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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997 LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997 LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995 LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995 LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995 LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr 1999-07-20
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997 LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997 LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995 LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995 LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995 LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr 1999-07-20
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17284A9001999-10-31031 October 1999 Rev 0 to COLR 99-15, WNP-2 Cycle 15,COLR GO2-99-177, LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With1999-10-0101 October 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With ML17284A8941999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for WNP-2.With 991012 Ltr ML17284A8801999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for WNP-2.With 990910 Ltr ML17284A8691999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for WNP-2.With 990813 Ltr ML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B7271999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for WNP-2.With 990707 Ltr ML17292B6961999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for WNP-2.With 990608 Ltr ML17292B6641999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for WNP-2.With 990507 Ltr ML17292B6391999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for WNP-2.With 990413 Ltr ML17292B5871999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for WNP-2.With 990311 Ltr ML17292B5571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for WNP-2.With 990210 Ltr ML17292B5621999-01-31031 January 1999 Rev 1 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2 Cycle 14 Colr. ML17292B5341999-01-15015 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Incorrect Modeling of BWR Lower Plenum Vol in Bison.Defect Applies Only to Reload Fuel Assemblies Currently in Operation at WNP-2.BISON Code Model for WNP-2 Has Been Revised to Correct Error ML17292B5331999-01-15015 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re XL-S96 CPR Correlation for SVEA-96 Fuel. Defect Applies Only to WNP-2,during Cycles 12,13 & 14 Operation.Evaluations of Defect Performed by ABB-CE ML17292B4791998-12-31031 December 1998 Washington Public Power Supply Sys 1998 Annual Rept. with 981215 Ltr ML17292B5351998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for WNP-2.With 990112 Ltr ML17292B5741998-12-31031 December 1998 WNP-2 1998 Annual Operating Rept. with 990225 Ltr ML17284A8231998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for WNP-2.With 981207 Ltr ML17284A8081998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for WNP-2.With 981110 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7831998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for WNP-2.With 981007 Ltr ML17284A7491998-09-10010 September 1998 WNP-2 Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Refueling Outage RF13 Spring,1998. ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7681998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for WNP-2.With 980915 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7261998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for WNP-2.W/980810 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6751998-06-30030 June 1998 Ro:On 980617,flooding of RB Northeast Stairwell with Consequential Flooding of Two ECCS Pump Rooms.Caused by Inadequate Fire Protection Sys Design.Pumped Out Water from Affected Areas to Point Below Berm Areas of Pump Rooms ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17284A6491998-05-31031 May 1998 Rev 0 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2,Cycle 14 Colr. ML17292B4031998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for WNP-2.W/980608 Ltr ML17292B3921998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for WNP-2.W/980513 Ltr ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3371998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for WNP-2.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2641998-03-0404 March 1998 Performance Self Assessment,WNP-2. ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B2911998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for WNP-2.W/980313 Ltr ML17284A7971998-02-17017 February 1998 Rev 28 to Operational QA Program Description, WPPSS-QA-004.With Proposed Rev 29 ML17292B3591998-02-12012 February 1998 WNP-2 Cycle 14 Reload Design Rept. 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
LICENSEE EV T REPORT (LER)
AGILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)
Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 I 5 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 3 I 9 I 7 i OF 6 ITLE (4)
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACTION REQUIREMENT WHEN INOPERABLE CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION EXCEEDED THE ALLOWED OUTAGE TIME EVENT DATE (5) LER NUHBER 6) REPORT DATE 7 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6 HONTM OAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL; EVI SION HOHTM OAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES OCKET NUMBERS(S)
HUHBER ;, UMBER lslololol I I 1~5 9I4 9I4 0 I 6 0 ~
I 0 ~
3 0 ~
2 9 I 5 Islololol I I PERATING HIS REPORT IS SUBHITTEO PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREHENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)
ODE (9)
ONER LEVEL 0.402(b) 20.405(C) 0.73(a)(2)(iv) 77.71(b)
(10) 0.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 0.73(a)(2)(v) 73.73(c) 0.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) THER (Specify in Abstract 0.405(a)(1)(iii) 0.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(v111)(A) elow and in Text, HRC 0.405(a)(1)(iv) 0.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) orm 366A) 0.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 TELEPHONE NUHBER C.D. Mackaman, Technical Specialist REA CODE I P I g I 7 I 7 I - I 4 I 4 I 5 I 1 COMPLETE ONE LIHE FOR EACH COHPOHENI'AILURE DESCRIBED IH THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE SYSTEH COMPONENT HAHUFACTURER EPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEH COHPONEHT HANUFACTURER REPORTABLE 0 HPRDS TO NPRDS LIS~ H I 0 I 4 I 0 HO I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I SUPPLEHEHTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED SUSHI SS ION HONTN DAY YEAR ATE (15) 1 YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBHISSION DATE) 1 HO Tlvct nO A replacement Channel "A" Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) high water level control rod block level switch was installed during the Sp.-ng 1994 Refueling Outage and calibrated and tested on June 30, 1994 to verify operability. The switch failed the first quarterly channel functional test (CFT) on October 11, 1994. The switch was recalibrated and functionally tested several times to assure repeatability, and as a precaution, the surveillance frequency was increased. The CFT was successfully performed approximately two weeks later, but the switch failed the CFT on November 9, 1994 and was declared inoperable. During an evaluation of the repeat failure, it was discovered that the level switch is not designed to be adjustable, and the previous switch calibrations could have caused the switch actuation failures, As a result, on November 15, 1994, with WNP-2 in Mode 1 at 100% power, it was determined that the Channel "A" level switch had been technically inoperable from June 30, 1994 to November 9, 1994 without the Technical Specification required action having been performed. With only the Channel "B" level switch and trip function operable, the number of operable channels was less than that required by Technical Specification 3.3.6.b and Table 3.3.6-1, Trip Function S.a.
Immediate corrective action was taken at 1527 hours0.0177 days <br />0.424 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.810235e-4 months <br /> on November 9, 1994 to place the Channel "A" SDV high water level control rod block trip function in the tripped condition. Actions were then taken to restore the Channel "A" level switch and trip function to operable status. The level switch and trip function were declared operable at 1914 hours0.0222 days <br />0.532 hours <br />0.00316 weeks <br />7.28277e-4 months <br /> on November 11, 1994.
9503080384 950302 PDR ADOCK 05000397 PDR
LICENSEE EVENT REPOR (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAHE (1) PPCKET NUHBER (2) LER KUHBER (8) AGE (3) umber ev. No.
Washington Nuclea)'lant - Unit 2 P I 6 I P I Pl P I 3 I g I 7 '4 lilB Pli 2 F 6 ITLE (4)
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACTION REQUIREMENT WHEN INOPERABLE CONTROI. ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION EXCEEDED THE ALLOWED OUTAGE TIME The root cause for this event was the failure to identify the nonadjustable design characteristic of the replacement SDV rod block level switch. Corrective actions include strengthening the substitution evaluation process, revision/re-evaluation of the replacement level switch substitution evaluations and information, obtaining the proper Operation and Maintenance (O&M) manual(s), and conducting maintenance shop briefings concerning this event.
Event De cri 'ti n The Channel "A" Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) [JC, VSL] high water level control rod block level switch (CRD-LS-13E) [AA, LS] was replaced during the Spring 1994 (R-9) Maintenance and Refueling Outage and initially calibrated on June 30, 1994 to verify operability. The level switch is one of two Magnetrol float-type switches that actuate on increasing SDV water level to prevent (block) control rod withdrawal. The switch failed to actuate during the first quarterly channel functional test (CFT) surveillance at 1120 hours0.013 days <br />0.311 hours <br />0.00185 weeks <br />4.2616e-4 months <br /> on October 11, 1994. The level switch was successfully recalibrated and declared operable at 1211 hours0.014 days <br />0.336 hours <br />0.002 weeks <br />4.607855e-4 months <br /> on October 11, 1994. On October 13, 1994, a Followup Operability Assessment concurred with the initial declaration of operability based on acceptable trip actuation repeatability, demonstrated during level switch recalibration. It was suspected that small suspended particulate caused transient binding of the float mechanism. Since this could not be verified (without breaking the level switch pressure boundary seal), it was concluded that the cause of the failure was indeterminate. As a precaution, the surveillance frequency was increased.
The level switch was verified to actuate properly during the first increased frequency CFT surveillance performance on October 27, 1994, but failed to actuate on the next performance on November 9, 1994.
Consequently, the switch was declared inoperable at 1453 hours0.0168 days <br />0.404 hours <br />0.0024 weeks <br />5.528665e-4 months <br /> on November 9, 1994, and Problem Evaluation Request (PER) 294-0975 (a corrective action program document) was initiated to evaluate the condition. During the PER investigation of the repeat failure, discussions with the switch supplier (General Electric Company [GE]) and the manufacturer (Magnetrol) indicated that the level switch is not designed to be adjustable, and the previous switch calibrations could have caused the switch actuation failures. As a result, on November 15, 1994, with WNP-2 in Mode 1 at 100% power, it was determined that the Channel "A" level switch had been technically inoperable from June 30, 1994 to November 9, 1994 without the Technical Specification required action having been performed. With only the Channel "B" level switch and trip function operable, the number of operable channels was less than that required by Technical Specification 3.3.6.b and Table 3.3.6-1, Trip Function S.a.
Tmrnedia e orrec ive Action Immediate corrective action was taken at 1527 hours0.0177 days <br />0.424 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.810235e-4 months <br /> on November 9, 1994 to place the Channel "A" SDV high water level control rod block trip function in the tripped condition. Actions were then taken to restore the Channel "A" level switch and trip function to operable status. The level switch setpoint was revised to restore the switch to within the manufacturer's specifications. Following recalibration and testing, the switch and trip function were declared operable at 1914 hours0.0222 days <br />0.532 hours <br />0.00316 weeks <br />7.28277e-4 months <br /> on November 11, 1994.
LICENSEE EVENT REPOR LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAHE (1) OOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 I 5 I 0 I 0I 0 I 3 I 9 I 7 I 3 F 6 ITLE (4)
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACTION REQUIREMENT WHEN INOPERABLE CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION EXCEEDED THE ALLOWED OUTAGE TIME F rther Evaluati n n rr iv Acti n herEv 1 i n This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as "[a]ny operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications...."
- 2. SDV water level is detected by both float-type level switches and differential pressure (dp) type level transmitters for the scram function. Separate float-type level switches actuate a high level alarm in the control room and establish a control rod withdrawal block condition before reaching the high level setpoint that would cause an automatic scram. This gives plant operators time to take corrective action before the automatic scram occurs,
- 3. The Channel "A" SDV rod block level switch was replaced during the R-9 refueling outage under a substitution evaluation. During the initial calibration, it was discovered that the replacement switch, which was supplied by GE and manufactured by Magnetrol, appeared to have somewhat different operating characteristics than the original switch. However, the GE equivalency evaluation stated that the level switch was an acceptable replacement. This application requires that the switch be welded in place, making it critical that the adjustment and setpoint tolerances be similar. The replacement switch was installed and calibrated under the assumption that the characteristics were similar to the original switch.
During the first switch failure (October, 1994) investigation, both GE and Magnetrol were contacted to provide switch drawi: gs and operation and maintenance (O&M) instructions. Magnetrol informed the Supply System that the level switch had been provided to GE without an O&M manual, and it was expected that GE would provide a manual. After further prompting, Magnetrol provided a vendor guide for a similar switch, and GE acknowledged that the guide was acceptable for the troubleshooting application only.
During the second switch failure (November, 1994) investigation, GE and Magnetrol were contacted again to provide information relating to switch installation and calibration. Based on a conversation with Magnetrol, it was determined that the level switch provided is not designed to be adjustable.
This was later confirmed in a letter from GE responding to technical inquiries regarding the supplied level switch. Level switches manufactured by Magnetrol have been routinely adjusted using surveillance procedures, and the switches have generally performed reliably since initial plant startup. The GE letter also stated that the switch was provided with two magnetic switch mechanisms that were designed to actuate simultaneously on high level. The SDV level rod block application did not require two switches, and the unused upper switch had been removed during the course of previous calibrations. Although the reset characteristics could be slightly affected, the removal of the upper switch assembly does not impact switch operability. However, the lower switch actuation point was found to have been set higher (11/32 inch) than that specified by Magnetrol, which could have impaired actuation repeatability and reliability. On this basis it was concluded that the Channel "A" SDV level rod block level switch had been inoperable since initial calibration.
LICENSEE EVENT REPOR (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY HAHE (I) OOCKET HUH8ER (2) LER HUN8ER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. Ho Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 OISIOIOIOI3I9I7 I II I 4 F 6 TITLE (4)
.FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACTION RE(UIREHENT WHEN INOPERABLE CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION EXCEEDED THE ALLOWED OUTAGE TINE The replacement SDV level switch was installed at the reference elevation of the original switch to ensure consistent performance. However, it was later determined that the original switch had apparently not been installed at the elevation specified in the Instrument Master Data Sheet. The difference in elevation necessitated compensation by field adjustment of the new switch mechanism in a manner for which it was not designed. In addition, it was discovered that proper documentation for removal of the upper switch assembly had not been obtained. Use of the established configuration control process would have afforded an opportunity to evaluate the difference in operating characteristics during initial installation and calibration and could have identified that the replacement switch was nonadjustable and installed at an incorrect elevation. As part of the completed immediate corrective actions, the lower level switch was restored to the original configuration and the setpoint was modified to reflect the slight change in trip elevation. Although not required for operability, an additional corrective action is specified to reinstall the upper switch assembly.
The Maintenance Production Manager held briefings with Electrical, Mechanical, and Instrumentation and Control g&C) shop personnel concerning the production group's involvement in this event and to re-emphasize the importance of Engineering approval for plant configuration changes. In addition, the usage limitation information for the replacement SDV level switches has been revised to emphasize the importance of installing the switch at the correct elevation and to inform the installer of the possibility that the setpoint may have to be revised.
- 4. The substitution evaluation for the replace'ment SDV rod block level switch relied on GE's 10CFR50, Appendix B program. Based on the equivalency evaluation supplied by GE, there were no changes to the switch function, mounting, electrical interface, mechanical interface, or accuracy.
Since there appeared to be a difference in operating characteristics, additional information was requested from GE concerning the adequacy of the Supply System calibration procedure for the supplied rod block level switch and their justification for providing a nonadjustable level switch as "equivalent." In the January 10, 1995 response, GE reiterated that the replacement level switch is not designed to be adjustable. They further stated that this nonadjustable characteristic applies to the original switch, and that there was no mention of a difference in tolerance to setpoint adjustability because the actuation setpoints and accuracy are identical and not intended to be adjusted. The response did note; however, that the original type switches are apparently more tolerant of adjustment than the replacement switch. Therefore, based on the satisfactory performance history, the original type switches will tolerate the amount of adjustment specified in the Supply System calibration procedure.
- 5. An evaluation of the GE response was completed on January 27, 1995. Based on the evaluation, it was determined that the substitution evaluation process should have identified the nonadjustable characteristic of the replacement SDV rod block level switch. TI e GE part equivalency evaluation noted differences in the number of switches, which should have invoked a more questioning attitude during the substitution evaluation process that could have identified the nonadjustable characteristic, of the replacement switch. Furthermore, the substitution evaluation process should have identified the need for an O&M manual for the replacement switch. The proper O&M manual would likely have described the characteristics of the replacement switch to the level of detail necessary for maintenance and/or technical personnel to have identified that the replacement switch was
LICENSEE EVENT REPOR LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY HAHE (I) OOCKET HUM8ER (2) LER NUN8ER (8) AGE (3) usher ev. No.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 ~
5 ~
0 ~ 0~ 0 ~
3 ~ 9 ~
7 4 OI I I8 OI I 5 F 6 ITLE (4)
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACTION RE(UIRENENT WHEN INOPERABLE CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION EXCEEDED THE ALLOWED OUTAGE TINE nonadjustable. Based on the satisfactory performance history, the GE response evaluation did not identify a need to revise calibration procedures for the original type level switches.
The substitution evaluations for the replacement SDV level switches have been revised/re-evaluated as necessary to reflect the nonadjustable characteristic. The Procurement Engineering Manual (SPES-1) was revised on January 13, 1995 to emphasize the need for a more questioning attitude when performing substitution evaluations. The revision also pointed out the advantages of consulting plant maintenance and/or technical personnel and applicable procedures when evaluating the acceptability of a proposed substitution. The Procurement Engineering Manual was further revised on February 15, 1995 to strengthen the requirement to obtain an OEM manual for substitute items that have different physical of functional attributes.
- 6. There were no other structures, systems, or components inoperable at the time that contributed to this event.
~R~a!ie The root cause for this event was the failure to identify the nonadjustable design char cteristic of the replacement SDV rod block level switch. A contributing cause was the incorrect installed elevation of the switch, which necessitated field adjustment in a manner for which it was not designed.
F her rr iv A i n
- 1. The upper switch assembly for the SDV rod block level switch (CRD-LS-13E) will be reinstalled by July 1, 1995.
- 2. O&M manual(s) will be obtained for the replacement SDV level switches and placed in the Contract Vendor Information (CVI) reference files by March 31, 1995.
- 3. The usage limitation information and Instrument Master Data Sheet information for applicable level switches manufactured by Magnetrol will be revised by April 15, 1995 to emphasize the importance of installing the switch at the correct elevation.
afe i nific n There was minimal safety significance associated with this event. The SDV high water level control rod block level switch does not provide an active safety-related function. Separate redundant and diverse float-type level switches and level transmitters provide the active safety-related scram function. The SDV rod block level switch is safety-related only to assure system pressure integrity. The misadjustment of the Channel "A" rod block level switch did not affect the switch pressure integrity. Furthermore, only one operable SDV level rod block channel is necessary to initiate the rod block, and the redundant channel was available during the period that the Channel "A" switch and trip function were inoperable. With the exception of a 1.3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> period on October 11, 1994 (when the Channel "B" level switch was being recalibrated), the Channel "B" SDV level rod block trip function was operable between June 30, 1994 and November 9, 1994. Since this event had no impact on the SDV high water level scram function or system pressure integrity, the event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or plant personnel.
~ '4, LICENSEE EVENT REPORR)
TEXT CONTINUATION ACILITY NAME (1) QQCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3)
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit umbel'v. No.
2 0 ~ 6l0l OI0 I 3 I9 I 7 4 llt8 II 6 F 6 TiTLE (4)
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACTION RE(UIREHENT WHEN INOPERABLE CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION EXCEEDED THE ALLOWED OUTAGE TINE imiI r Ev n A review of previous LERs was performed for similar root causes resulting from material substitution process failures or inaccurate or incomplete vendor information, and none were identified. Furthermore, no events were found where a failure to identify a design characteristic caused a safety-related instrument to be incorrectly installed or calibrated. Instances were found where similar root causes and conditions resulted in safety-related component failures (e.g., LERs88-037, 92-022,92-027, and 94-003). However, the components and circumstances are generally unrelated, and none of the previous events involved instrumentation. Therefore, the corrective actions for these precursors would not have been expected to prevent this event.
4 REGULATORY COMMITMENTIDENTIFICATIONFORM WASHINOTON PUBL)C poWBB SUPPLY SYSTEM (FOR INTERNALDISTRIBUTION ONLY)
Regulatory Agency Ucensing Specialist Source Document/Date NRC C.D. Mackaman LER 94-01 8-01/03-03-95 Outgoing Document Author Incoming Document Reviewer Mail Drop Ext
'.D. Mackaman N/A PE20 4451 Summary of Document FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACTION REQUIREMENT WHEN INOPERABLE CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION EXCEEDED THE ALLOWED OUTAGE TIME
" 'ONCURRENCE'.FOR'.COMMITMENTS LISTED BELOW Commitment Act(on Tracking No Assigned To Supv. Noma (Print)
K.L. Cutler J.R. Sampson LER Corrective Action St (PER 295 0975 Corrective Action S 6): Reinstall the upper switch assembly for the SDV rod block level switch (CRD-LS-135h PTL 112842 Scheduled Complete Oats Supv. Signature 07-01-95 /0 Hard Dote QYES QNO Commitment: Action Tracking No. Assigned To Supv. Nome (Print)
D.P. Giroux P.S. Ingersoll LER Corrective Action S2 (PER 295.0975 Corrective Actions Se snd St 1):
obtain oatM manual(s) for tha replacement SDV level switches ond ploce In PTLs 112844 Schedtsed Complete Oats Supv. Signature the CVI reference files. and 112847 03-31-95 Herd Date GYES QNO Commitment: Action Tracking No. Assigned To Supv. Name (Print)
C.M. Icayan M.A. Widmeyer LER Corrective Act)on S3: The usage limitation Informotkm snd Instrument Scheduled Complot ~ Oats Supv. Signature Master Dsts Sheet Information for applicable level switches manufactured by 04-15-95 Mognetrol will be revised to emphasize the importance of installing the switch at the correct alevst)on.
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Hard Dote SYES QNO z2~-
Commitmant: Action Tracking No. Assigned To Supv. Nome IPrint)
Scheduled Complete Oate Supv. Signature Hard Dote QYEs QNo Commitment: Action Tracking No. Assigned To Supv. Name (Print)
Scheduled Complete Date Supv. Signature Hard Dote GYES QNO Commitment: Action Tracking No. Assigned To Supv. Nome (Print)
Scheduled Complete Oats Supv. Signature Hard Dote QYES QNO Commitment: Action Tracking No. Assigned To Supv. Noma (Print)
Schadtred Complete Oats Supv. Signature Hard Dote GYES QNO 968-25260 R2 (I 2/94)