05000440/FIN-2007005-10: Difference between revisions
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{{finding | {{finding | ||
| title = Adequacy | | title = Adequacy of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Surveillance Testing | ||
| docket = 05000440 | | docket = 05000440 | ||
| Line 13: | Line 13: | ||
| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = M Wilk, A Dahbur, G Wright, M Franke, J Cameronm, | | Inspector = M Wilk, A Dahbur, G Wright, M Franke, J Cameronm, Wilkr Jickling, J Robbins, D Reeser, M Franke, B Burgess, J Quichocho, R Leidy, T Mccall, T Taylor | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = On November 28, 2007, the inspectors observed licensee actions in response to a scram with complications. The digital feedwater level control system experienced a loss of two power supplies. This caused a loss of feedwater, main turbine trip, and reactor scram due to an erroneous reactor vessel water level 8 signal. The loss of feedwater caused an actual reactor vessel water level 2, which initiated both RCIC and high pressure core spray (HPCS) for reactor vessel water level control. RCIC tripped approximately 13 seconds after initiation due to low suction pressure, and reactor vessel control was maintained using HPCS. The inspectors observed licensee personnel shutdown the plant to Mode 4. A Special Inspection Team was chartered to investigate this event, and the results are documented in IR 05000440/2007010. At the end of the inspection period, the inspectors continued to evaluate the adequacy of RCIC surveillance test procedures. A contributing cause of the November 28, 2007, RCIC failure was determined to be an improperly tuned flow controller. The controller settings were established in January 2006 and the RCIC system had passed routine surveillance testing criteria since that time without identification of the condition. RCIC testing typically relied on a suction and return flow path to the condensate storage tank. On November 28, 2007, RCIC failed to perform as designed when called upon to inject from the suppression pool to the reactor vessel. | | description = On November 28, 2007, the inspectors observed licensee actions in response to a scram with complications. The digital feedwater level control system experienced a loss of two power supplies. This caused a loss of feedwater, main turbine trip, and reactor scram due to an erroneous reactor vessel water level 8 signal. The loss of feedwater caused an actual reactor vessel water level 2, which initiated both RCIC and high pressure core spray (HPCS) for reactor vessel water level control. RCIC tripped approximately 13 seconds after initiation due to low suction pressure, and reactor vessel control was maintained using HPCS. The inspectors observed licensee personnel shutdown the plant to Mode 4. A Special Inspection Team was chartered to investigate this event, and the results are documented in IR 05000440/2007010. At the end of the inspection period, the inspectors continued to evaluate the adequacy of RCIC surveillance test procedures. A contributing cause of the November 28, 2007, RCIC failure was determined to be an improperly tuned flow controller. The controller settings were established in January 2006 and the RCIC system had passed routine surveillance testing criteria since that time without identification of the condition. RCIC testing typically relied on a suction and return flow path to the condensate storage tank. On November 28, 2007, RCIC failed to perform as designed when called upon to inject from the suppression pool to the reactor vessel. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 20:32, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Perry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000440/2007005 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2007 (2007Q4) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | No Cornerstone |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Wilk A Dahbur G Wright M Franke J Cameronm Wilkr Jickling J Robbins D Reeser M Franke B Burgess J Quichocho R Leidy T Mccall T Taylor |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |