05000250/FIN-2014004-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71152 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71152 | ||
| Inspector = C Jones, D Dumbacher, D Mas, | | Inspector = C Jones, D Dumbacher, D Mas Penaranda, M Endress, T Hoeg, T Lighty | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = A self-revealing, non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to implement corrective actions to prevent water intrusion into electrical conduits that affected safety related equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish corrective actions to prevent water intrusion into the power supply for the Unit 3 B train (3B) pressurizer back-up heaters. After discovery of the condition, the licensee completed immediate corrective actions to apply waterproofing sealant to an unsealed condulet elbow that was the source of the pressurizer back-up heater water intrusion. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as ARs 1985831 and 1986395. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected its objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement corrective actions to prevent water intrusion events which resulted in the inoperability of 3B pressurizer back-up heaters. The inspectors evaluated the significance of the finding under the mitigating systems cornerstone using Table 2 of Attachment 4 (dated June 19, 2012) and Exhibits 2 and 4 of Appendix A (dated June 19, 2012) to Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, (dated June 2, 2011). The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) because the exhibit criteria did not screen to a detailed risk assessment. A cross-cutting aspect was not identified because this performance deficiency occurred in 2007 and there have been no recent opportunities for the licensee to apply current processes and procedures for this issue. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the performance deficiency was not indicative of current licensee performance. | | description = A self-revealing, non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to implement corrective actions to prevent water intrusion into electrical conduits that affected safety related equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish corrective actions to prevent water intrusion into the power supply for the Unit 3 B train (3B) pressurizer back-up heaters. After discovery of the condition, the licensee completed immediate corrective actions to apply waterproofing sealant to an unsealed condulet elbow that was the source of the pressurizer back-up heater water intrusion. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as ARs 1985831 and 1986395. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected its objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement corrective actions to prevent water intrusion events which resulted in the inoperability of 3B pressurizer back-up heaters. The inspectors evaluated the significance of the finding under the mitigating systems cornerstone using Table 2 of Attachment 4 (dated June 19, 2012) and Exhibits 2 and 4 of Appendix A (dated June 19, 2012) to Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, (dated June 2, 2011). The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) because the exhibit criteria did not screen to a detailed risk assessment. A cross-cutting aspect was not identified because this performance deficiency occurred in 2007 and there have been no recent opportunities for the licensee to apply current processes and procedures for this issue. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the performance deficiency was not indicative of current licensee performance. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:51, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000250/2014004 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Jones D Dumbacher D Mas Penaranda M Endress T Hoeg T Lighty |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |