaterforshieldingpurposes.Thediesel-drivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)creditedfortheSFPmakeupiscapableofproviding250gpmofflowtothemonitornozzles(Section2.3.10.1),whichboundsthe90gpmmakeupraterequiredundertheworstcaseheatloadconditions.Thediesel-drivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001and1FLEXC002)issizedtosimultaneouslyprovidetherequiredmakeupflowsforreactorcorecoolingandSFPcooling(Reference3.18).Belowisasummaryoftimetoboil,boiloffrateandtimetotopoffuelforboilofffortheSFPforfullcoreoffloadandnormalcoreoffloadfromstationanalysisMC-Q1111-14003(Reference3.36): Parameter Full Core Offload Normal Offload Duringa20Day OutageTimetoboil5.17hours 11.91 hoursBoil-offrate90gpm39.07gpmTimetotopoffuel57.37hours132.16hoursPage47of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation Upper Containment PoolInadditiontotheSFP,theUCPisalsousedforinterimstorageandcoolingofspentfuelassembliesandifnecessarydefectivefuelstoragecontainers(withfuel)duringrefuelingoperations.ThespentfuelassembliesaretransferredtothespentfuelpoolintheAuxiliaryBuildingforlong-termstorage.Nofueliscontainedintheuppercontainmentpoolduringnormalpoweroperationoftheplant.Belowisasummaryoftimetoboil,boiloffrateandtimetotopoffuelforboilofffortheUCPforfullcoreoffloadfromstationanalysisQ1111-14003(Reference3.36): Parameter Full Core OffloadTimetoboil3.54hoursBoil-offrate60gpmTimetotopoffuel 49.01 hoursMakeuptotheUCPduringrefuelingwouldbehandledviatheShutdownandRefuelingstrategiesincludingtheShutdownSafetyManagementProgram(Reference3.103)(Section2.16addressesthe UCP).2.4.7FlexPumpandWaterSupplies2.4.7.1FLEXInjectionPumpsOneportabledieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001 or1FLEXC002)willbeusedtoprovidemakeupwaterforPhase2reactorcorecoolingandinventorycontrol,aswellasSFPcoolingandinventorycontrol.ForthethreeSFPmakeupstrategymethodsdescribedinSection2.4.2(SFPmakeupstrategymethodsarenotutilizedsimultaneously)thedieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC092)willbedeployedtotakesuctionfromoneoftheSSWBasins.DischargeflowoftheFLEXpumpwillberoutedtothe139'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuildingviaeither,theHPCSSSWundergroundpipingandhoseoronlyhose(Sections 2.4.4.1and2.4.4.2).IntheAuxiliaryBuilding,agatedwyewithtwo5"hoseconnectionsisprovided;oneconnectionforreactorcorecoolingmakeupandoneforSFPmakeup.ForSFPcoolingandinventorycontroltheFLEXpumpiscapableofPage48of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation Upper Containment PoolInadditiontotheSFP,theUCPisalsousedforinterimstorageandcoolingofspentfuelassembliesandifnecessarydefectivefuelstoragecontainers(withfuel)duringrefuelingoperations.ThespentfuelassembliesaretransferredtothespentfuelpoolintheAuxiliaryBuildingforlong-termstorage.Nofueliscontainedintheuppercontainmentpoolduringnormalpoweroperationoftheplant.Belowisasummaryoftimetoboil,boiloffrateandtimetotopoffuelforboilofffortheUCPforfullcoreoffloadfromstationanalysisQ1111-14003(Reference3.36): Parameter Full Core OffloadTimetoboil3.54hoursBoil-offrate60gpmTimetotopoffuel 49.01 hoursMakeuptotheUCPduringrefuelingwouldbehandledviatheShutdownandRefuelingstrategiesincludingtheShutdownSafetyManagementProgram(Reference3.103)(Section2.16addressesthe UCP).2.4.7FlexPumpandWaterSupplies2.4.7.1FLEXInjectionPumpsOneportabledieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001 or1FLEXC002)willbeusedtoprovidemakeupwaterfor Phase2reactorcorecoolingandinventorycontrol,aswellasSFPcoolingandinventorycontrol.ForthethreeSFPmakeupstrategymethodsdescribedinSection2.4.2(SFPmakeupstrategymethodsarenotutilizedsimultaneously)thedieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC092)willbedeployedtotakesuctionfromoneoftheSSWBasins.DischargeflowoftheFLEXpumpwillberoutedtothe139'elevationoftheAuxiliaryBuildingviaeither,theHPCSSSWundergroundpipingandhoseoronlyhose(Sections 2.4.4.1and2.4.4.2).IntheAuxiliaryBuilding,agatedwyewithtwo5"hoseconnectionsisprovided;oneconnectionforreactorcorecoolingmakeupandoneforSFPmakeup.ForSFPcoolingandinventorycontroltheFLEXpumpiscapableofPage48of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationproviding250gpmofflowtothespraymonitornozzles(Section2.3.10.1),whichboundsthe90gpmmakeupraterequiredundertheworstcaseheatloadconditions.Thediesel-drivenFLEXpumpissizedtosimultaneouslyprovidetherequiredmakeupflowsforreactorcorecoolingandSFPcooling(Reference3.18).RefertoSection2.3.10.1foradditionalinformationregardingthedieseldrivenFLEXpump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)utilizedforSFPmakeup.AtotaloftwodieseldrivenFLEXpumpswillbestoredinFLEXstoragefacilities(i.e.onepumpineachstoragebuilding)inordertomeettheNEI12-06requirementsofN+1setsofequipment.ThetrailermountedFLEXPumps (1 FLEXCOO1or1FLEXC002)willbetransferredandstagedviahaulroutesandstagingareasevaluatedforimpactfromapplicableexternalhazards.ProgramsandtrainingwillbeimplementedtosupportthedeploymentandoperationoftheFLEXPumps (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).2.4.7.2UltimateHeatSinkTheFLEXpumpdeployedandalignedforreactorcorecooling/injectionissizedtoallowtheconcurrentadditionofwatertotheSFPfromtheUHSforinventorymakeupastheSFPboilsortoprovideconcurrentspraycapability.Theultimateheatsink(UHS)forthesiteincludesthewaterinventoryoftheseismicallydesignedStandbyServiceWater(SSW)basins.TheFLEXpump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)iscapableofpumpingfromtheSSWbasinsforapproximately99hoursbeforecavitationoccursduetoinsufficientNPSHavailable(Reference3.20).ForthestationanalysistheFLEXpumpdelivers500gpm(250gpmtotheSFPand250gpmforreactorvesselmakeup)forthedurationofthe99hours.AddingwatertotheSSWBasinswillsupportindefiniteoperationofthePhase2FLEXpump.Additionally,seeSection2.15.Page49of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationproviding250gpmofflowtothespraymonitornozzles(Section2.3.10.1),whichboundsthe90gpmmakeupraterequiredundertheworstcaseheatloadconditions.Thediesel-drivenFLEXpumpissizedtosimultaneouslyprovidetherequiredmakeupflowsforreactorcorecoolingandSFPcooling(Reference3.18).RefertoSection2.3.10.1foradditionalinformationregardingthedieseldrivenFLEXpump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)utilizedforSFPmakeup.AtotaloftwodieseldrivenFLEXpumpswillbestoredinFLEXstoragefacilities(i.e.onepumpineachstoragebuilding)inordertomeettheNEI12-06requirementsofN+1setsofequipment.ThetrailermountedFLEXPumps (1 FLEXCOO1or1FLEXC002)willbetransferredandstagedviahaulroutesandstagingareasevaluatedforimpactfromapplicableexternalhazards.ProgramsandtrainingwillbeimplementedtosupportthedeploymentandoperationoftheFLEXPumps (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).2.4.7.2UltimateHeatSinkTheFLEXpumpdeployedandalignedforreactorcorecooling/injectionissizedtoallowtheconcurrentadditionofwatertotheSFPfromtheUHSforinventorymakeupastheSFPboilsortoprovideconcurrentspraycapability.Theultimateheatsink(UHS)forthesiteincludesthewaterinventoryoftheseismicallydesignedStandbyServiceWater(SSW)basins.TheFLEXpump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)iscapableofpumpingfromtheSSWbasinsforapproximately99hoursbeforecavitationoccursduetoinsufficientNPSHavailable(Reference3.20).ForthestationanalysistheFLEXpumpdelivers500gpm(250gpmtotheSFPand250gpmforreactorvesselmakeup)forthedurationofthe99hours.AddingwatertotheSSWBasinswillsupportindefiniteoperationofthePhase2FLEXpump.Additionally,seeSection2.15.Page49of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.4.8ElectricalAnalysisSFPlevelwillbemonitoredbyinstrumentation (1 G41-LE-N040A 1 1 G41-L1-R040Aand1G41-LE-N040B 11G41-LI-R040B)installedforOrderEA-12-051.PowerisprovidedtoSFPIChannel-Afrom 120/240VACBOPpowerpanel1P199whichispoweredfrom480VACBOPMCC13B12.PowerisprovidedtoSFPIChannel-Bfrom120VAClightingpanel1L143whichispoweredfrom480VACBOPMCC14B21.Eachinstrumenthasthecapabilitytoconnecttoasourceofpowerindependentofthenormal AC/DCpowersystem.Theinstrumentshavebuilt-inbatteriesthatwillenablethemtofunctionforatleastsevendaysfollowingalossofpower(Reference3.38).Page50of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.4.8ElectricalAnalysisSFPlevelwillbemonitoredbyinstrumentation (1 G41-LE-N040A 1 1 G41-L1-R040Aand1G41-LE-N040B 11G41-LI-R040B)installedforOrderEA-12-051.PowerisprovidedtoSFPIChannel-Afrom 120/240VACBOPpowerpanel1P199whichispoweredfrom480VACBOPMCC13B12.PowerisprovidedtoSFPIChannel-Bfrom120VAClightingpanel1L143whichispoweredfrom480VACBOPMCC14B21.Eachinstrumenthasthecapabilitytoconnecttoasourceofpowerindependentofthenormal AC/DCpowersystem.Theinstrumentshavebuilt-inbatteriesthatwillenablethemtofunctionforatleastsevendaysfollowingalossofpower(Reference3.38).Page50of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.5ContainmentIntegrityDuringtheBDBEEcontainmentintegrityismaintainedbynormaldesignfeaturesofthecontainment,suchasthecontainmentisolationvalvesandthemodifiedEOPcontainmentventpath.AsthesuppressionpoolheatsupduetoRCICoperationandreliefvalveoperation,thecontainmentwillbegintoheatupandpressurize.TheGGNSFLEXStrategyisbasedonperformingcontainmentventingforcontainmentheatremovalwhenthesuppressionpooltemperatureexceeds190°FtomaintainContainmentpressurebelowdesignconditionsandtominimizetheresultantcontainmenttemperatureincreaseabovedesignconditions. 2.5.1PhaseIThecoreandcontainmentanalysisin XC-01111-14005 (Reference3.13)determinedthatContainmentintegrityismaintainedusinga"RPVfeedandContainmentvent"strategywherecoolwaterisinjectedintotheRPV,steamisdischargedfromtheRPVtotheSPviaSRVs,anddecayheatisremovedfromcontainmentviathemodifiedEOPcontainmentventpath(seeSection 2.5.4.1foradescriptionoftheEOPcontainmentventpath).Basedonresultsofthecoreandcontainmentanalysis(Reference3.13)themodifiedEOPcontainmentventpathwillbeopenedwhenthesuppressionpooltemperatureexceeds190°F(approximatelyfourhoursafterthestartoftheevent).Thisactionlimitsincreasesincontainmentpressureandtemperaturethroughouttheevent.Theventpathremainsopentoremovecontainmentheatforthedurationoftheeventuntilthe"normal"designbasisdecayheatremovalfunctionhasbeenadequatelyrestored,atwhichtimetheventflowwillsubsideandeventuallycease,allowingthevalvesintheventpathtobeclosed.FortheBDBEEdrivenELAP,thecoreandcontainmentanalysisin 01111-14005CaseB(Reference3.13)showsthatthepeakcontainmenttemperatureof233°Fandthepeaksuppressionpoolwatertemperatureof226°Fexceedtheirdesignvaluesof215°Fby18°Fand11°F,respectively.ConfirmationofcontinuedcontainmentintegrityfortheBDBEEdrivenELAPwiththesetemperatureparametersabovetheirdesignvaluesisprovidedinSection2.5.4.2.Allothercontainmentparametersremainbelowtheirrespectivedesignvaluesfortheanalysisdurationof72hours(Reference3.13).Theexpectedelevatedtemperatureswithincontainmentarealsoillustratedbythecurrentlicensingbasisstationblackout(SBO)Page51of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.5ContainmentIntegrityDuringtheBDBEEcontainmentintegrityismaintainedbynormaldesignfeaturesofthecontainment,suchasthecontainmentisolationvalvesandthemodifiedEOPcontainmentventpath.AsthesuppressionpoolheatsupduetoRCICoperationandreliefvalveoperation,thecontainmentwillbegintoheatupandpressurize.TheGGNSFLEXStrategyisbasedonperformingcontainmentventingforcontainmentheatremovalwhenthesuppressionpooltemperatureexceeds190°FtomaintainContainmentpressurebelowdesignconditionsandtominimizetheresultantcontainmenttemperatureincreaseabovedesignconditions. 2.5.1PhaseIThecoreandcontainmentanalysisin XC-01111-14005 (Reference3.13)determinedthatContainmentintegrityismaintainedusinga"RPVfeedandContainmentvent"strategywherecoolwaterisinjectedintotheRPV,steamisdischargedfromtheRPVtotheSPviaSRVs,anddecayheatisremovedfromcontainmentviathemodifiedEOPcontainmentventpath(seeSection 2.5.4.1foradescriptionoftheEOPcontainmentventpath).Basedonresultsofthecoreandcontainmentanalysis(Reference3.13)themodifiedEOPcontainmentventpathwillbeopenedwhenthesuppressionpooltemperatureexceeds190°F(approximatelyfourhoursafterthestartoftheevent).Thisactionlimitsincreasesincontainmentpressureandtemperaturethroughouttheevent.Theventpathremainsopentoremovecontainmentheatforthedurationoftheeventuntilthe"normal"designbasisdecayheatremovalfunctionhasbeenadequatelyrestored,atwhichtimetheventflowwillsubsideandeventuallycease,allowingthevalvesintheventpathtobeclosed.FortheBDBEEdrivenELAP,thecoreandcontainmentanalysisin 01111-14005CaseB(Reference3.13)showsthatthepeakcontainmenttemperatureof233°Fandthepeaksuppressionpoolwatertemperatureof226°Fexceedtheirdesignvaluesof215°Fby18°Fand11°F,respectively.ConfirmationofcontinuedcontainmentintegrityfortheBDBEEdrivenELAPwiththesetemperatureparametersabovetheirdesignvaluesisprovidedinSection2.5.4.2.Allothercontainmentparametersremainbelowtheirrespectivedesignvaluesfortheanalysisdurationof72hours(Reference3.13).Theexpectedelevatedtemperatureswithincontainmentarealsoillustratedbythecurrentlicensingbasisstationblackout(SBO)Page51of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationanalysisdocumentedinGGNS-NE-10-00034(Reference3.41)(Le.giventhedecayheatratefortheextendedthermalratingofGGNSwithnocontainmentheatremovalcapabilitythesuppressionpoolwatertemperatureincreasestoapproximately200 0Fwithin4hoursoftheeventinitiation).TheBWROGGEHEvaluationofFLEXImplementationGuidelinesNEDC-33771P(Reference3.32)indicatesthatgiventheextendedthermalratingofGGNS,evenwithunspecifiedFLEXstrategiesprovidingsubstantialalternatecontainmentheatremovalcapabilities(seeAppendices SandTofNEDC-33771P),thecontainmenttemperatureandsuppressionpoolwatertemperaturepeakabovetheirdesignvalues.Calculation CC-Q1 M10-14001(Reference3.42)andanadditionalevaluationinAttachment6.020ofEC50275(Reference3.21)evaluatedtheimpacttocontainmentandconcludedthattheexpectedtemperatureswithincontainmentareacceptable(seediscussioninSection2.5.4.2).ThePhase1copingstrategyforContainmentincludesmonitoringcontainmentpressure,suppressionpooltemperature,suppressionpoollevel,drywellpressureandcontainmentairtemperature(seeSection2.5.5).TheinstalledClass1EDCdistributionsystemwillprovidepowerforthisinstrumentation.FollowingDCloadshedtheStationDivisionIBattery1A3andDivisionIIBattery1B3willmaintainvoltageaboveminimumrequirementsandwillbecapableofsupplyingpowertotherequiredloadsforapproximately12hoursand14hours,respectively,andpriortobatterydepletion.Priortobatterydepletion,aFLEXgenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)willbedeployedtopowerthebatterychargerstomaintaintheinstrumentationforthedurationoftheevent(seeSection2.5.8).2.5.2Phase2AsdescribedforPhase1,permanentlyinstalledplantequipment/featuresareusedtomaintaincontainmentintegritythroughoutthedurationoftheevent.ThenitrogenbottlesthatareusedtooperatetheAOVsinthemodifiedEOPcontainmentventpathareofsufficientcapacitytomaintaintheventpathopenforover72hourswhichisalsosufficienttimetodeployandconnectadditionalnitrogenbottlesfromeitherFLEXstoragebuildingoroffsiteresources.Similarly,theUPSusedtooperatetheAOVsinthemodifiedEOPcontainmentventpathisofsufficientcapacitytopowerthesolenoidvalvesfor27hours.APage52of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationanalysisdocumentedinGGNS-NE-10-00034(Reference3.41)(Le.giventhedecayheatratefortheextendedthermalratingofGGNSwithnocontainmentheatremovalcapabilitythesuppressionpoolwatertemperatureincreasestoapproximately200 0Fwithin4hoursoftheeventinitiation).TheBWROGGEHEvaluationofFLEXImplementationGuidelinesNEDC-33771P(Reference3.32)indicatesthatgiventheextendedthermalratingofGGNS,evenwithunspecifiedFLEXstrategiesprovidingsubstantialalternatecontainmentheatremovalcapabilities(seeAppendices SandTofNEDC-33771P),thecontainmenttemperatureandsuppressionpoolwatertemperaturepeakabovetheirdesignvalues.Calculation CC-Q1 M10-14001(Reference3.42)andanadditionalevaluationinAttachment6.020ofEC50275(Reference3.21)evaluatedtheimpacttocontainmentandconcludedthattheexpectedtemperatureswithincontainmentareacceptable(seediscussioninSection2.5.4.2).ThePhase1copingstrategyforContainmentincludesmonitoringcontainmentpressure,suppressionpooltemperature,suppressionpoollevel,drywellpressureandcontainmentairtemperature(seeSection2.5.5).TheinstalledClass1EDCdistributionsystemwillprovidepowerforthisinstrumentation.FollowingDCloadshedtheStationDivisionIBattery1A3andDivisionIIBattery1B3willmaintainvoltageaboveminimumrequirementsandwillbecapableofsupplyingpowertotherequiredloadsforapproximately12hoursand14hours,respectively,andpriortobatterydepletion.Priortobatterydepletion,aFLEXgenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)willbedeployedtopowerthebatterychargerstomaintaintheinstrumentationforthedurationoftheevent(seeSection2.5.8).2.5.2Phase2AsdescribedforPhase1,permanentlyinstalledplantequipment/featuresareusedtomaintaincontainmentintegritythroughoutthedurationoftheevent.ThenitrogenbottlesthatareusedtooperatetheAOVsinthemodifiedEOPcontainmentventpathareofsufficientcapacitytomaintaintheventpathopenforover72hourswhichisalsosufficienttimetodeployandconnectadditionalnitrogenbottlesfromeitherFLEXstoragebuildingoroffsiteresources.Similarly,theUPSusedtooperatetheAOVsinthemodifiedEOPcontainmentventpathisofsufficientcapacitytopowerthesolenoidvalvesfor27hours.APage52of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationportablecabledeployedfromeitherFLEXstoragebuildingconnectsthe480V300kWdieselgenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)totheUPSafter24hourstoensurelongtermpowerforthesolenoidvalves.The480V300kWportableFLEXgenerator (1FLEXS009or 1 FLEXS010)isrequiredtorepowerthestationbatterychargersat approximately 11hoursintotheeventtomaintainDCpowerincludingthemonitoringinstrumentationandisthereforereadilyavailabletopowertheAOVsofthemodifiedEOPcontainmentventpath.NEI12-06guidelines(Reference3.3)statethatunitswithMarkIIIcontainment"...shouldaddressthedeploymentofportablepowersuppliesforprovidingbackuppowertothecontainmenthydrogenigniters,includingaprioritizationapproachfordeployment."InordertomeetthisrequirementoftheNEI12-06guidelines,acapabilityis providedtore-poweradivisionofhydrogenigniterswithaportablepowersupply.Aportabledieselgenerator (1 FLEXS011 or1FLEXS022)isstoredineachofthetwo(2)FLEXstoragebuildingsthatwillbedeployedtorepoweronetrainofthehydrogenigniters.Thelocalinitiationofthesingledivisionofhydrogenignitersismanuallyperformedwhendirectedbytheemergencyprocedures.Therefore,thestrategyforPhase2isthecontinuationofthePhase1strategy(useofthemodifiedEOPcontainmentventpath),criticalinstrumentationpoweredbytheFLEXgenerator (1FLEXS009or 1 FLEXS010),andthehydrogenignitersavailabletobepoweredbyaportableFLEXgenerator (1 FLEXS011or1FLEXS022).2.5.3Phase3Thestrategyforlong-termcontainmentintegritywillbethecontinueduseofthestrategyofPhase1andPhase2(containmentventingandavailabilityofthehydrogenigniters)withnoimmediaterelianceonequipmentfromtheNSRC.Duringplantrecovery,operationoftheventpathandtheRHRsystemwillsupportthecontinuedsaferemovalofdecayheatfromtheRPVandcontainment,furtherreducingcontainmenttemperatureandpressurewhichwillensurecontainmentintegrityismaintained.NSRCEquipmentthatmaybeutilizedduringrecoveryislistedinTable4.Page53of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationportablecabledeployedfromeitherFLEXstoragebuildingconnectsthe480V300kWdieselgenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)totheUPSafter24hourstoensurelongtermpowerforthesolenoidvalves.The480V300kWportableFLEXgenerator (1FLEXS009or 1 FLEXS010)isrequiredtorepowerthestationbatterychargersat approximately 11hoursintotheeventtomaintainDCpowerincludingthemonitoringinstrumentationandisthereforereadilyavailabletopowertheAOVsofthemodifiedEOPcontainmentventpath.NEI12-06guidelines(Reference3.3)statethatunitswithMarkIIIcontainment"...shouldaddressthedeploymentofportablepowersuppliesforprovidingbackuppowertothecontainmenthydrogenigniters,includingaprioritizationapproachfordeployment."InordertomeetthisrequirementoftheNEI12-06guidelines,acapabilityisprovidedtore-poweradivisionofhydrogenigniterswithaportablepowersupply.Aportabledieselgenerator (1 FLEXS011 or1FLEXS022)isstoredineachofthetwo(2)FLEXstoragebuildingsthatwillbedeployedtorepoweronetrainofthehydrogenigniters.Thelocalinitiationofthesingledivisionofhydrogenignitersismanuallyperformedwhendirectedbytheemergencyprocedures.Therefore,thestrategyforPhase2isthecontinuationofthePhase1strategy(useofthemodifiedEOPcontainmentventpath),criticalinstrumentationpoweredbytheFLEXgenerator (1FLEXS009or 1 FLEXS010),andthehydrogenignitersavailabletobepoweredbyaportableFLEXgenerator (1 FLEXS011or1FLEXS022).2.5.3Phase3Thestrategyforlong-termcontainmentintegritywillbethecontinueduseofthestrategyofPhase1andPhase2(containmentventingandavailabilityofthehydrogenigniters)withnoimmediaterelianceonequipmentfromtheNSRC.Duringplantrecovery,operationoftheventpathandtheRHRsystemwillsupportthecontinuedsaferemovalofdecayheatfromtheRPVandcontainment,furtherreducingcontainmenttemperatureandpressurewhichwillensurecontainmentintegrityismaintained.NSRCEquipmentthatmaybeutilizedduringrecoveryislistedinTable4.Page53of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril20162.5.4Structures,Systems,ComponentsGrandGulfNuclearStation2.5.4.1EOPContainmentVentPathTosupportFLEXstrategies,theexistingEOPcontainmentventpathwasmodified.Anew20"diameterbutterflytypeairoperatedvalve(AOV)wasinstalledinsideofcontainmentonanew20"teebranchinstalledonthecontainment.ventlineupstreamoftheinboardcontainmentisolationvalve 1 M41F034suchthatthenew20"AOVopensdirectlyintocontainment,bypassingthenon-safetyrelated/qualifiedcharcoalfiltrationtraintoestablishamodifiedventpathdirectlytotheatmosphere.Thenew20"AOVisremotelyoperatedfromanewalternatecontrolpanel (1 M41P001)seismicallyinstalledoutsideofContainment,butnearbyintheAuxiliaryBuilding.Thenew20"AOVisdesignedtooperatewithoutrelianceonnormalinstrumentairornormalACpower.Thetwoexistingairoperated20"diameterprimarycontainmentisolationvalves(PCIVs)andthetwoexistingairoperated20"diametersecondarycontainmentisolationvalves(SCIVs)thataredownstreamofthenew20"AOVinitiallyfailcloseduponthelossofpowerevent;however,followingmodificationtheyareremotelyopenedfromthenewalternatecontrolpanel (1 M41P001)withoutrelianceonnormalinstrumentairornormalACpower.Tosupportthenewalternatecontrolpanel (1 M41P001)andoperationofthefive(5)AOVs,independentnitrogenbottlesareseismicallyinstalledintheAuxiliaryBuildingnexttothecontrolpanel.Also,anindependentUninterruptablePowerSupply(UPS)andassociatedbatteriesareinstalledinpanel 1 M41P001.Thenitrogenbottleshavesufficientcapacitytopowerandmaintaintheventpathopenforatleast72hourswhiletheUPSbatterieshavesufficientcapacitytopowertheAOVsolenoidvalvesforatleast27hourspriortowhichtimeadditionalonsiteandoffsiteresourceswillbeavailable.FortheAOVs,eachadditionalairbottlewillcounteractleakageformorethan36hours(PC-N1M41-14001,Reference3.44).Consideringthatonly2bottlesarerequiredtosupportthe72hourduration,and4bottlesareinstalled,Page54 ofJ20FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril20162.5.4Structures,Systems,ComponentsGrandGulfNuclearStation2.5.4.1EOPContainmentVentPathTosupportFLEXstrategies,theexistingEOPcontainmentventpathwasmodified.Anew20"diameterbutterflytypeairoperatedvalve(AOV)wasinstalledinsideofcontainmentonanew20"teebranchinstalledonthecontainment.ventlineupstreamoftheinboardcontainmentisolationvalve 1 M41F034suchthatthenew20"AOVopensdirectlyintocontainment,bypassingthenon-safetyrelated/qualifiedcharcoalfiltrationtraintoestablishamodifiedventpathdirectlytotheatmosphere.Thenew20"AOVisremotelyoperatedfromanewalternatecontrolpanel (1 M41P001)seismicallyinstalledoutsideofContainment,butnearbyintheAuxiliaryBuilding.Thenew20"AOVisdesignedtooperatewithoutrelianceonnormalinstrumentairornormalACpower.Thetwoexistingairoperated20"diameterprimarycontainmentisolationvalves(PCIVs)andthetwoexistingairoperated20"diametersecondarycontainmentisolationvalves(SCIVs)thataredownstreamofthenew20"AOVinitiallyfailcloseduponthelossofpowerevent;however,followingmodificationtheyareremotelyopenedfromthenewalternatecontrolpanel (1 M41P001)withoutrelianceonnormalinstrumentairornormalACpower.Tosupportthenewalternatecontrolpanel (1 M41P001)andoperationofthefive(5)AOVs,independentnitrogenbottlesareseismicallyinstalledintheAuxiliaryBuildingnexttothecontrolpanel.Also,anindependentUninterruptablePowerSupply(UPS)andassociatedbatteriesareinstalledinpanel 1 M41P001.Thenitrogenbottleshavesufficientcapacitytopowerandmaintaintheventpathopenforatleast72hourswhiletheUPSbatterieshavesufficientcapacitytopowertheAOVsolenoidvalvesforatleast27hourspriortowhichtimeadditionalonsiteandoffsiteresourceswillbeavailable.FortheAOVs,eachadditionalairbottlewillcounteractleakageformorethan36hours(PC-N1M41-14001,Reference3.44).Consideringthatonly2bottlesarerequiredtosupportthe72hourduration,and4bottlesareinstalled,Page54 ofJ20 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationmorethan144hoursisavailableandsufficienttimeexiststodeployandconnectanadditionalnitrogensupplyfromeitherFLEXstoragebuildingsoroffsiteresources.TheUPSpowersupply (1 M41PS01)foroperationoftheAOVsissufficientforatleast27hoursfollowingtheELAPconsideringtherequiredsinglecycleofthefivesolenoidvalves(Reference3.45).Atemporarycablewillberoutedfromaconveniencereceptacleonthe480VFLEXdiesel generator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)within27hourstorepowertheUPS.Thereissufficientcapacityonthe480VFLEXDieselGenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEX010)tocarrytheloadoftheAOVsolenoidvalveUPSintegraltothecontrolpanel1 M41 POO1.2.5.4.2ContainmentFortheBDBEEdrivenELAP,thecoreandcontainmentanalysisinXC-Q1111-14005CaseB(Reference3.13)showsthatthepeakcontainmenttemperatureof233°Fandthepeaksuppressionpoolwatertemperatureof226°Fexceedtheirdesignvaluesof215°Fby18°Fand11°F,respectively.Containmenttemperatureandsuppressionpoolwatertemperaturepassthedesignvalueof215°Fatabout7.5hoursafterthestartoftheevent.Thepeakcontainmenttemperatureoccursatapproximately20.5hoursafterthestartoftheeventandthepeaksuppressionpooltemperatureoccursatabout21.5hoursafterthestartoftheevent.Astheeventprogresses,thesuppressionpoolwatertemperaturedropsbelowthedesignvalueof215°Fatabout144hoursintotheeventandatthesametimecontainmenttemperaturereturnstowithinabout2degreesofthedesignvalue(Reference3.13)wherebothremainforthedurationoftheevent.Althoughsmallincreases,basedonthepeakvaluesofthecontainmentandsuppressionpoolwatertemperature,calculationCC-Q1 M10-14001(Reference3.42)andanevaluationinAttachment6.020'oftheFLEXBasisengineeringevaluation,EC50275(Reference3.21)wereperformedtoconfirmthestructuralintegrityofthecontainmentwallandstructuresfortheseconditionsPage55of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationmorethan144hoursisavailableandsufficienttimeexiststodeployandconnectanadditionalnitrogensupplyfromeitherFLEXstoragebuildingsoroffsiteresources.TheUPSpowersupply (1 M41PS01)foroperationoftheAOVsissufficientforatleast27hoursfollowingtheELAPconsideringtherequiredsinglecycleofthefivesolenoidvalves(Reference3.45).Atemporarycablewillberoutedfromaconveniencereceptacleonthe480VFLEXdiesel generator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)within27hourstorepowertheUPS.Thereissufficientcapacityonthe480VFLEXDieselGenerator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEX010)tocarrytheloadoftheAOVsolenoidvalveUPSintegraltothecontrolpanel1 M41 POO1.2.5.4.2ContainmentFortheBDBEEdrivenELAP,thecoreandcontainmentanalysisinXC-Q1111-14005CaseB(Reference3.13)showsthatthepeakcontainmenttemperatureof233°F andthepeaksuppressionpoolwatertemperatureof226°Fexceedtheirdesignvaluesof215°Fby18°Fand11°F,respectively.Containmenttemperatureandsuppressionpoolwatertemperaturepassthedesignvalueof215°Fatabout7.5hoursafterthestartoftheevent.Thepeakcontainmenttemperatureoccursatapproximately20.5hoursafterthestartoftheeventandthepeaksuppressionpooltemperatureoccursatabout21.5hoursafterthestartoftheevent.Astheeventprogresses,thesuppressionpoolwatertemperaturedropsbelowthedesignvalueof215°Fatabout144hoursintotheeventandatthesametimecontainmenttemperaturereturnstowithinabout2degreesofthedesignvalue(Reference3.13)wherebothremainforthedurationoftheevent.Althoughsmallincreases,basedonthepeakvaluesofthecontainmentandsuppressionpoolwatertemperature,calculationCC-Q1 M10-14001(Reference3.42)andanevaluationinAttachment6.020'oftheFLEXBasisengineeringevaluation,EC50275(Reference3.21)wereperformedtoconfirmthestructuralintegrityofthecontainmentwallandstructuresfortheseconditionsPage55of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station associatedwiththe FLEX Strategy.The method of analysisusedto evaluate the existing containmentwallwas based on the following steps:..The design calculations (Reference3.47)were reviewed for thermal loading conditions to establish the maximum design temperatureusedinthe analysis;*The design calculations were reviewed to identify the critical load combinations;*The design calculations were reviewed to identify the most critical locationsinthe containmentwall;and..The design calculations were reviewed to ensure that the stresses and strainsinthe concrete, reinforcingsteeland linerplatedidnot exceed the allowable limits.Forthenew temperatureof233°F, thermal loads were evaluated using temperature increase ratios.The analysis (Reference 3.42)determinedthatthe structural integrityofthe existing containmentwallis satisfactory subjecttothesmall temperature increasesatthepeak temperatures associatedwiththe FLEX Strategy as describedinthe FLEX Basis engineering evaluation, EC50275 (Reference 3.21).2.5.5 Key Containment Parameters In additiontothekey containment parameters requiredbyNEI12-06, containment pressure, suppression pool temperature, and suppressionpoollevel,the installed Class1EDC distribution systemwillalso provide power for instrumentation to monitor drywell pressure and containment air temperature. The instruments and their associated power supplies for monitoring the containment parameters(NEI12-06, Section 3.2.1.10)above are presented in Table 2.Instruments for alternate monitoring(NEI12-06, Section5.3.3,Item1)are noted in Table2withan asterisk (*).Page56of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station associatedwiththe FLEX Strategy.The method of analysisusedto evaluate the existing containmentwallwas based on the following steps:..The design calculations (Reference3.47)were reviewed for thermal loading conditions to establish the maximum design temperatureusedinthe analysis;*The design calculations were reviewed to identify the critical load combinations;*The design calculations were reviewed to identify the most critical locationsinthe containmentwall;and..The design calculations were reviewed to ensure that the stresses and strainsinthe concrete, reinforcingsteeland linerplatedidnot exceed the allowable limits.Forthenew temperatureof233°F, thermal loads were evaluated using temperature increase ratios.The analysis (Reference 3.42)determinedthatthe structural integrityofthe existing containmentwallis satisfactory subjecttothesmall temperature increasesatthepeak temperatures associatedwiththe FLEX Strategy as describedinthe FLEX Basis engineering evaluation, EC50275 (Reference 3.21).2.5.5 Key Containment Parameters In additiontothekey containment parameters requiredbyNEI12-06, containment pressure, suppression pool temperature, and suppressionpoollevel,the installed Class1EDC distribution systemwillalso provide power for instrumentation to monitor drywell pressure and containment air temperature. The instruments and their associated power supplies for monitoring the containment parameters(NEI12-06, Section 3.2.1.10)above are presented in Table 2.Instruments for alternate monitoring(NEI12-06, Section5.3.3,Item1)are noted in Table2withan asterisk (*).Page56of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear Station\Table 2 Function Instrument Transmitter Power Supplies Containment M71-PDR-R601 A M71-PDT-002A*Loop:11DA;72-11 A29 Pressure M71-PDT-027A* Recorder:11DA;72-11A29 M71-PDR-R601 B M71-PDT-002BLoop:11DB;72-11B32 M71-PDT-027B Recorder:11DB;72-11B32 Suppression M71-TR-R605A M71-TE-N012A*RecordersA&C:11DA;Pool M71-TR-R605C M71-TE-N022A*72-11A29 Temperature M71-TE-N023A* Temp sensors:1Y89;M71-TE-N024A* 08-1 Y89-15 M71-TE-N025A*M71-TE-N026A*M71-TR-R605B M71-TE-N012B*RecordersB&0:11DB;M71-TR-R605D M71-TE-N022B*72-11B32 M71-TE-N023B* Temp sensors:1Y84;M71-TE-N024B*08-1 Y84-15 M71-TE-N025B*M71-TE-N026B* Suppression E30-LR-R600A E30-L T-N003C*Loop:11DA;72-11 A29 Pool Level Recorder:11DA;72-11A29 E30-LR-R600B E30-L T-N003D*Loop:11DB;72-11B32 Recorder:11DB;72-11B32 Containment M71-TR-R602A M71-TE-N007 A*RecordersA&C:1Y89;Air M71-TR-R603A M71-TE-N007C*08-1 Y89-15 Temperature Temp sensors:11DA;72-11A29 M71-TR-R602B M71-TE-N007B*RecordersA&C:1Y84;M71-TR-R603B M71-TE-N007D*08-1 Y84-15 Temp sensors:11DB;72-11B32 Dry Well M71-PDR-R601 A M71-PDT-001A*Loop:11DA;72-11A29 Pressure Recorder:11DA;72-11A29 M71-PDR-R601 B M71-PDT-001B*Loop:11DB;72-11B32 Recorder:11DB;72-11B32Theabove instrumentation is availablepriortoandafterloadsheddingofthedcbusesduringPhase1.Continued availabilityduringPhases2and3is maintainedbyrepoweringthe125VDCbattery chargers forthestation125VDCbatteriesusingeitherFLEXPortableDiesel Generator (1FLEXS009or1FLEXS010)(seeSection2.5.8). Page57of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear Station\Table 2 Function Instrument Transmitter Power Supplies Containment M71-PDR-R601 A M71-PDT-002A*Loop:11DA;72-11 A29 Pressure M71-PDT-027A* Recorder:11DA;72-11A29 M71-PDR-R601 B M71-PDT-002BLoop:11DB;72-11B32 M71-PDT-027B Recorder:11DB;72-11B32 Suppression M71-TR-R605A M71-TE-N012A*RecordersA&C:11DA;Pool M71-TR-R605C M71-TE-N022A*72-11A29 Temperature M71-TE-N023A* Temp sensors:1Y89;M71-TE-N024A* 08-1 Y89-15 M71-TE-N025A*M71-TE-N026A*M71-TR-R605B M71-TE-N012B*RecordersB&0:11DB;M71-TR-R605D M71-TE-N022B*72-11B32 M71-TE-N023B* Temp sensors:1Y84;M71-TE-N024B*08-1 Y84-15 M71-TE-N025B*M71-TE-N026B* Suppression E30-LR-R600A E30-L T-N003C*Loop:11DA;72-11 A29 Pool Level Recorder:11DA;72-11A29 E30-LR-R600B E30-L T-N003D*Loop:11DB;72-11B32 Recorder:11DB;72-11B32 Containment M71-TR-R602A M71-TE-N007 A*RecordersA&C:1Y89;Air M71-TR-R603A M71-TE-N007C*08-1 Y89-15 Temperature Temp sensors:11DA;72-11A29 M71-TR-R602B M71-TE-N007B*RecordersA&C:1Y84;M71-TR-R603B M71-TE-N007D*08-1 Y84-15 Temp sensors:11DB;72-11B32 Dry Well M71-PDR-R601 A M71-PDT-001A*Loop:11DA;72-11A29 Pressure Recorder:11DA;72-11A29 M71-PDR-R601 B M71-PDT-001B*Loop:11DB;72-11B32 Recorder:11DB;72-11B32Theabove instrumentation is availablepriortoandafterloadsheddingofthedcbusesduringPhase1.Continued availabilityduringPhases2and3is maintainedbyrepoweringthe125VDCbattery chargers forthestation125VDCbatteriesusingeitherFLEXPortableDiesel Generator (1FLEXS009or1FLEXS010)(seeSection2.5.8). Page57of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationPortableFLEXequipmentissuppliedwiththelocalinstrumentationneededtooperatetheequipment.TheuseoftheseinstrumentsisdetailedintheassociatedFSGsforuseoftheequipment.Theseproceduresarebasedoninputsfromtheequipmentsuppliers,operationexperience,andexpectedequipmentfunctioninanELAP.FLEXsupportguidelinesareprovidedforalternatemonitoringofthecriticalparameterslocallyinaccordancewiththeguidelinesofNEI06Section 5.3.3.1.2.5.6Thermal-HydraulicAnalysesCalculationXC-Q1111-14005,Rev.000,GrandGulfCoreandContainmentAnalysisofFLEXStrategies(Reference3.13),analyzestheGGNScoreandcontainmentfortheFLEXstrategiesduringELAPconditionswithsimultaneousLUHS(CaseBofAppendix9isusedasthebasisfortheGGNSFLEXstrategyandallsupportinganalysis).Thecalculationdeterminestimingsignificantactionsinreferencetotheeventinitiationandassociatedsymptomaticindications,includingthe following:*Approximately2hours-HCTLcurveisreached,operatorsreducereactorpressureinaccordancewithtechspectemperaturechangeof100°F/hrandmaintainreactorpressurebetween200-400psig;*Approximately3hours-Suppressionpooltemperatureexceeds170°F,RCICsuctionisswappedfromthesuppressionpooltotheUCP;*Approximately4hours-Suppressionpooltemperatureexceeds190°FandthemodifiedEOPcontainmentventisopenedandmaintainedopenthroughouttherestoftheevent;and*Approximately20hours-UCPlevelavailableforRCICsuctionisdepletedandRPVisdepressurizedtoallowtherequiredinjectionfromportabledieseldrivenFLEXMakeuppump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).Theresultsofthestrategyindicatethatdrywelltemperature,drywellpressure,containmentpressure,coretemperature,andRPVwaterlevelallremainwithintheacceptabledesignvalues.ThecalculatednumberofSRVactuationsis79throughouttheevent.TheanalysisPage58of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationPortableFLEXequipmentissuppliedwiththelocalinstrumentationneededtooperatetheequipment.TheuseoftheseinstrumentsisdetailedintheassociatedFSGsforuseoftheequipment.Theseproceduresarebasedoninputsfromtheequipmentsuppliers,operationexperience,andexpectedequipmentfunctioninanELAP.FLEXsupportguidelinesareprovidedforalternatemonitoringofthecriticalparameterslocallyinaccordancewiththeguidelinesofNEI06Section 5.3.3.1.2.5.6Thermal-HydraulicAnalysesCalculationXC-Q1111-14005,Rev.000,GrandGulfCoreandContainmentAnalysisofFLEXStrategies(Reference3.13),analyzestheGGNScoreandcontainmentfortheFLEXstrategiesduringELAPconditionswithsimultaneousLUHS(CaseBofAppendix9isusedasthebasisfortheGGNSFLEXstrategyandallsupportinganalysis).Thecalculationdeterminestimingsignificantactionsinreferencetotheeventinitiationandassociatedsymptomaticindications,includingthe following:
- Approximately2hours-HCTLcurveisreached,operatorsreducereactorpressureinaccordancewithtechspectemperaturechangeof100°F/hrandmaintainreactorpressurebetween200-400psig;*Approximately3hours-Suppressionpooltemperatureexceeds170°F,RCICsuctionisswappedfromthesuppressionpooltotheUCP;*Approximately4hours-Suppressionpooltemperatureexceeds190°FandthemodifiedEOPcontainmentventisopenedandmaintainedopenthroughouttherestoftheevent;and*Approximately20hours-UCPlevelavailableforRCICsuctionisdepletedandRPVisdepressurizedtoallowtherequiredinjectionfromportabledieseldrivenFLEXMakeuppump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002).Theresultsofthestrategyindicatethatdrywelltemperature,drywellpressure,containmentpressure,coretemperature,andRPVwaterlevelallremainwithintheacceptabledesignvalues.ThecalculatednumberofSRVactuationsis79throughouttheevent.TheanalysisPage58of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationshowedthatthepeakcontainmenttemperatureof233°Fandthepeaksuppressionpoolwatertemperatureof225°Fexceedtheirdesignvaluesof215°Fby18°Fand11°F,respectively.AsdiscussedinSection2.5.4.2,theelevatedcontainmenttemperaturehasbeenevaluatedfortheuniqueloadingconditionsassociatedwiththeFLEXstrategy.Theevaluationconcludesthatthestructuralintegrityoftheexistingcontainmentwallsubjecttotheincreasedtemperatureof233°Fissatisfactory.BecausetheRCICpumpisnottakingsuctionfromthesuppressionpooloncethesuppressionpooltemperatureisgreaterthan170°F,exceedingthesedesignvalueswillnotimpactRCICoperation.BasedontheresultsofcalculationMC-Q1111-14001(Reference3.48),byusingboththesuppressionpoolanduppercontainmentpoolasasuctionsource,sufficientNPSHisavailableforRCICpumpoperationthroughouttheevent.NEDC-33771P(Reference3.32)documentsthatlongtermcontainmentventingcouldpotentiallyleadtonegativepressuresincontainmentsincetheanalyticalmodelsupportingNEDC-33771Pdidnotsupportreverseflowthroughthesimulated16"vent.Regardlessofthisanalyticallimitationofthe NEDC-33771Pmodel,reverseflowthroughthemodifiedEOPventispossible,whichnegatesnegativepressureconcernsincontainmentandproceduralprecautionsareprovidedforoperatoractiontoconsidercontainmentpressurecontrolpriortotransitionfromtheapprovedFLEXsupportguidelines(Reference3.104).FortheFLEXmitigationstrategy,thepressuresuppressionpressurecurveandtheSRVtailpipelevellimitwaterlevelarenotexceededfortheevent(References3.13and3.14)RefertoSection2.3.7regardingtheuseoftheMAAP4computercode.2.5.7FLEXPumpandWaterSuppliesAsdiscussedinSection2.5.1,whenthesuppressionpooltemperatureexceeds1 gO°Fat4hoursafterthestartoftheevent,themodifiedEOPcontainmentventpathisopenedtoprovidecontainmentheatremovalandbeginalongtermstrategyofreactormakeupandboilingtoprotectthecoreandcontainment.SeeSection2.3.10foradiscussionregardingreactormakeupwiththeportabledieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)fromtheSSWBasins.Page59of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationshowedthatthepeakcontainmenttemperatureof233°Fandthepeaksuppressionpoolwatertemperatureof225°Fexceedtheirdesignvaluesof215°Fby18°Fand11°F,respectively.AsdiscussedinSection2.5.4.2,theelevatedcontainmenttemperaturehasbeenevaluatedfortheuniqueloadingconditionsassociatedwiththeFLEXstrategy.Theevaluationconcludesthatthestructuralintegrityoftheexistingcontainmentwallsubjecttotheincreasedtemperatureof233°Fissatisfactory.BecausetheRCICpumpisnottakingsuctionfromthesuppressionpooloncethesuppressionpooltemperatureisgreaterthan170°F,exceedingthesedesignvalueswillnotimpactRCICoperation.BasedontheresultsofcalculationMC-Q1111-14001(Reference3.48),byusingboththesuppressionpoolanduppercontainmentpoolasasuctionsource,sufficientNPSHisavailableforRCICpumpoperationthroughouttheevent.NEDC-33771P(Reference3.32)documentsthatlongtermcontainmentventingcouldpotentiallyleadtonegativepressuresincontainmentsincetheanalyticalmodelsupportingNEDC-33771Pdidnotsupportreverseflowthroughthesimulated16"vent.Regardlessofthisanalyticallimitationofthe NEDC-33771Pmodel,reverseflowthroughthemodifiedEOPventispossible,whichnegatesnegativepressureconcernsincontainmentandproceduralprecautionsareprovidedforoperatoractiontoconsidercontainmentpressurecontrolpriortotransitionfromtheapprovedFLEXsupportguidelines(Reference3.104).FortheFLEXmitigationstrategy,thepressuresuppressionpressurecurveandtheSRVtailpipelevellimitwaterlevelarenotexceededfortheevent(References3.13and3.14)RefertoSection2.3.7regardingtheuseoftheMAAP4computercode.2.5.7FLEXPumpandWaterSuppliesAsdiscussedinSection2.5.1,whenthesuppressionpooltemperatureexceeds1 gO°Fat4hoursafterthestartoftheevent,themodifiedEOPcontainmentventpathisopenedtoprovidecontainmentheatremovalandbeginalongtermstrategyofreactormakeupandboilingtoprotectthecoreandcontainment.SeeSection2.3.10foradiscussionregardingreactormakeupwiththeportabledieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)fromtheSSWBasins.Page59of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.5.8ElectricalAnalysisPowerrequirementsforthecontainmentcriticalinstrumentationareprovidedbythestationbatteries.SeeSection2.3.11foradiscussionregardingrepoweringthestationbatterychargerswiththeFLEXportable480VDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS01 0).A15kWportabledieselgenerator (1 FLEXS011or1FLEXS022)isusedtorepoweronetrainofthehydrogenignitersifnecessaryandwhendirectedbytheemergencyprocedures.Atotaloftwo15kWDGswillbestoredintheFLEXstoragefacilities(i.e.one15kWDGineachstoragebuilding)inordertomeettheNEI12-06requirementsofN+1setsofequipment.TheUPSpowersupplyforoperationoftheAOVsissufficientforgreaterthan27hoursfollowingtheELAPconsideringtherequired singlecycleofthefivesolenoidvalves(Reference3.45).Thereissufficientcapacityonthe480V300kWportableDG (1FLEXS009or 1 FLEXS010)tocarrytheloadoftheAOVsolenoidvalveUPSintegraltothecontrolpanel1 M41 P001(EC-Q1111-14002,Reference3.46).One480V300kWportableDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)anditsassociatedpowercablewillbestoredineachstoragebuildinginordertomeettheNEI12-06requirementsofN+1setsofequipment.Page60of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.5.8ElectricalAnalysisPowerrequirementsforthecontainmentcriticalinstrumentationareprovidedbythestationbatteries.SeeSection2.3.11foradiscussionregardingrepoweringthestationbatterychargerswiththeFLEXportable480VDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS01 0).A15kWportabledieselgenerator (1 FLEXS011or1FLEXS022)isusedtorepoweronetrainofthehydrogenignitersifnecessaryandwhendirectedbytheemergencyprocedures.Atotaloftwo15kWDGswillbestoredintheFLEXstoragefacilities(i.e.one15kWDGineachstoragebuilding)inordertomeettheNEI12-06requirementsofN+1setsofequipment.TheUPSpowersupplyforoperationoftheAOVsissufficientforgreaterthan27hoursfollowingtheELAPconsideringtherequiredsinglecycleofthefivesolenoidvalves(Reference3.45).Thereissufficientcapacityonthe480V300kWportableDG (1FLEXS009or 1 FLEXS010)tocarrytheloadoftheAOVsolenoidvalveUPSintegraltothecontrolpanel1 M41 P001(EC-Q1111-14002,Reference3.46).One480V300kWportableDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)anditsassociatedpowercablewillbestoredineachstoragebuildinginordertomeettheNEI12-06requirementsofN+1setsofequipment.Page60of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril20162.6CharacterizationofExternalHazardsGrandGulfNuclearStation 2.6.1 SeismicPertheGGNSUFSAR(Reference3.24,Section2.5),theseismiccriteriaforGGNSincludetwodesignbasisearthquakespectra:theOperatingBasisEarthquake (aBE)andtheDesignBasisEarthquake(DBE)(SafeShutdownEarthquake).TheDBEandthe aBEare0.15gand0.075g,respectively;thesevaluesconstitutethedesignbasisofGGNS.PerNEI12-06Section5.2(Reference3.3),allsiteswillconsidertheseismichazard.Therefore,implementationoftheFLEXcopingstrategyisstructuredtobeachievablefollowingaseismicevent,includingstorageanddeploymentofFLEXequipment,andutilizationofinstalledSSCsthatareseismicallyrobustasdefinedin NEI12-06.TheconditionsoftheequipmentdeploymentpathsfollowingaBDBEEwereassessed(Reference3.49).AsubsurfaceexplorationwasperformedtoevaluatetheengineeringpropertiesofthesubsurfacesoilswithinthetwoFLEXstoragebuildingsites,NSRCStagingAreaB(thePhase3recoveryequipmentstagingarea),andalongthetravelpaths.Thepotentialforsoilliquefactionalongtheequipmentdeploymentpathswasdeterminedtobelow,withthemaximumverticalsettlementatthetestlocationsfollowingstrongshakingestimatedtobelessthanoneinch;therefore,nomitigationorgroundimprovementswerenecessaryintheseareas.InaccordancewiththeNRCRequestForInformationPursuantto10CFR50.54(f)RegardingtheSeismicAspectsofRecommendation 2.1oftheNear-TermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromtheFukushimaDai-ichiAccident(Reference3.50),aseismichazardandscreeningevaluationwasperformedforGGNS(Reference3.51).AGroundMotionResponseSpectra(GMRS)wasdevelopedsolelyforpurposeofscreeningforadditionalevaluationsinaccordancewithNRCendorsedEPRIReport1025287,"Screening,PrioritizationandImplementationDetails(SPID)fortheResolutionofFukushimaTermTaskForceRecommendation2.1:Seismic"(Reference3.52).Basedontheresultsofthescreeningevaluation,nofurtherevaluationwillbeperformedforGGNS.Page61of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril20162.6CharacterizationofExternalHazardsGrandGulfNuclearStation 2.6.1 SeismicPertheGGNSUFSAR(Reference3.24,Section2.5),theseismiccriteriaforGGNSincludetwodesignbasisearthquakespectra:theOperatingBasisEarthquake (aBE)andtheDesignBasisEarthquake(DBE)(SafeShutdownEarthquake).TheDBEandthe aBEare0.15gand0.075g,respectively;thesevaluesconstitutethedesignbasisofGGNS.PerNEI12-06Section5.2(Reference3.3),allsiteswillconsidertheseismichazard.Therefore,implementationoftheFLEXcopingstrategyisstructuredtobeachievablefollowingaseismicevent,includingstorageanddeploymentofFLEXequipment,andutilizationofinstalledSSCsthatareseismicallyrobustasdefinedin NEI12-06.TheconditionsoftheequipmentdeploymentpathsfollowingaBDBEEwereassessed(Reference3.49).AsubsurfaceexplorationwasperformedtoevaluatetheengineeringpropertiesofthesubsurfacesoilswithinthetwoFLEXstoragebuildingsites,NSRCStagingAreaB(thePhase3recoveryequipmentstagingarea),andalongthetravelpaths.Thepotentialforsoilliquefactionalongtheequipmentdeploymentpathswasdeterminedtobelow,withthemaximumverticalsettlementatthetestlocationsfollowingstrongshakingestimatedtobelessthanoneinch;therefore,nomitigationorgroundimprovementswerenecessaryintheseareas.InaccordancewiththeNRCRequestForInformationPursuantto10CFR50.54(f)RegardingtheSeismicAspectsofRecommendation 2.1oftheNear-TermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromtheFukushimaDai-ichiAccident(Reference3.50),aseismichazardandscreeningevaluationwasperformedforGGNS(Reference3.51).AGroundMotionResponseSpectra(GMRS)wasdevelopedsolelyforpurposeofscreeningforadditionalevaluationsinaccordancewithNRCendorsedEPRIReport1025287,"Screening,PrioritizationandImplementationDetails(SPID)fortheResolutionofFukushimaTermTaskForceRecommendation2.1:Seismic"(Reference3.52).Basedontheresultsofthescreeningevaluation,nofurtherevaluationwillbeperformedforGGNS.Page61of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.6.2ExternalFloodingThesitewasoriginallydesignatedasadrysiteforFLEXbasedonGGNSUFSARAppendix3Awhichidentifiedtheplantasadrysite Jbasedontheplantgradeelevationbeing30feetgreaterthantheprobablemaximumflood(PMF)level.Afterconsiderationoftheneedforfloodbarriersforprobablemaximumprecipitation(PMP)andtheguidanceofNEI12-06(Reference3.3),GGNSisclassifiedasawetsiteforbeyonddesignbasisevents.InaccordancewiththeNRCRequestforInformationPursuantto10CFR50.54(f)regardingthefloodingaspectsofRecommendation 2.1 oftheNear-TermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromtheFukushimaichiAccident(Reference3.50),areevaluationoffloodinghazardsatGGNSwasperformed(Reference3.53).Thereevaluation representsthemostcurrentfloodinganalysisforGGNS.ReevaluationoffloodingduetoLocalIntensePrecipitation(LIP)hasresultedinafloodingheightof133.7ftMSLversusthecurrentlicensingbasisof133.25ftMSLwhichisbasedonPMP.(ThefloodmechanismconsideredtobecontrollingplantflooddesigninthecurrentlicensingbasisisthePMPonthewatershedsforthetwolocalstreams(StreamAandStreamB)whichincludesthesite[Reference3.24,Section 2.4.2.2]).TheimpactofexternalfloodingontheFLEXstrategiesisaddressedbyEC50287(Reference3.49)andGGNS-SA-14-00002(Reference3.14)whichconsiderthefloodlevelof133.7ftfromtherevisedfloodinganalysis(Reference3.53).Eventhoughconsideringthisrevisedfloodinganalysisisnotrequiredtocomplywithpercurrentindustryguidance(Reference3.3),theimpactofexternalfloodingontheFLEXstrategiesisaddressedinaccordancewithNEI12-06(sections6.2.2and6.2.3(includingsub-sections 6.2.3.1 through6.2.3.4))includingcredittakenforexistingsitemitigatingactions(deploymentofsandbags)containedinprocedure05-1-02-VI-2(Reference3.54).Thisproceduredirectsthesitetodeploysandbagsuptoanelevationof134'-6".2.6.3SevereStormswithHighWindTheGGNSplantsiteislocatedbelowthe35thparallel(Reference3.24,Section2.1.1.1).PerFigures 7-1and7-2ofNEI12-06(Reference3.3),hurricanesandtornadohazardsareapplicabletoGGNS.Therefore,hazardsfromextremehighwindsareconsideredinPage62of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.6.2ExternalFloodingThesitewasoriginallydesignatedasadrysiteforFLEXbasedonGGNSUFSARAppendix3Awhichidentifiedtheplantasadrysite Jbasedontheplantgradeelevationbeing30feetgreaterthantheprobablemaximumflood(PMF)level.Afterconsiderationoftheneedforfloodbarriersforprobablemaximumprecipitation(PMP)andtheguidanceofNEI12-06(Reference3.3),GGNSisclassifiedasawetsiteforbeyonddesignbasisevents.InaccordancewiththeNRCRequestforInformationPursuantto10CFR50.54(f)regardingthefloodingaspectsofRecommendation 2.1 oftheNear-TermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromtheFukushimaichiAccident(Reference3.50),areevaluationoffloodinghazardsatGGNSwasperformed(Reference3.53).Thereevaluation representsthemostcurrentfloodinganalysisforGGNS.ReevaluationoffloodingduetoLocalIntensePrecipitation(LIP)hasresultedinafloodingheightof133.7ftMSLversusthecurrentlicensingbasisof133.25ftMSLwhichisbasedonPMP.(ThefloodmechanismconsideredtobecontrollingplantflooddesigninthecurrentlicensingbasisisthePMPonthewatershedsforthetwolocalstreams(StreamAandStreamB)whichincludesthesite[Reference3.24,Section 2.4.2.2]).TheimpactofexternalfloodingontheFLEXstrategiesisaddressedbyEC50287(Reference3.49)andGGNS-SA-14-00002(Reference3.14)whichconsiderthefloodlevelof133.7ftfromtherevisedfloodinganalysis(Reference3.53).Eventhoughconsideringthisrevisedfloodinganalysisisnotrequiredtocomplywithpercurrentindustryguidance(Reference3.3),theimpactofexternalfloodingontheFLEXstrategiesisaddressedinaccordancewithNEI12-06(sections6.2.2and6.2.3(includingsub-sections 6.2.3.1 through6.2.3.4))includingcredittakenforexistingsitemitigatingactions(deploymentofsandbags)containedinprocedure05-1-02-VI-2(Reference3.54).Thisproceduredirectsthesitetodeploysandbagsuptoanelevationof134'-6".2.6.3SevereStormswithHighWindTheGGNSplantsiteislocatedbelowthe35thparallel(Reference3.24,Section2.1.1.1).PerFigures 7-1and7-2ofNEI12-06(Reference3.3),hurricanesandtornadohazardsareapplicabletoGGNS.Therefore,hazardsfromextremehighwindsareconsideredinPage62of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationthedevelopmentoftheFLEXcopingstrategy,includingstorageanddeploymentofFLEXequipment,andutilizationofinstalledSSCsthatareadequatelyprotectedfromextremehighwindandassociatedmissilehazards.2.6.4Ice,SnowandExtremeColdTheguidelinesprovidedinSection 8.2.1ofNEI12-06(Reference3.3)generallyexcludetheneedtoconsiderextremesnowfallatplantsitesinthesoutheasternU.S.belowthe35thparallel.TheGGNSplantsiteislocatedbelowthe35thparallelat32°0 127"latitude(Reference3.24,Section2.1.1.1)andthusthecapabilitytoaddresshindrancescausedbyextremesnowfallwithsnowremovalequipmentneednotbe provided.TheGGNSsiteislocatedwithintheregioncharacterizedbyEPRIasiceseveritylevel4(NEI12-06,Figure8-2).Icestormsinthegeneralareasurroundingtheplantsitehaveoccurredwithaccumulatedicecoatingsinexcessof0.5inches(Reference3.24,Section2.3.1.2.2).Assuch,theGGNSsiteissubjecttosevereicingconditionsthatcouldalsocauseseveredestructiontoelectricaltransmissionlinesand/ortheexistenceofalargeamountofice.Therefore,accumulationoficeistheonlyextremecoldweathereventthatrequiredconsiderationinthedevelopmentoftheFLEXcopingstrategy.2.6.5HighTemperaturesPerSection9.2ofNEI12-06(Reference3.3),allsiteswilladdresshightemperatures.Mississippisummersarewarmandhumid,withlimitedperiodsofextremelyhotweatherover100°F(Reference3.24,Section2.3.2.1.2).Therefore,extremehightemperaturesareconsideredinthedevelopmentoftheFLEXcopingstrategy.Page63of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationthedevelopmentoftheFLEXcopingstrategy,includingstorageanddeploymentofFLEXequipment,andutilizationofinstalledSSCsthatareadequatelyprotectedfromextremehighwindandassociatedmissilehazards.2.6.4Ice,SnowandExtremeColdTheguidelinesprovidedinSection 8.2.1ofNEI12-06(Reference3.3)generallyexcludetheneedtoconsiderextremesnowfallatplantsitesinthesoutheasternU.S.belowthe35thparallel.TheGGNSplantsiteislocatedbelowthe35thparallelat32°0 127"latitude(Reference3.24,Section2.1.1.1)andthusthecapabilitytoaddresshindrancescausedbyextremesnowfallwithsnowremovalequipmentneednotbe provided.TheGGNSsiteislocatedwithintheregioncharacterizedbyEPRIasiceseveritylevel4(NEI12-06,Figure8-2).Icestormsinthegeneralareasurroundingtheplantsitehaveoccurredwithaccumulatedicecoatingsinexcessof0.5inches(Reference3.24,Section2.3.1.2.2).Assuch,theGGNSsiteissubjecttosevereicingconditionsthatcouldalsocauseseveredestructiontoelectricaltransmissionlinesand/ortheexistenceofalargeamountofice.Therefore,accumulationoficeistheonlyextremecoldweathereventthatrequiredconsiderationinthedevelopmentoftheFLEXcopingstrategy.2.6.5HighTemperaturesPerSection9.2ofNEI12-06(Reference3.3),allsiteswilladdresshightemperatures.Mississippisummersarewarmandhumid,withlimitedperiodsofextremelyhotweatherover100°F(Reference3.24,Section2.3.2.1.2).Therefore,extremehightemperaturesareconsideredinthedevelopmentoftheFLEXcopingstrategy.Page63of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.7PlannedProtectionofFlexEquipmentGGNSportableFLEXequipmentwillbestoredintwo,onsiteFLEXstorage buildings (1FLEXZ001and1FLEXZ002).EachstoragebuildingwillcontainNsetsofFLEXequipmentrequiredforsuccessfulimplementationofthecopingstrategies.ForthesingleBWR6reactorsitedatGGNS,Nequalsone(1).Thelocationofthetwostoragebuildings,aswellastheprimaryandalternatedeploymentroutestotheProtectedArea(PA)fromeachlocationareshowninFigure3.ThestoragebuildingsaredesignedforwindloadingdeterminedperASCE10(References3.49and3.57).ThestoragebuildingsaredesignedforseismicloadingdeterminedperASCE7-10.TheFLEXstoragebuildingshaveanoverallfootprintof70'x90'each.Thissizewasdevelopedbasedonthe equipmenttobestoredwithinthebuildings.Arrangementofallitemstobestoredinthestoragebuildingswasestablishedbasedonoptimizingeaseof deployment.
Seismic Considerations: Section 5.3.2.1ofNEI12-06(Reference3.3)statesthatlargeportableFLEXequipmentshouldbesecuredasappropriatetoprotectthemduringaseismiceventandthatstoredequipmentandstructuresshouldbeevaluatedandprotectedfromseismicinteractions.Acalculation, CC-N1FLEX-14001,SlidingandRockingEvaluationofFLEXStorageBuildingEquipment(Reference3.55),evaluatedtherigidbodyslidingandrockingofunanchoredequipmenttodeterminetherequiredseparationdistanceoftheequipmentwithinthestoragebuildingstoensurethattheyprotectedfromseismicinteractions.TheminimumspacingofequipmentwithintheFLEXstoragebuildingsisgovernedbythemaximumdisplacementoftheequipmentduringslidingandrocking.Themaximumdistancethatanypieceofequipmentwillslidewasdeterminedtobeapproximately3.5",whilethemaximumrockingdisplacementwasdeterminedtobeapproximately6".Inordertoprotecttheequipmentfromimpactingeachother,theminimumspacingisequaltogreaterthantwicethemaximumdisplacement.PerSection 7.1ofReference3.56,thedesignvaluesofslidingandrockingarenotrequiredtobecombinedandthereforetheminimumspacingbetweentwopiecesofequipmentwasdeterminedtobeapproximately12".Foraddedconservatism,theminimumrequiredspacingtopreventseismicinteractionswaschosenas15"forGGNS.Equipmenttiedownshavebeenprovidedinthestoragebuildingsbutarenotrequiredduetotheseparationbeingmaintainedbetweenequipment.Page64of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.7PlannedProtectionofFlexEquipmentGGNSportableFLEXequipmentwillbestoredintwo,onsiteFLEXstorage buildings (1FLEXZ001and1FLEXZ002).EachstoragebuildingwillcontainNsetsofFLEXequipmentrequiredforsuccessfulimplementationofthecopingstrategies.ForthesingleBWR6reactorsitedatGGNS,Nequalsone(1).Thelocationofthetwostoragebuildings,aswellastheprimaryandalternatedeploymentroutestotheProtectedArea(PA)fromeachlocationareshowninFigure3.ThestoragebuildingsaredesignedforwindloadingdeterminedperASCE10(References3.49and3.57).ThestoragebuildingsaredesignedforseismicloadingdeterminedperASCE7-10.TheFLEXstoragebuildingshaveanoverallfootprintof70'x90'each.Thissizewasdevelopedbasedontheequipmenttobestoredwithinthebuildings.Arrangementofallitemstobestoredinthestoragebuildingswasestablishedbasedonoptimizingeaseof deployment. Seismic Considerations: Section 5.3.2.1ofNEI12-06(Reference3.3)statesthatlargeportableFLEXequipmentshouldbesecuredasappropriatetoprotectthemduringaseismiceventandthatstoredequipmentandstructuresshouldbeevaluatedandprotectedfromseismicinteractions.Acalculation, CC-N1FLEX-14001,SlidingandRockingEvaluationofFLEXStorageBuildingEquipment(Reference3.55),evaluatedtherigidbodyslidingandrockingofunanchoredequipmenttodeterminetherequiredseparationdistanceoftheequipmentwithinthestoragebuildingstoensurethattheyprotectedfromseismicinteractions.TheminimumspacingofequipmentwithintheFLEXstoragebuildingsisgovernedbythemaximumdisplacementoftheequipmentduringslidingandrocking.Themaximumdistancethatanypieceofequipmentwillslidewasdeterminedtobeapproximately3.5",whilethemaximumrockingdisplacementwasdeterminedtobeapproximately6".Inordertoprotecttheequipmentfromimpactingeachother,theminimumspacingisequaltogreaterthantwicethemaximumdisplacement.PerSection 7.1ofReference3.56,thedesignvaluesofslidingandrockingarenotrequiredtobecombinedandthereforetheminimumspacingbetweentwopiecesofequipmentwasdeterminedtobeapproximately12".Foraddedconservatism,theminimumrequiredspacingtopreventseismicinteractionswaschosenas15"forGGNS.Equipmenttiedownshavebeenprovidedinthestoragebuildingsbutarenotrequiredduetotheseparationbeingmaintainedbetweenequipment.Page64of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationAsubsurfaceexplorationwasperformed(Reference3.49)toevaluatetheengineeringpropertiesofthesubsurfacesoilswithinthetwoFLEXstoragebuildingsites,StagingAreaB(thePhase3equipmentstagingarea),andalongthetravelpaths.Thepotentialforsoilliquefactionalongtheequipmentdeploymentpathsdeterminedtobelow,withthemaximumverticalsettlementatthetestlocationsfollowingstrongshakingestimatedtobelessthanoneinch.HighWind Considerations:NEI12-06Section7.3.1.1.callowsforFLEXstoragelocationswithsufficientseparationdistancetobedesignedtolocalbuildingcodesandASCE7-10regardinghighwinds.TheplantspecificevaluatedseparationdistanceminimizestheprobabilitythatasingleeventwoulddamageallFLEXmitigationequipmentsuchthatatleastNsetsofFLEXequipmentwouldremaindeployablefollowingthehighwindevent.Anevaluation(Reference3.49)wasperformedtodetermineareasonableseparationdistancethatboundsalargemajorityoftornadosintheregionofthesitebasedonthe90thpercentiletornadowidthand1973-2012data;theseparationdistancewasdeterminedtobe990feet.SeparationofthestoragebuildinglocationsbyatleastthisperpendiculardistancetothepredominanttornadopathforthegeographicallocationofGGNSprovidesreasonableassurancethatNsetsofFLEXequipmentwillremaindeployable.Pertheevaluation,basedonthehistoricalrecord,theaxisofseparationconsideredtornadopathsfromtheSouthwesttotheNortheast.Basedonthebuildinglocationsthestoragebuildingsarelocatedatadistanceofapproximately1500ft.fromeachotherperpendiculartothepredominanttornadopathsthusexceedingthecalculatedseparationdistanceof990feet. External Flooding Considerations:ProtectionofFLEXequipmentagainstexternalfloodingeventswasevaluatedinaccordancewithSection6.2.3.1.1.aofNEI12-06whichstatesthattheFLEXequipmentisprotectedfromfloodsifitisstoredabovethefloodelevationdeterminedinthemostrecentsitefloodanalysis.Therecentfloodingre-evaluation(seeSection2.6.2)determinedthatfloodingduetoLocalIntensePrecipitation(LIP)isthere-evaluatedcontrollingeventforGGNS.ThepredictedmaximumfloodelevationresultingfromtheLIPinthevicinityofthestoragebuildingatSite4is133.5 ftaboveMeanSeaLevel(MSL)(Reference3.49).OnlythestoragebuildingattheSite4isincludedintheareacoveredbythemostrecentLlPreanalysis.Duetoitsremotelocationandgradeelevation,Site1isnotincludedinthemostrecentLIPreanalysis;Page65of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationAsubsurfaceexplorationwasperformed(Reference3.49)toevaluatetheengineeringpropertiesofthesubsurfacesoilswithinthetwoFLEXstoragebuildingsites,StagingAreaB(thePhase3equipmentstagingarea),andalongthetravelpaths.Thepotentialforsoilliquefactionalongtheequipmentdeploymentpathsdeterminedtobelow,withthemaximumverticalsettlementatthetestlocationsfollowingstrongshakingestimatedtobelessthanoneinch.HighWind Considerations:NEI12-06Section7.3.1.1.callowsforFLEXstoragelocationswithsufficientseparationdistancetobedesignedtolocalbuildingcodesandASCE7-10regardinghighwinds.TheplantspecificevaluatedseparationdistanceminimizestheprobabilitythatasingleeventwoulddamageallFLEXmitigationequipmentsuchthatatleastNsetsofFLEXequipmentwouldremaindeployablefollowingthehighwindevent.Anevaluation(Reference3.49)wasperformedtodetermineareasonableseparationdistancethatboundsalargemajorityoftornadosintheregionofthesitebasedonthe90thpercentiletornadowidthand1973-2012data;theseparationdistancewasdeterminedtobe990feet.SeparationofthestoragebuildinglocationsbyatleastthisperpendiculardistancetothepredominanttornadopathforthegeographicallocationofGGNSprovidesreasonableassurancethatNsetsofFLEXequipmentwillremaindeployable.Pertheevaluation,basedonthehistoricalrecord,theaxisofseparationconsideredtornadopathsfromtheSouthwesttotheNortheast.Basedonthebuildinglocationsthestoragebuildingsarelocatedatadistanceofapproximately1500ft.fromeachotherperpendiculartothepredominanttornadopathsthusexceedingthecalculatedseparationdistanceof990feet. External Flooding Considerations:ProtectionofFLEXequipmentagainstexternalfloodingeventswasevaluatedinaccordancewithSection6.2.3.1.1.aofNEI12-06whichstatesthattheFLEXequipmentisprotectedfromfloodsifitisstoredabovethefloodelevationdeterminedinthemostrecentsitefloodanalysis.Therecentfloodingre-evaluation(seeSection2.6.2)determinedthatfloodingduetoLocalIntensePrecipitation(LIP)isthere-evaluatedcontrollingeventforGGNS.ThepredictedmaximumfloodelevationresultingfromtheLIPinthevicinityofthestoragebuildingatSite4is133.5 ftaboveMeanSeaLevel(MSL)(Reference3.49).OnlythestoragebuildingattheSite4isincludedintheareacoveredbythemostrecentLlPreanalysis.Duetoitsremotelocationandgradeelevation,Site1isnotincludedinthemostrecentLIPreanalysis;Page65of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationhowever,theLIPreanalysissupportsamaximumexpecteddepthof0.1ft.to0.2ft.basedupontheadjacentmodeledareas(Reference3.49).Asspecifiedincalculation CC-N1FLEX-14002(Reference3.58),Site1islocatedsuchthatthetop-of-slabelevationisatanelevationof163ft.andSite4hasaslabelevationof133.2ft.Thefoundation(slab)designsofbothstoragebuildingsincludeaninternalspillcontainmentcurbextending0.5 ft.abovethetop-of-slab.Thisresultsinan"effectivetop-of-slab"elevationof163.5feetforSite1and133.7feetforSite4,whicharebothabovetheactualprojectedmaximumfloodelevationsduetoLIPof163.2feetand133.5feet, respectively. Impact ofSnow,Ice and Extreme ColdAsstatedinSection2.6.4,accumulationoficeistheonlyextremecoldweathereventthatrequiredconsiderationinthedevelopmentoftheFLEXcopingstrategy.ThedesignofthestoragebuildingsutilizedthedesignprocedurefoundinASCE7-10(Reference3.57)whichdeterminedanominalicethicknessof0.5".Usingthedensityoficeof56pcfandanadjusteddesignicethicknessof1",theresultantuniformiceloadwasdeterminedtobe5psf.Thisislessthanthe20psfroofliveloadperASCE7-10.Thereforetheiceloaddidnotgovernthestoragebuildingdesign. Impact of High TemperaturesTheextremehighambienttemperatureforGGNSof104°FisfoundinSpecificationE100.0(Reference3.59).Forthedesignofthestoragebuildings,amaximumindoor temperaturelimitof120°Fwasusedwithrespecttotheextremeambienttemperature.ProtectionoftheFLEXequipmentfromimpactsduetoextremehighambienttemperaturesduringstorageisdependentoninstalledfansprovidingbuildingventilation.Procedurerevisions(Reference3.105)havebeendevelopedtoprovideguidanceforprotectionofstoredequipmentagainsthighambienttemperaturesinthecaseofalossofpowertothestoragebuildings.Withrespecttostorage,preventivemaintenanceoftheFLEXequipmentwilldetectabnormalwearonFLEXequipmentduetoprolongedperiodsofextreme temperatures. Impact of Low TemperaturesProtectionofFLEXequipmentfromimpactsduetofreezingweatherisperformedinaccordancewithSection 9.3.1ofNEI12-06,whichstatesthatequipmentshouldbemaintainedatatemperaturewithinarangetoensureitslikelyfunctionwhencalledupon.InaccordancewithSection8.3.1.bofNEIPage66of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationhowever,theLIPreanalysissupportsamaximumexpecteddepthof0.1ft.to0.2ft.basedupontheadjacentmodeledareas(Reference3.49).Asspecifiedincalculation CC-N1FLEX-14002(Reference3.58),Site1islocatedsuchthatthetop-of-slabelevationisatanelevationof163ft.andSite4hasaslabelevationof133.2ft.Thefoundation(slab)designsofbothstoragebuildingsincludeaninternalspillcontainmentcurbextending0.5 ft.abovethetop-of-slab.Thisresultsinan"effectivetop-of-slab"elevationof163.5feetforSite1and133.7feetforSite4,whicharebothabovetheactualprojectedmaximumfloodelevationsduetoLIPof163.2feetand133.5feet, respectively. Impact ofSnow,Ice and Extreme ColdAsstatedinSection2.6.4,accumulationoficeistheonlyextremecoldweathereventthatrequiredconsiderationinthedevelopmentoftheFLEXcopingstrategy.ThedesignofthestoragebuildingsutilizedthedesignprocedurefoundinASCE7-10(Reference3.57)whichdeterminedanominalicethicknessof0.5".Usingthedensityoficeof56pcfandanadjusteddesignicethicknessof1",theresultantuniformiceloadwasdeterminedtobe5psf.Thisislessthanthe20psfroofliveloadperASCE7-10.Thereforetheiceloaddidnotgovernthestoragebuildingdesign. Impact of High TemperaturesTheextremehighambienttemperatureforGGNSof104°FisfoundinSpecificationE100.0(Reference3.59).Forthedesignofthestoragebuildings,amaximumindoor temperaturelimitof120°Fwasusedwithrespecttotheextremeambienttemperature.ProtectionoftheFLEXequipmentfromimpactsduetoextremehighambienttemperaturesduringstorageisdependentoninstalledfansprovidingbuildingventilation.Procedurerevisions(Reference3.105)havebeendevelopedtoprovideguidanceforprotectionofstoredequipmentagainsthighambienttemperaturesinthecaseofalossofpowertothestoragebuildings.Withrespecttostorage,preventivemaintenanceoftheFLEXequipmentwilldetectabnormalwearonFLEXequipmentduetoprolongedperiodsofextreme temperatures. Impact of Low TemperaturesProtectionofFLEXequipmentfromimpactsduetofreezingweatherisperformedinaccordancewithSection 9.3.1ofNEI12-06,whichstatesthatequipmentshouldbemaintainedatatemperaturewithinarangetoensureitslikelyfunctionwhencalledupon.InaccordancewithSection8.3.1.bofNEIPage66of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation12-06thestorageofequipmentshallbeinastructuredesignedtoorevaluatedequivalenttoASCE7-10fortheplant'sdesignbasisforthesnow,iceandcoldconditions.PerSpecificationE100.0(Reference3.59),theplant'sdesignbasislowtemperatureis-1°F.ProtectionoftheFLEXequipmentfromimpactsduetoextremecoldduringstorageisnotdependentoncentralheating.Electricalreceptaclesareprovidedforlocalheatingelements,whichmaybenecessarydependingontheequipment,equipmentfluids,andfuelstoragerequirements.Procedurerevisions(Reference3.105)havebeendevelopedtoprovideguidancefor protectionofstoredequipmentagainstcoldweatherinthecaseofalossof powertothestoragebuildingsPage67of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation12-06thestorageofequipmentshallbeinastructuredesignedtoorevaluatedequivalenttoASCE7-10fortheplant'sdesignbasisforthesnow,iceandcoldconditions.PerSpecificationE100.0(Reference3.59),theplant'sdesignbasislowtemperatureis-1°F.ProtectionoftheFLEXequipmentfromimpactsduetoextremecoldduringstorageisnotdependentoncentralheating.Electricalreceptaclesareprovidedforlocalheatingelements,whichmaybenecessarydependingontheequipment,equipmentfluids,andfuelstoragerequirements.Procedurerevisions(Reference3.105)havebeendevelopedtoprovideguidanceforprotectionofstoredequipmentagainstcoldweatherinthecaseofalossofpowertothestoragebuildingsPage67of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation -, e!7., ti I II+I J I Z I!10 If..UI..on*'(-..r._'"'llol.tJ ICUI_.r.1;1'""*:-....-..;>l**'o..IHf' "[i}-{J.....-:=:::.::._,:; . 1-----1II I Iii i YAR" i l:: L__-T_..)!51 4-,!I"'-"'-'P
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- .EXHAUST FAN 1Z77C001A BATTERY CHARGER 1DA4 BATTERY CHARGER 1DB4FUELOIL TRANSFER PUMP 1P81C001 MCC 15B61 52-156120 52-15605 3-1/C SOOMCM CABLE 1BB66051IN3" RIGID CONDUIT lBBRHOO43-1/C4/0 FLEXIBLE CABLES IN FREE AIR CD-(UNSCHEDULED, ONLY DEPLOYED AND CONNECTED AFTER A BDBEE)FLEX CONNECTION CABINET A 1R20P018 FLEX CONNECTION CABINETB 1R20P019 3-1/C SOOMCM CABLE1AB56051IN3"RIGID CONDUIT lBARH003 n-____1-3/C#4AWG CABLE1BB71102AIN (UNSCHEDULED, ONLY DEPLOYED AND CONNECTED 1.5" RIGID CONDUIT 1BBRH005 AFTER A BDBEE)FLEX DISCONNECT SWITCH 89-171102A FLEX DIESEL GENERATOR PRIMARY CONNECTION CABINET 1R20P016 FLEX DIESEL GENERATOR ALTERNATE CONNECTION CABINET-1R20P017 3-1/C SOOMCM CABLElBB66052IN3" RIGID CONDUIT 1BBRHOO23-1/C500MCM CABLElBB660S31N3" RIGID CONDUIT lBBRHOO1 I I I I I I I I I I L.._FLEX DIESEL GENERATOR 3-1/C 4/0&2/0 GND FLEXIBLE CABLES IN FREE AIR (UNSCHEDULED, ONLY DEPLOYED FROM AND CONNEffiD AFTER ABDBEE)Figure4
- FLEX Connection Block Diagram'Page71of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation EXHAUST FAN 1Z77C001A BATTERY CHARGER 1DA4 BATTERY CHARGER 1DB4FUELOIL TRANSFER PUMP 1P81C001 MCC 15B61 52-156120 52-15605 3-1/C SOOMCM CABLE 1BB66051 IN 3" RIGID CONDUIT lBBRHOO43-1/C4/0 FLEXIBLE CABLES IN FREE AIR"-L----(UNSCHEDULED.
ONLY DEPLOYED AND CONNECTED AFTER A BDBEE)FLEX CONNECTION CABINET A 1R20P018 FLEX CONNECTION CABINETB 1R20P019 3-1/C SOOMCM CABLE 1AB56051IN 3" RIGID CONDUIT lBARH003\'-4!e"OAWG flEXIBLE CABLE IN FREE AIR(UNSCHEDULED, ONLY DEPLOYED AND CONNECTED l.-__1-3/C#4AWG CABLE1BB71102AIN AFTER A BDBEE)1.5" RIGID CONDUIT 1BBRH005 FLEX DISCONNECT SWITCH 89-171102A FLEX DIESEL GENERATOR PRIMARY CONNECTION CABINET 1R20P016 FLEX DIESEL GENERATOR ALTERNATE CONNECTION CABINET-1R20P017 3-1/C SOOMCM CABLElBB66052IN 3" RIGID CONDUIT 1BBRHOO23-1/C500MCM CABLE lBB660S31N 3" RIGID CONDUIT lBBRHOO1 I I I I I I I I I I L.._FLEX DIESEL GENERATOR 3-1/C 4/0&2/0 GND FLEXIBLE CABLES IN FREE AIR (UNSCHEDULED, ONLY DEPLOYED FROM AND CONNEffiD AFTER ABDBEE)Figure4: FLEX Connection Block Diagram'Page71of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril20162.8PlannedDeploymentofFLEXEquipmentGrandGulfNuclearStation 2.8.1HaulPathsandAccessibilityThelocationofthetwostoragebuildings,aswellastheprimaryandalternatedeploymentroutestotheProtectedArea(PA)fromeachlocationareshowninFigure3andcontinuedonFigure2.Asubsurfaceexplorationwasperformed(Reference3.49)toevaluatetheengineeringpropertiesofthesubsurfacesoilsalongthetravelpaths.Thepotentialforsoilliquefactionalongtheequipmentdeploymentpathswasdeterminedtobelow,withthemaximumverticalsettlementatthetestlocationsfollowingstrongshakingestimatedtobelessthanoneinch.Anassessment(Reference3.49)wasperformedforremovalofdebrisalongtheprimaryandalternatedeploymentroutes.Thedebrisremovalassessmentconcludedthatafront-endloaderwouldbesufficienttoremoveanydebrisby6hoursaftertheeventiftwopersonsaredeployedat1houraftertheinitiatingeventwhentheELAPisdeclared.Therefore,thefront-endloader (1 FLEXE001or1FLEXE002)storedineachFLEXStorageBuildingisutilizedtomeetthedeploymenttimeline.Additionaldebrisremovalequipmentforpersonnelsafety,thatisstoredinaseismicallyrestrainedstoragecabinetinstalledintheControlBuilding,includesequipmentsuchasflashlights;razorwirecuttersandrazorwireprotectiveclothing;gogglesandvaporrespiratorprotection;andequipmenttoconfirmlightingpolesarede-energizedwhenencounteredbeforeremoval.Thepotentialimpairmentstorequiredaccessare:1)doorsandgates,and2)sitedebrisblockingpersonnelorequipmentaccess.ThecopingstrategytomaintainsiteaccessibilitythroughdoorsandgatesisapplicabletoallphasesoftheFLEXcopingstrategies,butisimmediatelyrequiredaspartoftheimmediateactivitiesrequiredduringPhase1.Doorsandgatesserveavarietyofbarrierfunctionsonthesite.Oneprimaryfunctionissecurityandisdiscussedbelow.However,otherbarrierfunctionsincludefire,flood,radiation,ventilation,tornado,andHELB.Asbarriers,thesedoorsandgatesaretypicallyadministrativelycontrolledtomaintaintheirfunctionasbarriersduringnormaloperations.FollowinganaBDBEEandsubsequentELAPevent,FLEXcopingstrategiesrequiretheroutingofhosesandcablestobethroughPage72of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril20162.8PlannedDeploymentofFLEXEquipmentGrandGulfNuclearStation 2.8.1HaulPathsandAccessibilityThelocationofthetwostoragebuildings,aswellastheprimaryandalternatedeploymentroutestotheProtectedArea(PA)fromeachlocationareshowninFigure3andcontinuedonFigure2.Asubsurfaceexplorationwasperformed(Reference3.49)toevaluatetheengineeringpropertiesofthesubsurfacesoilsalongthetravelpaths.Thepotentialforsoilliquefactionalongtheequipmentdeploymentpathswasdeterminedtobelow,withthemaximumverticalsettlementatthetestlocationsfollowingstrongshakingestimatedtobelessthanoneinch.Anassessment(Reference3.49)wasperformedforremovalofdebrisalongtheprimaryandalternatedeploymentroutes.Thedebrisremovalassessmentconcludedthatafront-endloaderwouldbesufficienttoremoveanydebrisby6hoursaftertheeventiftwopersonsaredeployedat1houraftertheinitiatingeventwhentheELAPisdeclared.Therefore,thefront-endloader (1 FLEXE001or1FLEXE002)storedineachFLEXStorageBuildingisutilizedtomeetthedeploymenttimeline.Additionaldebrisremovalequipmentforpersonnelsafety,thatisstoredinaseismicallyrestrainedstoragecabinetinstalledintheControlBuilding,includesequipmentsuchasflashlights;razorwirecuttersandrazorwireprotectiveclothing;gogglesandvaporrespiratorprotection;andequipmenttoconfirmlightingpolesarede-energizedwhenencounteredbeforeremoval.Thepotentialimpairmentstorequiredaccessare:1)doorsandgates,and2)sitedebrisblockingpersonnelorequipmentaccess.ThecopingstrategytomaintainsiteaccessibilitythroughdoorsandgatesisapplicabletoallphasesoftheFLEXcopingstrategies,butisimmediatelyrequiredaspartoftheimmediateactivitiesrequiredduringPhase1.Doorsandgatesserveavarietyofbarrierfunctionsonthesite.Oneprimaryfunctionissecurityandisdiscussedbelow.However,otherbarrierfunctionsincludefire,flood,radiation,ventilation,tornado,andHELB.Asbarriers,thesedoorsandgatesaretypicallyadministrativelycontrolledtomaintaintheirfunctionasbarriersduringnormaloperations.FollowinganaBDBEEandsubsequentELAPevent,FLEXcopingstrategiesrequiretheroutingofhosesandcablestobethroughPage72of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationvariousbarriersinordertoconnectFLEXequipmenttostationfluidandelectricsystems.Forthisreason,certainbarriers(gatesanddoors)willbeopenedandremainopen.AccesstotheProtectedAreaduringaBDBEEisaddressedintheFLEXSupportGuidelines(FSGs)andFSGSupportProceduresincludingsecurityimplementationofFLEXStrategiesincludingsuspensionoftheSecurityPlanunderprovisionsof10CFR50.54(x)andtheuseofsecuritypersonnelinresponsetotheBDBEE.ThissuspensionofnormaladministrativecontrolsisacknowledgedandisacceptableduringtheimplementationofFLEXcopingstrategies.Theabilitytoopendoorsforingressandegress,ventilation,ortemporarycables/hosesroutingisnecessarytoimplementtheFLEXcopingstrategies.Therearenostrategydependentsecuritydoorsorgatesthatrelyonelectricpowertooperatetoopenand/orlockingmechanismsthatarebarriersofconcern.TheSecurityforcewillinitiateanaccesscontingencyuponlossofallac/dcpoweraspartoftheSecurityPlan.AccesstotheOwnerControlledArea,siteProtectedArea,andareaswithintheplantstructureswillbecontrolledunderthisaccesscontingencyasimplementedbysecuritypersonnel.ThedeploymentofonsiteFLEXequipmenttoimplementcopingstrategiesbeyondtheinitialplantcapabilities(Phase1)requiresthatpathwaysbetweentheFLEXstoragearea(s)anddeploymentlocationbeclearofdebrisresultingfromBDBseismic,highwind(hurricaneortornado),orfloodingevents.VehicleaccesstotheProtectedAreaisviathedoublegatedsally-port.AspartoftheSecurityaccesscontingency,thesally-portgateswillbemanuallycontrolledtoallowdeliveryofFLEXequipment(e.g.,generators,pumps)andothervehiclessuchasdebrisremovalequipmentintotheProtectedArea.Phase3oftheFLEXstrategiesinvolvesthereceiptofequipmentfromoffsitesourcesincludingtheNSRCandvariouscommoditiessuchasfuelandsupplies.Transportationofthesedeliveriescanbethroughairliftorviagroundtransportation.DebrisremovalforthepathwaybetweenthesiteandtheNSRCreceivinglocationandfromthevarious plantaccessroutesmayberequired.FollowingcompletionofdebrisremovalonsiteforPhase2andPhase3,thesamedebrisremovalequipmentusedfortheseon-sitepathwaysmaybeusedtosupportdebrisremovaltofacilitateroadaccesstothesite.Page73of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationvariousbarriersinordertoconnectFLEXequipmenttostationfluidandelectricsystems.Forthisreason,certainbarriers(gatesanddoors)willbeopenedandremainopen.AccesstotheProtectedAreaduringaBDBEEisaddressedintheFLEXSupportGuidelines(FSGs)andFSGSupportProceduresincludingsecurityimplementationofFLEXStrategiesincludingsuspensionoftheSecurityPlanunderprovisionsof10CFR50.54(x)andtheuseofsecuritypersonnelinresponsetotheBDBEE.ThissuspensionofnormaladministrativecontrolsisacknowledgedandisacceptableduringtheimplementationofFLEXcopingstrategies.Theabilitytoopendoorsforingressandegress,ventilation,ortemporarycables/hosesroutingisnecessarytoimplementtheFLEXcopingstrategies.Therearenostrategydependentsecuritydoorsorgatesthatrelyonelectricpowertooperatetoopenand/orlockingmechanismsthatarebarriersofconcern.TheSecurityforcewillinitiateanaccesscontingencyuponlossofallac/dcpoweraspartoftheSecurityPlan.AccesstotheOwnerControlledArea,siteProtectedArea,andareaswithintheplantstructureswillbecontrolledunderthisaccesscontingencyasimplementedbysecuritypersonnel.ThedeploymentofonsiteFLEXequipmenttoimplementcopingstrategiesbeyondtheinitialplantcapabilities(Phase1)requiresthatpathwaysbetweentheFLEXstoragearea(s)anddeploymentlocationbeclearofdebrisresultingfromBDBseismic,highwind(hurricaneortornado),orfloodingevents.VehicleaccesstotheProtectedAreaisviathedoublegatedsally-port.AspartoftheSecurityaccesscontingency,thesally-portgateswillbemanuallycontrolledtoallowdeliveryofFLEXequipment(e.g.,generators,pumps)andothervehiclessuchasdebrisremovalequipmentintotheProtectedArea.Phase3oftheFLEXstrategiesinvolvesthereceiptofequipmentfromoffsitesourcesincludingtheNSRCandvariouscommoditiessuchasfuelandsupplies.Transportationofthesedeliveriescanbethroughairliftorviagroundtransportation.DebrisremovalforthepathwaybetweenthesiteandtheNSRCreceivinglocationandfromthevariousplantaccessroutesmayberequired.FollowingcompletionofdebrisremovalonsiteforPhase2andPhase3,thesamedebrisremovalequipmentusedfortheseon-sitepathwaysmaybeusedtosupportdebrisremovaltofacilitateroadaccesstothesite.Page73of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril20162.9DeploymentofstrategiesGrandGulfNuclearStation 2.9.1RCSPrimaryMakeupStrategyPriortotransitiontoPhase2,aFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001 or1FLEXC002)willbedeploymenttoeitherSSWBasinA(primary)orB(alternate)fromeitheronsitestoragebuildingandwillbeplacedontheconcretedirectlynexttotherailingsurroundingthebasin.Thispumpwillbedeployedearlyintheevent(-11hours)forSFPmakeupcapabilitypriortowhenitwillberequiredforreactorcorecooling (-20hours).A6"suctionhoseandstrainerdesignedtopreventlargedebrisfromenteringthepumpsuctionwillbeloweredintoaservicewaterbasintoprovidesuctiontotheportableFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001 or1FLEXC002).Anadditionalsuctionstrainerwillbeprovidedforeachpumptoallowforswappingoutsuctionstrainers.PriortodepletionoftheUCPinventory(approximately20hoursaftertheinitialBDBEE)RPVdepressurizationto100psigwillcontinuetoallowinitiationofRPVinjectionwiththeFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)fordecayheatremoval.TheprimaryRCSmakeupstrategyistoconnecttotheRHR"C"systemupstreamofvalve1E12F063CintheCRWSTSystemathoseconnectionvalve1P 11F438allowinginjectionintotheRPVviatheRHRsystem.TheFLEXpumpdeployedandalignedforcorecooling/injectionissizedtoallowtheconcurrentadditionofwatertotheSFPfromtheUHSastheSFPboilsortoprovideSFPspraycapability.SeeSection2.3forspecificsregardingstrategiesformakeuptotheRCS.Thedieseldrivenpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)isoperatedundermanualspeedcontroltoachievethedesiredpressureandflowasreadlocally.OncethedieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001 or1FLEXC002)isdeployedneartheUHSbasins"theengine-drivenpumpsarestarted,purgedandvented,andflowisestablishedtoensurethepumpsareoperatingandreadytosupplymakeuptotheSFPand/orRPV.ThedieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001 or1FLEXC002)isequippedwitha200gallondieselfueltankwhichsupportsapproximately15hoursruntimeatfullload(Reference3.21).TherequiredFLEXpumps (1 FLEXC001and1FLEXC002)willbemaintainedatthetwoon-siteFLEXstoragelocations.ThetwoFLEXpumpsarerequiredtobestoredonsitetosatisfytheN+1requirement.ThesetrailermountedFLEXpumps (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)aretransferredandstagedviahaulroutesandstagingareasevaluatedforPage74of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril20162.9DeploymentofstrategiesGrandGulfNuclearStation 2.9.1RCSPrimaryMakeupStrategyPriortotransitiontoPhase2,aFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001 or1FLEXC002)willbedeploymenttoeitherSSWBasinA(primary)orB(alternate)fromeitheronsitestoragebuildingandwillbeplacedontheconcretedirectlynexttotherailingsurroundingthebasin.Thispumpwillbedeployedearlyintheevent (-11hours)forSFPmakeupcapabilitypriortowhenitwillberequiredforreactorcorecooling (-20hours).A6"suctionhoseandstrainerdesignedtopreventlargedebrisfromenteringthepumpsuctionwillbeloweredintoaservicewaterbasintoprovidesuctiontotheportableFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001 or1FLEXC002).Anadditionalsuctionstrainerwillbeprovidedforeachpumptoallowforswappingoutsuctionstrainers.PriortodepletionoftheUCPinventory(approximately20hoursaftertheinitialBDBEE)RPVdepressurizationto100psigwillcontinuetoallowinitiationofRPVinjectionwiththeFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)fordecayheatremoval.TheprimaryRCSmakeupstrategyistoconnecttotheRHR"C"systemupstreamofvalve1E12F063CintheCRWSTSystemathoseconnectionvalve1P 11F438allowinginjectionintotheRPVviatheRHRsystem.TheFLEXpumpdeployedandalignedforcorecooling/injectionissizedtoallowtheconcurrentadditionofwatertotheSFPfromtheUHSastheSFPboilsortoprovideSFPspraycapability.SeeSection2.3forspecificsregardingstrategiesformakeuptotheRCS.Thedieseldrivenpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)isoperatedundermanualspeedcontroltoachievethedesiredpressureandflowasreadlocally.OncethedieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001 or1FLEXC002)isdeployedneartheUHSbasins"theengine-drivenpumpsarestarted,purgedandvented,andflowisestablishedtoensurethepumpsareoperatingandreadytosupplymakeuptotheSFPand/orRPV.ThedieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001 or1FLEXC002)isequippedwitha200gallondieselfueltankwhichsupportsapproximately15hoursruntimeatfullload(Reference3.21).TherequiredFLEXpumps (1 FLEXC001and1FLEXC002)willbemaintainedatthetwoon-siteFLEXstoragelocations.ThetwoFLEXpumpsarerequiredtobestoredonsitetosatisfytheN+1requirement.ThesetrailermountedFLEXpumps (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)aretransferredandstagedviahaulroutesandstagingareasevaluatedforPage74of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationimpactfromapplicableexternalhazards.ProgramsandtraininghavebeenimplementedtosupportthedeploymentandoperationoftheFLEXpumps.TheSSWbasins(UHS)havethecapacitytoprovidemakeuptotheRPVandSFPforupto99hoursatwhichtimemakeuptotheSSWbasinsisrequired(Reference3.20)andSection2.3.3.TheMississippiRiverprovidesanindefinitesupplyofwater,asmakeuptotheSSWbasin.TheUHSandMississippiwillremainavailableforanyoftheexternalhazardslistedinSection2.6.2.9.2AlternateRCSMakeupStrategyAnalternatepathforPhase2reactorcorecoolingisaconnectionlocationupstreamof1 E21F025alsointheCRWSTSystemathoseconnectionvalve1 P11F445.Thistie-inallowsRPVinjectionviatheLPCSsystem.AnadditionalalternatestrategyconsidersthatiftheHPCSSWsystempipingbetweentheSSWbasinsandtheHPCSDGBuildingisunavailable,700feetofflexiblehosestoredineachstoragebuildingwillberoutedfromeitherservicewaterbasindirectlytoeitherconnectionpointfortheRHRCorLPCShoseconnectionsintheCRWSTSystempipingintheAuxiliaryBuilding.ThesealternatestrategiesusethesamedieselpoweredFLEXpump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)creditedfortheprimarystrategy.2.9.3ElectricalStrategyTransitionfromPhase1(relianceonstationbatteries)toPhase2(repoweringstationbatterychargers)willbemadeusingaFLEXportable480VDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010).ThedecisiontodeploytheFLEXDGwillbemadeduringtheinitialresponsephase.TheoperatorisdirectedtotakestepstominimizetheloadonthestationbatteriesbyinitiallysheddingunnecessaryloadsinaccordancewithstationSBOproceduresandwithin2hoursoftheeventinitiationsheddingadditionalunnecessaryloadsinaccordancewiththeFSGs.Theloadsheddingensuresthestationbatterieswillhavegreaterthan12hoursofcapability.Page75of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationimpactfromapplicableexternalhazards.ProgramsandtraininghavebeenimplementedtosupportthedeploymentandoperationoftheFLEXpumps.TheSSWbasins(UHS)havethecapacitytoprovidemakeuptotheRPVandSFPforupto99hoursatwhichtimemakeuptotheSSWbasinsisrequired(Reference3.20)andSection2.3.3.TheMississippiRiverprovidesanindefinitesupplyofwater,asmakeuptotheSSWbasin.TheUHSandMississippiwillremainavailableforanyoftheexternalhazardslistedinSection2.6.2.9.2AlternateRCSMakeupStrategyAnalternatepathforPhase2reactorcorecoolingisaconnectionlocationupstreamof1 E21F025alsointheCRWSTSystemathoseconnectionvalve1 P11F445.Thistie-inallowsRPVinjectionviatheLPCSsystem.AnadditionalalternatestrategyconsidersthatiftheHPCSSWsystempipingbetweentheSSWbasinsandtheHPCSDGBuildingisunavailable,700feetofflexiblehosestoredineachstoragebuildingwillberoutedfromeitherservicewaterbasindirectlytoeitherconnectionpointfortheRHRCorLPCShoseconnectionsintheCRWSTSystempipingintheAuxiliaryBuilding.ThesealternatestrategiesusethesamedieselpoweredFLEXpump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)creditedfortheprimarystrategy.2.9.3ElectricalStrategyTransitionfromPhase1(relianceonstationbatteries)toPhase2(repoweringstationbatterychargers)willbemadeusingaFLEXportable480VDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010).ThedecisiontodeploytheFLEXDGwillbemadeduringtheinitialresponsephase.TheoperatorisdirectedtotakestepstominimizetheloadonthestationbatteriesbyinitiallysheddingunnecessaryloadsinaccordancewithstationSBOproceduresandwithin2hoursoftheeventinitiationsheddingadditionalunnecessaryloadsinaccordancewiththeFSGs.Theloadsheddingensuresthestationbatterieswillhavegreaterthan12hoursofcapability.Page75of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationPriortodepletionofthebatteries,thePhase2FLEX480Vdiesel generator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)willbeplacedintoserviceator before 11hoursandconnectedtorechargetheDivisionIandDivisionIIbatteriesasdiscussedinSection2.3.2.Therefore,thetimemarginbetweenthecalculatedbatterydurationfortheFLEXstrategyandtheexpecteddeploymenttimeforFLEXequipmenttosupplythedcloadsisgreater-than1hour.Asingle300kWgenerator (1FLEXS009or1FLEXS010)iscapableofrepoweringthetwo125Vbatterychargers(oneperdivision),theHPCSDGfueloilstoragetankpump (1 P81C001),themodifiedEOPcontainmentventUPS (1 M41 PS01),andabatteryroomexhaustfan(01 Z77C001A).EachFLEX480V300kWdieselgeneratorisequippedwitha500gallondieselfueltankwhichsupportsapproximately22hoursruntimeatfullload(Reference 3.21).Onebatterychargerdieselgenerator (1FLEXS009and1 FLEXS010)isstoredineachFLEXstoragebuilding.OnceinsidethePA,theportable480VDGisdeployedtoeithertheprimaryoralternatestaginglocation.Theprimarystaginglocationforthe480VDG (1FLEXS009and 1 FLEXS010)isatgradelevel,justwestoftheControlBuilding.ThealternatestaginglocationisatgradelevelonthesouthwestcorneroftheUnit1AuxiliaryBuilding.ThestaginglocationsfortheFLEXDGareshowninFigure2.TherequiredFLEX480VDGs (1FLEXS009and1 FLEXS010)willbemaintainedatthetwoon-siteFLEXstoragelocations.TwoFLEX480VDGsarerequiredtobestoredonsitetosatisfytheN+1requirement.ThetrailermountedFLEX480VDGswillbetransferredandstagedviaspecifichaulpaths/pre-definedroutes(seeFigure2andFigure3)evaluatedforimpactfromapplicableexternalhazards.ProgramsandtraininghavebeenimplementedtosupportthedeploymentandoperationoftheFLEX480VDGs.2.9.4FuelingofEquipmentTheFLEXstrategiesformaintenanceand/orsupportofsafetyfunctionsinvolveseveralelementsincludingthesupplyoffueltonecessarydieselenginedrivengenerators,pumps,haulingvehicles,etc.Toensureadequatefuelexiststomeetthestrategy,alldrivenFLEXequipmentstoredintheFLEXstoragebuildingsismaintainedwithafulltankofdieselfuel.AdditionalfuelwillbeneededPage76of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationPriortodepletionofthebatteries,thePhase2FLEX480Vdiesel generator (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)willbeplacedintoserviceator before 11hoursandconnectedtorechargetheDivisionIandDivisionIIbatteriesasdiscussedinSection2.3.2.Therefore,thetimemarginbetweenthecalculatedbatterydurationfortheFLEXstrategyandtheexpecteddeploymenttimeforFLEXequipmenttosupplythedcloadsisgreater-than1hour.Asingle300kWgenerator (1FLEXS009or1FLEXS010)iscapableofrepoweringthetwo125Vbatterychargers(oneperdivision),theHPCSDGfueloilstoragetankpump (1 P81C001),themodifiedEOPcontainmentventUPS (1 M41 PS01),andabatteryroomexhaustfan(01 Z77C001A).EachFLEX480V300kWdieselgeneratorisequippedwitha500gallondieselfueltankwhichsupportsapproximately22hoursruntimeatfullload(Reference 3.21).Onebatterychargerdieselgenerator (1FLEXS009and1 FLEXS010)isstoredineachFLEXstoragebuilding.OnceinsidethePA,theportable480VDGisdeployedtoeithertheprimaryoralternatestaginglocation.Theprimarystaginglocationforthe480VDG (1FLEXS009and 1 FLEXS010)isatgradelevel,justwestoftheControlBuilding.ThealternatestaginglocationisatgradelevelonthesouthwestcorneroftheUnit1AuxiliaryBuilding.ThestaginglocationsfortheFLEXDGareshowninFigure2.TherequiredFLEX480VDGs (1FLEXS009and1 FLEXS010)willbemaintainedatthetwoon-siteFLEXstoragelocations.TwoFLEX480VDGsarerequiredtobestoredonsitetosatisfytheN+1requirement.ThetrailermountedFLEX480VDGswillbetransferredandstagedviaspecifichaulpaths/pre-definedroutes(seeFigure2andFigure3)evaluatedforimpactfromapplicableexternalhazards.ProgramsandtraininghavebeenimplementedtosupportthedeploymentandoperationoftheFLEX480VDGs.2.9.4FuelingofEquipmentTheFLEXstrategiesformaintenanceand/orsupportofsafetyfunctionsinvolveseveralelementsincludingthesupplyoffueltonecessarydieselenginedrivengenerators,pumps,haulingvehicles,etc.Toensureadequatefuelexiststomeetthestrategy,alldrivenFLEXequipmentstoredintheFLEXstoragebuildingsismaintainedwithafulltankofdieselfuel.AdditionalfuelwillbeneededPage76of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationtoreplenishthefuelusedbythedieseldrivenequipmentforthedurationoftheevent.GGNShasthreesafetyrelatedundergroundfueloilstoragetanksandthreesafetyrelatedfueloildaytankswhichsupplythetwostandbydieselgeneratorsandtheHPCSdieselgenerator.Thethreestoragetanksareofthehorizontaltypeandareburiedapproximately 11 feetunderground,whichiswellbelowthefrostlinetoeliminatelowtemperaturedamageofthefuel(Reference3.24,Section9.5.4.2).Eachverticaltypedaytankhasanominalcapacityof550gallons(Reference3.111)andislocatedwitheachdieselgeneratorwithineachdieselgeneratorroomoftheDieselGeneratorbuilding.Eachstoragetankhasagrossstoragecapacityof76,000gallons.Theminimumrequiredstoragevolumeofthestoragetanksforthestandbydieselgeneratorsis68,744gallons(Reference3.107).TheminimumrequiredstoragevolumeofthestoragetankfortheHPCSdieselgeneratoris44,616gallons(Reference3.108).Thestrategyforrefuelingthedieseldrivenportableequipment,i.e.,pumpsandgenerators,beingutilizedfortheresponsetoanELAP/LUHSevent,istogravitydrainfueloilout,oftheHPCSDGFuelOilDayTank (1 P81A002),asnecessary,andtopumpadditionalfueloiloutoftheHPCSDGFuelOilStorageTank (1 P81A001)usingtheHPCSDGfueloiltransferpump (1 P81C001)poweredbytheFLEX480V300kWDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)whichwillbeinoperationatorbefore 11hoursafterthestartoftheevent(Reference3.21).TheHPCSDGfueloilstoragetanktransferpump,willberepoweredbyinstallingtemporarypowercableroutedfromtheFLEX480VDGprimaryconnectioncabinet (1R20P016)topowerMCC17811whichfeedsthetransferpumpinaccordancewiththeapprovedFSGs(Reference3.94).Thisinstalledpumpwilltransferdieselfuelfromtheundergroundstoragetanktoaportable500gallonfueltrailerviaflexible1.5" diameterhoseconnectedtotheHPCSDGfueloiltransferpumpdischargestrainerlocatedintheHPCSDGroom.The500gallonfueltrailerwillbetowedaroundthesitetothevariousequipmentstaginglocationstorefillthefueltanks.ADCmotor-drivenfuelpump (1FLEXC003or1FLEXC004)onthetrailer-mountedtankwillbeusedtopumpfuelfromthetrailer-mountedtanktoFLEXequipmentfuel tanks.Page77of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationtoreplenishthefuelusedbythedieseldrivenequipmentforthedurationoftheevent.GGNShasthreesafetyrelatedundergroundfueloilstoragetanksandthreesafetyrelatedfueloildaytankswhichsupplythetwostandbydieselgeneratorsandtheHPCSdieselgenerator.Thethreestoragetanksareofthehorizontaltypeandareburiedapproximately 11 feetunderground,whichiswellbelowthefrostlinetoeliminatelowtemperaturedamageofthefuel(Reference3.24,Section9.5.4.2).Eachverticaltypedaytankhasanominalcapacityof550gallons(Reference3.111)andislocatedwitheachdieselgeneratorwithineachdieselgeneratorroomoftheDieselGeneratorbuilding.Eachstoragetankhasagrossstoragecapacityof76,000gallons.Theminimumrequiredstoragevolumeofthestoragetanksforthestandbydieselgeneratorsis68,744gallons(Reference3.107).TheminimumrequiredstoragevolumeofthestoragetankfortheHPCSdieselgeneratoris44,616gallons(Reference3.108).Thestrategyforrefuelingthedieseldrivenportableequipment,i.e.,pumpsandgenerators,beingutilizedfortheresponsetoanELAP/LUHSevent,istogravitydrainfueloilout,oftheHPCSDGFuelOilDayTank (1 P81A002),asnecessary,and topumpadditionalfueloiloutoftheHPCSDGFuelOilStorageTank (1 P81A001)usingtheHPCSDGfueloiltransferpump (1 P81C001)poweredbytheFLEX480V300kWDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)whichwillbeinoperationatorbefore 11hoursafterthestartoftheevent(Reference3.21).TheHPCSDGfueloilstoragetanktransferpump,willberepoweredbyinstallingtemporarypowercableroutedfromtheFLEX480VDGprimaryconnectioncabinet (1R20P016)topowerMCC17811whichfeedsthetransferpumpinaccordancewiththeapprovedFSGs(Reference3.94).Thisinstalledpumpwilltransferdieselfuelfromtheundergroundstoragetanktoaportable500gallonfueltrailerviaflexible1.5" diameterhoseconnectedtotheHPCSDGfueloiltransferpumpdischargestrainerlocatedintheHPCSDGroom.The500gallonfueltrailerwillbetowedaroundthesitetothevariousequipmentstaginglocationstorefillthefueltanks.ADCmotor-drivenfuelpump (1FLEXC003or1FLEXC004)onthetrailer-mountedtankwillbeusedtopumpfuelfromthetrailer-mountedtanktoFLEXequipmentfuel tanks.Page 77of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationFuelfromtheHPCSDGFuelStorageOilTankcanbetransferredtoallFLEXequipmentinanestimated212minutes,orapproximately3.5hours(Reference3.21).TheFLEXMCRventilationfandiesel generator(1FLEXS012or1FLEXS013),whichisstartedat10hoursaftertheeventtoprovideMCRventilation,hasasmallfueltankandisthefirstFLEXcomponentthatrequiresrefueling5.9hoursafteritstartsoperating.Basedonthefueltanksizeofthisportabledieselgenerator(4.6gallons),a28gallonportabletankcartisstoredanddeployedwiththegeneratortorefillthistank.Usingthiscartwillprovideenoughfueltolastforatleast30hours,whichissufficienttimeuntilthe500gallon tank (1FLEXC003or1FLEXC004)canbeusedtorefuelthisdiesel generator.Thetrucksupportedrefuelingcycleforthe500gallonfueltrailerwiththeDCmotor-drivenpumpwillstartatapproximately26hoursafterthestartoftheBDBEEtorefuelthedieseldrivenFLEXmakeuppump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)followingtheinitialfillingofthe500gallontankfromthefromtheHPCSDGfueloilstoragetankandwiththedieseldrivenFLEXmakeuppumpinitiallystarted 11hoursafterthestartoftheBDBEE.AllFLEXequipmentcanberefueledwithin3.5hours,thereforethisrefuelingstrategyensuresthatalldiesel-runFLEXequipmentwillberefueledfollowingaBDBEE.Refuelingrequirements areshowninTable3.Table3 Run Time Between Truck Refuelina 1st Refuel Time (hrs)Refills (hrs)FLEXDieselDrivenRCS/ SFP Makeup Pump(1FLEXC001or 1 FLEXC002)26.1 15.1FLEX300kWDG (1 FLEXS009 or 1 FLEXS010)33.6 22.6 FLEX Hydrogen IgnitersDG(1FLEXS011or 1 FLEXS022)44.3 33.3(4)FLEXDieselLight Towers (1 FLEXS014 through 1 FLEXS017 or 1 FLEXS018 through 1 FLEXS021)74.6 66.6 Run Time Between Cart Refuelina 1st Refuel Time (hrs)Refills Ihrs)FLEXMCR Ventilation FansDG(1 FLEXS012 or 15.9 5.9Page78of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationFuelfromtheHPCSDGFuelStorageOilTankcanbetransferredto all FLEXequipmentinanestimated212minutes,orapproximately3.5hours(Reference3.21).TheFLEXMCRventilationfandiesel generator(1FLEXS012or1FLEXS013),whichisstartedat10hoursaftertheeventtoprovideMCRventilation,hasasmallfueltankandisthefirstFLEXcomponentthatrequiresrefueling5.9hoursafteritstartsoperating.Basedonthefueltanksizeofthisportabledieselgenerator(4.6gallons),a28gallonportabletankcartisstoredanddeployedwiththegeneratortorefillthistank.Usingthiscartwillprovideenoughfueltolastforatleast30hours,whichissufficienttimeuntilthe500gallon tank (1FLEXC003or1FLEXC004)canbeusedtorefuelthisdiesel generator.Thetrucksupportedrefuelingcycleforthe500gallonfueltrailerwiththeDCmotor-drivenpumpwillstartatapproximately26hoursafterthestartoftheBDBEEtorefuelthedieseldrivenFLEXmakeuppump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)followingtheinitialfillingofthe500gallontankfromthefromtheHPCSDGfueloilstoragetankandwiththedieseldrivenFLEXmakeuppumpinitiallystarted 11hoursafterthestartoftheBDBEE.AllFLEXequipmentcanberefueledwithin3.5hours,thereforethisrefuelingstrategyensuresthatalldiesel-runFLEXequipmentwillberefueledfollowingaBDBEE.RefuelingrequirementsareshowninTable3.Table3 Run Time Between Truck Refuelina 1st Refuel Time (hrs)Refills (hrs)FLEXDieselDrivenRCS/ SFP Makeup Pump(1FLEXC001or 1 FLEXC002)26.1 15.1FLEX300kWDG (1 FLEXS009 or 1 FLEXS010)33.6 22.6 FLEX Hydrogen IgnitersDG(1FLEXS011or 1 FLEXS022)44.3 33.3(4)FLEXDieselLight Towers (1 FLEXS014 through 1 FLEXS017 or 1 FLEXS018 through 1 FLEXS021)74.6 66.6 Run Time Between Cart Refuelina 1st Refuel Time (hrs)Refills Ihrs)FLEXMCR Ventilation FansDG(1 FLEXS012 or 15.9 5.9Page78of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationTable3 1 FLEXS013)(3)EP Communications DG(1FLEXE001A through1FLEXE001Cor1FLEXE001 0 through1FLEXE001F) 22.5 14.5The3.5-hourrefuelingcycleforthe500gallontrailermountedtankmayberequiredforanindefiniteperiod.Forthefirst72hoursafterdeployment,calculateddieselfuelusageisapproximately3,726gallons,basedonafuelconsumptionrateof1,242gallonsperday(Reference3.21).Asdiscussedabove,theminimumrequireddieselfueloilvolumeoftheHPCSDGfueloilstoragetankis44,616gallons(Reference3.24,Section9.5.4.2andReference3.28,LCO3.8.3)whichissufficientfueltosupplytheFLEXequipmentforapproximately35.9daysfollowingaBDBEE,basedonafuelconsumptionrateof1,242gallonsperday(Reference3.21).InadditiontotheHPCSDGfueloilstoragetanks,thetwostandbyDGfueloilstoragetankscontainacombinedminimumrequiredfueloilvolumeofover137,000gallonsthatcouldalsobeavailableifrequired.Becausethereisalargevolumeofonsitedieselfuelavailable,dieselrefuelingwillbeprocedurallycontrolledbythefueloillevelsintheequipmentandnotnecessarilybythetiming.Similarly,asstaffinglevelsallow,use of the28gallonportablecarttanksforsmallloadsmaytransitiontouseeitherthe500gallonfueltrailersortheNSRCsuppliedequipment.Therefore,onsitefueloilsuppliescouldprovideonsitedieseldrivenFLEXequipmentdieselfuelforwellbeyond30days.TheonsitefuelandmethodsdescribedabovecanalsobeusedtorefuelthePhase3NSRCequipmentasnecessary.DieselfuelinthestandbyandHPCSDGfueloilstoragetanksismaintainedforoperationoftheemergencyDGsandisroutinelysampledandtestedtoassurefueloilqualityismaintainedtoASTMstandards(TechnicalSpecifications5.5.9,DieselFuelOilTestingProgram,Reference3.28).FueloilinthefueltanksofportabledieselenginedrivenFLEXequipmentwillbemaintainedinthePreventativeMaintenanceprograminaccordancewiththeEPRImaintenance templates.Page79of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationTable3 1 FLEXS013)(3)EP Communications DG(1FLEXE001A through1FLEXE001Cor1FLEXE001 0 through1FLEXE001F) 22.5 14.5The3.5-hourrefuelingcycleforthe500gallontrailermountedtankmayberequiredforanindefiniteperiod.Forthefirst72hoursafterdeployment,calculateddieselfuelusageisapproximately3,726gallons,basedonafuelconsumptionrateof1,242gallonsperday(Reference3.21).Asdiscussedabove,theminimumrequireddieselfueloilvolumeoftheHPCSDGfueloilstoragetankis44,616gallons(Reference3.24,Section9.5.4.2andReference3.28,LCO3.8.3)whichissufficientfueltosupplytheFLEXequipmentforapproximately35.9daysfollowingaBDBEE,basedonafuelconsumptionrateof1,242gallonsperday(Reference3.21).InadditiontotheHPCSDGfueloilstoragetanks,thetwostandbyDGfueloilstoragetankscontainacombinedminimumrequiredfueloilvolumeofover137,000gallonsthatcouldalsobeavailableifrequired.Becausethereisalargevolumeofonsitedieselfuelavailable,dieselrefuelingwillbeprocedurallycontrolledbythefueloillevelsintheequipmentandnotnecessarilybythetiming.Similarly,asstaffinglevelsallow,use of the28gallonportablecarttanksforsmallloadsmaytransitiontouseeitherthe500gallonfueltrailersortheNSRCsuppliedequipment.Therefore,onsitefueloilsuppliescouldprovideonsitedieseldrivenFLEXequipmentdieselfuelforwellbeyond30days.TheonsitefuelandmethodsdescribedabovecanalsobeusedtorefuelthePhase3NSRCequipmentasnecessary.DieselfuelinthestandbyandHPCSDGfueloilstoragetanksismaintainedforoperationoftheemergencyDGsandisroutinelysampledandtestedtoassurefueloilqualityismaintainedtoASTMstandards(TechnicalSpecifications5.5.9,DieselFuelOilTestingProgram,Reference3.28).FueloilinthefueltanksofportabledieselenginedrivenFLEXequipmentwillbemaintainedinthePreventativeMaintenanceprograminaccordancewiththeEPRImaintenance templates.Page79of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril20162.10OffsiteResourcesGrandGulfNuclearStation2.10.1NationalSAFERResponseCenterTheindustryhasestablishedtwoNationalSAFERResponseCenters(NSRCs)tosupportutilitiesduringBDBEEs.EntergyhasestablishedcontractswiththePooledEquipmentInventoryCompany(PEICo)toparticipateintheprocessforsupportoftheNSRCsasrequired(Reference3.109).EachNSRCholdsfivesetsofequipment,fourofwhichwillbeabletobefullydeployedwhenrequested,thefifthsetisassumedtobeinamaintenancecycle.Inaddition,on-siteFLEXequipmenthoseandcableendfittingsarestandardizedwiththeequipmentsuppliedfromtheNSRCorutilizeadaptersstoredintheFLEXstoragebuildings.IntheeventofaBDBEEandsubsequentELAP/LUHScondition,equipmentwillbemovedfromanNSRCtoalocalassemblyareaestablishedbytheStrategicAllianceforFLEXEmergencyResponse(SAFER)team.FLEXStrategyrequeststotheNationalSAFERResponseCenter(NSRC)aredirectedbytheExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)AOP IONEP(Reference3.89).FLEXsupportguidelineProceduresdirectconnectionofNSRCsuppliedequipment.CommunicationswillbeestablishedbetweenthesiteandtheNSRCviasatellitephones.AllNSRCarrivingequipmentwillbedeliveredtothesitewithin24hoursfromtheinitialrequest.TheorderatwhichequipmentisdeliveredisidentifiedintheGGNS"SAFERResponsePlan(Reference3.22)."ForGGNS,StagingArea'B'islocatedintheESClaydownarea,anareawest-northwestofthePA.StagingArea'C'islocatedattheVicksburgTallulahRegionalAirportandStagingArea'D'islocatedattheNatchezAdamsCountyAirport(Reference3.22).FromStagingAreas'C'or'D',equipmentcanbetakentotheGGNSsiteandstagedatStagingArea'B'byhelicopterifgroundtransportationisunavailable.2.10.2EquipmentListForGGNS,theequipmentthatisplannedtobeavailableforusefromtheNSRCincludesthe2500gpmLowPressure IMediumFlowPumpandthe1000gpmPortableSubmersiblePumpthatcouldoptionallybeusedforthePhase2toPhase3transitionat99hoursafterthestartoftheeventtosupplymakeuptotheSSWbasinsfromtheMississippiRiver.Thisequipmentiswithintheair-liftcapabilityoftheNSRC.The IPage80of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril20162.10OffsiteResourcesGrandGulfNuclearStation2.10.1NationalSAFERResponseCenterTheindustryhasestablishedtwoNationalSAFERResponseCenters(NSRCs)tosupportutilitiesduringBDBEEs.EntergyhasestablishedcontractswiththePooledEquipmentInventoryCompany(PEICo)toparticipateintheprocessforsupportoftheNSRCsasrequired(Reference3.109).EachNSRCholdsfivesetsofequipment,fourofwhichwillbeabletobefullydeployedwhenrequested,thefifthsetisassumedtobeinamaintenancecycle.Inaddition,on-siteFLEXequipmenthoseandcableendfittingsarestandardizedwiththeequipmentsuppliedfromtheNSRCorutilizeadaptersstoredintheFLEXstoragebuildings.IntheeventofaBDBEEandsubsequentELAP/LUHScondition,equipmentwillbemovedfromanNSRCtoalocalassemblyareaestablishedbytheStrategicAllianceforFLEXEmergencyResponse(SAFER)team.FLEXStrategyrequeststotheNationalSAFERResponseCenter(NSRC)aredirectedbytheExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP)AOP IONEP(Reference3.89).FLEXsupportguidelineProceduresdirectconnectionofNSRCsuppliedequipment.CommunicationswillbeestablishedbetweenthesiteandtheNSRCviasatellitephones.AllNSRCarrivingequipmentwillbedeliveredtothesitewithin24hoursfromtheinitialrequest.TheorderatwhichequipmentisdeliveredisidentifiedintheGGNS"SAFERResponsePlan(Reference3.22)."ForGGNS,StagingArea'B'islocatedintheESClaydownarea,anareawest-northwestofthePA.StagingArea'C'islocatedattheVicksburgTallulahRegionalAirportandStagingArea'D'islocatedattheNatchezAdamsCountyAirport(Reference3.22).FromStagingAreas'C'or'D',equipmentcanbetakentotheGGNSsiteandstagedatStagingArea'B'byhelicopterifgroundtransportationisunavailable.2.10.2EquipmentListForGGNS,theequipmentthatisplannedtobeavailableforusefromtheNSRCincludesthe2500gpmLowPressure IMediumFlowPumpandthe1000gpmPortableSubmersiblePumpthatcouldoptionallybeusedforthePhase2toPhase3transitionat99hoursafterthestartoftheeventtosupplymakeuptotheSSWbasinsfromtheMississippi River.Thisequipmentiswithintheair-liftcapabilityoftheNSRC.The IPage80of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear Station equipmentstoredand maintainedattheNSRCfor transportationtothe local assemblyareato supporttheresponsetoaBDBEEislistedinTable4.Table4 identifies the equipmentthatiscreditedintheFLEX strategiesforGGNSrecoveryduringPhase3andalsoliststhe equipmentthatwillbe availableforbackup/ replacementforon-sitePhase2 equipmentorwouldbeonhandas defenseindepth.Sinceall the equipmentwillbe deliveredtothelocalstagingarea(StagingArea'B')within24hours,thetimeneededforthe replacementofafailed componentwillbeminimalfollowing equipment delivery.Page81of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear Station equipmentstoredand maintainedattheNSRCfor transportationtothe local assemblyareato supporttheresponsetoaBDBEEislistedinTable4.Table4 identifies the equipmentthatiscreditedintheFLEX strategiesforGGNSrecoveryduringPhase3andalsoliststhe equipmentthatwillbe availableforbackup/ replacementforon-sitePhase2 equipmentorwouldbeonhandas defenseindepth.Sinceall the equipmentwillbe deliveredtothelocalstagingarea(StagingArea'B')within24hours,thetimeneededforthe replacementofafailed componentwillbeminimalfollowing equipment delivery.Page81of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear StationTable4BWRPortable EquipmentFromNSRCUseand (Potential! Flexibility) Diverse Uses List Portable Qty Qty Core Cont.Instrumen-Performance Notes Req'd Provided Power Cool-Cooling!SFP Access RCS Criteria Equipment!Unit!Unit ing Integrity tation Inventory MediumRef.3.22and Voltage 01TurbineXXX X 4160 3.84 Generators X VAC 2MWSection7.1 (Generic)(1)(2)LowVoltageRef.3.22and Generator 01TurbineXXX X 4801000kW 3.84 (Generic)VACSection7.2 (1)HighPressureRef.3.22andInjectionPump 01Diesel 2000#60GPM 3.84 (Generic)Section7.3 (3)SG/RPVRef.3.22andMakeupPump01Diesel 500#500 3.84 (Generic)GPMSection7.4 (3)LowPressure IMediumFlow11Diesel 2500Ref.3.22and Pump X X X 300#3.84 (Generic)GPMSection7.5LowPressure IHighFlowRef.3.22and (Dewatering) 01Diesel X X X 150#50003.84 PumpGPMSection7.6 (Generic)(1)Page82of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear StationTable4BWRPortable EquipmentFromNSRCUseand (Potential! Flexibility) Diverse Uses Qty Qty Core Cont.Performance Notes List Portable Req'd Provided Power Cool-Cooling!SFP Access Instrumen-RCS Criteria Equipment!Unit!Unit ing Integrity tation Inventory MediumRef.3.22and Voltage 01TurbineXXX X X 4160 2MW 3.84 Generators VACSection7.1 (Generic)(1)(2)LowVoltageRef.3.22and 480 3.84 Generator 01TurbineXXX X VAC1000kWSection7.2 (Generic)(1)HighPressureRef.3.22and 3.84InjectionPump 01Diesel 2000#60GPMSection7.3 (Generic)(3)SG/RPVRef.3.22andMakeupPump01Diesel 500#500 3.84GPMSection7.4 (Generic)(3)LowPressureRef.3.22and IMediumFlow 2500 Pump11Diesel X X X 300#GPM 3.84 (Generic)Section7.5LowPressureRef.3.22and IHighFlow50003.84 (Dewatering) 01Diesel X X X 150#GPMSection7.6 Pump (1)(Generic)Page82of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear StationTable4BWRPortable EquipmentFromNSRC Use and (Potential! Flexibility) Diverse Uses List PortableQtyQty Core Cont.Instrumen-Performance Notes Equipment Req'd Provided Power Cool-Cooling!SFP Access RCS Criteria!Unit!Unit ing Integrity tation Inventory Lighting TowerRef.3.22and03 Diesel X440,0003.84 (Generic)LuSection7.7(1)DieselFuelRef.3.22and Transfer 0 1 AC/DCXXX X X 240 3.84 (Generic)GallonsSection7.8 (1)FuelAir-LiftRef.3.22and Containers01 N/A XXXXX 500 3.84 (Generic)GallonsSection7.8.1 (1)On-SiteDieselRef.3.22and Transfer 01Diesel XXX X X 60GPM 3.84 (Generic)Section7.8.2 (1)PortableDieselFuelRef.3.22andTankand 264 Attached 0 1 AC/DC X X XXX Gallons 3.84 Pumps 25GPMSection7.8.3 (Generic)(1)4160VACRef.3.22and Distribution System 014160VACXXX X12003.84 (Generic)AMPSection7.9.1 (1)Page83of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear StationTable4BWRPortable EquipmentFromNSRC Use and (Potential! Flexibility) Diverse UsesQtyQty Core Cont.Performance Notes List Portable Req'd Provided Power Cool-Cooling!SFP Access Instrumen-RCS Criteria Equipment!Unit!Unit ing Integrity tation InventoryRef.3.22and Lighting Tower03 Diesel X440,0003.84 (Generic)LuSection7.7(1)DieselFuelRef.3.22and Transfer 0 1 AC/DCXXXX X2403.84 (Generic)GallonsSection7.8 (1)FuelAir-LiftRef.3.22and Containers01 N/A XXXXX 500 3.84 (Generic)GallonsSection7.8.1 (1)On-SiteDieselRef.3.22and Transfer 01Diesel XXXX X 60GPM 3.84 (Generic)Section7.8.2 (1)PortableDieselFuel 264Ref.3.22andTankand 0 1 AC/DC X XXXX Gallons 3.84 AttachedSection7.8.3 Pumps 25GPM (1)(Generic)4160VACRef.3.22and Distribution 014160VACXXX X12003.84 SystemAMPSection7.9.1 (Generic)(1)Page83of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear StationTable4BWRPortable EquipmentFromNSRCUseand (Potential! Flexibility) Diverse UsesQtyQty Core Cont.Performance Notes List Portable Req'd Provided Power Cool-Cooling!SFP Access Instrumen-RCS Criteria Equipment!Unit!Unit ing Integrity tation Inventory AirRef.3.22and Compressor01 Diesel X X 150#300scfm3.84 (Non-Generic)Section8.6 WaterRef.3.22and Treatment 01N/AX X X500'3.84 (Pre-filter)GPMSection8.7 (Non-Generic)(1)WaterRef.3.22and Treatment 250 3.84 (Reverse 01Diesel X XGPMSection8.7 Osmosis)(1)(Non-Generic) PortableRef.3.22and Submersible11DieselXXX 75#1000 3.84Pump(Non-GPMSection8.8 Generic)Note1-NSRCGeneric Equipment-NotrequiredforFLEX Strategy-Providedas Defense-in-Depth.Note2-The4160VAC generatoristwopieces.Note3-NSRCGeneric Equipment-NotneededforFLEX Strategy-ProvidedaspartofNSRC equipmentforallplants.Page84of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear StationTable4BWRPortable EquipmentFromNSRCUseand (Potential! Flexibility) Diverse UsesQtyQty Core Cont.Performance Notes List Portable Req'd Provided Power Cool-Cooling!SFP Access Instrumen-RCS Criteria Equipment!Unit!Unit ing Integrity tation Inventory AirRef.3.22and Compressor01 Diesel X X 150#300scfm3.84 (Non-Generic)Section8.6 WaterRef.3.22and Treatment 01N/AX X X500'3.84 (Pre-filter)GPMSection8.7 (Non-Generic)(1)WaterRef.3.22and Treatment 250 3.84 (Reverse 01Diesel X XGPMSection8.7 Osmosis)(1)(Non-Generic) PortableRef.3.22and Submersible11DieselXXX 75#1000 3.84Pump(Non-GPMSection8.8 Generic)Note1-NSRCGeneric Equipment-NotrequiredforFLEX Strategy-Providedas Defense-in-Depth.Note2-The4160VAC generatoristwopieces.Note3-NSRCGeneric Equipment-NotneededforFLEXStrategy-ProvidedaspartofNSRC equipmentforallplants.Page84of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016 2.11HabitabilityandOperationsGrandGulfNuclearStation2.11.1EquipmentOperatingConditionsFollowingaBDBEEandsubsequentELAPeventatGGNS,ventilationprovidingcoolingtooccupiedareasandareascontainingFLEXstrategyequipmentwillbelost.PertheguidancegiveninNEI12-06,FLEXstrategiesmustbecapableofexecutionundertheadverseconditions(unavailabilityofinstalledplantlighting,ventilation,etc.)expectedfollowingaBDBEEresultinginanELAP/LUHS.Theprimaryconcernwithregardtoventilationistheheatbuildupwhichoccurswiththelossofforcedventilationinareasthatcontinuetohaveheatloads.AlossofventilationanalysiswasperformedtoquantifythemaximumsteadystatetemperaturesexpectedinspecificareasrelatedtoFLEXimplementationtoensuretheenvironmentalconditionsremainacceptableforpersonnelhabitabilityoraccessibilityandwithinequipmentlimits.ThekeyareasidentifiedforallphasesofexecutionoftheFLEXstrategyactivitiesarethemaincontrolroom(MCR),RCICroom,BatteryRoomandSwitchgearRoom.2.11.1.1MainControlRoomCalculationXC-Q1111-14001,Rev.1,ControlRoomHeatupforExtendedLossofACPower(Reference3.60),determinedthetransienttemperatureresponseintheMCRfor120hoursfollowinganELAP.Tomaintainthecontrolroombelowthemaximumtemperatureof110°Fthefollowingactionswillbetaken:adoortotheroofwillbeopenedwithin1hoursoftheinitiatingevent;13controlbuildingdoorswillbeopenedwithin4hoursoftheinitiatingevent;and,two3,000cfm(minimum)fanswillbestagedtoexhaustairfromtheMCRintothecorridorwithin10hoursoftheinitiatingevent.VentilationfortheMCRwillbeviaany twoportablefans (1FLEXC005through1FLEXC008),poweredbyaportable6kWdieselgenerator (1 FLEXS012 I1FLEXS013).TheseactionswilldrawairintotheMCRthroughthestairwellopentotheatmosphereonelevation133'0"(andhotairisexhaustedthroughtheMCRthroughdoorsupthroughanadditionalstairwelltotheroof (ReferenceTheheatupevaluationdeterminedthatthemaximumtemperaturereached120hoursafterthestartPage85of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016 2.11HabitabilityandOperationsGrandGulfNuclearStation2.11.1EquipmentOperatingConditionsFollowingaBDBEEandsubsequentELAPeventatGGNS,ventilationprovidingcoolingtooccupiedareasandareascontainingFLEXstrategyequipmentwillbelost.PertheguidancegiveninNEI12-06,FLEXstrategiesmustbecapableofexecutionundertheadverseconditions(unavailabilityofinstalledplantlighting,ventilation,etc.)expectedfollowingaBDBEEresultinginanELAP/LUHS.Theprimaryconcernwithregardtoventilationistheheatbuildupwhichoccurswiththelossofforcedventilationinareasthatcontinuetohaveheatloads.AlossofventilationanalysiswasperformedtoquantifythemaximumsteadystatetemperaturesexpectedinspecificareasrelatedtoFLEXimplementationtoensuretheenvironmentalconditionsremainacceptableforpersonnelhabitabilityoraccessibilityandwithinequipmentlimits.ThekeyareasidentifiedforallphasesofexecutionoftheFLEXstrategyactivitiesarethemaincontrolroom(MCR),RCICroom,BatteryRoomandSwitchgearRoom.2.11.1.1MainControlRoomCalculationXC-Q1111-14001,Rev.1,ControlRoomHeatupforExtendedLossofACPower(Reference3.60),determinedthetransienttemperatureresponseintheMCRfor120hoursfollowinganELAP.Tomaintainthecontrolroombelowthemaximumtemperatureof110°Fthefollowingactionswillbetaken:adoortotheroofwillbeopenedwithin1hoursoftheinitiatingevent;13controlbuildingdoorswillbeopenedwithin4hoursoftheinitiatingevent;and,two3,000cfm(minimum)fanswillbestagedtoexhaustairfromtheMCRintothecorridorwithin10hoursoftheinitiatingevent.VentilationfortheMCRwillbeviaany twoportablefans (1FLEXC005through1FLEXC008),poweredbyaportable6kWdieselgenerator (1 FLEXS012 I1FLEXS013).TheseactionswilldrawairintotheMCRthroughthestairwellopentotheatmosphereonelevation133'0"(andhotairisexhaustedthroughtheMCRthroughdoorsupthroughanadditionalstairwelltotheroof (ReferenceTheheatupevaluationdeterminedthatthemaximumtemperaturereached120hoursafterthestartPage85of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationoftheeventisapproximately106°F.BasedonSection2.7.2.3ofReference3.9,atemperatureof110°FisanacceptablelimitforControlRoomhabitability.2.11.1.2RCICRoomCalculationXC-Q1111-14003,Rev.000,GrandGulfNuclearStationRCICPumpRoomHeatupforExtendedLossofACPower(Reference3.17)determinedtheRCICroomtransienttemperatureresponsefor120hoursfollowinganELAP.AcceptancecriterionformaximumRCICroomtemperatureis212°F(Reference3.63).FourcaseswereanalyzedinthiscalculationtoevaluatedifferentpossiblescenariosassociatedwithsheddingornotsheddingtheRCICglandsealcompressorfollowingtheBDBEE.TheoptimumstrategywasdeterminedtobetoshedtheRCICglandsealcompressorwithin30minutesoftheBDBEE(thecalculationassumesitisshedattimezerotoconservativelymaximizeroomheatup)asdetailedintheLossofACPowerprocedure(Reference3.19)andthenre-energizetheRCICglandsealcompressorwhenthestationbatterychargersarere-poweredbytheFLEX480V300kWDG (1FLEXS009or 1 FLEXS010)at 11hours.Themaximumroomtemperaturereachedis193°Fforthiscase.ThisrecommendedactionisbasedonextendingtheinstalledbatterydischargecapacityandminimizingareasofincreasedairbornecontaminationoutsidetheRCICroomthatwouldotherwiseresultduetotheshutdownoftheglandsealcompressoriftheroomdoorswereopenedtoprovideroomcooling(twoofthecasesevaluatedinReference3.17)eventhoughopeningthedoorsisanacceptablestrategyformaintainingadequate temperatures.PersonnelarenotrequiredtoentertheRCICroomduringPhase1sinceremoteoperationfromthecontrolroomremainsavailable.2.11.1.3BatteryRoomandSwitchgearRoomVentilationCalculationMC-QSZ77-09004(Reference3.64)evaluatesheatupoftheControlBuildingSafeguardSwitchgearandBatteryRooms.VentilationforthebatteryroomsandswitchgearroomsisprovidedbyusingtheFLEXDGPage86of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationoftheeventisapproximately106°F.BasedonSection2.7.2.3ofReference3.9,atemperatureof110°FisanacceptablelimitforControlRoomhabitability.2.11.1.2RCICRoomCalculationXC-Q1111-14003,Rev.000,GrandGulfNuclearStationRCICPumpRoomHeatupforExtendedLossofACPower(Reference3.17)determinedtheRCICroomtransienttemperatureresponsefor120hoursfollowinganELAP.AcceptancecriterionformaximumRCICroomtemperatureis212°F(Reference3.63).FourcaseswereanalyzedinthiscalculationtoevaluatedifferentpossiblescenariosassociatedwithsheddingornotsheddingtheRCICglandsealcompressorfollowingtheBDBEE.TheoptimumstrategywasdeterminedtobetoshedtheRCICglandsealcompressorwithin30minutesoftheBDBEE(thecalculationassumesitisshedattimezerotoconservativelymaximizeroomheatup)asdetailedintheLossofACPowerprocedure(Reference3.19)andthenre-energizetheRCICglandsealcompressorwhenthestationbatterychargersarere-poweredbytheFLEX480V300kWDG (1FLEXS009or 1 FLEXS010)at 11hours.Themaximumroomtemperaturereachedis193°Fforthiscase.ThisrecommendedactionisbasedonextendingtheinstalledbatterydischargecapacityandminimizingareasofincreasedairbornecontaminationoutsidetheRCICroomthatwouldotherwiseresultduetotheshutdownoftheglandsealcompressoriftheroomdoorswereopenedtoprovideroomcooling(twoofthecasesevaluatedinReference3.17)eventhoughopeningthedoorsisanacceptablestrategyformaintainingadequate temperatures.PersonnelarenotrequiredtoentertheRCICroomduringPhase1sinceremoteoperationfromthecontrolroomremainsavailable.2.11.1.3BatteryRoomandSwitchgearRoomVentilationCalculationMC-QSZ77-09004(Reference3.64)evaluatesheatupoftheControlBuildingSafeguardSwitchgearandBatteryRooms.VentilationforthebatteryroomsandswitchgearroomsisprovidedbyusingtheFLEXDGPage86of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)torepoweraninstalledbatteryroomexhaustventilationfan (1Z77C001A).Priortorepoweringtheinstalledventilationfan,sixControlBuildingdoorswillbeopenedby1houraftertheinitiatingeventtoprovidenaturalcirculation.Thecalculationassumesnormaloperatingheatloads.SincetheSBObatteryandswitchgearroomheatloadswillbelessthannormaloperationheatloadswithnoACpoweravailable,openingtherequireddoorsby1houraftertheinitiatingeventmaintainstheseroomsbelow120°F.Non-safetyrelatedelectricalequipmentintheswitchgearroomswillbede-energizedduringtheELAP,therefore,theloadonthetransformersfeedingthebreakerswillbereduced.Theheatloadintheroomsisprimarilycomprisedoftheheatgeneratedbyelectricalequipmentandwilldecreaseafteralossofpower(LOP)duetothelossofsafetyrelatedelectricalswitchgear.GGNS92-0002(Reference3.65)documentsthatLoadCenters15BA6and16BB6includingallassociateddevices,i.e.breakers,areexpectedtofunctionproperlyatanelevatedtemperatureof120°Ffora100dayperiod.Actionswillneedtooccurintheswitchgearroomsduringphases1and2forloadsheddinganddeployingthecablesassociatedwiththebatterychargerdieselgenerator.PlantprocedureEN-IS-108(Reference3.66)addressesworkingin hotenvironments.Duringroutine/normalbatterychargingoperations,ventilationisrequiredinthemainbatteryroomsduetohydrogengeneration.CalculationE0046(Reference3.67)determinedthatifalossofventilationoccursduringchargingoperations,thenthetimefortheroomtoreachadangerousconcentrationof 2%hydrogenisapproximately24hoursunderworstcaseconditions.Batteryroomventilationfan1Z77C001AwillberepoweredfromtheportableFLEX480V300kWDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS0101)viaLoadCenter15BA6priorto24hours.Thisexhaustfanwillprovidethenecessaryhydrogenremovalfromthebatteryroomsinadditiontoprovidingadditionalventilation.TherearenounpowereddevicesthatwouldnegativelyimpacttheFLEXPage87of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS010)torepoweraninstalledbatteryroomexhaustventilationfan (1Z77C001A).Priortorepoweringtheinstalledventilationfan,sixControlBuildingdoorswillbeopenedby1houraftertheinitiatingeventtoprovidenaturalcirculation.Thecalculationassumesnormaloperatingheatloads.SincetheSBObatteryandswitchgearroomheatloadswillbelessthannormaloperationheatloadswithnoACpoweravailable,openingtherequireddoorsby1houraftertheinitiatingeventmaintainstheseroomsbelow120°F.Non-safetyrelatedelectricalequipmentintheswitchgearroomswillbede-energizedduringtheELAP,therefore,theloadonthetransformersfeedingthebreakerswillbereduced.Theheatloadintheroomsisprimarilycomprisedoftheheatgeneratedbyelectricalequipmentandwilldecreaseafteralossofpower(LOP)duetothelossofsafetyrelatedelectricalswitchgear.GGNS92-0002(Reference3.65)documentsthatLoadCenters15BA6and16BB6includingallassociateddevices,i.e.breakers,areexpectedtofunctionproperlyatanelevatedtemperatureof120°Ffora100dayperiod.Actionswillneedtooccurintheswitchgearroomsduringphases1and2forloadsheddinganddeployingthecablesassociatedwiththebatterychargerdieselgenerator.PlantprocedureEN-IS-108(Reference3.66)addressesworkinginhotenvironments.Duringroutine/normalbatterychargingoperations,ventilationisrequiredinthemainbatteryroomsduetohydrogengeneration.CalculationE0046(Reference3.67)determinedthatifalossofventilationoccursduringchargingoperations,thenthetimefortheroomtoreachadangerousconcentrationof 2%hydrogenisapproximately24hoursunderworstcaseconditions.Batteryroomventilationfan1Z77C001AwillberepoweredfromtheportableFLEX480V300kWDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS0101)viaLoadCenter15BA6priorto24hours.Thisexhaustfanwillprovidethenecessaryhydrogenremoval fromthebatteryroomsinadditiontoprovidingadditionalventilation.TherearenounpowereddevicesthatwouldnegativelyimpacttheFLEXPage87of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationfunctionoftherepoweredexhaustfan(References3.68and 3.69).Tomitigatetheeffectsofextremelowtemperaturesforthebatteryrooms,personnelwillmonitoroutdoorandroomtemperaturesasnecessaryandimplementmitigatingstrategies(e.g.closingdoorsorcyclingtheexhaustfan)toensurebatteryroomtemperaturesremainabove70°F.2.11.2HeatTracingThestrategyutilizesHPCSSWlinesthatarepotentiallysubjectedtofreezingconditions.GGNS-SA-14-00002(Reference3.14)discussesconcernsassociatedwithfreezingofnon-heattracedlinesintheHPCSSWsystem.AsstatedinSOC P41(Reference3.70),thesiphonbetweenthetwoSSWbasinsisinstalledbelowgradeandisthereforeprotectedfromfreezing.Similarly,HPCSSWbasinpipingthatisbeingutilizediseitherbelowgradeorinheatedroomsandprotectedfromfreezing.FollowingaBDBEEresultinginanELAP,heatingislostintheSSWBasinAvalveroom,suchthatthe6inchand10inchnominaldiameterpipesarepotentiallysubjecttofreezingconditionsasaneventprogressesiftheyarenotdrainedorifflowisnotestablishedthroughthepipinginareasonabletimeframe.Flowcouldbereasonablyestablishedthroughthe6inchteeconnectionintheSSWBasinAvalveroomsincetheroomtemperatureisexpectedtoremainabovefreezingforanextendedperiodoftimebasedontheresultsofsimilarevaluationsfortheSSWpumphouse(Reference3.110)andflowforSFPmakeupisestablishedwithin-11hoursoftheinitiatingBDBEE.Discountingthisconclusion,however,duringimplementationoftheFLEXstrategysubjecttofreezingconditions,thealternateRPVandSFPmakeupstrategy(hosesrunfromthebasintotheAuxiliaryBuilding)inlieuoftheHPCSSWpipingcouldbeusedifnecessary. BasedonanalysisperformedattheIndianPointEnergyCenterlocatedinaregionthatexperiencescoldertemperaturesthanGGNS(Reference3.71)hosefreezingisnotaconcernfortheflowratesrequiredbySections2.3.2,2.3.3,2.4.2and2.4.3.Therefore,theGGNSFLEXStrategydoesnothavedependencyonheattracingforanyrequiredequipmentaftertheinitiationoftheevent.Page88of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationfunctionoftherepoweredexhaustfan(References3.68and 3.69).Tomitigatetheeffectsofextremelowtemperaturesforthebatteryrooms,personnelwillmonitoroutdoorandroomtemperaturesasnecessaryandimplementmitigatingstrategies(e.g.closingdoorsorcyclingtheexhaustfan)toensurebatteryroomtemperaturesremainabove70°F.2.11.2HeatTracingThestrategyutilizesHPCSSWlinesthatarepotentiallysubjectedtofreezingconditions.GGNS-SA-14-00002(Reference3.14)discussesconcernsassociatedwithfreezingofnon-heattracedlinesintheHPCSSWsystem.AsstatedinSOC P41(Reference3.70),thesiphonbetweenthetwoSSWbasinsisinstalledbelowgradeandisthereforeprotectedfromfreezing.Similarly,HPCSSWbasinpipingthatisbeingutilizediseitherbelowgradeorinheatedroomsandprotectedfromfreezing.FollowingaBDBEEresultinginanELAP,heatingislostintheSSWBasinAvalveroom,suchthatthe6inchand10inchnominaldiameterpipesarepotentiallysubjecttofreezingconditionsasaneventprogressesiftheyarenotdrainedorifflowisnotestablishedthroughthepipinginareasonabletimeframe.Flowcouldbereasonablyestablishedthroughthe6inchteeconnectionintheSSWBasinAvalveroomsincetheroomtemperatureisexpectedtoremainabovefreezingforanextendedperiodoftimebasedontheresultsofsimilarevaluationsfortheSSWpumphouse(Reference3.110)andflowforSFPmakeupisestablishedwithin -11hoursoftheinitiatingBDBEE.Discountingthisconclusion,however,duringimplementationoftheFLEXstrategysubjecttofreezingconditions,thealternateRPVandSFPmakeupstrategy(hosesrunfromthebasintotheAuxiliaryBuilding)inlieuoftheHPCSSWpipingcouldbeusedifnecessary.BasedonanalysisperformedattheIndianPointEnergyCenterlocatedinaregionthatexperiencescoldertemperaturesthanGGNS(Reference3.71)hosefreezingisnotaconcernfortheflowratesrequiredbySections2.3.2,2.3.3,2.4.2and2.4.3.Therefore,theGGNSFLEXStrategydoesnothavedependencyonheattracingforanyrequiredequipmentaftertheinitiationoftheevent.Page88of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.12PersonnelHabitabilityPersonnelhabitabilitywasevaluatedfortheMCRinSection2.11.1.1aboveanddeterminedtobeacceptable.AnauxiliarybuildingheatupcalculationwasperformedandtheresultsofthisevaluationdeterminethateveryareaintheauxiliarybuildingrequiringoperatoractionswillbeaccessiblefollowinganELAPevent(Reference3.85).Entergyindustrialsafetyprocedurescurrentlyaddressactivitieswithapotentialforheatstresstopreventadverseimpactsonpersonnel(Reference 3.66).2.13LightingFollowingtheBDBEE,emergencylightingisretainedfortheMCR.Followingsheddingofnon-essentialDCloads,theDivisionIIstationbatterieshavethecapacitytofeedtheMCRemergencylightingforupto13hours.After 11hoursthebatterychargersarepoweredfromtheFLEX480V300kWDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS0101)whichcarriestheDCloads(Reference3.12).Thestandardgear/equipmentofoperatorswithdutiesintheplant(outsidethemaincontrolroom)includesflashlights;therefore,flashlightswouldbeavailabletooperationspersonnelimmediatelyfollowingthestartoftheevent.ThisrequirementisinplantprocedureEN-OP-115-01,OperatorRounds(Reference3.72).Additionally,portableflashlightsareprovidedincontrolroomevacuationbagsalongwiththecontrolbuildingopsworkarea(References3.73and3.74).FlexsupportguidelinesaddresslightingrequirementsduringtheELAP.Page89of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.12PersonnelHabitabilityPersonnelhabitabilitywasevaluatedfortheMCRinSection2.11.1.1aboveanddeterminedtobeacceptable.AnauxiliarybuildingheatupcalculationwasperformedandtheresultsofthisevaluationdeterminethateveryareaintheauxiliarybuildingrequiringoperatoractionswillbeaccessiblefollowinganELAPevent(Reference3.85).Entergyindustrialsafetyprocedurescurrentlyaddressactivitieswithapotentialforheatstresstopreventadverseimpactsonpersonnel(Reference 3.66).2.13LightingFollowingtheBDBEE,emergencylightingisretainedfortheMCR.Followingsheddingofnon-essentialDCloads,theDivisionIIstationbatterieshavethecapacitytofeedtheMCRemergencylightingforupto13hours.After 11hoursthebatterychargersarepoweredfromtheFLEX480V300kWDG (1FLEXS009or1 FLEXS0101)whichcarriestheDCloads(Reference3.12).Thestandardgear/equipmentofoperatorswithdutiesintheplant(outsidethemaincontrolroom)includesflashlights;therefore,flashlightswouldbeavailabletooperationspersonnelimmediatelyfollowingthestartoftheevent.ThisrequirementisinplantprocedureEN-OP-115-01,OperatorRounds(Reference3.72).Additionally,portableflashlightsareprovidedincontrolroomevacuationbagsalongwiththecontrolbuildingopsworkarea(References3.73and3.74).FlexsupportguidelinesaddresslightingrequirementsduringtheELAP.Page89of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.14CommunicationsGGNShascommunicationcapabilitieswithoff-siteresponseorganizations,theNRC,betweenemergencyresponsefacilities,withfieldandoff-sitemonitoringteams,andwithin-plantandoff-siteemergencyresponseorganizationstaff.Anassessmentofcommunicationsassumingalarge-scalenaturalevent,whichwouldleadtoanextendedlossofallACpowerwasperformedanddescribedinReferences3.75and3.76.Aspartofthisassessment,GGNSidentifiedenhancements/changestomaintaincommunicationscapabilitiesforrespondingtoemergencyevents.ChangesresultingfromdesignevolutionoccurredsuchthatsomeoftheoriginalstrategiescommunicatedtotheNRCinReference3.76wererevised.Theimplementeddesignensurestherequiredpowerandphysicalprotectionfromflooding,wind,andseismiceventsareprovidedfortheessentialequipmentperNEI 12-01(Reference3.77).TheGGNSplantpagingsystemprovidespublicaddresscapabilityoveralargeportionofthesite.Thesystemislimitedprimarilybythelackofsystemwidebackuppower.Althoughportionsofthesystemmaybeavailable,itisnotcreditedasavailablefornotificationofplantpersonnel.Plantpersonnelwillbecomeawareofthelargescalenaturaleventbypersonalobservation(e.g.,lossoflighting).GeneralEmployeeTraining(GET)includesdirectionregardingactionstobetakenbypersonneluponobservationofsiteevents,i.e.,theyaretoreporttothedesignatedsiteassemblyarea(s).Siteaccountabilityprocesswillbeimplementedtoensureallpersonnelare notified.Table5providesisasummaryofthecommunicationequipmentprovided(Reference3.78):Table5 CREDITED COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
SUMMARY
Building Location Communication and Power Supply EquipmentTurbineBuildingElevation186'-3"Channel1RadioRepeaterandActiveFilterRadioRoom1UPSand5BatteryPacksChannel3RadioRepeaterandActiveFilterSatellitePhoneDockingStation1UPSand5BatteryPacksAdminBuilding OSCTwoDesktopRadios (Maintenance1UPSand2BatteryPacksPage90of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.14CommunicationsGGNShascommunicationcapabilitieswithoff-siteresponseorganizations,theNRC,betweenemergencyresponsefacilities,withfieldandoff-sitemonitoringteams,andwithin-plantandoff-siteemergencyresponseorganizationstaff.Anassessmentofcommunicationsassumingalarge-scalenaturalevent,whichwouldleadtoanextendedlossofallACpowerwasperformedanddescribedinReferences3.75and3.76.Aspartofthisassessment,GGNSidentifiedenhancements/changestomaintaincommunicationscapabilitiesforrespondingtoemergencyevents.ChangesresultingfromdesignevolutionoccurredsuchthatsomeoftheoriginalstrategiescommunicatedtotheNRCinReference3.76wererevised.Theimplementeddesignensurestherequiredpowerandphysicalprotectionfromflooding,wind,andseismiceventsareprovidedfortheessentialequipmentperNEI 12-01(Reference3.77).TheGGNSplantpagingsystemprovidespublicaddresscapabilityoveralargeportionofthesite.Thesystemislimitedprimarilybythelackofsystemwidebackuppower.Althoughportionsofthesystemmaybeavailable,itisnotcreditedasavailablefornotificationofplantpersonnel.Plantpersonnelwillbecomeawareofthelargescalenaturaleventbypersonalobservation(e.g.,lossoflighting).GeneralEmployeeTraining(GET)includesdirectionregardingactionstobetakenbypersonneluponobservationofsiteevents,i.e.,theyaretoreporttothedesignatedsiteassemblyarea(s).Siteaccountabilityprocesswillbeimplementedtoensureallpersonnelare notified.Table5providesisasummaryofthecommunicationequipmentprovided(Reference3.78):Table5 CREDITED COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
SUMMARY
Building Location Communication and Power Supply EquipmentTurbineBuildingElevation186'-3"Channel1RadioRepeaterandActiveFilterRadioRoom1UPSand5BatteryPacksChannel3RadioRepeaterandActiveFilterSatellitePhoneDockingStation1UPSand5BatteryPacksAdminBuilding OSCTwoDesktopRadios (Maintenance1UPSand2BatteryPacksPage90of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Table 5 CREDITED COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
SUMMARY
Building Location Communication and Power Supply Equipment Shop)3HandheldSatellitePhones3SpareSatellitePhoneBatteries1FourSlotSatellitePhoneCharger2DeployableSatellitePhones 2SpareDeployableSatellitePhoneBatteries 2DeployableSatellitePhoneBatteryChargers 23HandheldRadios46SpareRadioBatteriesTwelve(12)SixSlotRadioChargersControlBuildingUnit1MainRadioConsoleControlRoom1UPSand1BatteryPack2DeployableSatellitePhones 2SpareDeployableSatellitePhoneBatteries 2DeployableSatellitePhoneBatteryChargersControlBuildingTSC2HandheldSatellitePhones 2SpareSatellitePhoneBatteries1FourSlotSatellitePhoneCharger2DeployableSatellitePhones2SpareDeployableSatellitePhoneBatteries2DeployableSatellitePhoneBatteryChargers3HandheldRadios6SpareRadioBatteries2SixSlotRadioChargersEnergyServicesEOF4DeployableSatellitePhones Center4SpareDeployableSatellitePhoneBatteries4DeployableSatellitePhoneBatteryChargers4HandheldSatellitePhones4SpareSatellitePhoneBatteries1FourSlotSatellitePhoneChargerControlBuildingBackupOSC2HandheldSatellitePhones-Elevation.2SpareSatellitePhoneBatteries 148'-0"1FourSlotSatellitePhoneCharger MaintenanceBackupTSC2HandheldSatellitePhonesandEngineering2SpareSatellitePhoneBatteries Building1FourSlotSatellitePhoneChargerBaxterWilsonBackupEOF2HandheldSatellitePhonesSteamPlant2SpareSatellitePhoneBatteries1FourSlotSatellitePhoneChargerPage91of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Table 5 CREDITED COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
SUMMARY
Building Location Communication and Power Supply Equipment Shop)3HandheldSatellitePhones3SpareSatellitePhoneBatteries1FourSlotSatellitePhoneCharger2DeployableSatellitePhones 2SpareDeployableSatellitePhoneBatteries2DeployableSatellitePhoneBatteryChargers 23HandheldRadios46SpareRadioBatteriesTwelve(12)SixSlotRadioChargersControlBuildingUnit1MainRadioConsoleControlRoom1UPSand1BatteryPack2DeployableSatellitePhones 2SpareDeployableSatellitePhoneBatteries 2DeployableSatellitePhoneBatteryChargersControlBuildingTSC2HandheldSatellitePhones 2SpareSatellitePhoneBatteries1FourSlotSatellitePhoneCharger2DeployableSatellitePhones2SpareDeployableSatellitePhoneBatteries2DeployableSatellitePhoneBatteryChargers3HandheldRadios6SpareRadioBatteries2SixSlotRadioChargersEnergyServicesEOF4DeployableSatellitePhones Center4SpareDeployableSatellitePhoneBatteries4DeployableSatellitePhoneBatteryChargers4HandheldSatellitePhones4SpareSatellitePhoneBatteries1FourSlotSatellitePhoneChargerControlBuildingBackupOSC2HandheldSatellitePhones-Elevation.2SpareSatellitePhoneBatteries 148'-0"1FourSlotSatellitePhoneCharger MaintenanceBackupTSC2HandheldSatellitePhonesandEngineering2SpareSatellitePhoneBatteries Building1FourSlotSatellitePhoneChargerBaxterWilsonBackupEOF2HandheldSatellitePhonesSteamPlant2SpareSatellitePhoneBatteries1FourSlotSatellitePhoneChargerPage91of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationTable5 CREDITED COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
SUMMARY
Building Location Communication and Power Supply EquipmentFLEXStorageDeployedat1Portable Generator BuildingGroundLevelOutsideofControl BuildingDeployedat1Portable GeneratorGroundLevelOutsideof Maintenance ShopDeployedat1Portable GeneratorGroundLevelOutsideofEOFAcombinationofbatteriesanduninterruptiblepowersupplies(UPSs)topowersite communicationsequipmentwillbeavailable.Thesitestrategieswillresultin:(1)eachsatellitephonewillbeprovideda24hourpowersupplycapabilitythroughbatteries;(2)radioswillbeprovideda24hourpowersupplycapabilitythroughbatteries,and(3)Radiorepeatersystemswillbeprovidedback-uppowerbyacombinationofUPSunitsandportabledieselgeneratorstomaintain communication capability.Three(3)dieselgeneratorswillbedeployedandpositionedinstrategiclocationstoprovidecontinuouspowertocreditedEPCommunicationssystemequipment.One generatorwillbedeployedtoalocationadjacenttotheControlbuilding.One generatorwillbedeployedtoalocationadjacenttotheMaintenanceandEngineeringBuilding.AthirdgeneratorwillbedeployedtoalocationadjacenttotheEnergyServicesCenter.Three(3)sparegeneratorsarestoredineachFLEXstoragebuilding.Portableself-containedsatellitephone"pelicancases"containanantenna,dockingstation,satellitephoneandananalogphone;thesewillbestagedintheControlBuilding,EnergyServicesBuilding,andMaintenanceShoptoallowquick deploymentwhenneeded.IntheeventthatnormaltelephoneserviceisunavailablefollowingaBDBEE,thepelicancasesandantennaswillbeinstalledontheroofofthebuildingsandtelephonewireinstalledfromthepelicancasestoanalogphonesineachfacilitytoprovideemergencyresponsepersonneluseofsatellitephonesfromwithinthefacility.Batterychargersandsparebatterieswillbestagedineachfacilitytoensure continuoussatellitephoneusagebyemergencypersonnel.Page92of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationTable5 CREDITED COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
SUMMARY
Building Location Communication and Power Supply EquipmentFLEXStorageDeployedat1Portable Generator BuildingGroundLevelOutsideofControl BuildingDeployedat1Portable GeneratorGroundLevelOutsideof Maintenance ShopDeployedat1Portable GeneratorGroundLevelOutsideofEOFAcombinationofbatteriesanduninterruptiblepowersupplies(UPSs)topowersite communicationsequipmentwillbeavailable.Thesitestrategieswillresultin:(1)eachsatellitephonewillbeprovideda24hourpowersupplycapabilitythroughbatteries;(2)radioswillbeprovideda24hourpowersupplycapabilitythroughbatteries,and(3)Radiorepeatersystemswillbeprovidedback-uppowerbyacombinationofUPSunitsandportabledieselgeneratorstomaintain communication capability.Three(3)dieselgeneratorswillbedeployedandpositionedinstrategiclocationstoprovidecontinuouspowertocreditedEPCommunicationssystemequipment.One generatorwillbedeployedtoalocationadjacenttotheControlbuilding.One generatorwillbedeployedtoalocationadjacenttotheMaintenanceandEngineeringBuilding.AthirdgeneratorwillbedeployedtoalocationadjacenttotheEnergyServicesCenter.Three(3)sparegeneratorsarestoredineachFLEXstoragebuilding.Portableself-containedsatellitephone"pelicancases"containanantenna,dockingstation,satellitephoneandananalogphone;thesewillbestagedintheControlBuilding,EnergyServicesBuilding,andMaintenanceShoptoallowquick deploymentwhenneeded.IntheeventthatnormaltelephoneserviceisunavailablefollowingaBDBEE,thepelicancasesandantennaswillbeinstalledontheroofofthebuildingsandtelephonewireinstalledfromthepelicancasestoanalogphonesineachfacilitytoprovideemergencyresponsepersonneluseofsatellitephonesfromwithinthefacility.Batterychargersandsparebatterieswillbestagedineachfacilitytoensurecontinuoussatellitephoneusagebyemergencypersonnel.Page92of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.15WatersourcesInregardstowatersources,onlythesuppressionpool,UCP,SFP,SSWbasins(theUHS),andMississippimeetthequalificationguidelinesofNEI06foraninjectionsourcethatcanbecreditedfortheELAP/LUHSevent.Otherwatersources,dependingonthecauseoftheevent,maybeavailableforinjectionandalthougharenotcredited,couldbeconsideredduringanactualevent. RPVMakeupEventhoughRCICisnormallyalignedtotheCST,theCSTisnotcreditedforFLEXbecausethetankisnotseismicallydesignedorprotectedfrommissiles.However,theCSTcouldbeutilizedastheinitialsourceofRPVmakeupiftheELAP/LUHSinitiatingeventisnotduetoaseismicormissilegeneratingeventoriftheCSTsurvivestheseevents.ThesuppressionpoolistheinitialsourceofwaterforRCICforELAP/LUHSeventswhichresultinthelossoftheCST.Atapproximately3hours,RCICsuctionistransferredtothe UCP"becauseofincreasingsuppressionpooltemperature.TheavailablevolumeintheUCPisdepletedatapproximately20hours(Seesection2.3.7).Atapproximately20hours,theUCPsupplyavailableforRCICsuctionisnearingdepletion.TwoSRVsarethenopenedtodepressurizethereactortolessthan100psigandallowinitiationofPhase2flowfromthedieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)tostartfeedingthereactor.OneportabledieseldrivenFLEXpumpwillbeusedtoprovidethemakeupwaterforPhase2reactorcorecoolingandinventorycontrol,aswellasSFPcoolingandinventorycontrol.Thispumpwill'takesuctionfromoneoftheSSW basins.TheFLEXpumpiscapableofdraftingfromtheSSWbasinsforapproximately99hourswithoutexternalmakeupbeforecavitationoccursduetoinsufficientNPSHavailablepercalculationMC-Q1111-14007(Reference3.20).ForthecalculationtheFLEXpumpdelivers500gpm(250gpmtotheSFPand250gpmforreactorvesselmakeup)forthedurationofthe99hours.AddingwatertotheSSWBasinswillsupportindefiniteoperationofthePhase2FLEX pump.Anymethodtoprovidebasinmakeupisacceptableprovidedatleast23,000gallonsperhourcanbeprovidedby99hoursaftereventinitiation.Offsitesuppliedpumpsand IorwatertransportationequipmentwillprovidewaterfromtheMississippiRiverviapublicaccessroadsfromthePortofPortGibson,fromGrandGulfMilitaryPark,orfromtheownercontrolledaccessPage93of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.15WatersourcesInregardstowatersources,onlythesuppressionpool,UCP,SFP,SSWbasins(theUHS),andMississippimeetthequalificationguidelinesofNEI06foraninjectionsourcethatcanbecreditedfortheELAP/LUHSevent.Otherwatersources,dependingonthecauseoftheevent,maybeavailableforinjectionandalthougharenotcredited,couldbeconsideredduringanactualevent. RPVMakeupEventhoughRCICisnormallyalignedtotheCST,theCSTisnotcreditedforFLEXbecausethetankisnotseismicallydesignedorprotectedfrommissiles.However,theCSTcouldbeutilizedastheinitialsourceofRPVmakeupiftheELAP/LUHSinitiatingeventisnotduetoaseismicormissilegeneratingeventoriftheCSTsurvivestheseevents.ThesuppressionpoolistheinitialsourceofwaterforRCICforELAP/LUHSeventswhichresultinthelossoftheCST.Atapproximately3hours,RCICsuctionistransferredtothe UCP"becauseofincreasingsuppressionpooltemperature.TheavailablevolumeintheUCPisdepletedatapproximately20hours(Seesection2.3.7).Atapproximately20hours,theUCPsupplyavailableforRCICsuctionisnearingdepletion.TwoSRVsarethenopenedtodepressurizethereactortolessthan100psigandallowinitiationofPhase2flowfromthedieseldrivenFLEXpump (1 FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)tostartfeedingthereactor.OneportabledieseldrivenFLEXpumpwillbeusedtoprovidethemakeupwaterforPhase2reactorcorecoolingandinventorycontrol,aswellasSFPcoolingandinventorycontrol.Thispumpwill'takesuctionfromoneoftheSSW basins.TheFLEXpumpiscapableofdraftingfromtheSSWbasinsforapproximately99hourswithoutexternalmakeupbeforecavitationoccursduetoinsufficientNPSHavailablepercalculationMC-Q1111-14007(Reference3.20).ForthecalculationtheFLEXpumpdelivers500gpm(250gpmtotheSFPand250gpmforreactorvesselmakeup)forthedurationofthe99hours.AddingwatertotheSSWBasinswillsupportindefiniteoperationofthePhase2FLEX pump.Anymethodtoprovidebasinmakeupisacceptableprovidedatleast23,000gallonsperhourcanbeprovidedby99hoursaftereventinitiation.Offsitesuppliedpumpsand IorwatertransportationequipmentwillprovidewaterfromtheMississippiRiverviapublicaccessroadsfromthePortofPortGibson,fromGrandGulfMilitaryPark,orfromtheownercontrolledaccessPage93of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationroadfromthesitebargeslip.Additionally,theNSRCsuppliedSSWbasinmakeuppumpandsubmersiblepumpcanbedeployedtotherivertoprovidemakeuptotheSSWBasinforindefinitecorecooling. SPFMakeupForSFPmakeup,thelimiting(fullcoreoffload)requiredmakeupduetoinventorylossfromboiloffis -90gpmstartingatapproximately
- 57 hourswhentheSFPwaterlevelreachesthetopofthefuelinthestorageracks.ForthedesignbasisSFPheatload,therequiredmakeupduetoboiloffis
-39 gpm starting-atapproximately132hourswhentheSFPlevelreachestotopofthefuelinthestorageracks.NEI12-06alsorequiresplantstohavethecapabilityofspraycoolingat200gpm(or250gpmforoverspray)fortheSFP.TheGGNSSFPmakeupstrategiesprovidethesecapabilities.ForthethreeSFPmakeupstrategymethods,adieseldrivenFLEXpump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)willbedeployedandavailableatapproximately 11hoursafterthestartoftheeventtotakesuctionfromtheSSWBasins.TheFLEXpumpiscapableofproviding250gpmofflowtothemonitornozzles,whichboundsthe90gpmmakeupraterequiredundertheworstcaseheatloadconditions.Thediesel-drivenFLEXpumpissizedtosimultaneouslyprovidetherequiredmakeupflowsforreactorcorecoolingandSFPcooling.FLEXRawWaterStrategyConsiderations:TheGGNSFLEXStrategyis,bynecessity,partlya IIRaw Water ll Strategy,thatis,intheextremecaseoflosingpreferredsourcesofRPVmakeupwater(Le.,CST,suppressionpool,UCP),theUltimateHeatSink(UHS)rawwatersourcewillbeusedinaccordancewithguidanceforhandlinglowqualitybutplentifulwatersources.ThisStrategyisinaccordancewithNEIguidance.NEI12-06(Reference3.3)Section3.2.2,states:UndercertainBeyond-Design-BasisConditions,theintegrityofsomewatersourcesmaybechallenged.CopingwithanELAP/LUHSmayrequirewatersuppliesformultipledays.Guidanceshouldaddressalternatewatersourcesandwaterdeliverysystemstosupporttheextendedcopingduration.Coolingandmakeupwaterinventoriescontainedinsystemsorstructureswithdesignsthatarerobustwithrespecttoseismicevents,floods,andhighwinds,andassociatedmissilesareassumedto'beavailableinanELAP/LUHSattheirnominal capacities.Page94of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationroadfromthesitebargeslip.Additionally,theNSRCsuppliedSSWbasinmakeuppumpandsubmersiblepumpcanbedeployedtotherivertoprovidemakeuptotheSSWBasinforindefinitecorecooling. SPFMakeupForSFPmakeup,thelimiting(fullcoreoffload)requiredmakeupduetoinventorylossfromboiloffis -90gpmstartingatapproximately
- 57 hourswhentheSFPwaterlevelreachesthetopofthefuelinthestorageracks.ForthedesignbasisSFPheatload,therequiredmakeupduetoboiloffis
-39 gpm starting-atapproximately132hourswhentheSFPlevelreachestotopofthefuelinthestorageracks.NEI12-06alsorequiresplantstohavethecapabilityofspraycoolingat200gpm(or250gpmforoverspray)fortheSFP.TheGGNSSFPmakeupstrategiesprovidethesecapabilities.ForthethreeSFPmakeupstrategymethods,adieseldrivenFLEXpump (1FLEXC001or1FLEXC002)willbedeployedandavailableatapproximately 11hoursafterthestartoftheeventtotakesuctionfromtheSSWBasins.TheFLEXpumpiscapableofproviding250gpmofflowtothemonitornozzles,whichboundsthe90gpmmakeupraterequiredundertheworstcaseheatloadconditions.Thediesel-drivenFLEXpumpissizedtosimultaneouslyprovidetherequiredmakeupflowsforreactorcorecoolingandSFPcooling.FLEXRawWaterStrategyConsiderations:TheGGNSFLEXStrategyis,bynecessity,partlya IIRaw Water ll Strategy,thatis,intheextremecaseoflosingpreferredsourcesofRPVmakeupwater(Le.,CST,suppressionpool,UCP),theUltimateHeatSink(UHS)rawwatersourcewillbeusedinaccordancewithguidanceforhandlinglowqualitybutplentifulwatersources.ThisStrategyisinaccordancewithNEIguidance.NEI12-06(Reference3.3)Section3.2.2,states:UndercertainBeyond-Design-BasisConditions,theintegrityofsomewatersourcesmaybechallenged.CopingwithanELAP/LUHSmayrequirewatersuppliesformultipledays.Guidanceshouldaddressalternatewatersourcesandwaterdeliverysystemstosupporttheextendedcopingduration.Coolingandmakeupwaterinventoriescontainedinsystemsorstructureswithdesignsthat arerobustwithrespecttoseismicevents,floods,andhighwinds,andassociatedmissilesareassumedto'beavailableinanELAP/LUHSattheirnominal capacities.Page94of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationFinally,whenallotherpreferredwatersourceshavebeendepleted,lowerwaterqualitysourcesmaybepumpedasmakeupflowusingavailableequipment(e.g.,adieseldrivenfirepumporaportablepumpdrawingfromarawwatersource).Procedures/guidanceshouldclearlyspecifytheconditionswhenthe operatorisexpectedtoresorttoincreasinglyimpurewatersources.Page95of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationFinally,whenallotherpreferredwatersourceshavebeendepleted,lowerwaterqualitysourcesmaybepumpedasmakeupflowusingavailableequipment(e.g.,adieseldrivenfirepumporaportablepumpdrawingfromarawwatersource).Procedures/guidanceshouldclearlyspecifytheconditionswhenthe operatorisexpectedtoresorttoincreasinglyimpurewatersources.Page95of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.16ShutdownandRefuelingAnalysisGGNSabidesbythe NuclearEnergyInstitutepositionpaperentitled"Shutdown/RefuelingModes"(Reference3.80) addressing mitigatingstrategiesinshutdownandrefuelingModes.ThispaperhasbeenendorsedbytheNRCStaff(Reference3.81).Therefore,Entergyhas incorporated the supplementalguidanceprovidedintheNEIpositionpapertoenhancetheshutdownriskprocessandprocedures.Inordertofurtherreduceshutdownrisk,theshutdownriskprocessand procedureswillbeenhancedthroughincorporationoftheFLEXequipment. Considerationwillbegivenintheshutdownrisk assessmentprocessto:*MaintainingFLEX equipment necessarytosupportshutdownrisk processes and proceduresreadilyavailable,and*HowFLEX equipmentcouldbedeployedor pre-deployed/pre-stagedtosupport maintainingorrestoringthekeysafety functionsintheeventofalossofshutdowncooling.IncaseswhereFLEX equipmentwouldneedtobedeployedinlocationsthatwouldquicklybecome inaccessibleasaresultofalossofdecayheatremovalfromanELAPevent,pre-stagingofthat equipment requires consideration.FLEXmitigatingstrategiesavailableduringshutdownandrefuelingmodesaresummarizedbelow. RPV Core Cooling:HotShutdown(Mode3)andColdShutdown(Mode4) conditions(otherthanRefuelingModes)areboundedbytheFLEXStrategyforPowerOperation.TheFLEXStrategyresponsetimesforaneventthatoccurswhilealreadyinHotorColdShutdownarelongerthanforthePowerOperationconditionbecausetheRPVisinitiallyre-pressurizedtoallowuseofthesteam-drivenRCICsystemforcorecooling.The subsequentPhase1,2,and3actionsarethesameasforPowerOperation,butoccurlaterasthedecayheatislowerandheatuptimeslonger, dependentontheelapsedtimesinceshutdown.ThetransitionfromMode4toMode5atthebeginningofeachrefuelingoutagerequiresdrainingthedrywellcavityandremovingthedrywellheadtogainaccesstotheRPVhead.OnceoneormoreRPVheadboltsaretensionedRCICwillnotbeavailablesincetheRPVpressureboundaryiscompromised.ForanELAPinthisconfiguration,RPVinjectionusingaFLEXPage96of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.16ShutdownandRefuelingAnalysisGGNSabidesbythe NuclearEnergyInstitutepositionpaperentitled"Shutdown/RefuelingModes"(Reference3.80) addressing mitigatingstrategiesinshutdownandrefuelingModes.ThispaperhasbeenendorsedbytheNRCStaff(Reference3.81).Therefore,Entergyhas incorporated the supplementalguidanceprovidedintheNEIpositionpapertoenhancetheshutdownriskprocessandprocedures.Inordertofurtherreduceshutdownrisk,theshutdownriskprocessand procedureswillbeenhancedthroughincorporationoftheFLEXequipment. Considerationwillbegivenintheshutdownrisk assessmentprocessto:*MaintainingFLEX equipment necessarytosupportshutdownrisk processes and proceduresreadilyavailable,and*HowFLEX equipmentcouldbedeployedor pre-deployed/pre-stagedtosupport maintainingorrestoringthekeysafety functionsintheeventofalossofshutdowncooling.IncaseswhereFLEX equipmentwouldneedtobedeployedinlocationsthatwouldquicklybecome inaccessibleasaresultofalossofdecayheatremovalfromanELAPevent,pre-stagingofthat equipment requires consideration.FLEXmitigatingstrategiesavailableduringshutdownandrefuelingmodesaresummarizedbelow. RPV Core Cooling:HotShutdown(Mode3)andColdShutdown(Mode4) conditions(otherthanRefuelingModes)areboundedbytheFLEXStrategyforPowerOperation.TheFLEXStrategyresponsetimesforaneventthatoccurswhilealreadyinHotorColdShutdownarelongerthanforthePowerOperationconditionbecausetheRPVisinitiallyre-pressurizedtoallowuseofthesteam-drivenRCICsystemforcorecooling.The subsequentPhase1,2,and3actionsarethesameasforPowerOperation,butoccurlaterasthedecayheatislowerandheatuptimeslonger, dependentontheelapsedtimesinceshutdown.ThetransitionfromMode4toMode5atthebeginningofeachrefuelingoutagerequiresdrainingthedrywellcavityandremovingthedrywellheadtogainaccesstotheRPVhead.OnceoneormoreRPVheadboltsaretensionedRCICwillnotbeavailablesincetheRPVpressureboundaryiscompromised.ForanELAPinthisconfiguration,RPVinjectionusingaFLEXPage96of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationpumpisrequired.Othernon-limitingconditions(e.g.fuelcurrentlybeingtransferredthroughhorizontalfueltransfersystem,Mode2startuporMode3withRCICunavailable)havethesamestrategyasthelimitingconditionswithlesssensitivetimelines.DuringrefuelingthetimelinefortheMode5strategycouldbechallengedbytheavailabledebrisremovaltimedependinguponconditionsatthetimeofalossofshutdowncoolingevent.However,thedebrisremovalassessmentisbasedonminimalstaffingandtheconservativeconsiderationoftheworstcasedebrisgeneration.Mostdebriswouldbeeasilyremovedsheetmetalfromthenon-qualifiedmetalstructures.Also,inordertoeffectivelymanageriskandmaintainsafetyduringrefueling,theplantmaintainscontingenciestoaddresstheprecautionsandresponseactionsforlossofcooling.Thesecontingenciesdirectactionstominimizethelikelihoodforalossofcoolingandalsodirecttheactionstobetakentorespondtosuchanevent.Duringmodes4and5,therewouldbeadditionalstaffavailabletorespondtotheeventincludingdebrisremovalwhichwouldallowforquickerdeploymentoftheFLEXpump.Pre-stagingofFLEXequipmentcanbecreditedpertheguidelineofNEI06aslongasthepre-stagedequipmentisprotectedfromthenaturalhazards.However,theequipmentstagingareaisnottypicallyprotectedfromnaturalhazards,sostaginganddeploymentofFLEXportablepumpstosupplyinjectionflowmustcommenceimmediatelyfromthetimeoftheevent.Thisstrategyremainsconsistentwiththecontingenciesdevelopedtoaddresstheprecautionsandresponseactionsforalossofcoolingduringrefueling.ThecorecoolingstrategyforModes4and5relyontheprimaryandalternateinjectionpathsdescribedforMode1forreactormakeup(Section2.3.5). SFP andUCPCooling:FollowinganextendedlossofACpower,therearenocapabilitiestoprovideSFPorUCPmakeupduringshutdownconditions.Thestrategycreditstheplantdesign'swhichmaintainscoolingforthespentfuelintheSFPandUCP(whenspentfuelispresent)viathelargeinventoryandheatcapacityofwaterintheSFPandUCP.GGNSTechnicalSpecifications(Reference3.28)LCO3.7.6requirestheSFPandUCPwaterlevelstobemaintainedgreaterthanorequalto23 ftoverthetopofirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthespentfuelstoragepoolanduppercontainmentfuelstoragepoolracks.Atthislevel,theearliestthatfuelintheSFPcouldbeuncoveredfromboil-offfortheworstcasefullcoreoffload(outageconditionsonly)isapproximately57hourswhichisthelatestmakeupcouldstartperstationanalysis(Reference3.36).Page97of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationpumpisrequired.Othernon-limitingconditions(e.g.fuelcurrentlybeingtransferredthroughhorizontalfueltransfersystem,Mode2startuporMode3withRCICunavailable)havethesamestrategyasthelimitingconditionswithlesssensitivetimelines.DuringrefuelingthetimelinefortheMode5strategycouldbechallengedbytheavailabledebrisremovaltimedependinguponconditionsatthetimeofalossofshutdowncoolingevent.However,thedebrisremovalassessmentisbasedonminimalstaffingandtheconservativeconsiderationoftheworstcasedebrisgeneration.Mostdebriswouldbeeasilyremovedsheetmetalfromthenon-qualifiedmetalstructures.Also,inordertoeffectivelymanageriskandmaintainsafetyduringrefueling,theplantmaintainscontingenciestoaddresstheprecautionsandresponseactionsforlossofcooling.Thesecontingenciesdirectactionstominimizethelikelihoodforalossofcoolingandalsodirecttheactionstobetakentorespondtosuchanevent.Duringmodes4and5,therewouldbeadditionalstaffavailabletorespondtotheeventincludingdebrisremovalwhichwouldallowforquickerdeploymentoftheFLEXpump.Pre-stagingofFLEXequipmentcanbecreditedpertheguidelineofNEI06aslongasthepre-stagedequipmentisprotectedfromthenaturalhazards.However,theequipmentstagingareaisnottypicallyprotectedfromnaturalhazards,sostaginganddeploymentofFLEXportablepumpstosupplyinjectionflowmustcommenceimmediatelyfromthetimeoftheevent.Thisstrategyremainsconsistentwiththecontingenciesdevelopedtoaddresstheprecautionsandresponseactionsforalossofcoolingduringrefueling.ThecorecoolingstrategyforModes4and5relyontheprimaryandalternateinjectionpathsdescribedforMode1forreactormakeup(Section2.3.5). SFP andUCPCooling:FollowinganextendedlossofACpower,therearenocapabilitiestoprovideSFPorUCPmakeupduringshutdownconditions.Thestrategycreditstheplantdesign'swhichmaintainscoolingforthespentfuelintheSFPandUCP(whenspentfuelispresent)viathelargeinventoryandheatcapacityofwaterintheSFPandUCP.GGNSTechnicalSpecifications(Reference3.28)LCO3.7.6requirestheSFPandUCPwaterlevelstobemaintainedgreaterthanorequalto23 ftoverthetopofirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthespentfuelstoragepoolanduppercontainmentfuelstoragepoolracks.Atthislevel,theearliestthatfuelintheSFPcouldbeuncoveredfromboil-offfortheworstcasefullcoreoffload(outageconditionsonly)isapproximately57hourswhichisthelatestmakeupcouldstartperstationanalysis(Reference3.36).Page97of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationTheearliestthatfuelintheUCPcouldbeuncoveredfromboil-offfortheworstcasefullcoreoffloadisapproximately49hours(Reference3.36).Belowisasummaryoftimetoboil,boiloffrate,andtimetotopoffuelforboilofffortheSFPandUCPforfullcoreoffloadfromstationanalysis(Reference 3.36): Parameter SFP UCPTimetoboilforfullcoreoffload5.17hours3.54hoursBoil-offrateforfullcoreoffload90gpm60gpmTimetotopoffuelforfullcoreoffload57.37hours 49.01 hoursTheSFPmakeupstrategydiscussedinSection2.4canbeusedtoprovidemakeuptoboththeUCPandSFPatthesametimebyalsoestablishingaflowpathintheSFPsystemtotheUCP(Reference3.82).Page98of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationTheearliestthatfuelintheUCPcouldbeuncoveredfromboil-offfortheworstcasefullcoreoffloadisapproximately49hours(Reference3.36).Belowisasummaryoftimetoboil,boiloffrate,andtimetotopoffuelforboilofffortheSFPandUCPforfullcoreoffloadfromstationanalysis(Reference 3.36): Parameter SFP UCPTimetoboilforfullcoreoffload5.17hours3.54hoursBoil-offrateforfullcoreoffload90gpm60gpmTimetotopoffuelforfullcoreoffload57.37hours 49.01 hoursTheSFPmakeupstrategydiscussedinSection2.4canbeusedtoprovidemakeuptoboththeUCPandSFPatthesametimebyalsoestablishingaflowpathintheSFPsystemtotheUCP(Reference3.82).Page98of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.17SequenceofEventsTable6belowpresentsasequenceofevents(SOE)timelineforanELAP/LUHSeventatGGNS.Validation(Reference3.87)ofeachoftheFLEXtimeconstraintactionshasbeencompletedinaccordancetheFLEXvalidationprocessdocumentissuedbyNEIandincludesconsiderationforstaffing(References3.88).AdebrisremovalassessmentbasedonsitereviewsoftheequipmentdeploymentroutesandthelocationsofeachofthetwoFLEXstoragebuildings (1 FLEXZ001and1FLEXZ002)hasbeenperformedtodetermineareasonabletimeneededtocleardebristoallowFLEXequipmentdeploymenttosupportthePhase2andbeyondstrategies.Debrisremovalequipment (1FLEXE001and1FLEXE002)isstoredineachFLEXStorageBuilding.Table6SequenceofEventsTimeline Action Elapsed FLEX Time Action Constraint Remarks I Applicability item Time YIN 0 Event Starts NA Plant@1 00%powerRCICstarts N Reactor operatorInitiatesorverifiesinitiationofreactorwater 1.-1minutelevelrestorationwithsteamdrivenhighpressureinjectionandentersSBO procedure 05-1-02-1-4-30ShedRCICglandseal NToextend battery life.2.minutes compressorSee05-1-02-1-4Section 3.2.2 (Reference 3.19)3.-30Openallpaneldoorsincontrol NSee05-1-02-1-4Sectionminutesroomanduppercontrolroom 3.2.2 (Reference 3.19)AttemptstostartEDGshave YEntryintoELAP been unsuccessful.EnterELAPprocedure05-1-02-1-7 4.-1hour procedure(Reference3.89)providesguidancetooperatorstoperformELAPactionsOpenControlBuilding Safeguard yControlBuilding Switchgear and Battery Room Safeguard Switchgear 5.-1hour doorsandBatteryRoomdoorsareopenedat
approximately1hour.See05-1-02-1-4SectionPage99of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.17SequenceofEventsTable6belowpresentsasequenceofevents(SOE)timelineforanELAP/LUHSeventatGGNS.Validation(Reference3.87)ofeachoftheFLEXtimeconstraintactionshasbeencompletedinaccordancetheFLEXvalidationprocessdocumentissuedbyNEIandincludesconsiderationforstaffing(References3.88).AdebrisremovalassessmentbasedonsitereviewsoftheequipmentdeploymentroutesandthelocationsofeachofthetwoFLEXstoragebuildings (1 FLEXZ001and1FLEXZ002)hasbeenperformedtodetermineareasonabletimeneededtocleardebristoallowFLEXequipmentdeploymenttosupportthePhase2andbeyondstrategies.Debrisremovalequipment (1FLEXE001and1FLEXE002)isstoredineachFLEXStorageBuilding.Table6SequenceofEventsTimeline Action Elapsed FLEX Time Action Constraint Remarks I Applicability item Time YIN 0 Event Starts NA Plant@1 00%powerRCICstarts N Reactor operatorInitiatesorverifiesinitiationofreactorwater 1.-1minutelevelrestorationwithsteamdrivenhighpressureinjectionandentersSBO procedure 05-1-02-1-4-30ShedRCICglandseal NToextend battery life.2.minutes compressorSee05-1-02-1-4Section 3.2.2 (Reference 3.19)3.-30Openallpaneldoorsincontrol NSee05-1-02-1-4Sectionminutesroomanduppercontrolroom 3.2.2 (Reference 3.19)AttemptstostartEDGshave YEntryintoELAP been unsuccessful.EnterELAPprocedure05-1-02-1-7 4.-1hour procedure(Reference3.89)providesguidancetooperatorstoperformELAPactionsOpenControlBuilding Safeguard yControlBuilding Switchgear and Battery Room Safeguard Switchgear 5.-1hour doorsandBatteryRoomdoors areopenedat
approximately1hour.See05-1-02-1-4SectionPage99of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear StationTable6 SequenceofEvents Timeline Action Elapsed FLEX Time Action Constraint Remarks I Applicability item Time YIN 3.2.3 (Reference 3.19).Openingdoorsis necessarytomaintain temperatureinroomsatlessthan120°F.See Section 2.11.1.3OpenControlBuilding stairway\YAnalysisindicatesthatdoortotheroofopeningthis door willinitiallymaintainMCR 6.-1hour temperature below110°F.SeeSection2.11.1.1.See05-1-02-1-4Section3.2.3 (Reference 3.19).PerformDCloadshedonDivision yStartsat-1hourandIandDivisionII batteries completedby-2hours.Providesatleast12hour 7.-2hoursbatterylifeforeachstationbattery.SeeSection2.3.11See05-S-01-FSG-004 (Reference 3.90).UsemanualcontrolofSRVsto YManualSRV operation depressurizetheRPVto to depressurizeRPVto approximately200-400psig(via approximately200-400controlroom hand-switches)psigmust occurpriortothepointofenteringtheUnsafeRegionofthe 8.-2hoursHCTLCurve.EOPs require operators tokeepreactorpressure and temperature fromcausingentryintoUnsafeRegionofHCTLcurve.SeeSection2.3.1SwapRCICsuctionfromthe Y Maintainsacoolsource suppressionpooltotheUCPataofcoolingwater supply suppression pool temperature oftotheRCICpumpand170°F(open1G41F201viapanelturbineaswellasto 9.-3hours 1 H22P003onEI.139'Auxiliarymaintainnetpositive Building)suctionheadfortheRCICpumpwithoutcreditfor containment overpressure. SeeSection2.3.See05-S-Page100of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear StationTable6 SequenceofEvents Timeline Action Elapsed FLEX Time Action Constraint Remarks I Applicability item Time YIN 3.2.3 (Reference 3.19).Openingdoorsis necessarytomaintain temperatureinroomsatlessthan120°F.See Section 2.11.1.3OpenControlBuilding stairway\YAnalysisindicatesthatdoortotheroofopeningthis door willinitiallymaintainMCR 6.-1hour temperature below110°F.SeeSection2.11.1.1.See05-1-02-1-4Section3.2.3 (Reference 3.19).PerformDCloadshedonDivision yStartsat-1hourandIandDivisionII batteries completed by-2hours.Providesatleast12hour 7.-2hoursbatterylifeforeachstationbattery.SeeSection2.3.11See05-S-01-FSG-004 (Reference 3.90).UsemanualcontrolofSRVsto YManualSRV operation depressurizetheRPVto to depressurizeRPVto approximately200-400psig(via approximately200-400controlroom hand-switches)psigmust occurpriortothepointofenteringtheUnsafeRegionofthe 8.-2hoursHCTLCurve.EOPs require operators tokeepreactorpressure and temperature fromcausingentryintoUnsafeRegionofHCTLcurve.SeeSection2.3.1SwapRCICsuctionfromthe Y Maintainsacoolsource suppressionpooltotheUCPataofcoolingwater supply suppression pool temperature oftotheRCICpumpand170°F(open1G41F201viapanelturbineaswellasto 9.-3hours 1 H22P003onEI.139'Auxiliarymaintainnetpositive Building)suctionheadfortheRCICpumpwithoutcreditfor containment overpressure. SeeSection2.3.See05-S-Page100of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationTable6 SequenceofEvents Timeline Action Elapsed FLEX Time Action Constraint Remarks I Applicability item Time YIN 01-FSG-002 (Reference3.91)and 05-S-01-FSG-003 (Reference 3.95).OpenMCR doors to minimize Y Analysis indicates that heat-upoftheMCR during Phase opening these doors will 10.-4hours 1 continue to maintain MCR temperature below110°F.See Section 2.11.1.1.Initiateuseof modifiedEOPM41 Y The modified EOPventpath before the suppression containmentventpathis pool temperature exceeds opened to provide approximately 190°F(opennew containment heatAOV1M41F100and isolationremovalandbegina 11.-4hours valves1M41F034,1M41F035,longterm strategy of1M41F036,and1M41F037via reactor makeup andpanel1M41P001onEI.166'boilingto protect the Auxiliary Building)coreand containment.SeeSection2.5.1.See 05-S-01-FSG-012 (Reference 3.92).AttheSFPsetup2.5"and4"NPriortopoolboiling(5 hoses and monitor nozzleforSFPhoursforworstcasefull makeup and cooling and establish core offload),theFLEXtheSFP areaventflowpathhosesand spray monitor nozzlesstoredintheSFPareawillbesetup, 12.-4hours local Auxiliary Buildingdoorswillbe opened toventtheSFPareato atmosphere. SeeSection2.4.See 05-S-01-FSG-011 (Reference 3.93).Openvalve1G41F214to prevent NDuetothe temperature SFP water from entering SFP increaseoftheSFP,the sweeps ventilation duct water volume willexpandandwould enter the spentfuelpool 13.-5hours sweeps ventilation ducts.Thespentfuelpool draintankvalve1G41F214is opened to ensure thatthewater drainstothe equipment drain sumpPage101of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationTable6 SequenceofEvents Timeline Action Elapsed FLEX Time Action Constraint Remarks I Applicability item Time YIN 01-FSG-002 (Reference3.91)and 05-S-01-FSG-003 (Reference 3.95).OpenMCR doors to minimize Y Analysis indicates that heat-upoftheMCR during Phase opening these doors will 10.-4hours 1 continue to maintain MCR temperature below110°F.See Section 2.11.1.1.Initiateuseof modifiedEOPM41 Y The modified EOPventpath before the suppression containmentventpathis pool temperature exceeds opened to provide approximately 190°F(opennew containment heatAOV1M41F100and isolationremovalandbegina 11.-4hours valves1M41F034,1M41F035,longterm strategy of1M41F036,and1M41F037via reactor makeup andpanel1M41P001onEI.166'boilingto protect the Auxiliary Building)coreand containment.SeeSection2.5.1.See 05-S-01-FSG-012 (Reference 3.92).AttheSFPsetup2.5"and4"NPriortopoolboiling(5 hoses and monitor nozzleforSFPhoursforworstcasefull makeup and cooling and establish core offload),theFLEXtheSFP areaventflowpathhosesand spray monitor nozzlesstoredintheSFPareawillbesetup, 12.-4hours local Auxiliary Buildingdoorswillbe opened toventtheSFPareato atmosphere. SeeSection2.4.See 05-S-01-FSG-011 (Reference 3.93).Openvalve1G41F214to prevent NDuetothe temperature SFP water from entering SFP increaseoftheSFP,the sweeps ventilation duct water volume willexpandandwould enter the spentfuelpool 13.-5hours sweeps ventilation ducts.Thespentfuelpool draintankvalve1G41F214is opened to ensure thatthewater drainstothe equipment drain sumpPage101of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear StationTable6 SequenceofEvents Timeline Action Elapsed FLEX Time Action Constraint Remarks I Applicability item Time YINratherthanthe ventilationducts.SeeSection2.4.1.See05-S-01-FSG-011 (Reference 3.93).Complete debrisremovalandNTheFLEX480VACDG deploymentofFLEX480VACDGisrequiredfor powering (1 FLEXS009or1FLEXS010).thestation battery chargers approximately11hoursafterthestartoftheBDBEE(the 14.-6hours station batteries have>12hours capacity). See Sections2.3.11and2.8.1.See 05-S-01-FSG-005 (Reference3.94)and 05-S-01-FSG-004 (Reference 3.90).Deploy cables and portable fans Y A minimumofa6000 (1 FLEXC005 throughCFMairflow supplied to 1 FLEXC008)toMCRdoors. the corridorfromthe 15.-10hoursDeployandplacein service FLEXMCRisrequiredwithin6kWDG(1 FLEXS012 or10hoursoftheinitiating 1 FLEXS013)outside the Controleventto maintain the Building.ExhaustairfromMCRtoMCRat<110°F.See corridorviaopendoors.Section2.11.1.1. Deploy cables, connect, and YTheFLEX480VAC300placeFLEX480VAC300kWDGkWDG supplies power (1 FLEXS009or1FLEXS010)intoClass1ELoad service.Centers 15BA6 and 16BB6 which power upthestation battery chargers,dieselfueloil transferpump,and 16.-11hours battery room exhaustfan.Thetimemargin between the calculated battery durationforthe FLEX strategyandthe expected deploymenttimeforFLEX equipment to supplythedcloadsis>1hour.SeeSection 2.3.11.17.-11hoursRestartRCICGlandSeal N RestartingtheRCICPage102of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear StationTable6 SequenceofEvents Timeline Action Elapsed FLEX Time Action Constraint Remarks I Applicability item Time YINratherthanthe ventilationducts.SeeSection2.4.1.See05-S-01-FSG-011 (Reference 3.93).Complete debrisremovalandNTheFLEX480VACDG deploymentofFLEX480VACDGisrequiredfor powering (1 FLEXS009or1FLEXS010).thestation battery chargers approximately11hoursafterthestartoftheBDBEE(the 14.-6hours station batteries have>12hours capacity). See Sections2.3.11and2.8.1.See 05-S-01-FSG-005 (Reference3.94)and 05-S-01-FSG-004 (Reference 3.90).Deploy cables and portable fans Y A minimumofa6000 (1 FLEXC005 throughCFMairflow supplied to 1 FLEXC008)toMCRdoors. the corridorfromthe 15.-10hoursDeployandplacein service FLEXMCRisrequiredwithin6kWDG(1 FLEXS012 or10hoursoftheinitiating 1 FLEXS013)outside the Controleventto maintain the Building.ExhaustairfromMCRtoMCRat<110°F.See corridorviaopendoors.Section2.11.1.1. Deploy cables, connect, and YTheFLEX480VAC300placeFLEX480VAC300kWDGkWDG supplies power (1 FLEXS009or1FLEXS010)intoClass1ELoad service.Centers 15BA6 and 16BB6 which power upthestation battery chargers,dieselfueloil transferpump,and 16.-11hours battery room exhaustfan.Thetimemargin between the calculated battery durationforthe FLEX strategyandthe expected deploymenttimeforFLEX equipment to supplythedcloadsis>1hour.SeeSection 2.3.11.17.-11hoursRestartRCICGlandSeal N RestartingtheRCICPage102of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationTable6 SequenceofEvents Timeline Action Elapsed FLEX Time Action Constraint Remarks I Applicability item Time YIN Compressorglandseal compressor minimizesareasof increased airborne contamination outsidetheRCICroomthat would otherwise resultduetothe shutdown oftheRCICglandseal compressor(sincedoorswouldhavetobeopenedtoprovideroomcoolingif compressorswerenotrestarted).SeeSection2.11.1.2.-11hoursDeployandplaceinservice(if NSeeSection2.5.2. 18.toneeded)theFLEXH 2igniterDG-13hours(1FLEXS011or1 FLEXS022)andinitiateH 2 ignitersDeployandmake available diesel y During non-outagedrivenFLEXpump(1FLEXC001conditions,thetimetoor1 FLEXC002)forSFPmakeup.boilingintheSFPis-11hours,andboilofftothelevelofthetopofthespentfuelracks(NEI12-
- 02Level3)is
-5.5 daysifnoadditionalwaterissuppliedtotheSFP.The 19.-11hoursinitialcoping strategy forSFPcoolingisto monitorSFPlevelusing instrumentation(1G41-LE-N040A/1G41-L1-R040Aand1 G41-LE-N040B/1G41-L1-R040B)installedasrequiredbyNRC OrderEA-12-051.SeeSection 2.4.6Use28gallontankcart NSeeSection2.9.4. (1 FLEXC009 through 20.-15hours 1 FLEXC016)torefuelsmall portable equipment(e.g.,MCRfansDG[1 FLEXS012 or 1 FLEXS013]) 21.-20hoursOpentwoSRVsto depressurize y At approximately 20Page103of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationTable6 SequenceofEvents Timeline Action Elapsed FLEX Time Action Constraint Remarks I Applicability item Time YIN Compressorglandseal compressor minimizesareasof increased airborne contamination outsidetheRCICroomthat would otherwise resultduetothe shutdown oftheRCICglandseal compressor(sincedoorswouldhavetobeopenedtoprovideroomcoolingif compressorswerenotrestarted).SeeSection2.11.1.2. -11hoursDeployandplaceinservice(if NSeeSection2.5.2. 18.toneeded)theFLEXH 2igniterDG-13hours(1FLEXS011or1 FLEXS022)andinitiateH 2 ignitersDeployandmake available diesel y During non-outagedrivenFLEXpump(1FLEXC001conditions,thetimetoor1 FLEXC002)forSFPmakeup.boilingintheSFPis -11hours,andboilofftothelevelofthetopofthespentfuelracks(NEI12-
- 02Level3)is
-5.5 daysifnoadditionalwaterissuppliedtotheSFP.The 19.-11hoursinitialcoping strategy forSFPcoolingisto monitorSFPlevelusing instrumentation(1G41-LE-N040A/1G41-L1-R040Aand1 G41-LE-N040B/1G41-L1-R040B)installedasrequiredbyNRC OrderEA-12-051.SeeSection 2.4.6Use28gallontankcart NSeeSection2.9.4. (1 FLEXC009 through 20.-15hours 1 FLEXC016)torefuelsmall portable equipment(e.g.,MCRfansDG[1 FLEXS012 or 1 FLEXS013]) 21.-20hoursOpentwoSRVsto depressurize y At approximately 20Page103of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear StationTable6 SequenceofEvents Timeline Action Elapsed FLEX Time Action Constraint Remarks I Applicability item Time YINthereactortolessthan100psighours,theUCPsupplyandbeginPhase2RPVflowfrom availableforRCICtheFLEXpump(1FLEXC001orsuctionisnearing 1 FLEXC002).depletion.Pumpwasdeployedat11hoursforSFPmakeup.SeeSection2.3.2.See05-S-01-FSG-003 (Reference 3.95)Neededtoensurelong-24hoursDeploycablefrom480V300kW term operability of 22.to DG (1 FLEXS009or1FLEXS010) Y containmentvent.See-27hours to repower1M41P001PanelEI.Section2.5.2.See05-S-166 Auxiliary Building.01-FSG-012 (Reference 3.92)Deploycablefrom DisconnectNPoweredfromFLEXSwitch89-171102Ato17B11480V300kWDG Breaker2to repowerHPCSDG through Disconnect 89-fuel transferpumpforrefueling 171102Ato17B11 23.-26hourslarge portable equipment. Breaker2.SeeSection2.9.4.See05-1-02-1-7 (Reference3.89)and 05-S-01-FSG-005 (Reference 3.94).Alignnitrogenbottle(s)to YThe40hoursisbasedrechargetheADSSRV receiverontheinitialopeningof tankstheSRVsasthereactorscramsattheinitiationoftheevent,theuseofthelow-lowsetfunctionoftheSRVstocontrolRPV 24.40hourspressure,andtheuseoftwoSRVsto depressurizetheRPVforPhase2makeupwiththedieseldrivenFLEXpumpforatotalof79SRVactuations.SeeSection2.3.2.See05 02-1-7 (Reference 3.89)Offsitesuppliedpumpsand/orNSeeSection2.3.3.See water transportation equipment 05-1-02-1-7 (Reference 25.-99 hours begins delivery of 23,000 gallons3.89)and 05-S-01-FSG-perhourriverwater makeup to 001 (Reference 3.96).UHSbasin.Page104of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear StationTable6 SequenceofEvents Timeline Action Elapsed FLEX Time Action Constraint Remarks I Applicability item Time YINthereactortolessthan100psighours,theUCPsupplyandbeginPhase2RPVflowfrom availableforRCICtheFLEXpump(1FLEXC001orsuctionisnearing 1 FLEXC002).depletion.Pumpwasdeployedat11hoursforSFPmakeup.SeeSection2.3.2.See05-S-01-FSG-003 (Reference 3.95)Neededtoensurelong -24hoursDeploycablefrom480V300kW term operability of 22.to DG (1 FLEXS009or1FLEXS010) Y containmentvent.See-27hours to repower1M41P001PanelEI.Section2.5.2.See05-S-166 Auxiliary Building.01-FSG-012 (Reference 3.92)Deploycablefrom DisconnectNPoweredfromFLEXSwitch89-171102Ato17B11480V300kWDG Breaker2to repowerHPCSDG through Disconnect 89-fuel transferpumpforrefueling 171102Ato17B11 23.-26hourslarge portable equipment. Breaker2.SeeSection2.9.4.See05-1-02-1-7 (Reference3.89)and 05-S-01-FSG-005 (Reference 3.94).Alignnitrogenbottle(s)to YThe40hoursisbasedrechargetheADSSRV receiverontheinitialopeningof tankstheSRVsasthereactorscramsattheinitiationoftheevent,theuseofthelow-lowsetfunctionoftheSRVstocontrolRPV 24.40hourspressure,andtheuseoftwoSRVsto depressurizetheRPVforPhase2makeupwiththedieseldrivenFLEXpumpforatotalof79SRVactuations.SeeSection2.3.2.See05 02-1-7 (Reference 3.89)Offsitesuppliedpumpsand/orNSeeSection2.3.3.See water transportation equipment 05-1-02-1-7 (Reference 25.-99 hours begins delivery of 23,000 gallons3.89)and 05-S-01-FSG-perhourriverwater makeup to 001 (Reference 3.96).UHSbasin.Page104of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016 2.18 Programmatic ElementsGrandGulf Nuclear Station2.18.1OverallProgram DocumentTheFLEXprogram document EN-OP-201-02 (Reference 3.98)provides a descriptionoftheFLEX programforGGNS.Thekey program elements providedintheProgram Document include:*DescriptionoftheFLEX strategiesandbasis*Provisions for documentationofthe historicalrecordof previous strategiesandthebasisfor changes*Thebasisforthe ongoing maintenanceandtesting programschosenfortheFLEX equipment*Designationofthe minimumsetof parameters necessary to support strategy implementationInaddition,the program document includesalistofthe engineering documentsthatprovidethe basesfortheFLEX strategies.Existingdesign control and licensing proceduressuchas EN-DC-115 (Reference3.99)and EN-LI-100 (Reference3.100),respectively,havebeenrevisedtoensurethat changestotheplantdesign,physicalplantlayout,roads, buildings, and miscellaneous structureswillnot adversely impact the approved FLEX strategies. Future changestotheFLEX strategiesmaybemade without prior NRC approval provided1)therevisedFLEX strategiesmeetthe requirementsofNEI12-06,and2)an engineeringbasisis documented that ensuresthatthe changeinFLEX strategies continuestoensurethekeysafety functions(coreandSFPcooling, Containment integrity)aremet.2.18.2 Procedural Guidance The inability to predictallactualplantbeyonddesignbasis external events (BDBEEs)and conditionsthatrequiretheuseofFLEX equipmentmakesit impracticaltoprovidespecificprocedural guidance.Assuch,theFLEX support guidelines(FSGs)provide guidancethatcanbe employedfora variety of conditions. ClearcriteriaforentryintoFSGs ensuresthatFLEX strategiesareusedonly as directed for BDBEE conditions,andarenotused inappropriately inlieuofexisting procedures.WhenFLEX equipmentisneededtoPage105of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016 2.18 Programmatic ElementsGrandGulf Nuclear Station2.18.1OverallProgram DocumentTheFLEXprogram document EN-OP-201-02 (Reference 3.98)provides a descriptionoftheFLEX programforGGNS.Thekey program elements providedintheProgram Document include:*DescriptionoftheFLEX strategiesandbasis*Provisions for documentationofthe historicalrecordof previous strategiesandthebasisfor changes*Thebasisforthe ongoing maintenanceandtesting programschosenfortheFLEX equipment*Designationofthe minimumsetof parameters necessary to support strategy implementationInaddition,the program document includesalistofthe engineering documentsthatprovidethe basesfortheFLEX strategies.Existingdesign control and licensing proceduressuchas EN-DC-115 (Reference3.99)and EN-LI-100 (Reference3.100),respectively,havebeenrevisedtoensurethat changestotheplantdesign,physicalplantlayout,roads, buildings, and miscellaneous structureswillnot adversely impact the approved FLEX strategies. Future changestotheFLEX strategiesmaybemade without prior NRC approval provided1)therevisedFLEX strategiesmeetthe requirementsofNEI12-06,and2)an engineeringbasisis documented that ensuresthatthe changeinFLEX strategies continuestoensurethekeysafety functions(coreandSFPcooling, Containment integrity)aremet.2.18.2 Procedural Guidance The inability to predictallactualplantbeyonddesignbasis external events (BDBEEs)and conditionsthatrequiretheuseofFLEX equipmentmakesit impracticaltoprovidespecificprocedural guidance.Assuch,theFLEX support guidelines(FSGs)provide guidancethatcanbe employedfora variety of conditions. ClearcriteriaforentryintoFSGs ensuresthatFLEX strategiesareusedonly as directed for BDBEE conditions,andarenotused inappropriately inlieuofexisting procedures.WhenFLEX equipmentisneededtoPage105of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationsupplementEOPsorAbnormalOperatingProcedures(AOPs) INormalEventProcedures(ONEPs)strategies,theEOPorAOP IONEP,SevereAccidentMitigationGuidelines(SAMGs),orExtremeDamageMitigationGuidelines(EDGMs) IAlternateStrategy(B.5.b)(Reference3.101)directtheentryintoandexitfromtheappropriateFSGprocedure.TheFLEXSupportGuidelinesprovideavailable,pre-plannedFLEXstrategiesforaccomplishingspecifictasksintheEOPsorAOPs IONEPs.FSGsareusedtosupplement(notreplace)theexistingprocedurestructurethatestablishescommandandcontrolforevents.ProceduralInterfaceshavebeen incorporatedintoProcedure 1-4,LossofACPower,totheextentnecessarytoincludeappropriatereferencetoFSGsandprovidecommandandcontrolfortheELAP.Additionally,bydirectorindirectproceduralinterfaceswiththeLossofACPowerAOP IONEP,appropriatereferencetotheFSGshasbeenincorporatedintothefollowingAOPs I ONEPs:*05-1-02-VI-1"Flooding"*05-1-02-VI-2,"Hurricanes,Tornados,AndSevere Weather"*05-S-02-VI-3,"Earthquake"FSGmaintenancewillbeperformedbyOperations.Inaccordancewithsiteadministrativeprocedures,NEI96-07,Revision1Guidelinesfor10CFR50.59Implementation,andNEI97-04,Revision1,DesignBasesProgramGuidelines,aretobeusedtoevaluatechangestocurrentprocedures,includingFSGs,todeterminetheneed for priorNRCapproval.PertheguidanceandexamplesprovidedinNEI96-07,Rev.1,changestoprocedures(EOPs,AOPs,EDMGs,SAMGs,orFSGs)thatperformactionsinresponseeventsthatexceedasite'sdesignbasisshouldscreenout.Therefore,procedurestepswhichrecognizetheELAP/LUHShasoccurredandwhichdirectactionstoensurecorecooling,SFPcooling,orcontainmentintegrityshouldnotrequirepriorNRCapproval.FSGswillbereviewedandvalidatedbytheinvolvedgroupstotheextentnecessarytoensurethestrategyisfeasible.Validationmaybeaccomplishedviawalk-throughsordrillsoftheguidelines.Page106of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationsupplementEOPsorAbnormalOperatingProcedures(AOPs) INormalEventProcedures(ONEPs)strategies,theEOPorAOP IONEP,SevereAccidentMitigationGuidelines(SAMGs),orExtremeDamageMitigationGuidelines(EDGMs) IAlternateStrategy(B.5.b)(Reference3.101)directtheentryintoandexitfromtheappropriateFSGprocedure.TheFLEXSupportGuidelinesprovideavailable,pre-plannedFLEXstrategiesforaccomplishingspecifictasksintheEOPsorAOPs IONEPs.FSGsareusedtosupplement(notreplace)theexistingprocedurestructurethatestablishescommandandcontrolforevents.ProceduralInterfaceshavebeen incorporatedintoProcedure 1-4,LossofACPower,totheextentnecessarytoincludeappropriatereferencetoFSGsandprovidecommandandcontrolfortheELAP.Additionally,bydirectorindirectproceduralinterfaceswiththeLossofACPowerAOP IONEP,appropriatereferencetotheFSGshasbeenincorporatedintothefollowingAOPs I ONEPs:*05-1-02-VI-1"Flooding"*05-1-02-VI-2,"Hurricanes,Tornados,AndSevere Weather"*05-S-02-VI-3,"Earthquake"FSGmaintenancewillbeperformedbyOperations.Inaccordancewithsiteadministrativeprocedures,NEI96-07,Revision1Guidelinesfor10CFR50.59Implementation,andNEI97-04,Revision1,DesignBasesProgramGuidelines,aretobeusedtoevaluatechangestocurrentprocedures,includingFSGs,todeterminetheneed for priorNRCapproval.PertheguidanceandexamplesprovidedinNEI96-07,Rev.1,changestoprocedures(EOPs,AOPs,EDMGs,SAMGs,orFSGs)thatperformactionsinresponseeventsthatexceedasite'sdesignbasisshouldscreenout.Therefore,procedurestepswhichrecognizetheELAP/LUHShasoccurredandwhichdirectactionstoensurecorecooling,SFPcooling,orcontainmentintegrityshouldnotrequirepriorNRCapproval.FSGswillbereviewedandvalidatedbytheinvolvedgroupstotheextentnecessarytoensurethestrategyisfeasible.Validationmaybeaccomplishedviawalk-throughsordrillsoftheguidelines.Page106of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.18.3StaffingUsingthemethodologyof(NuclearEnergyInstitute)NEI12-01,Guidelinefor AssessingBeyondDesignBasisAccidentResponseStaffingandCommunicationsCapabilities(Reference3.77),anassessmentofthecapabilityoftheGGNSon-shiftstaffandaugmentedEmergencyResponseOrganization(ERO)torespondtoaBDBEEwasperformed.TheresultswereprovidedtotheNRC(Reference3.83)andsubsequentlyclarified(Reference3.88).Theclarifyingrevisiondoesnotchangetheoverallconclusionsasdetailedintheoriginalreport.TheassumptionsfortheNEI 12-01Phase2scenarioassessmentpostulatethattheBDBEEinvolvesalarge-scaleexternaleventthatresultsin:*anextendedlossofacpower(ELAP)*anextendedlossofaccesstoultimateheatsink(UHS)*impactontheunit(unitisoperatingatfullpoweratthetimeoftheevent)*impededaccessto theunitbyoff-siterespondersasfollows:*0to6HoursPostEvent-Nositeaccess.
- 6to24HoursPostEvent-Limitedsiteaccess.Individualsmayaccessthesitebywalking,personalvehicleorviaalternatetransportationcapabilities(e.g.,privateresourceprovidersorpublicsectorsupport).*24+HoursPostEvent-Improvedsiteaccess.Siteaccessisrestoredtoanear-normalstatusand/oraugmentedtransportationresourcesareavailabletodeliverequipment,suppliesandlargenumbersof personnel.AteamofsubjectmatterexpertsfromOperations,OperationsTraining,RadiationProtection,Chemistry,Security,EmergencyPlanningandFLEXProjectTeampersonnelperformedatabletopinJuly2015.Theparticipantsreviewedtheassumptionsandappliedproceduralguidance,includingapplicable draftandapprovedFLEXSupportGuidelines(FSGs)forcopingwithaBDBEEusingminimumon-shiftstaffing.ParticularattentionwasgiventothesequenceandtimingofPage107of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.18.3StaffingUsingthemethodologyof(NuclearEnergyInstitute)NEI12-01,Guidelinefor AssessingBeyondDesignBasisAccidentResponseStaffingandCommunicationsCapabilities(Reference3.77),anassessmentofthecapabilityoftheGGNSon-shiftstaffandaugmentedEmergencyResponseOrganization(ERO)torespondtoaBDBEEwasperformed.TheresultswereprovidedtotheNRC(Reference3.83)andsubsequentlyclarified(Reference3.88).Theclarifyingrevisiondoesnotchangetheoverallconclusionsasdetailedintheoriginalreport.TheassumptionsfortheNEI 12-01Phase2scenarioassessmentpostulatethattheBDBEEinvolvesalarge-scaleexternaleventthatresultsin:*anextendedlossofacpower(ELAP)*anextendedlossofaccesstoultimateheatsink(UHS)*impactontheunit(unitisoperatingatfullpoweratthetimeoftheevent)*impededaccessto theunitbyoff-siterespondersasfollows:*0to6HoursPostEvent-Nositeaccess.
- 6to24HoursPostEvent-Limitedsiteaccess.Individualsmayaccessthesitebywalking,personalvehicleorviaalternatetransportationcapabilities(e.g.,privateresourceprovidersorpublicsectorsupport).*24+HoursPostEvent-Improvedsiteaccess.Siteaccessisrestoredtoanear-normalstatusand/oraugmentedtransportationresourcesareavailabletodeliverequipment,suppliesandlargenumbersof personnel.AteamofsubjectmatterexpertsfromOperations,OperationsTraining,RadiationProtection,Chemistry,Security,EmergencyPlanningandFLEXProjectTeampersonnelperformedatabletopinJuly2015.Theparticipantsreviewedtheassumptionsandappliedproceduralguidance,includingapplicable draftandapprovedFLEXSupportGuidelines(FSGs)forcopingwithaBDBEEusingminimumon-shiftstaffing.ParticularattentionwasgiventothesequenceandtimingofPage107of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationeachproceduralstep,itsduration,andtheon-shiftindividualperformingthesteptoaccountforboththetaskandtheestimatedtimetoprepareforandperformthetask.Avalidationandverificationofthetimeandresourcesneededtoreasonablyassurerequiredtasks,manualactionsanddecisionsforFLEXstrategiesarefeasibleandmaybeexecutedwithinthetimeconstraintsidentifiedintheOverallIntegratedPlan(OIP)/FinalIntegratedPlan(FIP)wasalsoconducted(Reference3.87)ThevalidatedandverifiedPhase2StaffingAssessmentconcludedthatthecurrentminimumon-shiftstaffingasdefinedintheGGNSEmergencyPlanissufficienttosupporttheimplementationofthemitigatingstrategies(FLEXstrategies)aswellastherequiredEmergencyPlanactions,withnounacceptablecollateraltasksassignedtotheon-shiftstaffduringthefirst6hours.Theassessmentalsoconcludedthattheon-shiftstaffing,withassistancefrom augmentedstaff,iscapableofimplementingtheFLEXstrategiesnecessaryafterthe6hourperiodwithinthestrategytimeconstraints.Itwasconcludedthattheemergencyresponsefunctionwouldnotbedegradedorlost.2.18.4TrainingEntergy'sNuclearTrainingProgramhasbeenrevisedtoassurepersonnelproficiencyinthemitigationofBDBEEsisadequateandmaintained.Theseprogramsandcontrolsweredevelopedandhave beenimplementedinaccordancewiththeSystematicApproachtoTraining(SAT)Process.InitialtraininghasbeenprovidedandperiodictrainingwillbeprovidedtositeemergencyresponseleadersonBOBemergencyresponsestrategiesandimplementingguidelines.PersonnelassignedtodirecttheexecutionofmitigationstrategiesforBOBEEshavereceivedthenecessarytrainingtoensurefamiliaritywiththeassociatedtasks,consideringavailablejobaids,instructions,andmitigatingstrategytime
constraints.OperatortrainingforBOBEEaccidentmitigationhasnotbeengivenundueweight(incomparisonwithothertrainingrequirements).Thetesting/evaluationofOperatorknowledgeandskillsinthisareahasbeensimilarlyweighted.Page108of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationeachproceduralstep,itsduration,andtheon-shiftindividualperformingthesteptoaccountforboththetaskandtheestimatedtimetoprepareforandperformthetask.Avalidationandverificationofthetimeandresourcesneededtoreasonablyassurerequiredtasks,manualactionsanddecisionsforFLEXstrategiesarefeasibleandmaybeexecutedwithinthetimeconstraintsidentifiedintheOverallIntegratedPlan(OIP)/FinalIntegratedPlan(FIP)wasalsoconducted(Reference3.87)ThevalidatedandverifiedPhase2StaffingAssessmentconcludedthatthecurrentminimumon-shiftstaffingasdefinedintheGGNSEmergencyPlanissufficienttosupporttheimplementationofthemitigatingstrategies(FLEXstrategies)aswellastherequiredEmergencyPlanactions,withnounacceptablecollateraltasksassignedtotheon-shiftstaffduringthefirst6hours.Theassessmentalsoconcludedthattheon-shiftstaffing,withassistancefromaugmentedstaff,iscapableofimplementingtheFLEXstrategiesnecessaryafterthe6hourperiodwithinthestrategytimeconstraints.Itwasconcludedthattheemergencyresponsefunctionwouldnotbedegradedorlost.2.18.4TrainingEntergy'sNuclearTrainingProgramhasbeenrevisedtoassurepersonnelproficiencyinthemitigationofBDBEEsisadequateandmaintained.TheseprogramsandcontrolsweredevelopedandhavebeenimplementedinaccordancewiththeSystematicApproachtoTraining(SAT)Process.InitialtraininghasbeenprovidedandperiodictrainingwillbeprovidedtositeemergencyresponseleadersonBOBemergencyresponsestrategiesandimplementingguidelines.PersonnelassignedtodirecttheexecutionofmitigationstrategiesforBOBEEshavereceivedthenecessarytrainingtoensurefamiliaritywiththeassociatedtasks,consideringavailablejobaids,instructions,andmitigatingstrategytime
constraints.OperatortrainingforBOBEEaccidentmitigationhasnotbeengivenundueweight(incomparisonwithothertrainingrequirements).Thetesting/evaluationofOperatorknowledgeandskillsinthisareahasbeensimilarlyweighted.Page108of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationANSI/ANS3.5,NuclearPowerPlantSimulatorsforuseinOperatorTraining,certificationofsimulatorfidelityisconsideredtobesufficientfortheinitialstagesoftheBDBEEscenariountilthecurrentcapabilityofthesimulatormodelisexceeded.FullscopesimulatormodelswillnotbeupgradedtoaccommodateFLEXtrainingordrills.2.18.5EquipmentListTheequipmentstoredandmaintainedattheGGNSFLEXStorageareasnecessaryfortheimplementationoftheFLEXstrategiesinresponsetoaBDBEEatGGNSislistedinTable7.Table7identifiesthequantity,applicablestrategy,andcapacity/ratingforthemajorFLEXequipmentcomponentsonly.Detailsregardingfittings,tools,hoselengths,consumablesupplies,etc.arenotinTable7.Page109of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationANSI/ANS3.5,NuclearPowerPlantSimulatorsforuseinOperatorTraining,certificationofsimulatorfidelityisconsideredtobesufficientfortheinitialstagesoftheBDBEEscenariountilthecurrentcapabilityofthesimulatormodelisexceeded.FullscopesimulatormodelswillnotbeupgradedtoaccommodateFLEXtrainingordrills.2.18.5EquipmentListTheequipmentstoredandmaintainedattheGGNSFLEXStorageareasnecessaryfortheimplementationoftheFLEXstrategiesinresponsetoaBDBEEatGGNSislistedinTable7.Table7identifiesthequantity,applicablestrategy,andcapacity/ratingforthemajorFLEXequipmentcomponentsonly.Detailsregardingfittings,tools,hoselengths,consumablesupplies,etc.arenotinTable7.Page109of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear StationTable7-BWRPortable EquipmentStoredOn-Site Use and (Potential I Flexibility) Diverse Uses Performance CriteriaListPortable Equipment Core Containment SFPInstru mentation AccessibilityTwo(2)FLEXDiesel Generators (1 FLEXS009 and X X 300kW@0.8PF, 30, 4801FLEXS010), VACTwo(2)FLEXDieselDrivenRCS/SFP Makeup Pumps X X500gpmat337fttotal(1FLEXC001and1 FLEXC002)dynarnicheadTwo(2)FLEX Hydrogen Igniter Diesel Generators X15kW,240VAC, 50(1FLEXS011and1 FLEXS022)ampere breakerTwo(2)FLEXFuelTankon TrailerwithDC PoweredXXX X500gallon tankwithDC TransferPump(1 FLEXC003and1 FLEXC004)powered20gpm transfer pumpEight(8)FLEX PortableFuelCartwithHandPumpX28gallontank (1 FLEXC009 through 1 FLEXC016)Two(2)FLEXMCR VentilationFanDiesel Generators X X X6kW(5.5kW continuous (1 FLEXS012and1 FLEXS013)rating),240VACTwo(2)FLEX Auxiliary Equipment TrailersXXX XTwo(2)FLEXFrontEnd LoadersfordebrisXCase821F, Four Wheelremoval(1FLEXE001and1 FLEXE002)Drive(or equivalent)Two(2)FLEXTow Vehicles (1 FLEXE003 andX3500 Chevrolet4WD 1 FLEX3004)Pickup Truck, V8 Turbocharged Diesel, 23,000 Ib towing capacityEight(8)FLEXDieseldriven portable light towers X 1000Wmetalhalide lamps (1 FLEXS014 through 1 FLEXS021)Four(4)FLEX PortableMCRFans (1 FLEXC005XX X X3200cfm,240VAC through 1 FLEXC008)Page110of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear StationTable7-BWRPortable EquipmentStoredOn-Site Use and (Potential I Flexibility) Diverse Uses Performance CriteriaListPortable Equipment Core Containment SFPInstru mentation AccessibilityTwo(2)FLEXDiesel Generators (1 FLEXS009 and X X 300kW@0.8PF, 30, 4801FLEXS010), VACTwo(2)FLEXDieselDrivenRCS/SFP Makeup Pumps X X500gpmat337fttotal(1FLEXC001and1 FLEXC002)dynarnicheadTwo(2)FLEX Hydrogen Igniter Diesel Generators X15kW,240VAC, 50(1FLEXS011and1 FLEXS022)ampere breakerTwo(2)FLEXFuelTankon TrailerwithDC Powered X X X X500gallon tankwithDC TransferPump(1 FLEXC003and1 FLEXC004)powered20gpm transfer pumpEight(8)FLEX PortableFuelCartwithHandPump X28gallontank (1 FLEXC009 through 1 FLEXC016)Two(2)FLEXMCR VentilationFanDiesel GeneratorsXXX6kW(5.5kW continuous (1 FLEXS012and1 FLEXS013)rating),240VACTwo(2)FLEX Auxiliary Equipment Trailers X X X XTwo(2)FLEXFrontEnd LoadersfordebrisXCase821F, Four Wheelremoval(1FLEXE001and1 FLEXE002)Drive(or equivalent)Two(2)FLEXTow Vehicles (1 FLEXE003 andX3500 Chevrolet4WD 1 FLEX3004)Pickup Truck, V8 Turbocharged Diesel, 23,000 Ib towing capacityEight(8)FLEXDieseldriven portable light towers X 1000Wmetalhalide lamps (1 FLEXS014 through 1 FLEXS021)Four(4)FLEX PortableMCRFans (1 FLEXC005 XXX X3200cfm,240VAC through 1 FLEXC008)Page110of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.18.6EquipmentMaintenanceandTestingMaintenanceandtestingofFLEXequipmentisgovernedbytheEntergyPreventiveMaintenance(PM)ProgramasdescribedinDC-324.TheEntergyPMProgramisconsistentwithINPOAP-913andutilizestheEPRIPreventiveMaintenanceBasisDatabaseasaninputindevelopmentoffleetspecificEntergyPMBasisTemplates.Basedonthis,theEntergyfleetPMprogramforFLEXequipmentfollowstheguidanceNEI12-06,Section11.5.PMshavebeendevelopedforboththe"Standby"conditionandthe"Deployed"conditionfortheFLEXPortableandSupportEquipment.TheEntergyPMBasisTemplatesincludeactivitiessuchas:*PeriodicStaticInspections*OperationalInspections*Fluidanalysis*Periodicfunctionalverifications*PeriodicperformanceverificationtestsTheEntergyPMBasisTemplatesprovideassurancethatstoredorpre-stagedFLEXequipmentisbeingproperlymaintainedandtested.InthosecaseswhereEPRItemplateswerenotavailableforthespecificcomponenttypes,PreventativeMaintenance(PM)actionsweredevelopedbasedonmanufacturerprovidedinformation/ recommendations.Additionally,theEROperformsperiodicfacilityreadinesschecksforequipmentthatisoutsidethejurisdictionofthenormalPMprogramandconsideredafunctionalaspectofthespecificfacility(EPcommunicationsequipmentsuchasUPSs,radios,batteries,batterychargers,satellitephones,etc.).ThesefacilityfunctionalreadinesschecksprovideassurancethattheEPcommunicationsequipmentoutsidethejurisdictionofthePMProgramisbeingproperlymaintainedandtested.TheunavailabilityofequipmentandapplicableconnectionsthatdirectlyperformaFLEXmitigationstrategyforcore,containment,andSFParemanagedbyTechnicalRequirementsManual(TRM)SectionPage111of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation2.18.6EquipmentMaintenanceandTestingMaintenanceandtestingofFLEXequipmentisgovernedbytheEntergyPreventiveMaintenance(PM)ProgramasdescribedinDC-324.TheEntergyPMProgramisconsistentwithINPOAP-913andutilizestheEPRIPreventiveMaintenanceBasisDatabaseasaninputindevelopmentoffleetspecificEntergyPMBasisTemplates.Basedonthis,theEntergyfleetPMprogramforFLEXequipmentfollowstheguidanceNEI12-06,Section11.5.PMshavebeendevelopedforboththe"Standby"conditionandthe"Deployed"conditionfortheFLEXPortableandSupportEquipment.TheEntergyPMBasisTemplatesincludeactivitiessuchas:*PeriodicStaticInspections*OperationalInspections
- Fluidanalysis
- Periodicfunctionalverifications*PeriodicperformanceverificationtestsTheEntergyPMBasisTemplatesprovideassurancethatstoredorpre-stagedFLEXequipmentisbeingproperlymaintainedandtested.InthosecaseswhereEPRItemplateswerenotavailableforthespecificcomponenttypes,PreventativeMaintenance(PM)actionsweredevelopedbasedonmanufacturerprovidedinformation/
recommendations.Additionally,theEROperformsperiodicfacilityreadinesschecksforequipmentthatisoutsidethejurisdictionofthenormalPMprogramandconsideredafunctionalaspectofthespecificfacility(EPcommunicationsequipmentsuchasUPSs,radios,batteries,batterychargers,satellitephones,etc.).ThesefacilityfunctionalreadinesschecksprovideassurancethattheEPcommunicationsequipmentoutsidethejurisdictionofthePMProgramisbeingproperlymaintainedandtested.TheunavailabilityofequipmentandapplicableconnectionsthatdirectlyperformaFLEXmitigationstrategyforcore,containment,andSFParemanagedbyTechnicalRequirementsManual(TRM)SectionPage111of120 FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation6.10suchthatrisktomitigatingstrategycapabilityisminimized(Reference3.101).Maintenance/riskguidanceconformstotheguidanceofNEI12-06asfollows:*PortableFLEXequipmentmaybeunavailablefor90daysprovidedthatthesiteFLEXcapability(N)isavailable.*IfportableequipmentbecomesunavailablesuchthatthesiteFLEXcapability (N).isnotmaintained,initiateactionswithin24hourstorestorethesiteFLEXcapability(N)andimplementcompensatorymeasures(e.g.,repairequipment,useofalternatesuitableequipmentorsupplementalpersonnel)within72hours.WorkManagementprocedureswillreflectAOT(AllowedOutageTimes)asoutlinedabove.Page112of120FINALINTEGRATEDPLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation6.10suchthatrisktomitigatingstrategycapabilityisminimized(Reference3.101).Maintenance/riskguidanceconformstotheguidanceofNEI12-06asfollows:*PortableFLEXequipmentmaybeunavailablefor90daysprovidedthatthesiteFLEXcapability(N)isavailable.*IfportableequipmentbecomesunavailablesuchthatthesiteFLEXcapability (N).isnotmaintained,initiateactionswithin24hourstorestorethesiteFLEXcapability(N)andimplementcompensatorymeasures(e.g.,repairequipment,useofalternatesuitableequipmentorsupplementalpersonnel)within72hours.WorkManagementprocedureswillreflectAOT(AllowedOutageTimes)asoutlinedabove.Page112of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016 3.ReferencesGrandGulfNuclearStation3.1SECY-11-0093, IINear-TermReportand RecommendationsforAgencyActionsFollowingtheEventsinJapan, II(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML11186A950)3.2NRC Order NumberEA-12-049,OrdertoModifyLicenseswithRegardto RequirementsforMitigation StrategiesforBDBEEs,datedMarch12,2012(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML12056A045) 3.3 NuclearEnergyInstitute(NEI)12-06,DiverseandFlexibleCopingStrategies (FLEX)ImplementationGuide,Revision0,datedAugust2012(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML12221A205)3.4NRCInterimStaff GuidanceJLD-ISG-2012-01, CompliancewithOrder12-049,OrderModifyingLicenseswithRegardto Requirements torMitiqation StrategiesforBDBEEs,Revision0,datedAugust29,2012(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML12229A174)3.5NRCOrderNumber,EA-12-051,OrderModifyingLicenseswithRegardtoReliableSpentFuelPool Instrumentation,datedMarch,12,2012(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML12054A682) 3.6 NuclearEnergyInstitute(NEI)12-02,Industry GuidanceforCompliancewithNRCOrderEA-12-051,ToModifyLicenseswithRegardtoReliableSFP Instrumentation,Revision1,datedAugust2012(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML12240A307)3.7NRCInterimStaff Guidance JLD-ISG-2012-03, CompliancewithOrder12-051,ReliableSFP Instrumentation,Revision0,datedAugust29,2012(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML12221A339)3.8NRCLetter,RequestforInformationPursuanttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations50.54(f)Regarding Recommendations2.1,2.3,and9.3oftheNear-TermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromtheFukushimaDai-ichiAccident,March12,2012(ML12056A046)3.9NUMARC87-00, GuidelinesandTechnicalBasesforNUMA.RCInitiativesAddressingStationBlackoutatLight WaterReactors,Revision13.10TaskInterface Agreement(TIA)2004-04,"AcceptabilityofProceduralizedDeparturesfromTechnical Specifications (TSs)RequirementsattheSurryPage113of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016 3.ReferencesGrandGulfNuclearStation3.1SECY-11-0093, IINear-TermReportand RecommendationsforAgencyActionsFollowingtheEventsinJapan, II(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML11186A950)3.2NRC Order NumberEA-12-049,OrdertoModifyLicenseswithRegardto RequirementsforMitigation StrategiesforBDBEEs,datedMarch12,2012(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML12056A045) 3.3 NuclearEnergyInstitute(NEI)12-06,DiverseandFlexibleCopingStrategies (FLEX)ImplementationGuide,Revision0,datedAugust2012(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML12221A205)3.4NRCInterimStaff GuidanceJLD-ISG-2012-01, CompliancewithOrder12-049,OrderModifyingLicenseswithRegardto Requirements torMitiqation StrategiesforBDBEEs,Revision0,datedAugust29,2012(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML12229A174)3.5NRCOrderNumber,EA-12-051,OrderModifyingLicenseswithRegardtoReliableSpentFuelPool Instrumentation,datedMarch,12,2012(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML12054A682) 3.6 NuclearEnergyInstitute(NEI)12-02,Industry GuidanceforCompliancewithNRCOrderEA-12-051,ToModifyLicenseswithRegardtoReliableSFP Instrumentation,Revision1,datedAugust2012(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML12240A307)3.7NRCInterimStaff Guidance JLD-ISG-2012-03, CompliancewithOrder12-051,ReliableSFP Instrumentation,Revision0,datedAugust29,2012(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML12221A339)3.8NRCLetter,RequestforInformationPursuanttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations50.54(f)Regarding Recommendations2.1,2.3,and9.3oftheNear-TermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromtheFukushimaDai-ichiAccident,March12,2012(ML12056A046)3.9NUMARC87-00, GuidelinesandTechnicalBasesforNUMA.RCInitiativesAddressingStationBlackoutatLight WaterReactors,Revision13.10TaskInterface Agreement(TIA)2004-04,"AcceptabilityofProceduralizedDeparturesfromTechnical Specifications (TSs)RequirementsattheSurryPage113of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationPowerStation,"(TACNos.MC4331and MC4332),1I dated September 12,2006(ADAMSAccessionNo. ML060590273)3.11SDC-E51,Revision003,ReactorCoreIsolationCooling 3.12 EC-Q1111-14001,Rev.000,StationDivisionIBattery1A3andDivisionIIBattery1B3Discharge CapacityduringExtendedLossofACPower 3.13 XC-Q1111-14005,Rev.000,GrandGulfCoreand ContainmentAnalysisof FLEX Strategies 3.14 GGNS-SA-14-00002,Rev.000,Further DevelopmentofGrandGulfFLEXStrategyAnalyticalBasesand Conceptual Design 3.15 BWROG-TP-018,BeyondDesignBasisRCICElevated Temperature Functionality Assessment, December 2014 3.16 GGNS-SA-14-00003,Rev.000,BWROG-RCICPumpandTurbineDurabilityEvaluation-PinchPointStudy,GrandGulf Nuclear StationEvaluationand Recommendations 3.17 XC-Q1111-14003,Rev.000,GrandGulf NuclearStationRCICPumpRoomHeatupforExtendedLossofACPower 3.18 MC-Q1111-14008,Rev.000,GrandGulfNuclearStationFLEXPhase2PumpSizingCalculation 3.19 05-1-02-1-4,Rev.050,LossofACPower 3.20 MC-Q1111-14007,Rev.000,GrandGulf NuclearStationFLEXPumpNetPositiveSuctionHeadAvailableCalculationforaBeyondDesignBasisExternalEvent3.21EC50275,Rev.2,FLEXBasis Engineering Evaluation 3.22 GGNS-SA-15-00001,Rev.000,GrandGulf NuclearStationSAFERResponsePlan 3.23 MC-Q1111-14010,Rev.000,GrandGulfNuclearStationFLEXPhase3HydraulicPumpSizingCalculation3.24GrandGulfNuclearStationUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(Updated 1/28/2015)3.25SDC-B21,Revision003, NuclearBoilerSystemPage114of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStationPowerStation,"(TACNos.MC4331and MC4332),1I dated September 12,2006(ADAMSAccessionNo. ML060590273)3.11SDC-E51,Revision003,ReactorCoreIsolationCooling 3.12 EC-Q1111-14001,Rev.000,StationDivisionIBattery1A3andDivisionIIBattery1B3Discharge CapacityduringExtendedLossofACPower 3.13 XC-Q1111-14005,Rev.000,GrandGulfCoreand ContainmentAnalysisof FLEX Strategies 3.14 GGNS-SA-14-00002,Rev.000,Further DevelopmentofGrandGulfFLEXStrategyAnalyticalBasesand Conceptual Design 3.15 BWROG-TP-018,BeyondDesignBasisRCICElevated Temperature Functionality Assessment, December 2014 3.16 GGNS-SA-14-00003,Rev.000,BWROG-RCICPumpandTurbineDurabilityEvaluation-PinchPointStudy,GrandGulf Nuclear StationEvaluationand Recommendations 3.17 XC-Q1111-14003,Rev.000,GrandGulf NuclearStationRCICPumpRoomHeatupforExtendedLossofACPower 3.18 MC-Q1111-14008,Rev.000,GrandGulfNuclearStationFLEXPhase2PumpSizingCalculation 3.19 05-1-02-1-4,Rev.050,LossofACPower 3.20 MC-Q1111-14007,Rev.000,GrandGulf NuclearStationFLEXPumpNetPositiveSuctionHeadAvailableCalculationforaBeyondDesignBasisExternalEvent3.21EC50275,Rev.2,FLEXBasis Engineering Evaluation 3.22 GGNS-SA-15-00001,Rev.000,GrandGulf NuclearStationSAFERResponsePlan 3.23 MC-Q1111-14010,Rev.000,GrandGulfNuclearStationFLEXPhase3HydraulicPumpSizingCalculation3.24GrandGulfNuclearStationUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(Updated 1/28/2015)3.25SDC-B21,Revision003, NuclearBoilerSystemPage114of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation3.26SDC-01,Revision001,125VoltDCClass1EDistributionSystem3.27SDC-Z77,Rev.002,Safeguard Switchgear &BatteryRoomVentilation3.28GGNSTechnical SpecificationsandBases, Amendment 202 3.29 04-1-01-E51-1,Rev.132,SystemOperatingInstructionReactorCoreIsolationCoolingSystem3.30EPRITechnicalReport 3002001785,"Useof ModularAccidentAnalysisProgram(MAAP)inSupportof Post-Fukushima Applications"June20133.31MAAP4ApplicationGuidance,DesktopReferenceforUsingMAAP4Software,Revision2"(ElectricPowerResearchInstituteReport1020236),July20103.32NEDC-33771PRev2GEHEvaluationofFLEX Implementation Guidelines3.33NRCGenericLetter91-07:GI-23,"ReactorCoolantPumpSealFailures"anditsPossibleEffectonStationBlackout3.34GNRI92-00024,SafetyEvaluationofResponsetoStationBlackoutRule TAC-M68549 3.35 NEAD-92-SR-045,GGNSStationBlackoutAnalysisUsingGOTHIC,Rev.0 3.36 MC-Q1111-14003,Rev.000,GrandGulfNuclearStationWaterRequirementsandAvailabilityforaBeyondDesignBasisExternalEvent 3.37 05-1-02-111-1,Revision039,InadequateDecayHeatRemoval3.38EC50286,GGNSpentFuelPoolLevel Instrumentation Upgrade3.39BWROGTechnicalReport,Rev.1,BWR ContainmentVenting,dated 10/29/2013(NRCADAMSAccessionNo.ML13352A057)3.40NRCLettertoNEIdated January 9,2014,EndorsingBWROGTechnicalReport,Rev.1,BWR ContainmentVenting,dated 10/29/2013(NRCADAMSAccessionNo.ML13358A206) 3.41 GGNS-NE-10-00034,Rev.001,GGNSEPUStationBlackout3.42CC-Q1 M10-14001,Rev.000,Evaluationof ContainmentWallforFLEX Strategy 3.43 05-S-01-STRATEGY,AlternateStrategy,Revision012Page115of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation3.26SDC-01,Revision001,125VoltDCClass1EDistributionSystem3.27SDC-Z77,Rev.002,Safeguard Switchgear &BatteryRoomVentilation3.28GGNSTechnical SpecificationsandBases, Amendment 202 3.29 04-1-01-E51-1,Rev.132,SystemOperatingInstructionReactorCoreIsolationCoolingSystem3.30EPRITechnicalReport 3002001785,"Useof ModularAccidentAnalysisProgram(MAAP)inSupportof Post-Fukushima Applications"June20133.31MAAP4ApplicationGuidance,DesktopReferenceforUsingMAAP4Software,Revision2"(ElectricPowerResearchInstituteReport1020236),July20103.32NEDC-33771PRev2GEHEvaluationofFLEX Implementation Guidelines3.33NRCGenericLetter91-07:GI-23,"ReactorCoolantPumpSealFailures"anditsPossibleEffectonStationBlackout3.34GNRI92-00024,SafetyEvaluationofResponsetoStationBlackoutRule TAC-M68549 3.35 NEAD-92-SR-045,GGNSStationBlackoutAnalysisUsingGOTHIC,Rev.0 3.36 MC-Q1111-14003,Rev.000,GrandGulfNuclearStationWaterRequirementsandAvailabilityforaBeyondDesignBasisExternalEvent 3.37 05-1-02-111-1,Revision039,InadequateDecayHeatRemoval3.38EC50286,GGNSpentFuelPoolLevel Instrumentation Upgrade3.39BWROGTechnicalReport,Rev.1,BWR ContainmentVenting,dated 10/29/2013(NRCADAMSAccessionNo.ML13352A057)3.40NRCLettertoNEIdated January 9,2014,EndorsingBWROGTechnicalReport,Rev.1,BWR ContainmentVenting,dated 10/29/2013(NRCADAMSAccessionNo.ML13358A206) 3.41 GGNS-NE-10-00034,Rev.001,GGNSEPUStationBlackout3.42CC-Q1 M10-14001,Rev.000,Evaluationof ContainmentWallforFLEX Strategy 3.43 05-S-01-STRATEGY,AlternateStrategy,Revision012Page115of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear Station3.44PC-N1 M41-14001,Rev.000, NumberofNitrogenBottlesRequiredtoSupport FLEX Strategy for Operationofthe ContainmentCoolingSystem(M41) Operated Valves3.45EC50282,Rev.0,Flex ContainmentCoolingSystem(M41)VentPathto Atmosphere 3.46 EC-Q1111-14002,Rev.1,FLEX Strategy-Port-able Diesel Generator System Sizing3.47CC-Q1 M10-10001,Rev.0,Evaluationof ContainmentWallforExtendedPowerUprate3.48MC-Q11 ,11-14001,Rev.000,GrandGulf NuclearStationReactorCoreIsolationCoolingNetPositiveSuctionHeadAvailable CalculationforaBeyondDesignBasisExternalEvent3.49EC50287,Rev.0,GGNSFLEXStorageBuilding3.50NRCLetter IIRequestfor InformationPursuanttoTitle10oftheCodeof Federal Regulations50.54(f)Regarding Recommendations2.1,2.3,and9.3oftheNear-TermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromtheFukushimaDai-ichiAccident",datedMarch12,2012(ML12053A340)3.51EntergyLettertoNRC, Entergy SeismicHazardand Screening Report(CEUSSites),ResponsetoNRCRequestfor InformationPursuantto10CFR50.54(f)Regarding Recommendation2.1oftheNear-TermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromthe FukushimaDai-ichiAccident,GrandGulf NuclearStation,Unit1,datedMarch31,2014(GGNSLetter GNRO-2014/00027)(ML14090A098)3.52EPRIReport1025287,"Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details(SPID)fortheResolutionof FukushimaNear-TermTaskForce Recommendation2.1:Seismic",datedFebruary20133.53GrandGulf NuclearStationLettertoNRC,"RequiredResponse2forTermTaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Flooding-Hazard ReevaluationReport",datedMarch11,2013(GGNSLetter GNRO-2013/00020)(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML13071A457) 3.54 05-1-02-VI-2,Revision127,Hurricanes, Tornados,andSevere Weather3.55CC-N1 FLEX-14001,Rev.000,SlidingandRockingEvaluationofFLEXStorageBuilding EquipmentPage116of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear Station3.44PC-N1 M41-14001,Rev.000, NumberofNitrogenBottlesRequiredtoSupport FLEX Strategy for Operationofthe ContainmentCoolingSystem(M41) Operated Valves3.45EC50282,Rev.0,Flex ContainmentCoolingSystem(M41)VentPathto Atmosphere 3.46 EC-Q1111-14002,Rev.1,FLEX Strategy-Port-able Diesel Generator System Sizing3.47CC-Q1 M10-10001,Rev.0,Evaluationof ContainmentWallforExtendedPowerUprate3.48MC-Q11 ,11-14001,Rev.000,GrandGulf NuclearStationReactorCoreIsolationCoolingNetPositiveSuctionHeadAvailable CalculationforaBeyondDesignBasisExternalEvent3.49EC50287,Rev.0,GGNSFLEXStorageBuilding3.50NRCLetter IIRequestfor InformationPursuanttoTitle10oftheCodeof Federal Regulations50.54(f)Regarding Recommendations2.1,2.3,and9.3oftheNear-TermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromtheFukushimaDai-ichiAccident",datedMarch12,2012(ML12053A340)3.51EntergyLettertoNRC, Entergy SeismicHazardand Screening Report(CEUSSites),ResponsetoNRCRequestfor InformationPursuantto10CFR50.54(f)Regarding Recommendation2.1oftheNear-TermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromthe FukushimaDai-ichiAccident,GrandGulf NuclearStation,Unit1,datedMarch31,2014(GGNSLetter GNRO-2014/00027)(ML14090A098)3.52EPRIReport1025287,"Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details(SPID)fortheResolutionof FukushimaNear-TermTaskForce Recommendation2.1:Seismic",datedFebruary20133.53GrandGulf NuclearStationLettertoNRC,"RequiredResponse2forTermTaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Flooding-Hazard ReevaluationReport",datedMarch11,2013(GGNSLetter GNRO-2013/00020)(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML13071A457) 3.54 05-1-02-VI-2,Revision127,Hurricanes, Tornados,andSevere Weather3.55CC-N1 FLEX-14001,Rev.000,SlidingandRockingEvaluationofFLEXStorageBuilding EquipmentPage116of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016---------------
GrandGulf Nuclear Station3.56ASCE43-05,"SeismicDesignCriteriaforStructures,Systems,and Components in Nuclear Facilities"3.57ASCE7-10,MinimumDesignLoadsonBuildingsand Other Structures 3.58 N1FLEX-14002,Rev.0,DrainageAnalysisforFLEXStorageBuildings3.59SpecificationE100.0,Rev.007, Environment ParametersforGGNS 3.60 XC-Q1111-14001,Rev.1,ControlRoomHeatupforExtendedLossofAC Power3.61DrawingA-0012,Rev.15,Units1
&2,Gen.FI.Plan-FI.PlanatEI.133'-0",136'-0",139'-0",144'-3"&148'-0"3.62DrawingA-0015,Rev9,Units1 &2,GeneralFloorPlan,FI.PlanatEI. 10" 3.63 Engineering Report GGNS-ME-12-00009,Rev.0,StationBlackoutEvaluationforGrandGulf Nuclear Station3.64MC-QSZ77-09004,Rev.000,AlternateVentilationforSafeguard SwitchgearandBatteryRooms 3.65 GGNS92-0002,Rev.002, EngineeringReportfortheEvaluationofSafetyRelatedElectrical EquipmentinVariousRoomswithElevatedPostLOCA Temperatures3.66EN-IS-108Rev10,WorkinginHot Environments3.67E0046,Revision001,HydrogenGasEvolutionfromClass1E +NonClass1E Battery3.68E1267SH021,Rev.002, SchematicDiagramZ77Safeguard Switchgear &BatteryRoomExhaustFanQ1Z77C001A-A 3.69 04-1-01-Z77-1,Rev.024,Safeguard SwitchgearandBatteryRoomVent System3.70SDC-P41,Rev.004,SystemDesignCriteriafor Standby Service Water System 3.71 IP-CALC-13-00058,Rev.001,FreezingofUnit3CoolantSourcesforFLEXEvent(EC45784)3.72EN-OP-115-01,Revision000, Operator RoundsPage117of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016---------------
GrandGulf Nuclear Station3.56ASCE43-05,"SeismicDesignCriteriaforStructures,Systems,and Components in Nuclear Facilities"3.57ASCE7-10,MinimumDesignLoadsonBuildingsand Other Structures 3.58 N1FLEX-14002,Rev.0,DrainageAnalysisforFLEXStorageBuildings3.59SpecificationE100.0,Rev.007, Environment ParametersforGGNS 3.60 XC-Q1111-14001,Rev.1,ControlRoomHeatupforExtendedLossofAC Power3.61DrawingA-0012,Rev.15,Units1
&2,Gen.FI.Plan-FI.PlanatEI.133'-0",136'-0",139'-0",144'-3"&148'-0"3.62DrawingA-0015,Rev9,Units1 &2,GeneralFloorPlan,FI.PlanatEI. 10" 3.63 Engineering Report GGNS-ME-12-00009,Rev.0,StationBlackoutEvaluationforGrandGulf Nuclear Station3.64MC-QSZ77-09004,Rev.000,AlternateVentilationforSafeguard SwitchgearandBatteryRooms 3.65 GGNS92-0002,Rev.002, EngineeringReportfortheEvaluationofSafetyRelatedElectrical EquipmentinVariousRoomswithElevatedPostLOCA Temperatures3.66EN-IS-108Rev10,WorkinginHot Environments3.67E0046,Revision001,HydrogenGasEvolutionfromClass1E +NonClass1E Battery3.68E1267SH021,Rev.002, SchematicDiagramZ77Safeguard Switchgear &BatteryRoomExhaustFanQ1Z77C001A-A 3.69 04-1-01-Z77-1,Rev.024,Safeguard SwitchgearandBatteryRoomVent System3.70SDC-P41,Rev.004,SystemDesignCriteriafor Standby Service Water System 3.71 IP-CALC-13-00058,Rev.001,FreezingofUnit3CoolantSourcesforFLEXEvent(EC45784)3.72EN-OP-115-01,Revision000, Operator RoundsPage117of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station 3.73 02-S-01-32, Revision 030, Control Building Rounds 3.74 02-S-01-31, Revision 034, Control Room Rounds 3.75 GGNS Letter GNRO-2012/00131, dated October 31,2012, Entergy's ResponsetotheMarch12, 2012 Information Request Pursuantto10CFR 50.54(f)Regarding Recommendation9.3for Completing Emergency Communication Assessments, Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station,Unit1 3.76 GGNS Letter GNRO-2013/00014, dated February 21,2013, Entergy's ResponsetoNRC Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee CommunicationSubmittalsAssociated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3, Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station,Unit13.77NEI12-01,Rev.1, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities3.78EC 50711,Rev.0, GGNS FLEX EmergencyPlan(EP)Communications System Enhancements3.79NRC letter'toAll Power Reactor Licensees and holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status,"Follow-up Letter on Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation9.3(TACNo. ME7951)," dated January 23, 2013 (ADAMS AccessionNo.ML1301OA162) 3.80 Nuclear Energy Institute position paper entitled"Position Paper: Shutdown/Refueling Modes," dated September 18, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.ML13273A514) 3.81 United States NRC Endorsement Letterofthe Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)Position Paper entitled"Position Paper: Shutdown/Refueling Modes," dated September 30,2013(ADAMS AccessionNo.ML13267A382)3.82 M1088E,Rev.020,Piping& Instrumentation DiagramFuelPool Cooling&Cleanup System 3.83 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station LettertoNRC,"ResponsetoMarch12,2012, Request for Information (RFI)PursuanttoTitle10ofthe Code of FederalRegulation50.54(f) Regarding Recommendationsofthe Near-Term Task Force (NTTF)Review of Insightsfromthe Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, Enclosure 5 Recommendation 9.3, Emergency Preparedness -Staffing, Requested Information Items1,2,and6-Phase 2 Staffing Assessment," dated 10/21/15 (GNR02015-00054)Page118of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station 3.73 02-S-01-32, Revision 030, Control Building Rounds 3.74 02-S-01-31, Revision 034, Control Room Rounds 3.75 GGNS Letter GNRO-2012/00131, dated October 31,2012, Entergy's ResponsetotheMarch12, 2012 Information Request Pursuantto10CFR 50.54(f)Regarding Recommendation9.3for Completing Emergency Communication Assessments, Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station,Unit1 3.76 GGNS Letter GNRO-2013/00014, dated February 21,2013, Entergy's ResponsetoNRC Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee CommunicationSubmittalsAssociated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3, Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station,Unit13.77NEI12-01,Rev.1, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities3.78EC 50711,Rev.0, GGNS FLEX EmergencyPlan(EP)Communications System Enhancements3.79NRC letter'toAll Power Reactor Licensees and holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status,"Follow-up Letter on Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation9.3(TACNo. ME7951)," dated January 23, 2013 (ADAMS AccessionNo.ML1301OA162) 3.80 Nuclear Energy Institute position paper entitled"Position Paper: Shutdown/Refueling Modes," dated September 18, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.ML13273A514) 3.81 United States NRC Endorsement Letterofthe Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)Position Paper entitled"Position Paper: Shutdown/Refueling Modes," dated September 30,2013(ADAMS AccessionNo.ML13267A382)3.82 M1088E,Rev.020,Piping& Instrumentation DiagramFuelPool Cooling&Cleanup System 3.83 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station LettertoNRC,"ResponsetoMarch12,2012, Request for Information (RFI)PursuanttoTitle10ofthe Code of FederalRegulation50.54(f) Regarding Recommendationsofthe Near-Term Task Force (NTTF)Review of Insightsfromthe Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, Enclosure 5 Recommendation 9.3, Emergency Preparedness -Staffing, Requested Information Items1,2,and6-Phase 2 Staffing Assessment," dated 10/21/15 (GNR02015-00054)Page118of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation3.84EC50275 Attachment10.030,ArevaEngineeringInformationRecord 519199717-013,NationalSAFERResponse CenterEquipmentTechnical Requirements 3.85 XC-Q1111-15002,Rev.0,GGNSFLEXAuxiliaryBuildingHeat-Up3.86BWR Owner's Group EmergencyProcedureandSevereAccidentGuidelines,AppendixB: TechnicalBasis,Volume1,Revision3,February20133.87EntergyGrandGulf NuclearPlantFLEXValidationdatedFebruary5,2016 (CIN2016-00023)3.88GrandGulf NuclearStationNEI12-01Phase2StaffingAssessment,Rev.1,(CIN2016-00031) 3.89 05-1-02-1-7,Rev.0,ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP) 3.90 05-S-01-FSG-004,Rev.0,ELAPDCBusLoadShedand Management 3.91 05-S-01-FSG-002,Rev.0,AlternateRCICSuctionSource 3.92 05-S-01-FSG-012,Rev.0,Alternate ContainmentCoolingandHydrogen Control 3.93 05-S-01-FSG-011,Rev.0,AlternateSpentFuelPoolMakeupandCooling 3.94 05-S-01-FSG-005,Rev.0,Initial AssessmentandFlexEquipmentStaging 3.95 05-S-01-FSG-003,Rev.0,AlternateReactorVesselCooling 3.96 05-S-01-FSG-001,Rev.0,LongTermReactorVesselCooling3.97E-1020,Rev.11,OneLineMeter &RelayDiagram480VBuses15BA6and 16BB63.98EN-OP-201-02,Rev.0,GGNSFLEXProgramDocument3.99EN-DC-115,Rev.18, EngineeringChangeProcess 3.100 EN-L1-100,Rev.18,Process Applicability Determination 3.101 05-S-01-STRATEGY,Rev.13,AlternateStrategy3.102LBDCR2016-0015 Technical RequirementsManual(TRM)Section6.10andTRMBasesSection6.10additionforBeyondDesignBasis Components3.103EN-OU-108,Rev.8,ShutdownSafety ManagementProgram(SSMP)Page119of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulfNuclearStation3.84EC50275 Attachment10.030,ArevaEngineeringInformationRecord 519199717-013,NationalSAFERResponse CenterEquipmentTechnical Requirements 3.85 XC-Q1111-15002,Rev.0,GGNSFLEXAuxiliaryBuildingHeat-Up3.86BWR Owner's Group EmergencyProcedureandSevereAccidentGuidelines,AppendixB: TechnicalBasis,Volume1,Revision3,February20133.87EntergyGrandGulf NuclearPlantFLEXValidationdatedFebruary5,2016 (CIN2016-00023)3.88GrandGulf NuclearStationNEI12-01Phase2StaffingAssessment,Rev.1,(CIN2016-00031) 3.89 05-1-02-1-7,Rev.0,ExtendedLossofACPower(ELAP) 3.90 05-S-01-FSG-004,Rev.0,ELAPDCBusLoadShedand Management 3.91 05-S-01-FSG-002,Rev.0,AlternateRCICSuctionSource 3.92 05-S-01-FSG-012,Rev.0,Alternate ContainmentCoolingandHydrogen Control 3.93 05-S-01-FSG-011,Rev.0,AlternateSpentFuelPoolMakeupandCooling 3.94 05-S-01-FSG-005,Rev.0,Initial AssessmentandFlexEquipmentStaging 3.95 05-S-01-FSG-003,Rev.0,AlternateReactorVesselCooling 3.96 05-S-01-FSG-001,Rev.0,LongTermReactorVesselCooling3.97E-1020,Rev.11,OneLineMeter &RelayDiagram480VBuses15BA6and 16BB63.98EN-OP-201-02,Rev.0,GGNSFLEXProgramDocument3.99EN-DC-115,Rev.18, EngineeringChangeProcess 3.100 EN-L1-100,Rev.18,Process Applicability Determination 3.101 05-S-01-STRATEGY,Rev.13,AlternateStrategy3.102LBDCR2016-0015 Technical RequirementsManual(TRM)Section6.10andTRMBasesSection6.10additionforBeyondDesignBasis Components3.103EN-OU-108,Rev.8,ShutdownSafety ManagementProgram(SSMP)Page119of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear Station 3.104 05-S-01-FSG-013,Rev.0, TransitionfromFLEX Equipment 3.105 02-S-01-35,Rev.79, Outside Rounds 3.106 04-1-03-A30-1,Rev.023,Cold Weather Protection3.107MC-Q1P75-90190,Rev.5,DieselFuelOilStorage RequirementsforDivision1and2Diesel Generators3.108MCQ1 P81-90188,Rev.4,DieselFuelOilStorage RequirementsforDivision3Diesel Generator3.109Entergy Contract 10390483dated10/4/13,Pooled Inventory Management3.110MC-Q1 Y47-09002,Rev.0,SSWPumpHouse TemperatureDuringStation Blackout (SBO)3.111M102.0,Rev.31, MiscellaneousTanksandPressureVessels(ASMESection III), Appendix S Sheets2and3Page120of120 FINAL INTEGRATED PLANApril2016GrandGulf Nuclear Station 3.104 05-S-01-FSG-013,Rev.0, TransitionfromFLEX Equipment 3.105 02-S-01-35,Rev.79, Outside Rounds 3.106 04-1-03-A30-1,Rev.023,Cold Weather Protection3.107MC-Q1P75-90190,Rev.5,DieselFuelOilStorage RequirementsforDivision1and2Diesel Generators3.108MCQ1 P81-90188,Rev.4,DieselFuelOilStorage RequirementsforDivision3Diesel Generator3.109Entergy Contract 10390483dated10/4/13,Pooled Inventory Management3.110MC-Q1 Y47-09002,Rev.0,SSWPumpHouse TemperatureDuringStation Blackout (SBO)3.111M102.0,Rev.31, MiscellaneousTanksandPressureVessels(ASMESection III), Appendix S Sheets2and3Page120of120}}