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{{#Wiki_filter:BACK-UP BIN SLIDES Peter LeBlondNEI 96-07 Appendix D Team
{{#Wiki_filter:Peter LeBlond NEI 96-07 Appendix D Team BACK-UP Nuclear Energy Institute  BIN SLIDES October 11, 2017


Nuclear Energy InstituteOctober 11, 2017 A n informal "Binning System" will be introduced to assist in organizing the most common digital-related permutations  
An informal Binning System will be introduced to assist in organizing the most common digital-related permutations
*Slide 20 is generalized to describe this approach
*Following this generalization, we can describe four commonly encountered situations.
o Each of these "Bins" will have a nominally


expected outcomeStandardized Approach Can Be Graphically Expressed Identify the DBF(s) involved and classify its relationship with the identified functions below using NEI 96-07, definition 3.3.(If no DBF apparently exists, specialized evaluations may be required.)
Standardized Approach Can Be Graphically Expressed
GraphicalSummary of Approach*Describe the activity*Identify any functions involvedIdentify all Safety Analyses that credit directly or indirectly the DBF identified below.(If no Safety Analysis apparently exists, specialized evaluations may
* Slide 20 is generalized to describe this approach
* Following this generalization, we can describe four commonly encountered situations.
o Each of these Bins will have a nominally expected outcome


be required.)*Is the DBF preserved?*Was a FMEA needed to assess  
Graphical Summary of Approach Identify all Safety Analyses that credit directly or indirectly the DBF identified
* Do all assumptions below.                                            remain valid?
(If no Safety Analysis apparently
* Does the Safety exists, specialized evaluations may                Analysis remain be required.)                                     valid?
* Is the DBF Identify the DBF(s) involved and classify its        preserved?
relationship with the identified functions
* Was a FMEA below using NEI 96-07, definition 3.3.                needed to assess (If no DBF apparently exists, specialized            the propagation evaluations may be required.)                        of effects?
* Determine if SCCF:
* Describe the activity          Is classed as create a
* Identify any                    possibility.
functions involved            Induces effects across trains FMEA is needed?                Slide 20


the propagation of effects? *Do all assumptions remain valid?*Does the Safety Analysis remain
Repetitive Patterns of Evaluation
* Inspection of the graphic on the previous slide results in the recognition that repetitive Evaluation patterns are likely o In every instance, an individual assessment must be made
* Four expected patterns, or Bins will be described


valid?*Determine if SCCF:Is classed as "create a possibility."
Repetitive Patterns of Evaluation Four Bins Bin #1            Bin #2        Bin #3          Bin #4
Induces effects across trains FMEA  is needed?
* Non-Safety
Slide 20
* Safety
*Inspection of the graphic on the previous slide results in the recognition that repetitive Evaluation
* Safety
* Safety Related          Related w/    Related w/      Related w/
* Safety            SFC req.      SFC req.        SFC req.
Related w/o    o NOT          o SCCF          o SCCF Single Failure    immediately    likelihood      likelihood Criteria (SFC)    required      sufficiently    NOT Requirement    o NO short-      low            sufficiently term auto                      low actions


patterns are likely oIn every instance, an individual assessment must be made*Four expected patterns, or "Bins" will be described Repetitive Patterns of Evaluation Repetitive Patterns of Evaluation Four Bins Bin #1*Non-Safety Related*Safety Related w/o Single Failure Criteria (SFC)
Repetitive Patterns of Evaluation Cont. - Bin #1
Requirement Bin #2
* Description - Involves functions that are either:
*Safety Related w/
o Non-Safety Related o Safety-Related but not associated with any single failure criteria
SFC req.oNOT immediately required o NO short-term auto
* Discussion Points:
o Typically would be incapable of having a different result (Criterion 2 would control.)
o Safety Analyses already assume mis-behaviour of NSR SSCs o Care must be taken to ensure all Safety Analyses remain valid (e.g., functions combined, etc.)
* Examples:
o Turbine or FW controls o AFW turbine controls o MCR Chillers with no rack cooling functions


actions Bin #3
Repetitive Patterns of Evaluation Cont. - Bin #2
*Safety Related w/
* Description - Involves Safety-Related functions required to comply with single failure criteria that:
SFC req.o SCCF likelihood sufficiently
o Are not immediately required to respond to an event o Typically are not associated with very short-term automatic actions
* Discussion Points:
o A new FMEA would likely be required o Compliance with current procedures results in detection and a restorative response
* Examples:
o Digital EDG jacket water surge tank controls o MCR Chillers with rack cooling functions o Radiation Monitors that actuate CREFS


low Bin #4
Repetitive Patterns of Evaluation Cont. - Bin #3
*Safety Related w/
* Description - Involves Safety-Related functions required to comply with single failure criteria and an engineering evaluation determined the likelihood of SCCF is sufficiently low:
SFC req.o SCCF likelihood NOT sufficiently
o May immediately respond to an event o Can be associated with very short-term automatic action
* Discussion Points:
o Does not create a possibility of a SCCF o Relies on results from engineering evaluations
* Examples:
o EDG voltage regulator digital upgrade with no analog back-up o Replacement of transmitters with digital devices that control safeguard actuation


low
Repetitive Patterns of Evaluation Cont. - Bin #4
*Description -Involves functions that are either:
* Description - Involves Safety-Related functions required to comply with single failure criteria and an engineering evaluation determined the likelihood of SCCF is not sufficiently low:
o Non-Safety Related oSafety-Related but not associated with any single failure criteria
o May immediately respond to an event (typical) o Can be associated with a very short-term automatic action o System application is complex
*Discussion Points:
* Discussion Points:
oTypically would be incapable of having a different result (Criterion 2 would control.)
o Does create a possibility of a SCCF o No potential for FMEA application o LAR required
oSafety Analyses already assume mis-behaviourof
* Examples:
 
o Reactor Protection System upgrade}}
NSR SSCs oCare must be taken to ensure all Safety Analyses remain valid (e.g., functions combined, etc.)
*Examples: oTurbine or FW controls o AFW turbine controls oMCR Chillers with no rack cooling functions Repetitive Patterns of EvaluationCont. -"Bin #1"
*Description -Involves Safety-Related functions required to comply with single failure criteria that:
oAre not immediately required to respond to an event oTypically are not associated with very short-term
 
automatic actions
*Discussion Points:
oA new FMEA would likely be required oCompliance with current procedures results in detection and a restorative response
*Examples: oDigital EDG jacket water surge tank controls oMCR Chillers with rack cooling functions o Radiation Monitors that actuate CREFS Repetitive Patterns of EvaluationCont. -"Bin #2"
*Description -Involves Safety-Related functions required to comply with single failure criteria and an engineering evaluation determined the likelihood of SCCF is "sufficiently  
 
low": oMay immediately respond to an event oCan be associated with very short-term automatic action
*Discussion Points:
oDoes not "create a possibility" of a SCCF oRelies on results from engineering evaluations
*Examples: oEDG voltage regulator digital upgrade with no analog back-up oReplacement of transmitters with digital devices that control safeguard actuation Repetitive Patterns of EvaluationCont. -"Bin #3"
*Description -Involves Safety-Related functions required to comply with single failure criteria and an engineering evaluation determined the likelihood of
 
SCCF is not "sufficiently low"
: oMay immediately respond to an event (typical) oCan be associated with a very short-term automatic action oSystem application is complex
*Discussion Points:
oDoes "create a possibility" of a SCCF oNo potential for FMEA application o LAR required
*Examples: oReactor Protection System upgrade Repetitive Patterns of EvaluationCont. -"Bin #4"}}

Revision as of 14:49, 29 October 2019

10/11/2017 NEI 96-07, App D Meeting NEI Backup Slides
ML17285A005
Person / Time
Site: Nuclear Energy Institute
Issue date: 10/11/2017
From: Leblond P
Nuclear Energy Institute
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Holonich J
References
Download: ML17285A005 (10)
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Text

Peter LeBlond NEI 96-07 Appendix D Team BACK-UP Nuclear Energy Institute BIN SLIDES October 11, 2017

An informal Binning System will be introduced to assist in organizing the most common digital-related permutations

Standardized Approach Can Be Graphically Expressed

  • Slide 20 is generalized to describe this approach
  • Following this generalization, we can describe four commonly encountered situations.

o Each of these Bins will have a nominally expected outcome

Graphical Summary of Approach Identify all Safety Analyses that credit directly or indirectly the DBF identified

  • Do all assumptions below. remain valid?

(If no Safety Analysis apparently

  • Does the Safety exists, specialized evaluations may Analysis remain be required.) valid?
  • Is the DBF Identify the DBF(s) involved and classify its preserved?

relationship with the identified functions

  • Was a FMEA below using NEI 96-07, definition 3.3. needed to assess (If no DBF apparently exists, specialized the propagation evaluations may be required.) of effects?
  • Determine if SCCF:
  • Describe the activity Is classed as create a
  • Identify any possibility.

functions involved Induces effects across trains FMEA is needed? Slide 20

Repetitive Patterns of Evaluation

  • Inspection of the graphic on the previous slide results in the recognition that repetitive Evaluation patterns are likely o In every instance, an individual assessment must be made
  • Four expected patterns, or Bins will be described

Repetitive Patterns of Evaluation Four Bins Bin #1 Bin #2 Bin #3 Bin #4

  • Non-Safety
  • Safety
  • Safety
  • Safety Related Related w/ Related w/ Related w/
  • Safety SFC req. SFC req. SFC req.

Related w/o o NOT o SCCF o SCCF Single Failure immediately likelihood likelihood Criteria (SFC) required sufficiently NOT Requirement o NO short- low sufficiently term auto low actions

Repetitive Patterns of Evaluation Cont. - Bin #1

  • Description - Involves functions that are either:

o Non-Safety Related o Safety-Related but not associated with any single failure criteria

  • Discussion Points:

o Typically would be incapable of having a different result (Criterion 2 would control.)

o Safety Analyses already assume mis-behaviour of NSR SSCs o Care must be taken to ensure all Safety Analyses remain valid (e.g., functions combined, etc.)

  • Examples:

o Turbine or FW controls o AFW turbine controls o MCR Chillers with no rack cooling functions

Repetitive Patterns of Evaluation Cont. - Bin #2

  • Description - Involves Safety-Related functions required to comply with single failure criteria that:

o Are not immediately required to respond to an event o Typically are not associated with very short-term automatic actions

  • Discussion Points:

o A new FMEA would likely be required o Compliance with current procedures results in detection and a restorative response

  • Examples:

o Digital EDG jacket water surge tank controls o MCR Chillers with rack cooling functions o Radiation Monitors that actuate CREFS

Repetitive Patterns of Evaluation Cont. - Bin #3

  • Description - Involves Safety-Related functions required to comply with single failure criteria and an engineering evaluation determined the likelihood of SCCF is sufficiently low:

o May immediately respond to an event o Can be associated with very short-term automatic action

  • Discussion Points:

o Does not create a possibility of a SCCF o Relies on results from engineering evaluations

  • Examples:

o EDG voltage regulator digital upgrade with no analog back-up o Replacement of transmitters with digital devices that control safeguard actuation

Repetitive Patterns of Evaluation Cont. - Bin #4

  • Description - Involves Safety-Related functions required to comply with single failure criteria and an engineering evaluation determined the likelihood of SCCF is not sufficiently low:

o May immediately respond to an event (typical) o Can be associated with a very short-term automatic action o System application is complex

  • Discussion Points:

o Does create a possibility of a SCCF o No potential for FMEA application o LAR required

  • Examples:

o Reactor Protection System upgrade

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