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l FNP TS Conversion fhr 3,/o, / -2                              Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems  l l
CTS 3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY FNP ITS 3.6.1 CONTAINMENT DOC HQ      SHE                                  DISCUSSION and secured in position prior to mode 4 entry but not more often than every 92 days is retained with the associated action. As this change is part of a r. l organization of the presentation and format of the Containment section TS      l and is not intended to introduce a technical revision, it is considered an l
administrative change.
6      LA    CTS 3/4.6.1
* footnote to surveillance requirement 4.6.1.1.a is revised consistent with the STS. The CTS surveillance footnote verifies the status of containment penetrations and the position of the associated isolation devices inside containment during cold shutdown prior to Mode 4 entry but not more often than every 92 days. This footnote includes verification of the status of the equipment hatch. In the STS, the Containment operability      l requirement pertaining to the equipment hatch is discussed in the STS LCO 3.6.1 bases as part of the overall operability requirements for Containment.
For a system to be considered operable, the def'mition of operability for the system must be satisfied and the associated Surveillance requirements must be met. In the STS, information related to the design and configuration of a system which relate to meeting the operability requirements of the LCO is moved to the Bases. The removal of this information from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. As the equipment hatch is part of the design of the containment and SR 3.6.1.1 ensures that the configuration of the equipment hatch is capable of maintaining leakage rates within limits, it is appropriate to move this redundant information to the Bases. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for guidance in performing the associated surveillances is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.
7        A  CTS 3/4.6.1
* footnote to surveillance requirement 4.6.1.1.a verifies the status of containment penetrations and the position of the associated i                    isolation devices inside containment during cold shutdown prior to Mode 4 l                    entry but not more often than every 92 days. This footnote contains an FNP specific allowance for the blind flange on the fuel transfer canal flange.
The CTS
* footnote only requires the blind flange on the fuel transfer canal flange be verified closed after each draining of the canal. This provision of the CTS has been retained as a note in SR 3.6.3.3. Since this CTS provision is only revised in form and presentation to fit the STS, this Chanter 3.6                -,              E2-4-A                                November,1998 l 9812010153 981120 l PDR  ADOCK 05000348 P                PDR          ,_
 
Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.1-3 l
l l
2 I
 
Mr 3,/, . /-J                                                                                          L A
3.(o                                                                              for ecodoe cMro' A cdah B g* g g    3 /4.8 contvaf anarirt sYsvens
                                        >                  m-                                                                  .
3/4.5.1        patuamrTenertafwwtwv                      j A            OPERABLE co m rxMrwT r m carTr LIMITIIIC C00fDIT!ost POR OPRAAT!ost
                          / C.O  3.4.                        coefTAIMMBFT hWTSGRITT)shall be      toined
                                                                                                                  ~
kPPLIc131LITY:            MODBS 1, 2, 3 and 4.
con +Enmen+ 'inoperdle.
                                  .m. ,                                                                      _ -
M M
A.i                                                                                                  t,o%  CFEAABLE Giueet ,,ima,,              ui    ,T      unlestore oo-ui T a t-er .iaa      -
: c. , i  ee. hem, - - sa meaet .= === .tata ao meet . he-o a.d a c SNWDoom withis the fellenting 30 hours.                4 ggg4gg                      g g,1                                                                                                              '
samvsrLLANcs RagttaBMENTS ER
,                                                  QcouTAzi.-rf @rTesazT                11 he demonstrated                            y SR3 6.3.2_
a IAt least once per 31            verifying that all penetrationa* not capable of betag      oeed by opsmama ooetalaeset aut'amatie Leelation valves        required to be sleeed during accident          ;
Leoeditions are elooed by valves 2_ blind flampor enactivated                    LC.0 34.h lautomatie valves soeured La theLr positions,)nscept se provided la] AC.TicNS q          (Table 3.6-1 of specificaties 3.6.3.1.              _f                            A l_+Ml N '[ee*I'd.**N / *** 7 **'/ ** '' D b b                                          i SR3.6.1.1 [ sr oe doesing vieul e w--tions and leakage rate tuting ta accordamoe with the coetaisoneet I,makage Rate Testing Program.
f 3,la.1 Bhstb              LCo 3.lo.3 ACTION $ palaueLh.2.                          LA
                                  *Es          valves, blind flanges, Geactivated automatie valveJe aed the equipmen % 3,p hat        which are located inside the oestataamat ame are toebos, peares or    '
BASE 5
                                -  otherwise secured La the sleeed poetties. These penetratioes shall be verified eleoed during eask 00t.D sNyfaceur ascept that such verification esed aut be perfossed more eften them ease ser 93 days. ffhe blind flange en the                      hon IN ful transfe- ennat flange shalt me verified stooed after meh de i im of                        6R34,3 3 Lt,ecanal.-                                                                                                ,
d
                                                                        > sa s. .s.s Valve 3 rusroe:.      p-                          -          -
A CC"%"ni-                sR 3.(o.l. 2 ve,r' F containered 7
                    ,      NebtmN es                                              <
in hi                .on ocea.s Ngh radia.+.be verified, by use, i
9
( Teoden &tvelQc
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                                                                                                                                  '[ ,nc g s igg Ad.mims+m.t'we Contro is.                                          tg
                                                      ^
FA LET-vuaT 4          ~
3/4 6-1                        AMENDMENT 30.122 8
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h,,,, ,, ,,                  This      L c.o i s i N e orpora_tecL into STS 3. (o .1
                                                                                                                                      \a-A ga m Im zz:U,mu2cr                              /g LIMIT! Iso coerDITION FOR CPERATICW or (UA*:,cws Y
3.6.1.2        Containment leakage rates shall be limited in accordance with the g 3, g , , g        Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.                                    'M b
                                                                                              = -- _    .- . ,      -
m u ci m m ,            oou 1, 2, 2 an. ..          conh.intnenf inopem.ble._-    -
p
                                                                                                      ~
LCo 3.6.1 Sc b*I      With he measured tainment 1 akage rates    coeding tS overall ntainment
(,)      Le    ge Rate foot        Program ceptance er      is, reetpre the mes red aimeest i            rates to ithin the a      amoe cri.torg  ithia 1 hour er (e b      he La et least 3DT STANDST within the seart 5 heure and la                    withis the following 20 hours.                                                      -
SURVETLtAIBCS RBgGIREMENTS redste).
i 4.6.1.2        The containeent leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the test      l schedule and shall be determined La comformance with the criteria dk 3. l ,l,)        specified is the Containment 14akage Rate Testing Proream.            l l
FARLIT-UNIT 1                            3/4 6-2                      AMENDMENT NO. 122 l
 
K 3.b.
                            ; s a a 6 /. /
S R 3,6, l. 2-f                                                    ,
LA 5.56                                                                      n.)
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTECRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
: 3. 6.1. 6 The structural integrity of. the containment shall be maintained at a
* level consistent with the acceptance criteria in Specification 4.6.1.6.                        7.
APPLICA8ILITY: M00E5 1 ,2, 3, and 4 ACTION:                                *
{
                                                                                            ' con 0:1 Ton)g lth the structural integrity of the containment not confonsing to the above                - "'
requirements, restore the structural integrity to within the lief ts with 4 hoursace De in as seast mi hours.
STANOSY within Ene **  next e nours and in GULR'    ggy QHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing30                                                    2
        ~                                                                                    CoNDlIl04 C-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3
4.6.1.6.1 Containment Tendens. The containment tendons' structural integrity                      A shall be demonstrated at the end of one, three and five years following the initial containment structural integrity test and at five year intervals thereafter. The tendons' structural integrity shall be demonstrated by:
: a. Detersining that a representative sample of at least 21 tendons (6 dome 5 vertical, and 10 hoop) each have a If ft off force within the acceptance limits, defined as not less than the allowable lower bound force nor greater than the allowable upper bound force per wire at the time of the test as shown in Figure 4.6-1. This test '
shall include an unloading cycle in which each of these tendons is detensioned to determine if any wires or strands are broken or damaged. If the lift off force of any one tendon in the total sample population is out of the allowable bounds (less than minimum                      ,
or greater than saximum), an adjacent tendon on each side of the defective tendon shall also be checked for Ifft off force. If both of these tendons are found acceptable, the surveillance program may proceed considering the single deficiency as unfque and acceptoble.
More than one defective tendon out of the original sample population is evidence of abncroal degradation of the containment structure.
Unless there is evidence of abnormal degradation of the containment structure during the first three tests of the tendons, the number of tendons checked for lift off force during subsequent tests may be reduced to a representative sa=ple of at least 9 tendons (3 dome, 3 vertical and 3 hoop).
FARLEY-UNIT 1                            3/4 6 s          .      AMENDMENT NO. 26
 
g y' 4, j y                                                                      FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY FNP ITS 3.6.1 CONTAINMENT DOC HQ      SHE                                                      DISCUSSION 1      A          The CTS 3/4.6.1 Containment Integrity LCO and Action Statements are revised consistent with the STS. The defined term of" Containment Integrity"is not used in the STS and has been deleted from the LCO and Actions. The term Operable is used in place ofintegrity. The LCO requirement for the system, structure, or component to be Operable is consistent with all STS LCO statements. As with other STS LCOs, specific operability considerations are discussed in the TS bases. The disposition of the defined term " Containment Integrity"is discussed in Enclosure 2 of TS definitions section 1.0. The CTS defined term " Containment Integrity"is effectively retained in the STS surveillance requirements and the operability discussions in the STS bases. This change substitutes an STS term for a CTS term and is not intended to reduce the operability requirements for Containment. As this change is part of a re-organization of the presentation and format of the Containment section TS, it is considered an administrative change.
la      A          CTS 3/4.6.1 is revised to reflect the addition of a Farley-specific Condition B in the FNP ITS LCO 3.6.1 consistent with the action statement of CTS 3/4.6.1.6. The DOC associated with this change to CTS 3/4.6.1.6 discusses the addition of this new Condition. Since this change merely reflects the movement of current requirements to another location consistent with the STS format and presentation (i.e., covering the requirement to maintain containment operable, including the structural integrity, in the containment specification) the associated change is considered an administrative change.
2      A          CTS 3/4.6.1 surveillance requirement 4.6.1.1.a is revised consistent with the STS. ' The CTS surveillance verifies the status of containment penetrations and the position of the associated isolation devices outside of containment every 31 days. The requirements of this surveillance pertain to isolation devices and therefore have been moved to the Containment Isolation Valve TS (STS LCO 3.6.3). The requirements of this CTS surveillance, except for the requirements resulting from required actions i.e., deactivated automatic valves, have been retained in SR 3.6.3.2. The requirements of this CTS surveillance regarding deactivated automatic valves (inoperable valves deactivated in accordance with action requirements) are effectively retained in the STS LCO 3.6.3 Actions A.1 and A.2. As automatic valves are deactivated and secured in the closed Chapter 3.6                                                    E2-1-A                            November,1998
 
f26C      3,(,, f - 3 FNP TS Conversion
                                                                            ~
Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE FNP ITS 3.6.1 CONTAINMENT DOC                                                                                                ;
EQ        i
              .S_ hie                                  DISCUSSION 1        A      All the requirements of CTS 3/4.6.1.2, " Containment Leakage" are              l effectively incorporated into STS LCO 3.6.1 " Containment" consistent with the STS. In the STS, the leakage requirements of this CTS are considered part of the containment operability requirements. The markup of CTS            ;
3/4.6.1.2 in Enclosure 1 indicates the corresponding requirements in the        l S fS LCO 3.6.1 " Containment" that effectively address the CTS 3/4.6.1.2        ;
requirements. As this change is part of the STS re-organization of the presentation and format of the Containment TS section and is not intended to introduce a technical revision, it is considered an administrative change. 1 1
la        A      CTS 3/4.6.1.2 is revised to reflect the addition of a Farley-specific Condition B in the FNP ITS LCO 3.6.1 consistent with the action statement of CTS 3/4.6.1.6. The DOC associated with this change to CTS 3/4.6.1.6 discusses the addition of this new Condition. Since this change merely reflects the movement of current requirements to another location consistent with the STS format and presentation (i.e., covering the requirement to maintain containment operable, including the structural integrity, in the containment specification) the associated change is considered an administrative change.
l 1
Chapter 3.6                                    E2-1-B                                November,1998 l
l l
 
              % l'3                                                                FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY FNP ITS - N/A DOC b'Q      SHE                                    DISCUSSION 1      LA      CTS 3/4.6.1.6 requires the structural integrity of the containment to be maintained consistent with the acceptance criteria of the associated surveillance requirement (4.6.1.6). CTS 3/4.6.1.6 is applicable in Modes 1-4. The CTS surveillances 4.6.1.6.1 and 4.6.1.6.2 address the verification of containment tendon operability including the end anchorages and adjacent concrete surfaces. CTS suneillance 4.6.1.6.3 requires visual inspections of the accessible interior and exterior surfaces of containment including the containment liner plate. CTS 3/4.6.1.6 is removed from the      i TS consistent with the STS. In the STS, the requirements for containment structural integrity are maintained in the surveillance requirements of LCO 3.6.1, " Containment" as SR 3.6.1.1 and SR 3.6.1.2 and in Specification 5.5.6," Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program" in the Administrative Controls section of the STS. The STS surveillance requirements SR 3.6.1.1 and SR 3.6.1.2 effectively retain the requirements to perform the Containment Tendon operability determinations and the visual inspections required by CTS surveillances 4.6.1.6.1,4.6.1.6.2, and 4.6.1.6.3. The STS LCO 3.6.1," Containment"is applicable in Modes 1-4 and requires the plant to be placed in Mode 5 for non-conforming conditions. Therefore, failure to meet the LCO 3.6.1 surveillance requirements results in essentially the same outcome as failure to meet the CTS 3/4.6.1.6 requirements for Containment Structural Integrity. However, l                    consistent with the STS, the details of CTS 3/4.6.1.6, including the specific  1 l                    guidance for performing the required surveillances are moved into a r ogram outside of the Technical Specifications similar to the existing l                    omms for ASME Inservice Testing and Containment Leakage. Similar
                          .he ASME Inservice Testing Program and Containment Leakage Rate Programs, the Containment Tendon Surveillance Program is specified in I
the Administrative Controls section of the TS. Specification 5.5.6," Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program", requires a program be established that contains the required inspection frequencies, and acceptance criteria in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.35 Rev. 2,            i 1976. As such, the frequency and acceptance criteria of the required                !
suneillances continue to be specified in the TS. In addition, the STS contains a reporting requirement, Specification 5.6.9," Tendon Surveillance Report" which requires that any abnormal containment structure degradation detected during performance of the suneillances required by Specification 5.5.6," Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon                      l Chapter 3.6                                  E2-1-F                              November,1998
 
3'6 * ''3                                                        FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY FNP ITS - N/A DOC N_Q      SHE                                      DISCUSSION Surveillance Program," be reported to the NRC within 30 days. This STS reporting requirement constitutes an additional NRC notification beyond the current requirements of the CTS. Therefore, the requirements that remain in the TS effectively ensure the containment structural integrity continues to be determined in an acceptable manner. The removal of the details from CTS 3/4.6.1.6 and placement in a program outside of the technical specifications is acceptable based on the control provided by the associated surveillance requirements retained in LCO 3.6.1 and the surveillance program and reporting requirements in the administrative controls section of the TS.
2        A    CTS 3/4.6.1.6 contains actions which allow 24 hours to restore any non-conforming conditions before requiring a plant shutdown to Mode 5. These CTS actions have been in:orporated into a Farley-specific Condition B in the FNP ITS LCO 3.6.1 Since this change merely moves current requirements to anotuct location consistent with the STS format and presentation (i.e., covering the requirement to maintain containment operable, including the structural integrity, in the containment specification)    ;
the associated change is considered an administrative change.
3        A    The shutdown requirements of CTS 3/4.6.1.6 are incorporated into the ITS LCO 3.6.1, Containment, Condition C consistent with Condition B of the STS. Since this change merely moves current requirements to another location consistent with the STS format and presentation, the associated change is considered an administrative change.
l l
3 apter 3.6                                  E2-2-F                              November,1998
 
F a n.i-3                /47          _
4 Containment { Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual))
: 3. .i 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS L
3.6.1  Containmenthtmospheric,Subatmospheric,IceCondenser,andDualh LC0 3.6.1          Containment shall be OPERABLE.                                  ,
APPLICABILITY:    MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION                    REQUIRED ACTION        COM ETION TIME A. Containment              A.1      Restore containment  I hour inoperable.                        to OPERABLE status.
Required Action and associated Completion 4 h        Be in MODE 3.        6 hours g
Time not met.            AE Be in MODE 5.        36 hours G                                                            1 7k B, .5bvckmd                        B.I  Resbre 4he skvM            29 6vr3 4h un6Wi",N    red                inkyty 40 wh l        nek cu b 5      40
                                              \;u,Q
          &c gveem)ents #
3R %.I.L WOG STS                                  3.6-1                  Rev 1, 04/07/95
 
l l
l FNP TS Conversion l
Enclosure 5 - JD from STS M 34'l'3                                                      Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems 3
STS 3.6.1 CONTAINMENT FNP ITS 3.6.1 CONTAINMENT JD NUMBER                                      JUSTIFICATION 1      STS 3.6.1 surveillance 3.6.1.1 is revised consistent with the NEI/ Industry recommendations for incorporating 10CFR50 Appendix J, Option B changes. The NEI/ Industry position on incorporating 10CFR50 Appendix J, Option B changes in the STS is documented in TSTF - 52 which has been previously transmitted to the NRC.
2      STS LCO 3.6.1 is revised consistent with the requirements of CTS 3/4.6.1.6. FNP CTS allow 24 hours to restore the structural integrity of containment to within limits before requiring a unit shutdown. The revision of STS LCO 3.6.1 maintains the FNP current licensing basis.                                                          ,
                                                                                                          ]
l 1
!                                                                                                        I l                                                                                                        l i
l                                                                                                        l l
Chapter 3.6                            ES-1-A                                        November,1998 t
 
W d
N          3.6./-3                                  d6                Containment [AtmosphericD B 3.6.1 BASES i
ACTIONS                        Al (continued) also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal.
I and V
If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within                          I the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a                          !
MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this                                  l status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating                                    i experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full                          :
power conditions in an orderly manner and without                                    {
,                                          challenging plant systems.
.                                                                    Rewsst> by TETF ST AppJ CMMB SURVEILLANCE                  SR      3.6.1.1                        ~
REQUIREMENTS h'          Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test V                      E
                -13p-62.,                _ requirements ofM10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. I ?, as Jnodified) g by approved exemotions./ Failure to meet air lock Jand purge valve with esilient seal                eakage limits specified in 3.6.2 nd LC0 3.6.            ces not invalidate the acce abil ty of these overall leakage determinations unless l        Rhu        an edge. their otribution to overalf Type A, B, and C leakage                                  737F 52.
or At          Mbe,            causesthttoexceedlimits. As left leakaoe orior o the                                  l mdu        T te. B    W irst star                    after performing a req 'ed [0 CFR 50                            j M C-                                                                                                        g
                          .i            (Appendix Ji eakage test is requir                    be < 0.6 L, for        -
f%-
i                          -
combined Type B and C leakage,, and                .75 L, for overall                l At all other times'Tetween required leakage (hell      8MnJ*fE      6houIm      rate    tests,    the  acceptance    criteria is based on an overall Type AType  leabge A    limitleakag4 or SAvkitkunkt                                                  of s 1.0 L,. At s 1.0 L, the offsite l  in6M~[,goe. A                    dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the i      ' fc5 fin      v                    safety analysis. SR Freauencies are as required by fAppenq1x SR 3.4.2 (whidh      J, as/allows modified  pp approvyd exempti/)ns.
FNequency/extensioM      doef not #Jhus, ply) / W These periodic testing requirements verify that the containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate
;                                _ assumed in the safety analysis.
i
                                              - ,                          ~
Cen~hunthenf f.etJa9e &~Esh                                  ? m (continued)
WOG STS                                                    B 3.6-9                      Rev 1, 04/07/95 4
                                                                                                                              /
 
CHAPTER 3.6 3 6I. 3,I t- 3                                            mSERT V                            -
NEW ACTION B BASES PAGE B 3.6-9                            l If the requirements of SR 3.6.1.2 are not met, the structural integrity of the containment is in a i degraded state. SR 3.6.1.2 ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained in accordance with the provisions of the Containment Tendon Surveillance Program.
If a limit of the Program is not met, Condition B allows 24 hours to restore the structural      ,
integrity to within limits. The 24-hour Completion Time allows for the correction of minor        !
problems while providing a limit to the amount of time that the structural integrity of containment may be in a degraded condition during at-power conditions.
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Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.1-7 i.
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ContainmentQAtmospheric) l                        FAr 3.6,i J                                                              B361
                                                                                                              )
BASES i
,                BACKGROUND                2. closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or (continued)                de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in gism              LCO 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves";
ofwAN W                    b. Each air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in gch penetroiton                  LCO 3.6.2, " Cont inment Air Locks";
(e ., we,ld S,beMcA05
: c. All equipment hatches are closed; and or      -rmis)is        _
d.
p                                                        P    g OPERA BLE,                      The pressurized sealing mechanism associated with al penetration is OPERABLE, except as provided in          J FNp                    LCO 3.6.[ ] f                                                g Ps donbnrnenf ZntegroTf Dkr:
APPLICABLE          The safety design basis for the containment is that the SAFETY ANALYSES      containment must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.
M                                                                                      O' 6 TM [ -~
The DBAs that result in a challenge to containment OPERABILITY from high pressures and temperatures            a loss l
of coolant accident (LOCA), a steam line break nd a rod gr gf 3f              ejection accident (REA) (Ref. 2). In addit , release of significant fission product radioactivit ithin containment l Z4 h0VIS              can occur from a LOCA or REA. In the            analyses, it is L  o, o75% Oe*          assumed that the containment is OPE          E such that, for the a_p+e,r              DBAs involving release of fission          oduct radioactivity, is co rolled by the rate of release to the containment          environmen}fonte leakage.      The          nment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of 0.          of containment air weight per dayWRef. 3). This lea age rate, used to evaluate aOf f' " B  offsite doses resulting from accidents, is defined in 10 CFR 50, AppendixA(Ref.1), as L,: the maximum
                    '/grg.62        allowable containment ~ leakage rate at the calculated peak gc3, g a            containment i        rnal pressure (P.) resulting from the limiting B        The allowable leakage rate represented by L,
                        ,          forms the asis for the acceptance criteria imposed on all                i d,16                    Mentleakageratetesting. L is assumed to be                        !
0.1.% per day in the safety analysis at P, =        . psig F534                ( e 3)-
b-(o I' 4 d              Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for l
l            fMg.2                  the establishment of containment OPERABILITY.
3M-95-ote-cc7 (W
i (continued) 7 WOG STS                                      B 3.6-7                    Rev 1, 04/07/95 l
 
.                                                                                                                W hdh                    Containment (AtmosphericD
                                                                                                          "  62 run m              ;
;              BASES ACTIONS                  AJ (continued) 1 also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring                      i containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when                          l containment is inoperable is minimal.
1 and V
If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within                      1 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed                                l Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating                              !
experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
Revisec by TETF n- App.T CDWB l
SURVEILLANCE            SR    3.6.1.1                        -                                            '
REQUIREMENTS g'  Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance I          with the visual examinations and leakage rate test V                    N
                    -Gfr-W            requirements ofM10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref.1?, as Jnodified) gbyapprovedexemotions.fFailuretomeetairLockjandpurge valve with esilient seal eakage limits specified in 3.6.2    nd LC0 3.6.          oes not invalidate the acce abil ty of these overall leakage determinations unless f.hu        a.n edge. their 1tribution to overall Type A, B, and C leakage                    737f 52.
orskt          Mhd.        causes t    t to exceed limits. As left leakaoe crior lo the T te. B    W irst star in 6                                          after performing a requi ed (i0 CFR 50, F              g M6              h        uppendix Jh eakage test is require o be < 0.6 L, for                      -
* I -~  - - - - -
combined Type B and C leakage,, and < __.75 L, for overall Type A leakagk At all other times etween required leakage hall 8Mnj a n cuI        4Em rate tests, tha acceptance criteria is bcsed on an overall
( H 5AufdtkunM                  Type A leakage limit of s 1.0 L . At s 1.0 L, the offsite 1      I included.Tgjoe. 4            dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis. SR Freauencies are as required by I fe 5 fin TAppenq1x J, as/ modified p9 approvyd exemptiAns.
i                                    SR 3.4.2 (whtdh allows Frequency / extensions) not            doer}hus,
                                                                                                          # ply) /W These periodic testing requirements verify that the
.                                      containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analysis.
Cen~huntrenf f.edn9e Reje.Tesh                  7 m (continued) i WOG STS                                          B 3.6-9                          Rev 1, 04/07/95
 
NQ                                                g ContainmentAirLocks@ Atmospheric,Subatmospheric.IceCondenser.andDualij B 3.6.2 BASES      c nt                              M " M ^*
o,l3 APPLICABLE            The DBAs that resu      in a release of radioactive materA 1 SAFETY ANALYSES        within containment are a loss of coolant accident,On Va rod ejection accident; Ref. 2) . In the analysis of each of these accidents, it is assumed that containment is OPERABLE Ns lege rde such that release of fission products to the environment is                              '
15cle6necLin /odpA j control                by the rate of containment leakage. .The opfgn              t was designed with an allowable leakage rate of 50, Apperdigg/gn e p;q            i10.1; of containment air weight per day (Ref. 2). JThis l-g      dMe cen%n.,                    leaKhge rate is ' fined in 10 CFR 50, ppendix J Ref. 1)          }
    ,      mentle6            e, rde    as L,  [0.1]% o contain nt air wei t per day, the i    g,t the,                  ,
maxim    allowab'e contai      nt leakag rate at t      calcu ted    1 pe Q cafgnm                  peak containme $ intern pressure . = [14.4]            ia          ;  I th/aro42,,pte g g              fol wing a DBA. ITh s allowable leikage rate forms the basis for the~ acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs PS    ,        a o a d with the air locks.
follaulms  C ct Ot.A        te n e.sb l e on      ment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC
[      Policy Statement.
              ~
sm- AS- o'2 \ **3                                                                          7bTF52-LC0        CN        Each containment air lock forms part of the :ontainment pressure boundary. As part of ntainment, the air lock safety function is related to control of the containment
_                leakage rate resulting from a DBA. Thus, each air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.
Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to be OPERABLE.
Closure of a single door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events.
Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed whepthe air lock is not being used for normal entry into@7 exit from containment.
73F.-5Z_
APPLICABILITY          In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment.        In MODES S and 6, the (continued)
WOG STS                                      B 3.6-22                      Rev 1, 04/07/95 i
 
f MN                                          D-Containment Air Locks (( Atmospheric, Subatmosnheric. Ice Condenser. and Dua $
B 3.6.2 P& 3 6.M BASES (continued)
SURVEILLANCE      SR    3.6.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining containment air locks OPERABLE requires TSTF            pmpliance with the leakage rate test reauirements of A 10 G R 50, Appendix J (Ref. 1), as modified by approved)
                                                        .}Q                exemptions.f This SR reflects the leakage rate testing Cordaintrent        requirements with regard to air lock leakage (Type 8 leakage eg        tests). The acceptance criteria were established during L                  initial air lock and containment OPERABILITY testing. The Tesfin ?r f          periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall containment leakage rate. The Freouency is required by
_                                                                b TAppendix J (Ref. 1), as modified by approved exemptions. 3
                                                                          'Thus, SR_3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not ;
2P.P.I  .T.! [
The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.
This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the l    Ag                results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of 4f j(.E - y            3.6.1.1.forThis SRaccounted                  ensures that air lock Je.akage is proper y in determining the overall/Ntainment leakage C.cmbrned. fe-  ""e T6TF4L 3.6.2.2 The air lock interlock is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in a single air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed .to withstand the maximum expected post accident containment pressure, closure of either door will support containment                j OPERABILITY. Thus, the door interlock feature supports                    f M ^q>g              containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for M            personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock g W1l            will function as designed and that simultaneous opening of
                                                            ~----~
the inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur. Due              f wto the purely mechanical nature of thi interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is'eni            allenged when the
_ containment air lock doo_r isgo_peneo,rthis test is only
_M Mg b            requirea to be perto_rmedjiipo      nte    g    ex  ng (ontafnmenJ/ f    air lock ydt is ot r_    ir    mo  fr u tly        _
:nJ5 Eft'r R                                                  (continued)
WOG STS                                  B 3.6-27                        Rev 1, 04/07/95
 
Associated Package Changes for RAIs 3.6.1-8, 3.6.2-4,3.6.3-21,3.6.5-2,3.6,7-3, and 3.6.9-3
 
RAI i 3. f .l- 8, 3.6.2-%
3'''3' 24 7'M-5                                                    FNP TS Conversion 24.,7-3; 3.6.9 3                          Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems  ,
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l CHAPTER 3.6 DISCUSSION OF CHANGES (DOCS)                                        l TO THE CURRENT FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT (FNP)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TS)
This enclosure contains a brief DOC for each marked-up change to the FNP Current Technical Specifications (CTS) required to produce the FNP specific Improved Technical Specification (ITS). The DOC numbers are referenced directly from Enclosure 1 (CTS markup), and the associated Significant Hazard Evaluations (SHEs) are contained in Enclosure 3. Some obvious editorial changes made to the CTS in order to conform with the Standard TS (STS) contained in NUREG-1431, Rev. I may not be specifically addressed by an individual DOC but are covered by the generic administrative SHE contained in Enclosure 3.
A generic administrative DOC which applies to all administrative changes in Enclosure 1 not otherwise identified is included below.
DOCOA            Numerous reformatting, renumbering, and editorial changes have been made to the CTS in Enclosure 1. In addition, certain wording preferences and/or English language conventions have been adopted, which resulted in the ITS being more readily readable and therefore understandable by the plant operators and users.
These changes did not result in any technical changes, but are considered to be Administrative changes.
Each of the following DOCS and associated SHEs are applicable to both Unit I and 2 unless otherwise stated.
In order to facilitate review, the DOCS in this enclosure are organized by individual TS and may be easily separated into individual TS review sections if desired. The DOCS are labeled with the corresponding CTS number and name and the proposed FNP ITS specific number and name.
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Chapter 3.6                                      E2-1                              November,1998
 
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FNP TS Conversion QC 3,6 Z- )                                  Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS FNP ITS 3.6.2 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS DOC EQ        SHE                                    DISCUSSION and the low likelihood of an event occurring during the time the air lock door is open for entry or exit which would challenge the containment boundary. In addition, the allowance provided by this note may reduce the potential risk incurred during a plant transient (shutdown) that could result from an inoperable air lock.
The second STS note provides the allowance to enter the Actions Conditions separately for each inoperable air lock. As explained in STS section 1.3, " Completion Times", this note allows a =parate Completion        .
i Time to be established for each airlock. The application of this note in the STS is based on the Action requirements providing sufficient remedial measures when applied individually to each component or system addressed in the TS. As the FNP air locks are consistent with the air locks addressed in the STS, the provision of this note is applicable to and acceptable for FNP.
The third STS note affecting the CTS 3/4.6.1.3 Actions provides guidance to direct the user to the Containment LCO (3.6.1) if the air lock leakage results in the total containment leakage exceeding the limit required by LCO 3.6.1. CTS 3.6.1.3, action c contains the same actions as CTS 3/4.6.1.2 when the leakage rates exceed the overall Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program acceptance criteria. In the conversion to the ITS, CTS 3/4.6.1.2 is incorporated into ITS LCO 3.6.1 as Conditions A and B and SR 3.6.1.1. Thus, the CTS effectively require the same actions to be entered as the ITS. The only difference is the format of the STS as compared to the CTS. Therefore, this note provides a clarification based on the format of the STS and does not introduce a technical change. As such, the addition of this note is considered an administrative change.
3        L    The CTS 3/4.6.1.3 Actions are revised consistent with the STS. The CTS l                    actions are revised to specifically include "one or more" inoperable air locks. The STS actions are applicable to each air lock individually and each i                    STS condition may be applicable to more than one air lock at a time.
Therefore, consistent with the format and presentation of the STS, the i                    action Conditions for an inopenble air lock use the term "one or more air locks" to describe the applicability of each Condition. This clarification of the applicability of the required actions is acceptable since the level of assurance (for containment leakage) provided by accomplishing the
! Chapter 3.6                                  E2-2-C                              November,1998
 
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Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.2-2 1
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  - ~ . .    -        -      -      - - - - - _ - -                        - -    - - --- --
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FNP TS Conversion M%M                                      Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS        l l                                                                          Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems
!                                                                                                                i CTS 3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS l                                  FNP ITS 3.6.2 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS                                            j
!            ' OC D                                                                                                    l l            NQ      SiiE                                  DISCUSSION 1      LA  The CTS 3.6.1.3 LCO statement is revised consistent with the STS. The descriptive text contained in the CTS LCO regarding the status of the                ,
airlock doors and the exception to allow entry and exit through the air lock        !
is moved to the bases discussion for this TS. For a system to be considered operable, the def'mition of operability for the system must be satisfied and          i the associated Surveillance requirements must be met. In the STS,                    j information related to the design and configuration of a system which relate        .
to meeting the operability requirements of the LCO is included in the Bases.        !
As the above descriptive text defines the allowable configurations under which the air lock is operable, and the conditions and surveillances ensure          i that those configurations are maintained or appropriate actions are taken, it is appropriate to move this redundant information to the Bases. The removal of this information from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentatior. of the STS. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases frr guidance in performing the associated surveillances is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.
2        L  The CTS 3/4.6.1.3 Actions are revised by the addition of three notes consistent with the STS. The STS notes provide the following; 1) an allowance to enter and exit the air locks to perform maintenance on affected i
air lock components while the action requirements to maintain one air lock door closed are applicable,2) an allowance for separate actions Condition l
I                          entry for each inoperable air lock which results in a separate Completion Time clock being established for each air lock, and 3) a clarification to ensure the more conservative requirements of LCO 3.6.1 are applied if air              ,
lock leakage results in exceeding the limit required to be met by LCO 3.6.1.          l The first STS note provides an allowance required to ensure the air lock is
!                          repaired in a timely manner. The note allows entry and exit of the air lock
,                          to perform the required repairs while the action requirement to maintain one air lock door closed is applicable. However, the note only provides an exception to the action requirement for the brief time required to make an entry or exit and only for the purpose of repairing the air lock. The                  4 allowance provided by this note is acceptable based on the brief time the air          !
j                          lock door is open for entry or exit, the other air lock door remaining closed, Chapter 3.6                                E2-1-C                                    November,1998
 
l l
Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-3
                                            \
l i
l O
 
(2/tt 3. f, . 3 -3                                                FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS  I Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems f
CTS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC FQ        SHE                                  DISCUSSION the addition of Notes consistent with the STS. STS Notes 2,3, and 4 provide additional clarification and guidance in the use and application of STS 3.6.3 and related TS.
Note 2 provides guidance in entering the STS Conditions for each penetration flowpath. This note conforms with the STS administrative conventions for Condition entry as described in Section 1.3," Completion        l Times" of the STS. It is also consistent with the equivalent CTS actions        l
("one or more" containment isolation valves may be inoperable). As such,        .
I the addition of this note is required for the administrative conventions of the STS and does not introduce a technical change.
Notes 3 and 4 provide guidance in determining when other applicable TS may be entered due to an inoperable containment isolation valve and/or excessive leakage. The STS format contains directions within certain TS        l for entering other related TS when applicable. CTS 3.0.1 states the following: " Compliance with the Limiting Conditions for Operation contained in the succeeding specifications is required during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified therein; except that upon failure to meet the Limiting Conditions for Operation, the associated ACTION requirements shall be met." Therefore, if a system is made inoperable by a containment isolation valve or the leakage through an isolation valve results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria, then by the requirements of CTS 3.0.1, the appropriate system LCO, and/or LCO 3.6.1.2 for excessive valve leakage (equivalent to that requirement for entry into LCO 3.6.1 in the ITS), would be entered.
Thus, the CTS effectively require the same actions to be entered as the ITS.
The notes are considered additional infomiation contained in the STS to prompt the user when other TS may be applicable. The addition of Notes 3 and 4 is intended to provide guidance for the use of the STS only, and is not intended to introduce a technical change to the CTS. Therefore, this is considered an administrative change.
4        A  The CTS 3/4.6.3 action statement is revised consistent with Condition A of the STS. The term " penetration"is used consistently in STS 3.6.3, the penetration is what must be isolated to maintain containment integrity. This term is used in the STS as a single penetration may have more than one flow path and multiple isolation valves on each side of containment.
Chapter 3.6                                E2-2-J                              November,1998 l
l
 
1 Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-4 1
i l
I I
i
 
  . _            . _ . - _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ -                              _-_          _ _              _              _    , ~. _                _      _- -            __.__
PAI ~34 2-Y                                                                  g L,w 3,$,3 Con [unmenf ZsoYle!' NM
                                                                                                      ~          _        -
                                                                                                  .TSOLATION V8lV6$                                                                  ^
2 ,b CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS                                                                                    -
2.6.3 C NTAINMENThMULAMON SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION j
l un 3,g,3
                                                        ,                                  ,        r.
Containment (urge supply and exhaust valve] shall be OPERABLE                      and 2
b a      Th_e 48-inch cont ainment nures suoply and exhaust isolation alves 3 .
l            .6R 3 lo,3.l M                          .
(CBV-Hy-3198A. 31980. 3196. 31970shall be (e-activated and secured)in i    3                                                    sneir cioseo yom on.
L., gg3 g3 he,g,$                                  The 8-inch containment          ni-purge f up' ply and ' exhaust isolation valves (CBV-HV-2566L 2866D. 756/C. 25670 )may be open for safety-related '                                          $
reasons.                                                                                    #                  ,,
'                                                                                              L-96 AS E S gg7{                                  PLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and a                                            zmtsr r
* m pg pg                                          A
    $TS 10                            ACTION:
l
'    3 6,3 ' .
y p*                              t one    8-  ch cont nmen pur          supply      one      inch cont nment
__            _                                      ge      au    isolat n va eo n or not -a ct ted, de-a                          vate
                                                            'cu r in a close posi on e open va e(s) ' isolate                                                                          i e            3 l
8            L    ene ati within our h urtarnbe in at least nu6 STANDBY' within the i
{      p g ,3 m            gg            Teit 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.                                            Odf/OO L
LQ 3.5.3                                    with the le            rate fo the conta5 ament purne supp1r and-es"
        , .m o                                                        [xceed p enet ,atio                    e unit        soec,rm1        .              n+aust                      -
7            E .6.1.7.3.D wi thin          Jurs either:
N              . Reduce thi leakage' to witnfn the Jimit/, or
      'I~NS E AT f                                        . solate the containment purge supply or both supply and e                        t b 3 4 ,3                                                pe        ions as required to reduce tne leakage rate                    the containme          mosphere to the outside atmosph              o within the Action 5                                                iteit of spect          on 4.6.1.7.2 by the seTfatleast:
D,ljD.7j0AAd N a) One OPERA 8LE'de-activate            nch inside contaitunent purge A
supply or both sujpy d exhau                olation valves secured in the closed pogtron or secured by use                  blind flange, and one
                                            /                    OPERABL      6 activated 8-inch inside contairen              urge supply or g                                                upply and exhaust isolation valves secured                        closed sition or secured by use of a blind flange, or
                                  *Inis specification is governing for the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation penetration leakage and 48-inc isolation valve position.
I4EM U                                                                        -
u.o u.3                                                                                                                    6 3ASES 9
l  CoeJDTmr4 6                                                                                                    L.A FARLEY-UNIT 1                                              3/4 6-10
* AMENDMENT NO. ;;, 74
'              5-t 4
i e
 
CHAPTER 3.6 F6I 3.6.3-i INSERT T TO CTS PAGE 3/4 610 NEW GENERAL ACTION NOTES FOR CTS 3/4.6.1.7                                                                  -
i
                                                                                    ... . NOTES                                          -          .
: l.      Penetration flow path (s) except for 48 inch purge valve flow paths may be unisolated                                          ,
intermittently under administrative controls.                                                                                  t
: 2.        Separate Condition Entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.
: 3.        Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by                                                  i containment isolation valves.
: 4.        Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1," Containment," when                                              i isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate                                              ?
acceptance criteria.                                                                                                            )
                                                                                                                                      ..                      1 l
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Chapter 3.6 Insert Page i
 
g      y,f, y p                                                        FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems l
l                  CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC bLQ      SHE                                    DISCUSSION 3.6.3.
l    4      LA    The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 LCO statements a and b are revised consistent with the STS. The valve numbers for the 48 inch and 8 inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are removed from the LCO and placed in the bases i                    of the Containment Isolation Valve TS (3.6.3). The removal of this type of information from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. The valve numbers listed in CTS 3.6.1.7.a and .b provide plant nomenclature for the valves listed in the LCO statement (Containment purge supply and exhaust valves). This information is detail provided in the FSAR and on plant drawings. It does not define the requirements of operability for the valves but rather provides additional descriptors of the valves that have already been identified by the statement of the LCO. Therefore, it is also appropriate to move this information to the Bases. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for identification of the associated valves is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.
4a        L    The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Actions are modified by the addition of Notes consistent l                  with the STS. The first STS Note provides an allowance to unisolate any penetration flow path (except for the 48 inch purge supply and exhaust valves) intermittently under administrative controls. This allowance applies to penetration flow paths isolated in accordance with the Required Actions    j of STS 3.6.3. The CTS Table 3.6-1 currently provides a similar allowance for a limited number of valves. The STS note, however, expands the CTS allowance to apply to all Containment Isolation Valves except the 48 inch purge supply and exhaust. The allowance to open intermittently any containment isolation valve, closed as a result of Required Actions, is considered acceptable in the STS based on the requirement for I
administrative controls (described in the STS bases) that provide for a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. The required administrative controls      ;
provide adequate assurance that the affected penetration may be rapidly        l l                  closed if containment isolation is required. The 48 inch containment purge supply and exhaust valves are excepted from the STS allowance due to the      ;
large size and direct path from the containment to the outside atmosphere.    !
Chapter 3.6                                  E2-2-G                              November,1998
 
i FNP TS Conversion  I N 3'N'I                                                            Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems 1
CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC NQ          SHE                                                    DISCUSSION 4b          A    The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Actions are modified by the addition of Notes consistent with the STS. STS Notes 2,3, and 4 provide additional clarification and guidance in the use and application of STS 3.6.3 and related TS.
Note 2 provides guidance in entering the STS Conditions for each penetration flowpath. This note conforms with the STS administrative conventions for Condition entry as described in Section 1.3, " Completion Times" of the STS. It is also consistent with the equivalent CTS actions
("one or more" containment isolation valves may be inoperable). As such, the addition of this note is required for the administrative conventions of the STS and does not introduce a technical change.
Notes 3 and 4 provide guidance in detennining when other applicable TS may be entered due to an inoperable containment isolation valve and/or excessive leakage. The STS format contains directions within certain TS for entering other related TS when applicable. CTS 3.0.1 states the following: " Compliance with the Limiting Conditions for Operation
!                          contained in the succeeding specifications is required during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified therein; except that upon failure to meet the Limiting Conditions for Operation, the associated ACTION requirements shall be met." Therefore, if a system is made inoperable by a containment isolation valve or the leakage through an isolation valve results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria, then by the requirements of CTS 3.0.1, the appropriate system LCO, and/or LCO 3.6.1.2 for excessive valve leakage (equivalent to that requirement for entry into LCO 3.6.1 in the ITS), would be entered.
Thus, the CTS effectively require the same actions to be entered as the ITS.
The notes are considered additional information contained in the STS to prompt the user when other TS may be applicable. The addition of Notes 3 and 4 is intended to provide guidance for the use of the STS only, and is not intended to introduce a technical change to the CTS. Therefore, this is considered an administrative change.
5            M  The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Action Statement a is revised consistent with the STS.
CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Action Statement a addresses a mispositioned 48 inch purge supply or exhaust isolation valve and requires isolation of the affected penetration within 4 hours. This CTS action is replaced by Condition A of STS LCO 3.6.3 which addresses inoperable containment isolation valves.
Chapter 3.6                                      E2-3-G                                            November,1998
 
FNP TS Conversion N 3'b'N                                              Enclosure 3 - Signincant Hazards Evaluations Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems III. SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIONS CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES da;L
  -L Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change involves upgrading the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to more closely agree with the STS and does not result in any hardware changes. The proposed change allows isolation valves other than the 48 inch purge valves to be opened intermittently under administrative controls that assure the isolation function of the valve remains available. The containment isolation valves are not assumed to be an initiator of any analyzed event. The isolation valves act to isolate the containment penetrations in the event of a design basis accident and serve to limit the consequences of accidents. The proposed change still ensures the isolation valv es will perform their required function and will serve to limit the consequences of design basis events as described in the FSAR and that the results of the analyses in the FSAR remain bounding.
Additionally, the proposed change does not impose any new safety analyses limits or alter the plants ability to detect and mitigate events. Therefore, this char.ge does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
: 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change involves upgrading the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to more closely agree with the STS and does not necessitate a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in parameters governing normal plant operation. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
: 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The proposed change, which upgrades the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to be consistent with the STS does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change has been developed considering the importance of the containment isolation valves in limiting the consequences of a design basis event and the concerns for the plants ability to perform required operational support functions with the necessery systems isolated. The proposed change allows for alternative protection to assure the isolation function of the valve remains available. Considering the low probability of an event that would challenge the containment boundary, the alternative protection provided by this change and the operational requirements to occasionally open these valves, the proposed change is acceptable and any reduction in the margin of safety f    insignificant.
Chapter 3.6                                      E3-1-C                      November,1998
 
Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-5 l
 
                            'Mr 3.635                                                                                                                                                            31
                                                                                                                                ,z    sa:s a saapes, CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS                                                                                          L.
O t# d M 5 6c. 4 d in fo'$.            g SURVEILLANCE REQUIntEMENTS (Conti ued)
SR 3 6.'5 fo                                                                                                                                              /                                      hg G.6.3.                                                  Each isolation valve Specified in Table 3.6-1                                                    all be demonstrated OPERABLE (durino_the co r _n u                                                                                                  avorrrun wnnrc nr    co r ueg
                                                                                                                                                      -f at least once per 18 months by:(                                                                                          -5 g g                                                      l f                                                                                        V}33 J                                  adv      of g"                            Verifying that on a Fhase A                                            containment isolation 7          signal,      f.496.hd ,
each wnase w isol tion valve actuates to its isolation position. gyd.cus verifying th t on a(phase B contaipmen* isola *4 @                                                        ignal, each g, nase,,p isolation valve actuates to i                                                  o fr                                              'e.                                        m          %gw esition.        i5 e    o g
Q_.6. 3. 'iY AThe isolation time of each power operated or automata valv able 3.6-D shall beJetermined to be within its limit when tested pursu                                                                                                  t *o (pecification 4.0.f."                                                                                                                                                      Inscvvs.c I                                                                      -
M                                                                                                                                                        _                      g 4.6.                                  .4                The cont nmentpurgeishationvalvessha                                                      be demonst ated          tesa.co.w OPERA E prior to sta tup after each EOLD SHUTDOWN if n t performed n the                                                                                                        '
previou 3 months by v ifying that'wh                                                                                            the measured le age rate is dded t the leaka e rates for al other Type B a                                                                                            C penetrations, the combine leakage ra                                                is less than r equal to 0.6                                              . In addition,    he leakage    te for the cent nment purge i lation valves                                                                                              all be compared          the previc ly measured leaka e rate (for th containment pu e isolation val s) to detect excess valve de adation.
An engineering eva ation shall b                                                                                            erformed to de rmine what corr tive action, if any, is n essary.
IV A
                                  ~DMERT' L 6 r3 3,6,3 LvvMI-d3 SR 3.G,.3.2. M 5e. 3. c.,3. '6, n
A 1
1 l                FARLEY-UNIT L                                                                                                      3/4 6-15                            AMENDMENT No.130 l
 
P E % .?-5                    15'l                  Containmont Isolation valves [AtmospheriTc,
                                                                          @tsitmdspheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual))
3-6-7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE                                                          FREQUENCY SR    3.6.3.              -------------------NOT                      ------- ------                    M nof l#'kek I. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation                                        scoAch, or The, blind. %e , areas may be verified by use of                                                                  cAede on the fuel                      administrative means.                                                            gecyc3 rm fer & fd) fl.ange is onto.J
                                                                                                                /              TM- D, re9,iftred.to d                  Verify each containment isolation manual                                    Prior to fleiqased                    valve and blind flange that is located                                      entering MODE 4 rm                          inside containmenthand required to be                                      from MODE 5 if a.irne.coFO.e                  closed during accfdent conditions is                                      not performed camo.,l.d                        closed, except for containment isolation                                  within the valves that are open under administrative                                  previous controls.                                                                  92 days l
SR    3.6.3.g{            Ve 0
the isolatfn time of'eiEn poser QIn              -
                                                                                                                                      /
l l
perated eno eacarautomatic containment                                  / accordance                i isolation valve is within limits.                                            with the          ,
                                                                                                                                          /  i t                                                                                          Inservice      d M
rog      o-
{$l fays                    ,
m  -/              -;
N/A To FNP Conia.inmenf                                          /                _
SR 3.6.3.6                    each weight or spring loaded che                                    92 days valve        ble during operation t                            gh one complete                  e of full t            , and verify each check                          ains closed when the differential                    ur      the direction of flow is :s Lk j psid and op                            hen the differe              pressure in the directi .
f1      s 2: [1.2] psid and < (5.0) psid.
for .50boYtnoSDherlC        .
ConfodhMSob                              \ ~~
!                                                                                                                          (continued) l I
Rev 1, 04/07/95 WOG STS                                                        3.6-13
 
950                                                        e ,
pat 34 3"I Containment Isolation Valv M (Atmospheric],
{ubatmospheric,IceCondenser,andDualU Toh 1R h ed 93 b %be. -%h ave \oc.ksd scold or                            B 3.6.3 j
oh<dise 9tured )m h, dosedposW, <ime,s ike.z w, cve                                  ,
BASES      McAF'd b be in M weed posLW              upen %,.5%,
u orsecu,'g,            j
                                  - _f _ x      -  ->x                      ,- - -
T5TF- 6 f4v.I SURVEILLANCE        SR  3.6.3.# 3(continued)
REQUIREMENTS administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. The SR specifies that containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls required to meet the SR during the time they are
        -3 hi Note' allows valves and blind flanges located in high ra iation areas to be verified closed by use of NOTE 2 prov.i des    administrative means. Allowing verification by M cdlewatne_e to        administrative means is considered acceptable, since access OnLgverdyth6            to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, 3, ggggCfy e              and 4, for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these containment isolation valves, once on M be              r they have been verified to be in their proper position, is ca.nedL%.r>je            mall .
erecd.hcitedn.m SR  3.6.3.ff                        m A% N Verifying that the isolation time of each riower operated automatic containment isolation valve is within limits is                    !
required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in a time periods lefs than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. GThe isolation time and Frequency of this _SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program gr 92 days.] %
s-N                                                                          ,-
                      $E 3.6.3.6 In subatm      eric containments, the check val              at serve a containment          ation function are wei        or spring loaded to provide positive          sure in the      ction of flow. This ensures that these check          ve    1 remain closed when the inside containment atmos                rns to subatmospheric conditions followin            A. SR 3.b.        requires vecification of          operation of the che        alves that are testable        ng unit operation. The Frequenc            92 days is cons      nt with the Inservice Testing Program requi              nt valve testing on a 92 day Frequency.
              /                                                                                    ~
(continued)
WOG STS                                  B 3.6-41                        Rev 1, 04/07/95
 
  . --                              .-.        .= -        .-      -___  ._    -.    .            .-
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 5 - JD from STS
          ~@AI      %3i                                                Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems STS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES JD                                                                                              1 NUMBER                                            JUSTIFICATION 1      Not used.
2      The STS 3.6.3 surveillance 3.6.3.2 has been deleted consistent with FNP CTS requirements. FNP CTS allow for continuous operation of the mini-purge system for safety related reasons. The FSAR states that the mini-purge system operates        j during power operation to continuously purge the containment atmosphere. The STS Bases discussion for SR 3.6.3.2 states that the mini-purge valves are required to be closed. This is in direct conflict with the FNP current licensing basit and has  -
been deleted consistent with FNP current licensing basis.
3        The STS 3.6.3 surveillance 3.6.3.4 is revised by the acMition of Note 2 consistent with the CTS allowance for the blind flange installed on the fuel transfer canal flange. The allowance provided in this Note to the STS surveillance corresponds to the
* footnote to 4.6.1.1 in CTS 3/4.6.1 Containment Integrity. The allowance to verify the position of this blind flange only after each draining of the fuel transfer canal is justified since misposition of this flange at other times during normal        ,
operation is highly unlikely.                                                          j 4      The STS 3.6.3 surveillance 3.6.3.5 (ITS 3.6.3.4) has been revised consistent with FNP CTS requirements. FNP CTS 4.6.3.3 requires that the isolation time of each l                  power operated or automatic valve of Table 3.6-1 be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. The IST Program contains the testing requirements for the valves listed in Table 3.6-1. Therefore, STS 3.6.3 surveillance 3.6.3.5 (ITS 3.6.3.4) has been revised consistent with the deletion of l                  Specification 4.0.5 in the STS and the FNP current licensing basis as stated in CTS      I 4.6.3.3.
5      The STS 3.6.3 Conditions A, B, and E (ITS Condition D) and SR 3.6.3.7 (ITS SR 3.6.3.5) have been revised consistent with FNP CTS requirements. The FNP CTS l                  leakage limit for containment purge valves with resilient seals is based on a total l
penetration leakage rate, and is related to the total leakage from all Type B and C tests as opposed to an individual valve leakage rate as indicated in the STS. The l
l                  above sections of STS 3.6.3 have been revised to reflect this difference and to maintain the FNP current licensing basis for these penetrations.
P Chapter 3.6                                  E5-1-C                                November,1998
 
i Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-6 i
e I
1 I
i J
l l
l l
l l
 
bm 28                              NOIE:
Although STS LCO 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves", contaias the requirements for th
                              '-      Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves, the markup ofCTS 3/4.6.3, " Containment Isolatio not include the requirements associated with the containment purge supply and exhaust isola The TS requirements for the containment purge supp:
3 and exhaust isolation valves are contained in CTS I                                    3/4.6.1.7 "Contamment Ventilation System", and all clumges to those requirements are addre markups and DOCS associated with that CTS. In the STS, CTS 3/4.6.l.7 and CTS 3/4.6.3 into one STS LCO 3.6.3 for all contamment isolation valves.
b CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3,f,3                  OvtAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 2        .3        LIMITING CCNDITICNJCR OPERATICN                                                            I L        A                        ~'
O                        E u.o            ' E C#b"l                    V                          r  ? TR%
F ~~                      3.6.3    he containm~ent isolation valveC#pecified in Table 3.6-1)sha11 be J INSERT      H            CPERAste witn isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-11 f          _
[(
7                  APPLICABILITY: MCCE51, 2, 3 and_4                                      A                4/ pre            o f'        !
[
ACTION:                " I" ** ' #      "W EO"    6 J      O p
CDODITIDPJ N Y With one or more kf thholation valv                    (5ecified in Table L E-h {noptrable,        LAM bth
* Ixsearz $ICC"o'.'R*E.*Ze" ''T ""'7"Y '" "7'"""'Y""T''Y
              =                                                                                                                                    '
coneW,o04 5 Q Restore W inoperable valve (s) to CPERABLE status within 4 .)hours #                              g of a es a ected penetration within 4 hours by              of at least              b 1 yggg77                            one eactivated automatic valve 6ecured in tne isolation position]
          $. 2,                            #
7                      Isolate each affected penetratton within 4 hoyrs by use                    og off/oas  at least f gdM one closed sanual valve or blind flange; or w g            gg, d          Be in at least HOT STANCBY within the ne.xt 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDCW within the following 30 hours.
Vdv SCf.ur
                                                                                                                        ^'  -
I.NSE~RJ N*            '
                                +c.ordiSn E N                SURVEILLANCE RECUIREMENTS B SnD C, Pco brntn M f4.6.3.1 The isolation valves specified in Table 3.5-1 shall be demonstrated                N          i lo            CPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after saintenance, repair or @T*gg                                -
b              replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test, and verification of isola J fon time.                                                                          -
                          "*'"**"1                                  u< s-1<                  m EnonEur no 26
 
Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-7
 
f? g 3.fe.3~ ]
L,w 3s,3 Con [s unmen f IssY!''' V' b'S 150 ATIoH V IVES
)
3 .lo CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
                                                                                                                                              ~
3,g,3CONTA!NMENT[ VENT!LATIONSYSTEM
                                                                                          ....y ',
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3,6 ~3          .6.1.7' Containment (urge supply and exhaust valvej shall be OPERABLE                                                and The a8-inch containment nurce suoply and exhaust isolation alves S-4
          .6R3.lo.3. l b                        ((CBV-HV-3198A. 31980, 3196. 3197)]shall be Qe-activated and secured)in                                                          i 3                                              sneir ciosea gom on.                                                                                                          l kg                        Q,) The 8-inch containment Qews                                                                                  )
ni-purge sup~ ply and exhaust isolation valves (CBV-HV-2866C. 2866D. FB6K. za67D )may be open for safety-related                                                  4 g
                                                                                        '-98 AS E S 5)
D667E                      PPLICA8ILITY: N00ES 1, 2, 3 and a                                                  INSEIU' T m pg g                                              A S T S 1.I O            ACTION:
34,2
* g p*          {q                  t one ge 8-au ch cont nmen pur supply isolat n va eo n or not one
                                                                                                            -a ct inch cont nment ted , de-                  ivate a      l
                                                      'cu r in      a close posi on        e_ open va e(s)        ' isolate e                              3
                                $              n ene ati            within our h ort Sr De in at least nul 5TMDBY within the I
l  gg,3 L
m O U NDO gg[Et 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the followin rate fo th ontainment nurse supply an CL.C.,0      ,u,s 3%.3 pWiththe1[-eed            ene, ratio                  e .,e c,t .,
                                                                                      ,.        ,0. -    _ . m ,d eas uit Q.6.1.7.3.D within I grseither:                        _f
                                                    . Reduce thd leakage' to witnfn the Jimit/, or
                                              ~
        'TNSEAT F                                    . sotate the containment purge supply or both supply and e                                    t b 3 4 ,3                                        pe      ' ions as required to reduce the leakage rate                              the containme          mosphere to the outside atmosphe              o within the AC.TsoN5                                          limit of speci          on 4.6.1.7.2 by the se4fatleast:
D,Jt, b.2;&3 a) One OPERABLE'de-activate      j      nch inside contaisinent purge supply or Doth sup r and exhau                olation valves secured in A
the closed jpo n or secured by use                    blind flange, and one                                          )
                                /                          OPERABL      e-activated 8-inch inside contai                      urge supply or g
b        upply and exhaust isolation valves secured                                    losed i
position or secured by use of -a b11nd flange, or
                          *Inis specification is governing for the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation penetration leakage and 48-inch isolation valve position.
  "DOIM V
                                                                            ~
L.C.0 9,(p,3                                                                                                            h ME5 4
c m o m or4 &                                                                                              L.A FARLEY-UNIT 1                                              3/4 6-10                                                                          -
AMENDMENT NO. ;;, 74 h*-
u
 
l
                    %n % 3-7                                                                            FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems l
CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM I
FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES l
DOC                                                                                                                    l EQ      _SEE                                              DISCUSSIOE                                                  l In the STS, mispositioned containment purge supply and exhaust valves are considered inoperable containment isolation valves. Condition A of the l                                            STS also requires the affected penetration to be isolated in 4 hours. In addition, Condition A of the STS requires that the isolation of the affected penetration be verifi,ed periodically. The requirement to verify the penetration status periodically while Condition A remains applicable is an additional restriction not present in the CTS. The additional CTS verification requirement is reasonable to ensure any temporary measures taken to isolate the affected penetration are maintained until the inoperable isolation valve is returned to operable status. However, the additional STS actions are considered a more restrictive change.
Sa        L              The CTS 3/4.6.1.7," Containment Ventilation System," actions are revised by the addition of Condition B consistent with the STS. The STS provides an additional Condition, not previously addressed by the CTS, for inoperable Containment Isolation Valves.
Condition B of the STS addresses the situation where two Containment isolation valves on the same penetration flowpath are inoperable. In this Condition the STS provides an appropriately short Completion Time of one hour to isolate the penetration. The penetration must be isolated in a similar manner as a penetration with one inoperable isolation valve. The Completion Time for the isolation action requirement of Condition B is the same as that for an inoperable containment in STS LCO 3.6.1. Therefore, the remedial measure provided by the new STS Action is acceptable for the Condition of two inoperable isolation valves in the same penetration flowpath and provides adequate assurance that the containment boundary is maintained intact.
5b        L              CTS 3/4.6.1.7.b states that the 8-inch containment mini-purge supply and exhaust isolation valves may be open for safety-related reasons. CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Action Statement a addresses a mispositioned 48 inch purge supply or exhaust isolation valve and requires isolation of the affected                      !
penetration within 4 hours. If a mini-purge valve is open for other than safety reasons, CTS 3/4.6.1.7 does not specify an ACTION, therefore CTS 3.0.3 would be entered. Entry into LCO 3.0.3 would be reportable under 10 CFR 50.73. In the STS, the valve would be declared inoperable and Condition A would be applied. Therefore, with respect to the mini-purge Chapter 3.6                                            E2-4-G                              November,1998
 
g 3' '                                                                          FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Sptems  l CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC NQ      fiUE                                    DISCUSSION valves, STS LCO 3.6.3 Condition A is a less restrictive change.
6        L    The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Action Statement b is revised consistent with the STS.
The CTS Action Statement b addresses the leakage rate for the containment      i purge supply and exhaust penetrations exceeding the limit. This CTS action l
requires that the leakage be reduced in 12 hours or the affected penetration    l must be isolated to reduce the leakage. This CTS action is replaced with STS LCO 3.6.3 Condition D which also addresses containment purge supply and exhaust penetrations exceeding the leakage rate limit. The STS      ,
actions of this Condition allow 24 hours to reduce the leakage or isolate the  I affected penetration and verify leakage within limits. Although the action      l to reduce the leakage to within limits is not explicitly stated in the STS actions, restoration of systems or parameters to within the LCO                l requirements is always an option in the STS. The additional 12 hours allowed by the STS provides a more reasonable total time (24 hours) to affect repairs on the leaking purge supply and exhaust isolation valves. The additional time is a sufficient restriction, given the low likelihood of an      i event occurring during this time that would challenge the containment boundary, the STS actions that specifically require additional leakage testing of the valves used to isolate the affected penetration, and the fact that the actions of STS LCO 3.6.1, " Containment", ultimately become applicable ifleakage from a purge supply and exhaust penetration results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria (1.0 L.).
The actions of LCO 3.6.1 provide an appropriately conservative I hour completion time to restore leakage to within the overall containment limit assumed in the safety analysis. Purge supply and exhaust penetration leakage may cause the combined type B and C leakage to exceed the 0.6 L.
limit but total containment leakage may still be below the overall containment leakage rate limit of 1.0 L. and therefore be within the assumptions of the applicable safety analysis.
l 7          A  The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Action Statement b.1 is deleted consistent with the STS.
This CTS action statement requires that the containment purge supply and          !
exhaust penetration leakage be restored to within the limit. In the STS, it is implicit in all actions that restoration to meet the requirements of the LCO      i is an always an option and therefore, STS actions typically do not explicitly require restoration to meet the LCO requirements. As such, the deletion of this explicit CTS restoration action is considered an administrative change Chapter 3.6                                  E2-5-G                              November,1998
 
m . . _ . __                _    _          _-        . .    ._          _ _ _            _ _ .      _._ _- _
FNP TS Conversion PE 36 M                                                    Enclosure 3 - Significant Hazards Evaluations Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems III. SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIONS                                          l CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES                                          I fh:L
: 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change involves upgrading the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to            j more closely agree with the STS and do'es not result in any hardware changes. The proposed change revises the TS actions with regard to an inoperable mini-purge containment isolation valve. The containment isolation valves are not assumed to be an initiator of any analyzed event. The isolation    ,
valves act to isolate the containment penetrations in the event of a design basis accident and serve to  l limit the consequences of accidents. The proposed change continues to ensure the isolation function of the inoperable valves is accomplished to limit the consequences of design basis events as described in the FSAR and that the results of the analyses in the FSAR remain bounding.
Additionally, the proposed change does not impose any new safety analyses limits or alter the plants    1 ability to detect and mitigate events. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in I l
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
: 2.      Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change involves upgrading the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to more closely agree with the STS and does not necessitate a physical alteration of the plant (no new or
;                different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in parameters governing normal plant operation. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
: 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The proposed change, which upgrades the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to be consistent with the STS does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change has been developed considering the importance of the containment isolation valves in limiting the consequences of a design basis event and the STS requirement to isolate a penetration with one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure when the required isolation valve is inoperable. The proposed change introduces a Condition not specifically addressed in the CTS and provides adequate remedial measures for that Condition which effectively provides the same level of assurance that the containment isolation function is maintained as provided by the CTS. Therefore, any reduction in the margin of safety is insir;.iificant.
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i j        Chapter 3.6                                              E3-3-C                          November,1998 l
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Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-8 1
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CHAPTER 3.6 M r 7,(,.3-7 INSERT U NEW CONDITION B FOR CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM CTS 3/4.6.1.7 PAGE 3/4 6-10 CONDITION                                            REQUIRED ACTION                              COMPLETION TIME B. ---------NOTE                                      B.1 Isolate the affected penetranon                    Ihour Only applicable to                                      flow path by use of at least one penetration flow paths                                  closed and de-activated automatic with two containment                                    valve, closed manual valve, or isolation valves.                                      blind flange.
One or more penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves inoperable except for purge valve l penetrationleakagenot within limit.
Chapter 3.6 Insert Page
 
fe r. 3./,,3 - g                                CHAPTER 3.6                                        !
INSERT E TO CTS PAGE 3/4 6-10 REVSED ACTIONS FOR CONTAINMENT PURGE / EXHAUST VALVES STS LCO 3.6.3 CONDITION A CONDITION                                                                COMPLETION TIME l                                                  REQUIRED ACTION 1
A.  ---------NOTE---------          A.1      Isolate the affected                  4 hours Only applicable to                        penetration flow path penetration flow paths                    by use of at least with two containment                      one closed and isolation valves.                        .de-activated
          -------------            ---              automatic valve, closed manual valve, One or more                                blind flange, or penetration flow paths                    check valve with flow with one containment                      through the valve isolation val                              secured.
inoperable        ept forf purge val _v Jr shielg A!!Q D_uildino bVoan eakage not within W 4*g. imi A.2      --------NOTE---------
Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by                                          1 use of administrative                                        J means.
Verify the affected                  Once per 31 days penetration flow path                for isolation is isolated,                          devices outside containment 8!!Q Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed          l within the            1 previous 92 days      !
for isolation devices inside        i containment Chapter 3.6 Insert Page
 
W 3,6 3,.7                                  CHAPTER 3.6 1
INSERT F                                                      l TO CTS PAGE 3/4 6-10/10a REVSED ACTIONS FOR CONTAINMENT PURGE / EXHAUST VALVE LEAKAGE FNP ITS LCO 3.6.3 CONDITION D
                                                      .1      Isolate the affected                  24 hours
            /.Oneormore                                      penetration flow path D penetration flow                                                                                                :
pathsfun one o                            by            f at least                                          :
ntatnment                      one        losed and 4oc        purge vahes o                              de-activated ithin purge valve                      automatic valve, leakage limit .                            closed manual v                    e, or blind flange
                , w;th penelmMn (gotc        Sv0 YW 5#                #
                                                      .2    --------NOTE---------
leak $e b ^d                                Isolation devices in high radiation areas                                            l
                  , be B eA c fe36                          may be verified by                                                1 is e d- W O a'. g'    4                    use of administrative                                            i I
means.
                                                                                                                                \
Verify the affected                    Once per penetration flow path                  31 days for is isolated.                            Isolation devices outside containment Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment bB 5    a
                                                    .3      Perform SR 3.6.3.1                    \0nce per for the resilient                      (92 days seal purge valves closed to comply with RequiredActionf.1.
D Chapter 3.6 Insert Page
 
pn y,3,.9                                    CHAPTER 3.6 INSERT F TO CTS PAGE 3/4 6-10/10a REVSED ACTIONS FOR CONTAINMENT PURGE / EXHAUST VALVE LEAKAGE                                  ,
FNP ITS LCO 3.6.3 CONDITION D g.Oneormore                      .1        Isolate the affected                  24 hours D penetration flow                          penetration flow path                                  .
pathsfim one                          by u            f at least                            ,
pp -                        ntainment                    one        losed and pura_e valves o                      de-activated
                    ,$iithin purge valve                    automatic valve,                                        i Jeakage limit .                        closed manual va            e,                          i
                                                          , _ or blind flange                                        ,
                    , uA peneMa,n                                                                                    l E
tg SvE M                    D w ak ^'g                    f.2          --------NOTE---------
18*ky                                  Isolation devices in high radiation areas E B eA c Mb
                                  .                          may be verified by I's cal- WOm. O'.b                  use of administrative means.
Verify the affected                    Once per penetration flow path                  31 days for as isolated.                          1 solation devices outside containment AliQ Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment
                                                $ liq g.3          Perform SR 3.6.3.                      Once per for the resilient                    q92 days seal purge valves with closedtocomply/.1.
Required Action D
Chapter 3.6 Ins rt Page I
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98                                  _                      w 2.e.2 4 Although STS LCO 3.6.3," Containment Isolation Valves", contains the requirements for t 8-      purge supply and exhaust isolation valves, the markup of CTS 3/4.6.3," Containment Isolation not include the requirements associated with the containment purge supply and exhaust isolat He TS requirements for the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are co 3/4.6.1.7," Containment Ventilation System", and a!! changes to those requirements are add markups and DOCS associated with that CTS. In the S13, CTS 3/4.6.1.7 and CTS 3/4.
into one STS LCO 3.6.3 for all containment isolation valves.
: 3. [4    CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS L.
* 3, [0,3            h CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 2      3          LIMITING CCNDITIONJCR OPERATION                                                            !
L      A                          --^
LB
        . _ _'~'          LC O 3.6.3 WN                                                &5 INSER.T H he containment isolation valve pecified in Table 3.6-D sha11 be OPERABLt with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6 _l) gg M M ST.s ocr/0N APPLICAstLITY: HOCES 1 1 2, 3 and 4 N            fp          -
FES                                                                        --
we        o t-  g TION:                                          -6        $              7-COUD61DM b+ With one or more {f totTisolation valv                        Fecified in Tabl= i s-D inoperable,    toi Win U* d' InsedTI Cor)DMcQ4                              Rubre the imperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours NcTE'            3A (a.        ''          "
Clo S@'
Isol e eac a ected penetration within 4 hours b                                  g se of at least 1 JN$pg7 $7                              one    eactivated autocatic valve 6ecured in tne isotation position] y I
8'1          $.l 4 c,heckva.1VC 7                      Isolate each afrected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least      g4 f/c,u.,
one closed sanual valve or blind flange; or s g              g d [ SHUTDCW  8e in at least HOT STANCBY within the ne.xt 6 hours and in COLD within the following 30 hours.                            vo IV SC04
                                                                                                                      ^
0                  9 C.DrdiSn E DI      N                                                                                            [,
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS BM Pod m al m lo 4.6.3.1      The isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or}
i L              replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control yT'g (or tionpower time circuit by performance of a cycling test, and verification of isola J FARLEY-UNIT 1                            3/4 6 14                AMENOMENT N0, 26 I
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CHAPTER 3.6
                                                                                                ]j~
ME 343.-p INSERT K NEW STS CONDITIONS B AND C FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES CTS 3/4.6.2.3 PAGE 3/4 6-14 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION                      REQUIRED ACTION            COMPLETION TIME B.    ---------NOTE---------        8.1      Isolate the affected    I hour Only applicable to                      penetration flow path penetration flow paths                                                                  j by use of at least with two containment                    one closed and I
isolation valves.                      de-activated                                      ;
automatic valve.                                !
closed manual valve,                              '
One or more                            or blind flange.
penetration flow paths with two containment isolation val inoperable        xcept for  ,q,_,,,
purge valvej r sniei EgQ%        uiaaina nynast reakage not within limi Y
C.    ---------NOTE---------          C.1      Isolate the affected          hours only applicable to                      penetration flow path penetration flow paths with only one by use of at least                71 ~ TsTF-30    1 one closed and                                    '
containment isolation                    de-activated valve and a closed                      automatic valve, system.
closed manual valve.                            -
or blind flange.
One or more                      63Q penetration flow paths with one containment            C.2    --------NOTE-        ----
1 isolation valve                          Isolation devices in inoperable.                              high radiation areas                              j may be verified by use of administrative means.
Verify the affected        Once per.31 days penetration flow path is isolated.
Chapter 3.6 Insert Page
 
FNP TS Conversion gg                                          Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC hLQ  S.HE                                      DISCUSSION Therefore, the term flow path is also used to encompa:s all types of isolation valve / penetration variations. In addition, the action is revised to clarify that it only applies when a single isolation valve in a penetration flow path is inoperable. Therefore, the CTS requirement to maintain an operable isolation valve in each affected penetration is no longer necessary (the STS Condition only applies for one inoperable isolation valve) and has been deleted consistent with the STS. A statement is also added to the CTS action to exempt purge valve penetration leakage. The STS contains a            l separate Condition to address the leakage of the purge supply and exhaust valve penetrations. Note that changes affecting the purge supply and            l exhaust valve TS requirements are documented in CTS 3/4.6.1.7,
                      " Containment Ventilation System". Therefore, changes made to the CTS action statement are required to conform with the presentation and format of this information in the STS and are considered administrative.
5    A      The CTS 3/4.6.3 action statement is revised by the addition of a note consistent with the STS. This CTS action statement becomes Condition A in the STS and is modified by a Note which clarifies that the Condition is only applicable to penetration flowpaths with two isolation valves. In the STS separate Conditions are provided for penetration flowpaths with one and two isolation valves. Notes are used in the STS to distinguish these inoperable isolation valve Conditions. The addition of the new STS Condition for penetration flowpaths with a single isolation valve is addressed elsewhere. As the addition of this note is required to conform to the STS format and presentation of Actions Conditions for Containment l                    Isolation Valves, it is considered an administrative change.
l        6    A      The CTS 3/4.6.3 action statements are revised by the deletion of action
!                    statement "a" consistent with the STS. CTS action statement "a" required restoration of the inoperable valve (s) within 4 hours. In the STS, the action to restore a system or component to operable status is always considered an option and is not typi: ally stated as an action requirement in the STS. As such, the deletion of this CTS action is made to conform with the conventions used in the STS for actions and is considered an administrative change.
7    A      The CTS 3/4.6.3 action statements are revised by the addition of STS required action A.2. STS required action A.2 verifies the status of a Chapter 3.6                                      E2-3-J                              November,1998
 
15th                                                    ,
ContainmentIsolationValvesMtmospheric,            ~
E 3 08'-3                          Qubatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual 3.6.
3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3        ContainmentunlationValveskAtmospheric,Subatmospheric, Ice (Condenser, and Dual) _
LC0 3.6.3                    Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:                MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS 43
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                      =--------=--------- ------NOTES -- ------------------------- ---
: 1.      Penetration flow path (s) .except for              j inch purge valve flow path        may be unisolated intermittently under adm istrative controls.
: 2.      Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.
: 3.      Enter applicable Ceaditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by conteinment isolation valves.
: 4.      Enter applicable Londitions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, "Containmer.t," when isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.
--------= == - -------------------------------------------------------_ -----
CONDITION                        REQUIRED ACTION              COMPLETION TIME A.      ---------NOTE---------          A.1      Isolate the affected      4 hours Only applicable to                        penetration flow path penetration flow paths                    by use of at least with two containment                      one closed and isolation valves.                        de-activated
          ----------------------                    automatic valve, closed manual valve, One or more                              blind flange, or penetration flow paths                  check valve with flow with one containment                      through the valve isolation valv                          secured.
inoperable exce)t_ forf purge valvej r s dela MQ J uisainq oypass leakage not within 5
          'if p n,QK                                                                              (continued) w-WOG STS                                            3.6-8                          Rev I, 04/07/95
 
155 Containmant Isolation ValvesfAtmospheric, g 34,7,3                        (Subatmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual) 3.5.3 ACTIONS CONDITION              REQUIRED ACTION          COMPLETION TIME A.                    (continued)              A.2    --------NOTE---------
Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
Verify the affected    Once per 31 days penetration flow path  for isolation is isolated.          devices outside containment 8!!Q Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment B.                    ---------NOTE---------    B.1    Isolate the affected  I hour only applicable to              penetration flow path penetration flow paths          by use of at least with two containment            one closed and isolation valves.              de-activated
                        ----------------------          automatic valve, closed manual valve, One or more                    or blind flange.
penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valv#
inoperable 7xce)t for    a3 purge valve j r s11elo]
muisoing Dypass y i    leakage not within li (continued)
WOG STS                                              3.6-9                      Rev 1, 04/07/95
 
ISS Containment Isolation Valves fAtmosphericl, L j2E 3,6 g ,.9                    6ubatmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual_))
                                                                                        .$.O.3 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION                REQUIRED ACTION            COMPLETION TIME C.    ---------NOTE---------      C.1    Isolate the affected          ours Only applicable to                  penetration flow path    p penetration flow paths with only one by use of at least one closed and 7p      75TF-30 containment isolation              de-activated valve and a closed                  automatic valve, system.                            closed manual valve,
              --= = =        ----------
or blind flange.
One or more                MQ penetration flow paths with one containment        C.2    --------NOTE---------
isolation valve                    Isolation devices in inoperable.                        high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
Verify the affected      Once per 31 days penetration flow path is isolated.
NA TD FN P Conbonchtg-D. Shield building                      Restore le                4 hours leakage not within                        ,        imit.
limit.                                            N m.
E. One or more f cas penetration,,fl ow o
                                        /.1    Isolate the affected penetra ion flow path 24 hours
                                                                                        +
pathsfitith one d                  by u          of at least (noreftontainment                  one        losed and purge valves o                    de-activated Bitnin purge valve                  automatic valve, teakagelimits1._                    closed manual valve, fgg,m                            or blind flangej).
Why. hk M                AND                          /0 L
We sum # fhe                                          (                    l
                )eah e 4 ,M                                                    (continued) 1 Ty* B =A t,4eb (
b                                                  ,
WOG STS                                  3.6-10                        Rev 1, 04/07/95
 
  + e  ._    n              .n_  w a. u.  .au,- -w.u....n.                a s.v .-.u .s_n,+  n.sa.    ., w ~ ,    a-.      n. s    ..--a,-    a-.u.-  - ~. .__ na m e n Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric, Qubatmospheric, Ice tonaenser, and 1
ACTIONS, k CONDITION                                                                  REQUIRED ACTION                                  COMPLETION TIME
                                                                                                                                                                                  )
g/      o.                                                            D                                                                                    '
E.  '(continued)                                                      2        --------NOTE---------                                                  \ !
Isolation devices in                                                    i high radiation areas                                                    !
may be verified by use of administrative                                                    l means.
Verify the affected                          Once per                  i penetration flow path                        31 days for                i is isolated.                                  isolation                  !
devices outside containment E
Prior to                    '
entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed
                                                                                                          ,                                            within the                i 9                                            previous                  j 92 days for
                                                                                                                              #                        isolation devices inside i
                                                                                                                      /                                containment M
Perform,SR 3.6.3.                                nce per p            for thewesilient                            y92 days
.                                                                                                        seal purge valve closed to compi                        ith Required Action                  . 1.
p                                    _
equired Action and                                                      Be in MODE 3.                                6 hours associated Completion Time not met.                                                    M                                                                                    4 Be in MODE 5.                                36 hours E
nl0G STS                                                                            3.6-11                                              Rev 1, 04/07/95
 
Containment Isolation Valves f(AtmosphericT, g y,g                                      (5ubatmospheric. Ice condenser and Dual))
3.b.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE                                              FREQUENCY
(__
SR 3.6.3 #          Perform leakage rate testing for                              184 days        \
containment purge valves with resilient
,                                              seal s.                                                      AND i
C +"1.,in w n F          t in pene4e.Aive cama $
j s
after opening 5                                                  the valve D
                        ~
g,                                                                    [                            !
SR 3.6.3.#            Verify each automatic containment isolation                  618 months                  )
:                                            valve that is not locked, sealed or                                                        j otherwise secured in position, actuates to                                                i the isolation position on an actual or                                                      '
1 simulated actuation signal.                                                                !
l SR 3.6.3.          Cycle each weight or spring loaded check                                nths va        at testable during operation                                                      l through        omplete cycle of ful                  vel,                                '
  ,                                          and verify eac            ck valve            ins closed when the differentia                ssure in the                                            {
direction of f            s s [1.            id and opens                                  I erential pressure in when the d        ion of flow is 2 [1.2] psid and
                                              < [5.0] psid.
For 5defrnowhenc.Conbnrnent SR 3.6.3.10          Ver                    inch containmen                        [18] months                  !
valve is blocked                    -
he valve from openin              .
N/A FNP (continued) 4 WOG STS                                                3.6-14                            Rev 1, 04/07/95
 
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 5 - JD from STS
{2A C 3.fo. 3 - 7                                                                        Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems STS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES JD NUMBER                                                                              JUSTIFICATION 1            Not used.
2              The STS 3.6.3 surveillance 3.6.3.2 has been deleted consistent with FNP CTS requirements. FNP CTS allow for continuous operation of the mini-purge system for safety related reasons. The FSAR states that the mini-purge system operates during power operation to continuously purge the containment atmosphere. The STS Bases discussion for SR 3.6.3.2 states that the mini-purge valves are required to be closed. This is in direct conflict with the FNP current licensing basis and has been deleted consistent with FNP current licensing basis.
3            The STS 3.6.3 surveillance 3.6.3.4 is revised by the addition of Note 2 consistent with the CTS allowance for the blind flange installed on the fuel transfer canal flange. The allowance provided in this Note to the STS surveillance corresponds to the
* footnote to 4.6.1.1 in CTS 3/4.6.1 Containment Integrity. The allowance to verify the position of this blind flange only after each draining of the fuel transfer canal is justified since misposition of this flange at other times during normal operation is highly unlikely.
4              The STS 3.6.3 surveillance 3.6.3.5 (ITS 3.6.3.4) has been revistd consistent with FNP CTS requirements. FNP CTS 4.6.3.3 requires that the isolation time of pch power operated or automatic valve of Table 3.6-1 be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. The IST Program contains the testing requirements for the valves listed in Table 3.6-1. Therefore, STS 3.6.3 surveillance 3.6.3.5 (ITS 3.6.3.4) has been revised consistent with the deletion of Specification 4.0.5 in the STS and the FNP current licensing basis as stated in CTS 4.6.3.3.
5            The STS 3.6.3 Conditions A, B, and E (ITS Condition D) and SR 3.6.3.7 (ITS SR 3.6.3.5) have been revised consistent with FNP CTS requirements. The FNP CTS leakage limit for containment purge valves with resilient seals is based on a total penetration leakage rate, and is related to the total leakage from all Type B and C tests as opposed to an individual valve leakage rate as indicated in the STS. The above sections of STS 3.6.3 have been revised to reflect this difference and to maintain the FNP current licensing basis for these penetrations.
Chapter 3.6                                                                    ES-1-C                            November,1998
 
h                                                _o ,
Containment Isolation Valves [(Atmospheric},
iubatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual))
MT- 3M34                                                                                                8 3.6.3 BASES (continued)
                                                                                                                            ~
ACTIONS                                                                    The ACTIONS are modif ed by a Note allowing penetration flow paths, except for 4              inch purge valve penetration flow paths, to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for containment isolation is indicated. Due to the size of the containment purge line penetration and the fact that those penetrations exhaust directly from the containment atmosphere to the environment, the penetration flow path containing these valves may not be opened unjer administrative controls. A single purge valve in a penetration flow path may be opened to effect repairs to an inoperable valve, as allowed by SR 3.6.3.1.
A second Note has been added to provide clarification that,
            ,                          ,                                        ,c  for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each
      ,                                                                                penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable containment I
isolation valve. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable containment isolation valves are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Pequired Actions.
                                                                                    'The ACTIONS are further modified by a third Note, which
.                                                                                    ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected systems are rendered inoperable by an inoperable containment is ti  val      g                  i f f La hmy.be In the event the tur locl0 leakage results tw exceeding the overall containment leakage rate, Note 4 directs entry into                      l the applicable Conditions ud Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1.
i A.1 and A.2 In the event one contairy              t isolation alve in one o more penetration flow pathsAs. inoperable except for pur e valve f6b                                                          r shield building Dypass) leakage not within limi , the affected penetrau on riow path must be isolated.                he method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation dgW, barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active (continued)
WOG STS                                                                                            B 3.6-33                          Rev 1, 04/07/95      j
 
a46                                                    s-ContainmentIsolationValvesf(Atmospheric,X gubatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual _))
D ~L6&S                                                                                  5 3.6.3 BASES ACTIONS                  - QJ                              NA To FNP C,onhioment                                    '
(continued)
Wit    e shield building bypass leakage rate not wit limit,                    assumptions of the safety analyses ar at met.
Therefore,                  e leakage must be restored to wi            n limit within 4 hours. Restoration can be accom shed by isolating the pen ation(s) that caus                            he limit to be L                exceeded by use of on                    losed and d      ctivated automatic valve, closed manual va                      or      nd flange. When a penetration is isolated the                        age rate for the isolated penetration is assumed t                    et      ctual pathway leakage through the isolation vice. If                              isolation devices are used to isolate t                      enetration, the          age ratc is assumed to be the less actual pathway leakage o he two devices.
The 4 hour                    pletion Time is reasonable cons ring the time re red to restore the leakage by isolatin he pene    tion (s) and the relative importance of secon ainment bypass leaka e to t                        ve al          inmen      N function.                                  g wa-a pens .b\                    e
                            /-  _
N                                        ScbM -h sm .4 e \
roQaw & oA) rg 6 ad C % h_      -
          .5c1rdkd- W                I l , .2. and .3 41 pp.s                                            M"$*i[~ _                    -
Intheeventone'ormo7eFcontal                          ent purge valves /n on ci b
Vm e h not d Oh)    1        ore penetrau o1 tlow oarns ars ot withinEthe nurap va l vs-keakageflimits, purge valve' eakage niust be restored @
p' exueded          -    %ithin limitF, or the affec                          penetration flow path must be :    s isolated. The method of isolation must be by the use of at                                        '
least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely.
Og-            affected by a single active fail fur . Isolation barrier that n.e                          iterion are a lyclosed and de-activated [s automatic valve,                          manual valve, or blind flanger. A surge valve wit                      silien    als utilized to satisfy
                              -      Required Acti                      1 must have    sn                      J    the p ['          1eakage requirements of SR 3.6.3Q7.)                      The specifieddemonstrated tohnee Completion Time is reasonable, considering that one                              i containment purge valve remains closed 10 that a gruss breach of containment does not exist.
InaccordancewithRequiredActionf.2,thispenetration flow path must be verified to be isolated on a perio:lic basis. The periodic verification is necessary to en ure that containment penetrations required to be isolate following an accident, which are no longer capable o being _
SW % f (continued)
WOG STS                                                        B 3.6-37                          Rev 1, 04/07/95
 
Containment Isolation Valves f(AtmosphericT ,
Qbatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual)J W 34' M                                                              B 3.0.3 BASES                                  O N N
                                                .1./.2.andI.3    (continued)
ACTIONS
                                                            !  I automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position j      should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those isolation devices outside containment capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. For the isolation devices inside containment, the time period specified as " prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not              f performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other administrative controls that will ensure that iso tion device misalignment is an unlikely possibility. p                5
                                        ~
C#@M#                For the& containment purge valve with re 1e r e that
[@                isolated in accordance with Required A< i ( 1, R 3.6.3 mustbeperformedatleastonceevery/ 2 days This A                assures that degradation of the resilient seal s detected              f and confirms that the leakage rate of the cont inment purge valv#rdoes not increase during the time the p 'rttion is
                                    #      isolated. The normal Frequency for SR 3.6.3          184 days, is f                based on an NRC d'ninauve. hanet ic issue 5-ZU (Ref. 3)R Since more relianc is placed on a single valve while Tn this Condition, it is prudent to perform the SR more often.
t Therefore, a Freqt ncy of once per            days was chosen and has been shown to be acceptable ' sed on operating experience.
qwkn4O. g f.1 and Y.2              - ~
W If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
(continued) 1 WOG STS                                        B 3.6-38                    Rev 1, 04/07/95 l
 
Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-9 I
l l
I l
 
FNP TS Conversion g pq                                                Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC NO        SHE                                    DISCUSSION barrier that can not be adversely affected by a single active failure".
Therefore, the use of a check valve with the flow through the valve secured is an acceptable altemative action to isolate a containment penetration.
10        L  The CTS 3/4.6.3," Containment Isolation Valves", actions are revised by the addition of two Actions Conditions consistent with the STS. The STS provides two additional Conditions, not previously addressed by the CTS, for inoperable Containment Isolation Valves.
Condition B of the STS addresses the situation where two Containment isolation valves on the same penetration flowpath are inoperable. Since there are no actions for the condition addressed by STS Condition B in the CTS, CTS 3.0.3 would require placing the unit in MODE 5. If, under CTS 3/4.6.3, the system was restored such that it met the LCO requirements, i
3.0.3 could be exited prior to completing the unit shutdown. However, entry into LCO 3.0.3 would be reportable under 10 CFR 50.73. In Condition B, the STS provides an appropriately short Completion Time of one hour to isolate the penetration. The penetration must be isolated in a similar manner as a penetration with one inoperable isolation valve. The        !
Completion Time for the isolation action requirement of Condition B is the i                same as that for an inoperable containment in STS LCO 3.6.1. Therefore,          I l                the remedial measure provided by the new STS Action is acceptable for the        ,
l                Condition of two inoperable isolation valves in the same penetration flowpath and provides adequate assurance that the containment boundary is maintained intact.                                                              l Condition C of the STS addresses the situation where a single isolation valve in a penetration flowpath is inoperable and that penetration flowpath has only one isolation valve with a closed system functioning as the second isolation barrier. In this situation, the STS provides for a longer Completion Time (72 hours) to isolate the penetration. The penetration is l                still required to be isolated in a manner similar to that required by Condition B of the STS, however, due to the closed system isolation barrier used in such a penetration, a longer Completion Time is justified. Closed systems are passive isolation barriers not subject to the same single active failures of typical automatic isolation valves and are subject to 10 CFR50 Appendix J,
,                Type A leak tests. In addition, closed systems are typically pressurized which ensures leakage is into containment and detectable. As such, a Chapter 3.6                                E2-5-J                              November,1998
 
FNP TS Conversion pan '3(o,3-9                                    Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems 1
l CTS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES                                        1 DOC NO        SHE                                  DISCUSSION                                      l longer Completion Time to isolate this type of penetration is acceptable and will continue to provide adequate assurance that the containment boundary is maintained.                                                                    I 11      LA  CTS 3/4.6.2.3 surveillance 4.6.3.1 is removed from the TS consistent with the STS. CTS surveillance 4.6.3.1 requires testing be performed on containment isolation valves prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement of the valve, actuator, or control power circuit. In the STS, post maintenance test requirements are not specified.
The STS considers post maintenance testing to be an inherent requirement of the defmition of operability and the operability requirements stated for each system or component in its associated LCO. It is inherent in the TS requirements that equipment or systems declared operable must, as a minimum, meet the requirements of any applicable surveillance tests. As            q such, the post maintenance test requirements in the CTS are moved into the        '
TRM. The removal of these specific test requirements from the CTS is l                    acceptable based on the inherent operability requirements for equipment i
and systems controlled by the TS definition of operability and the                ;
operability requirements of the associated LCO that is required to be met.        l In addition, the removal of these requirements from the CTS to TRM is              !
acceptable since changes to the requirements in the TRM will be controlled in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process.                                      )
12        L  CTS 3/4.6.3 surveillance 4.6.3.2 is revised consistent with the STS. The STS contains an exception to the CTS requirement to demonstrate that each containment isolation valve actuates to its isolation position upon receipt of a containment isolation signal. The STS provides an exception for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required safety position.
,                      The exception provided by the STS is acceptable because the required
'                    safety function of such valves is accomplished when the valves are secured in the required position. Therefore, additional testing of the actuation capability of these valves is not required.
,      13      LA  CTS 3/4.6.3 surveillance 4.6.3.2 is revised consistent with the STS.
Surveillance test details are removed to the bases consistent with the level of detail contained in the STS. The CTS requirement that the surveillance be performed during Cold Shutdown or refueling is an expansion of the information already included in the STS bases (i.e., outage) and therefore Chapter 3.6                                E2-6-J                                    March,1998
 
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N '3,(o.3-lO                                                                                            l IB
                                @ ],(p,3 {pnhnmCn                            5be TSo ATioN VAIVE*S 3 ,[o CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS                                                                      -
3, g,3 CONTA!NMENT fvENTILATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION n                            ,                                      r,                                        --
2 i
3,g,3              .6.1. ' Containment (urge supply and exnaust valve] shall be OPERABLE                  and            b The 48-inch containment eurce suoply and exhaust isolation alves _D.
683.lo.3. l b                      QCBV-HV-3198A. 31980, 3196, 3197)]sht11 be (e-activated and secured)in 3                                        sneir ciosco go.iuon.
                                                                          /      Q BASES h,,g                        (D The 8-inch containment sini-purge r        sup' ply and exhaust isolation valves (cav-Hv zss6c. 28660, iss7c. zus7a_))may be open for safety-related                      6 reasons,                                                                                c t,,,9 g gg g g LR                '
ggy                              4b DMT6                      -APPLICABILITY: N00ES 1, 2, 3 and a m ggg g                          A ST5 Lt O 3 (, 2 ACTION:
                                    -                              P'
(        __,
p*        {q          t one 8
                                                , ge      au cn cent nmen pur supply isolat n va eo n or not one
                                                                                                -act incn cont nment [
cur in        e close posi on _ ,e open va e(s)        ,ted,  de-ae frateap1 isolete
                                $ 7      L ene att . within our h urs ride ist at least MUI STANDBY witnin the gg,3 m          M        Te~xt 6 hours ano in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.                        ~
bdtNOS i C O 2.$. 3                        with the leat e rate fo tne containment _ purse suppirlot.e5 aust
* gg                            p enet ratio xceedj.Q e limit (Lf Spect 'ication s.6_11                                    -
E.6.1.7.3 3 wi tninQ1 tours eitner:
                                              . Reduce the leakage' to witnfn the Jimit4 o T Nj E/(T f                            .
solate the containment purge supply or both supply ,and e            t
      @ 34,3                                      pe        tons as required to reduce the leakage rate            the containme.      mosphere to the outside atmospher o within the ACTIONS                                      limit of Speci        en 4.6.1.7.2 by the se Tf at least:
D,lj D.7j                                                    ~
a) One OPERABLE de-activate,        nch inside containment purge
          -~
supply or Doth supgly-aiId exhav        olation vahes secured in A
the closed polittbn or secured by use          blind flange, and one
                                  /                  OPERABL    edctivated 8-inch inside contairvn        crge supply or g                                  b      upply and exhaust isolation valves secured              closed sition or secured by use of a blind flange, or
                          'Inis specification is governing for the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation penetration leakage and 48-inch isolation valve position, w SEAT v                                                                                                6 pg3 l-C.O 3,(p. 3 9
cowme4 6                                                                                      LA l
FARLEY-UNIT 1                                    3/4 6-10                                                    -
AMENDMfNT NO. ;;, 74 l
5- L.                                                                                                                                !
l
 
                  -            . . _ _ _ . . . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . . . ~ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _
D %34 o            t CHAPTER 3.6 INSERT U                                                              ;
NEW CONDITION B FOR CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM                                                          i CTS 3/4.6.1.7 PAGE 3/4 6-10                                                        l CONDITION                              REQUIRED ACTION                                  COMPLETION TIME        i i
B.            NOTE        ----
B.1 Isolate the affected penetration                          1 hour Only applicable to                      flow path by use of at least one                                              ;
penetration flow paths                  closed and de-activated automatic                                            ;
with two containment                    valve, closed manual valve, or                                                ,
isolation valves.                      blind flange.                                                                )
              .                                                                                                                    1 1
One or more penetration                                                                                              l
            . flow paths with two                                                                                                  i' containment isolation valves inoperable except for purge valve penetration leakage not                                                                                                i within limit.
Chapter 3.6 Insert Page 1
                                                                                                                            .p.. ~l
 
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FNP TS Conversion g                                                Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC blQ      SHE                                  DISCUSSION                                    l In the STS, mispositioned containment purge supply and exhaust valves are considered inoperable containment isolation valves. Condition A of the l
i STS also requires the afTected penetration to be isolated in 4 hours. In      l addition, Condition A of the STS requires that the isolation of the affected  l penetration be verified periodically. The requirement to verify the penetration status periodically while Condition A remains applicable is an additional restriction not present in the CTS. The adaitional CTS verification requirement is reasonable to ensure any temporary measures taken to isolate the affected penetration are maintained until the inoperable  j isolation valve is returned to operable status. However, the additional STS    l actions are considered a more restrictive change.                              l Su        L  The CTS 3/4.6.1.7, " Containment Ventilation System," actions are revised by the addition of Condition B consistent with the STS. The STS provides an additional Condition, not previously addressed by the CTS, for inoperable Containment Isolation Valves.
Condition B of the STS addresses the situation where two Containment isolation valves on the same penetration flowpath are inoperable. In this Condition the STS provides an appropriately short Completion Time of one hour to isolate the penetration. The penetration must be isolated in a similar manner as a penetration with one inoperable isolation valve. The Completion Time for the isolation action requirement of Condition B is the same as that for an inoperable containment in STS LCO 3.6.1. Therefore, the remedial measure provided by the new STS Action is acceptable for the Condition of two inoperable isolation valves in the same penetration          j flowpath and provides adequate assurance that the containment boundary is      ;
maintained intact.
5b        L  CTS 3/4.6.1.7.b states that the 8-inch containment mini-purge supply and exhaust isolation valves may be open for safety-related reasons. CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Action Statement a addresses a mispositioned 48 inch purge supply or exhaust isolation valve and requires isolation of the affected penetration within 4 hours. If a mini-purge valve is open for other than safety reasons, CTS 3/4.6.1.7 does not specify an ACTION, therefore CTS 3.0.3 would be entered. Entry into LCO 3.0.3 would be relortable under 10 CFR 50.73. In the STS, the valve would be declared inoperable and Condition A would be applied. Therefore, with respect to the mini-purge Chapter 3.6                                E2-4-G                              November,1998
 
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 3 - Significant Hazards Evaluations M 3.0 3 - to                                                    Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems              ;
i l
III. SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIONS CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 1a-L
: 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change involves upgrading the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to more closely agree with the STS and does not result in any hardware changes. The proposed change provides an additional Condition that addresses inoperable containment isolation valves. The containment isolation valves are not assumed to be an initiator of any analyzed event. The isolation valves act to isolate the containment penetrations in the event of a design basis accident and serve to limit the consequences of accidents. The proposed change continues to ensure the isolation function of the inoperable valves is accomplished to limit the consequences of design basis events as described in the FSAR and that the results of the analyses in the FSAR remain bounding. The                      ,
proposed change does not allow indefinite continued operation in a condition where a single active                l l                  failure could prevent containment isolation. Additionally, the proposed change does not impose any l                new safety analyses limits or alter the plants ability to detect and mitigate events. Therefore, this
;                change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident                  !
previously evaluated.
: 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
l l                The proposed change involves upgrading the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to
                ~ more closely agree with the STS and does not necessitate a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in parameters governing normal plant operation. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
j
: 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
l                The proposed change, which upgrades the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to be consistent with the STS does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change has been developed considering the importance of the containment isolation valves in limiting the consequences of a design basis event and the STS requirement to isolate a penetration with one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure when the
!                required isolation valve is inoperable. The proposed change introduces a Condition not specifically l                addressed in the CTS and provides adequate remedial measures for that Condition which effectively provides the same level of assurance that the containment isolation function is maintained as provided by the CTS. Therefore, any reduction in the margin of safety is insignificant.
4
.d Chapter 3.6                                          E3-2-C                                November,1998
 
Associated Packase Changes for RAI 3.6.311 1
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FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS M 34 3 'll                                                Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC NQ        SHE                                    DISCUSSION 1        A    The CTS 3/4.6.1.7," Containment Ventilation System"is incorporated into the STS LCO 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves consistent with the STS.
In the STS all containment isolation valve requirements are located in one TS. The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 LCO statement is revised accordingly. As this discussion only addresses the reorganization of the CTS 3/4.6.1.7 TS requirements consistent with the STS format and presentation, the associated change is considered an administrative change.
2        A  The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 LCO and surveillance requirement regarding the 48 inch purge supply and exhaust valves being deactivated and secured in the closed position is revised consistent with the STS. This LCO requirement is incorporated into surveillance requirement SR 3.6.3.1 in the STS Containment Isolation Valve TS which defines the operable status of this valve. In addition, the CTS terms "de-activated and secured" are replaced with the STS term " sealed" in referring to the means by which the valve is maintained closed. The essential requirement for the valve to be maintained closed is not altered. The STS term " sealed"is described in the STS bases for SR 3.6.3.1 and effectively requires the valve to be maintained in a similar condition as the CTS requirement of de-activated and secured.
As the revision of this CTS requirement is made to conform with the format and language of the STS and no significant technical change in the required status of the affected valve is made, this change is considered administrative.
3        LA  The CTS 3/4.6.1.7.b LCO provision regarding the 8 inch mini-purge supply and exhaust isolation valves is removed from the LCO and placed in the bases of the Containment Isolation Valve TS (3.6.3). The removal of this type ofinformation from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. CTS 3.6.1.7.b contains detail which provides an allowance for valve configuration. This is a detail of system operation. Such details are also contained in the FSAR where changes are controlled via the 10 CFR 50.59 process. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for identification of the associated valves is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS. The CTS allowance for these valves to be open for " safety-related" reasons is retained and discussed in the bases for LCO Chapter 3.6                                E2-1-G                              November,1998
 
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Chances to CTS
                                                                                      ~
[htr. 4,6,3-(l Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems l CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC N_Q      SHE                                    DISCUSSION 3.6.3.
4      LA  The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 LCO statements a and b are revised consistent with the STS. The valve numbers for the 48 inch and 8 inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are removed from the LCO and placed in the bases of the Containment Isolation Valve TS (3.6.3). The removal of this type of information from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. The valve numbers listed in CTS 3.6.1.7.a and .b provide plant nomenclature for the valves listed in the LCO statement (Containment purge sugly and exhaust valves). This information is detail provided in the FSAR and on plant drawings. It does not define the requirements of operability for the valves but rather provides additional descriptors of the valves that have already been identified by the statement of the LCO. Therefore, it is also appropriate to move this            i information to the Bases. Reliance on the information contained in the STS      j bases for identification of the associated valves is acceptable since changes  1 to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.
4a        L  The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Actions are modified by the addition of Notes consistent with the STS. The first STS Note provides an allowance to unisolate any penetration flow path (except for the 48 inch purge supply and exhaust valves) intermittently under administrative controls. This allowance applies to penetration flow paths isolated in accordance with the Required Actions of STS 3.6.3. The CTS Table 3.6-1 currently provides a similar allowance for a limited number of valves. The STS note, however, expands the CTS allowance to apply to all Containment Isolation Valves except the 48 inch purge supply and exhaust. The allowance to open intermittently any containment isolation valve, closed as a result of Required Actions, is considered acceptable in the STS based on the requirement for administrative controls (described in the STS bases) that provide for a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. The required administrative controls provide adequate assurance that the affected penetration may be rapidly closed if containment isolation is required. The 48 inch containment purge supply and exhaust valves are excepted from the STS allowance due to the large size and direct path from the containment to the outside atmosphere.
Chapter 3.6                                  E2-2-G                              November,1998
 
Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-13 i
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FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS N 34 3" G                                                  Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC EO      SHE                                    DISCUSSION made to conform with the presentation and format of this information in the STS.
8        M    The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Action Statement b.2 is revised consistent with the STS.
This CTS action requires that the affected containment purge supply and exhaust penetrations be isolated to reduce leakage to within the limit. The    l CTS requirement specifies the possible combinations of valves to be used for isolating the affected penetrations. The CTS action is completely replaced by the STS LCO 3.6.3 Actions D.1, D.2, and D.3 for containment        ;
purge supply and exhaust penetrations exceeding the leakage limit. The STS action D.1 effectively requires the same remedial action (affected penetration be isolated) however the STS only specifies the minimum              !
isolation requirement of at least one closed and deactivated automatic valve, closed manual valve or blind flange. Although more valves may be used to        :
accomplish the isolation requirement, the STS only requires that "at least one" be used. Although the STS action D.1 is written substantially different than the CTS action the basic intent, requirement, and end result are the same. The STS actions D.2 and D.3 add new requirements that are not currently part of the CTS. STS action D.2 requires the affected penetration, isolated by action D.1, be periodically verified isolated. STS action D.3 requires that the resilient seal valves used to isolate the affected i                  penetration in action D.1 be periodically leak tested to verify isolation of the l                  penetration. The addition of STS actions D.2 and D.3 provide reasonable requirements to verify the remedial measures taken in action D.1 to isolate the penetration and reduce leakage remain effective over time. However, the addition of these STS requirements is considered a more restrictive change.
9        LA    The CTS 3/4.6.1.7
* footnote to the LCO statement is removed from the LCO and placed in the bases of the Containment Isolation Valve TS (3.6.3).
The definition of OPERABILITY for the containment purge supply and exhaust valves per the CTS 3.6.1.7 LCO statement is modified by the I
* Footnote (i.e., OPERABILITY with regards to this LCO is defined to include the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation penetration leakage and 48-inch isolation valve position. It does not include individual i
valve leakage requirements or 8-inch minipurge isolation valve position l                  requirements). For a system to be considered c.perable, the definition of I
operability for the system must be satisfied and the associated Surveillance Chapter 3.6                                  E2-6-G                              November,1998 l
 
l FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS W 3' O1.3                                            Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC HQ        SHE                                  DISCUSSION requirements must be met. In the STS, information related to the configuration of a system which relate to meeting the operability requirements of the LCO is moved to the Bases. The removal of this type ofinformation from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for guidance in defining the OPERABILITY of the associated system is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.
10      LA  CTS 3/4.6.1.7 action statement c and CTS surveillance requirement 4.6.1.7.3.b a e removed from the TS consistent with the STS. The CTS          i action st:nement c provides specific actions for the purge supply and        !
exhaust penetration leakage limit verified by CTS surveillance 4.6.1.7.3.b.
CTS survc!!!ance 4.6.1.7.3.b requires verification of purge supply and        l exhaust penetra: ion leakage to be less than or equal to 0.05 L.. The        I conservative CTS leakage limit of 0.05 L. for penetrations with purge supply and exhau.et valves with resilient seals is unrelated to the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix J and is not required to be in the TS by 10CFR50 Appendix J or by 10CFR36. In the STS, the allowable leakage from these penetrations is controlled by the total Type B and C leakage limit (0.6 L.) and ultimately by the overall containment leakage limit (1.0 L. ). Both of these 10CFR50 Appendix J limits are specified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program in the administrative controls section of the TS. As such, the removal of the 0.05 L. limit for penetrations with purge supply and exhaust valves with resilient seals from the CTS is consistent with the requirements contained in the STS and acceptable considering the goveming total Type B and C and overall containment leakage limits which remain in the TS. This leakage limit, associated actions, and surveillance requirements are moved from the CTS to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). Reliance on requirements contained in the TRM is acceptable since changes to the requirements in the TRM will be controlled in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process.
I1        L  The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 surveillance 4.6.1.7.1 which requires the 48 inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves to be deactivated in the closed position is revised consistent with the STS SR 3.6.3.1. An exception to this requirement is added that would allow one valve in a Chapter 3.6                                E2-7-G                              November,1998
 
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FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS FA E 3 4.7 -15                                              Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems 1
CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC NQ          SHE                                      DISCUSSION TS. As such, the essential technical requirements of the information                  ,
removed from the CTS surveillances is retained within the FNP TS. As this              i change does not remove the required leakage limit specified in the TS and              l is made to conform with the format and presentation of this information in            ]
the STS, this change is considered administrative.                                    j 14            A    The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 surveillance requirement 4.6.1.7.3 frequency of" prior to startup after each Cold Shutdown, if not performed in the previous 92 days" is deleted from the TS consistent with the STS. This surveillance frequency is essentially redundant to the general rules of TS (STS section 3.0) which require that surveillances be current when entering the Mode of applicability for a TS. Since the containment isolation valves are required
                        .      operable in Modes 1-4, the required surveillances (unless otherwise specified) must be satisfied and current (have been performed within the surveillance interval) upon entering Mode 4 from Mode 5 (cold shutdown).
The deletion of this specific CTS surveillance frequency is consistent with the STS and the resulting surveillance frequency is effectively the same as the CTS requirement. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.
15          LA    The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 surveillance requirements 4.6.1.7.3 and 4.6.1.7.4 are                ;
revised consistent with the STS. The last paragraph of CTS surveillance 4.6.1.7.3 which requires that containment purge supply and exhaust                      l isolation valve leakage be compared to previous test results and an engineering evaluation performed and CTS surveillance 4.6.1.7.4 which requires the resilient seal material of the containment purge supply and                l i
exhaust isolation valves be replaced every 5 years are removed from the TS consistent with the STS. These CTS requirements are in excess of the STS requirements for these valves. The above requirement to replace the resilient seal material is a preventative maintenance item designed to preclude excessive degradation of the resilient material in the valve seals. It is not part of the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J, Option B testing. It is not used to detennire tne current operability of the valves.10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J, Option B requites that the performance-based program developed to implement Option B include a comparison to previous test results to examine the performance history of the overall containment system to limit leakage. The purpose of the comparison to the previously measured leak rate in CTS 4.6.1.7.4 is to detect excessive valve Chapter 3.6                                      E2-9-G                              November,1998 E
 
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Pva rt 3, (,. 3- 15                                        Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC N_Q      SHE                                      DISCUSSION resilient seal material degradation and to evaluate and take corrective as necessary. This requirement is also a preventative maintenance item designed to identify potential excessive degradation of the resilient material in the valve seals and to address it prior to the degradation affecting the operability of the valve. As such, these CTS surveillance requirements do not demonstrate the operability of the valves nor ensure that the requirements of the LCO are met. Therefore, movement of these requirements to the TRM is acceptable. Reliance on requirements contained in the TRM is acceptable since changes to the requirements in the TRM will be controlled in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process.
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t Chapter 3.6                                    E2-10-G                              November,1998
 
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Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-16 i
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i FNP TS Conversion  l Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS  l fvYC 3. lo. ~3- lla                                    Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems i
CTS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES                                      l FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC
_NQ      SHE                                  DISCUSSION 1      LA    The CTS 3/4.6.3 LCO statement is revised consistent with the STS.
References to CTS Table 3.6-1 are removed from the I CO statement and Table 3.6-1 is removed from the TS. The removal from the TS of CTS Table 3.6-1, which listed the valves identified as Containment Isolation Valves, is consistent with the level of detail contained in the STS for        .
Containment Isolation Valves. The listing of specific valve names and          )
numbers for valves identified as containment isolation valves is design        !
information which is not directly related to the requirements of the TS.        l This information does not directly support the operability of any LCO-required systems. Design information is controlled via 10 CFR 50.34 and Appendix B of 10 CFR 50. Changes to this information is controlled via 10      j CFR 50.59. The list of Containment Isolation Valves contained in Table          :
3.6-1 is proposed to be placed in the TRM with other CTS details removed during conversion to the ITS. Reliance on requirements contained in the          j TRM is acceptable since changes to the requirements in the TRM will be controlled in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process.                          j i
2        L  The CTS 3/4.6.3 Actions are modified by the addition of Notes consistent with the STS. The first STS Note provides aa allowance to unisolate any penetration flow path (except for the 48 inch purp supply and exhaust            i valves) intermittently under administrative controls. This allowance applies    l I
to penetration flow paths isolated in accordance with the Required Actions of STS 3.6.3. The CTS Table 3.6-1 currently provides a similar allowance for a limited number of valves. The STS note, however, expands the CTS l                  allowance to apply to all Containment Isolation Valves except the 48 inch purge supply and exhaust. The allowance to open intermittently any containment isolation valve, closed as a result of Required Actions, is considered acceptable in the STS based on the requirement for administrative controls (described in the STS bases) that provide for a        ,
dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. The required administrative controls l
l                  provide adequate assurance that the affected penetration may be rapidly closed if containment isolation is required. The 48 inch containment purge supply and exhaust valves are excepted from the STS allowance due to the large size and direct path from the containment to the outside atmosphere.
3        A  The CTS 3/4.6.3," Containment Isolation Valves", Actions are modified by Chapter 3.6                                E2-1-J                              November,1998
 
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Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.318 l                                                          l l                                                          l l
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A        -            ~ ~ , -        . . _
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS M 34 3-HP                                                        Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems l
CTS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC HQ        SHE                                          DISCUSSION longer Completion Time to isolate this type of penetration is acceptable and will continue to provide adequate assurance that the containment boundary is maintained.
I1      LA  CTS 3/4.6.2.3 surveillance 4.6.3.1 is removed from the TS consistent with                I the STS. CTS surveillance 4.6.3.1 requires testing be performed on                      ,
containment isolation valves prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement of the valve, actuator, or control power circuit. In the STS, post maintenance test requirements are not specified.
The STS considers post maintenance testing to be an inherent requirement                  i of the definition of operability and the operability requirements stated for              l each system or component in its associated LCO. It is inherent in the TS requirements that equipment or systems declared operable must, as a minimum, meet the requirements of any applicable surveillance tests. As such, the post maintenance test requirements in the CTS are moved into the TRM. The removal of these specific test requirements from the CTS is                      I acceptable based on the inherent operability requirements for equipment and systems controlled by the TS definition of operability and the operability rcquirements of the associated LCO that is required to be met.
In addition, the removal of these requirements from the CTS to TRM is acceptable since changes to the requirements in the TRM will be controlled in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process.
12        L  CTS 3/4.6.3 surveillance 4.6.3.2 is revised consistent with the STS. The STS contains an exception to the CTS requirement to demonstrate that each containment isolation valve actuates to its isolation position upon receipt of a containment isolation signal. The STS provides an exception for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required safety position.
The exception provided by the STS is acceptable because the required safety function of such valves is accomplished when the valves are secured in the required position. Therefore, additional testing of the actuation capability of these valves is not required.
13      LA  CTS 3/4.6.3 surveillance 4.6.3.2 is revised consistent with the STS.
Surveillance test details are removed to the bases consistent with the level of detail contained in the STS. The CTS requirement that the surveillance be performed during Cold Shutdown or refueling is an expansion of the information already included in the STS bases (i.e., outage) and therefore Chapter 3.6                                E2-6-J                                      November,1998
 
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS (Vrr 3,6.3-l7                                        Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC HQ        SHE                                    DISCUSSION belongs in the bases for the corresponding STS surveillance SR 3.6.3.6.
The specific actuating signals contained in the CTS surveillance have been moved to the bases for the corresponding STS surveillance SR 3.6.3.6. The control of the plant conditions appropriate to perform a surveillance test is typically an issue for procedures and scheduling. The inclusion of specific detail (i.e., which signals provide the appropriate input) intended to explain or clarify the intent of the requirements of surveillances are unnecessary as a TS restriction. Which signals act on which valves is a design detail that is included in the FSAR where changes are controlled via the 10 CFR 50.59 process. The removal of this type ofinformation from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for guidance in performing surveillance requirements is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.
14      LB  CTS 3/4.6.3 surveillance 4.6.3.2 is revised consistent with the STS. The CTS requirement to verify automatic containment isolation valve actuation with a Phase A or B " test signal"is replaced with the STS phrase " actual or simulated actuation signal". This requirement is revised consistent with the STS to provide the allowance to utilize a simulated or actual signal to verify the automatic actuation of containment isolation valves. This change allows satisfactory automatic actuations (required equipment / system              -
operation is verified) that occur due to an actual automatic actuation signal to fulfill the surveillance requirement. Operability is adequately demonstrated in either case as the affected equipment or system cannot discriminate between an actual or simulated (test) signal. This change is considered less restrictive as it provides an alternate method to satisfy the surveillance requirement to verify automatic system actuation.
15        A  CTS 3/4.6.3 surveillance 4.6.3.3 is revised consistent with the STS. The CTS surveillance references Specification 4.0.5 for guidance in verifying the isolation time of the containment isolation valves. In the CTS, Specification 4.0.5 references the required Inservice Inspection and Testing Programs. In the STS, Specification 4.0.5 is not used. The applicable program is referenced directly. In this case, the Inservice Testing Program is referenced. The Requirements for an Inservice Testing Program are contained in the program section of the TS administrative Controls. Since Chapter 3.6                                  E2-7-J                                  Novemb:r,1998
 
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d Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-19 i
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pg          3,g g                          Containment Isolation Valves [(Atmospheric,\
fubatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Duall)
B 3.6.3
            . BASES (continued)
                                                                            ,~
ACTIONS-                    The ACTIONS are modif ed by a Note allowing penetration flow paths, except for 4 inch purge valve penetration flow paths, to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for containment isolation is indicated. Due to the size of the containment purge line penetration and the fact that those penetrations exhaust directly from the containment atmosphere to the environment, the penetration flow path containing these valves may not be opened under administrative controls. A single purge valve in a penetration flow path may be opened to effect repairs to an inoperable valve, as allowed by SR 3.6.3.1.
A second Note has been added to provide clarification that,
                                        ;  for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each
          ,                                penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each condition provide appropriate
                                    -      compensatory actions for each inoperable containment I
isolation valve. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable containment isolation valves are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.
L
                                          'The ACTIONS are further modified by a third Note, which                              .
ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if                                  )
necessary, if the affected systems are rendered inoperable                          !
by an inoperable containment is ti v1                                                I C g m Mm uM                            MS              ;
l                                          In the event the Fer locl0 leakage results 11r exceeding the overall containment leakage rate, Note 4 directs entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.
e        4
;      a A.1 and A.2 l
In the event one contaiy6ent isolation alve in one o more penetration _ flow paths /is. inoperable except for pur e valve l                        f60              dir shield building Dypass) leakage not within limitj , the affected penetrauon now path must be isolated,                        he method dyWe of barrier'that isolation must    include cannot            the use affected be adversely            of at least by one  isolation a single  active i
t i
(continued) l 1            WOG STS                                          B 3.6-33                                    Rev 1, 04/07/95 I
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Containment Isolation Valves [(Atmospheric},
[AC. 3,4.J . 23                        fubatmospheric,IceCondenser and Dual))
e B 3.6.3 BASES (continued)
                                                          ~
ACTIONS                The ACTIONS are modif/ed by a Note allowing penetration flo paths, except for(LTO> inch purge valve penetration flow paths, to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for containment isolation is indicated. Due to the size of the containment purge line penetration and the fact that those penetrations exhaust directly from the containment atmosphere to the environment, the penetration flow path containing these valves may not be opened under administrative controls. A single purge valve in a penetration flow path may be opened to effect repairs to an inoperable valve, as allowed by SR 3.6.3.1.
A second Note has been added to provide clarification that,
                          ,  for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each
  ,                          penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable containment isolation valve. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable contair. ment isolation valves are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.
8
                            ~T he ACTIONS are further modified by a third Note, which ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected systems are rendered inoperable by an inoperable cont nment i  _
gg In the event the ttir loclDkakage results iTF exceeding the overall containment leakage rate, Note 4 directs entry into f    O the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1.
i A.1 and A.2 In the event one contairynent isolation alve in one o more penetration flow paths /is. inoperable except for pur e valve f60          Gr shield building Dypasgleakage not within limitd , the affected penetrauon now path must be isolated. ihe method pc- of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation f            barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active (continued)
WOG STS                                    B 3.6-33                      Rev 1, 04/07/95
 
l' Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.4-1 e
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                            . - . .-          _ = _ _ _  . .. . -  ._-___._ - -                . . .
p a s.s. u                            I69                                                  o ContainmentPressurehtmospheric, Dual,andIceCondenser))
4.o.4 %
3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS p
3.6.        ntainmentPressure((Ntmospheric, Dual,andIceCondenser))
LCO  3.6.        Containm          ressure  shall be 2: -0. g and s +1.5) psig.
                                          + 3,0                                                      l l
APPLICABILITY:    MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION                        REQUIRED ACTION            COMPLETION TIME A. Containment pressure          A.1      Restore containment    I hour not within limits.                    pressure to within limits.
B. Required Action and            B.1      Be in MODE 3.          6 hours associated Completion Time not met.                  6N_Q B.2      Be in MODE 5.          36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE                                          FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4 .1    Verify containment pressure is within                12 hours limits.
WOG STS                                    3.6-16                          Rev 1, 04/07/95
 
MT_ 34,4- 1                                                                FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 5 - JD from STS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems STS 3.6.4.A CONTAINMENT PRESSURE FNP ITS 3.6.4 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE JD NUMBER                                        JUSTIFICATION 1      The bracketed lower bound for containment pressure is replaced with a new FNP-specific pressure. The lower pressure boundary for containment has been revised (from - 1.5 to -1.0 psig). In the STS Bases for TS 3.6.4," Containment Pressure,"
one of the design parameters discussed is an inadvertent actuation of the Containment Spray System. The existing analyses for Farley did not consider an      ;
inadvertent Containment Spray actuation event. A new analysis for this event was performed for Farley. The results of this analysis indicated that the maximum lower  I bound for containment pressure should be - 1.0 psig. Based on operational history,  !
I revising this limit will have no operational impact on the units. While this change differs from the current licensing basis, it reduces the window of operation with respect to containment pressure, and is therefore a more conservative position for plant operation.
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l Chapter 3.6                                E5-1-D                                  November,1998
 
Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.5-1 l
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  . - . - .-    .- . . -            - . -      . - . - .                - -. - ..- .                _-      . -      - - - . - . ~ . - -
l FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS 9dC 3.G M l                                                            Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems l
CTS 3/4.6.1.5 CONTAINMENT AIR TEMPERATURE                                          '
FNP ITS 3.6.5 CONTAINMENT AIR TEMPERATURE DOC
                              ]iQ          SHE                              -
DISCUSSION 1        A                The CTS 3/4.6.1.5 LCO statement and surveillance text is revised by the deletion of the word " primary" consistent with the STS. The STS does not use the word "primarf"in this specificatioc. This change does not introduce a technical revision and is considered administrative made to            i conform with the format and presentation of this information in the STS.            I 2        LA                C' TS 3/4.6.1.5 surveillance 4.6.1.5.1 which contains details regarding the performance of CTS surveillance 4.6.1.5.2 is removed from the specification consistent with the STS. The specific details related to determining the containment average air temperature are moved into the TS bases consistent with the typical location of this type ofinformation in the STS. The specific instruments required, the instrument numbers, and locations of the sensors for determining the containment average air temperature are design and procedural detail which are meant to clarify the intent of the requirements in the surveillance. This information does not directly support the operability of any LCO-required systems. The ITS l                                                          bases provides a more appropriate location for these types ofinformational statements. The removal of this information from the TS and placement in l                                                          the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS.
j                                                          Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for guidance in i
performing the associated surveillance is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program                    I specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.
3        A              CTS 3/4.6.1.5 surveillance 4.6.1.5.2 is revised consistent with the STS.
The surveillance is revised to specifically require the average containment temperature be detennined. The addition of the word " average" to CTS surveillance 4.6.1.5.2 is required after removing surveillance 4.6.1.5.1 which contained the specific instructions for determining the " average" containment temperature. As this change does not alter the intent of the CTS smveillance and is consistent with the LCO statement and actions, it is considered an administrative change made to conform with the presentation
:                                                          and format of this TS in the STS.
i Chapter 3.6                                                      E2-1-E                                  November,1998 4
s
            .- -          w - . .            ,    - . . _ ,        ,-              - -n        -                              ,      - - -
 
Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.61 21 4
1 I
 
_-_._____.____-..-_-_____..~._.____m__m.
M 3 4 6-1                                          '
g                                                                              i i
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0 3.4 CONTAINNENT sYsTEus 3,/o, h CONTAINMENTk00 LING SYSTFM$
{              Q                v I
                                      -LIMITING CON 0!TIONS FOR OPERATION t% O
'                                                                                            '                                                              1 LC.O                            D..            3.-                                                                                      LR 3,g,[o            O.6.2.D Two 6dependen roup of containment cooling fans shall be OPERA 8LE..,                                '
Q1ta one ran in we m            um y. y          7 ggggg l
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, to %s b hg ACTION:                                                              M              cf LW 4 mee+ %e Lco.                      i
                                                                                                                                                      -              I brd,.lktOO S .9 and both containment spray systees OPERA 8LE, restore t eginoperableW group of cooling ans to OPERABLE status within                                                          g C+E                    1 east NOT ST              ithin the next 6 hours and in or be in at thin r
the following 6 ur                                                            g                                !
3 With two groups of th              ov required containment cooling fans                      N                  '
inoperable, and both contal nt spray systees OPERABLE, restore at q                                    least one group of cooling fa s to OPERA 8LE status within 72 g      CoNDiT OAIS                                                                                                          r Dj dj d                      or be in at least NOT STAN08W thin the next 6 hours and in SHUTDOWN within the following hours. Restore both above requ' red Od@
of cooling fans to 0PERA8LE            tus within 7 days of initial 0                                    be in at least NOT STAND 8          thin the next 6 hours and in
,                                                            SHUTDOWN within the followirg            hours.                                                3 M
With one group of the above required containeen                        ing fans bO fd.tktONS                          inoperable and one containment spray systes inoperable, r tore the g/g/g/g                4 inoperable spray system to CPERABLE status within 72 at least NOT STAN08Y ' thin the next 6 hours and in r be in UTDOWN              @
q      3                              within the following( hours. Restore the inoperable gPoup of containment cooling f s to CPERABLE status within 7 days of initial s or be in at leasi HOT STANC8Y' i
Oh                        MO SHUTDOWN within the fell in the next 6 hours and in urs.
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              %NSE Q
                                            ;                                                  1 30 ST3 MDW                SURVE1LLANCE REQUIREMENTS 5              i L.
                                      .6.2.3        ach group of containment cooling fans shall b                            ated OPERA 8LE:                    )
SR3,(4,2.
A        ast once'per 31 days (pn a STAGGERED TEST BASITby:                          f--pb8363 l
pearting e,cn ran o, coo tunie,, ai,e dy ,,e,atin 3 fro, tno                                              >
l                          _                              untrol_ room, andfTrerifying that each ran group operates for at least a minutes.
3ed,
                                            )              Verifying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to 1600 gpa to each cooler                                                                                  j At least once per 11__sonths by veri _fyino that each fan group starts automatically on a(sarety injectio                  s signal.
FARLEY-UNIT 1                                      3/4 6-13                      AME!LOMr_uru a,cf&0r6)rnobb U
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  . - . .-. - = ~ -            . . --- - - - - - . . - - - .                            -        _ - -        . - - . - . - -
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS P e r 3 4 .lo - l                                                Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC ILQ      SHE                                              DISCUSSION 1        A              CTS 3/4.6.2.3, Containment Cooling System, is combined with the Containment Spray System into one TS consistent with the STS. The new LCO 3.6.6, " Containment Spray and Cooling Systems" contains the requirements that were previously included in the two individual LCOs. As such, this change is made to conform with the format and presentation of        l this information in the STS and is considered an administrative change.
2      LA              The CTS 3/4.6.2.3 LCO statement is revised consistent with the STS. The term " train" is used in place of the CTS word " group" to conform with the STS terminology. The word " independent"is deleted and the text describing the number of fans in each train is moved into the bases. The l                                                word independent is not used in the STS as this describes an inherent system design and operability requirement. The movement of descriptive text to the bases is consistent with the STS expanded bases which describes l                                                the basic operability requirements for the TS system. The removal of this type ofinformation from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent l                                                with the format and presentation of the STS. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for system operability requirements is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.
3        M              The CTS 3/4.6.2.3 applicability for the Containment Cooling System is            :
revised by the addition of Mode 4 consistent with the STS. The CTS action        j statements for inoperable Spray and Cooling Systems are also revised to        i place the unit in Cold Shutdown vs. Hot Shutdown to reflect the existing Mode of applicability for the Spray System and the change in applicable Modes for the Cooling System. The Containment Cooling System, l                                                although normally in service for temperature control, is an ESF system l                                                required for SI. The addition of Mode 4 to the applicability of the
[                                                Coucainment Cooling System is consistent with the applicable Modes for l.
other ESF systems required for SI and with the ESFAS TS requirements for manual capability to initiate SI in Mode 4. Therefore, this change is
:                                                considered acceptable for FNP. However, the addition of this specific requirement represents a more restrictive change to the CTS.
i
;                      3a        M              The CTS 3/4.6.2.3 action statement a. is revised by tN addition of a second
~
completion time for the Containment Cooling System consistent with the Chapter 3.6                                            E2-1-I                              November,1998 j
 
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS M M'b 'I                                                      Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC.
NO    _SjiE                                              DISCUSSION STS. The new Completion Time of 10 days from discovery of failure to I                                  meet the LCO is applicable to an inoperable Containment Cooling train as I
well as the 7 day Completion Time. In the STS, the most limiting i                                  Completion Time always applies. This new Completion Time is based on l                                  the STS format ofindividual actions Conditions which may be entered simultaneously and therefore potentially allow attemating between Conditions such that the LCO may not be met indefinitely. Since the Spray and Cooling systems are now in the same TS and the Conditions for these systems may be entered in a serial or consecutive manner such that the LCO may not be met for extended periods, this type of Completion Time " Cap" is applicable. Specifically, Conditions A and C of STS LCO 3.6.6 could be continuously entered for inoperable Spray trains and Cooling System trains
                                  .such that one of these Conditions was always applicable and the LCO requirement was never met. This Completion Time format is discussed in more detail in example 1.3-3 in STS Section 1.3. The addition of this second Completion Time is intended to limit the time that the LCO may not be met. This Completion Time was designed to limit serial (overlapping) entries into different Conditions of the same TS to one time. Since the Completion Times are 72 hours and 7 days in this TS, the total time the
,                                  LCO may not be met is 10 days. This limits consecutive (overlapping) entry into the Conditions for Containment Spray and Cooling systems to one time,                                                                                        i For example, initially if a Spray train becomes inoperable, a total of 72 hours is available for restoration in STS LCO 3.6.6 Condition A (of the two Condition A Completion Times,72 hours is limiting). If at 70 hours into this time the Spray train is still inoperable and a Cooling System train becomes inoperable, STS LCO 3.6.6 Condition C is entered (overlapping Condition A entry without restoration to meet the LCO) and the 7 day Completion Time of Condition C wouid be the limiting Completion Time                              ,
for the inoperable Cooling System train. However, given that the initial                          I inoperable Spray train is restored to operable status in 71 hours and at 6 days into the Completion Time for the inoperable Cooling System train a Spray train became inoperable again, Condition A would be entered again (overlapping Condition C entry without restoration to meet the LCO). The total time that the LCO has not been met when Condition A is entered for the second time is approximately 9 days (3 days for the initial inoperable Spray train + 6 days for the inoperable Cooling System train). Therefore, Chapter 3.6                                              E2-2-1                                    November,1998
 
l 1                                                                                                      l FNP TS Conversion {
Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS  ;
Pdr 3,4.fo -I                                        Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems  I CTS 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM                                    i i
FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC HQ      SHE                                    DISCUSSION when Condition A is entered for the subsequent inoperable Spray train, the 72 hour Completion Time would not be available as the 10 day Completion Time "from discovery of failure to meet the LCO" would become the limiting Completion Time for this Condition.
Since this new Completion Time format represents a new limitation for FNP (current TS do not limit serial or consecutive entry of these actions) this change is considered more restrictive.
4        A    The CTS 3/4.6.2.3 action statements a, b, and c are effectively replaced by    )
the STS Conditions A through E as indicated on the Enclosure I markup of      l the CTS. Due to the STS rules of multiple Conditions being entered as          i applicable and the fact that the Completion Time for these Conditions begin    l when entered, the STS Conditions A through E provide an equivalent set of      )
actions to the CTS except where noted in other DOCS. Therefore, the replacement of CTS action statements a, b, and c by STS Conditions A through E is considered essentially an administrative change. The STS provides one new Condition that does not have a corresponding CTS action.
The STS Condition F is included due to the format and rules of Condition entry in the STS. In the STS, it is possible to enter all applicable Conditions in a TS. For example, in STS LCO 3.6.6, Condition A and D could be applicable at the same time and allow 72 hours before requiring action to shutdown the unit. However, if Condition A and D were l                      applicable the unit would have no operable Cooling System train and only one operable Spray system train. The combination of these STS Conditions allows operation to continue for longer than acceptable (up to 72 hours) in l                      this degraded plant condition. Therefore, the STS provides Condition F which is intended to address the situation described above (three inoperable trains) and require more immediate action (enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediately).
The addition of Condition F is considered an administrative change
;                      required by the format and rules for actions Conditions in the STS.
l 5        L    CTS 3/4.6.2.3 action statement c for the inoperable containment spray system is revised consistent with the STS and the existing CTS 3/4.6.2.1 requirements for an inoperable spray system. The time allowed for reducing the unit Mode of operation below Mode 3 is increased from 6 hours to Mode 4 to 78 hours to Mode 5. Since 30 hours are typically allowed to reach Mode 5, this change increases the time the unit may stay in l    Chapter 3.6                                  E2-3-I                              November,1998 f
 
l i
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Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.6-2 4
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i                c g
g gP WoulCoobo$s8sb' 3,(o C0AT AN\f ENT SYSTE\f 5 kN6 2 DEPPISSLM7ATf0N AND COOLNO SYSTE\f5 CONTAfNMENT $ PRAY SYSTEM                                                                              2, LR LfufTTNG CONDfTION FOR OPERATION c L          -
V O        8,[o , b 6 2) TdMependenlcontainment spray systems sha!! be OPERABLE. Nth
                                                                                                                            /
capaba of taking sucoco from the AwsT and transfernos sucuae to cbc contamment sump.                        3 APPLICABftfTY:          MODES 1,2,3 and 4.
ACTION:                        g4 h h                f,o          se.cycar o breb M                O tco, 00BDITn0H R                  %"ah one con          spray system inoperable, restors the inoperable spray          to OPERABLE stanas a    within  72 hours' be in at least HOT STANDBY withis the                          re pe nextuppergble 6 hourr.a6rayd gggg                          r "m  ro wewh_E samsa mthp thynex: 47houtf og in COLD ShumOWN withm 6e foUowing[
INSE R1" 6 SL1tVEfLLANCE REOUTREMENTS P                                                  4 DN                                    Each contamment spray rystem sha!! be demonstrated OPERABLE:                          *
              ,$R 3,6,[a, f                At least once pcr 31 das by venfyvig that och valve (manual, power operstad or
  'y                                      automatic) in the flow path that is not locimf, scaled, or        ~ securid in position,is in A                                    it8 **'nct posh                                              5 BASES 5    #"3'b 'I'-        '
sy wnfbns.tmT= <=imuinion en                                    'schuse pa=ure dsnar LA                                                                                                -
to@,+= 4 03) than or equajl10 pt:g)when                                                      g ggygg g                              fArleast once per 18 a                ring shutdowti,by:
                                                                                                                                .k
        .bE                              1        V          that    automanc va!w in the flow pa6 actuanes to its corred nositimi flDY.                              M.
                                          %fy' on a
                                                        > em B    ignal      gfy or,Simod d al.:h>6MOf5 L8 g,4fr,5                          2.      venfbas ihat each spray eump sarts --"y o= =      -
sisnat
          =-                                                                                                            BASES d    At least once per 10 pari 6 performes an air or anoke flow test through endi spray)
                                  $.                    '' each spray nozdeis unobstructas.
BASES                                                                      g SR,3 lo 4g                                                                                                              LA                        l g
                                                                                                                                                          ]
FARLEY. UNIT I                                    3/4 6 si                          AMENDMINTNO II3 e*
I
                                                                                                                                            \
 
g 34.6 a                            CHAPTER 3.6                                                        j INSERT G NEW CONDITION F FOR CONTAINMENT SPRAY / COOLING SYSTEMS                                              :
CTS 3/4.6.2.1 PAGE 3/4 6-11                                              l AND                                                          l CTS 3/4.6.2.3 PAGE 3/4 6-13                                              !
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CONDITION                          REQUIRED ACTION                            COMPLETION TIME i
F. Two containment spray            F.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.                                Immediately .
trains inoperable.                                                                                        I i
DE                                                                                                          ,
1 i
Any combination of three or more trains inoperable.
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Chapter 3.6 Insert Page                                                    i l
 
l 4
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS M 3,lae(A                                                  Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems l
l CTS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC                                                                                                  l b'Q      SHE                                        DISCUSSION                                      I requirement was never met. This Completion Time format is discussed in more detail in example 1.3-3 in STS Section 1.3. The addition of this second Completion Time is intended to limit the time that the LCO may not be met. This Completion Time was designed to limit serial (overlapping)              l l                    entries into different Conditions of the same TS to one time. Since the
!                    Completion Times are 72 hours and 7 days in this TS, the total time the l                    LCO may not be met is 10 days. This limits consecutive (overlapping) entry into the Conditions for Containment Spray and Cooling systems to one time.
For example, initially if a Spray train becomes inoperable, a total of 72 hours is available for restoration in STS LCO 3.6.6 Condition A (of the two Condition A Completion Times,72 hours is limiting). If at 70 hours into this time the Spray train is still inoperable and a Cooling System , train          ;
becomes inoperable, STS LCO 3.6.6 Condition C is entered (overlapping Condition A entry without restoration to meet the LCO) and the 7 day Completion Time of Condition C would be the limiting Completior. Time for the inoperable Cooling System train. However, given that the initial inoperable Spray train is restored to operable status in 71 hours and at 6 l                    days into the Completion Time for the inoperable Cooling System train a Spray train became inoperable again, Condition A would be entered again (overlapping Condition C entry without restoration to meet the LCO). The total time that the LCO has not been met when Condition A is entered for            :
the second time is approximately 9 days (3 days for the initial inoperable Spray train + 6 days for the inoperable Cooling System train). Therefore, when Condition A is entered for the subsequent inoperable Spray train, the 72 hour Completion Time would not be available as the 10 day Completion Time "from discovery of failure to meet the LCO" would become the limiting Completion Time for this Condition.
Since this new Completion Time format represents a new limitation for FNP (current TS do not limit serial or consecutive entry of these actions) l                    this change is considered more restrictive.
3a        A    The STS provides a new Condition that does not have a corresponding CTS action. The STS Condition F is included due to the format and rules of Condition entry in the STS. In the STS, it is possible to enter all applicable Conditions in a TS. For example, in STS LCO 3.6.6, Condition A and D Chapter 3.6                                    E2-2-H                              November,1998
 
FNP TS Conversion PNC 3.6,6                                  Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC FQ        SHE                                    DISCUSSION could be applicable at the same time and allow 72 hours before requiring action to shutdown the unit. However,if Condition A and D were applicable the unit would have no operable Cooling System train and only one operable Spray system train. The combination of these STS Conditions allows operation to continue for longer than acceptable (up to 72 hours) in this degraded plant condition. Therefore, the STS provides Coadition F which is intended to address the situation described above (three inoperable trains) and require more immediate action (enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediately).
The addition of Condition F is considered an administrative change required by the format and rules for actions Conditions in the STS.
4-        A    The Completion Times of the CTS 3/4.6.2.1 action statement are revised consistent with the STS. The CTS Completion Times specified for reducing power to Mode 3, restoration in Mode 3, and cooling down to Mode 5 have been combined consistent with the STS. In the STS, the action to restore a system to operable status is always considered an option and specific restoration actions are not typically included in the STS actions. Therefore, the 48 hours allowed to restore in Mode 3 is combined with the 30 hours allowed to reach Mode 5 for a new total time to rea:h Mode 5. Since in the STS, the expression "the following X hours"is not used for expressing the time allowed for performing an action and the Completion Time clock starts upon Condition entry, the 6 hours allowed to reach Mode 3 in this STS Condition must be added to the time allowed to reach Mode 5. Therefore, the equivalent Completion Time to reach Mode 5 in the STS is 84 hours (6 + 48 + 30) from Condition entry. As this change only reformats the Completion Times for this action to conform with the STS and does not alter the total time allowed by the CTS to remove the unit from the applicable Modes (1-4) for this TS, this change is considered administrative.
5        LA    CTS 3/4.6.2.1 surveillance 4.6.2.1.b is revised consistent with the STS. In the STS, the specific required flow and discharge pressures have been removed from the pump performance surveillance requirements. The surveillance has been reworded consistent with the STS to specify 2 the required developed head at the flow test point instead of specific values.
The specific required values in the CTS are moved to the bases. The removal of this type ofinformation from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. The flow Chapter 3.6                                  E2-3-H                                November,1998
 
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1 FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS P4C 344-3                                                Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems i
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CTS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC EQ.      SHE                                    DISCUSSION could be applicable at the same time and allow 72 hours before requiring action to shutdown the unit. However,if Condition A and D were applicable die unit would have no operable Cooling System train and only one operable Spray system train. The combination of these STS Conditions allows operation to continue for longer than acceptable (up to 72 hours) in this degraded plant condition. Therefore, the STS provides Condition F which is intended to address the situation described above (three inoperable trains) and require more immediate action (enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediately).
The addition of Condition F is considered an administrative change              j required by the format and rules for actions Conditions in the STS.              j 4        A    The Completion Times of the CTS 3/4.6.2.1 action ste: ment are revised consistent with the STS. The CTS Completion Times specified for                  I reducing power to Mode 3, restoration in Mode 3, and cooling down to Mode 5 have been combined consistent with the STS. In the STS, the action to restore a system to operable status is always considered an option and specific restoration actions are not typically included in the STS actions. Therefore, the 48 hours allowed to restore in Mode 3 is combined with the 30 hours allowed to reach Mode 5 for a new total time to reach Mode 5. Since in the STS, the expression "the following X hours" is not used for expressing the time allowed for performing an action and the Completion Time clock starts upon Condition entry, the 6 hours allowed to reach Mode 3 in this STS Condition must be added to the time allowed to reach Mode 5. Therefore, the equivalent Completion Time to reach Mode 5 in the STS is 84 hours (6 + 48 + 30) from Condition entry. As this change only reformats the Completion Times for this action to conform with the STS and does not alter the total time allowed by the CTS to remove the unit from the applicable Modes (1-4) for this TS, this change is considered administrative.
5        LA    CTS 3/4.6.2.1 surveillance 4.6.2.1.b is revised consistent with the STS. In the STS, the specific required flow and discharge pressures have been removed from the pump performance surveillance requirements. The surveillance has been reworded consistent with the STS to specify 2 the required developed head at the flow test point instead of specific values.
l The specific required values in the CTS are moved to the bases. The removal of this type ofinformation from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. The flow            l Chapter 3.6                                  E2-3-H                                November,1998
 
I FNP TS Conversion  {
Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS 3' Ni                                                                                      Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC NO      SHE                                                                                  DISCUSSION alWent (recirculation flow) is a procedural detail related to the per:ormance of this surveillance in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The alignment allows testing of the Containment Spray pumps without causing flow to be released out of the nozzles into contaimnent.
The flow alignment is described in the IST plan along with an acceptable range ofdifferential pressures. The minimum required differential pressure corresponds to a single point on the pump curve. Testing at other points along the pump's required head curve may also be used to warn of abnormal pump performance. Ensuring 4 hat the pump performs in accordance with the IST plan will continue to ensure that adequate differential pressure is maintained. Movement of this information to the bases will not affect the acceptance criteria of the IST plan and will continue to provide the appropriate guidance as to the intent of the surveillance. Reliance on the infonnation contained in the STS bases for the performance of surveillance testing is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.
6        A    CTS 3/4.6.2.1 surveillance 4.6.2.1.b is revised consistent with the STS. In the STS Specification 4.0.5 is not used. CTS Specification 4.0.5 contained the Inservice Inspection and Testing requirements. The CTS requirement to test pumps pursuant to Specification 4.0.5 is replaced with a direct reference to the Inservice Testing Program. In the STS, the Inservice Testing requirements are contained in the Inservice Testing Program in the Program Section of the TS Administrative Controls. As such, this change is made to conform with the format and presentation of this information in the STS and is not intended to introduce a technical change. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.
7        LB    CTS 3/4.6.2.1 surveillance 4.6.2.1.c.1 and 2 are revised consistent with the STS. The CTS requirement to verify automatic valve and pump actuation with a test signal is replaced with the STS phrase " actual or simulated actuation signal". This requirement is revised consistent with the STS to provide the allowance to utilize a simulated or actual signal to verify the automatic actuation of the pump or valve. This change allows satisfactory automatic actuations (required equipment / system operation is verified) that occur due to an actual automatic actuation signal to fulfill the surveillance requirement. Operability is adequately demonstrated in either case as the Chapter 3.6                                                                                E2-4-H                            November,1998
 
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FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS g2Ar 3Md                                                Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC NQ      SHE                                    DLSCUSSION affected equipment or system car        Jiscriminate between an actual or simulated (test) signal. This change is considered less restrictive as it provides an alternate method to satisfy the surveillance requirement to          i verifyautomatic system actuation.
8      LA      CTS 3/4.6.2.1 surveillance 4.6.2.1.c.1/2 and 4.6.2.1.d are revised consistent with the STS. The specific actuation signal used for the automatic valve and pump verifications and the descriptive detail regarding how the spray header nozzle is verified unobstructed are moved into the bases for the          l associated surveillances. The inclusion of specific detail (i.e., which signals  !
provide the appropriate input) intended to explain or clarify the intent of the requirements of surveillances are unnecessary as a TS restriction.
Identification of valve control signals is a design detail included in the        ;
FSAR where changes are controlled via the 10 CFR 50.59 process. The              j descriptive detail regarding how the spray header nozzles are verified unobstmeted is a procedural detail of the methodology employed to ensure          !
that the nozzles are not blocked. The ITS bases provides a more appropriate location for these types of detail. The removal of this type of information from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for the performance of surveillance testing is acceptable l                    since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.
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Chapter 3.6                                  E2-5-H                                November,1998
 
l Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.6-5 j I
 
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS M              3' M                                                                                        Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC EQ    SHE                                                                                          DISCUSSION Mode 3 with an inoperable spray system to 48 hours. The time allowed to reach Mode 5 is consistent with the CTS 3/4.6.2.1, Containment Spray System, action requirements and the STS LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems, Condition A actions. This change affects CTS action statement c which applies when one spray and one cooling system are inoperable. In this condition, one spray and one cooling system remain                                    "
operaMe and provide 100% of the containment heat removal capacity and 1008. of the iodine removal function required of these systems to mitigate the consequences of a DBA. In addition, the plant is required to be placed in Mode 3 within 6 hours and ultimately in Mode 5 where the systems are no longer required operable. The additional time allowed by this change to remain in Mode 3 is reasonable considering that the plant is shutdowTi within 6 hours, thus reducing the potential energy released to containment from a DBA, and the fact that the heat and iodine removal capacity of the remaining operable spray and cooling systems is sufficient to meet the requirements of a DBA occurring during power operation.
Sa      L                            The CTS 3/4.6.2.3 surveillance 4.6.2.3.a is revised by the deletion of the Staggered Test Basis requirement for the Containment Cooling Fans consistent with the similar requirements for the Containment Cooling Fans in the STS. The resulting test interval for the Containment Cooling Fans is a straight 31 days consistent with the STS requirements for the similar Containment Cooling Fans. In the STS, testing on a Staggered Test Basis is removed from many surveillances. This was considered acceptable in the development of the STS based on the fact that Staggered Testing is operationally more difficult (particularly for scheduling), in most cases has negligible impact on component reliability, results in more frequent reductions in system redundancy for testing purposes, and increases the likelihood of human error by increasing the number of separate test evolutions. As such, the deletion of the staggered testing requirement for the Containment Cooling Fans is also acceptable, 6      LA                          CTS 3/4.6.2.3 surveillance requirement 4.6.2.3.a.1 and 4.6.2.3.b are revised consistent with the STS. Detail from these CTS surveillances is moved into the bases consistent with the level of detail contained in the corresponding STS surveillances. The detail regarding where to start fans if not nmning and the specific actuation signal for the fans are discussed in the bases for the corresponding STS surveillances. The inclusion of specific detail (i.e.,                                    l Chapter 3.6                                                                                        E2-4-I                              November,1998
 
FNP TS Conversion 8/tr Leo,/o-5                                          Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems i
CTS 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC NQ        SHE                                      DISCUSSION                                              j which signals provide the appropriate input) intended to explain or clarify              l the intent of the requirements of surveillances are unnecessary as a TS                  I restriction. Identification of valve control signals is a design detail included in the FSAR where changes are controlled via the 10 CFR 50.59 process.                    ;
The details regarding where to start the containment cooling fans if not                  ;
mnning is a procedural detail providing guidance for the performance of the surveillance. The ITS bases provides a more appropriate location for these                l types of detail. The removal of this type ofinformation from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent witirthe format and presentation of the STS. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for guidance in performing surveillance requirements is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.
1 7        LB    CTS 3/4.6.2.3 surveillance 4.6.2.3.b is revised consistent with the STS.
The CTS requirement to verify automatic fan group actuation with a " test signal"is replaced with the STS phrase " actual or simulated actuation signal". This requirement is revised consistent with the STS to provide the allowance to utilize a simulated or actual signal to verify the automatic actuation of the fan group. This change allows satisfactory automatic actuations (required equipment / system operation is verified) that occur due to an actual automatic actuation signal to fulfill the surveillance requirement. Operability is adequately demonstrated in either case as the affected equipment or system cannot discriminate between an actual or simulated (test) signal. This change is considered less restrictive as it provides an alternate method to satisfy the surveillance requirement to l                            verify automatic system actuation.
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          %"U. ~3.d [a i
I 3.6 c0NTarNMENT SYSTEMS Q
3,6,6 c0NTarNNENT400 trna Sv5TEss l
t'o 103                                        i LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 1
3            [o                        o 6iden Qvith one ran in esca ysvvy. 3 en ta nment cooling fans shall be OPERABLE. .,
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2,                    n 3              -
ID D b b9 cf Dwe +o rneef ne LCO.
ACTION:
* M                  _ _ _
                                                                                    ~
With one group of the above required containment cooli g fans inopera$1e                                        g brd,.tkt00 5 -->                    and both containment spray systems CPERABLE, restore t e inoperable g
group of cooling ans to OPERABLE status within 7 OYb                  least HOT ST                    ithin the next 6 hours and in s or be in at within the following 6 hour                                                                                                  i 30                                            0.0LD s 3 With two groups of th                    ove required containment cooling fans                          10              l inoperable, and both contai                    nt spray systems OPERABLE. restore at                                    1 t-l CON DITf 0. MS              least one group of cooling fa s to OPERA 8LE status within 72 h r g                                        in at least HOT STAN08W ithin the next 6 hours and in                                                    0.d @
I Dj d.j 6 Y or beSHUTDOWN                            within the following hours. Restore both above requ red 3        gro s of cooling fans to CPERABLE                                tus within 7 days of initial U
Ni                        r be in at least HOT STAN08                    thin the next 6 hours and in 3
                                                                                                                                                                        )
SHUTDOWN within the following                  hours, g
bo rd4glON$                              With one group of the above required containment oo ing fans inoperable and one containment spray system inoperable, r tore the g/ g/ g/ g                        )  inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within 72                                          r be in at least HOT STAN08Y '                thin the next 6 hours and in within the following( hours. Restore the inoperadie giaoup or HUTD0VN                O 4        3 containment cooling f s to CPERABLE status within 7 days of initial n              .ss or be in at leas < HOT STANOBY w in the next 6 hours and in W          H0 SHUTDOWN within the followl                                  urs.
3*NSEATW                              :
                                                                          " (7]g                      1 30      g 573 gpg                      SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS p                                                                    -
So.
L
                                    . 6. 2. 3 ach group of cratainment cooling fans shall b                                      ated CPERABLE:
At least once'per 31 days (on a STAGGERED TEST BASIVby:
6E.M2                              fpta, ting eaco ran o,o o <unie,s ai,ea,y ,,e,atino) f,os tnea f.~7bS$E3 i
                          -                                Lontrol room, andf9erifying that each fan group operates for at least a minutes ~
M,N                                            Verifying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to
          -^        -~
1600 gpa to each cooler              p Ob      At least once per la months by verifyino that each fan group starts autoeatically on alsarety injecti                            es signal.
FARLEY-UNIT 1                                          3/4 6-13                          AM D    I !PA g f h or6/fnub
                                                                            @%'                  raduafien
 
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS 3 4. W                                              Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC NQ        SHE                                    DISCUSSION Mode 3 with an inoperable spray system to 48 hours. The time allowed to reach Mode 5 is consistent with the CTS 3/4.6.2.1, Containment Spray System, action requirements and the STS LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems, Condition A actions. This change affects CTS action statement c which applies when one spray and one cooling system are inoperable. In this condition, one spray and one cooling system remain operable and provide 100% of the containment heat removal capacity and 100% of the iodine removal function required of these systems to mitigate the consequences of a DBA. In addition, the plant is required to be placed in Mode 3 within 6 hours and ultimately in Mode 5 where the systems are no longer required operable. The additional time allowed by this change to remain in Mode 3 is reasonable considering that the plant is shutdown          I within 6 hours, thus reducing the potential energy released to containment from a DBA, and the fact that the heat and iodine removal capacity of the remaining operable spray and cooling systems is sufficient to meet the requirements of a DBA occurring during power operation.
5a        L    The CTS 3/4.6.2.3 surveillance 4.6.2.3.a is revised by the deletion of the Staggered Test Basis requirement for the Containment Cooling Fans consistent with the similar requirements for the Containment Cooling Fans in the STS. The resulting test interval for the Containment Cooling Fans is a straight 31 days consistent with the STS requirements for the similar Containment Cooling Fans. In the STS, testing on a Staggered Test Basis is removed from many surveillances. This was considered acceptable in the development of the STS based on the fact that Staggered Testing is operationally more difficult (particularly for scheduling), in most cases has negligible impact on component reliability, results in more frequent reductions in system redundancy for testing purposes, and increases the likelihood of human error by increasing the number of separate test evolutions. As such, the deletion of the staggered testing requirement for the Containment Cooling Fans is also acceptable.
6        LA    CTS 3/4.6.2.3 surveillance requirement 4.6.2.3.a.1 and 4.6.2.3.b are revised consistent with the STS. Detail from these CTS surveillances is moved into the bases consistent with the level of detail contained in the corresponding STS surveillances. The detail regarding where to start fans if not running and the specific actuation signal for the fans are discussed in the bases for the corresponding STS surveillances. The inclusion of specific detail (i.e.,
Chapter 3.6                                    E2-4-I                            November,1998
 
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 3 - Significant Hazards Evaluations FAT-. 3, fo . /, - 6 Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems III. SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIONS CTS 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS la;L
: 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The Containment Cooling Fans are used to support mitigation of the consequences of an accident, but they are not considered as the initiator of any previously analyzed accident.
As such, the elimination of a requirement to stagger the surveillance testing and the extension of the surveillance interval will not increase the probability of any accident previously evaluated. The proposed SR continues to provide adequate assurance of operable Containment Cooling Fans and therefore, does not involve any increase to the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
: 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change introduces no new mode of plant operation and it does not involve physical modification to the plant. Therefore it does not create the possibility of a new or      .
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.                                !
: 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
l This change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety since the operability of the Containment Cooling Fans continues to be determined in the same manner. The elimination of staggered testing and resulting extension of the surveillance interval do not have a significant effect on reliability, and do not impact the capability of the j Containment Cooling Fans to perform their safety function. The proposed change still ensures the capability of the Containment Cooling Fans to perform their safety function while providing an increase in the availability of the Containment Cooling Fans through reduced testing.
t Chapter 3.6                                    E3-2-D                          November,1998
 
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FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS f d T. 36M-                                            Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.4.2 ELECTRIC HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS FNP ITS 3.6.7 HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS DOC EQ        SHE                                    DISCUSSION maintained (by the post accident containment venting system), the small likelihood of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate enough hydrogen to exceed the flammability limit, and the time available after such a DBA to take action to prevent the accumulation of hydrogen from exceeding the flammabilitylimit.
4        LA    CTS 3/4.6.4.2 is revised by the removal of surveillance 4.6.4.2.b.1 consistent with the STS. The CTS surveillance 4.6.4.2.b.1 requires the performance of a Channel Calibration on all the hydrogen recombiner instrumentation. These calibrations and any necessary compensatory measures (i.e., substitute test instrumentation) will be controlled administratively in the TRM. This change is acceptable based on the system redundancy, available alternate means of contro: ling hydrogen, the fact that the recombiners are controlled manually, and the instrumentation
                                ' does not provide essential control or interlock functions. In addit'on, the functional test required by TS every 18 months will also verify the operation of the hydrogen recombiner instrumentation. In addition, placement of this requirement in 6e TRM is acceptable due to the 10CFR50.59 control applied to changes in the TRM.
5        LA    CTS surveillance 4.6.4.2 is revised consistent w?h the STS. Details contained in the CTS regarding the performance of the s uveillance requirements have been moved into the bases. The details and descriptive information on the performance of the hydrogen recombiner functional test, the visual examination of the recombiners for abnormal conditions, and the resistance to ground tests for the heaters are intended to explain or clarify the intent of the requirements and provide guidance for the performance of the surveillance. As such, they are unnecessary as a TS restriction. The ITS bases provides a more appropriate location for these types of informational statements. The removal of this information from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of these surveillance requirements in the STS. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.
Chapter 3.6                                  E2-2-L                              November,1998
 
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FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS  !
M M'b                                                      Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.4.4 HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.8 HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM (HMS)
DOC EO      SHE                                    DISCUSSION the backup post accident containment venting system or a hydrogen recombiner for attemate hydrogen control capability for up to 7 days with two hydrogen mixing trains inoperable is acceptable based on the STS actions that require confirmation that the attemate hydrogen control function is maintained (by the post accident containment venting system or a hydrogen recombiner) and the existing containment atmosphere mixing and hydrogen removal capabilities provided by the required contairunent cooling fans, reactor cavity hydrogen dilution fans, and recombiners. In addition, the operating flexibility provided by the STS Condition B is acceptable based on the small likelihood of the occurrence of a DBA during the time allowed by Condition B that would generate enough hydrogen to exceed the flammabiliry limit and the time available to the operators after such a DBA to take action to prevent the accumulation of hydrogen from exceeding the flammabilitylimit.
4        L  The CTS 3/4.6.4.4 surveillance 4.6.4.4.a is revised by the deletion of the Staggered Test Basis requirement for the hydrogen mixing system                  )
consistent with the STS. The resulting test interval for the hydrogen            i mixing system is a straight 92 days consistent with the STS requirements.
In the STS, testing on a Staggered Test Basis is removed from many surveillances. This was considered acceptable in the development of the STS based on the fact that Staggered Testing is operationally more difficult (panicularly for scheduling),in most cases has negligible impact on component reliability, results in more frequent reductions in system              !
redundancy for testing purposes, and increases the likelihood of human l                error by increasing the number of separate test evolutions. As such, the deletion of the staggered testing requirement for the FNP hydrogen mixing system is also acceptable.
5        LA  The CTS 3/4.6.4.4 surveillance 4.6.4.4.a is revised consistent with the STS by the removal of descriptive information. The information in this CTS surveillance regarding how and where the system is started is moved to the bases of the associated surveillance. The descriptive information regarding how and where the HMS is started specified in CTS 4.6.4.4.a is intended to provide guidance for the performance of the surveillance. As such, it is i                unnecessary as a TS restriction. The ITS bases provides a more appropriate
:                location for these types ofinformational statements. The removal of this information from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the Chapter 3.6                                E2-2-N                              November,1998
 
FNP TS Conversion g_g                              Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS    l Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems    i i
CTS 3/4.6.4.4 HYDROGEN MLXING SYSTEM l
FNP ITS 3.6.8 HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM (HMS)
DOC NQ        SHE                                    DISCUSSION format and presentation of similar surveillance requirements in the STS.
Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases is acceptable since changes to the infonnation in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.
6        M    The CTS 3/4.6.4.4 surveillance requirements are modified by the addition of a requirement to verify the automatic actuation of the hydrogen mixing system every 18 months. The addition of this requirement is consistent with the requirements in the STS for the hydrogen mixing system. As this system is actuated by a Safety Injection signal, verification of this actuabn capability is applicable and appropriate for FNP. However, the addition of this surveillance requirement is considered a more restrictive change.
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l FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS  i f/)E MS2.-                                                    Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems  )
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CTS 3/4.6.4.4 HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.8 HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM (HMS)
DOC                                                                                                  1 N_Q          SHE                                    DISCUSSION 1            A  CTS 3/4.6.4.4 LCO statement, Actions, and surveillances are revised consistent with the STS terminology used in this TS. The word independent is deleted from the LCO statement. The word independent is not used in the STS as this describes an inherent system design and              1 operability requirement. In addition, the common STS term " train" is used in place of" system"in the LCO, Actions, and Surveillances. In the STS,          i the term train is used in all TS to describe sets of redundant equipment As the revision of these CTS terms does not introduce a technical change to the requirements for the system as designed and installed at FNP, and is made to conform with the format and presentation of this information in the STS, these changes are considered administrative.
2              L The CTS 3/4.6.4.4 actions are revised by the addition of a note that provides an exception to the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 consistent with the STS. The STS note will allow Mode changes to take place with a single inoperable hydrogen mixing train. The allowance provided by this note is considered acceptable due to the remaining operable hydrogen mixing and removal capabilities of the other hydrogen mixing train, the reactor cavity hydrogen dilution system, the hydrogen recombiners, and the post accident containment venting system which serves as a backup to the hydrogen recombiners, as well as the low likelihood of a LOCA or SLB occurring
!                    that would generate an amount of hydrogen that exceeds the flammability l                    limit and the time available after such a DBA to take action to prevent the accumulation of hydrogen from exceeding the flammability limit.
I 3            L  CTS 3/4.6.4.4 is modified by the addition of an Actions Condition for two inoperable hydrogen mixing trains consistent with the STS. The incorporation of STS Actions Condition B will allow operation to continue for up to 7 days with two inoperable hydrogen mixing trains provided the l                    post accident containment venting system or a hydrogen recombiner is            l
:                    verified capable of perfonning its intended function within one hour and every 12 hours thereafter. The capability of the post accident containment venting system to pressurize containment with hydrogen free air and vent the pressurized containment through filters to the outside atmosphere will provide an attemate hydrogen dilution and mixing capacity. The capability of a hydrogen recombiner to reduce the hydrogen content in containment also provides a backup hydrogen control function. The allowance to rely on Chapter 3.6                                    E2-1-N                              November,1998
 
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FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS  i M I 3.fo.g-2.-                                        Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.4.4 HYDROGEN MLXING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.8 HYDROGEN MLXING SYSTEM (HMS)
DOC FQ        SHE                                  DISCUSSION the backup post accident containment venting system or a hydrogen recombiner for altemate hydrogen control capability for up to 7 days with two hydrogen mixing trains inoperable is acceptable based on the STS actions that require confirmation that the attemate hydrogen control function is maintained (by the post accident containment venting system or a hydrogen recombiner) and the existing containment atmosphere mixing and hydrogen removal capabilities provided by the required containment cooling fans, reactor cavity hydrogen dilution fans, and recombiners. In addition, the operating flexibility provided by the STS Condition B is acceptable based on the small likelihood of the occurrence of a DBA during the time allowed by Condition B that would generate enough hydrogen to exceed the flammability limit and the time available to the operators after such a DBA to take action to prevent the accumulation of hydrogen from exceeding the flammabilitylimit.
4        L  The CTS 3/4.6.4.4 surveillance 4.6.4.4.a is revised by the deletion of the Staggered Test Basis requirement for the hydrogen mixing system consistent with the STS. The resulting test interval for the hydrogen mixing system is a straight 92 days consistent with the STS requirements.
In the STS, testing on a Staggered Test Basis is removed from many surveillances. This was considered acceptable in the development of the STS based on the fact that Staggered Testing is operationally more difficult (particularly for scheduling), in most cases has negligible impact on l                component reliability, results in more frequent reductions in system i                redundancy for testing purposes, and increases the likelihood of human error by increasing the number of separate test evolutions. As such, the l
l                deletion of the staggered testing requirement for the FNP hydrogen mixing system is also acceptable.
5        LA  The CTS 3/4.6.4.4 surveillance 4.6.4.4.a is revised consistent with the STS by the removal of descriptive information. The information in this CTS l
surveillance regarding how and where the system is started is moved to the      l bases of the associated surveillance. The descriptive information regarding    ;
how and where the HMS is started specified in CTS 4.6.4.4.a is intended to provide guidance for the performance of the surveillance. As such, it is unnecessary as a TS restriction. The ITS bases provides a more appropriate      l location for these types ofinformational statements. The removal of this        ;
information from the TS and placement in the bas:s is cot.sistent with the Chapter 3.6                                E2-2-N                              November,1998
 
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 3 - Significant Hazards Evaluations W 3. 4 2-                                                    Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems III. SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIONS CTS 3/4.6.4.4 HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.8 HYDROGEN MLXING SYSTEM (HMS) 3-L
: 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
This change does not result in any hardware changes. The hydrogen mixing system is not assumed to be an initiator of any analyzed event. The proposed change allows two                    l hydrogen mixing trains to be inoperable for up to 7 days provided an alternate hydrogen control function is available. The alternate hydrogen control capability is provided by the post accident containment ventilation system or a hydrogen recombiner. The time allowed by STS Condition B for two inoperable hydrogen mixing trains is acceptable given the containment atmosphere mixing and removal functions provided by the required containment cooling fans, reactor cavity hydrogen dilution system fans, the hydrogen recombiners, and the additional assurance provided by the post accident containment ventilation system or hydrogen recombiner verified operable while in Condition B. A one hour Completion Time to initially verify the availability of the alternate hydrogen control          I function and additional verification once per 12 hours thereafter,is an acceptable frequency to ensure the alternate hydrogen control function is maintained. The proposed Completion i Time of 7 days is a reasonable time to allow two hydrogen mixing trains to be inoperable because of the alternate hydrogen control functions available and because of the low                l probability of a DBA which would generate hydrogen in the amount capable of exceeding l      the flammability limit occurring within the time allowed by proposed Condition B.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
i  2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any l      accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change does not necessitate a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in parameters governing normal plant operation. The proposed change will allow two hydrogen mixing trains to be I
inoperable for up to 7 days provided an alternate hydrogen control function is maintained.
i Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from I      any accident previously evaluated.
: 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The allowance to have two hydrogen mixing trains inoperable for up to 7 days, provided an alternate hydrogen control function is available, does not significantly impact the applicable I accident analysis. Use of the post accident containment ventilation system or a hydrogen recombiner as the alternate hydrogen control function provides additional assurance that          I Chapter 3.6                                    E3-2-H                          November,1998
 
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 3 - Significant Hazards Evaluations 94F-. 3Jo.2      2-Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems III. SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIONS CTS 3/4.6.4.4 HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM                                          l 1
l FNP ITS 3.6.8 HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM (HMS)                                        I the temperature and pressure assumptions in the applicable safety analysis are maintained.
The 1 hour Completion Time to initially verify the availability of the alternate hydrogen        I control function, and the additional verification once per 12 hours thereafter, is an acceptable frequency to ensure function of the post accident containment ventilation system          l or hydrogen recombiner is maintained. The 7 day Completion Time to restore the                      l I
inoperable hydrogen mixing trains prior to requiring a plant shutdown is acceptable based on the small probability of an event requiring the hydrogen mixing system to function during this time period and the availability of the alternate hydrogen control function of the post accident containment ventilation system or hydrogen recombiner as well as the containment atmosphere mixing and removal functions provided by the required containment cooling fans, reactor cavity hydrogen dilution system fans, and the hydrogen recombiners. Providing the 7 day Completion Time when two hydrogen mixing trains are inoperable and an alternate hydrogen control system is available will minimize the              l potential for plant transients that can occur by providing an adequate time to restore an inoperable hydrogen mixing train to operable status prior to requiring a plant shutdowm.
As such, any reduction in a margin of safety by allowing two hydrogen mixing trains to be inoperable for 7 days will be offset by the benefits gained through avoiding an unnecessary          '
plant transient by providing adequate time to restore a hydrogen mixing train to operable status.                                                                                              ,
i                                                                                                          ;
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Chapter 3.6                                    E3-3-H                      November,1998
 
99/                                                    v gg                                    HMShtmospheric,IceCondenser,andDal BASES ACTIONS Al.(continued)                                              3st.
A c.Aiden 4 i
thehydrogenrecombiners,ContainmentSpraySysteMHydrogen                          l Purge System, and hydrogen monitors.
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Required Action A.1 has been modified by a Note that states the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable. As a result, a MODE change is allowed when one HMS train is                        ;
inoperable. This allowance is based on the availability of                    :
the other HMS train, the small probability of a LOCA or SLB l
occurring (that would generate an amount of hydrogen that                      '
exceeds the flammability limit), and the amount of time                        I available after a LOCA or SLB (should one occur) for                            {
operator action to prevent hydrogen accumulation from                          i exceeding the flammability limit.
{
l B.1 and B.2 r-                                                                                4 l          Reviewer's Note: This Condition is only allowed for units                      ;
with an alternate hydrogen control system acceptable to the technical staff.                          ___
r a.
With two HMS trains inoperable, t                  ty to perform the            '
7,}I g 10 hydrogen control function via air rnate capabilities must be verified by administrative means within I hour. The f
alternate hydrogen control capabL              es are provided by / the        i
  /                      cor tainmentiHydrocen Purae Systa          vdrocen recombineri f                l F
Hycrogen Jgn1SorfystegHMS/Jontainment Air D1 Ast1on SFItam l  Cg6tainepht Iner/ing spstemI.J The I hour Comp'etion T'me
                      'ailows a reasonapse pertos of time to verify that a loss of M hydrogen control _ function does not exist. r[ e~ viewer's note:"
The t sowing 1 to De u ea ir a n n-Techni 1 Specifi ation
{ alter ate hydr gen cont 1 functi is used to justif this Cond tion: I addition the alte ate hyd gen contr 1 sys 16ci                        vtenn:pfieonce pe 12 hours th          -+ idy.mUstEeF.ei e Jn pabi                      .inu A
availahlitv-]O BothD the veri (dication)initialfv may beification performed fand      subsequent4check, all administrative as an by examining ogs or other information to determine the availability of the alternate hydrogen control system.                It does not mean to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate OPERABILITY of the alternate hydrogen control system.      If the ability to perform the hydrogen control function is maintained, continued operation is permitted with two HMS trains inoperable for up to 7 days. Seven days (continued)
WOG STS                                  B 3.6-124                          Rev 1, 04/07/95 l
 
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FNP TS Conversion PAI      3. 6.9 - l                                    Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems i
CTS 3/4.6.4.3 REACTOR CAVITY HYDROGEN DILUTION SYSTEM                                    i FNP ITS 3.6.9 REACTOR CAVITY HYDROGEN DILUTION SYSTEM DOC N.LQ      SHE                                      DISCUSSION                                      !
results in more frequent reductions in system redundancy for testing            I purposes, and increases the likelihood of human error by increasing the          j number of separate test evolutions. As such, the deletion of the staggered      j testing requirement for the reactor cvity hydrogen dilution system is also      ;
acceptable.                                                                      l 4        LA      CTS 3/4.6.4.3 surveillance 4.6.4.3.a.1 contains descriptive information concerning the performance of the surveillance which is moved into the bases of the surveillance consistent with the level of detail in the STS. The particulars of how and where the reactor cavity hydrogen dilution fans are        )
started are moved into the bases description for the associated surveillance.
The descriptive information concerning how and where the reactor cavity hydrogen dilution fans are started specified in CTS 4.6.4.3.a.1 is intended to provide guidance for the performance of the surveillance. As such, it is unnecessary as a TS restriction. The ITS bases provides a more appropriate location for these types ofinformational statements. The removal of this information from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of similar surveillance requirements in the STS.
Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.
5        M      The CTS 3/4.6.4.3 surveillance requirements are modified by the addition of a requirement to verify the automatic actuation of the reactor cavity hydrogen dilution system every 18 months. The addition of this requirement is consistent with the requirements in the STS for the similar hydrogen mixing system. As this system is actuated by a Safety Injection signal, verification of this actuation capability is applicable and appropriate for FNP. However, the addition of this surveillance requirement is considered a more restrictive change.
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Chapter 3.6                                    E2-2-M                              November,1998
 
Associated Package Changes for RAI 5.2-01
 
_                                      -    -          . -          -  -                      -- ~ ~~'~~~~~ ~ ~~^'                    ' ^
3-O# '
q          The      Units        %opm2 don skJl v.clud ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS                        g              .e        M 4
j 62.2 FACILITY                        F q
b
: a. I Each on-duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift Lcrew composition shown in Table 6.2-1.
i      IN,5ERT D                    b.
;                                            At least one licensed Reactor Operator shall be in the Control Room ,
d when fuel is in the reactor.
b                        Senior Reactor Operator shall be iIn addition, at least one licensed                                    !
is in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4.                                the Con t rat taa- while th= naie              ;
n le .5AA            61/ fhisjossMofah c.
;                                            A  Realth Physics Technician' shall ne on site when fuel is in the reactor.                                                                                        y l                                                                                                                                      g      a      ;
Id.                                          #
CORE ALTEE$TIONS shall be di ectly supertised by/eithe
                          $                  iconsed 5        or Reac or Operato!or Senior Reactor perat r a 1mited to el San ing who i
responsib ities d ing this peration                no ot f concurr t                                    i i
1 j
Q . (Deletod [)
Q., .
f.
}'                                            Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit  the working hours of unit staff who perform safety-related functions e.g., Senior Reactor Operators, Reactor Operators, Besith    Physics maintenance personnel. Technicians, Auxiliary Operators, and key
(                                                                            Adequate shift coverage shall be maintained without routine heavy use of overties. The
: j.                                          objective shall be to have operating personnel work a l
nominal 40-hour week vh11e the plant is operating.
4                                          In the event that unforeseen problems require substantial amounts of overtise to be used, or during extended periods of
;                                          shutdown for refueling, asjor maintenance or major plant J                                            modifications, on a tempora                      tsis, he following guidelines
  ;                                          shall be followed:  .
s ode,            n.
                                                                                          - =
I
: 1. An individual i                                        L                                            l not be          et          to work mora than 16 hours straight (
Qi          ift turnover time).                                      i f
'                                                  There              a shift turnover time) between      of at leas't work8periods.
hours (which cea include r
t The Realth Physics Technicina may be absent for a period of time not t f            immediate action is taken to restore the Realth Physics Technician ithin the minimus requirement.                                                                            j j
FARLET-13 TIT 1                                              6-2                                            AMENDKDr! NO. g, U, 96
 
                                                                                                              ~
[2A*C 6 2-0 l k
ADMINTSTRATI7E CONTROLS                                                      s ook                    L
                    ..............................                                          .......... w...................,...........
1      3              An individual vill not vork more than 16 hours in any 24-hour period, not more than 24 hours in any 43-hour period, not more than 72 hours in any 7-day period (all excluding shift turnover time).
4              Except during extended shutdown periods, the use of overtime
                  -- =                            should be considered on an individual basis and not for
* leve.ls e f                          entire staff on a shift.                                                              g,g,g,,c.
gaf.yetr1                                                                                                                    =-
: 5.            Any de                ion from the above zu elines for the inimus hi ift geospleraen t                ined in LTechnical) Specification Gable 6.2-11and health physics                          hnicians shall be reviewed and approved by_ M M the Central Manage - Nuclear Plant, his designee (Emergencyj 10                              (Director)] or higher GDtnority) Any deviation from the above b                                gulaelines for key maintenance personnel shall be reviewed and approved by the Maintenance Manager or his designee.                                          Jo, I                              ,  .g group superviso p                                                                        ,        L          l ThT AssisYant' General Manager - Plant-Operations Operations
                                                    ~
E.
Manager fnd Shift Supervisor Qshall hold a seniot' reactor operator                                                    ,
license.] The Reactor e erators s r.a A A noAo a reactor operator                                                      l
                        ,,          Qicense.                                                                                  ..
                                                      - 1.:    .                        .
                          -  .~~                        ...                    .          .                            _,,
2..
II
                                                                                        , .                      tg SGN N                                                                                                                                      .
!                                                                                                                                                            i l
i
                '                                                                                U M o(.                                                        ?                      .-;
                                                                                                                                '~
                    *~-
                                                                    - -~ ~ .-~. ... -.                      . . . . . _ . .        . . .
                                            .I JIGd DC              't .3 . * . R oq y 6 ..      c. ;-          -- jm , ,, ,
i                          - . . . o . - m                                                                                                                  ,
I i
t i                                                                                                                                                            I l                                                                                                                                                            i l
l FARLEY-UNIT 1                                                                6-3                                AMENDMENT No. O , 77
(,.'
                              - r.        ?
CORRECTED PAGE e
 
(
FNP TS Conversion 3-. p                                    Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 5.0 - Admm, istrative Controls CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DOC HO        SHE                                  DISCUSSION units). Since Table 6.2-1 is being eliminated from the TS, this CTS allowance for a single SRO to fill the same position on both units is not l                      clearly expressed in the remaining staffing requirements. Therefore this l                      CTS allowance is retained in the appropriate CTS paragraph 6.2.2.b (or ITS paragraph 5.2.2.b) to provide a necessary clarification of the requirement.
The revision of CTS paragraph 6.2.2.b to retain this CTS allowance l                      preserves the current FNP licensing basis as specified in CTS Table 6.2-1.
l                      Therefore, this change is considered administrative and is necessary duc to the format and presentation of this information in the STS.
7a        L    CTS 6.2.2.f contains requirements for limiting the hours worked by unit        l l                      staff who perform safety-related functions. CTS subsections 6.2.2.f.1,2,
;                      and 3 specify different requirements related to limiting hours worked and l                      are revised consistent with the STS. These subsections of CTS 6.2.2.f l                      correspond to STS 5.2.2.e.1,2, and 3. The STS and CTS subsections are              j intended to specify the same requirements. However, one significant                !
difference exists between the wording used in the CTS and STS for these requirements. The CTS subsections use the word "will"in specifying the particular requirement addressed in that subsection. The conesponding STS subsections use the word "should"instead of"will." The CTS subsections 6.2.2.f.1,2, and 3 are revised consistent with the corresponding STS subsections to use the word "should." Both CTS 6.2.2.f and the corresponding STS section 5.2.2.e contain an allowance (CTS 6.2.2.f.5 and in the paragraph after STS 5.2.2.e.4) for exceptions to the requirements for i
limiting the hours worked. This change does not alter the intent of the CTS requirements. The revised wording improves the internal consistency and clarity of the CTS 6.2.2.f requirements consistent with the corresponding          l l                      STS requirements. The revision of the CTS 6.2.2.f requirements is not              l technical in nature and these requirements will continue to be implemented l                      in the same manner as before. As exceptions are permitted for the l                      requirements specified in CTS subsections 6.2.2.f.1,2,3 the word "should"
;                      is more correct and appropriate than the word "will" for specifying these j                      requirements. However, since the meaning of the words "will" and "should" are different, apart from the context of the succeeding TS, this change may be deemed Less Restrictive.
!    Chapter 5.0                                E2-4-A                              November,1998
 
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 3 - Significant Hazards Evaluations
* M 5, 2 - N                                            Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls III. SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIONS CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 7a-L
: 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change involves changing the CTS administrative controls wording related to the control of the hours worked by unit staff who perform safety-related functions to more closely agree with the STS wording and does not result in any hardware changes. The word                  i "will"is changed to the word "should"in CTS subsections 6.2.2.f.1,2, and 3. As CTS 6.2.2.f.5 contains an allowance for exceptions to the requirements for limiting the hours                  1 worked, this change does not alter the intent of the CTS requirements. The revised wording                l improves the intemal consistency and clarity of the CTS 6.2.2.f requirements consistent with              l the corresponding STS requirements. The proposed change does not impact the capability of the plant or any equipment to provide the required safety function as described in the FSAR.              ,
In addition, the results of the analyses described in the FSAR remain bounding. Additionally,              l the proposed change does not impose any new safety analyses limits or alter the plants ability to detect and mitigate events. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
l 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any l    accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change involves changing the CTS administrative controls wording related to the control of the hours worked by unit staff who perform safety-related functions to more closely agree with the STS wording and does not necessitate a physical alteration of the plant l    or changes in parameters governing normal plant operation. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
: 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
{    The proposed change, which revise the TS administrative controls wording related to the control of the hours worked by unit staff who perform safety-related functions to more
-    closely agree with the STS wording does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change does not impact any safety analysis assumptions and does not impose any new safety analyses limits or alter the plants ability to detect and mitigate events.
Therefore, the proposed change does not impact any margin of safety.
Chapter 5.0                              E3-2-A                                    November,1998
 
I l
i Associated Package Changes for RAI 5.2-02 i
I i
l 1
i l
l l
l I
l 1
 
par 6,2-07                            TABLE 6.2-1 (Continued)                  ll SS            d                                                                                                          I i
13 SRO-- $Individual ift Sup:rvi 4r with a Sa'nior Reac r Oper ors Lice e on U it 1                                            l LA        R0            Individual ithth    a Sanier/Res.ctor a Reac    6r Operato s0Licenrators .feense o Unit on Unit AO        - Auxilia Operator                                                                                              !
ST
                              - Shift T hnical Adv or                                                                                          l a
                                                                                      /                            I The Shift Crew Composition say be one less than the minimum requirements of Table 6.2-1 for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to acconnodate                                                i t
unexpected absence of on-duty shift crew members provided immediata action is
;                taken to restore the Shift Crew Composition to within the minimum reautrements of Table 6.2-1. This provisions does not permit any shift crew position to be unmanned upon shift change due to an oncoming shift crewman being late or absent.
[
During any 3
ence of th?6hift SupervisoP[ros_the control Room while the unit j
4 is in M00E , 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6, an individual (other than tne shift TechnicaTML W s_or) th a valid SR0 license shall be (Ignated to assume the control 2
Roos e            nd unction and shall remain in peervis6r turns and reassuses,the c                              Control Room until the g                                    jg c
function g
                                                                                                                    ^
1 2 -_                                                                                        ,
p l                      z,                              fn MODES Sadle L                              @ lnb-tV101.DA k$*N e . .,
anactove 6Ro o rRo                          ;
License shd. be
                                  .u .w eGC          ':                                                                                      i J estj N S $0
                  > 5. q . 2. Q                'N                                            usuk N' "                                      ;
(g/*n df/Mi/b g"Wy*)
I i
L        -/  .
j
                                                    ~
                                                                                  .        . . . .    ,. .. r n u.              o . s , :-
w m                s,:.:...w.-      :'
              ;, g; . pgg; pOZ ? <h              M r ' '.5 d f  5 b *2 OI        ,',                                        h, ' - .
                      .u: m- :na ni h ; : *.N : W;:
* a, n FARLEY-UNIT 1                                          6-5                                AMENOMENT NO. 26
 
N        '
                    ~
CHAPTER 5.0 INSERT H                                                    l TO CTS PAGE 6-3 STS ADDITION TO 6.2.2
: g. The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) shall provide advisory technical support to the responsible SRO in the areas of thermal hydraulics, reactor engineering, and plant analysis l
with regard to the safe operation of the unit. In addition, the STA shall meet the qualifications specified by the Commission Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shirt. The same individual may fill this position for both units.                                    >
1 1
l l
1 1
i f                                    Chapter 5.0 Insert Page l
i
 
l        g 5,2- OL                                                                      Organization l$(g                                    5.2 5.2 Organization 5.2.2              Unit Staff (continued) l
: 2. An individual should not be permitted to work more than
;                                      16 hours in any 24 hour period, nor more than 24 hours
!                                      in any 48 hour period, nor more than 72 hours in any 7 day period, all excluding shift turnover time;
: 3. A break of at least 8 hours should be allowed between work periods, including shift turnover time;
: 4. Except during extended shutdown periods, the use of                INSERT
                    ,                  overtime should be considered on an individual basis                    E
[m( nt0,                          and not for the nntiro etaff g SV(GerkmLit'5r-NurlOS ,
s  cAut S
S                      Any deviat/on Ti^um#ne above guidelines _irhall s  be WuthorizecD -
                    ,,      :yQn advang by the ( PlantSuperintendent]JElhisdecignee,'n q,,,,,,(accoroance wun approved administrative procedure      _ r by __
higher levels of management.jin accordance with Established' j F__                            proceoures anc witn cocumenTation of the basis for granting            '
  < INSERTF            -.4 ethe deviation.
w ___                    w or.
fControlsshallbeincludedintheproceduressuchthat individual overtime shall be reviewed monthly by the [ Plant Superintendent] or his designee to ensure that excessive hours have not been assigned. Routine deviation from the (above guidelines is not authorized.                                  J    _
A                      E1 The amount of overtime worked by unit staff members
_3
:                performing safety related functions shall be limited and controlled in accordance with the NRC Policy Statement on working hours (Generic letter 82-12).                                      _J
: f.          The 61perations Manacer or Assistant Operations Manager) i      EM-shall hold an SR0 license.                            g
: g.          The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) shall providpvisory echnical support to the'_ Shift Supervisor (SSy in the areas of thermal hydraulics, reactor engineering, and plant                        $
g9m;Q.                      analysis with regard to the safe operation of the unit. In
'            9                  addition, the STA shall meet the qualifications specified by the Commission Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shift.                                                                        (D 1                                                                        -
T'he see irdivW^ 0.              M % poMen for M @d$.
WOG STS                                              5.0-4                        Rev 1, 04/07/95 l
l
 
1 FNP TS Conversion  l MD 6,7.-oL ,                                                            Enclosure 5 - JD from STS l Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls l l
l STS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS JD 1
NUMBER                                            JUSTIFICATION                                      t 1        STS paragraph 5.1.2 is revised by the addition of an FNP specific clarification. The STS paragraph discusses the responsibilities of the Shift Supervisor (SS) and          i addresses the topic on a per unit basis. In order to ensure the CTS allowance for a sugle individual to fill the SS position for both units is clearly retained, a sentence ,
to that effect is added to the STS discusden. The CTS, in Table 6.2-1, clearly specifies (in footnote a) that an individual may also fill the SS position on unit 2.
As the STS has no corresponding table to contain this information, and STS 5.1.2 discusses the replacement of the SS during any absence in some detail, the retention of this CTS allowance is appropriate to avoid any confusion regarding the intent of the STS paragraph and how many SS are required. This change provides a clarification consistent with the current FNP licensing basis as specified in CTS Table 6.2-1.
1 la      STS paragraphs 5.1.2 and 5.2.2.g are revised by the replacement of the title " Shift Supervisor" with a description of the individual qualified to fill that position ("A Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)" or " responsible SRO"). This change will eliminate the need for nonessential technical specification changes due to organizational orjob title changes. As the proposed change still requires an            l individual with a SRO license to be responsible for the control room command function, the technical content of the requirement remains unchanged and is l              consistent with the current requirements for the Shift Supervisor in the CTS.            ;
2        The bracketed paragraph in STS 5.2.2.a is revised to fit FNP and other similar            l l
statements in the STS. The paragraph is edited to revise the generic statement          1 l              regarding a two unit facility to a specific statement applicable to FNP. In addition,    ;
the reference to shutdown is revised to be more specific and state Modes 5 and 6.        ;
l l              This more closely conforms with current FNP staffing requirements. This change l              provides a clarification consistent with the current FNP licensing basis as specified
!              in CTS Table 6.2-1.
l l    3        STS paragraph 5.2.2.b is revised by the addition of an FNP specific clarification.
l              The STS paragraph discusses the staffing requirements for ROs and SROs and
!              addresses the topic on a per unit basis, in order to ensure the CTS allowance for a
;              single individual to fill the SRO position for both units is clearly retained, a sentence to that effect is added to the STS discussion. The CTS, in Table 6.2-1, clearly specifies (in footnote a) that an individual may also fill the SRO position on unit 2. As the STS has no corresponding table to contain this information, and STS 5.2.2.b discusses the staffing requirements for ROs and SROs, the retention of this CTS allowance is appropriate to avoid any confusion regarding the intent of the Chapter 5.0                                  E5-1-A                                November,1998
 
I Associated Package Changes for RAI 5.2-03
 
n __ - a,-t-,.-          -    -            4:,sL                . - -          A ._    u        mA          4 1 4A--  -==,s.,-A.4u            s-~s,        awa  n  a  e    ,,
d FAC 8T.2- og                                    TABLE 6.2 I (Continued)                          gl 55      -
G                                      i ft Sup rvi ar with a Senior Reac r Oper ors Lice SRO    -
ndividual        th a Senio                                                                        e on U it 1/
;          LA                  R0            Individual ith a Reac r Operato              eactor s0 Licen rators icense o Unit
:                                AO      - Auxiliary Operator                                                                    on Unit i
ST
                                        - Shift T hnical Adv or                                                                                                                            i j                          The Shift Crw Composition may be one less than the einfeue requirements of Table 6.2-1 for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to accommodate                                                                                  ,
i nexpected absence of on-duty shift crew members provided immediate action is i                            aken to restore the Shift Crew Composition to within the minieue recuirements                                                                                  i of TV.le 6.2-1. .This provisions does not permit any shift crew position to be                                                                                  I 4
;                          unmannea upon shift change due to an oncoming shift crewman being late or absent.
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FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS M '5. 2 -d3                                          Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DOC NO        SHE                                    DISCUSSION                                      .
the TS it is considered more restrictive.
13      LA  CTS Table 6.2-1, Minimum Shift Crew Composition, is deleted consistent with the STS. In the STS, there is no corresponding Table to CTS Table              1 6.2-1. The STS includes specific provisions for licensed and non-licensed          l shift crew members (ITS 5.2.2.a and g) as well as the minimum l
requirements for licensed operators (5.2.2.b) and references the appropriate Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i)) which mandates the minimum staffing requirements for licensed operators (ITS 5.2.2.c). CTS Table 6.2-1        1 contains information redundant to the existing federal regulations for              ;
licensed operator staffing requirements and the provisions of STS 5.2.2.a, b,      l c, and g. The elimination of Table 6.2 1 and all references to it in the Facility Staff section are acceptable considering that the requirements for licensed operator staffing is addressed by 10 CFR 50.54 (k) (1) and (m), and retained in STS 5.2.2.b and the non-licensed staff requirements are retained        i in STS 5.2.2.a and g. These changes conform with the format and presentation of this information in the STS and effectively replace CTS            ,
Table 6.2-1.                                                                        j l
14        A  The CTS Table 6.2-1 note regarding the minimum shift crew composition and the 2 hour exception to this minimum requirement is replaced by STS 5.2.2.c. STS 5.2.2.c contains the same exception and references the appropriate Federal Regulation and STS sections which comprise the                  I equivalent staff requirements as CTS Table 6.2-1. As such, STS 5.2.2.c effectively replaces the similar CTS note to Table 6.2-1 and this change is made to conform with the format and presentation of this information in the STS. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.
14a        L  The CTS Table 6.2-1 note regarding the minimum shift crew composition and the 2-hout exception to this minimum requirement is revised consistent with the STS. The following sentence has been deleted:"This provisions does not permit any shift crew position to be unmanned upon shift change due to an oncoming shift crewman being late or absent." STS 5.2.2.c specifically addresses the unexpected absence of on-duty shift crewmembers. As the oncoming shift has not yet come on-duty, STS 5.2.2.c does not apply to oncoming crewmembers being late or absent. STS 5.2.2.c specifically states that the 2-hour caveat applies to "the unexpected l Chapter 5.0                                E2-8-A                                November,1998 l
l
 
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS PM S2-03                                          Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DOC FQ        SHE                                    DISCUSSION absence of on-duty shift crew members." Therefore, STS 5.2.2.c effectively excludes the absence or tardiness of the oncoming shift from the 2-hour caveat. However, the deletion of the specific exclusion included in the CTS is seen as a less restrictive change.
15      LA  CTS 6.2.3, which contains the requirements for the Safety Audit and Engineering Review Group (SAERG), is completely removed from the CTS consistent with the content of the STS. The SAERG is a multi-disciplined dedicated onsite review group responsible for operational evaluations to improve safety, systematic engineering reviews of plant performance and            i activities and comprehensive plant audits. The SAERG TS requirements                l are moved, intact, into the FNP Quality Assurance Program. The placement of the SAERG requirements in the Quality Assurance Program is acceptable since subsequent changes to these requirements will be controlled in                l accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(a). The placement of the FNP SAERG                    '
requirements in the Quality Assurance Program is consistent with the guidance found in the NRC Administrative Letter 95-06 which recommends              j the preferred location for CTS requirements that are removed from the              l l
Administrative Controls section of the TS.
16      LA  CTS section 6.4, Training, is deleted from the administrative controls section of the TS consistent with the content of the STS. The information contained in CTS 6.4 is a brief summary of the much more detailed training information contained in FSAR Chapter 13.2, Training Program. The FSAR contains specific training commitments to ANSI N18.1-1971 and 10 CFR 55. In addition, the FSAR contains a description of the INPO accredited retraining program. As such, CTS section 6.4 is redundant to the more detailed FSAR training requirements and the deletion of CTS 6.4 does not reduce the level of training required in FSAR 13.2. The same level of training at FNP continues to be assured by the requirements of FSAR 13.2.
Any changes to the requirements of FSAR 13.2 must be in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process. Therefore, the deletion of CTS 6.4 is acceptable I                  and consistent with the content of the STS.
I 17      LA  CTS 6.5, which contains requirements for Review and Audit functions, is i                  completely removed from the CTS consistent with the content of the STS.
CTS 6.5 contains requirements applicable to the Plant Operations Review Chapter 5.0                                  E2-9-A                            November,1998 l
 
M E143                                                                            FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 3 - Significant Hazards Evaluations Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls III. SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIONS CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRA TIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 14a-L
: l. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change involves the deletion of the sentence excluding the absence or tardiness of the oncoming shift from the 2-hour caveat to the crew requirements of Table 6.2-1. This change is made to more closely agree with the STS requirements and does not result in any hardware changes. The minimum shift crew composition oion-duty shift crewmembers is not affected. The proposed change does not impact the capability of the plant or any equipment to provide the required safety function as described in the FSAR. The results of the analyses described in the FSAR remain bounding. Additionally, the proposed change does not impose any new safety analyses limits or alter the plants ability to detect and mitigate events. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
: 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change involves changing the TS administrative controls regarding the exclusion of the absence or tardiness of the oncoming shift from the 2-hour caveat to the crew requirements of Table 6.2-1 to more closely agree with the STS requirements. This change does not necessitate a physical alteration of the plant or changes in parameters governing normal plant operation. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
: 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of sr.fety?
The proposed change, which involves changing the TS administrative controls regarding the exclusion of the absence or tardiness of the oncoming shift from the 2-hour caveat to the crew requirements of Table 6.2-1 to be consistent with the STS requirements does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change does not impact any safety analysis assumptions and does not impose any new safety analyses limits or alter the plants ability to detect and mitigate events. Therefore, the proposed change does not impact any margin of safety.
                                                                                                      -)
Chapter 5.0                                E3-4-A                                    November,1998
 
i Associated Package Changes for RAI 5.5-01 6
 
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS NOl                                                                                                                Chpter 5.0 - Administrative Controls CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DOC HQ      SHE                                                                                                        DISCUSSION of" functional capability"in place of the word " operability" used in the CTS. This difference is intended to avoid using a term that could be confused with the TS defined term " OPERABILITY". Although not capitalized in the CTS, the word operability introduces the potential to confuse the meaning of this word with the TS defined term OPERABILITY (designated by the use of all capitalized letters) and cause requirements and interpretations to be applied which were not intended by the use of operability (small case letters) in CTS 6.8.3.e(i) and 6.8.3.e(vi). As such, these changes make the FNP TS consistent with the STS and provides a clarification that is consister;t with the intent of the CTS which did not refer to the TS defined term. The clarification provided by the STS does not impact the intent or effectiveness of the affected CTS reopirement and is therefore considered an administrative change.
33a      A    Section (ii) of CTS 6.8.3.e, " Radioactive Effluent Controls Program", is revised consistent with the STS. The words, "at all times" are deleted from the sentence " Limitations at all times on the concentration...". The corresponding STS sentence does not contain these words. The lirnitations are contcolled in accordance with 10 CFR 20. The words it th CTS do not change the intent of the reqrirement and therefore are simply additional detail. In the STS, deletion of unneeded detail is often used to simplify the statement of requirements in the TS. Since the presence or absence of these descriptive words does not change the intent of the associated requirement, this is seen as an administrative change.
34      LA    CTS 6.8.3.f, " Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program", contains requirements to monitor the radiation and radionuclides in the environs of
:                  the plant. The program requirements are implemented within the ODCM.
The program controls provided by CTS 6.8.3.f are proposed to be removed from the TS, consistent with the content of the STS, and also placed within the ODCM. The controls provided by this program are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix I.10 CFR 50, Appendix I provides l                  numerical guides for design objectives and limiting conditions for operation to support meeting the requirements of ' O CFR 50.34a and 50.36.a which require that radioactive material in effluents released to unrestricted areas be kept as low as is reasonably achievable. Furthermore,10 CFR 50.36a(a)(2) requires that regular reports be sub.nitted to the NRC Chapter 5.0                                                                                                      E2-17-A                              March,1998
 
I FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS M 7 6-Of                                                Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls i
CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DOC L        SHE                                    DISCUSSION regarding the quantities of the radionuclides released to unrestricted areas.
Basei on the reports required by 10 CFR 50.36a(a)(2) the NRC directly                  l monitors the effectiveness of the program controls to keep radioactive material in effluents released to unrestricted areas as low as is reasonably achievable and may (consistent with 10 CFR 50.36a(a)(2)) require the                    ;
licensee take additional action as deemed appropriate to further limit                  '
releases. As such, the program controls in CTS 6.8.3.f are not required within the TS to ensure the radiation and radionuclides released to unrestricted areas are adequately monitored and controlled. In addition,10 CFR 50, Appendix I, Section IV(B)(3) requires that the licensee establish an appropriate surveillance and monitoring program to identify changes in              l the use of unrestricted areas to permit modifications in monitoring programs for evaluating doses to individuals from principle pathways of exposure. Thus, equivalent requirements to the requirements of CTS 6.8.3.ii are included in 10 CFR 50, Appendix I. Finally, Regulatory Guide 4.15 describes a method acceptable to the NRC staff for designing a program to assure the quality of the results of measurements of radioactive materials in the effluents and the environment outside nuclear facilities during normal operations. Section C.6.3.2 discusses interlaboratory analyses as part of that program. CTS 6.8.1.i and ITS 5.4.1.b state that I
Farley will maintain procedures for effluent and environmental monitoring using the guidance in Regulatory Guide 4.15, February 1979. Therefore,                  l equivalent requirements to the requirements of CTS 6.8.3.iii are included in Regulatory Guide 4.15 and ITS 5.4.1.b.
The existing regulatory controls and reporting requirements discussed i
above provide assurance that the radiation and radionuclides released to unrestricted areas continue to be adequately monitored and controlled. The removal of CTS 6.8.3.f from the TS does not reduce the numerical guides, level of control, or reports required in the regulations cited above.
Therefore, the incorporation of these program requirements into the ODCM is acceptable.
35        A  CTS 6.8.3 which contains requirements for Administrative Controls Programs is revised consistent with the STS by the addition of a new l                program. The Component Cyclic or Transient Limit Program, STS 5 5.5,is added to the CTS program section of Administrative Controls. The STS Chapter 5.0                                E2-18-A                              November,1998
 
1 I
I i
Associated Package Changes for RAI 5.5-02  l i
                                              )
1 1
l
                                              ]
l l
 
FNP TS Conversion pat g, p.g                                        Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS
                                                            , Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS                                          l FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DOC                                                                                              l EQ        SHE                                    DISCUSSION                                      l Component Cyclic or Transient Limit Program addresses the CTS 5.7.1, l
Component Cyclic or Transient Limit requirements which were removed from CTS section 5.0, Design Features, and placed within a new FSAR Table 5.2-2a. The CTS Component Cyclic or Transient Limits listed in the new FSAR Table 5.2-2a are required to be monitored by the STS Component Cyclic or Transient Limit Program,5.5.5. This arrangement of requirements is consistent with the format and presentation of this information in the STS. The transfer of the CTS 5.7.1 limits to the new FSAR Table 5.2-2a is discussed within the DOCS associated with CTS section 5.0, Design Features. CTS 5.7.1, Component Cyclic or Transient Limit, contains the requirement to maintain components within the specified limits and Table 5.7-1 contains a list oflimits. The STS program, 5.5.5, " Component Cyclic or Nnsient Limit", retains in the TS the basic requirement of CTS 5.7.1 to maintain components within the limits and              l refers to the new FSAR Tame 5.2-2a which contains the same limits as CTS Table 5.7-1. The addition of this program requirement conforms to the presentation and format of this information in the STS and retains within the TS the existing CTS requirement to maintain components within the Cyclic'or Transient limits. As this change documents a CTS requirement that is retained within the TS, it is considered administrative.
36        A  CTS 6.8.3 which contains requirements for Administrative Controls Programs is revised consistent with the STS by the addition of a new program. The Pre-Stressed Containment Tendon Surveillance Program, STS 5.5.6, is added to the CTS program section of Administrative Controls.
This STS program is based on the requirements of CTS 3/4.6.1.6. The details of the smveillance requirements to verify containment tendon operability contained in CTS 3/4.6.1.6 are removed to a tendon surveillance program outside of the TS (as discussed within the DOC associated with the changes to CTS 3/4.6.1.6). The description in ITS 5.5.6 identifies the basic requirements for the program. The program itself(specific details related to the actual compliance with the requirements such as the SRs of CTS 3/4.6.1.6) is contained within the procedures used to comply with the i                requirement. Currently, they exist as surveillance procedures for the TS.
After the conversion, they will exist as the implementing procedures for the program. As part of the changes to CTS 3/4.6.1.6, the requirement to maintain the tendon surveillance program in accordance with the inspection Chapter 5.0                              E2-19-A                                  November,1998
 
Associated Package Changes for RAI 5.5-03 1
l l
l l,
I l
l l
 
i i                                                                                          i ggg g,$.o3                      CHAPTER 5.0                                            l l
INSERT K (continued)
NEW ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS PROGRAMS i
ESF Ventilation System          Penetration              RJJ    j l
CREFS Recirculation                2.5%                70 %    l CREFS Filtration                  2.5%                70 %    i CREFS Pressurization                0.5%                70 %    l PRF Post LOCA Mode                  10 %                959o
                                                                                          )
l NOTE: CREFS Pressurization methyl iodide penetration limit    j is based on a 6 inch bed depth                          )
: d. Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and the charcoal adsorbers is less than the value    i specified below when tested in accordance with ASME N510-1989 at the        !
system flowrate specified below 10%.                                        l l
l ESF Ventilation System Delta P (in. water gauge) Flowrate (CFM)        l CREFS Recirculation                2.3                  2,000 CREFS Filtration                  2.9                  1,000      l CREFS Pressurization                2.2                    300 PRF Post LOCA Mode                  2.6                  5,000
: e. Demonstrate that the heaters for the CREFS Pressurization system dissipate  '
the value specified below i 0.8 kW when tested in accordance with          l ASME N510-1989.
ESF Ventilation System                Wattage (kW) i CREFS Pressurization                        7.5 The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the VFTP test frequencies.
I l
t Chapter 5.0 Insert Page
 
Programs and Manuals FAL T. g -03                                                                                                                                                                            5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.11      Ventilation Filter Testina Proaram (VFTP)                                                                            (continued) evision 2. and ASME N510-1989                                                                            the system flo                                  c fie belo        e 10% W                                                                                                                              (in, m y ej ESFVentilationSystem[                                                                            Delta P
* Flowrate p )
DEM Recircu,lAkicn"-                                                                                23                                    ~4000
                                                                                                                                                                              ~
CAEM RLited                                                                                        2,q                                  1,000 0.Res Pressun)on .toien                                                                              22                                      300 3G~
                                                                                                                                                                        ~      ~
y._            ~M Pos H N.A M*4 ~
cREF        nvva                            Gccc
: e.      Demonstrate that the heaters for eNt                                                                                      the is ste f dissipate the v        specified below(                                                                  e  10%]fkhentested in accordance wi        ASME N510-1989}% -                                                                                              A                                  i0 N ESFVentilationSystemy                                                                            g Wattage (k D cREFS FresunmMon                                                                                                              y The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the VFTP test frequencies.
16 5.5.12      Explosive Gas and Storace Tank Radioactivi                                                                                    onitorina Proaram This program provides controls for pot t ly expl sive gas mixturescontainedinthe7WasteGas oldup System ,ithe quantity of radioactivity contained in gas storage tanks 6r fed into ther-e _
f faas treatment system and the quantity of radioacti it contained in unprotected outdoor liauid storage tanks .                                                                                                      he N      ' gaseous raaioact.ivity quantities shall be determined following the methodology in [ Branch Technical Position (BTP) ETSB 11-5,
              " Postulated Radioactive Release due to Waste Gas System Leak or ailure"]. The liquid radwaste quantities shall be determined in ac rdance with [ Standard Review Plan, Section 15.7.3, " Postulated Radi tiveReleaseduetoTankFailures").{
The progra shall include:                                                                                                                                                          O The limits or        centrat ns of hydrogen and oxygen in the
: a. N Waste Gas [ Holdup] System and a surveillance program to ensure the limits are maintained. Such limits shall be (continued)
WOG STS                                      5.0-14                                                                                                              Rev 1, 04/07/95
 
l l
l
                                                                                            )
ATTACHMENTIU l
SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Related to Plant Staff Qualifications - NRC Letter Dated 9/8/98 Associated Package Changes I
i
 
LLCICINYRATIVE CONTROLS
                      . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .g ,.
6.2.3 SAFETY AUDIT'AND ENGINEERING REVIEW GROUP (SAERG                                            A FUNCTION 6.2.3.1 The SAERG shall function to conduct operational evaluations, engineering reviews, and audits for the purnose of improving safety.
COMPOSITION 6.2.3.2 The SAERG shall be composed of a multi-disciplined dedicated onsite group    with a minimum assigned complement of five engineers or appropriate specialists.
RESPONSIBILITIES 6.2.3.3 The SAERG s' hall be responsible for the following:                                          .
: a. Paftict'patl$g in operathonal . evaluations for improvement of safety wherein such evaluations and recommendations therefrom are not limited to the fulfillment of existing programs, policies, procedures, or capabilities of existing equipment and installations.
: b. Systematic engineering reviews of plant performance and activities with results reported independently of onsite operational management to offsite upper management.
I j
: c. Comprehensive plant audits in accordance with audit requirements set forth in quality assurance programs, licensing documents, and
{                                other policies and procedures.
4 j                  AUTHORITY i
;                  6.2.3.4 The onsite SAERG shall carry out its function reporting offsite directly to the Manager-Safety Audit and Enoineerina Review who in turn reports directly to the Vice President.                                                                      -
G                                {
6.2.4 SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISon                                5'. 2, 2, l
;                                                                                                                                  y i
;                6.2.4.1 The Shift Technical Advisor shall' serve in an advisory capacity to the Shift Supervisor primarily in the assessment of accident and transient J j
1
            ,_Accurrences.1                        gp Alh 3 ACILITY STAFF ni_lALIFICATIONS UMT                                                    ^
1 t
5                                                                    f 4                  .3.1 Each member of the dacins staff shall meet or exceed the minimum qualifications f ANSI .N18.1-1971 for comparable positions and the supplemental Physics Qupervisortrements                        specified in 10 CFR 55, except for (1) the Health l o shall meet or exceed the qualifications of 4 i                Regulatory sutoe 1.8,                        tomber 1975 3                                    _ -
12ct          senior individu:LI FARLEY-UNIT 1                                                    6-m chtrge o f AMENOMENT N0. H J8,103        l
                                %enel s6 complete % ucceJ4.J proy                                                  J,3 6
                            '    bei M h 44 r#tt 361) %,,f +6 rey,4,m,ds 4f                                                          N
                                % wnbAch pp > % & k o%e.
1%I- N R.c. i.ew i-8-4
    .-    - . - .                    .        .    -.          ..      .        .--          ..            -            -    ~ .      . _ _ _
 
FNP TS Conversion  1 Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Par _- nec. Le Her &s-12                                  Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls '
l CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DOC EQ        SHE                                    DISCUSSION 12      M  The CTS section 6.2.2 is revised by the addition of paragraph g addressing the Shift Technical Advisor (STA). CTS section 6.2.4 which currently addresses the STA is replaced by the more comprehensive STS section 5.2.2.g which further defines the STA qualifications and responsibilities.
The additional material contained within STS 5.2.2.g is consistent with the NRC generic guidance regarding STAS and is therefore applicable to FNP.
As the STS paragraph 5.2.2.g contains additional requirements for the STA position, beyond those specified in CTS 6.2.4, the addition of STS 5.2.2.g to the FNP TS is considered more restrictive.
4 12a      A  CTS 6.3.1 which discusses facility staff qualifications is revised to            ,
eliminate a specific job tit': for the " Health Physics Supervisor". The specific title has been replaced with the term "the senior individual in charge of Health Physics". The revision of this title is necessary to eliminate the need for nonessential technical specification changes due to organizational or title changes. The use of the term "the senior individual in charge of Health Physics" is not intended to modify the existing health physics organizational structure or r:nponsibilities. The proposed change is a change in terminology only for the designated individual and does not introduce a tecimical change to the CTS or the FNP health physics organization. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.
12b        M  CTS 6.3.1 which discusses facility staff qualifications is revised to address the NRC RAI included in NRC letter dated September 8,1998. 10 CFR 55 was revised in 1987. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.8, Revision 2, issued April 1987, endorses, with conditions, certain parts of ANSI /ANS-3.1-1981 as an acceptable approach for cenain plant positions for complying with the qualification and training requirements of 10 CFR 50 and 55. Endorsement for all other positions remains with ANSI N18.1-1971," Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel." Another option stated in RG 1.8, Revision 2 for complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 55 is the implementation of an accredited program. The INPO accredited, SAT-based licensed operator training program implemented at FNP encompasses j                the applicable requirements of the later standards. Referencing this l                program in the TS addresses the NRC concern related to plant staff qualifications. However, since this change adds additional requirements to l
Chapter 5.0                                E2-7-A                              November,1998
 
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Tutt -tJRc. c d ev 9-i-4 7                            Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DOC EQ      SHE                                    DISCUSSION the TS it is considered more restrictive.                                        !
13      LA  CTS Table 6.2-1, Minimum Shin Crew Composition, is deleted consistent with the STS. In the STS, there is no corresponding Table to CTS Table 6.2-1. The STS includes specific provisions for licensed and non-licensed shift crew members (ITS 5.2.2.a and g) as well as the minimum requirements for licensed operators (5.2.2.b) and references the appropriate Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i)) which mandates the minimum staffing requirements for licensed operators (ITS 5.2.2.c). CTS Table 6.2-1          )
contains information redundant to the existing federal regulations for              l licensed operator staffing requirements and the provisions of STS 5.2.2.a, b, c, and g. The elimination of Table 6.2-1 and all references to it in the Facility Staff section are acceptable considering that the requirements for licensed operator staffing is addressed by 10 CFR 50.54 (k) (1) and (m), and retained in STS 5.2.2.b and the non-licensed statirequirements are retained in STS 5.2.2.a and g. These changes conform with the format and presentation of this information in the STS and effectively replace CTS Table 6.2-1.
14        A  The CTS Table 6.2-1 note regarding the minimum shift crew composition and the 2 hour exception to this minimum requirement is replaced by STS 5.2.2.c. STS 5.2.2.c contains the same exception and references the l
appropriate Federal Regulation and STS sections which comprise the l                  equivalent staff requirements as CTS Table 6.2-1. As such, STS 5.2.2.c l
effectively replaces the similar CTS note to Table 6.2-1 and this change is l                  made to conform with the format and presentation of this information in the i                  STS. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.
l l  14a        L  The CTS Table 6.2-1 note regarding the minimum shift crew composition and the 2-hour exception to this tninimum requirement is revised consistent with the STS. The following sentence has been deleted: "This provisions does not permit any shift crew position to be unmanned upon shift change due to an oncoming shift crewman being late or absent." STS 5.2.2.c specifically addresses the unexpected absence of on-duty shift crewmembers. As the oncoming shift has not yet come on-duty, STS 5.2.2.c does not apply to oncoming crewmembers being late or absent. STS 5.2.2.c specifically states that the 2-hour caveat applies to "the unexpected Chapter 5.0                                E2-8-A                                November,1998
 
                                              ._.          = . .
i%                                                  l Unit Staff Qualifications 5.3 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS l  5.3 Unit Staff Qualifications Rev      '
te: Minimum qualifications for members of the unit s                    '
be specified by    .,        overall qualification state                    encing an ANSI Standard acceptable to the                r                  ing individual position                  ,
qualifications. Generall              me erable; however, the second method e to those unit staffs requiri            .,
l              on statements because of unique organizational structures.
5.3.1          Each member of the unit itaff shall meet or exceed the minimum qualificat_ ions of f[ Regulatory buiae 1.8, Revision 2,1987, or morel M
P recent revisions, or ANSI Standard acceptable to the NRC staffJ.
The staff not covered by (Regulatory Guide 1.8] shall meet or exceed'the minimum qualifications of [ Regulations, Regulatory)            i juides, or ANSI Standards acceptable to NRC staff]. c                    J AMI Hlal-197/ For con 7eo.rablejoosOibas and.the
                                                                    / A /0 0 R 5 6; 6Ufflctnenfd fefUife!Y) cab SfeClbe                                                  hosisJ\
4 ke$ for (t llkrfo        r syc&) the SeniorIncElvidwQ in ch)7                                                l
        /,8, Sepfember /175.                              >            >          -
Personal who umplek                acmaM p<oy- wkak 6sskJl m bem enMsed h de NIEC                          of & c o.b we Yhe ou M &J Proy w ik Gew l
[
!        tMI- NRf- Ldbv 9-847                            7a l
l WOG STS                                  5.0-5                              Rev 1, 04/07/95
 
l FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 5 - JD from STS l                Rtr- A) 9.c. L chv 'i-F-93                              Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls STS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS JD NUK @                                          JUSTIFICATION STS paragraph and how many SROs are required. This change provides a clarification consistent with the current FNP licensing basis as specified in CTS Table 6.2-1.
4      The bracketed STS 5.2.2.e regarding overtime hours is revised to conform with the l                      corresponding CTS paragraph 6.2.2.f. Various changes to the STS ~are made to be conform with CTS 6.2.2.f. All the changes are consistent with the current FNP licensing basis as specified in CTS 6.2.2.f.
5        STS 5.2.2.fis revised to more closely conform with the corresponding CTS paragraph 6.2.2.g and the STS format. This change is consistent with the intent of ANSI N18.1-1971, the current licensing basis for Farley Nuclear Plant.
6        STS paragraph 5.2.2.g is revised by the addition of an FNP specific clarification.
The STS paragraph discusses the staffing requirements for STAS and addresses the topic on a per unit basis. In order to ensure the CTS allowance for a single individual to fill the STA position for both units is clearly retained, a sentence to that effect is added to the STS discussion. The CTS, in Table 6.2-1, clearly specifies (in footnote a) that an individual may also fill the STA position on unit 2.
As the STS has no corresponding table to contain this information, and STS 5.2.2.g discusses the staffing requirements for STAS, the retention of this CTS allowance is appropriate to avoid any confusion regarding the intent of the STS paragraph and how many STAS are required. This change provides a clarification consistent with the current FNP licensing basis as specified in CTS Table 6.2-1.
7      STS paragraph 5.3.1, Unit Staff Qualifications, is revised consistent with the corresponding NRC approved CTS 6.3.1 paragraph for Facility Staff Qualifications as modified by the elimination of a specificjob title for the health physics supervisor (explained in DOC 12a-A). This change effectively maintains the current FNP licensing basis as specified in CTS 6.3.1.
7a      STS 5.3.1, which discusses unit staff qualifications, is revised to address the NRC RAI included in NRC letter dated September 8,1998. 10 CFR 55 was revised in 1987. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.8, Revision 2, issued April 1987, endorses, with conditions, certain parts of ANSI /ANS-3.1-1981 as an acceptable approach for certain plant positions for complying with the qualification and training requirements of 10 CFR 50 and 55. Endorsement for all other positions remains with ANSI N18.1-1971, " Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant l
Personnel." Another option stated in RG 1.8, Revision 2 for complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 55 is the implementation of an accredited program. The l
Chapter 5.0                                  E5-2-A                                November,1998
 
FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 5 - JD from STS FM - NM. u b 9-34?                                  Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls i
STS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 1
FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS                                        l JD NUMBER                                          JUSTIFICATION INPO accredited, SAT-based licensed operator training program implemented at FNP encompasses the applicable requirements of the later standards. Referencing          !
this program in the TS addresses the NRC concern related to plant staff                  I qualifications.                                                                          )
l 8      The STS 5.4.1 requirement for written procedures is revised consistent with the          l corresponding CTS requirement 6.8.1. Specifically STS item 5A.I.b, Emergency Operating procedures is deleted and STS item 5.4.1.c regarding effluent and              l environmental monitoring is revised to reference Regulatory Guide 4.15. These changes maintain consistency with the FNP current licensing basis as specified in the CTS. The deletion of the STS requirement 5.4.1.b which addresses Emergency Operating procedures is acceptable since 5.4.1.a (RG 1.33) in section D.6 requires procedures for combating emergencies and other significant events which encompasses emergency operating procedures.
8a      STS paragraph 5.5.1 is revised by the addition of an FNP specific CTS requirement.
The STS paragraph discusses the approval requirements of changes to the ODCM.          !
This change provides additional review and acceptance requirements consistent with the current FNP licensing basis as specified in CTS 6.14.2.2.
9      STS 5.5.2, Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment, is revised consistent with the corresponding CTS section,6.8.3.a. The FNP specific systems included in the program are added to the STS bracketed listed replacing the STS generic list and in STS item 5.5.2.b an FNP specific exception is included consistent with CTS 6.8.3.a(ii). These changes maintain the FNP current licensing basis as specified in the CTS.
9a      The location of the comma in 5.5.3 is incorrect. The proposed change in position of the comma makes it clear that radioactive gases and particulates are checked in the plant gaseous effluents not in the containment atmosphere. This change maintains consistency with the FNP current licensing basis as specified in the CTS.
10      STS 5.5.4, Radioactive Effluent Controls Program, paragraphs b and g are revised consistent with the corresponding CTS requirements in 6.8.3.e(ii) and 6.8.3.e(vii).
In STS paragraph b, the limit is revised to 10 times the concentration stated in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B and the specific paragraphs of appendix B are added. In STS paragraph g, specific limits for noble gases and iodine, tritium, and other radionuclides in particulate form with halflives greater than 8 days are specified.
The NRC approved CTS requirements are used in lieu of the generic STS requirements for these paragraphs. Therefore, these changes maintain consistency Chapter 5.0                                E5-3-A                                November,1998 I
I}}

Revision as of 09:21, 13 November 2020

Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re Conversion to Improved TS, Chapters 3.6.& 5.0
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I l

l FNP TS Conversion fhr 3,/o, / -2 Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems l l

CTS 3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY FNP ITS 3.6.1 CONTAINMENT DOC HQ SHE DISCUSSION and secured in position prior to mode 4 entry but not more often than every 92 days is retained with the associated action. As this change is part of a r. l organization of the presentation and format of the Containment section TS l and is not intended to introduce a technical revision, it is considered an l

administrative change.

6 LA CTS 3/4.6.1

  • footnote to surveillance requirement 4.6.1.1.a is revised consistent with the STS. The CTS surveillance footnote verifies the status of containment penetrations and the position of the associated isolation devices inside containment during cold shutdown prior to Mode 4 entry but not more often than every 92 days. This footnote includes verification of the status of the equipment hatch. In the STS, the Containment operability l requirement pertaining to the equipment hatch is discussed in the STS LCO 3.6.1 bases as part of the overall operability requirements for Containment.

For a system to be considered operable, the def'mition of operability for the system must be satisfied and the associated Surveillance requirements must be met. In the STS, information related to the design and configuration of a system which relate to meeting the operability requirements of the LCO is moved to the Bases. The removal of this information from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. As the equipment hatch is part of the design of the containment and SR 3.6.1.1 ensures that the configuration of the equipment hatch is capable of maintaining leakage rates within limits, it is appropriate to move this redundant information to the Bases. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for guidance in performing the associated surveillances is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.

7 A CTS 3/4.6.1

  • footnote to surveillance requirement 4.6.1.1.a verifies the status of containment penetrations and the position of the associated i isolation devices inside containment during cold shutdown prior to Mode 4 l entry but not more often than every 92 days. This footnote contains an FNP specific allowance for the blind flange on the fuel transfer canal flange.

The CTS

  • footnote only requires the blind flange on the fuel transfer canal flange be verified closed after each draining of the canal. This provision of the CTS has been retained as a note in SR 3.6.3.3. Since this CTS provision is only revised in form and presentation to fit the STS, this Chanter 3.6 -, E2-4-A November,1998 l 9812010153 981120 l PDR ADOCK 05000348 P PDR ,_

Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.1-3 l

l l

2 I

Mr 3,/, . /-J L A

3.(o for ecodoe cMro' A cdah B g* g g 3 /4.8 contvaf anarirt sYsvens

> m- .

3/4.5.1 patuamrTenertafwwtwv j A OPERABLE co m rxMrwT r m carTr LIMITIIIC C00fDIT!ost POR OPRAAT!ost

/ C.O 3.4. coefTAIMMBFT hWTSGRITT)shall be toined

~

kPPLIc131LITY: MODBS 1, 2, 3 and 4.

con +Enmen+ 'inoperdle.

.m. , _ -

M M

A.i t,o% CFEAABLE Giueet ,,ima,, ui ,T unlestore oo-ui T a t-er .iaa -

c. , i ee. hem, - - sa meaet .= === .tata ao meet . he-o a.d a c SNWDoom withis the fellenting 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. 4 ggg4gg g g,1 '

samvsrLLANcs RagttaBMENTS ER

, QcouTAzi.-rf @rTesazT 11 he demonstrated y SR3 6.3.2_

a IAt least once per 31 verifying that all penetrationa* not capable of betag oeed by opsmama ooetalaeset aut'amatie Leelation valves required to be sleeed during accident  ;

Leoeditions are elooed by valves 2_ blind flampor enactivated LC.0 34.h lautomatie valves soeured La theLr positions,)nscept se provided la] AC.TicNS q (Table 3.6-1 of specificaties 3.6.3.1. _f A l_+Ml N '[ee*I'd.**N / *** 7 **'/ ** D b b i SR3.6.1.1 [ sr oe doesing vieul e w--tions and leakage rate tuting ta accordamoe with the coetaisoneet I,makage Rate Testing Program.

f 3,la.1 Bhstb LCo 3.lo.3 ACTION $ palaueLh.2. LA

  • Es valves, blind flanges, Geactivated automatie valveJe aed the equipmen % 3,p hat which are located inside the oestataamat ame are toebos, peares or '

BASE 5

- otherwise secured La the sleeed poetties. These penetratioes shall be verified eleoed during eask 00t.D sNyfaceur ascept that such verification esed aut be perfossed more eften them ease ser 93 days. ffhe blind flange en the hon IN ful transfe- ennat flange shalt me verified stooed after meh de i im of 6R34,3 3 Lt,ecanal.- ,

d

> sa s. .s.s Valve 3 rusroe:. p- - -

A CC"%"ni- sR 3.(o.l. 2 ve,r' F containered 7

, NebtmN es <

in hi .on ocea.s Ngh radia.+.be verified, by use, i

9

( Teoden &tvelQc

(___

'[ ,nc g s igg Ad.mims+m.t'we Contro is. tg

^

FA LET-vuaT 4 ~

3/4 6-1 AMENDMENT 30.122 8

L h

h,,,, ,, ,, This L c.o i s i N e orpora_tecL into STS 3. (o .1

\a-A ga m Im zz:U,mu2cr /g LIMIT! Iso coerDITION FOR CPERATICW or (UA*:,cws Y

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited in accordance with the g 3, g , , g Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. 'M b

= -- _ .- . , -

m u ci m m , oou 1, 2, 2 an. .. conh.intnenf inopem.ble._- -

p

~

LCo 3.6.1 Sc b*I With he measured tainment 1 akage rates coeding tS overall ntainment

(,) Le ge Rate foot Program ceptance er is, reetpre the mes red aimeest i rates to ithin the a amoe cri.torg ithia 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> er (e b he La et least 3DT STANDST within the seart 5 heure and la withis the following 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />. -

SURVETLtAIBCS RBgGIREMENTS redste).

i 4.6.1.2 The containeent leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the test l schedule and shall be determined La comformance with the criteria dk 3. l ,l,) specified is the Containment 14akage Rate Testing Proream. l l

FARLIT-UNIT 1 3/4 6-2 AMENDMENT NO. 122 l

K 3.b.

s a a 6 /. /

S R 3,6, l. 2-f ,

LA 5.56 n.)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTECRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3. 6.1. 6 The structural integrity of. the containment shall be maintained at a
  • level consistent with the acceptance criteria in Specification 4.6.1.6. 7.

APPLICA8ILITY: M00E5 1 ,2, 3, and 4 ACTION: *

{

' con 0:1 Ton)g lth the structural integrity of the containment not confonsing to the above - "'

requirements, restore the structural integrity to within the lief ts with 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />sace De in as seast mi hours.

STANOSY within Ene ** next e nours and in GULR' ggy QHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing30 2

~ CoNDlIl04 C-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3

4.6.1.6.1 Containment Tendens. The containment tendons' structural integrity A shall be demonstrated at the end of one, three and five years following the initial containment structural integrity test and at five year intervals thereafter. The tendons' structural integrity shall be demonstrated by:

a. Detersining that a representative sample of at least 21 tendons (6 dome 5 vertical, and 10 hoop) each have a If ft off force within the acceptance limits, defined as not less than the allowable lower bound force nor greater than the allowable upper bound force per wire at the time of the test as shown in Figure 4.6-1. This test '

shall include an unloading cycle in which each of these tendons is detensioned to determine if any wires or strands are broken or damaged. If the lift off force of any one tendon in the total sample population is out of the allowable bounds (less than minimum ,

or greater than saximum), an adjacent tendon on each side of the defective tendon shall also be checked for Ifft off force. If both of these tendons are found acceptable, the surveillance program may proceed considering the single deficiency as unfque and acceptoble.

More than one defective tendon out of the original sample population is evidence of abncroal degradation of the containment structure.

Unless there is evidence of abnormal degradation of the containment structure during the first three tests of the tendons, the number of tendons checked for lift off force during subsequent tests may be reduced to a representative sa=ple of at least 9 tendons (3 dome, 3 vertical and 3 hoop).

FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 6 s . AMENDMENT NO. 26

g y' 4, j y FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY FNP ITS 3.6.1 CONTAINMENT DOC HQ SHE DISCUSSION 1 A The CTS 3/4.6.1 Containment Integrity LCO and Action Statements are revised consistent with the STS. The defined term of" Containment Integrity"is not used in the STS and has been deleted from the LCO and Actions. The term Operable is used in place ofintegrity. The LCO requirement for the system, structure, or component to be Operable is consistent with all STS LCO statements. As with other STS LCOs, specific operability considerations are discussed in the TS bases. The disposition of the defined term " Containment Integrity"is discussed in Enclosure 2 of TS definitions section 1.0. The CTS defined term " Containment Integrity"is effectively retained in the STS surveillance requirements and the operability discussions in the STS bases. This change substitutes an STS term for a CTS term and is not intended to reduce the operability requirements for Containment. As this change is part of a re-organization of the presentation and format of the Containment section TS, it is considered an administrative change.

la A CTS 3/4.6.1 is revised to reflect the addition of a Farley-specific Condition B in the FNP ITS LCO 3.6.1 consistent with the action statement of CTS 3/4.6.1.6. The DOC associated with this change to CTS 3/4.6.1.6 discusses the addition of this new Condition. Since this change merely reflects the movement of current requirements to another location consistent with the STS format and presentation (i.e., covering the requirement to maintain containment operable, including the structural integrity, in the containment specification) the associated change is considered an administrative change.

2 A CTS 3/4.6.1 surveillance requirement 4.6.1.1.a is revised consistent with the STS. ' The CTS surveillance verifies the status of containment penetrations and the position of the associated isolation devices outside of containment every 31 days. The requirements of this surveillance pertain to isolation devices and therefore have been moved to the Containment Isolation Valve TS (STS LCO 3.6.3). The requirements of this CTS surveillance, except for the requirements resulting from required actions i.e., deactivated automatic valves, have been retained in SR 3.6.3.2. The requirements of this CTS surveillance regarding deactivated automatic valves (inoperable valves deactivated in accordance with action requirements) are effectively retained in the STS LCO 3.6.3 Actions A.1 and A.2. As automatic valves are deactivated and secured in the closed Chapter 3.6 E2-1-A November,1998

f26C 3,(,, f - 3 FNP TS Conversion

~

Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE FNP ITS 3.6.1 CONTAINMENT DOC  ;

EQ i

.S_ hie DISCUSSION 1 A All the requirements of CTS 3/4.6.1.2, " Containment Leakage" are l effectively incorporated into STS LCO 3.6.1 " Containment" consistent with the STS. In the STS, the leakage requirements of this CTS are considered part of the containment operability requirements. The markup of CTS  ;

3/4.6.1.2 in Enclosure 1 indicates the corresponding requirements in the l S fS LCO 3.6.1 " Containment" that effectively address the CTS 3/4.6.1.2  ;

requirements. As this change is part of the STS re-organization of the presentation and format of the Containment TS section and is not intended to introduce a technical revision, it is considered an administrative change. 1 1

la A CTS 3/4.6.1.2 is revised to reflect the addition of a Farley-specific Condition B in the FNP ITS LCO 3.6.1 consistent with the action statement of CTS 3/4.6.1.6. The DOC associated with this change to CTS 3/4.6.1.6 discusses the addition of this new Condition. Since this change merely reflects the movement of current requirements to another location consistent with the STS format and presentation (i.e., covering the requirement to maintain containment operable, including the structural integrity, in the containment specification) the associated change is considered an administrative change.

l 1

Chapter 3.6 E2-1-B November,1998 l

l l

% l'3 FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY FNP ITS - N/A DOC b'Q SHE DISCUSSION 1 LA CTS 3/4.6.1.6 requires the structural integrity of the containment to be maintained consistent with the acceptance criteria of the associated surveillance requirement (4.6.1.6). CTS 3/4.6.1.6 is applicable in Modes 1-4. The CTS surveillances 4.6.1.6.1 and 4.6.1.6.2 address the verification of containment tendon operability including the end anchorages and adjacent concrete surfaces. CTS suneillance 4.6.1.6.3 requires visual inspections of the accessible interior and exterior surfaces of containment including the containment liner plate. CTS 3/4.6.1.6 is removed from the i TS consistent with the STS. In the STS, the requirements for containment structural integrity are maintained in the surveillance requirements of LCO 3.6.1, " Containment" as SR 3.6.1.1 and SR 3.6.1.2 and in Specification 5.5.6," Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program" in the Administrative Controls section of the STS. The STS surveillance requirements SR 3.6.1.1 and SR 3.6.1.2 effectively retain the requirements to perform the Containment Tendon operability determinations and the visual inspections required by CTS surveillances 4.6.1.6.1,4.6.1.6.2, and 4.6.1.6.3. The STS LCO 3.6.1," Containment"is applicable in Modes 1-4 and requires the plant to be placed in Mode 5 for non-conforming conditions. Therefore, failure to meet the LCO 3.6.1 surveillance requirements results in essentially the same outcome as failure to meet the CTS 3/4.6.1.6 requirements for Containment Structural Integrity. However, l consistent with the STS, the details of CTS 3/4.6.1.6, including the specific 1 l guidance for performing the required surveillances are moved into a r ogram outside of the Technical Specifications similar to the existing l omms for ASME Inservice Testing and Containment Leakage. Similar

.he ASME Inservice Testing Program and Containment Leakage Rate Programs, the Containment Tendon Surveillance Program is specified in I

the Administrative Controls section of the TS. Specification 5.5.6," Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program", requires a program be established that contains the required inspection frequencies, and acceptance criteria in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.35 Rev. 2, i 1976. As such, the frequency and acceptance criteria of the required  !

suneillances continue to be specified in the TS. In addition, the STS contains a reporting requirement, Specification 5.6.9," Tendon Surveillance Report" which requires that any abnormal containment structure degradation detected during performance of the suneillances required by Specification 5.5.6," Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon l Chapter 3.6 E2-1-F November,1998

3'6 * 3 FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY FNP ITS - N/A DOC N_Q SHE DISCUSSION Surveillance Program," be reported to the NRC within 30 days. This STS reporting requirement constitutes an additional NRC notification beyond the current requirements of the CTS. Therefore, the requirements that remain in the TS effectively ensure the containment structural integrity continues to be determined in an acceptable manner. The removal of the details from CTS 3/4.6.1.6 and placement in a program outside of the technical specifications is acceptable based on the control provided by the associated surveillance requirements retained in LCO 3.6.1 and the surveillance program and reporting requirements in the administrative controls section of the TS.

2 A CTS 3/4.6.1.6 contains actions which allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to restore any non-conforming conditions before requiring a plant shutdown to Mode 5. These CTS actions have been in:orporated into a Farley-specific Condition B in the FNP ITS LCO 3.6.1 Since this change merely moves current requirements to anotuct location consistent with the STS format and presentation (i.e., covering the requirement to maintain containment operable, including the structural integrity, in the containment specification)  ;

the associated change is considered an administrative change.

3 A The shutdown requirements of CTS 3/4.6.1.6 are incorporated into the ITS LCO 3.6.1, Containment, Condition C consistent with Condition B of the STS. Since this change merely moves current requirements to another location consistent with the STS format and presentation, the associated change is considered an administrative change.

l l

3 apter 3.6 E2-2-F November,1998

F a n.i-3 /47 _

4 Containment { Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual))

3. .i 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS L

3.6.1 Containmenthtmospheric,Subatmospheric,IceCondenser,andDualh LC0 3.6.1 Containment shall be OPERABLE. ,

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COM ETION TIME A. Containment A.1 Restore containment I hour inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

Required Action and associated Completion 4 h Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> g

Time not met. AE Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> G 1 7k B, .5bvckmd B.I Resbre 4he skvM 29 6vr3 4h un6Wi",N red inkyty 40 wh l nek cu b 5 40

\;u,Q

&c gveem)ents #

3R %.I.L WOG STS 3.6-1 Rev 1, 04/07/95

l l

l FNP TS Conversion l

Enclosure 5 - JD from STS M 34'l'3 Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems 3

STS 3.6.1 CONTAINMENT FNP ITS 3.6.1 CONTAINMENT JD NUMBER JUSTIFICATION 1 STS 3.6.1 surveillance 3.6.1.1 is revised consistent with the NEI/ Industry recommendations for incorporating 10CFR50 Appendix J, Option B changes. The NEI/ Industry position on incorporating 10CFR50 Appendix J, Option B changes in the STS is documented in TSTF - 52 which has been previously transmitted to the NRC.

2 STS LCO 3.6.1 is revised consistent with the requirements of CTS 3/4.6.1.6. FNP CTS allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to restore the structural integrity of containment to within limits before requiring a unit shutdown. The revision of STS LCO 3.6.1 maintains the FNP current licensing basis. ,

]

l 1

! I l l i

l l l

Chapter 3.6 ES-1-A November,1998 t

W d

N 3.6./-3 d6 Containment [AtmosphericD B 3.6.1 BASES i

ACTIONS Al (continued) also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal.

I and V

If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within I the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a  !

MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this l status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating i experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full  :

power conditions in an orderly manner and without {

, challenging plant systems.

. Rewsst> by TETF ST AppJ CMMB SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 ~

REQUIREMENTS h' Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test V E

-13p-62., _ requirements ofM10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. I ?, as Jnodified) g by approved exemotions./ Failure to meet air lock Jand purge valve with esilient seal eakage limits specified in 3.6.2 nd LC0 3.6. ces not invalidate the acce abil ty of these overall leakage determinations unless l Rhu an edge. their otribution to overalf Type A, B, and C leakage 737F 52.

or At Mbe, causesthttoexceedlimits. As left leakaoe orior o the l mdu T te. B W irst star after performing a req 'ed [0 CFR 50 j M C- g

.i (Appendix Ji eakage test is requir be < 0.6 L, for -

f%-

i -

combined Type B and C leakage,, and .75 L, for overall l At all other times'Tetween required leakage (hell 8MnJ*fE 6houIm rate tests, the acceptance criteria is based on an overall Type AType leabge A limitleakag4 or SAvkitkunkt of s 1.0 L,. At s 1.0 L, the offsite l in6M~[,goe. A dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the i ' fc5 fin v safety analysis. SR Freauencies are as required by fAppenq1x SR 3.4.2 (whidh J, as/allows modified pp approvyd exempti/)ns.

FNequency/extensioM doef not #Jhus, ply) / W These periodic testing requirements verify that the containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate

_ assumed in the safety analysis.

i

- , ~

Cen~hunthenf f.etJa9e &~Esh  ? m (continued)

WOG STS B 3.6-9 Rev 1, 04/07/95 4

/

CHAPTER 3.6 3 6I. 3,I t- 3 mSERT V -

NEW ACTION B BASES PAGE B 3.6-9 l If the requirements of SR 3.6.1.2 are not met, the structural integrity of the containment is in a i degraded state. SR 3.6.1.2 ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained in accordance with the provisions of the Containment Tendon Surveillance Program.

If a limit of the Program is not met, Condition B allows 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to restore the structural ,

integrity to within limits. The 24-hour Completion Time allows for the correction of minor  !

problems while providing a limit to the amount of time that the structural integrity of containment may be in a degraded condition during at-power conditions.

i i

I i

t I

i l

r l h i

l i

i

?

i Chapter 3.6 Insen Page

Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.1-7 i.

1 e

i i

i l

{

l

ContainmentQAtmospheric) l FAr 3.6,i J B361

)

BASES i

, BACKGROUND 2. closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or (continued) de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in gism LCO 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves";

ofwAN W b. Each air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in gch penetroiton LCO 3.6.2, " Cont inment Air Locks";

(e ., we,ld S,beMcA05

c. All equipment hatches are closed; and or -rmis)is _

d.

p P g OPERA BLE, The pressurized sealing mechanism associated with al penetration is OPERABLE, except as provided in J FNp LCO 3.6.[ ] f g Ps donbnrnenf ZntegroTf Dkr:

APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the containment is that the SAFETY ANALYSES containment must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.

M O' 6 TM [ -~

The DBAs that result in a challenge to containment OPERABILITY from high pressures and temperatures a loss l

of coolant accident (LOCA), a steam line break nd a rod gr gf 3f ejection accident (REA) (Ref. 2). In addit , release of significant fission product radioactivit ithin containment l Z4 h0VIS can occur from a LOCA or REA. In the analyses, it is L o, o75% Oe* assumed that the containment is OPE E such that, for the a_p+e,r DBAs involving release of fission oduct radioactivity, is co rolled by the rate of release to the containment environmen}fonte leakage. The nment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of 0. of containment air weight per dayWRef. 3). This lea age rate, used to evaluate aOf f' " B offsite doses resulting from accidents, is defined in 10 CFR 50, AppendixA(Ref.1), as L,: the maximum

'/grg.62 allowable containment ~ leakage rate at the calculated peak gc3, g a containment i rnal pressure (P.) resulting from the limiting B The allowable leakage rate represented by L,

, forms the asis for the acceptance criteria imposed on all i d,16 Mentleakageratetesting. L is assumed to be  !

0.1.% per day in the safety analysis at P, = . psig F534 ( e 3)-

b-(o I' 4 d Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for l

l fMg.2 the establishment of containment OPERABILITY.

3M-95-ote-cc7 (W

i (continued) 7 WOG STS B 3.6-7 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

. W hdh Containment (AtmosphericD

" 62 run m  ;

BASES ACTIONS AJ (continued) 1 also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring i containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when l containment is inoperable is minimal.

1 and V

If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 1 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed l Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating  !

experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Revisec by TETF n- App.T CDWB l

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 - '

REQUIREMENTS g' Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance I with the visual examinations and leakage rate test V N

-Gfr-W requirements ofM10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref.1?, as Jnodified) gbyapprovedexemotions.fFailuretomeetairLockjandpurge valve with esilient seal eakage limits specified in 3.6.2 nd LC0 3.6. oes not invalidate the acce abil ty of these overall leakage determinations unless f.hu a.n edge. their 1tribution to overall Type A, B, and C leakage 737f 52.

orskt Mhd. causes t t to exceed limits. As left leakaoe crior lo the T te. B W irst star in 6 after performing a requi ed (i0 CFR 50, F g M6 h uppendix Jh eakage test is require o be < 0.6 L, for -

  • I -~ - - - - -

combined Type B and C leakage,, and < __.75 L, for overall Type A leakagk At all other times etween required leakage hall 8Mnj a n cuI 4Em rate tests, tha acceptance criteria is bcsed on an overall

( H 5AufdtkunM Type A leakage limit of s 1.0 L . At s 1.0 L, the offsite 1 I included.Tgjoe. 4 dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis. SR Freauencies are as required by I fe 5 fin TAppenq1x J, as/ modified p9 approvyd exemptiAns.

i SR 3.4.2 (whtdh allows Frequency / extensions) not doer}hus,

  1. ply) /W These periodic testing requirements verify that the

. containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analysis.

Cen~huntrenf f.edn9e Reje.Tesh 7 m (continued) i WOG STS B 3.6-9 Rev 1, 04/07/95

NQ g ContainmentAirLocks@ Atmospheric,Subatmospheric.IceCondenser.andDualij B 3.6.2 BASES c nt M " M ^*

o,l3 APPLICABLE The DBAs that resu in a release of radioactive materA 1 SAFETY ANALYSES within containment are a loss of coolant accident,On Va rod ejection accident; Ref. 2) . In the analysis of each of these accidents, it is assumed that containment is OPERABLE Ns lege rde such that release of fission products to the environment is '

15cle6necLin /odpA j control by the rate of containment leakage. .The opfgn t was designed with an allowable leakage rate of 50, Apperdigg/gn e p;q i10.1; of containment air weight per day (Ref. 2). JThis l-g dMe cen%n., leaKhge rate is ' fined in 10 CFR 50, ppendix J Ref. 1) }

, mentle6 e, rde as L, [0.1]% o contain nt air wei t per day, the i g,t the, ,

maxim allowab'e contai nt leakag rate at t calcu ted 1 pe Q cafgnm peak containme $ intern pressure . = [14.4] ia  ; I th/aro42,,pte g g fol wing a DBA. ITh s allowable leikage rate forms the basis for the~ acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs PS , a o a d with the air locks.

follaulms C ct Ot.A te n e.sb l e on ment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC

[ Policy Statement.

~

sm- AS- o'2 \ **3 7bTF52-LC0 CN Each containment air lock forms part of the :ontainment pressure boundary. As part of ntainment, the air lock safety function is related to control of the containment

_ leakage rate resulting from a DBA. Thus, each air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.

Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to be OPERABLE.

Closure of a single door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events.

Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed whepthe air lock is not being used for normal entry into@7 exit from containment.

73F.-5Z_

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. In MODES S and 6, the (continued)

WOG STS B 3.6-22 Rev 1, 04/07/95 i

f MN D-Containment Air Locks (( Atmospheric, Subatmosnheric. Ice Condenser. and Dua $

B 3.6.2 P& 3 6.M BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining containment air locks OPERABLE requires TSTF pmpliance with the leakage rate test reauirements of A 10 G R 50, Appendix J (Ref. 1), as modified by approved)

.}Q exemptions.f This SR reflects the leakage rate testing Cordaintrent requirements with regard to air lock leakage (Type 8 leakage eg tests). The acceptance criteria were established during L initial air lock and containment OPERABILITY testing. The Tesfin ?r f periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall containment leakage rate. The Freouency is required by

_ b TAppendix J (Ref. 1), as modified by approved exemptions. 3

'Thus, SR_3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not ;

2P.P.I .T.! [

The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.

This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the l Ag results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of 4f j(.E - y 3.6.1.1.forThis SRaccounted ensures that air lock Je.akage is proper y in determining the overall/Ntainment leakage C.cmbrned. fe- ""e T6TF4L 3.6.2.2 The air lock interlock is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in a single air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed .to withstand the maximum expected post accident containment pressure, closure of either door will support containment j OPERABILITY. Thus, the door interlock feature supports f M ^q>g containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for M personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock g W1l will function as designed and that simultaneous opening of

~----~

the inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur. Due f wto the purely mechanical nature of thi interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is'eni allenged when the

_ containment air lock doo_r isgo_peneo,rthis test is only

_M Mg b requirea to be perto_rmedjiipo nte g ex ng (ontafnmenJ/ f air lock ydt is ot r_ ir mo fr u tly _

nJ5 Eft'r R (continued)

WOG STS B 3.6-27 Rev 1, 04/07/95

Associated Package Changes for RAIs 3.6.1-8, 3.6.2-4,3.6.3-21,3.6.5-2,3.6,7-3, and 3.6.9-3

RAI i 3. f .l- 8, 3.6.2-%

33' 24 7'M-5 FNP TS Conversion 24.,7-3; 3.6.9 3 Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems ,

i l

l CHAPTER 3.6 DISCUSSION OF CHANGES (DOCS) l TO THE CURRENT FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT (FNP)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TS)

This enclosure contains a brief DOC for each marked-up change to the FNP Current Technical Specifications (CTS) required to produce the FNP specific Improved Technical Specification (ITS). The DOC numbers are referenced directly from Enclosure 1 (CTS markup), and the associated Significant Hazard Evaluations (SHEs) are contained in Enclosure 3. Some obvious editorial changes made to the CTS in order to conform with the Standard TS (STS) contained in NUREG-1431, Rev. I may not be specifically addressed by an individual DOC but are covered by the generic administrative SHE contained in Enclosure 3.

A generic administrative DOC which applies to all administrative changes in Enclosure 1 not otherwise identified is included below.

DOCOA Numerous reformatting, renumbering, and editorial changes have been made to the CTS in Enclosure 1. In addition, certain wording preferences and/or English language conventions have been adopted, which resulted in the ITS being more readily readable and therefore understandable by the plant operators and users.

These changes did not result in any technical changes, but are considered to be Administrative changes.

Each of the following DOCS and associated SHEs are applicable to both Unit I and 2 unless otherwise stated.

In order to facilitate review, the DOCS in this enclosure are organized by individual TS and may be easily separated into individual TS review sections if desired. The DOCS are labeled with the corresponding CTS number and name and the proposed FNP ITS specific number and name.

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Chapter 3.6 E2-1 November,1998

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FNP TS Conversion QC 3,6 Z- ) Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS FNP ITS 3.6.2 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS DOC EQ SHE DISCUSSION and the low likelihood of an event occurring during the time the air lock door is open for entry or exit which would challenge the containment boundary. In addition, the allowance provided by this note may reduce the potential risk incurred during a plant transient (shutdown) that could result from an inoperable air lock.

The second STS note provides the allowance to enter the Actions Conditions separately for each inoperable air lock. As explained in STS section 1.3, " Completion Times", this note allows a =parate Completion .

i Time to be established for each airlock. The application of this note in the STS is based on the Action requirements providing sufficient remedial measures when applied individually to each component or system addressed in the TS. As the FNP air locks are consistent with the air locks addressed in the STS, the provision of this note is applicable to and acceptable for FNP.

The third STS note affecting the CTS 3/4.6.1.3 Actions provides guidance to direct the user to the Containment LCO (3.6.1) if the air lock leakage results in the total containment leakage exceeding the limit required by LCO 3.6.1. CTS 3.6.1.3, action c contains the same actions as CTS 3/4.6.1.2 when the leakage rates exceed the overall Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program acceptance criteria. In the conversion to the ITS, CTS 3/4.6.1.2 is incorporated into ITS LCO 3.6.1 as Conditions A and B and SR 3.6.1.1. Thus, the CTS effectively require the same actions to be entered as the ITS. The only difference is the format of the STS as compared to the CTS. Therefore, this note provides a clarification based on the format of the STS and does not introduce a technical change. As such, the addition of this note is considered an administrative change.

3 L The CTS 3/4.6.1.3 Actions are revised consistent with the STS. The CTS l actions are revised to specifically include "one or more" inoperable air locks. The STS actions are applicable to each air lock individually and each i STS condition may be applicable to more than one air lock at a time.

Therefore, consistent with the format and presentation of the STS, the i action Conditions for an inopenble air lock use the term "one or more air locks" to describe the applicability of each Condition. This clarification of the applicability of the required actions is acceptable since the level of assurance (for containment leakage) provided by accomplishing the

! Chapter 3.6 E2-2-C November,1998

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Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.2-2 1

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FNP TS Conversion M%M Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS l l Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems

! i CTS 3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS l FNP ITS 3.6.2 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS j

! ' OC D l l NQ SiiE DISCUSSION 1 LA The CTS 3.6.1.3 LCO statement is revised consistent with the STS. The descriptive text contained in the CTS LCO regarding the status of the ,

airlock doors and the exception to allow entry and exit through the air lock  !

is moved to the bases discussion for this TS. For a system to be considered operable, the def'mition of operability for the system must be satisfied and i the associated Surveillance requirements must be met. In the STS, j information related to the design and configuration of a system which relate .

to meeting the operability requirements of the LCO is included in the Bases.  !

As the above descriptive text defines the allowable configurations under which the air lock is operable, and the conditions and surveillances ensure i that those configurations are maintained or appropriate actions are taken, it is appropriate to move this redundant information to the Bases. The removal of this information from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentatior. of the STS. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases frr guidance in performing the associated surveillances is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.

2 L The CTS 3/4.6.1.3 Actions are revised by the addition of three notes consistent with the STS. The STS notes provide the following; 1) an allowance to enter and exit the air locks to perform maintenance on affected i

air lock components while the action requirements to maintain one air lock door closed are applicable,2) an allowance for separate actions Condition l

I entry for each inoperable air lock which results in a separate Completion Time clock being established for each air lock, and 3) a clarification to ensure the more conservative requirements of LCO 3.6.1 are applied if air ,

lock leakage results in exceeding the limit required to be met by LCO 3.6.1. l The first STS note provides an allowance required to ensure the air lock is

! repaired in a timely manner. The note allows entry and exit of the air lock

, to perform the required repairs while the action requirement to maintain one air lock door closed is applicable. However, the note only provides an exception to the action requirement for the brief time required to make an entry or exit and only for the purpose of repairing the air lock. The 4 allowance provided by this note is acceptable based on the brief time the air  !

j lock door is open for entry or exit, the other air lock door remaining closed, Chapter 3.6 E2-1-C November,1998

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Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-3

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(2/tt 3. f, . 3 -3 FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS I Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems f

CTS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC FQ SHE DISCUSSION the addition of Notes consistent with the STS. STS Notes 2,3, and 4 provide additional clarification and guidance in the use and application of STS 3.6.3 and related TS.

Note 2 provides guidance in entering the STS Conditions for each penetration flowpath. This note conforms with the STS administrative conventions for Condition entry as described in Section 1.3," Completion l Times" of the STS. It is also consistent with the equivalent CTS actions l

("one or more" containment isolation valves may be inoperable). As such, .

I the addition of this note is required for the administrative conventions of the STS and does not introduce a technical change.

Notes 3 and 4 provide guidance in determining when other applicable TS may be entered due to an inoperable containment isolation valve and/or excessive leakage. The STS format contains directions within certain TS l for entering other related TS when applicable. CTS 3.0.1 states the following: " Compliance with the Limiting Conditions for Operation contained in the succeeding specifications is required during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified therein; except that upon failure to meet the Limiting Conditions for Operation, the associated ACTION requirements shall be met." Therefore, if a system is made inoperable by a containment isolation valve or the leakage through an isolation valve results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria, then by the requirements of CTS 3.0.1, the appropriate system LCO, and/or LCO 3.6.1.2 for excessive valve leakage (equivalent to that requirement for entry into LCO 3.6.1 in the ITS), would be entered.

Thus, the CTS effectively require the same actions to be entered as the ITS.

The notes are considered additional infomiation contained in the STS to prompt the user when other TS may be applicable. The addition of Notes 3 and 4 is intended to provide guidance for the use of the STS only, and is not intended to introduce a technical change to the CTS. Therefore, this is considered an administrative change.

4 A The CTS 3/4.6.3 action statement is revised consistent with Condition A of the STS. The term " penetration"is used consistently in STS 3.6.3, the penetration is what must be isolated to maintain containment integrity. This term is used in the STS as a single penetration may have more than one flow path and multiple isolation valves on each side of containment.

Chapter 3.6 E2-2-J November,1998 l

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. _ . _ . - _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ - _-_ _ _ _ _ , ~. _ _ _- - __.__

PAI ~34 2-Y g L,w 3,$,3 Con [unmenf ZsoYle!' NM

~ _ -

.TSOLATION V8lV6$ ^

2 ,b CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS -

2.6.3 C NTAINMENThMULAMON SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION j

l un 3,g,3

, , r.

Containment (urge supply and exhaust valve] shall be OPERABLE and 2

b a Th_e 48-inch cont ainment nures suoply and exhaust isolation alves 3 .

l .6R 3 lo,3.l M .

(CBV-Hy-3198A. 31980. 3196. 31970shall be (e-activated and secured)in i 3 sneir cioseo yom on.

L., gg3 g3 he,g,$ The 8-inch containment ni-purge f up' ply and ' exhaust isolation valves (CBV-HV-2566L 2866D. 756/C. 25670 )may be open for safety-related ' $

reasons. # ,,

' L-96 AS E S gg7{ PLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and a zmtsr r

  • m pg pg A

$TS 10 ACTION:

l

' 3 6,3 ' .

y p* t one 8- ch cont nmen pur supply one inch cont nment

__ _ ge au isolat n va eo n or not -a ct ted, de-a vate

'cu r in a close posi on e open va e(s) ' isolate i e 3 l

8 L ene ati within our h urtarnbe in at least nu6 STANDBY' within the i

{ p g ,3 m gg Teit 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Odf/OO L

LQ 3.5.3 with the le rate fo the conta5 ament purne supp1r and-es"

, .m o [xceed p enet ,atio e unit soec,rm1 . n+aust -

7 E .6.1.7.3.D wi thin Jurs either:

N . Reduce thi leakage' to witnfn the Jimit/, or

'I~NS E AT f . solate the containment purge supply or both supply and e t b 3 4 ,3 pe ions as required to reduce tne leakage rate the containme mosphere to the outside atmosph o within the Action 5 iteit of spect on 4.6.1.7.2 by the seTfatleast:

D,ljD.7j0AAd N a) One OPERA 8LE'de-activate nch inside contaitunent purge A

supply or both sujpy d exhau olation valves secured in the closed pogtron or secured by use blind flange, and one

/ OPERABL 6 activated 8-inch inside contairen urge supply or g upply and exhaust isolation valves secured closed sition or secured by use of a blind flange, or

  • Inis specification is governing for the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation penetration leakage and 48-inc isolation valve position.

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l CoeJDTmr4 6 L.A FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 6-10

  • AMENDMENT NO. ;;, 74

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CHAPTER 3.6 F6I 3.6.3-i INSERT T TO CTS PAGE 3/4 610 NEW GENERAL ACTION NOTES FOR CTS 3/4.6.1.7 -

i

... . NOTES - .

l. Penetration flow path (s) except for 48 inch purge valve flow paths may be unisolated ,

intermittently under administrative controls. t

2. Separate Condition Entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.
3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by i containment isolation valves.
4. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1," Containment," when i isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate  ?

acceptance criteria. )

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Chapter 3.6 Insert Page i

g y,f, y p FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems l

l CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC bLQ SHE DISCUSSION 3.6.3.

l 4 LA The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 LCO statements a and b are revised consistent with the STS. The valve numbers for the 48 inch and 8 inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are removed from the LCO and placed in the bases i of the Containment Isolation Valve TS (3.6.3). The removal of this type of information from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. The valve numbers listed in CTS 3.6.1.7.a and .b provide plant nomenclature for the valves listed in the LCO statement (Containment purge supply and exhaust valves). This information is detail provided in the FSAR and on plant drawings. It does not define the requirements of operability for the valves but rather provides additional descriptors of the valves that have already been identified by the statement of the LCO. Therefore, it is also appropriate to move this information to the Bases. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for identification of the associated valves is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.

4a L The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Actions are modified by the addition of Notes consistent l with the STS. The first STS Note provides an allowance to unisolate any penetration flow path (except for the 48 inch purge supply and exhaust valves) intermittently under administrative controls. This allowance applies to penetration flow paths isolated in accordance with the Required Actions j of STS 3.6.3. The CTS Table 3.6-1 currently provides a similar allowance for a limited number of valves. The STS note, however, expands the CTS allowance to apply to all Containment Isolation Valves except the 48 inch purge supply and exhaust. The allowance to open intermittently any containment isolation valve, closed as a result of Required Actions, is considered acceptable in the STS based on the requirement for I

administrative controls (described in the STS bases) that provide for a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. The required administrative controls  ;

provide adequate assurance that the affected penetration may be rapidly l l closed if containment isolation is required. The 48 inch containment purge supply and exhaust valves are excepted from the STS allowance due to the  ;

large size and direct path from the containment to the outside atmosphere.  !

Chapter 3.6 E2-2-G November,1998

i FNP TS Conversion I N 3'N'I Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems 1

CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC NQ SHE DISCUSSION 4b A The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Actions are modified by the addition of Notes consistent with the STS. STS Notes 2,3, and 4 provide additional clarification and guidance in the use and application of STS 3.6.3 and related TS.

Note 2 provides guidance in entering the STS Conditions for each penetration flowpath. This note conforms with the STS administrative conventions for Condition entry as described in Section 1.3, " Completion Times" of the STS. It is also consistent with the equivalent CTS actions

("one or more" containment isolation valves may be inoperable). As such, the addition of this note is required for the administrative conventions of the STS and does not introduce a technical change.

Notes 3 and 4 provide guidance in detennining when other applicable TS may be entered due to an inoperable containment isolation valve and/or excessive leakage. The STS format contains directions within certain TS for entering other related TS when applicable. CTS 3.0.1 states the following: " Compliance with the Limiting Conditions for Operation

! contained in the succeeding specifications is required during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified therein; except that upon failure to meet the Limiting Conditions for Operation, the associated ACTION requirements shall be met." Therefore, if a system is made inoperable by a containment isolation valve or the leakage through an isolation valve results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria, then by the requirements of CTS 3.0.1, the appropriate system LCO, and/or LCO 3.6.1.2 for excessive valve leakage (equivalent to that requirement for entry into LCO 3.6.1 in the ITS), would be entered.

Thus, the CTS effectively require the same actions to be entered as the ITS.

The notes are considered additional information contained in the STS to prompt the user when other TS may be applicable. The addition of Notes 3 and 4 is intended to provide guidance for the use of the STS only, and is not intended to introduce a technical change to the CTS. Therefore, this is considered an administrative change.

5 M The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Action Statement a is revised consistent with the STS.

CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Action Statement a addresses a mispositioned 48 inch purge supply or exhaust isolation valve and requires isolation of the affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. This CTS action is replaced by Condition A of STS LCO 3.6.3 which addresses inoperable containment isolation valves.

Chapter 3.6 E2-3-G November,1998

FNP TS Conversion N 3'b'N Enclosure 3 - Signincant Hazards Evaluations Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems III. SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIONS CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES da;L

-L Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change involves upgrading the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to more closely agree with the STS and does not result in any hardware changes. The proposed change allows isolation valves other than the 48 inch purge valves to be opened intermittently under administrative controls that assure the isolation function of the valve remains available. The containment isolation valves are not assumed to be an initiator of any analyzed event. The isolation valves act to isolate the containment penetrations in the event of a design basis accident and serve to limit the consequences of accidents. The proposed change still ensures the isolation valv es will perform their required function and will serve to limit the consequences of design basis events as described in the FSAR and that the results of the analyses in the FSAR remain bounding.

Additionally, the proposed change does not impose any new safety analyses limits or alter the plants ability to detect and mitigate events. Therefore, this char.ge does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change involves upgrading the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to more closely agree with the STS and does not necessitate a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in parameters governing normal plant operation. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The proposed change, which upgrades the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to be consistent with the STS does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change has been developed considering the importance of the containment isolation valves in limiting the consequences of a design basis event and the concerns for the plants ability to perform required operational support functions with the necessery systems isolated. The proposed change allows for alternative protection to assure the isolation function of the valve remains available. Considering the low probability of an event that would challenge the containment boundary, the alternative protection provided by this change and the operational requirements to occasionally open these valves, the proposed change is acceptable and any reduction in the margin of safety f insignificant.

Chapter 3.6 E3-1-C November,1998

Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-5 l

'Mr 3.635 31

,z sa:s a saapes, CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS L.

O t# d M 5 6c. 4 d in fo'$. g SURVEILLANCE REQUIntEMENTS (Conti ued)

SR 3 6.'5 fo / hg G.6.3. Each isolation valve Specified in Table 3.6-1 all be demonstrated OPERABLE (durino_the co r _n u avorrrun wnnrc nr co r ueg

-f at least once per 18 months by:( -5 g g l f V}33 J adv of g" Verifying that on a Fhase A containment isolation 7 signal, f.496.hd ,

each wnase w isol tion valve actuates to its isolation position. gyd.cus verifying th t on a(phase B contaipmen* isola *4 @ ignal, each g, nase,,p isolation valve actuates to i o fr 'e. m %gw esition. i5 e o g

Q_.6. 3. 'iY AThe isolation time of each power operated or automata valv able 3.6-D shall beJetermined to be within its limit when tested pursu t *o (pecification 4.0.f." Inscvvs.c I -

M _ g 4.6. .4 The cont nmentpurgeishationvalvessha be demonst ated tesa.co.w OPERA E prior to sta tup after each EOLD SHUTDOWN if n t performed n the '

previou 3 months by v ifying that'wh the measured le age rate is dded t the leaka e rates for al other Type B a C penetrations, the combine leakage ra is less than r equal to 0.6 . In addition, he leakage te for the cent nment purge i lation valves all be compared the previc ly measured leaka e rate (for th containment pu e isolation val s) to detect excess valve de adation.

An engineering eva ation shall b erformed to de rmine what corr tive action, if any, is n essary.

IV A

~DMERT' L 6 r3 3,6,3 LvvMI-d3 SR 3.G,.3.2. M 5e. 3. c.,3. '6, n

A 1

1 l FARLEY-UNIT L 3/4 6-15 AMENDMENT No.130 l

P E % .?-5 15'l Containmont Isolation valves [AtmospheriTc,

@tsitmdspheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual))

3-6-7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3. -------------------NOT ------- ------ M nof l#'kek I. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation scoAch, or The, blind. %e , areas may be verified by use of cAede on the fuel administrative means. gecyc3 rm fer & fd) fl.ange is onto.J

/ TM- D, re9,iftred.to d Verify each containment isolation manual Prior to fleiqased valve and blind flange that is located entering MODE 4 rm inside containmenthand required to be from MODE 5 if a.irne.coFO.e closed during accfdent conditions is not performed camo.,l.d closed, except for containment isolation within the valves that are open under administrative previous controls. 92 days l

SR 3.6.3.g{ Ve 0

the isolatfn time of'eiEn poser QIn -

/

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perated eno eacarautomatic containment / accordance i isolation valve is within limits. with the ,

/ i t Inservice d M

rog o-

{$l fays ,

m -/ -;

N/A To FNP Conia.inmenf / _

SR 3.6.3.6 each weight or spring loaded che 92 days valve ble during operation t gh one complete e of full t , and verify each check ains closed when the differential ur the direction of flow is :s Lk j psid and op hen the differe pressure in the directi .

f1 s 2: [1.2] psid and < (5.0) psid.

for .50boYtnoSDherlC .

ConfodhMSob \ ~~

! (continued) l I

Rev 1, 04/07/95 WOG STS 3.6-13

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pat 34 3"I Containment Isolation Valv M (Atmospheric],

{ubatmospheric,IceCondenser,andDualU Toh 1R h ed 93 b %be. -%h ave \oc.ksd scold or B 3.6.3 j

oh<dise 9tured )m h, dosedposW, <ime,s ike.z w, cve ,

BASES McAF'd b be in M weed posLW upen %,.5%,

u orsecu,'g, j

- _f _ x - ->x ,- - -

T5TF- 6 f4v.I SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.# 3(continued)

REQUIREMENTS administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. The SR specifies that containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls required to meet the SR during the time they are

-3 hi Note' allows valves and blind flanges located in high ra iation areas to be verified closed by use of NOTE 2 prov.i des administrative means. Allowing verification by M cdlewatne_e to administrative means is considered acceptable, since access OnLgverdyth6 to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, 3, ggggCfy e and 4, for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these containment isolation valves, once on M be r they have been verified to be in their proper position, is ca.nedL%.r>je mall .

erecd.hcitedn.m SR 3.6.3.ff m A% N Verifying that the isolation time of each riower operated automatic containment isolation valve is within limits is  !

required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in a time periods lefs than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. GThe isolation time and Frequency of this _SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program gr 92 days.] %

s-N ,-

$E 3.6.3.6 In subatm eric containments, the check val at serve a containment ation function are wei or spring loaded to provide positive sure in the ction of flow. This ensures that these check ve 1 remain closed when the inside containment atmos rns to subatmospheric conditions followin A. SR 3.b. requires vecification of operation of the che alves that are testable ng unit operation. The Frequenc 92 days is cons nt with the Inservice Testing Program requi nt valve testing on a 92 day Frequency.

/ ~

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.6-41 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. -- .-. .= - .- -___ ._ -. . .-

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 5 - JD from STS

~@AI %3i Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems STS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES JD 1 NUMBER JUSTIFICATION 1 Not used.

2 The STS 3.6.3 surveillance 3.6.3.2 has been deleted consistent with FNP CTS requirements. FNP CTS allow for continuous operation of the mini-purge system for safety related reasons. The FSAR states that the mini-purge system operates j during power operation to continuously purge the containment atmosphere. The STS Bases discussion for SR 3.6.3.2 states that the mini-purge valves are required to be closed. This is in direct conflict with the FNP current licensing basit and has -

been deleted consistent with FNP current licensing basis.

3 The STS 3.6.3 surveillance 3.6.3.4 is revised by the acMition of Note 2 consistent with the CTS allowance for the blind flange installed on the fuel transfer canal flange. The allowance provided in this Note to the STS surveillance corresponds to the

  • footnote to 4.6.1.1 in CTS 3/4.6.1 Containment Integrity. The allowance to verify the position of this blind flange only after each draining of the fuel transfer canal is justified since misposition of this flange at other times during normal ,

operation is highly unlikely. j 4 The STS 3.6.3 surveillance 3.6.3.5 (ITS 3.6.3.4) has been revised consistent with FNP CTS requirements. FNP CTS 4.6.3.3 requires that the isolation time of each l power operated or automatic valve of Table 3.6-1 be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. The IST Program contains the testing requirements for the valves listed in Table 3.6-1. Therefore, STS 3.6.3 surveillance 3.6.3.5 (ITS 3.6.3.4) has been revised consistent with the deletion of l Specification 4.0.5 in the STS and the FNP current licensing basis as stated in CTS I 4.6.3.3.

5 The STS 3.6.3 Conditions A, B, and E (ITS Condition D) and SR 3.6.3.7 (ITS SR 3.6.3.5) have been revised consistent with FNP CTS requirements. The FNP CTS l leakage limit for containment purge valves with resilient seals is based on a total l

penetration leakage rate, and is related to the total leakage from all Type B and C tests as opposed to an individual valve leakage rate as indicated in the STS. The l

l above sections of STS 3.6.3 have been revised to reflect this difference and to maintain the FNP current licensing basis for these penetrations.

P Chapter 3.6 E5-1-C November,1998

i Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-6 i

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Although STS LCO 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves", contaias the requirements for th

'- Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves, the markup ofCTS 3/4.6.3, " Containment Isolatio not include the requirements associated with the containment purge supply and exhaust isola The TS requirements for the containment purge supp:

3 and exhaust isolation valves are contained in CTS I 3/4.6.1.7 "Contamment Ventilation System", and all clumges to those requirements are addre markups and DOCS associated with that CTS. In the STS, CTS 3/4.6.l.7 and CTS 3/4.6.3 into one STS LCO 3.6.3 for all contamment isolation valves.

b CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3,f,3 OvtAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 2 .3 LIMITING CCNDITICNJCR OPERATICN I L A ~'

O E u.o ' E C#b"l V r  ? TR%

F ~~ 3.6.3 he containm~ent isolation valveC#pecified in Table 3.6-1)sha11 be J INSERT H CPERAste witn isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-11 f _

[(

7 APPLICABILITY: MCCE51, 2, 3 and_4 A 4/ pre o f'  !

[

ACTION: " I" ** ' # "W EO" 6 J O p

CDODITIDPJ N Y With one or more kf thholation valv (5ecified in Table L E-h {noptrable, LAM bth

  • Ixsearz $ICC"o'.'R*E.*Ze" T ""'7"Y '" "7'"""'Y""TY

= '

coneW,o04 5 Q Restore W inoperable valve (s) to CPERABLE status within 4 .)hours # g of a es a ected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by of at least b 1 yggg77 one eactivated automatic valve 6ecured in tne isolation position]

$. 2, #

7 Isolate each affected penetratton within 4 hoyrs by use og off/oas at least f gdM one closed sanual valve or blind flange; or w g gg, d Be in at least HOT STANCBY within the ne.xt 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDCW within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Vdv SCf.ur

^' -

I.NSE~RJ N* '

+c.ordiSn E N SURVEILLANCE RECUIREMENTS B SnD C, Pco brntn M f4.6.3.1 The isolation valves specified in Table 3.5-1 shall be demonstrated N i lo CPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after saintenance, repair or @T*gg -

b replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test, and verification of isola J fon time. -

"*'"**"1 u< s-1< m EnonEur no 26

Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-7

f? g 3.fe.3~ ]

L,w 3s,3 Con [s unmen f IssY! V' b'S 150 ATIoH V IVES

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3 .lo CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

~

3,g,3CONTA!NMENT[ VENT!LATIONSYSTEM

....y ',

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3,6 ~3 .6.1.7' Containment (urge supply and exhaust valvej shall be OPERABLE and The a8-inch containment nurce suoply and exhaust isolation alves S-4

.6R3.lo.3. l b ((CBV-HV-3198A. 31980, 3196. 3197)]shall be Qe-activated and secured)in i 3 sneir ciosea gom on. l kg Q,) The 8-inch containment Qews )

ni-purge sup~ ply and exhaust isolation valves (CBV-HV-2866C. 2866D. FB6K. za67D )may be open for safety-related 4 g

'-98 AS E S 5)

D667E PPLICA8ILITY: N00ES 1, 2, 3 and a INSEIU' T m pg g A S T S 1.I O ACTION:

34,2

  • g p* {q t one ge 8-au ch cont nmen pur supply isolat n va eo n or not one

-a ct inch cont nment ted , de- ivate a l

'cu r in a close posi on e_ open va e(s) ' isolate e 3

$ n ene ati within our h ort Sr De in at least nul 5TMDBY within the I

l gg,3 L

m O U NDO gg[Et 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the followin rate fo th ontainment nurse supply an CL.C.,0 ,u,s 3%.3 pWiththe1[-eed ene, ratio e .,e c,t .,

,. ,0. - _ . m ,d eas uit Q.6.1.7.3.D within I grseither: _f

. Reduce thd leakage' to witnfn the Jimit/, or

~

'TNSEAT F . sotate the containment purge supply or both supply and e t b 3 4 ,3 pe ' ions as required to reduce the leakage rate the containme mosphere to the outside atmosphe o within the AC.TsoN5 limit of speci on 4.6.1.7.2 by the se4fatleast:

D,Jt, b.2;&3 a) One OPERABLE'de-activate j nch inside contaisinent purge supply or Doth sup r and exhau olation valves secured in A

the closed jpo n or secured by use blind flange, and one )

/ OPERABL e-activated 8-inch inside contai urge supply or g

b upply and exhaust isolation valves secured losed i

position or secured by use of -a b11nd flange, or

  • Inis specification is governing for the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation penetration leakage and 48-inch isolation valve position.

"DOIM V

~

L.C.0 9,(p,3 h ME5 4

c m o m or4 & L.A FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 6-10 -

AMENDMENT NO. ;;, 74 h*-

u

l

%n % 3-7 FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems l

CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM I

FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES l

DOC l EQ _SEE DISCUSSIOE l In the STS, mispositioned containment purge supply and exhaust valves are considered inoperable containment isolation valves. Condition A of the l STS also requires the affected penetration to be isolated in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. In addition, Condition A of the STS requires that the isolation of the affected penetration be verifi,ed periodically. The requirement to verify the penetration status periodically while Condition A remains applicable is an additional restriction not present in the CTS. The additional CTS verification requirement is reasonable to ensure any temporary measures taken to isolate the affected penetration are maintained until the inoperable isolation valve is returned to operable status. However, the additional STS actions are considered a more restrictive change.

Sa L The CTS 3/4.6.1.7," Containment Ventilation System," actions are revised by the addition of Condition B consistent with the STS. The STS provides an additional Condition, not previously addressed by the CTS, for inoperable Containment Isolation Valves.

Condition B of the STS addresses the situation where two Containment isolation valves on the same penetration flowpath are inoperable. In this Condition the STS provides an appropriately short Completion Time of one hour to isolate the penetration. The penetration must be isolated in a similar manner as a penetration with one inoperable isolation valve. The Completion Time for the isolation action requirement of Condition B is the same as that for an inoperable containment in STS LCO 3.6.1. Therefore, the remedial measure provided by the new STS Action is acceptable for the Condition of two inoperable isolation valves in the same penetration flowpath and provides adequate assurance that the containment boundary is maintained intact.

5b L CTS 3/4.6.1.7.b states that the 8-inch containment mini-purge supply and exhaust isolation valves may be open for safety-related reasons. CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Action Statement a addresses a mispositioned 48 inch purge supply or exhaust isolation valve and requires isolation of the affected  !

penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. If a mini-purge valve is open for other than safety reasons, CTS 3/4.6.1.7 does not specify an ACTION, therefore CTS 3.0.3 would be entered. Entry into LCO 3.0.3 would be reportable under 10 CFR 50.73. In the STS, the valve would be declared inoperable and Condition A would be applied. Therefore, with respect to the mini-purge Chapter 3.6 E2-4-G November,1998

g 3' ' FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Sptems l CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC NQ fiUE DISCUSSION valves, STS LCO 3.6.3 Condition A is a less restrictive change.

6 L The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Action Statement b is revised consistent with the STS.

The CTS Action Statement b addresses the leakage rate for the containment i purge supply and exhaust penetrations exceeding the limit. This CTS action l

requires that the leakage be reduced in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or the affected penetration l must be isolated to reduce the leakage. This CTS action is replaced with STS LCO 3.6.3 Condition D which also addresses containment purge supply and exhaust penetrations exceeding the leakage rate limit. The STS ,

actions of this Condition allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to reduce the leakage or isolate the I affected penetration and verify leakage within limits. Although the action l to reduce the leakage to within limits is not explicitly stated in the STS actions, restoration of systems or parameters to within the LCO l requirements is always an option in the STS. The additional 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> allowed by the STS provides a more reasonable total time (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) to affect repairs on the leaking purge supply and exhaust isolation valves. The additional time is a sufficient restriction, given the low likelihood of an i event occurring during this time that would challenge the containment boundary, the STS actions that specifically require additional leakage testing of the valves used to isolate the affected penetration, and the fact that the actions of STS LCO 3.6.1, " Containment", ultimately become applicable ifleakage from a purge supply and exhaust penetration results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria (1.0 L.).

The actions of LCO 3.6.1 provide an appropriately conservative I hour completion time to restore leakage to within the overall containment limit assumed in the safety analysis. Purge supply and exhaust penetration leakage may cause the combined type B and C leakage to exceed the 0.6 L.

limit but total containment leakage may still be below the overall containment leakage rate limit of 1.0 L. and therefore be within the assumptions of the applicable safety analysis.

l 7 A The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Action Statement b.1 is deleted consistent with the STS.

This CTS action statement requires that the containment purge supply and  !

exhaust penetration leakage be restored to within the limit. In the STS, it is implicit in all actions that restoration to meet the requirements of the LCO i is an always an option and therefore, STS actions typically do not explicitly require restoration to meet the LCO requirements. As such, the deletion of this explicit CTS restoration action is considered an administrative change Chapter 3.6 E2-5-G November,1998

m . . _ . __ _ _ _- . . ._ _ _ _ _ _ . _._ _- _

FNP TS Conversion PE 36 M Enclosure 3 - Significant Hazards Evaluations Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems III. SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIONS l CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES I fh:L

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change involves upgrading the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to j more closely agree with the STS and do'es not result in any hardware changes. The proposed change revises the TS actions with regard to an inoperable mini-purge containment isolation valve. The containment isolation valves are not assumed to be an initiator of any analyzed event. The isolation ,

valves act to isolate the containment penetrations in the event of a design basis accident and serve to l limit the consequences of accidents. The proposed change continues to ensure the isolation function of the inoperable valves is accomplished to limit the consequences of design basis events as described in the FSAR and that the results of the analyses in the FSAR remain bounding.

Additionally, the proposed change does not impose any new safety analyses limits or alter the plants 1 ability to detect and mitigate events. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in I l

the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change involves upgrading the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to more closely agree with the STS and does not necessitate a physical alteration of the plant (no new or

different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in parameters governing normal plant operation. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The proposed change, which upgrades the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to be consistent with the STS does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change has been developed considering the importance of the containment isolation valves in limiting the consequences of a design basis event and the STS requirement to isolate a penetration with one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure when the required isolation valve is inoperable. The proposed change introduces a Condition not specifically addressed in the CTS and provides adequate remedial measures for that Condition which effectively provides the same level of assurance that the containment isolation function is maintained as provided by the CTS. Therefore, any reduction in the margin of safety is insir;.iificant.

i j

l 4 l

i.

i j Chapter 3.6 E3-3-C November,1998 l

l

1 l

l 4

l l

Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-8 1

l I

1 l

l l

l l

l l

j

CHAPTER 3.6 M r 7,(,.3-7 INSERT U NEW CONDITION B FOR CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM CTS 3/4.6.1.7 PAGE 3/4 6-10 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. ---------NOTE B.1 Isolate the affected penetranon Ihour Only applicable to flow path by use of at least one penetration flow paths closed and de-activated automatic with two containment valve, closed manual valve, or isolation valves. blind flange.

One or more penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves inoperable except for purge valve l penetrationleakagenot within limit.

Chapter 3.6 Insert Page

fe r. 3./,,3 - g CHAPTER 3.6  !

INSERT E TO CTS PAGE 3/4 6-10 REVSED ACTIONS FOR CONTAINMENT PURGE / EXHAUST VALVES STS LCO 3.6.3 CONDITION A CONDITION COMPLETION TIME l REQUIRED ACTION 1

A. ---------NOTE--------- A.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Only applicable to penetration flow path penetration flow paths by use of at least with two containment one closed and isolation valves. .de-activated

--- automatic valve, closed manual valve, One or more blind flange, or penetration flow paths check valve with flow with one containment through the valve isolation val secured.

inoperable ept forf purge val _v Jr shielg A!!Q D_uildino bVoan eakage not within W 4*g. imi A.2 --------NOTE---------

Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by 1 use of administrative J means.

Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path for isolation is isolated, devices outside containment 8!!Q Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed l within the 1 previous 92 days  !

for isolation devices inside i containment Chapter 3.6 Insert Page

W 3,6 3,.7 CHAPTER 3.6 1

INSERT F l TO CTS PAGE 3/4 6-10/10a REVSED ACTIONS FOR CONTAINMENT PURGE / EXHAUST VALVE LEAKAGE FNP ITS LCO 3.6.3 CONDITION D

.1 Isolate the affected 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

/.Oneormore penetration flow path D penetration flow  :

pathsfun one o by f at least  :

ntatnment one losed and 4oc purge vahes o de-activated ithin purge valve automatic valve, leakage limit . closed manual v e, or blind flange

, w;th penelmMn (gotc Sv0 YW 5# #

.2 --------NOTE---------

leak $e b ^d Isolation devices in high radiation areas l

, be B eA c fe36 may be verified by 1 is e d- W O a'. g' 4 use of administrative i I

means.

\

Verify the affected Once per penetration flow path 31 days for is isolated. Isolation devices outside containment Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment bB 5 a

.3 Perform SR 3.6.3.1 \0nce per for the resilient (92 days seal purge valves closed to comply with RequiredActionf.1.

D Chapter 3.6 Insert Page

pn y,3,.9 CHAPTER 3.6 INSERT F TO CTS PAGE 3/4 6-10/10a REVSED ACTIONS FOR CONTAINMENT PURGE / EXHAUST VALVE LEAKAGE ,

FNP ITS LCO 3.6.3 CONDITION D g.Oneormore .1 Isolate the affected 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> D penetration flow penetration flow path .

pathsfim one by u f at least ,

pp - ntainment one losed and pura_e valves o de-activated

,$iithin purge valve automatic valve, i Jeakage limit . closed manual va e, i

, _ or blind flange ,

, uA peneMa,n l E

tg SvE M D w ak ^'g f.2 --------NOTE---------

18*ky Isolation devices in high radiation areas E B eA c Mb

. may be verified by I's cal- WOm. O'.b use of administrative means.

Verify the affected Once per penetration flow path 31 days for as isolated. 1 solation devices outside containment AliQ Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment

$ liq g.3 Perform SR 3.6.3. Once per for the resilient q92 days seal purge valves with closedtocomply/.1.

Required Action D

Chapter 3.6 Ins rt Page I

l

98 _ w 2.e.2 4 Although STS LCO 3.6.3," Containment Isolation Valves", contains the requirements for t 8- purge supply and exhaust isolation valves, the markup of CTS 3/4.6.3," Containment Isolation not include the requirements associated with the containment purge supply and exhaust isolat He TS requirements for the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are co 3/4.6.1.7," Containment Ventilation System", and a!! changes to those requirements are add markups and DOCS associated with that CTS. In the S13, CTS 3/4.6.1.7 and CTS 3/4.

into one STS LCO 3.6.3 for all containment isolation valves.

3. [4 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS L.
  • 3, [0,3 h CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 2 3 LIMITING CCNDITIONJCR OPERATION  !

L A --^

LB

. _ _'~' LC O 3.6.3 WN &5 INSER.T H he containment isolation valve pecified in Table 3.6-D sha11 be OPERABLt with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6 _l) gg M M ST.s ocr/0N APPLICAstLITY: HOCES 1 1 2, 3 and 4 N fp -

FES --

we o t- g TION: -6 $ 7-COUD61DM b+ With one or more {f totTisolation valv Fecified in Tabl= i s-D inoperable, toi Win U* d' InsedTI Cor)DMcQ4 Rubre the imperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> NcTE' 3A (a. "

Clo S@'

Isol e eac a ected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> b g se of at least 1 JN$pg7 $7 one eactivated autocatic valve 6ecured in tne isotation position] y I

8'1 $.l 4 c,heckva.1VC 7 Isolate each afrected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least g4 f/c,u.,

one closed sanual valve or blind flange; or s g g d [ SHUTDCW 8e in at least HOT STANCBY within the ne.xt 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. vo IV SC04

^

0 9 C.DrdiSn E DI N [,

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS BM Pod m al m lo 4.6.3.1 The isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or}

i L replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control yT'g (or tionpower time circuit by performance of a cycling test, and verification of isola J FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 6 14 AMENOMENT N0, 26 I

_j

CHAPTER 3.6

]j~

ME 343.-p INSERT K NEW STS CONDITIONS B AND C FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES CTS 3/4.6.2.3 PAGE 3/4 6-14 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. ---------NOTE--------- 8.1 Isolate the affected I hour Only applicable to penetration flow path penetration flow paths j by use of at least with two containment one closed and I

isolation valves. de-activated  ;

automatic valve.  !

closed manual valve, '

One or more or blind flange.

penetration flow paths with two containment isolation val inoperable xcept for ,q,_,,,

purge valvej r sniei EgQ% uiaaina nynast reakage not within limi Y

C. ---------NOTE--------- C.1 Isolate the affected hours only applicable to penetration flow path penetration flow paths with only one by use of at least 71 ~ TsTF-30 1 one closed and '

containment isolation de-activated valve and a closed automatic valve, system.

closed manual valve. -

or blind flange.

One or more 63Q penetration flow paths with one containment C.2 --------NOTE- ----

1 isolation valve Isolation devices in inoperable. high radiation areas j may be verified by use of administrative means.

Verify the affected Once per.31 days penetration flow path is isolated.

Chapter 3.6 Insert Page

FNP TS Conversion gg Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC hLQ S.HE DISCUSSION Therefore, the term flow path is also used to encompa:s all types of isolation valve / penetration variations. In addition, the action is revised to clarify that it only applies when a single isolation valve in a penetration flow path is inoperable. Therefore, the CTS requirement to maintain an operable isolation valve in each affected penetration is no longer necessary (the STS Condition only applies for one inoperable isolation valve) and has been deleted consistent with the STS. A statement is also added to the CTS action to exempt purge valve penetration leakage. The STS contains a l separate Condition to address the leakage of the purge supply and exhaust valve penetrations. Note that changes affecting the purge supply and l exhaust valve TS requirements are documented in CTS 3/4.6.1.7,

" Containment Ventilation System". Therefore, changes made to the CTS action statement are required to conform with the presentation and format of this information in the STS and are considered administrative.

5 A The CTS 3/4.6.3 action statement is revised by the addition of a note consistent with the STS. This CTS action statement becomes Condition A in the STS and is modified by a Note which clarifies that the Condition is only applicable to penetration flowpaths with two isolation valves. In the STS separate Conditions are provided for penetration flowpaths with one and two isolation valves. Notes are used in the STS to distinguish these inoperable isolation valve Conditions. The addition of the new STS Condition for penetration flowpaths with a single isolation valve is addressed elsewhere. As the addition of this note is required to conform to the STS format and presentation of Actions Conditions for Containment l Isolation Valves, it is considered an administrative change.

l 6 A The CTS 3/4.6.3 action statements are revised by the deletion of action

! statement "a" consistent with the STS. CTS action statement "a" required restoration of the inoperable valve (s) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. In the STS, the action to restore a system or component to operable status is always considered an option and is not typi: ally stated as an action requirement in the STS. As such, the deletion of this CTS action is made to conform with the conventions used in the STS for actions and is considered an administrative change.

7 A The CTS 3/4.6.3 action statements are revised by the addition of STS required action A.2. STS required action A.2 verifies the status of a Chapter 3.6 E2-3-J November,1998

15th ,

ContainmentIsolationValvesMtmospheric, ~

E 3 08'-3 Qubatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual 3.6.

3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3 ContainmentunlationValveskAtmospheric,Subatmospheric, Ice (Condenser, and Dual) _

LC0 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS 43

=-

=--------=--------- ------NOTES -- ------------------------- ---

1. Penetration flow path (s) .except for j inch purge valve flow path may be unisolated intermittently under adm istrative controls.
2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.
3. Enter applicable Ceaditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by conteinment isolation valves.
4. Enter applicable Londitions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, "Containmer.t," when isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.

= == - -------------------------------------------------------_ -----

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ---------NOTE--------- A.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Only applicable to penetration flow path penetration flow paths by use of at least with two containment one closed and isolation valves. de-activated

automatic valve, closed manual valve, One or more blind flange, or penetration flow paths check valve with flow with one containment through the valve isolation valv secured.

inoperable exce)t_ forf purge valvej r s dela MQ J uisainq oypass leakage not within 5

'if p n,QK (continued) w-WOG STS 3.6-8 Rev I, 04/07/95

155 Containmant Isolation ValvesfAtmospheric, g 34,7,3 (Subatmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual) 3.5.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2 --------NOTE---------

Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path for isolation is isolated. devices outside containment 8!!Q Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment B. ---------NOTE--------- B.1 Isolate the affected I hour only applicable to penetration flow path penetration flow paths by use of at least with two containment one closed and isolation valves. de-activated

automatic valve, closed manual valve, One or more or blind flange.

penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valv#

inoperable 7xce)t for a3 purge valve j r s11elo]

muisoing Dypass y i leakage not within li (continued)

WOG STS 3.6-9 Rev 1, 04/07/95

ISS Containment Isolation Valves fAtmosphericl, L j2E 3,6 g ,.9 6ubatmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual_))

.$.O.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. ---------NOTE--------- C.1 Isolate the affected ours Only applicable to penetration flow path p penetration flow paths with only one by use of at least one closed and 7p 75TF-30 containment isolation de-activated valve and a closed automatic valve, system. closed manual valve,

--= = = ----------

or blind flange.

One or more MQ penetration flow paths with one containment C.2 --------NOTE---------

isolation valve Isolation devices in inoperable. high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path is isolated.

NA TD FN P Conbonchtg-D. Shield building Restore le 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> leakage not within , imit.

limit. N m.

E. One or more f cas penetration,,fl ow o

/.1 Isolate the affected penetra ion flow path 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

+

pathsfitith one d by u of at least (noreftontainment one losed and purge valves o de-activated Bitnin purge valve automatic valve, teakagelimits1._ closed manual valve, fgg,m or blind flangej).

Why. hk M AND /0 L

We sum # fhe ( l

)eah e 4 ,M (continued) 1 Ty* B =A t,4eb (

b ,

WOG STS 3.6-10 Rev 1, 04/07/95

+ e ._ n .n_ w a. u. .au,- -w.u....n. a s.v .-.u .s_n,+ n.sa. ., w ~ , a-. n. s ..--a,- a-.u.- - ~. .__ na m e n Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric, Qubatmospheric, Ice tonaenser, and 1

ACTIONS, k CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

)

g/ o. D '

E. '(continued) 2 --------NOTE--------- \ !

Isolation devices in i high radiation areas  !

may be verified by use of administrative l means.

Verify the affected Once per i penetration flow path 31 days for i is isolated. isolation  !

devices outside containment E

Prior to '

entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed

, within the i 9 previous j 92 days for

  1. isolation devices inside i

/ containment M

Perform,SR 3.6.3. nce per p for thewesilient y92 days

. seal purge valve closed to compi ith Required Action . 1.

p _

equired Action and Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. M 4 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> E

nl0G STS 3.6-11 Rev 1, 04/07/95

Containment Isolation Valves f(AtmosphericT, g y,g (5ubatmospheric. Ice condenser and Dual))

3.b.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

(__

SR 3.6.3 # Perform leakage rate testing for 184 days \

containment purge valves with resilient

, seal s. AND i

C +"1.,in w n F t in pene4e.Aive cama $

j s

after opening 5 the valve D

~

g, [  !

SR 3.6.3.# Verify each automatic containment isolation 618 months )

valve that is not locked, sealed or j otherwise secured in position, actuates to i the isolation position on an actual or '

1 simulated actuation signal.  !

l SR 3.6.3. Cycle each weight or spring loaded check nths va at testable during operation l through omplete cycle of ful vel, '

, and verify eac ck valve ins closed when the differentia ssure in the {

direction of f s s [1. id and opens I erential pressure in when the d ion of flow is 2 [1.2] psid and

< [5.0] psid.

For 5defrnowhenc.Conbnrnent SR 3.6.3.10 Ver inch containmen [18] months  !

valve is blocked -

he valve from openin .

N/A FNP (continued) 4 WOG STS 3.6-14 Rev 1, 04/07/95

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 5 - JD from STS

{2A C 3.fo. 3 - 7 Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems STS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES JD NUMBER JUSTIFICATION 1 Not used.

2 The STS 3.6.3 surveillance 3.6.3.2 has been deleted consistent with FNP CTS requirements. FNP CTS allow for continuous operation of the mini-purge system for safety related reasons. The FSAR states that the mini-purge system operates during power operation to continuously purge the containment atmosphere. The STS Bases discussion for SR 3.6.3.2 states that the mini-purge valves are required to be closed. This is in direct conflict with the FNP current licensing basis and has been deleted consistent with FNP current licensing basis.

3 The STS 3.6.3 surveillance 3.6.3.4 is revised by the addition of Note 2 consistent with the CTS allowance for the blind flange installed on the fuel transfer canal flange. The allowance provided in this Note to the STS surveillance corresponds to the

  • footnote to 4.6.1.1 in CTS 3/4.6.1 Containment Integrity. The allowance to verify the position of this blind flange only after each draining of the fuel transfer canal is justified since misposition of this flange at other times during normal operation is highly unlikely.

4 The STS 3.6.3 surveillance 3.6.3.5 (ITS 3.6.3.4) has been revistd consistent with FNP CTS requirements. FNP CTS 4.6.3.3 requires that the isolation time of pch power operated or automatic valve of Table 3.6-1 be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. The IST Program contains the testing requirements for the valves listed in Table 3.6-1. Therefore, STS 3.6.3 surveillance 3.6.3.5 (ITS 3.6.3.4) has been revised consistent with the deletion of Specification 4.0.5 in the STS and the FNP current licensing basis as stated in CTS 4.6.3.3.

5 The STS 3.6.3 Conditions A, B, and E (ITS Condition D) and SR 3.6.3.7 (ITS SR 3.6.3.5) have been revised consistent with FNP CTS requirements. The FNP CTS leakage limit for containment purge valves with resilient seals is based on a total penetration leakage rate, and is related to the total leakage from all Type B and C tests as opposed to an individual valve leakage rate as indicated in the STS. The above sections of STS 3.6.3 have been revised to reflect this difference and to maintain the FNP current licensing basis for these penetrations.

Chapter 3.6 ES-1-C November,1998

h _o ,

Containment Isolation Valves [(Atmospheric},

iubatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual))

MT- 3M34 8 3.6.3 BASES (continued)

~

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modif ed by a Note allowing penetration flow paths, except for 4 inch purge valve penetration flow paths, to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for containment isolation is indicated. Due to the size of the containment purge line penetration and the fact that those penetrations exhaust directly from the containment atmosphere to the environment, the penetration flow path containing these valves may not be opened unjer administrative controls. A single purge valve in a penetration flow path may be opened to effect repairs to an inoperable valve, as allowed by SR 3.6.3.1.

A second Note has been added to provide clarification that,

, , ,c for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each

, penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable containment I

isolation valve. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable containment isolation valves are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Pequired Actions.

'The ACTIONS are further modified by a third Note, which

. ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected systems are rendered inoperable by an inoperable containment is ti val g i f f La hmy.be In the event the tur locl0 leakage results tw exceeding the overall containment leakage rate, Note 4 directs entry into l the applicable Conditions ud Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1.

i A.1 and A.2 In the event one contairy t isolation alve in one o more penetration flow pathsAs. inoperable except for pur e valve f6b r shield building Dypass) leakage not within limi , the affected penetrau on riow path must be isolated. he method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation dgW, barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active (continued)

WOG STS B 3.6-33 Rev 1, 04/07/95 j

a46 s-ContainmentIsolationValvesf(Atmospheric,X gubatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual _))

D ~L6&S 5 3.6.3 BASES ACTIONS - QJ NA To FNP C,onhioment '

(continued)

Wit e shield building bypass leakage rate not wit limit, assumptions of the safety analyses ar at met.

Therefore, e leakage must be restored to wi n limit within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Restoration can be accom shed by isolating the pen ation(s) that caus he limit to be L exceeded by use of on losed and d ctivated automatic valve, closed manual va or nd flange. When a penetration is isolated the age rate for the isolated penetration is assumed t et ctual pathway leakage through the isolation vice. If isolation devices are used to isolate t enetration, the age ratc is assumed to be the less actual pathway leakage o he two devices.

The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> pletion Time is reasonable cons ring the time re red to restore the leakage by isolatin he pene tion (s) and the relative importance of secon ainment bypass leaka e to t ve al inmen N function. g wa-a pens .b\ e

/- _

N ScbM -h sm .4 e \

roQaw & oA) rg 6 ad C % h_ -

.5c1rdkd- W I l , .2. and .3 41 pp.s M"$*i[~ _ -

Intheeventone'ormo7eFcontal ent purge valves /n on ci b

Vm e h not d Oh) 1 ore penetrau o1 tlow oarns ars ot withinEthe nurap va l vs-keakageflimits, purge valve' eakage niust be restored @

p' exueded - %ithin limitF, or the affec penetration flow path must be : s isolated. The method of isolation must be by the use of at '

least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely.

Og- affected by a single active fail fur . Isolation barrier that n.e iterion are a lyclosed and de-activated [s automatic valve, manual valve, or blind flanger. A surge valve wit silien als utilized to satisfy

- Required Acti 1 must have sn J the p [' 1eakage requirements of SR 3.6.3Q7.) The specifieddemonstrated tohnee Completion Time is reasonable, considering that one i containment purge valve remains closed 10 that a gruss breach of containment does not exist.

InaccordancewithRequiredActionf.2,thispenetration flow path must be verified to be isolated on a perio:lic basis. The periodic verification is necessary to en ure that containment penetrations required to be isolate following an accident, which are no longer capable o being _

SW % f (continued)

WOG STS B 3.6-37 Rev 1, 04/07/95

Containment Isolation Valves f(AtmosphericT ,

Qbatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual)J W 34' M B 3.0.3 BASES O N N

.1./.2.andI.3 (continued)

ACTIONS

! I automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position j should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those isolation devices outside containment capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. For the isolation devices inside containment, the time period specified as " prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not f performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other administrative controls that will ensure that iso tion device misalignment is an unlikely possibility. p 5

~

C#@M# For the& containment purge valve with re 1e r e that

[@ isolated in accordance with Required A< i ( 1, R 3.6.3 mustbeperformedatleastonceevery/ 2 days This A assures that degradation of the resilient seal s detected f and confirms that the leakage rate of the cont inment purge valv#rdoes not increase during the time the p 'rttion is

  1. isolated. The normal Frequency for SR 3.6.3 184 days, is f based on an NRC d'ninauve. hanet ic issue 5-ZU (Ref. 3)R Since more relianc is placed on a single valve while Tn this Condition, it is prudent to perform the SR more often.

t Therefore, a Freqt ncy of once per days was chosen and has been shown to be acceptable ' sed on operating experience.

qwkn4O. g f.1 and Y.2 - ~

W If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued) 1 WOG STS B 3.6-38 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-9 I

l l

I l

FNP TS Conversion g pq Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC NO SHE DISCUSSION barrier that can not be adversely affected by a single active failure".

Therefore, the use of a check valve with the flow through the valve secured is an acceptable altemative action to isolate a containment penetration.

10 L The CTS 3/4.6.3," Containment Isolation Valves", actions are revised by the addition of two Actions Conditions consistent with the STS. The STS provides two additional Conditions, not previously addressed by the CTS, for inoperable Containment Isolation Valves.

Condition B of the STS addresses the situation where two Containment isolation valves on the same penetration flowpath are inoperable. Since there are no actions for the condition addressed by STS Condition B in the CTS, CTS 3.0.3 would require placing the unit in MODE 5. If, under CTS 3/4.6.3, the system was restored such that it met the LCO requirements, i

3.0.3 could be exited prior to completing the unit shutdown. However, entry into LCO 3.0.3 would be reportable under 10 CFR 50.73. In Condition B, the STS provides an appropriately short Completion Time of one hour to isolate the penetration. The penetration must be isolated in a similar manner as a penetration with one inoperable isolation valve. The  !

Completion Time for the isolation action requirement of Condition B is the i same as that for an inoperable containment in STS LCO 3.6.1. Therefore, I l the remedial measure provided by the new STS Action is acceptable for the ,

l Condition of two inoperable isolation valves in the same penetration flowpath and provides adequate assurance that the containment boundary is maintained intact. l Condition C of the STS addresses the situation where a single isolation valve in a penetration flowpath is inoperable and that penetration flowpath has only one isolation valve with a closed system functioning as the second isolation barrier. In this situation, the STS provides for a longer Completion Time (72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) to isolate the penetration. The penetration is l still required to be isolated in a manner similar to that required by Condition B of the STS, however, due to the closed system isolation barrier used in such a penetration, a longer Completion Time is justified. Closed systems are passive isolation barriers not subject to the same single active failures of typical automatic isolation valves and are subject to 10 CFR50 Appendix J,

, Type A leak tests. In addition, closed systems are typically pressurized which ensures leakage is into containment and detectable. As such, a Chapter 3.6 E2-5-J November,1998

FNP TS Conversion pan '3(o,3-9 Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems 1

l CTS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 1 DOC NO SHE DISCUSSION l longer Completion Time to isolate this type of penetration is acceptable and will continue to provide adequate assurance that the containment boundary is maintained. I 11 LA CTS 3/4.6.2.3 surveillance 4.6.3.1 is removed from the TS consistent with the STS. CTS surveillance 4.6.3.1 requires testing be performed on containment isolation valves prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement of the valve, actuator, or control power circuit. In the STS, post maintenance test requirements are not specified.

The STS considers post maintenance testing to be an inherent requirement of the defmition of operability and the operability requirements stated for each system or component in its associated LCO. It is inherent in the TS requirements that equipment or systems declared operable must, as a minimum, meet the requirements of any applicable surveillance tests. As q such, the post maintenance test requirements in the CTS are moved into the '

TRM. The removal of these specific test requirements from the CTS is l acceptable based on the inherent operability requirements for equipment i

and systems controlled by the TS definition of operability and the  ;

operability requirements of the associated LCO that is required to be met. l In addition, the removal of these requirements from the CTS to TRM is  !

acceptable since changes to the requirements in the TRM will be controlled in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process. )

12 L CTS 3/4.6.3 surveillance 4.6.3.2 is revised consistent with the STS. The STS contains an exception to the CTS requirement to demonstrate that each containment isolation valve actuates to its isolation position upon receipt of a containment isolation signal. The STS provides an exception for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required safety position.

, The exception provided by the STS is acceptable because the required

' safety function of such valves is accomplished when the valves are secured in the required position. Therefore, additional testing of the actuation capability of these valves is not required.

, 13 LA CTS 3/4.6.3 surveillance 4.6.3.2 is revised consistent with the STS.

Surveillance test details are removed to the bases consistent with the level of detail contained in the STS. The CTS requirement that the surveillance be performed during Cold Shutdown or refueling is an expansion of the information already included in the STS bases (i.e., outage) and therefore Chapter 3.6 E2-6-J March,1998

1 l

l i

1 l

l Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-10 l

l l

l l

1 I

1 l

l 1

l l

l l

l

N '3,(o.3-lO l IB

@ ],(p,3 {pnhnmCn 5be TSo ATioN VAIVE*S 3 ,[o CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS -

3, g,3 CONTA!NMENT fvENTILATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION n , r, --

2 i

3,g,3 .6.1. ' Containment (urge supply and exnaust valve] shall be OPERABLE and b The 48-inch containment eurce suoply and exhaust isolation alves _D.

683.lo.3. l b QCBV-HV-3198A. 31980, 3196, 3197)]sht11 be (e-activated and secured)in 3 sneir ciosco go.iuon.

/ Q BASES h,,g (D The 8-inch containment sini-purge r sup' ply and exhaust isolation valves (cav-Hv zss6c. 28660, iss7c. zus7a_))may be open for safety-related 6 reasons, c t,,,9 g gg g g LR '

ggy 4b DMT6 -APPLICABILITY: N00ES 1, 2, 3 and a m ggg g A ST5 Lt O 3 (, 2 ACTION:

- P'

( __,

p* {q t one 8

, ge au cn cent nmen pur supply isolat n va eo n or not one

-act incn cont nment [

cur in e close posi on _ ,e open va e(s) ,ted, de-ae frateap1 isolete

$ 7 L ene att . within our h urs ride ist at least MUI STANDBY witnin the gg,3 m M Te~xt 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ano in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. ~

bdtNOS i C O 2.$. 3 with the leat e rate fo tne containment _ purse suppirlot.e5 aust

  • gg p enet ratio xceedj.Q e limit (Lf Spect 'ication s.6_11 -

E.6.1.7.3 3 wi tninQ1 tours eitner:

. Reduce the leakage' to witnfn the Jimit4 o T Nj E/(T f .

solate the containment purge supply or both supply ,and e t

@ 34,3 pe tons as required to reduce the leakage rate the containme. mosphere to the outside atmospher o within the ACTIONS limit of Speci en 4.6.1.7.2 by the se Tf at least:

D,lj D.7j ~

a) One OPERABLE de-activate, nch inside containment purge

-~

supply or Doth supgly-aiId exhav olation vahes secured in A

the closed polittbn or secured by use blind flange, and one

/ OPERABL edctivated 8-inch inside contairvn crge supply or g b upply and exhaust isolation valves secured closed sition or secured by use of a blind flange, or

'Inis specification is governing for the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation penetration leakage and 48-inch isolation valve position, w SEAT v 6 pg3 l-C.O 3,(p. 3 9

cowme4 6 LA l

FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 6-10 -

AMENDMfNT NO. ;;, 74 l

5- L.  !

l

- . . _ _ _ . . . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . . . ~ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _

D %34 o t CHAPTER 3.6 INSERT U  ;

NEW CONDITION B FOR CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM i CTS 3/4.6.1.7 PAGE 3/4 6-10 l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i i

B. NOTE ----

B.1 Isolate the affected penetration 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Only applicable to flow path by use of at least one  ;

penetration flow paths closed and de-activated automatic  ;

with two containment valve, closed manual valve, or ,

isolation valves. blind flange. )

. 1 1

One or more penetration l

. flow paths with two i' containment isolation valves inoperable except for purge valve penetration leakage not i within limit.

Chapter 3.6 Insert Page 1

.p.. ~l

i J

FNP TS Conversion g Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC blQ SHE DISCUSSION l In the STS, mispositioned containment purge supply and exhaust valves are considered inoperable containment isolation valves. Condition A of the l

i STS also requires the afTected penetration to be isolated in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. In l addition, Condition A of the STS requires that the isolation of the affected l penetration be verified periodically. The requirement to verify the penetration status periodically while Condition A remains applicable is an additional restriction not present in the CTS. The adaitional CTS verification requirement is reasonable to ensure any temporary measures taken to isolate the affected penetration are maintained until the inoperable j isolation valve is returned to operable status. However, the additional STS l actions are considered a more restrictive change. l Su L The CTS 3/4.6.1.7, " Containment Ventilation System," actions are revised by the addition of Condition B consistent with the STS. The STS provides an additional Condition, not previously addressed by the CTS, for inoperable Containment Isolation Valves.

Condition B of the STS addresses the situation where two Containment isolation valves on the same penetration flowpath are inoperable. In this Condition the STS provides an appropriately short Completion Time of one hour to isolate the penetration. The penetration must be isolated in a similar manner as a penetration with one inoperable isolation valve. The Completion Time for the isolation action requirement of Condition B is the same as that for an inoperable containment in STS LCO 3.6.1. Therefore, the remedial measure provided by the new STS Action is acceptable for the Condition of two inoperable isolation valves in the same penetration j flowpath and provides adequate assurance that the containment boundary is  ;

maintained intact.

5b L CTS 3/4.6.1.7.b states that the 8-inch containment mini-purge supply and exhaust isolation valves may be open for safety-related reasons. CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Action Statement a addresses a mispositioned 48 inch purge supply or exhaust isolation valve and requires isolation of the affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. If a mini-purge valve is open for other than safety reasons, CTS 3/4.6.1.7 does not specify an ACTION, therefore CTS 3.0.3 would be entered. Entry into LCO 3.0.3 would be relortable under 10 CFR 50.73. In the STS, the valve would be declared inoperable and Condition A would be applied. Therefore, with respect to the mini-purge Chapter 3.6 E2-4-G November,1998

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 3 - Significant Hazards Evaluations M 3.0 3 - to Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems  ;

i l

III. SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIONS CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 1a-L

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change involves upgrading the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to more closely agree with the STS and does not result in any hardware changes. The proposed change provides an additional Condition that addresses inoperable containment isolation valves. The containment isolation valves are not assumed to be an initiator of any analyzed event. The isolation valves act to isolate the containment penetrations in the event of a design basis accident and serve to limit the consequences of accidents. The proposed change continues to ensure the isolation function of the inoperable valves is accomplished to limit the consequences of design basis events as described in the FSAR and that the results of the analyses in the FSAR remain bounding. The ,

proposed change does not allow indefinite continued operation in a condition where a single active l l failure could prevent containment isolation. Additionally, the proposed change does not impose any l new safety analyses limits or alter the plants ability to detect and mitigate events. Therefore, this

change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident  !

previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

l l The proposed change involves upgrading the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to

~ more closely agree with the STS and does not necessitate a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in parameters governing normal plant operation. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

j

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

l The proposed change, which upgrades the Containment Ventilation System TS requirements to be consistent with the STS does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change has been developed considering the importance of the containment isolation valves in limiting the consequences of a design basis event and the STS requirement to isolate a penetration with one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure when the

! required isolation valve is inoperable. The proposed change introduces a Condition not specifically l addressed in the CTS and provides adequate remedial measures for that Condition which effectively provides the same level of assurance that the containment isolation function is maintained as provided by the CTS. Therefore, any reduction in the margin of safety is insignificant.

4

.d Chapter 3.6 E3-2-C November,1998

Associated Packase Changes for RAI 3.6.311 1

l l

l l

l l

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS M 34 3 'll Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC NQ SHE DISCUSSION 1 A The CTS 3/4.6.1.7," Containment Ventilation System"is incorporated into the STS LCO 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves consistent with the STS.

In the STS all containment isolation valve requirements are located in one TS. The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 LCO statement is revised accordingly. As this discussion only addresses the reorganization of the CTS 3/4.6.1.7 TS requirements consistent with the STS format and presentation, the associated change is considered an administrative change.

2 A The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 LCO and surveillance requirement regarding the 48 inch purge supply and exhaust valves being deactivated and secured in the closed position is revised consistent with the STS. This LCO requirement is incorporated into surveillance requirement SR 3.6.3.1 in the STS Containment Isolation Valve TS which defines the operable status of this valve. In addition, the CTS terms "de-activated and secured" are replaced with the STS term " sealed" in referring to the means by which the valve is maintained closed. The essential requirement for the valve to be maintained closed is not altered. The STS term " sealed"is described in the STS bases for SR 3.6.3.1 and effectively requires the valve to be maintained in a similar condition as the CTS requirement of de-activated and secured.

As the revision of this CTS requirement is made to conform with the format and language of the STS and no significant technical change in the required status of the affected valve is made, this change is considered administrative.

3 LA The CTS 3/4.6.1.7.b LCO provision regarding the 8 inch mini-purge supply and exhaust isolation valves is removed from the LCO and placed in the bases of the Containment Isolation Valve TS (3.6.3). The removal of this type ofinformation from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. CTS 3.6.1.7.b contains detail which provides an allowance for valve configuration. This is a detail of system operation. Such details are also contained in the FSAR where changes are controlled via the 10 CFR 50.59 process. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for identification of the associated valves is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS. The CTS allowance for these valves to be open for " safety-related" reasons is retained and discussed in the bases for LCO Chapter 3.6 E2-1-G November,1998

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Chances to CTS

~

[htr. 4,6,3-(l Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems l CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC N_Q SHE DISCUSSION 3.6.3.

4 LA The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 LCO statements a and b are revised consistent with the STS. The valve numbers for the 48 inch and 8 inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are removed from the LCO and placed in the bases of the Containment Isolation Valve TS (3.6.3). The removal of this type of information from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. The valve numbers listed in CTS 3.6.1.7.a and .b provide plant nomenclature for the valves listed in the LCO statement (Containment purge sugly and exhaust valves). This information is detail provided in the FSAR and on plant drawings. It does not define the requirements of operability for the valves but rather provides additional descriptors of the valves that have already been identified by the statement of the LCO. Therefore, it is also appropriate to move this i information to the Bases. Reliance on the information contained in the STS j bases for identification of the associated valves is acceptable since changes 1 to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.

4a L The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Actions are modified by the addition of Notes consistent with the STS. The first STS Note provides an allowance to unisolate any penetration flow path (except for the 48 inch purge supply and exhaust valves) intermittently under administrative controls. This allowance applies to penetration flow paths isolated in accordance with the Required Actions of STS 3.6.3. The CTS Table 3.6-1 currently provides a similar allowance for a limited number of valves. The STS note, however, expands the CTS allowance to apply to all Containment Isolation Valves except the 48 inch purge supply and exhaust. The allowance to open intermittently any containment isolation valve, closed as a result of Required Actions, is considered acceptable in the STS based on the requirement for administrative controls (described in the STS bases) that provide for a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. The required administrative controls provide adequate assurance that the affected penetration may be rapidly closed if containment isolation is required. The 48 inch containment purge supply and exhaust valves are excepted from the STS allowance due to the large size and direct path from the containment to the outside atmosphere.

Chapter 3.6 E2-2-G November,1998

Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-13 i

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FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS N 34 3" G Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC EO SHE DISCUSSION made to conform with the presentation and format of this information in the STS.

8 M The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 Action Statement b.2 is revised consistent with the STS.

This CTS action requires that the affected containment purge supply and exhaust penetrations be isolated to reduce leakage to within the limit. The l CTS requirement specifies the possible combinations of valves to be used for isolating the affected penetrations. The CTS action is completely replaced by the STS LCO 3.6.3 Actions D.1, D.2, and D.3 for containment  ;

purge supply and exhaust penetrations exceeding the leakage limit. The STS action D.1 effectively requires the same remedial action (affected penetration be isolated) however the STS only specifies the minimum  !

isolation requirement of at least one closed and deactivated automatic valve, closed manual valve or blind flange. Although more valves may be used to  :

accomplish the isolation requirement, the STS only requires that "at least one" be used. Although the STS action D.1 is written substantially different than the CTS action the basic intent, requirement, and end result are the same. The STS actions D.2 and D.3 add new requirements that are not currently part of the CTS. STS action D.2 requires the affected penetration, isolated by action D.1, be periodically verified isolated. STS action D.3 requires that the resilient seal valves used to isolate the affected i penetration in action D.1 be periodically leak tested to verify isolation of the l penetration. The addition of STS actions D.2 and D.3 provide reasonable requirements to verify the remedial measures taken in action D.1 to isolate the penetration and reduce leakage remain effective over time. However, the addition of these STS requirements is considered a more restrictive change.

9 LA The CTS 3/4.6.1.7

  • footnote to the LCO statement is removed from the LCO and placed in the bases of the Containment Isolation Valve TS (3.6.3).

The definition of OPERABILITY for the containment purge supply and exhaust valves per the CTS 3.6.1.7 LCO statement is modified by the I

  • Footnote (i.e., OPERABILITY with regards to this LCO is defined to include the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation penetration leakage and 48-inch isolation valve position. It does not include individual i

valve leakage requirements or 8-inch minipurge isolation valve position l requirements). For a system to be considered c.perable, the definition of I

operability for the system must be satisfied and the associated Surveillance Chapter 3.6 E2-6-G November,1998 l

l FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS W 3' O1.3 Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC HQ SHE DISCUSSION requirements must be met. In the STS, information related to the configuration of a system which relate to meeting the operability requirements of the LCO is moved to the Bases. The removal of this type ofinformation from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for guidance in defining the OPERABILITY of the associated system is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.

10 LA CTS 3/4.6.1.7 action statement c and CTS surveillance requirement 4.6.1.7.3.b a e removed from the TS consistent with the STS. The CTS i action st:nement c provides specific actions for the purge supply and  !

exhaust penetration leakage limit verified by CTS surveillance 4.6.1.7.3.b.

CTS survc!!!ance 4.6.1.7.3.b requires verification of purge supply and l exhaust penetra: ion leakage to be less than or equal to 0.05 L.. The I conservative CTS leakage limit of 0.05 L. for penetrations with purge supply and exhau.et valves with resilient seals is unrelated to the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix J and is not required to be in the TS by 10CFR50 Appendix J or by 10CFR36. In the STS, the allowable leakage from these penetrations is controlled by the total Type B and C leakage limit (0.6 L.) and ultimately by the overall containment leakage limit (1.0 L. ). Both of these 10CFR50 Appendix J limits are specified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program in the administrative controls section of the TS. As such, the removal of the 0.05 L. limit for penetrations with purge supply and exhaust valves with resilient seals from the CTS is consistent with the requirements contained in the STS and acceptable considering the goveming total Type B and C and overall containment leakage limits which remain in the TS. This leakage limit, associated actions, and surveillance requirements are moved from the CTS to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). Reliance on requirements contained in the TRM is acceptable since changes to the requirements in the TRM will be controlled in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process.

I1 L The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 surveillance 4.6.1.7.1 which requires the 48 inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves to be deactivated in the closed position is revised consistent with the STS SR 3.6.3.1. An exception to this requirement is added that would allow one valve in a Chapter 3.6 E2-7-G November,1998

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l Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-15

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS FA E 3 4.7 -15 Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems 1

CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC NQ SHE DISCUSSION TS. As such, the essential technical requirements of the information ,

removed from the CTS surveillances is retained within the FNP TS. As this i change does not remove the required leakage limit specified in the TS and l is made to conform with the format and presentation of this information in ]

the STS, this change is considered administrative. j 14 A The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 surveillance requirement 4.6.1.7.3 frequency of" prior to startup after each Cold Shutdown, if not performed in the previous 92 days" is deleted from the TS consistent with the STS. This surveillance frequency is essentially redundant to the general rules of TS (STS section 3.0) which require that surveillances be current when entering the Mode of applicability for a TS. Since the containment isolation valves are required

. operable in Modes 1-4, the required surveillances (unless otherwise specified) must be satisfied and current (have been performed within the surveillance interval) upon entering Mode 4 from Mode 5 (cold shutdown).

The deletion of this specific CTS surveillance frequency is consistent with the STS and the resulting surveillance frequency is effectively the same as the CTS requirement. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.

15 LA The CTS 3/4.6.1.7 surveillance requirements 4.6.1.7.3 and 4.6.1.7.4 are  ;

revised consistent with the STS. The last paragraph of CTS surveillance 4.6.1.7.3 which requires that containment purge supply and exhaust l isolation valve leakage be compared to previous test results and an engineering evaluation performed and CTS surveillance 4.6.1.7.4 which requires the resilient seal material of the containment purge supply and l i

exhaust isolation valves be replaced every 5 years are removed from the TS consistent with the STS. These CTS requirements are in excess of the STS requirements for these valves. The above requirement to replace the resilient seal material is a preventative maintenance item designed to preclude excessive degradation of the resilient material in the valve seals. It is not part of the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J, Option B testing. It is not used to detennire tne current operability of the valves.10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J, Option B requites that the performance-based program developed to implement Option B include a comparison to previous test results to examine the performance history of the overall containment system to limit leakage. The purpose of the comparison to the previously measured leak rate in CTS 4.6.1.7.4 is to detect excessive valve Chapter 3.6 E2-9-G November,1998 E

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Pva rt 3, (,. 3- 15 Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC N_Q SHE DISCUSSION resilient seal material degradation and to evaluate and take corrective as necessary. This requirement is also a preventative maintenance item designed to identify potential excessive degradation of the resilient material in the valve seals and to address it prior to the degradation affecting the operability of the valve. As such, these CTS surveillance requirements do not demonstrate the operability of the valves nor ensure that the requirements of the LCO are met. Therefore, movement of these requirements to the TRM is acceptable. Reliance on requirements contained in the TRM is acceptable since changes to the requirements in the TRM will be controlled in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process.

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t Chapter 3.6 E2-10-G November,1998

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Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-16 i

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i FNP TS Conversion l Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS l fvYC 3. lo. ~3- lla Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems i

CTS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES l FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC

_NQ SHE DISCUSSION 1 LA The CTS 3/4.6.3 LCO statement is revised consistent with the STS.

References to CTS Table 3.6-1 are removed from the I CO statement and Table 3.6-1 is removed from the TS. The removal from the TS of CTS Table 3.6-1, which listed the valves identified as Containment Isolation Valves, is consistent with the level of detail contained in the STS for .

Containment Isolation Valves. The listing of specific valve names and )

numbers for valves identified as containment isolation valves is design  !

information which is not directly related to the requirements of the TS. l This information does not directly support the operability of any LCO-required systems. Design information is controlled via 10 CFR 50.34 and Appendix B of 10 CFR 50. Changes to this information is controlled via 10 j CFR 50.59. The list of Containment Isolation Valves contained in Table  :

3.6-1 is proposed to be placed in the TRM with other CTS details removed during conversion to the ITS. Reliance on requirements contained in the j TRM is acceptable since changes to the requirements in the TRM will be controlled in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process. j i

2 L The CTS 3/4.6.3 Actions are modified by the addition of Notes consistent with the STS. The first STS Note provides aa allowance to unisolate any penetration flow path (except for the 48 inch purp supply and exhaust i valves) intermittently under administrative controls. This allowance applies l I

to penetration flow paths isolated in accordance with the Required Actions of STS 3.6.3. The CTS Table 3.6-1 currently provides a similar allowance for a limited number of valves. The STS note, however, expands the CTS l allowance to apply to all Containment Isolation Valves except the 48 inch purge supply and exhaust. The allowance to open intermittently any containment isolation valve, closed as a result of Required Actions, is considered acceptable in the STS based on the requirement for administrative controls (described in the STS bases) that provide for a ,

dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. The required administrative controls l

l provide adequate assurance that the affected penetration may be rapidly closed if containment isolation is required. The 48 inch containment purge supply and exhaust valves are excepted from the STS allowance due to the large size and direct path from the containment to the outside atmosphere.

3 A The CTS 3/4.6.3," Containment Isolation Valves", Actions are modified by Chapter 3.6 E2-1-J November,1998

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Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.318 l l l l l

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FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS M 34 3-HP Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems l

CTS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC HQ SHE DISCUSSION longer Completion Time to isolate this type of penetration is acceptable and will continue to provide adequate assurance that the containment boundary is maintained.

I1 LA CTS 3/4.6.2.3 surveillance 4.6.3.1 is removed from the TS consistent with I the STS. CTS surveillance 4.6.3.1 requires testing be performed on ,

containment isolation valves prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement of the valve, actuator, or control power circuit. In the STS, post maintenance test requirements are not specified.

The STS considers post maintenance testing to be an inherent requirement i of the definition of operability and the operability requirements stated for l each system or component in its associated LCO. It is inherent in the TS requirements that equipment or systems declared operable must, as a minimum, meet the requirements of any applicable surveillance tests. As such, the post maintenance test requirements in the CTS are moved into the TRM. The removal of these specific test requirements from the CTS is I acceptable based on the inherent operability requirements for equipment and systems controlled by the TS definition of operability and the operability rcquirements of the associated LCO that is required to be met.

In addition, the removal of these requirements from the CTS to TRM is acceptable since changes to the requirements in the TRM will be controlled in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process.

12 L CTS 3/4.6.3 surveillance 4.6.3.2 is revised consistent with the STS. The STS contains an exception to the CTS requirement to demonstrate that each containment isolation valve actuates to its isolation position upon receipt of a containment isolation signal. The STS provides an exception for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required safety position.

The exception provided by the STS is acceptable because the required safety function of such valves is accomplished when the valves are secured in the required position. Therefore, additional testing of the actuation capability of these valves is not required.

13 LA CTS 3/4.6.3 surveillance 4.6.3.2 is revised consistent with the STS.

Surveillance test details are removed to the bases consistent with the level of detail contained in the STS. The CTS requirement that the surveillance be performed during Cold Shutdown or refueling is an expansion of the information already included in the STS bases (i.e., outage) and therefore Chapter 3.6 E2-6-J November,1998

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS (Vrr 3,6.3-l7 Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FNP ITS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DOC HQ SHE DISCUSSION belongs in the bases for the corresponding STS surveillance SR 3.6.3.6.

The specific actuating signals contained in the CTS surveillance have been moved to the bases for the corresponding STS surveillance SR 3.6.3.6. The control of the plant conditions appropriate to perform a surveillance test is typically an issue for procedures and scheduling. The inclusion of specific detail (i.e., which signals provide the appropriate input) intended to explain or clarify the intent of the requirements of surveillances are unnecessary as a TS restriction. Which signals act on which valves is a design detail that is included in the FSAR where changes are controlled via the 10 CFR 50.59 process. The removal of this type ofinformation from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for guidance in performing surveillance requirements is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.

14 LB CTS 3/4.6.3 surveillance 4.6.3.2 is revised consistent with the STS. The CTS requirement to verify automatic containment isolation valve actuation with a Phase A or B " test signal"is replaced with the STS phrase " actual or simulated actuation signal". This requirement is revised consistent with the STS to provide the allowance to utilize a simulated or actual signal to verify the automatic actuation of containment isolation valves. This change allows satisfactory automatic actuations (required equipment / system -

operation is verified) that occur due to an actual automatic actuation signal to fulfill the surveillance requirement. Operability is adequately demonstrated in either case as the affected equipment or system cannot discriminate between an actual or simulated (test) signal. This change is considered less restrictive as it provides an alternate method to satisfy the surveillance requirement to verify automatic system actuation.

15 A CTS 3/4.6.3 surveillance 4.6.3.3 is revised consistent with the STS. The CTS surveillance references Specification 4.0.5 for guidance in verifying the isolation time of the containment isolation valves. In the CTS, Specification 4.0.5 references the required Inservice Inspection and Testing Programs. In the STS, Specification 4.0.5 is not used. The applicable program is referenced directly. In this case, the Inservice Testing Program is referenced. The Requirements for an Inservice Testing Program are contained in the program section of the TS administrative Controls. Since Chapter 3.6 E2-7-J Novemb:r,1998

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d Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-19 i

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4

pg 3,g g Containment Isolation Valves [(Atmospheric,\

fubatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Duall)

B 3.6.3

. BASES (continued)

,~

ACTIONS- The ACTIONS are modif ed by a Note allowing penetration flow paths, except for 4 inch purge valve penetration flow paths, to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for containment isolation is indicated. Due to the size of the containment purge line penetration and the fact that those penetrations exhaust directly from the containment atmosphere to the environment, the penetration flow path containing these valves may not be opened under administrative controls. A single purge valve in a penetration flow path may be opened to effect repairs to an inoperable valve, as allowed by SR 3.6.3.1.

A second Note has been added to provide clarification that,

for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each

, penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each condition provide appropriate

- compensatory actions for each inoperable containment I

isolation valve. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable containment isolation valves are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

L

'The ACTIONS are further modified by a third Note, which .

ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if )

necessary, if the affected systems are rendered inoperable  !

by an inoperable containment is ti v1 I C g m Mm uM MS  ;

l In the event the Fer locl0 leakage results 11r exceeding the overall containment leakage rate, Note 4 directs entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.

e 4

a A.1 and A.2 l

In the event one contaiy6ent isolation alve in one o more penetration _ flow paths /is. inoperable except for pur e valve l f60 dir shield building Dypass) leakage not within limitj , the affected penetrauon now path must be isolated, he method dyWe of barrier'that isolation must include cannot the use affected be adversely of at least by one isolation a single active i

t i

(continued) l 1 WOG STS B 3.6-33 Rev 1, 04/07/95 I

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l Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.3-23 l

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Containment Isolation Valves [(Atmospheric},

[AC. 3,4.J . 23 fubatmospheric,IceCondenser and Dual))

e B 3.6.3 BASES (continued)

~

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modif/ed by a Note allowing penetration flo paths, except for(LTO> inch purge valve penetration flow paths, to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for containment isolation is indicated. Due to the size of the containment purge line penetration and the fact that those penetrations exhaust directly from the containment atmosphere to the environment, the penetration flow path containing these valves may not be opened under administrative controls. A single purge valve in a penetration flow path may be opened to effect repairs to an inoperable valve, as allowed by SR 3.6.3.1.

A second Note has been added to provide clarification that,

, for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each

, penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable containment isolation valve. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable contair. ment isolation valves are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

8

~T he ACTIONS are further modified by a third Note, which ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected systems are rendered inoperable by an inoperable cont nment i _

gg In the event the ttir loclDkakage results iTF exceeding the overall containment leakage rate, Note 4 directs entry into f O the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1.

i A.1 and A.2 In the event one contairynent isolation alve in one o more penetration flow paths /is. inoperable except for pur e valve f60 Gr shield building Dypasgleakage not within limitd , the affected penetrauon now path must be isolated. ihe method pc- of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation f barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active (continued)

WOG STS B 3.6-33 Rev 1, 04/07/95

l' Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.4-1 e

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. - . .- _ = _ _ _ . .. . - ._-___._ - - . . .

p a s.s. u I69 o ContainmentPressurehtmospheric, Dual,andIceCondenser))

4.o.4 %

3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS p

3.6. ntainmentPressure((Ntmospheric, Dual,andIceCondenser))

LCO 3.6. Containm ressure shall be 2: -0. g and s +1.5) psig.

+ 3,0 l l

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Containment pressure A.1 Restore containment I hour not within limits. pressure to within limits.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. 6N_Q B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4 .1 Verify containment pressure is within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> limits.

WOG STS 3.6-16 Rev 1, 04/07/95

MT_ 34,4- 1 FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 5 - JD from STS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems STS 3.6.4.A CONTAINMENT PRESSURE FNP ITS 3.6.4 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE JD NUMBER JUSTIFICATION 1 The bracketed lower bound for containment pressure is replaced with a new FNP-specific pressure. The lower pressure boundary for containment has been revised (from - 1.5 to -1.0 psig). In the STS Bases for TS 3.6.4," Containment Pressure,"

one of the design parameters discussed is an inadvertent actuation of the Containment Spray System. The existing analyses for Farley did not consider an  ;

inadvertent Containment Spray actuation event. A new analysis for this event was performed for Farley. The results of this analysis indicated that the maximum lower I bound for containment pressure should be - 1.0 psig. Based on operational history,  !

I revising this limit will have no operational impact on the units. While this change differs from the current licensing basis, it reduces the window of operation with respect to containment pressure, and is therefore a more conservative position for plant operation.

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l Chapter 3.6 E5-1-D November,1998

Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.5-1 l

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. - . - .- .- . . - - . - . - . - . - -. - ..- . _- . - - - - . - . ~ . - -

l FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS 9dC 3.G M l Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems l

CTS 3/4.6.1.5 CONTAINMENT AIR TEMPERATURE '

FNP ITS 3.6.5 CONTAINMENT AIR TEMPERATURE DOC

]iQ SHE -

DISCUSSION 1 A The CTS 3/4.6.1.5 LCO statement and surveillance text is revised by the deletion of the word " primary" consistent with the STS. The STS does not use the word "primarf"in this specificatioc. This change does not introduce a technical revision and is considered administrative made to i conform with the format and presentation of this information in the STS. I 2 LA C' TS 3/4.6.1.5 surveillance 4.6.1.5.1 which contains details regarding the performance of CTS surveillance 4.6.1.5.2 is removed from the specification consistent with the STS. The specific details related to determining the containment average air temperature are moved into the TS bases consistent with the typical location of this type ofinformation in the STS. The specific instruments required, the instrument numbers, and locations of the sensors for determining the containment average air temperature are design and procedural detail which are meant to clarify the intent of the requirements in the surveillance. This information does not directly support the operability of any LCO-required systems. The ITS l bases provides a more appropriate location for these types ofinformational statements. The removal of this information from the TS and placement in l the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS.

j Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for guidance in i

performing the associated surveillance is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program I specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.

3 A CTS 3/4.6.1.5 surveillance 4.6.1.5.2 is revised consistent with the STS.

The surveillance is revised to specifically require the average containment temperature be detennined. The addition of the word " average" to CTS surveillance 4.6.1.5.2 is required after removing surveillance 4.6.1.5.1 which contained the specific instructions for determining the " average" containment temperature. As this change does not alter the intent of the CTS smveillance and is consistent with the LCO statement and actions, it is considered an administrative change made to conform with the presentation

and format of this TS in the STS.

i Chapter 3.6 E2-1-E November,1998 4

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.- - w - . . , - . . _ , ,- - -n - , - - -

Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.61 21 4

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_-_._____.____-..-_-_____..~._.____m__m.

M 3 4 6-1 '

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0 3.4 CONTAINNENT sYsTEus 3,/o, h CONTAINMENTk00 LING SYSTFM$

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-LIMITING CON 0!TIONS FOR OPERATION t% O

' ' 1 LC.O D.. 3.- LR 3,g,[o O.6.2.D Two 6dependen roup of containment cooling fans shall be OPERA 8LE.., '

Q1ta one ran in we m um y. y 7 ggggg l

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, to %s b hg ACTION: M cf LW 4 mee+ %e Lco. i

- I brd,.lktOO S .9 and both containment spray systees OPERA 8LE, restore t eginoperableW group of cooling ans to OPERABLE status within g C+E 1 east NOT ST ithin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in or be in at thin r

the following 6 ur g  !

3 With two groups of th ov required containment cooling fans N '

inoperable, and both contal nt spray systees OPERABLE, restore at q least one group of cooling fa s to OPERA 8LE status within 72 g CoNDiT OAIS r Dj dj d or be in at least NOT STAN08W thin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in SHUTDOWN within the following hours. Restore both above requ' red Od@

of cooling fans to 0PERA8LE tus within 7 days of initial 0 be in at least NOT STAND 8 thin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in

, SHUTDOWN within the followirg hours. 3 M

With one group of the above required containeen ing fans bO fd.tktONS inoperable and one containment spray systes inoperable, r tore the g/g/g/g 4 inoperable spray system to CPERABLE status within 72 at least NOT STAN08Y ' thin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in r be in UTDOWN @

q 3 within the following( hours. Restore the inoperable gPoup of containment cooling f s to CPERABLE status within 7 days of initial s or be in at leasi HOT STANC8Y' i

Oh MO SHUTDOWN within the fell in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in urs.

l

%NSE Q

1 30 ST3 MDW SURVE1LLANCE REQUIREMENTS 5 i L.

.6.2.3 ach group of containment cooling fans shall b ated OPERA 8LE: )

SR3,(4,2.

A ast once'per 31 days (pn a STAGGERED TEST BASITby: f--pb8363 l

pearting e,cn ran o, coo tunie,, ai,e dy ,,e,atin 3 fro, tno >

l _ untrol_ room, andfTrerifying that each ran group operates for at least a minutes.

3ed,

) Verifying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to 1600 gpa to each cooler j At least once per 11__sonths by veri _fyino that each fan group starts automatically on a(sarety injectio s signal.

FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 6-13 AME!LOMr_uru a,cf&0r6)rnobb U

Gl$Uovf/cn i

?

I

. - . .-. - = ~ - . . --- - - - - - . . - - - . - _ - - . - - . - . - -

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS P e r 3 4 .lo - l Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC ILQ SHE DISCUSSION 1 A CTS 3/4.6.2.3, Containment Cooling System, is combined with the Containment Spray System into one TS consistent with the STS. The new LCO 3.6.6, " Containment Spray and Cooling Systems" contains the requirements that were previously included in the two individual LCOs. As such, this change is made to conform with the format and presentation of l this information in the STS and is considered an administrative change.

2 LA The CTS 3/4.6.2.3 LCO statement is revised consistent with the STS. The term " train" is used in place of the CTS word " group" to conform with the STS terminology. The word " independent"is deleted and the text describing the number of fans in each train is moved into the bases. The l word independent is not used in the STS as this describes an inherent system design and operability requirement. The movement of descriptive text to the bases is consistent with the STS expanded bases which describes l the basic operability requirements for the TS system. The removal of this type ofinformation from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent l with the format and presentation of the STS. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for system operability requirements is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.

3 M The CTS 3/4.6.2.3 applicability for the Containment Cooling System is  :

revised by the addition of Mode 4 consistent with the STS. The CTS action j statements for inoperable Spray and Cooling Systems are also revised to i place the unit in Cold Shutdown vs. Hot Shutdown to reflect the existing Mode of applicability for the Spray System and the change in applicable Modes for the Cooling System. The Containment Cooling System, l although normally in service for temperature control, is an ESF system l required for SI. The addition of Mode 4 to the applicability of the

[ Coucainment Cooling System is consistent with the applicable Modes for l.

other ESF systems required for SI and with the ESFAS TS requirements for manual capability to initiate SI in Mode 4. Therefore, this change is

considered acceptable for FNP. However, the addition of this specific requirement represents a more restrictive change to the CTS.

i

3a M The CTS 3/4.6.2.3 action statement a. is revised by tN addition of a second

~

completion time for the Containment Cooling System consistent with the Chapter 3.6 E2-1-I November,1998 j

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS M M'b 'I Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC.

NO _SjiE DISCUSSION STS. The new Completion Time of 10 days from discovery of failure to I meet the LCO is applicable to an inoperable Containment Cooling train as I

well as the 7 day Completion Time. In the STS, the most limiting i Completion Time always applies. This new Completion Time is based on l the STS format ofindividual actions Conditions which may be entered simultaneously and therefore potentially allow attemating between Conditions such that the LCO may not be met indefinitely. Since the Spray and Cooling systems are now in the same TS and the Conditions for these systems may be entered in a serial or consecutive manner such that the LCO may not be met for extended periods, this type of Completion Time " Cap" is applicable. Specifically, Conditions A and C of STS LCO 3.6.6 could be continuously entered for inoperable Spray trains and Cooling System trains

.such that one of these Conditions was always applicable and the LCO requirement was never met. This Completion Time format is discussed in more detail in example 1.3-3 in STS Section 1.3. The addition of this second Completion Time is intended to limit the time that the LCO may not be met. This Completion Time was designed to limit serial (overlapping) entries into different Conditions of the same TS to one time. Since the Completion Times are 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and 7 days in this TS, the total time the

, LCO may not be met is 10 days. This limits consecutive (overlapping) entry into the Conditions for Containment Spray and Cooling systems to one time, i For example, initially if a Spray train becomes inoperable, a total of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is available for restoration in STS LCO 3.6.6 Condition A (of the two Condition A Completion Times,72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is limiting). If at 70 hours8.101852e-4 days <br />0.0194 hours <br />1.157407e-4 weeks <br />2.6635e-5 months <br /> into this time the Spray train is still inoperable and a Cooling System train becomes inoperable, STS LCO 3.6.6 Condition C is entered (overlapping Condition A entry without restoration to meet the LCO) and the 7 day Completion Time of Condition C wouid be the limiting Completion Time ,

for the inoperable Cooling System train. However, given that the initial I inoperable Spray train is restored to operable status in 71 hours8.217593e-4 days <br />0.0197 hours <br />1.173942e-4 weeks <br />2.70155e-5 months <br /> and at 6 days into the Completion Time for the inoperable Cooling System train a Spray train became inoperable again, Condition A would be entered again (overlapping Condition C entry without restoration to meet the LCO). The total time that the LCO has not been met when Condition A is entered for the second time is approximately 9 days (3 days for the initial inoperable Spray train + 6 days for the inoperable Cooling System train). Therefore, Chapter 3.6 E2-2-1 November,1998

l 1 l FNP TS Conversion {

Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS  ;

Pdr 3,4.fo -I Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems I CTS 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM i i

FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC HQ SHE DISCUSSION when Condition A is entered for the subsequent inoperable Spray train, the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time would not be available as the 10 day Completion Time "from discovery of failure to meet the LCO" would become the limiting Completion Time for this Condition.

Since this new Completion Time format represents a new limitation for FNP (current TS do not limit serial or consecutive entry of these actions) this change is considered more restrictive.

4 A The CTS 3/4.6.2.3 action statements a, b, and c are effectively replaced by )

the STS Conditions A through E as indicated on the Enclosure I markup of l the CTS. Due to the STS rules of multiple Conditions being entered as i applicable and the fact that the Completion Time for these Conditions begin l when entered, the STS Conditions A through E provide an equivalent set of )

actions to the CTS except where noted in other DOCS. Therefore, the replacement of CTS action statements a, b, and c by STS Conditions A through E is considered essentially an administrative change. The STS provides one new Condition that does not have a corresponding CTS action.

The STS Condition F is included due to the format and rules of Condition entry in the STS. In the STS, it is possible to enter all applicable Conditions in a TS. For example, in STS LCO 3.6.6, Condition A and D could be applicable at the same time and allow 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> before requiring action to shutdown the unit. However, if Condition A and D were l applicable the unit would have no operable Cooling System train and only one operable Spray system train. The combination of these STS Conditions allows operation to continue for longer than acceptable (up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) in l this degraded plant condition. Therefore, the STS provides Condition F which is intended to address the situation described above (three inoperable trains) and require more immediate action (enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediately).

The addition of Condition F is considered an administrative change

required by the format and rules for actions Conditions in the STS.

l 5 L CTS 3/4.6.2.3 action statement c for the inoperable containment spray system is revised consistent with the STS and the existing CTS 3/4.6.2.1 requirements for an inoperable spray system. The time allowed for reducing the unit Mode of operation below Mode 3 is increased from 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to Mode 4 to 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> to Mode 5. Since 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> are typically allowed to reach Mode 5, this change increases the time the unit may stay in l Chapter 3.6 E2-3-I November,1998 f

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Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.6-2 4

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g gP WoulCoobo$s8sb' 3,(o C0AT AN\f ENT SYSTE\f 5 kN6 2 DEPPISSLM7ATf0N AND COOLNO SYSTE\f5 CONTAfNMENT $ PRAY SYSTEM 2, LR LfufTTNG CONDfTION FOR OPERATION c L -

V O 8,[o , b 6 2) TdMependenlcontainment spray systems sha!! be OPERABLE. Nth

/

capaba of taking sucoco from the AwsT and transfernos sucuae to cbc contamment sump. 3 APPLICABftfTY: MODES 1,2,3 and 4.

ACTION: g4 h h f,o se.cycar o breb M O tco, 00BDITn0H R  %"ah one con spray system inoperable, restors the inoperable spray to OPERABLE stanas a within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />' be in at least HOT STANDBY withis the re pe nextuppergble 6 hourr.a6rayd gggg r "m ro wewh_E samsa mthp thynex: 47houtf og in COLD ShumOWN withm 6e foUowing[

INSE R1" 6 SL1tVEfLLANCE REOUTREMENTS P 4 DN Each contamment spray rystem sha!! be demonstrated OPERABLE: *

,$R 3,6,[a, f At least once pcr 31 das by venfyvig that och valve (manual, power operstad or

'y automatic) in the flow path that is not locimf, scaled, or ~ securid in position,is in A it8 **'nct posh 5 BASES 5 #"3'b 'I'- '

sy wnfbns.tmT= <=imuinion en 'schuse pa=ure dsnar LA -

to@,+= 4 03) than or equajl10 pt:g)when g ggygg g fArleast once per 18 a ring shutdowti,by:

.k

.bE 1 V that automanc va!w in the flow pa6 actuanes to its corred nositimi flDY. M.

%fy' on a

> em B ignal gfy or,Simod d al.:h>6MOf5 L8 g,4fr,5 2. venfbas ihat each spray eump sarts --"y o= = -

sisnat

=- BASES d At least once per 10 pari 6 performes an air or anoke flow test through endi spray)

$. each spray nozdeis unobstructas.

BASES g SR,3 lo 4g LA l g

]

FARLEY. UNIT I 3/4 6 si AMENDMINTNO II3 e*

I

\

g 34.6 a CHAPTER 3.6 j INSERT G NEW CONDITION F FOR CONTAINMENT SPRAY / COOLING SYSTEMS  :

CTS 3/4.6.2.1 PAGE 3/4 6-11 l AND l CTS 3/4.6.2.3 PAGE 3/4 6-13  !

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CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i

F. Two containment spray F.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately .

trains inoperable. I i

DE ,

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Any combination of three or more trains inoperable.

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Chapter 3.6 Insert Page i l

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FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS M 3,lae(A Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems l

l CTS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC l b'Q SHE DISCUSSION I requirement was never met. This Completion Time format is discussed in more detail in example 1.3-3 in STS Section 1.3. The addition of this second Completion Time is intended to limit the time that the LCO may not be met. This Completion Time was designed to limit serial (overlapping) l l entries into different Conditions of the same TS to one time. Since the

! Completion Times are 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and 7 days in this TS, the total time the l LCO may not be met is 10 days. This limits consecutive (overlapping) entry into the Conditions for Containment Spray and Cooling systems to one time.

For example, initially if a Spray train becomes inoperable, a total of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is available for restoration in STS LCO 3.6.6 Condition A (of the two Condition A Completion Times,72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is limiting). If at 70 hours8.101852e-4 days <br />0.0194 hours <br />1.157407e-4 weeks <br />2.6635e-5 months <br /> into this time the Spray train is still inoperable and a Cooling System , train  ;

becomes inoperable, STS LCO 3.6.6 Condition C is entered (overlapping Condition A entry without restoration to meet the LCO) and the 7 day Completion Time of Condition C would be the limiting Completior. Time for the inoperable Cooling System train. However, given that the initial inoperable Spray train is restored to operable status in 71 hours8.217593e-4 days <br />0.0197 hours <br />1.173942e-4 weeks <br />2.70155e-5 months <br /> and at 6 l days into the Completion Time for the inoperable Cooling System train a Spray train became inoperable again, Condition A would be entered again (overlapping Condition C entry without restoration to meet the LCO). The total time that the LCO has not been met when Condition A is entered for  :

the second time is approximately 9 days (3 days for the initial inoperable Spray train + 6 days for the inoperable Cooling System train). Therefore, when Condition A is entered for the subsequent inoperable Spray train, the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time would not be available as the 10 day Completion Time "from discovery of failure to meet the LCO" would become the limiting Completion Time for this Condition.

Since this new Completion Time format represents a new limitation for FNP (current TS do not limit serial or consecutive entry of these actions) l this change is considered more restrictive.

3a A The STS provides a new Condition that does not have a corresponding CTS action. The STS Condition F is included due to the format and rules of Condition entry in the STS. In the STS, it is possible to enter all applicable Conditions in a TS. For example, in STS LCO 3.6.6, Condition A and D Chapter 3.6 E2-2-H November,1998

FNP TS Conversion PNC 3.6,6 Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC FQ SHE DISCUSSION could be applicable at the same time and allow 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> before requiring action to shutdown the unit. However,if Condition A and D were applicable the unit would have no operable Cooling System train and only one operable Spray system train. The combination of these STS Conditions allows operation to continue for longer than acceptable (up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) in this degraded plant condition. Therefore, the STS provides Coadition F which is intended to address the situation described above (three inoperable trains) and require more immediate action (enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediately).

The addition of Condition F is considered an administrative change required by the format and rules for actions Conditions in the STS.

4- A The Completion Times of the CTS 3/4.6.2.1 action statement are revised consistent with the STS. The CTS Completion Times specified for reducing power to Mode 3, restoration in Mode 3, and cooling down to Mode 5 have been combined consistent with the STS. In the STS, the action to restore a system to operable status is always considered an option and specific restoration actions are not typically included in the STS actions. Therefore, the 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> allowed to restore in Mode 3 is combined with the 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> allowed to reach Mode 5 for a new total time to rea:h Mode 5. Since in the STS, the expression "the following X hours"is not used for expressing the time allowed for performing an action and the Completion Time clock starts upon Condition entry, the 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowed to reach Mode 3 in this STS Condition must be added to the time allowed to reach Mode 5. Therefore, the equivalent Completion Time to reach Mode 5 in the STS is 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> (6 + 48 + 30) from Condition entry. As this change only reformats the Completion Times for this action to conform with the STS and does not alter the total time allowed by the CTS to remove the unit from the applicable Modes (1-4) for this TS, this change is considered administrative.

5 LA CTS 3/4.6.2.1 surveillance 4.6.2.1.b is revised consistent with the STS. In the STS, the specific required flow and discharge pressures have been removed from the pump performance surveillance requirements. The surveillance has been reworded consistent with the STS to specify 2 the required developed head at the flow test point instead of specific values.

The specific required values in the CTS are moved to the bases. The removal of this type ofinformation from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. The flow Chapter 3.6 E2-3-H November,1998

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1 FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS P4C 344-3 Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems i

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CTS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC EQ. SHE DISCUSSION could be applicable at the same time and allow 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> before requiring action to shutdown the unit. However,if Condition A and D were applicable die unit would have no operable Cooling System train and only one operable Spray system train. The combination of these STS Conditions allows operation to continue for longer than acceptable (up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) in this degraded plant condition. Therefore, the STS provides Condition F which is intended to address the situation described above (three inoperable trains) and require more immediate action (enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediately).

The addition of Condition F is considered an administrative change j required by the format and rules for actions Conditions in the STS. j 4 A The Completion Times of the CTS 3/4.6.2.1 action ste: ment are revised consistent with the STS. The CTS Completion Times specified for I reducing power to Mode 3, restoration in Mode 3, and cooling down to Mode 5 have been combined consistent with the STS. In the STS, the action to restore a system to operable status is always considered an option and specific restoration actions are not typically included in the STS actions. Therefore, the 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> allowed to restore in Mode 3 is combined with the 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> allowed to reach Mode 5 for a new total time to reach Mode 5. Since in the STS, the expression "the following X hours" is not used for expressing the time allowed for performing an action and the Completion Time clock starts upon Condition entry, the 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowed to reach Mode 3 in this STS Condition must be added to the time allowed to reach Mode 5. Therefore, the equivalent Completion Time to reach Mode 5 in the STS is 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> (6 + 48 + 30) from Condition entry. As this change only reformats the Completion Times for this action to conform with the STS and does not alter the total time allowed by the CTS to remove the unit from the applicable Modes (1-4) for this TS, this change is considered administrative.

5 LA CTS 3/4.6.2.1 surveillance 4.6.2.1.b is revised consistent with the STS. In the STS, the specific required flow and discharge pressures have been removed from the pump performance surveillance requirements. The surveillance has been reworded consistent with the STS to specify 2 the required developed head at the flow test point instead of specific values.

l The specific required values in the CTS are moved to the bases. The removal of this type ofinformation from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. The flow l Chapter 3.6 E2-3-H November,1998

I FNP TS Conversion {

Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS 3' Ni Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC NO SHE DISCUSSION alWent (recirculation flow) is a procedural detail related to the per:ormance of this surveillance in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The alignment allows testing of the Containment Spray pumps without causing flow to be released out of the nozzles into contaimnent.

The flow alignment is described in the IST plan along with an acceptable range ofdifferential pressures. The minimum required differential pressure corresponds to a single point on the pump curve. Testing at other points along the pump's required head curve may also be used to warn of abnormal pump performance. Ensuring 4 hat the pump performs in accordance with the IST plan will continue to ensure that adequate differential pressure is maintained. Movement of this information to the bases will not affect the acceptance criteria of the IST plan and will continue to provide the appropriate guidance as to the intent of the surveillance. Reliance on the infonnation contained in the STS bases for the performance of surveillance testing is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.

6 A CTS 3/4.6.2.1 surveillance 4.6.2.1.b is revised consistent with the STS. In the STS Specification 4.0.5 is not used. CTS Specification 4.0.5 contained the Inservice Inspection and Testing requirements. The CTS requirement to test pumps pursuant to Specification 4.0.5 is replaced with a direct reference to the Inservice Testing Program. In the STS, the Inservice Testing requirements are contained in the Inservice Testing Program in the Program Section of the TS Administrative Controls. As such, this change is made to conform with the format and presentation of this information in the STS and is not intended to introduce a technical change. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.

7 LB CTS 3/4.6.2.1 surveillance 4.6.2.1.c.1 and 2 are revised consistent with the STS. The CTS requirement to verify automatic valve and pump actuation with a test signal is replaced with the STS phrase " actual or simulated actuation signal". This requirement is revised consistent with the STS to provide the allowance to utilize a simulated or actual signal to verify the automatic actuation of the pump or valve. This change allows satisfactory automatic actuations (required equipment / system operation is verified) that occur due to an actual automatic actuation signal to fulfill the surveillance requirement. Operability is adequately demonstrated in either case as the Chapter 3.6 E2-4-H November,1998

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FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS g2Ar 3Md Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC NQ SHE DLSCUSSION affected equipment or system car Jiscriminate between an actual or simulated (test) signal. This change is considered less restrictive as it provides an alternate method to satisfy the surveillance requirement to i verifyautomatic system actuation.

8 LA CTS 3/4.6.2.1 surveillance 4.6.2.1.c.1/2 and 4.6.2.1.d are revised consistent with the STS. The specific actuation signal used for the automatic valve and pump verifications and the descriptive detail regarding how the spray header nozzle is verified unobstructed are moved into the bases for the l associated surveillances. The inclusion of specific detail (i.e., which signals  !

provide the appropriate input) intended to explain or clarify the intent of the requirements of surveillances are unnecessary as a TS restriction.

Identification of valve control signals is a design detail included in the  ;

FSAR where changes are controlled via the 10 CFR 50.59 process. The j descriptive detail regarding how the spray header nozzles are verified unobstmeted is a procedural detail of the methodology employed to ensure  !

that the nozzles are not blocked. The ITS bases provides a more appropriate location for these types of detail. The removal of this type of information from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of the STS. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for the performance of surveillance testing is acceptable l since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.

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Chapter 3.6 E2-5-H November,1998

l Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.6-5 j I

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS M 3' M Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC EQ SHE DISCUSSION Mode 3 with an inoperable spray system to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. The time allowed to reach Mode 5 is consistent with the CTS 3/4.6.2.1, Containment Spray System, action requirements and the STS LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems, Condition A actions. This change affects CTS action statement c which applies when one spray and one cooling system are inoperable. In this condition, one spray and one cooling system remain "

operaMe and provide 100% of the containment heat removal capacity and 1008. of the iodine removal function required of these systems to mitigate the consequences of a DBA. In addition, the plant is required to be placed in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and ultimately in Mode 5 where the systems are no longer required operable. The additional time allowed by this change to remain in Mode 3 is reasonable considering that the plant is shutdowTi within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, thus reducing the potential energy released to containment from a DBA, and the fact that the heat and iodine removal capacity of the remaining operable spray and cooling systems is sufficient to meet the requirements of a DBA occurring during power operation.

Sa L The CTS 3/4.6.2.3 surveillance 4.6.2.3.a is revised by the deletion of the Staggered Test Basis requirement for the Containment Cooling Fans consistent with the similar requirements for the Containment Cooling Fans in the STS. The resulting test interval for the Containment Cooling Fans is a straight 31 days consistent with the STS requirements for the similar Containment Cooling Fans. In the STS, testing on a Staggered Test Basis is removed from many surveillances. This was considered acceptable in the development of the STS based on the fact that Staggered Testing is operationally more difficult (particularly for scheduling), in most cases has negligible impact on component reliability, results in more frequent reductions in system redundancy for testing purposes, and increases the likelihood of human error by increasing the number of separate test evolutions. As such, the deletion of the staggered testing requirement for the Containment Cooling Fans is also acceptable, 6 LA CTS 3/4.6.2.3 surveillance requirement 4.6.2.3.a.1 and 4.6.2.3.b are revised consistent with the STS. Detail from these CTS surveillances is moved into the bases consistent with the level of detail contained in the corresponding STS surveillances. The detail regarding where to start fans if not nmning and the specific actuation signal for the fans are discussed in the bases for the corresponding STS surveillances. The inclusion of specific detail (i.e., l Chapter 3.6 E2-4-I November,1998

FNP TS Conversion 8/tr Leo,/o-5 Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems i

CTS 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC NQ SHE DISCUSSION j which signals provide the appropriate input) intended to explain or clarify l the intent of the requirements of surveillances are unnecessary as a TS I restriction. Identification of valve control signals is a design detail included in the FSAR where changes are controlled via the 10 CFR 50.59 process.  ;

The details regarding where to start the containment cooling fans if not  ;

mnning is a procedural detail providing guidance for the performance of the surveillance. The ITS bases provides a more appropriate location for these l types of detail. The removal of this type ofinformation from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent witirthe format and presentation of the STS. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases for guidance in performing surveillance requirements is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.

1 7 LB CTS 3/4.6.2.3 surveillance 4.6.2.3.b is revised consistent with the STS.

The CTS requirement to verify automatic fan group actuation with a " test signal"is replaced with the STS phrase " actual or simulated actuation signal". This requirement is revised consistent with the STS to provide the allowance to utilize a simulated or actual signal to verify the automatic actuation of the fan group. This change allows satisfactory automatic actuations (required equipment / system operation is verified) that occur due to an actual automatic actuation signal to fulfill the surveillance requirement. Operability is adequately demonstrated in either case as the affected equipment or system cannot discriminate between an actual or simulated (test) signal. This change is considered less restrictive as it provides an alternate method to satisfy the surveillance requirement to l verify automatic system actuation.

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%"U. ~3.d [a i

I 3.6 c0NTarNMENT SYSTEMS Q

3,6,6 c0NTarNNENT400 trna Sv5TEss l

t'o 103 i LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 1

3 [o o 6iden Qvith one ran in esca ysvvy. 3 en ta nment cooling fans shall be OPERABLE. .,

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, n 3 -

ID D b b9 cf Dwe +o rneef ne LCO.

ACTION:

  • M _ _ _

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With one group of the above required containment cooli g fans inopera$1e g brd,.tkt00 5 --> and both containment spray systems CPERABLE, restore t e inoperable g

group of cooling ans to OPERABLE status within 7 OYb least HOT ST ithin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in s or be in at within the following 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> i 30 0.0LD s 3 With two groups of th ove required containment cooling fans 10 l inoperable, and both contai nt spray systems OPERABLE. restore at 1 t-l CON DITf 0. MS least one group of cooling fa s to OPERA 8LE status within 72 h r g in at least HOT STAN08W ithin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in 0.d @

I Dj d.j 6 Y or beSHUTDOWN within the following hours. Restore both above requ red 3 gro s of cooling fans to CPERABLE tus within 7 days of initial U

Ni r be in at least HOT STAN08 thin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in 3

)

SHUTDOWN within the following hours, g

bo rd4glON$ With one group of the above required containment oo ing fans inoperable and one containment spray system inoperable, r tore the g/ g/ g/ g ) inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within 72 r be in at least HOT STAN08Y ' thin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in within the following( hours. Restore the inoperadie giaoup or HUTD0VN O 4 3 containment cooling f s to CPERABLE status within 7 days of initial n .ss or be in at leas < HOT STANOBY w in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in W H0 SHUTDOWN within the followl urs.

3*NSEATW  :

" (7]g 1 30 g 573 gpg SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS p -

So.

L

. 6. 2. 3 ach group of cratainment cooling fans shall b ated CPERABLE:

At least once'per 31 days (on a STAGGERED TEST BASIVby:

6E.M2 fpta, ting eaco ran o,o o <unie,s ai,ea,y ,,e,atino) f,os tnea f.~7bS$E3 i

- Lontrol room, andf9erifying that each fan group operates for at least a minutes ~

M,N Verifying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to

-^ -~

1600 gpa to each cooler p Ob At least once per la months by verifyino that each fan group starts autoeatically on alsarety injecti es signal.

FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 6-13 AM D I !PA g f h or6/fnub

@%' raduafien

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS 3 4. W Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS DOC NQ SHE DISCUSSION Mode 3 with an inoperable spray system to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. The time allowed to reach Mode 5 is consistent with the CTS 3/4.6.2.1, Containment Spray System, action requirements and the STS LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems, Condition A actions. This change affects CTS action statement c which applies when one spray and one cooling system are inoperable. In this condition, one spray and one cooling system remain operable and provide 100% of the containment heat removal capacity and 100% of the iodine removal function required of these systems to mitigate the consequences of a DBA. In addition, the plant is required to be placed in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and ultimately in Mode 5 where the systems are no longer required operable. The additional time allowed by this change to remain in Mode 3 is reasonable considering that the plant is shutdown I within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, thus reducing the potential energy released to containment from a DBA, and the fact that the heat and iodine removal capacity of the remaining operable spray and cooling systems is sufficient to meet the requirements of a DBA occurring during power operation.

5a L The CTS 3/4.6.2.3 surveillance 4.6.2.3.a is revised by the deletion of the Staggered Test Basis requirement for the Containment Cooling Fans consistent with the similar requirements for the Containment Cooling Fans in the STS. The resulting test interval for the Containment Cooling Fans is a straight 31 days consistent with the STS requirements for the similar Containment Cooling Fans. In the STS, testing on a Staggered Test Basis is removed from many surveillances. This was considered acceptable in the development of the STS based on the fact that Staggered Testing is operationally more difficult (particularly for scheduling), in most cases has negligible impact on component reliability, results in more frequent reductions in system redundancy for testing purposes, and increases the likelihood of human error by increasing the number of separate test evolutions. As such, the deletion of the staggered testing requirement for the Containment Cooling Fans is also acceptable.

6 LA CTS 3/4.6.2.3 surveillance requirement 4.6.2.3.a.1 and 4.6.2.3.b are revised consistent with the STS. Detail from these CTS surveillances is moved into the bases consistent with the level of detail contained in the corresponding STS surveillances. The detail regarding where to start fans if not running and the specific actuation signal for the fans are discussed in the bases for the corresponding STS surveillances. The inclusion of specific detail (i.e.,

Chapter 3.6 E2-4-I November,1998

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 3 - Significant Hazards Evaluations FAT-. 3, fo . /, - 6 Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems III. SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIONS CTS 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS la;L

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The Containment Cooling Fans are used to support mitigation of the consequences of an accident, but they are not considered as the initiator of any previously analyzed accident.

As such, the elimination of a requirement to stagger the surveillance testing and the extension of the surveillance interval will not increase the probability of any accident previously evaluated. The proposed SR continues to provide adequate assurance of operable Containment Cooling Fans and therefore, does not involve any increase to the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change introduces no new mode of plant operation and it does not involve physical modification to the plant. Therefore it does not create the possibility of a new or .

different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.  !

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

l This change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety since the operability of the Containment Cooling Fans continues to be determined in the same manner. The elimination of staggered testing and resulting extension of the surveillance interval do not have a significant effect on reliability, and do not impact the capability of the j Containment Cooling Fans to perform their safety function. The proposed change still ensures the capability of the Containment Cooling Fans to perform their safety function while providing an increase in the availability of the Containment Cooling Fans through reduced testing.

t Chapter 3.6 E3-2-D November,1998

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Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.7-2

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS f d T. 36M- Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.4.2 ELECTRIC HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS FNP ITS 3.6.7 HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS DOC EQ SHE DISCUSSION maintained (by the post accident containment venting system), the small likelihood of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate enough hydrogen to exceed the flammability limit, and the time available after such a DBA to take action to prevent the accumulation of hydrogen from exceeding the flammabilitylimit.

4 LA CTS 3/4.6.4.2 is revised by the removal of surveillance 4.6.4.2.b.1 consistent with the STS. The CTS surveillance 4.6.4.2.b.1 requires the performance of a Channel Calibration on all the hydrogen recombiner instrumentation. These calibrations and any necessary compensatory measures (i.e., substitute test instrumentation) will be controlled administratively in the TRM. This change is acceptable based on the system redundancy, available alternate means of contro: ling hydrogen, the fact that the recombiners are controlled manually, and the instrumentation

' does not provide essential control or interlock functions. In addit'on, the functional test required by TS every 18 months will also verify the operation of the hydrogen recombiner instrumentation. In addition, placement of this requirement in 6e TRM is acceptable due to the 10CFR50.59 control applied to changes in the TRM.

5 LA CTS surveillance 4.6.4.2 is revised consistent w?h the STS. Details contained in the CTS regarding the performance of the s uveillance requirements have been moved into the bases. The details and descriptive information on the performance of the hydrogen recombiner functional test, the visual examination of the recombiners for abnormal conditions, and the resistance to ground tests for the heaters are intended to explain or clarify the intent of the requirements and provide guidance for the performance of the surveillance. As such, they are unnecessary as a TS restriction. The ITS bases provides a more appropriate location for these types of informational statements. The removal of this information from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of these surveillance requirements in the STS. Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.

Chapter 3.6 E2-2-L November,1998

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M M'b Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.4.4 HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.8 HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM (HMS)

DOC EO SHE DISCUSSION the backup post accident containment venting system or a hydrogen recombiner for attemate hydrogen control capability for up to 7 days with two hydrogen mixing trains inoperable is acceptable based on the STS actions that require confirmation that the attemate hydrogen control function is maintained (by the post accident containment venting system or a hydrogen recombiner) and the existing containment atmosphere mixing and hydrogen removal capabilities provided by the required contairunent cooling fans, reactor cavity hydrogen dilution fans, and recombiners. In addition, the operating flexibility provided by the STS Condition B is acceptable based on the small likelihood of the occurrence of a DBA during the time allowed by Condition B that would generate enough hydrogen to exceed the flammabiliry limit and the time available to the operators after such a DBA to take action to prevent the accumulation of hydrogen from exceeding the flammabilitylimit.

4 L The CTS 3/4.6.4.4 surveillance 4.6.4.4.a is revised by the deletion of the Staggered Test Basis requirement for the hydrogen mixing system )

consistent with the STS. The resulting test interval for the hydrogen i mixing system is a straight 92 days consistent with the STS requirements.

In the STS, testing on a Staggered Test Basis is removed from many surveillances. This was considered acceptable in the development of the STS based on the fact that Staggered Testing is operationally more difficult (panicularly for scheduling),in most cases has negligible impact on component reliability, results in more frequent reductions in system  !

redundancy for testing purposes, and increases the likelihood of human l error by increasing the number of separate test evolutions. As such, the deletion of the staggered testing requirement for the FNP hydrogen mixing system is also acceptable.

5 LA The CTS 3/4.6.4.4 surveillance 4.6.4.4.a is revised consistent with the STS by the removal of descriptive information. The information in this CTS surveillance regarding how and where the system is started is moved to the bases of the associated surveillance. The descriptive information regarding how and where the HMS is started specified in CTS 4.6.4.4.a is intended to provide guidance for the performance of the surveillance. As such, it is i unnecessary as a TS restriction. The ITS bases provides a more appropriate

location for these types ofinformational statements. The removal of this information from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the Chapter 3.6 E2-2-N November,1998

FNP TS Conversion g_g Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS l Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems i i

CTS 3/4.6.4.4 HYDROGEN MLXING SYSTEM l

FNP ITS 3.6.8 HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM (HMS)

DOC NQ SHE DISCUSSION format and presentation of similar surveillance requirements in the STS.

Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases is acceptable since changes to the infonnation in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.

6 M The CTS 3/4.6.4.4 surveillance requirements are modified by the addition of a requirement to verify the automatic actuation of the hydrogen mixing system every 18 months. The addition of this requirement is consistent with the requirements in the STS for the hydrogen mixing system. As this system is actuated by a Safety Injection signal, verification of this actuabn capability is applicable and appropriate for FNP. However, the addition of this surveillance requirement is considered a more restrictive change.

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CTS 3/4.6.4.4 HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.8 HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM (HMS)

DOC 1 N_Q SHE DISCUSSION 1 A CTS 3/4.6.4.4 LCO statement, Actions, and surveillances are revised consistent with the STS terminology used in this TS. The word independent is deleted from the LCO statement. The word independent is not used in the STS as this describes an inherent system design and 1 operability requirement. In addition, the common STS term " train" is used in place of" system"in the LCO, Actions, and Surveillances. In the STS, i the term train is used in all TS to describe sets of redundant equipment As the revision of these CTS terms does not introduce a technical change to the requirements for the system as designed and installed at FNP, and is made to conform with the format and presentation of this information in the STS, these changes are considered administrative.

2 L The CTS 3/4.6.4.4 actions are revised by the addition of a note that provides an exception to the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 consistent with the STS. The STS note will allow Mode changes to take place with a single inoperable hydrogen mixing train. The allowance provided by this note is considered acceptable due to the remaining operable hydrogen mixing and removal capabilities of the other hydrogen mixing train, the reactor cavity hydrogen dilution system, the hydrogen recombiners, and the post accident containment venting system which serves as a backup to the hydrogen recombiners, as well as the low likelihood of a LOCA or SLB occurring

! that would generate an amount of hydrogen that exceeds the flammability l limit and the time available after such a DBA to take action to prevent the accumulation of hydrogen from exceeding the flammability limit.

I 3 L CTS 3/4.6.4.4 is modified by the addition of an Actions Condition for two inoperable hydrogen mixing trains consistent with the STS. The incorporation of STS Actions Condition B will allow operation to continue for up to 7 days with two inoperable hydrogen mixing trains provided the l post accident containment venting system or a hydrogen recombiner is l

verified capable of perfonning its intended function within one hour and every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter. The capability of the post accident containment venting system to pressurize containment with hydrogen free air and vent the pressurized containment through filters to the outside atmosphere will provide an attemate hydrogen dilution and mixing capacity. The capability of a hydrogen recombiner to reduce the hydrogen content in containment also provides a backup hydrogen control function. The allowance to rely on Chapter 3.6 E2-1-N November,1998

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FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS i M I 3.fo.g-2.- Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems CTS 3/4.6.4.4 HYDROGEN MLXING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.8 HYDROGEN MLXING SYSTEM (HMS)

DOC FQ SHE DISCUSSION the backup post accident containment venting system or a hydrogen recombiner for altemate hydrogen control capability for up to 7 days with two hydrogen mixing trains inoperable is acceptable based on the STS actions that require confirmation that the attemate hydrogen control function is maintained (by the post accident containment venting system or a hydrogen recombiner) and the existing containment atmosphere mixing and hydrogen removal capabilities provided by the required containment cooling fans, reactor cavity hydrogen dilution fans, and recombiners. In addition, the operating flexibility provided by the STS Condition B is acceptable based on the small likelihood of the occurrence of a DBA during the time allowed by Condition B that would generate enough hydrogen to exceed the flammability limit and the time available to the operators after such a DBA to take action to prevent the accumulation of hydrogen from exceeding the flammabilitylimit.

4 L The CTS 3/4.6.4.4 surveillance 4.6.4.4.a is revised by the deletion of the Staggered Test Basis requirement for the hydrogen mixing system consistent with the STS. The resulting test interval for the hydrogen mixing system is a straight 92 days consistent with the STS requirements.

In the STS, testing on a Staggered Test Basis is removed from many surveillances. This was considered acceptable in the development of the STS based on the fact that Staggered Testing is operationally more difficult (particularly for scheduling), in most cases has negligible impact on l component reliability, results in more frequent reductions in system i redundancy for testing purposes, and increases the likelihood of human error by increasing the number of separate test evolutions. As such, the l

l deletion of the staggered testing requirement for the FNP hydrogen mixing system is also acceptable.

5 LA The CTS 3/4.6.4.4 surveillance 4.6.4.4.a is revised consistent with the STS by the removal of descriptive information. The information in this CTS l

surveillance regarding how and where the system is started is moved to the l bases of the associated surveillance. The descriptive information regarding  ;

how and where the HMS is started specified in CTS 4.6.4.4.a is intended to provide guidance for the performance of the surveillance. As such, it is unnecessary as a TS restriction. The ITS bases provides a more appropriate l location for these types ofinformational statements. The removal of this  ;

information from the TS and placement in the bas:s is cot.sistent with the Chapter 3.6 E2-2-N November,1998

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 3 - Significant Hazards Evaluations W 3. 4 2- Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems III. SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIONS CTS 3/4.6.4.4 HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM FNP ITS 3.6.8 HYDROGEN MLXING SYSTEM (HMS) 3-L

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

This change does not result in any hardware changes. The hydrogen mixing system is not assumed to be an initiator of any analyzed event. The proposed change allows two l hydrogen mixing trains to be inoperable for up to 7 days provided an alternate hydrogen control function is available. The alternate hydrogen control capability is provided by the post accident containment ventilation system or a hydrogen recombiner. The time allowed by STS Condition B for two inoperable hydrogen mixing trains is acceptable given the containment atmosphere mixing and removal functions provided by the required containment cooling fans, reactor cavity hydrogen dilution system fans, the hydrogen recombiners, and the additional assurance provided by the post accident containment ventilation system or hydrogen recombiner verified operable while in Condition B. A one hour Completion Time to initially verify the availability of the alternate hydrogen control I function and additional verification once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter,is an acceptable frequency to ensure the alternate hydrogen control function is maintained. The proposed Completion i Time of 7 days is a reasonable time to allow two hydrogen mixing trains to be inoperable because of the alternate hydrogen control functions available and because of the low l probability of a DBA which would generate hydrogen in the amount capable of exceeding l the flammability limit occurring within the time allowed by proposed Condition B.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

i 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any l accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change does not necessitate a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in parameters governing normal plant operation. The proposed change will allow two hydrogen mixing trains to be I

inoperable for up to 7 days provided an alternate hydrogen control function is maintained.

i Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from I any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The allowance to have two hydrogen mixing trains inoperable for up to 7 days, provided an alternate hydrogen control function is available, does not significantly impact the applicable I accident analysis. Use of the post accident containment ventilation system or a hydrogen recombiner as the alternate hydrogen control function provides additional assurance that I Chapter 3.6 E3-2-H November,1998

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 3 - Significant Hazards Evaluations 94F-. 3Jo.2 2-Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems III. SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIONS CTS 3/4.6.4.4 HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM l 1

l FNP ITS 3.6.8 HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM (HMS) I the temperature and pressure assumptions in the applicable safety analysis are maintained.

The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time to initially verify the availability of the alternate hydrogen I control function, and the additional verification once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter, is an acceptable frequency to ensure function of the post accident containment ventilation system l or hydrogen recombiner is maintained. The 7 day Completion Time to restore the l I

inoperable hydrogen mixing trains prior to requiring a plant shutdown is acceptable based on the small probability of an event requiring the hydrogen mixing system to function during this time period and the availability of the alternate hydrogen control function of the post accident containment ventilation system or hydrogen recombiner as well as the containment atmosphere mixing and removal functions provided by the required containment cooling fans, reactor cavity hydrogen dilution system fans, and the hydrogen recombiners. Providing the 7 day Completion Time when two hydrogen mixing trains are inoperable and an alternate hydrogen control system is available will minimize the l potential for plant transients that can occur by providing an adequate time to restore an inoperable hydrogen mixing train to operable status prior to requiring a plant shutdowm.

As such, any reduction in a margin of safety by allowing two hydrogen mixing trains to be inoperable for 7 days will be offset by the benefits gained through avoiding an unnecessary '

plant transient by providing adequate time to restore a hydrogen mixing train to operable status. ,

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Chapter 3.6 E3-3-H November,1998

99/ v gg HMShtmospheric,IceCondenser,andDal BASES ACTIONS Al.(continued) 3st.

A c.Aiden 4 i

thehydrogenrecombiners,ContainmentSpraySysteMHydrogen l Purge System, and hydrogen monitors.

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Required Action A.1 has been modified by a Note that states the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable. As a result, a MODE change is allowed when one HMS train is  ;

inoperable. This allowance is based on the availability of  :

the other HMS train, the small probability of a LOCA or SLB l

occurring (that would generate an amount of hydrogen that '

exceeds the flammability limit), and the amount of time I available after a LOCA or SLB (should one occur) for {

operator action to prevent hydrogen accumulation from i exceeding the flammability limit.

{

l B.1 and B.2 r- 4 l Reviewer's Note: This Condition is only allowed for units  ;

with an alternate hydrogen control system acceptable to the technical staff. ___

r a.

With two HMS trains inoperable, t ty to perform the '

7,}I g 10 hydrogen control function via air rnate capabilities must be verified by administrative means within I hour. The f

alternate hydrogen control capabL es are provided by / the i

/ cor tainmentiHydrocen Purae Systa vdrocen recombineri f l F

Hycrogen Jgn1SorfystegHMS/Jontainment Air D1 Ast1on SFItam l Cg6tainepht Iner/ing spstemI.J The I hour Comp'etion T'me

'ailows a reasonapse pertos of time to verify that a loss of M hydrogen control _ function does not exist. r[ e~ viewer's note:"

The t sowing 1 to De u ea ir a n n-Techni 1 Specifi ation

{ alter ate hydr gen cont 1 functi is used to justif this Cond tion: I addition the alte ate hyd gen contr 1 sys 16ci vtenn:pfieonce pe 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> th -+ idy.mUstEeF.ei e Jn pabi .inu A

availahlitv-]O BothD the veri (dication)initialfv may beification performed fand subsequent4check, all administrative as an by examining ogs or other information to determine the availability of the alternate hydrogen control system. It does not mean to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate OPERABILITY of the alternate hydrogen control system. If the ability to perform the hydrogen control function is maintained, continued operation is permitted with two HMS trains inoperable for up to 7 days. Seven days (continued)

WOG STS B 3.6-124 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

l i

l Associated Package Changes for RAI 3.6.9-1 i

I i

(

l

FNP TS Conversion PAI 3. 6.9 - l Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 3.6 - Containment Systems i

CTS 3/4.6.4.3 REACTOR CAVITY HYDROGEN DILUTION SYSTEM i FNP ITS 3.6.9 REACTOR CAVITY HYDROGEN DILUTION SYSTEM DOC N.LQ SHE DISCUSSION  !

results in more frequent reductions in system redundancy for testing I purposes, and increases the likelihood of human error by increasing the j number of separate test evolutions. As such, the deletion of the staggered j testing requirement for the reactor cvity hydrogen dilution system is also  ;

acceptable. l 4 LA CTS 3/4.6.4.3 surveillance 4.6.4.3.a.1 contains descriptive information concerning the performance of the surveillance which is moved into the bases of the surveillance consistent with the level of detail in the STS. The particulars of how and where the reactor cavity hydrogen dilution fans are )

started are moved into the bases description for the associated surveillance.

The descriptive information concerning how and where the reactor cavity hydrogen dilution fans are started specified in CTS 4.6.4.3.a.1 is intended to provide guidance for the performance of the surveillance. As such, it is unnecessary as a TS restriction. The ITS bases provides a more appropriate location for these types ofinformational statements. The removal of this information from the TS and placement in the bases is consistent with the format and presentation of similar surveillance requirements in the STS.

Reliance on the information contained in the STS bases is acceptable since changes to the information in the bases is controlled by the Bases Control Program specified in the administrative controls section of the TS.

5 M The CTS 3/4.6.4.3 surveillance requirements are modified by the addition of a requirement to verify the automatic actuation of the reactor cavity hydrogen dilution system every 18 months. The addition of this requirement is consistent with the requirements in the STS for the similar hydrogen mixing system. As this system is actuated by a Safety Injection signal, verification of this actuation capability is applicable and appropriate for FNP. However, the addition of this surveillance requirement is considered a more restrictive change.

l 1

Chapter 3.6 E2-2-M November,1998

Associated Package Changes for RAI 5.2-01

_ - - . - - - -- ~ ~~'~~~~~ ~ ~~^' ' ^

3-O# '

q The Units %opm2 don skJl v.clud ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS g .e M 4

j 62.2 FACILITY F q

b

a. I Each on-duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift Lcrew composition shown in Table 6.2-1.

i IN,5ERT D b.

At least one licensed Reactor Operator shall be in the Control Room ,

d when fuel is in the reactor.

b Senior Reactor Operator shall be iIn addition, at least one licensed  !

is in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4. the Con t rat taa- while th= naie  ;

n le .5AA 61/ fhisjossMofah c.

A Realth Physics Technician' shall ne on site when fuel is in the reactor. y l g a  ;

Id. #

CORE ALTEE$TIONS shall be di ectly supertised by/eithe

$ iconsed 5 or Reac or Operato!or Senior Reactor perat r a 1mited to el San ing who i

responsib ities d ing this peration no ot f concurr t i i

1 j

Q . (Deletod [)

Q., .

f.

}' Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of unit staff who perform safety-related functions e.g., Senior Reactor Operators, Reactor Operators, Besith Physics maintenance personnel. Technicians, Auxiliary Operators, and key

( Adequate shift coverage shall be maintained without routine heavy use of overties. The

j. objective shall be to have operating personnel work a l

nominal 40-hour week vh11e the plant is operating.

4 In the event that unforeseen problems require substantial amounts of overtise to be used, or during extended periods of

shutdown for refueling, asjor maintenance or major plant J modifications, on a tempora tsis, he following guidelines
shall be followed
.

s ode, n.

- =

I

1. An individual i L l not be et to work mora than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> straight (

Qi ift turnover time). i f

' There a shift turnover time) between of at leas't work8periods.

hours (which cea include r

t The Realth Physics Technicina may be absent for a period of time not t f immediate action is taken to restore the Realth Physics Technician ithin the minimus requirement. j j

FARLET-13 TIT 1 6-2 AMENDKDr! NO. g, U, 96

~

[2A*C 6 2-0 l k

ADMINTSTRATI7E CONTROLS s ook L

.............................. .......... w...................,...........

1 3 An individual vill not vork more than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in any 24-hour period, not more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in any 43-hour period, not more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any 7-day period (all excluding shift turnover time).

4 Except during extended shutdown periods, the use of overtime

-- = should be considered on an individual basis and not for

  • leve.ls e f entire staff on a shift. g,g,g,,c.

gaf.yetr1 =-

5. Any de ion from the above zu elines for the inimus hi ift geospleraen t ined in LTechnical) Specification Gable 6.2-11and health physics hnicians shall be reviewed and approved by_ M M the Central Manage - Nuclear Plant, his designee (Emergencyj 10 (Director)] or higher GDtnority) Any deviation from the above b gulaelines for key maintenance personnel shall be reviewed and approved by the Maintenance Manager or his designee. Jo, I , .g group superviso p , L l ThT AssisYant' General Manager - Plant-Operations Operations

~

E.

Manager fnd Shift Supervisor Qshall hold a seniot' reactor operator ,

license.] The Reactor e erators s r.a A A noAo a reactor operator l

,, Qicense. ..

- 1.: . .

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2..

II

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l FARLEY-UNIT 1 6-3 AMENDMENT No. O , 77

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CORRECTED PAGE e

(

FNP TS Conversion 3-. p Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Chapter 5.0 - Admm, istrative Controls CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DOC HO SHE DISCUSSION units). Since Table 6.2-1 is being eliminated from the TS, this CTS allowance for a single SRO to fill the same position on both units is not l clearly expressed in the remaining staffing requirements. Therefore this l CTS allowance is retained in the appropriate CTS paragraph 6.2.2.b (or ITS paragraph 5.2.2.b) to provide a necessary clarification of the requirement.

The revision of CTS paragraph 6.2.2.b to retain this CTS allowance l preserves the current FNP licensing basis as specified in CTS Table 6.2-1.

l Therefore, this change is considered administrative and is necessary duc to the format and presentation of this information in the STS.

7a L CTS 6.2.2.f contains requirements for limiting the hours worked by unit l l staff who perform safety-related functions. CTS subsections 6.2.2.f.1,2,

and 3 specify different requirements related to limiting hours worked and l are revised consistent with the STS. These subsections of CTS 6.2.2.f l correspond to STS 5.2.2.e.1,2, and 3. The STS and CTS subsections are j intended to specify the same requirements. However, one significant  !

difference exists between the wording used in the CTS and STS for these requirements. The CTS subsections use the word "will"in specifying the particular requirement addressed in that subsection. The conesponding STS subsections use the word "should"instead of"will." The CTS subsections 6.2.2.f.1,2, and 3 are revised consistent with the corresponding STS subsections to use the word "should." Both CTS 6.2.2.f and the corresponding STS section 5.2.2.e contain an allowance (CTS 6.2.2.f.5 and in the paragraph after STS 5.2.2.e.4) for exceptions to the requirements for i

limiting the hours worked. This change does not alter the intent of the CTS requirements. The revised wording improves the internal consistency and clarity of the CTS 6.2.2.f requirements consistent with the corresponding l l STS requirements. The revision of the CTS 6.2.2.f requirements is not l technical in nature and these requirements will continue to be implemented l in the same manner as before. As exceptions are permitted for the l requirements specified in CTS subsections 6.2.2.f.1,2,3 the word "should"

is more correct and appropriate than the word "will" for specifying these j requirements. However, since the meaning of the words "will" and "should" are different, apart from the context of the succeeding TS, this change may be deemed Less Restrictive.

! Chapter 5.0 E2-4-A November,1998

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 3 - Significant Hazards Evaluations

  • M 5, 2 - N Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls III. SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIONS CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 7a-L
1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change involves changing the CTS administrative controls wording related to the control of the hours worked by unit staff who perform safety-related functions to more closely agree with the STS wording and does not result in any hardware changes. The word i "will"is changed to the word "should"in CTS subsections 6.2.2.f.1,2, and 3. As CTS 6.2.2.f.5 contains an allowance for exceptions to the requirements for limiting the hours 1 worked, this change does not alter the intent of the CTS requirements. The revised wording l improves the intemal consistency and clarity of the CTS 6.2.2.f requirements consistent with l the corresponding STS requirements. The proposed change does not impact the capability of the plant or any equipment to provide the required safety function as described in the FSAR. ,

In addition, the results of the analyses described in the FSAR remain bounding. Additionally, l the proposed change does not impose any new safety analyses limits or alter the plants ability to detect and mitigate events. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

l 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any l accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change involves changing the CTS administrative controls wording related to the control of the hours worked by unit staff who perform safety-related functions to more closely agree with the STS wording and does not necessitate a physical alteration of the plant l or changes in parameters governing normal plant operation. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

{ The proposed change, which revise the TS administrative controls wording related to the control of the hours worked by unit staff who perform safety-related functions to more

- closely agree with the STS wording does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change does not impact any safety analysis assumptions and does not impose any new safety analyses limits or alter the plants ability to detect and mitigate events.

Therefore, the proposed change does not impact any margin of safety.

Chapter 5.0 E3-2-A November,1998

I l

i Associated Package Changes for RAI 5.2-02 i

I i

l 1

i l

l l

l I

l 1

par 6,2-07 TABLE 6.2-1 (Continued) ll SS d I i

13 SRO-- $Individual ift Sup:rvi 4r with a Sa'nior Reac r Oper ors Lice e on U it 1 l LA R0 Individual ithth a Sanier/Res.ctor a Reac 6r Operato s0Licenrators .feense o Unit on Unit AO - Auxilia Operator  !

ST

- Shift T hnical Adv or l a

/ I The Shift Crew Composition say be one less than the minimum requirements of Table 6.2-1 for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in order to acconnodate i t

unexpected absence of on-duty shift crew members provided immediata action is

taken to restore the Shift Crew Composition to within the minimum reautrements of Table 6.2-1. This provisions does not permit any shift crew position to be unmanned upon shift change due to an oncoming shift crewman being late or absent.

[

During any 3

ence of th?6hift SupervisoP[ros_the control Room while the unit j

4 is in M00E , 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6, an individual (other than tne shift TechnicaTML W s_or) th a valid SR0 license shall be (Ignated to assume the control 2

Roos e nd unction and shall remain in peervis6r turns and reassuses,the c Control Room until the g jg c

function g

^

1 2 -_ ,

p l z, fn MODES Sadle L @ lnb-tV101.DA k$*N e . .,

anactove 6Ro o rRo  ;

License shd. be

.u .w eGC ': i J estj N S $0

> 5. q . 2. Q 'N usuk N' "  ;

(g/*n df/Mi/b g"Wy*)

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  • a, n FARLEY-UNIT 1 6-5 AMENOMENT NO. 26

N '

~

CHAPTER 5.0 INSERT H l TO CTS PAGE 6-3 STS ADDITION TO 6.2.2

g. The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) shall provide advisory technical support to the responsible SRO in the areas of thermal hydraulics, reactor engineering, and plant analysis l

with regard to the safe operation of the unit. In addition, the STA shall meet the qualifications specified by the Commission Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shirt. The same individual may fill this position for both units. >

1 1

l l

1 1

i f Chapter 5.0 Insert Page l

i

l g 5,2- OL Organization l$(g 5.2 5.2 Organization 5.2.2 Unit Staff (continued) l

2. An individual should not be permitted to work more than
16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period, nor more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

! in any 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period, nor more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any 7 day period, all excluding shift turnover time;

3. A break of at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> should be allowed between work periods, including shift turnover time;
4. Except during extended shutdown periods, the use of INSERT

, overtime should be considered on an individual basis E

[m( nt0, and not for the nntiro etaff g SV(GerkmLit'5r-NurlOS ,

s cAut S

S Any deviat/on Ti^um#ne above guidelines _irhall s be WuthorizecD -

,, :yQn advang by the ( PlantSuperintendent]JElhisdecignee,'n q,,,,,,(accoroance wun approved administrative procedure _ r by __

higher levels of management.jin accordance with Established' j F__ proceoures anc witn cocumenTation of the basis for granting '

< INSERTF -.4 ethe deviation.

w ___ w or.

fControlsshallbeincludedintheproceduressuchthat individual overtime shall be reviewed monthly by the [ Plant Superintendent] or his designee to ensure that excessive hours have not been assigned. Routine deviation from the (above guidelines is not authorized. J _

A E1 The amount of overtime worked by unit staff members

_3

performing safety related functions shall be limited and controlled in accordance with the NRC Policy Statement on working hours (Generic letter 82-12). _J
f. The 61perations Manacer or Assistant Operations Manager) i EM-shall hold an SR0 license. g
g. The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) shall providpvisory echnical support to the'_ Shift Supervisor (SSy in the areas of thermal hydraulics, reactor engineering, and plant $

g9m;Q. analysis with regard to the safe operation of the unit. In

' 9 addition, the STA shall meet the qualifications specified by the Commission Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shift. (D 1 -

T'he see irdivW^ 0. M % poMen for M @d$.

WOG STS 5.0-4 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

l

1 FNP TS Conversion l MD 6,7.-oL , Enclosure 5 - JD from STS l Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls l l

l STS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS JD 1

NUMBER JUSTIFICATION t 1 STS paragraph 5.1.2 is revised by the addition of an FNP specific clarification. The STS paragraph discusses the responsibilities of the Shift Supervisor (SS) and i addresses the topic on a per unit basis. In order to ensure the CTS allowance for a sugle individual to fill the SS position for both units is clearly retained, a sentence ,

to that effect is added to the STS discusden. The CTS, in Table 6.2-1, clearly specifies (in footnote a) that an individual may also fill the SS position on unit 2.

As the STS has no corresponding table to contain this information, and STS 5.1.2 discusses the replacement of the SS during any absence in some detail, the retention of this CTS allowance is appropriate to avoid any confusion regarding the intent of the STS paragraph and how many SS are required. This change provides a clarification consistent with the current FNP licensing basis as specified in CTS Table 6.2-1.

1 la STS paragraphs 5.1.2 and 5.2.2.g are revised by the replacement of the title " Shift Supervisor" with a description of the individual qualified to fill that position ("A Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)" or " responsible SRO"). This change will eliminate the need for nonessential technical specification changes due to organizational orjob title changes. As the proposed change still requires an l individual with a SRO license to be responsible for the control room command function, the technical content of the requirement remains unchanged and is l consistent with the current requirements for the Shift Supervisor in the CTS.  ;

2 The bracketed paragraph in STS 5.2.2.a is revised to fit FNP and other similar l l

statements in the STS. The paragraph is edited to revise the generic statement 1 l regarding a two unit facility to a specific statement applicable to FNP. In addition,  ;

the reference to shutdown is revised to be more specific and state Modes 5 and 6.  ;

l l This more closely conforms with current FNP staffing requirements. This change l provides a clarification consistent with the current FNP licensing basis as specified

! in CTS Table 6.2-1.

l l 3 STS paragraph 5.2.2.b is revised by the addition of an FNP specific clarification.

l The STS paragraph discusses the staffing requirements for ROs and SROs and

! addresses the topic on a per unit basis, in order to ensure the CTS allowance for a

single individual to fill the SRO position for both units is clearly retained, a sentence to that effect is added to the STS discussion. The CTS, in Table 6.2-1, clearly specifies (in footnote a) that an individual may also fill the SRO position on unit 2. As the STS has no corresponding table to contain this information, and STS 5.2.2.b discusses the staffing requirements for ROs and SROs, the retention of this CTS allowance is appropriate to avoid any confusion regarding the intent of the Chapter 5.0 E5-1-A November,1998

I Associated Package Changes for RAI 5.2-03

n __ - a,-t-,.- - - 4:,sL . - - A ._ u mA 4 1 4A-- -==,s.,-A.4u s-~s, awa n a e ,,

d FAC 8T.2- og TABLE 6.2 I (Continued) gl 55 -

G i ft Sup rvi ar with a Senior Reac r Oper ors Lice SRO -

ndividual th a Senio e on U it 1/

LA R0 Individual ith a Reac r Operato eactor s0 Licen rators icense o Unit
AO - Auxiliary Operator on Unit i

ST

- Shift T hnical Adv or i j The Shift Crw Composition may be one less than the einfeue requirements of Table 6.2-1 for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in order to accommodate ,

i nexpected absence of on-duty shift crew members provided immediate action is i aken to restore the Shift Crew Composition to within the minieue recuirements i of TV.le 6.2-1. .This provisions does not permit any shift crew position to be I 4

unmannea upon shift change due to an oncoming shift crewman being late or absent.

1 During any 4 is in M00E ence of th?6hift Suoervtsorffrom the Control Roce while the unit esvisor) , 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6, an individual Other than tne shift TechnicaIM th a valid SR0 license shall be dignated to assume the control jA Room c unction and shall remain in sipervi turns and reassumes,the c Control Room until the M L.

function.g 4 6'I' i des Sa z ' in le L ' a.n inimcLa uAf6 '

\

an at+o ve suo o r Ro

, , 2-esc Licen$e hon. be

e. de6/ " d*

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1 FARLEY-UNIT 1 6-5 AM G0 MENT NO. 26 k..

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS M '5. 2 -d3 Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DOC NO SHE DISCUSSION .

the TS it is considered more restrictive.

13 LA CTS Table 6.2-1, Minimum Shift Crew Composition, is deleted consistent with the STS. In the STS, there is no corresponding Table to CTS Table 1 6.2-1. The STS includes specific provisions for licensed and non-licensed l shift crew members (ITS 5.2.2.a and g) as well as the minimum l

requirements for licensed operators (5.2.2.b) and references the appropriate Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i)) which mandates the minimum staffing requirements for licensed operators (ITS 5.2.2.c). CTS Table 6.2-1 1 contains information redundant to the existing federal regulations for  ;

licensed operator staffing requirements and the provisions of STS 5.2.2.a, b, l c, and g. The elimination of Table 6.2 1 and all references to it in the Facility Staff section are acceptable considering that the requirements for licensed operator staffing is addressed by 10 CFR 50.54 (k) (1) and (m), and retained in STS 5.2.2.b and the non-licensed staff requirements are retained i in STS 5.2.2.a and g. These changes conform with the format and presentation of this information in the STS and effectively replace CTS ,

Table 6.2-1. j l

14 A The CTS Table 6.2-1 note regarding the minimum shift crew composition and the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> exception to this minimum requirement is replaced by STS 5.2.2.c. STS 5.2.2.c contains the same exception and references the appropriate Federal Regulation and STS sections which comprise the I equivalent staff requirements as CTS Table 6.2-1. As such, STS 5.2.2.c effectively replaces the similar CTS note to Table 6.2-1 and this change is made to conform with the format and presentation of this information in the STS. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.

14a L The CTS Table 6.2-1 note regarding the minimum shift crew composition and the 2-hout exception to this minimum requirement is revised consistent with the STS. The following sentence has been deleted:"This provisions does not permit any shift crew position to be unmanned upon shift change due to an oncoming shift crewman being late or absent." STS 5.2.2.c specifically addresses the unexpected absence of on-duty shift crewmembers. As the oncoming shift has not yet come on-duty, STS 5.2.2.c does not apply to oncoming crewmembers being late or absent. STS 5.2.2.c specifically states that the 2-hour caveat applies to "the unexpected l Chapter 5.0 E2-8-A November,1998 l

l

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS PM S2-03 Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DOC FQ SHE DISCUSSION absence of on-duty shift crew members." Therefore, STS 5.2.2.c effectively excludes the absence or tardiness of the oncoming shift from the 2-hour caveat. However, the deletion of the specific exclusion included in the CTS is seen as a less restrictive change.

15 LA CTS 6.2.3, which contains the requirements for the Safety Audit and Engineering Review Group (SAERG), is completely removed from the CTS consistent with the content of the STS. The SAERG is a multi-disciplined dedicated onsite review group responsible for operational evaluations to improve safety, systematic engineering reviews of plant performance and i activities and comprehensive plant audits. The SAERG TS requirements l are moved, intact, into the FNP Quality Assurance Program. The placement of the SAERG requirements in the Quality Assurance Program is acceptable since subsequent changes to these requirements will be controlled in l accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(a). The placement of the FNP SAERG '

requirements in the Quality Assurance Program is consistent with the guidance found in the NRC Administrative Letter 95-06 which recommends j the preferred location for CTS requirements that are removed from the l l

Administrative Controls section of the TS.

16 LA CTS section 6.4, Training, is deleted from the administrative controls section of the TS consistent with the content of the STS. The information contained in CTS 6.4 is a brief summary of the much more detailed training information contained in FSAR Chapter 13.2, Training Program. The FSAR contains specific training commitments to ANSI N18.1-1971 and 10 CFR 55. In addition, the FSAR contains a description of the INPO accredited retraining program. As such, CTS section 6.4 is redundant to the more detailed FSAR training requirements and the deletion of CTS 6.4 does not reduce the level of training required in FSAR 13.2. The same level of training at FNP continues to be assured by the requirements of FSAR 13.2.

Any changes to the requirements of FSAR 13.2 must be in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process. Therefore, the deletion of CTS 6.4 is acceptable I and consistent with the content of the STS.

I 17 LA CTS 6.5, which contains requirements for Review and Audit functions, is i completely removed from the CTS consistent with the content of the STS.

CTS 6.5 contains requirements applicable to the Plant Operations Review Chapter 5.0 E2-9-A November,1998 l

M E143 FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 3 - Significant Hazards Evaluations Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls III. SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIONS CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRA TIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 14a-L

l. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change involves the deletion of the sentence excluding the absence or tardiness of the oncoming shift from the 2-hour caveat to the crew requirements of Table 6.2-1. This change is made to more closely agree with the STS requirements and does not result in any hardware changes. The minimum shift crew composition oion-duty shift crewmembers is not affected. The proposed change does not impact the capability of the plant or any equipment to provide the required safety function as described in the FSAR. The results of the analyses described in the FSAR remain bounding. Additionally, the proposed change does not impose any new safety analyses limits or alter the plants ability to detect and mitigate events. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change involves changing the TS administrative controls regarding the exclusion of the absence or tardiness of the oncoming shift from the 2-hour caveat to the crew requirements of Table 6.2-1 to more closely agree with the STS requirements. This change does not necessitate a physical alteration of the plant or changes in parameters governing normal plant operation. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of sr.fety?

The proposed change, which involves changing the TS administrative controls regarding the exclusion of the absence or tardiness of the oncoming shift from the 2-hour caveat to the crew requirements of Table 6.2-1 to be consistent with the STS requirements does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change does not impact any safety analysis assumptions and does not impose any new safety analyses limits or alter the plants ability to detect and mitigate events. Therefore, the proposed change does not impact any margin of safety.

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Chapter 5.0 E3-4-A November,1998

i Associated Package Changes for RAI 5.5-01 6

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS NOl Chpter 5.0 - Administrative Controls CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DOC HQ SHE DISCUSSION of" functional capability"in place of the word " operability" used in the CTS. This difference is intended to avoid using a term that could be confused with the TS defined term " OPERABILITY". Although not capitalized in the CTS, the word operability introduces the potential to confuse the meaning of this word with the TS defined term OPERABILITY (designated by the use of all capitalized letters) and cause requirements and interpretations to be applied which were not intended by the use of operability (small case letters) in CTS 6.8.3.e(i) and 6.8.3.e(vi). As such, these changes make the FNP TS consistent with the STS and provides a clarification that is consister;t with the intent of the CTS which did not refer to the TS defined term. The clarification provided by the STS does not impact the intent or effectiveness of the affected CTS reopirement and is therefore considered an administrative change.

33a A Section (ii) of CTS 6.8.3.e, " Radioactive Effluent Controls Program", is revised consistent with the STS. The words, "at all times" are deleted from the sentence " Limitations at all times on the concentration...". The corresponding STS sentence does not contain these words. The lirnitations are contcolled in accordance with 10 CFR 20. The words it th CTS do not change the intent of the reqrirement and therefore are simply additional detail. In the STS, deletion of unneeded detail is often used to simplify the statement of requirements in the TS. Since the presence or absence of these descriptive words does not change the intent of the associated requirement, this is seen as an administrative change.

34 LA CTS 6.8.3.f, " Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program", contains requirements to monitor the radiation and radionuclides in the environs of

the plant. The program requirements are implemented within the ODCM.

The program controls provided by CTS 6.8.3.f are proposed to be removed from the TS, consistent with the content of the STS, and also placed within the ODCM. The controls provided by this program are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix I.10 CFR 50, Appendix I provides l numerical guides for design objectives and limiting conditions for operation to support meeting the requirements of ' O CFR 50.34a and 50.36.a which require that radioactive material in effluents released to unrestricted areas be kept as low as is reasonably achievable. Furthermore,10 CFR 50.36a(a)(2) requires that regular reports be sub.nitted to the NRC Chapter 5.0 E2-17-A March,1998

I FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS M 7 6-Of Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls i

CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DOC L SHE DISCUSSION regarding the quantities of the radionuclides released to unrestricted areas.

Basei on the reports required by 10 CFR 50.36a(a)(2) the NRC directly l monitors the effectiveness of the program controls to keep radioactive material in effluents released to unrestricted areas as low as is reasonably achievable and may (consistent with 10 CFR 50.36a(a)(2)) require the  ;

licensee take additional action as deemed appropriate to further limit '

releases. As such, the program controls in CTS 6.8.3.f are not required within the TS to ensure the radiation and radionuclides released to unrestricted areas are adequately monitored and controlled. In addition,10 CFR 50, Appendix I, Section IV(B)(3) requires that the licensee establish an appropriate surveillance and monitoring program to identify changes in l the use of unrestricted areas to permit modifications in monitoring programs for evaluating doses to individuals from principle pathways of exposure. Thus, equivalent requirements to the requirements of CTS 6.8.3.ii are included in 10 CFR 50, Appendix I. Finally, Regulatory Guide 4.15 describes a method acceptable to the NRC staff for designing a program to assure the quality of the results of measurements of radioactive materials in the effluents and the environment outside nuclear facilities during normal operations. Section C.6.3.2 discusses interlaboratory analyses as part of that program. CTS 6.8.1.i and ITS 5.4.1.b state that I

Farley will maintain procedures for effluent and environmental monitoring using the guidance in Regulatory Guide 4.15, February 1979. Therefore, l equivalent requirements to the requirements of CTS 6.8.3.iii are included in Regulatory Guide 4.15 and ITS 5.4.1.b.

The existing regulatory controls and reporting requirements discussed i

above provide assurance that the radiation and radionuclides released to unrestricted areas continue to be adequately monitored and controlled. The removal of CTS 6.8.3.f from the TS does not reduce the numerical guides, level of control, or reports required in the regulations cited above.

Therefore, the incorporation of these program requirements into the ODCM is acceptable.

35 A CTS 6.8.3 which contains requirements for Administrative Controls Programs is revised consistent with the STS by the addition of a new l program. The Component Cyclic or Transient Limit Program, STS 5 5.5,is added to the CTS program section of Administrative Controls. The STS Chapter 5.0 E2-18-A November,1998

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Associated Package Changes for RAI 5.5-02 l i

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FNP TS Conversion pat g, p.g Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS

, Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS l FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DOC l EQ SHE DISCUSSION l Component Cyclic or Transient Limit Program addresses the CTS 5.7.1, l

Component Cyclic or Transient Limit requirements which were removed from CTS section 5.0, Design Features, and placed within a new FSAR Table 5.2-2a. The CTS Component Cyclic or Transient Limits listed in the new FSAR Table 5.2-2a are required to be monitored by the STS Component Cyclic or Transient Limit Program,5.5.5. This arrangement of requirements is consistent with the format and presentation of this information in the STS. The transfer of the CTS 5.7.1 limits to the new FSAR Table 5.2-2a is discussed within the DOCS associated with CTS section 5.0, Design Features. CTS 5.7.1, Component Cyclic or Transient Limit, contains the requirement to maintain components within the specified limits and Table 5.7-1 contains a list oflimits. The STS program, 5.5.5, " Component Cyclic or Nnsient Limit", retains in the TS the basic requirement of CTS 5.7.1 to maintain components within the limits and l refers to the new FSAR Tame 5.2-2a which contains the same limits as CTS Table 5.7-1. The addition of this program requirement conforms to the presentation and format of this information in the STS and retains within the TS the existing CTS requirement to maintain components within the Cyclic'or Transient limits. As this change documents a CTS requirement that is retained within the TS, it is considered administrative.

36 A CTS 6.8.3 which contains requirements for Administrative Controls Programs is revised consistent with the STS by the addition of a new program. The Pre-Stressed Containment Tendon Surveillance Program, STS 5.5.6, is added to the CTS program section of Administrative Controls.

This STS program is based on the requirements of CTS 3/4.6.1.6. The details of the smveillance requirements to verify containment tendon operability contained in CTS 3/4.6.1.6 are removed to a tendon surveillance program outside of the TS (as discussed within the DOC associated with the changes to CTS 3/4.6.1.6). The description in ITS 5.5.6 identifies the basic requirements for the program. The program itself(specific details related to the actual compliance with the requirements such as the SRs of CTS 3/4.6.1.6) is contained within the procedures used to comply with the i requirement. Currently, they exist as surveillance procedures for the TS.

After the conversion, they will exist as the implementing procedures for the program. As part of the changes to CTS 3/4.6.1.6, the requirement to maintain the tendon surveillance program in accordance with the inspection Chapter 5.0 E2-19-A November,1998

Associated Package Changes for RAI 5.5-03 1

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i i i ggg g,$.o3 CHAPTER 5.0 l l

INSERT K (continued)

NEW ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS PROGRAMS i

ESF Ventilation System Penetration RJJ j l

CREFS Recirculation 2.5% 70 % l CREFS Filtration 2.5% 70 % i CREFS Pressurization 0.5% 70 % l PRF Post LOCA Mode 10 % 959o

)

l NOTE: CREFS Pressurization methyl iodide penetration limit j is based on a 6 inch bed depth )

d. Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and the charcoal adsorbers is less than the value i specified below when tested in accordance with ASME N510-1989 at the  !

system flowrate specified below 10%. l l

l ESF Ventilation System Delta P (in. water gauge) Flowrate (CFM) l CREFS Recirculation 2.3 2,000 CREFS Filtration 2.9 1,000 l CREFS Pressurization 2.2 300 PRF Post LOCA Mode 2.6 5,000

e. Demonstrate that the heaters for the CREFS Pressurization system dissipate '

the value specified below i 0.8 kW when tested in accordance with l ASME N510-1989.

ESF Ventilation System Wattage (kW) i CREFS Pressurization 7.5 The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the VFTP test frequencies.

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t Chapter 5.0 Insert Page

Programs and Manuals FAL T. g -03 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.11 Ventilation Filter Testina Proaram (VFTP) (continued) evision 2. and ASME N510-1989 the system flo c fie belo e 10% W (in, m y ej ESFVentilationSystem[ Delta P

  • Flowrate p )

DEM Recircu,lAkicn"- 23 ~4000

~

CAEM RLited 2,q 1,000 0.Res Pressun)on .toien 22 300 3G~

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e. Demonstrate that the heaters for eNt the is ste f dissipate the v specified below( e 10%]fkhentested in accordance wi ASME N510-1989}% - A i0 N ESFVentilationSystemy g Wattage (k D cREFS FresunmMon y The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the VFTP test frequencies.

16 5.5.12 Explosive Gas and Storace Tank Radioactivi onitorina Proaram This program provides controls for pot t ly expl sive gas mixturescontainedinthe7WasteGas oldup System ,ithe quantity of radioactivity contained in gas storage tanks 6r fed into ther-e _

f faas treatment system and the quantity of radioacti it contained in unprotected outdoor liauid storage tanks . he N ' gaseous raaioact.ivity quantities shall be determined following the methodology in [ Branch Technical Position (BTP) ETSB 11-5,

" Postulated Radioactive Release due to Waste Gas System Leak or ailure"]. The liquid radwaste quantities shall be determined in ac rdance with [ Standard Review Plan, Section 15.7.3, " Postulated Radi tiveReleaseduetoTankFailures").{

The progra shall include: O The limits or centrat ns of hydrogen and oxygen in the

a. N Waste Gas [ Holdup] System and a surveillance program to ensure the limits are maintained. Such limits shall be (continued)

WOG STS 5.0-14 Rev 1, 04/07/95

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ATTACHMENTIU l

SNC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Related to Plant Staff Qualifications - NRC Letter Dated 9/8/98 Associated Package Changes I

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LLCICINYRATIVE CONTROLS

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6.2.3 SAFETY AUDIT'AND ENGINEERING REVIEW GROUP (SAERG A FUNCTION 6.2.3.1 The SAERG shall function to conduct operational evaluations, engineering reviews, and audits for the purnose of improving safety.

COMPOSITION 6.2.3.2 The SAERG shall be composed of a multi-disciplined dedicated onsite group with a minimum assigned complement of five engineers or appropriate specialists.

RESPONSIBILITIES 6.2.3.3 The SAERG s' hall be responsible for the following: .

a. Paftict'patl$g in operathonal . evaluations for improvement of safety wherein such evaluations and recommendations therefrom are not limited to the fulfillment of existing programs, policies, procedures, or capabilities of existing equipment and installations.
b. Systematic engineering reviews of plant performance and activities with results reported independently of onsite operational management to offsite upper management.

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c. Comprehensive plant audits in accordance with audit requirements set forth in quality assurance programs, licensing documents, and

{ other policies and procedures.

4 j AUTHORITY i

6.2.3.4 The onsite SAERG shall carry out its function reporting offsite directly to the Manager-Safety Audit and Enoineerina Review who in turn reports directly to the Vice President. -

G {

6.2.4 SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISon 5'. 2, 2, l

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6.2.4.1 The Shift Technical Advisor shall' serve in an advisory capacity to the Shift Supervisor primarily in the assessment of accident and transient J j

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,_Accurrences.1 gp Alh 3 ACILITY STAFF ni_lALIFICATIONS UMT ^

1 t

5 f 4 .3.1 Each member of the dacins staff shall meet or exceed the minimum qualifications f ANSI .N18.1-1971 for comparable positions and the supplemental Physics Qupervisortrements specified in 10 CFR 55, except for (1) the Health l o shall meet or exceed the qualifications of 4 i Regulatory sutoe 1.8, tomber 1975 3 _ -

12ct senior individu:LI FARLEY-UNIT 1 6-m chtrge o f AMENOMENT N0. H J8,103 l

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.- - . - . . . -. .. . .-- .. - - ~ . . _ _ _

FNP TS Conversion 1 Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Par _- nec. Le Her &s-12 Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls '

l CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DOC EQ SHE DISCUSSION 12 M The CTS section 6.2.2 is revised by the addition of paragraph g addressing the Shift Technical Advisor (STA). CTS section 6.2.4 which currently addresses the STA is replaced by the more comprehensive STS section 5.2.2.g which further defines the STA qualifications and responsibilities.

The additional material contained within STS 5.2.2.g is consistent with the NRC generic guidance regarding STAS and is therefore applicable to FNP.

As the STS paragraph 5.2.2.g contains additional requirements for the STA position, beyond those specified in CTS 6.2.4, the addition of STS 5.2.2.g to the FNP TS is considered more restrictive.

4 12a A CTS 6.3.1 which discusses facility staff qualifications is revised to ,

eliminate a specific job tit': for the " Health Physics Supervisor". The specific title has been replaced with the term "the senior individual in charge of Health Physics". The revision of this title is necessary to eliminate the need for nonessential technical specification changes due to organizational or title changes. The use of the term "the senior individual in charge of Health Physics" is not intended to modify the existing health physics organizational structure or r:nponsibilities. The proposed change is a change in terminology only for the designated individual and does not introduce a tecimical change to the CTS or the FNP health physics organization. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.

12b M CTS 6.3.1 which discusses facility staff qualifications is revised to address the NRC RAI included in NRC letter dated September 8,1998. 10 CFR 55 was revised in 1987. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.8, Revision 2, issued April 1987, endorses, with conditions, certain parts of ANSI /ANS-3.1-1981 as an acceptable approach for cenain plant positions for complying with the qualification and training requirements of 10 CFR 50 and 55. Endorsement for all other positions remains with ANSI N18.1-1971," Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel." Another option stated in RG 1.8, Revision 2 for complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 55 is the implementation of an accredited program. The INPO accredited, SAT-based licensed operator training program implemented at FNP encompasses j the applicable requirements of the later standards. Referencing this l program in the TS addresses the NRC concern related to plant staff qualifications. However, since this change adds additional requirements to l

Chapter 5.0 E2-7-A November,1998

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 2 - Discussion of Changes to CTS Tutt -tJRc. c d ev 9-i-4 7 Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls CTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DOC EQ SHE DISCUSSION the TS it is considered more restrictive.  !

13 LA CTS Table 6.2-1, Minimum Shin Crew Composition, is deleted consistent with the STS. In the STS, there is no corresponding Table to CTS Table 6.2-1. The STS includes specific provisions for licensed and non-licensed shift crew members (ITS 5.2.2.a and g) as well as the minimum requirements for licensed operators (5.2.2.b) and references the appropriate Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i)) which mandates the minimum staffing requirements for licensed operators (ITS 5.2.2.c). CTS Table 6.2-1 )

contains information redundant to the existing federal regulations for l licensed operator staffing requirements and the provisions of STS 5.2.2.a, b, c, and g. The elimination of Table 6.2-1 and all references to it in the Facility Staff section are acceptable considering that the requirements for licensed operator staffing is addressed by 10 CFR 50.54 (k) (1) and (m), and retained in STS 5.2.2.b and the non-licensed statirequirements are retained in STS 5.2.2.a and g. These changes conform with the format and presentation of this information in the STS and effectively replace CTS Table 6.2-1.

14 A The CTS Table 6.2-1 note regarding the minimum shift crew composition and the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> exception to this minimum requirement is replaced by STS 5.2.2.c. STS 5.2.2.c contains the same exception and references the l

appropriate Federal Regulation and STS sections which comprise the l equivalent staff requirements as CTS Table 6.2-1. As such, STS 5.2.2.c l

effectively replaces the similar CTS note to Table 6.2-1 and this change is l made to conform with the format and presentation of this information in the i STS. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.

l l 14a L The CTS Table 6.2-1 note regarding the minimum shift crew composition and the 2-hour exception to this tninimum requirement is revised consistent with the STS. The following sentence has been deleted: "This provisions does not permit any shift crew position to be unmanned upon shift change due to an oncoming shift crewman being late or absent." STS 5.2.2.c specifically addresses the unexpected absence of on-duty shift crewmembers. As the oncoming shift has not yet come on-duty, STS 5.2.2.c does not apply to oncoming crewmembers being late or absent. STS 5.2.2.c specifically states that the 2-hour caveat applies to "the unexpected Chapter 5.0 E2-8-A November,1998

._. = . .

i% l Unit Staff Qualifications 5.3 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS l 5.3 Unit Staff Qualifications Rev '

te: Minimum qualifications for members of the unit s '

be specified by ., overall qualification state encing an ANSI Standard acceptable to the r ing individual position ,

qualifications. Generall me erable; however, the second method e to those unit staffs requiri .,

l on statements because of unique organizational structures.

5.3.1 Each member of the unit itaff shall meet or exceed the minimum qualificat_ ions of f[ Regulatory buiae 1.8, Revision 2,1987, or morel M

P recent revisions, or ANSI Standard acceptable to the NRC staffJ.

The staff not covered by (Regulatory Guide 1.8] shall meet or exceed'the minimum qualifications of [ Regulations, Regulatory) i juides, or ANSI Standards acceptable to NRC staff]. c J AMI Hlal-197/ For con 7eo.rablejoosOibas and.the

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l WOG STS 5.0-5 Rev 1, 04/07/95

l FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 5 - JD from STS l Rtr- A) 9.c. L chv 'i-F-93 Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls STS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS JD NUK @ JUSTIFICATION STS paragraph and how many SROs are required. This change provides a clarification consistent with the current FNP licensing basis as specified in CTS Table 6.2-1.

4 The bracketed STS 5.2.2.e regarding overtime hours is revised to conform with the l corresponding CTS paragraph 6.2.2.f. Various changes to the STS ~are made to be conform with CTS 6.2.2.f. All the changes are consistent with the current FNP licensing basis as specified in CTS 6.2.2.f.

5 STS 5.2.2.fis revised to more closely conform with the corresponding CTS paragraph 6.2.2.g and the STS format. This change is consistent with the intent of ANSI N18.1-1971, the current licensing basis for Farley Nuclear Plant.

6 STS paragraph 5.2.2.g is revised by the addition of an FNP specific clarification.

The STS paragraph discusses the staffing requirements for STAS and addresses the topic on a per unit basis. In order to ensure the CTS allowance for a single individual to fill the STA position for both units is clearly retained, a sentence to that effect is added to the STS discussion. The CTS, in Table 6.2-1, clearly specifies (in footnote a) that an individual may also fill the STA position on unit 2.

As the STS has no corresponding table to contain this information, and STS 5.2.2.g discusses the staffing requirements for STAS, the retention of this CTS allowance is appropriate to avoid any confusion regarding the intent of the STS paragraph and how many STAS are required. This change provides a clarification consistent with the current FNP licensing basis as specified in CTS Table 6.2-1.

7 STS paragraph 5.3.1, Unit Staff Qualifications, is revised consistent with the corresponding NRC approved CTS 6.3.1 paragraph for Facility Staff Qualifications as modified by the elimination of a specificjob title for the health physics supervisor (explained in DOC 12a-A). This change effectively maintains the current FNP licensing basis as specified in CTS 6.3.1.

7a STS 5.3.1, which discusses unit staff qualifications, is revised to address the NRC RAI included in NRC letter dated September 8,1998. 10 CFR 55 was revised in 1987. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.8, Revision 2, issued April 1987, endorses, with conditions, certain parts of ANSI /ANS-3.1-1981 as an acceptable approach for certain plant positions for complying with the qualification and training requirements of 10 CFR 50 and 55. Endorsement for all other positions remains with ANSI N18.1-1971, " Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant l

Personnel." Another option stated in RG 1.8, Revision 2 for complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 55 is the implementation of an accredited program. The l

Chapter 5.0 E5-2-A November,1998

FNP TS Conversion Enclosure 5 - JD from STS FM - NM. u b 9-34? Chapter 5.0 - Administrative Controls i

STS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 1

FNP ITS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS l JD NUMBER JUSTIFICATION INPO accredited, SAT-based licensed operator training program implemented at FNP encompasses the applicable requirements of the later standards. Referencing  !

this program in the TS addresses the NRC concern related to plant staff I qualifications. )

l 8 The STS 5.4.1 requirement for written procedures is revised consistent with the l corresponding CTS requirement 6.8.1. Specifically STS item 5A.I.b, Emergency Operating procedures is deleted and STS item 5.4.1.c regarding effluent and l environmental monitoring is revised to reference Regulatory Guide 4.15. These changes maintain consistency with the FNP current licensing basis as specified in the CTS. The deletion of the STS requirement 5.4.1.b which addresses Emergency Operating procedures is acceptable since 5.4.1.a (RG 1.33) in section D.6 requires procedures for combating emergencies and other significant events which encompasses emergency operating procedures.

8a STS paragraph 5.5.1 is revised by the addition of an FNP specific CTS requirement.

The STS paragraph discusses the approval requirements of changes to the ODCM.  !

This change provides additional review and acceptance requirements consistent with the current FNP licensing basis as specified in CTS 6.14.2.2.

9 STS 5.5.2, Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment, is revised consistent with the corresponding CTS section,6.8.3.a. The FNP specific systems included in the program are added to the STS bracketed listed replacing the STS generic list and in STS item 5.5.2.b an FNP specific exception is included consistent with CTS 6.8.3.a(ii). These changes maintain the FNP current licensing basis as specified in the CTS.

9a The location of the comma in 5.5.3 is incorrect. The proposed change in position of the comma makes it clear that radioactive gases and particulates are checked in the plant gaseous effluents not in the containment atmosphere. This change maintains consistency with the FNP current licensing basis as specified in the CTS.

10 STS 5.5.4, Radioactive Effluent Controls Program, paragraphs b and g are revised consistent with the corresponding CTS requirements in 6.8.3.e(ii) and 6.8.3.e(vii).

In STS paragraph b, the limit is revised to 10 times the concentration stated in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B and the specific paragraphs of appendix B are added. In STS paragraph g, specific limits for noble gases and iodine, tritium, and other radionuclides in particulate form with halflives greater than 8 days are specified.

The NRC approved CTS requirements are used in lieu of the generic STS requirements for these paragraphs. Therefore, these changes maintain consistency Chapter 5.0 E5-3-A November,1998 I

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