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| {{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED QISTRJBUTION DEMObRATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9207240201 DOC.DATE: 92/07/15 NOTARIZED: | | {{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED QISTRJBUTION DEMObRATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS) |
| NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FULLER,R.E. | | ACCESSION NBR:9207240201 DOC.DATE: 92/07/15 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FULLER,R.E. Washington Public Power Supply System BAKER,J.W. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION |
| Washington Public Power Supply System BAKER,J.W. | |
| Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION | |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER 92-029-00:on 920624,RHR shutdown cooling isolation occurred a shutdown cooling supply line inboard isolation valve automatically closed.Caused by inadequate personnel work practices. | | LER 92-029-00:on 920624,RHR shutdown cooling isolation occurred a shutdown cooling supply line inboard isolation valve automatically closed. Caused by inadequate personnel work practices. Shutdown cooling reestablished.W/920717 ltr.. |
| Shutdown cooling reestablished.W/920717 ltr..DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA DEANiW.INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 NRR/DOEA/OEAB NRR/DST/SELB 8D NR~DSR/~PLB8Dl REG FILE~02 FILE 01 EXTERNAL EG&G BRYCE g J~H NRC PDR NSIC POOREgW.COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD ACRS AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DET/EMEB 7E NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 | | DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: |
| " NRR/DREP/PRPB11 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E RES/DSIR/EIB L ST LOBBY WARD NSIC MURPHY,G.A NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2" 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
| | TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc. |
| PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK.ROOM P 1-37 (EXT.20079)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 32 ENCL 32 ti WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O..Box 968~3000 George Washington Way~Richland, Washington 99362 July 17, 1992 G02-92-170 Docket No.50-397 Document Control Desk U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 | | NOTES: |
| | RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 DEANiW. 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 |
| | " |
| | NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 |
| | " |
| | 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 1 1 NR~DSR/~PLB8Dl 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 REG FILE~ 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL EG&G BRYCE g J ~ H 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NSIC POOREgW. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK. |
| | ROOM P 1-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED! |
| | FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 32 ENCL 32 |
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| | ti WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O..Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99362 July 17, 1992 G02-92-170 Docket No. 50-397 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| NUCLEAR PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.92-29 Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.92-29 for the WNP-2 Plant.This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence. | | NUCLEAR PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 92-29 Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 92-29 for the WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence. |
| Sincerely, J.W.Baker WNP-2 Plant Manager (Mail Drop 927M)JWB/REF/cgeh Enclosure CC: Mr.J.B.Martin, NRC-Region V Mr.C.Sorensen, NRC Resident Inspector (Mail Drop 901A, 2 Copies)INPO Records Center-Atlanta, GA Mr.D.L.Williams, BPA (Mail Drop 399)920724020i | | Sincerely, J. W. Baker WNP-2 Plant Manager (Mail Drop 927M) |
| 'ti207i5 PDR ADOCK 050003'P7 8 PDR~~1 r i~I~)
| | JWB/REF/cgeh Enclosure CC: Mr. J. B. Martin, NRC - Region V Mr. C. Sorensen, NRC Resident Inspector (Mail Drop 901A, 2 Copies) |
| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)AGILITY NAME (1)Mashin ton Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCKET NUHB R ()PAGE (3)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 1 OF 5 ITLE (4)SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION DUE TO TRANSFER OF RPS"B" TO ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY EVENT DATE 5 LER NUMBER 6 REPORT DATE 7 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 HONTH 0 6 DAY YEAR YEAR 2 4 9 2 9 2;:, SEQUENTIAL NUHBER 0 2 9 EVI 5 ION UHBER 0 0 HOHTH 0 7 DAY 1 5 YEAR FACILITY NAMES 9 2 CKE NUMB 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 R (5)P ERAT IHG ODE (9)HIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREHENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following)
| | INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA Mr. D. L. Williams, BPA (Mail Drop 399) |
| (11 5 OWER LEVEL 20.402(b)0.405(a)(1)(i) 0.405(a)(1)(ii) 0.405(a)(1)(1 1 1)0.405(a)(1)(iv) 0.405(a)(1)(v) 20.405(C)50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 77.71(b)73.73(c)THER (Specify in Abstract elow and in Text.NRC orm 366A)NAME LICENSEE COHTACT FOR THIS LER (12)R.E.Fuller, Compliance Engineer TELEPHOHE NUMBER REA CODE 5 0 9 7 7-4 1 4 8 COMPLETE OHE LINE FOR EACH COMPOHEHT FAILURE DESCRIBED IH INIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER EPORTABLE 0 HPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPOHEHI'ANUFACTURER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (If yes, compiete EXPECTED SUBHISSIOH DATE)X NO}RACZ}}d}EXPECTED SUBMISSIOH MONTH DAY YEAR ATE (15)On June 24, 1992, at 0439 hours, a Residual Heat Removal (RHR)Shutdown Cooling (SDC)isolation occurred.The RHR SDC supply line inboard isolation valve, RHR-V-9, automatically closed while Operations was manually transferring the Reactor Protection System (RPS)Bus"B" from its normal power source to its alternate source.The power transfer was being done in preparation to do work on the RPS Bus"B" Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPA).The root cause of this event is inadequate personnel work practices.
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| Plant Operators responded by restoring RHR SDC to pre-event lineup status.The safety significance of this event is negligible.
| | ~ ) |
| The increase in Reactor coolant temperature was less than 1'F.This event posed no threat to the operability of safety-related equipment or to the health and safety of Plant personnel or the public.
| | 920724020i 'ti207i5 050003'P7 PDR ADOCK 8 PDR |
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| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION"ACILITY NAME (I)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 OOCKET NUMBER (2)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7.ev.No.2 29 0 LER NUMBER (B)ear umber AGE (3)2 F 5 ITLE (4)SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION DUE TO TRANSFER OF RPS"B" TO ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY Plant n ii n Power Level-0%Plant Mode-5 (Refueling) | | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| Event D cri i n On June 24, 1992, at 0439 hours, a Residual Heat Removal (RHR)Shutdown Cooling (SDC)isolation occurred.The RHR SDC supply line inboard isolation valve, RHR-V-9, automatically closed while Operations was manually transferring the Reactor Protection System (RPS)Bus"B" from its normal power source to its alternate source, The power transfer was being done in preparation to do work on the RPS Bus"B" Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPA).The transfer operation causes a momentary loss of power to the respective bus.The loss of RPS Bus"B" power causes, among other actuations, closure of selected inboard and outboard Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NSSSS)isolation valves, which includes, RHR-V-8, RHR-V-9 and RHR-V-53B.
| | AGILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUHB R ( ) PAGE (3) |
| Inboard SDC supply line isolation valve RHR-V-9 and SDC return line valve RHR-V-53B closed as designed.The outboard SDC supply line isolation valve RHR-V-8 did not close as designed because maintenance activities being performed at the time precluded actuation.
| | Mashin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 1 OF 5 ITLE (4) |
| mm i'r iv A i n The Reactor Operators rapidly re-established RHR SDC within four minutes of the isolation per Plant procedures.
| | SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION DUE TO TRANSFER OF RPS "B" TO ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY EVENT DATE 5 LER NUMBER 6 REPORT DATE 7 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 HONTH DAY YEAR YEAR ;:, SEQUENTIAL EVI 5 ION HOHTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES CKE NUMB R (5) |
| There was no other impact to Plant operations.
| | NUHBER UHBER 5 0 0 0 0 6 2 4 9 2 9 2 0 2 9 0 0 0 7 1 5 9 2 5 0 0 0 P ERAT IHG HIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREHENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11 ODE (9) 5 OWER LEVEL 20.402(b) 20.405(C) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 77.71(b) 0.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.73(c) 0.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) THER (Specify in Abstract 0.405(a) (1) (1 1 1) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) elow and in Text. NRC 0.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) orm 366A) 0.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) |
| Fu her Evaluation and rrective Ac i n A.her Evaluati n This event is considered reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as any event that resulted in automatic actuation of any ESF, including the RPS.,NSSSS is an ESF.'he loss of power to the RPS Bus"B" caused actuation of the associated division of NSSSS logic and corresponding closure of the open SDC supply line valve RHR-V-9 and SDC return line valve RHR-V-53B.
| | LICENSEE COHTACT FOR THIS LER (12) |
| The control circuit for RHR-V-8 is powered by RPS Bus"A".The contacts for NSSSS manual isolation of RHR-V-8 are on Relay K81B.Relay K81B is powered from RPS 13us"B." Upon loss of power to RPS Bus"B", the NSSSS contacts to RHR-V-8, t3 and 6'4 contacts on K81B relay, open causing RHR-V-8 to close.However, RHR-V-8 did not close during this event because ongoing maintenance activities on RPS Division"B" had the RHR-V-8 NSSSS contacts jumpered to preclude such an actuation.
| | NAME TELEPHOHE NUMBER R. E. Fuller, Compliance Engineer REA CODE |
| RPS Bus"A" had power during this event.All other Plant systems responded as designed.
| | - |
| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXl CONTINUATION FACILITY HAHE (I)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCKET HUHBER (2)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 I LER HUHBER (8)ear umber ev.Ho.AGE (3)2 29 0 3'5 ITLE (4)SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION DUE TO TRANSFER OF RPS'.B" TO ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY 2.The NRC was verbally notified of the unplanned ESF actuation at 0511 PST on June 24, 1992, per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii).
| | 5 0 9 7 7 4 1 4 8 COMPLETE OHE LINE FOR EACH COMPOHEHT FAILURE DESCRIBED IH INIS REPORT (13) |
| h Emergent maintenance work was identified for the RPS Bus"B" EPA breakers (RPS-EPA-3B and RPS-EPA-3D).
| | CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER EPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPOHEHI'ANUFACTURER EPORTABLE 0 HPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED SUBMISSIOH MONTH DAY YEAR ATE (15) |
| Through some miscommunication in the Work Control Group (WCG), the EPA breaker work package was submitted to the Shift Manager without.WCG preapproval.
| | YES (If yes, compiete EXPECTED SUBHISSIOH DATE) X NO |
| The WCG provides a review of the maintenance activities to assist the Shift Manager in assessing the impact of implementation on Plant operation. | | }RACZ }}d} |
| The package was provided to the Control Room with the intent of being worked in parallel with the'cheduled RPS Division"B" work.However, the package did not have any cautions that normally accompany WCG preapproval. | | On June 24, 1992, at 0439 hours, a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling (SDC) isolation occurred. The RHR SDC supply line inboard isolation valve, RHR-V-9, automatically closed while Operations was manually transferring the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Bus "B" from its normal power source to its alternate source. The power transfer was being done in preparation to do work on the RPS Bus "B" Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPA). |
| In order to perform the EPA breaker work, the RPS Bus"B" power supply was required to be transferred from its normal supply, Bus SM-8, to its alternate supply, Bus SH-6.This transfer results in a momentary interruption of power to the loads until the transfer is completed at the switch.An unplanned ESF actuation from an RPS power transfer may be prevented while in SDC.The RHR pump that is being used for SDC is shutdown prior to the transfer and restarted upon completion of the transfer.Also, all other systems that normally actuate on loss of RPS power on the affected bus are aligned to their post-actuation state prior to the transfer.Therefore, no ESF actuations take place.The Shift Manager accepted the work package because he determined it would have minimal impact on Plant operation.
| | The root cause of this event is inadequate personnel work practices. |
| There were no cautions associated with the power transfer nor the affect the RPS Division"B" work would have on the EPA breaker work.The scheduled RPS Division"B" work jumpered out the manual isolation push buttons for the inboard NSSSS isolation valves to prevent inadvertent actuation of this logic circuit.The Shift Manager and Contxol Room Supervisor (CRS)did not take adequate time to review the RPS Division"B" jumpers and EPA breaker work.They incorrectly assumed that the jumpers would prevent an interruption of power to RPS Bus"B" during a manual transfer of the power supply.Prior to the transfer, the Reactor Operators aligned all of the systems that would be affected by a loss of power to RPS Bus"B" to their post actuation state except for the RPS Channel"B" scram solenoid valves and the SDC system.Consequently, when the power transfer was made, the SDC isolation occurred as designed with closure of RHR-V-9 and RHR-V-53B.
| | Plant Operators responded by restoring RHR SDC to pre-event lineup status. |
| The jumpers provided by the RPS Division"B" work were downstream of the RPS Bus.The power transfer evolution interrupts the power upstream of the RPS bus.Therefore, the jumpers in question would not preclude interruption of power to the bus.
| | The safety significance of this event is negligible. The increase in Reactor coolant temperature was less than 1'F. This event posed no threat to the operability of safety-related equipment or to the health and safety of Plant personnel or the public. |
| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME (1)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 LER NUMBER (8)ear umber ev.No.2 029 0 AGE (3)4 F 5 ITLE (4)SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION DUE TO TRANSFER OF RPS"B" TO ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY, The root cause of this event is Personnel-Work Practices-Other Intended or Required VeriTication Not Performed to ensure the actions taken would cause the expected results.The Shift Manager and the CRS did not take adequate time to verify that the jumpers would prevent power interruption to the RPS bus during the transfer to the alternate power supply.4.There were no other structures, components, or systems inoperable prior to the event which contributed to the event.B.rrective Acti n T ken 1.Management expectations have been communicated to the Shift Managers and all licensed Reactor Operator personnel to take the necessary time to adequately review Plant'aintenance related documents for impact on Plant systems and components prior to allowing the job to be performed.
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| irther C rrecive A i n No further corrective actions were identified.
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| The safety significance of this event is negligible.
| | TEXT CONTINUATION "ACILITY NAME (I) OOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (B) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No. |
| The Reactor Operators restored SDC within four minutes of the isolation per Plant procedures.
| | Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7. |
| The increase in Reactor coolant temperature was less than-1'F.Furthermore, the Reactor Operators were aware of the possibility of the isolati'on and were prepared to respond to the occurrence.
| | 2 29 0 2 F 5 ITLE (4) |
| This event posed no threat to the operability of safety-related equipment or to the health and safety of Plant personnel or the public.imilar Events LER 89-23 documents ESF actuations that occurred during testing of the ASS Recirculation Pump"A" Trip System while in Mode 5.Evaluations by the Plant Test Engineers and Plant Operators incorrectly concluded that other activities related to the recirculation pump could be performed in parallel with the test activities.
| | SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION DUE TO TRANSFER OF RPS "B" TO ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY Plant n ii n Power Level - 0% |
| This resulted in tripping the associated EPA breaker and caused the corresponding unplanned ESF actuations. | | Plant Mode - 5 (Refueling) |
| | Event D cri i n On June 24, 1992, at 0439 hours, a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling (SDC) isolation occurred. The RHR SDC supply line inboard isolation valve, RHR-V-9, automatically closed while Operations was manually transferring the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Bus "B" from its normal power source to its alternate source, The power transfer was being done in preparation to do work on the RPS Bus "B" Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPA). |
| | The transfer operation causes a momentary loss of power to the respective bus. The loss of RPS Bus "B" power causes, among other actuations, closure of selected inboard and outboard Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NSSSS) isolation valves, which includes, RHR-V-8, RHR-V-9 and RHR-V-53B. Inboard SDC supply line isolation valve RHR-V-9 and SDC return line valve RHR-V-53B closed as designed. The outboard SDC supply line isolation valve RHR-V-8 did not close as designed because maintenance activities mm i'r being performed at the time precluded actuation. |
| | iv A i n of the isolation per Plant The Reactor Operators rapidly re-established RHR SDC within four minutes procedures. There was no other impact to Plant operations. |
| | Fu her Evaluation and rrective Ac i n A. her Evaluati n This event is considered reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as any event that resulted in automatic actuation of any ESF, including the RPS.,NSSSS is an ESF.'he loss of power to the RPS Bus "B" caused actuation of the associated division of NSSSS logic and corresponding closure of the open SDC supply line valve RHR-V-9 and SDC return line valve RHR-V-53B. |
| | The control circuit for RHR-V-8 is powered by RPS Bus "A". The contacts for NSSSS manual isolation of RHR-V-8 are on Relay K81B. Relay K81B is powered from RPS 13us "B." Upon loss of power to RPS Bus "B", the NSSSS contacts to RHR-V-8, t3 and 6'4 contacts on K81B relay, open causing RHR-V-8 to close. However, RHR-V-8 did not close during this event because ongoing maintenance activities on RPS Division "B" had the RHR-V-8 NSSSS contacts jumpered to preclude such an actuation. RPS Bus "A" had power during this event. All other Plant systems responded as designed. |
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| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXl CONTINUATION FACILITY HAHE (I) DOCKET HUHBER (2) LER HUHBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. Ho. |
| | Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 I ' |
| | 2 29 0 3 5 ITLE (4) |
| | SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION DUE TO TRANSFER OF RPS'.B" TO ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY The NRC was verbally notified of the unplanned ESF actuation at 0511 PST on June 24, 1992, per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii). |
| | h |
| | : 2. Emergent maintenance work was identified for the RPS Bus "B" EPA breakers (RPS-EPA-3B and RPS-EPA-3D). Through some miscommunication in the Work Control Group (WCG), the EPA breaker work package was submitted to the Shift Manager without |
| | . WCG preapproval. The WCG provides a review of the maintenance activities to assist the Shift Manager in assessing the impact of implementation on Plant operation. The package was provided to the Control Room with the intent of being worked in parallel with the RPS Division "B" work. However, the package did not have any cautions that 'cheduled normally accompany WCG preapproval. |
| | In order to perform the EPA breaker work, the RPS Bus "B" power supply was required to be transferred from its normal supply, Bus SM-8, to its alternate supply, Bus SH-6. This transfer results in a momentary interruption of power to the loads until the transfer is completed at the switch. An unplanned ESF actuation from an RPS power transfer may be prevented while in SDC. The RHR pump that is being used for SDC is shutdown prior to the transfer and restarted upon completion of the transfer. Also, all other systems that normally actuate on loss of RPS power on the affected bus are aligned to their post-actuation state prior to the transfer. Therefore, no ESF actuations take place. |
| | The Shift Manager accepted the work package because he determined it would have minimal impact on Plant operation. There were no cautions associated with the power transfer nor the affect the RPS Division "B" work would have on the EPA breaker work. |
| | The scheduled RPS Division "B" work jumpered out the manual isolation push buttons for the inboard NSSSS isolation valves to prevent inadvertent actuation of this logic circuit. The Shift Manager and Contxol Room Supervisor (CRS) did not take adequate time to review the RPS Division "B" jumpers and EPA breaker work. They incorrectly assumed that the jumpers would prevent an interruption of power to RPS Bus "B" during a manual transfer of the power supply. Prior to the transfer, the Reactor Operators aligned all of the systems that would be affected by a loss of power to RPS Bus "B" to their post actuation state except for the RPS Channel "B" scram solenoid valves and the SDC system. Consequently, when the power transfer was made, the SDC isolation occurred as designed with closure of RHR-V-9 and RHR-V-53B. |
| | The jumpers provided by the RPS Division "B" work were downstream of the RPS Bus. |
| | The power transfer evolution interrupts the power upstream of the RPS bus. Therefore, the jumpers in question would not preclude interruption of power to the bus. |
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| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No. |
| | Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 2 029 0 4 F 5 ITLE (4) |
| | SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION DUE TO TRANSFER OF RPS "B" TO ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY, The root cause of this event is Personnel - Work Practices - Other Intended or Required VeriTication Not Performed to ensure the actions taken would cause the expected results. |
| | The Shift Manager and the CRS did not take adequate time to verify that the jumpers would prevent power interruption to the RPS bus during the transfer to the alternate power supply. |
| | : 4. There were no other structures, components, or systems inoperable prior to the event which contributed to the event. |
| | B. rrective Acti n T ken |
| | : 1. Management expectations have been communicated to the Shift Managers and all licensed Reactor Operator personnel to take the necessary time to adequately review Plant |
| | 'aintenance related documents for impact on Plant systems and components prior to allowing the job to be performed. |
| | irther C rrecive A i n No further corrective actions were identified. |
| | The safety significance of this event is negligible. The Reactor Operators restored SDC within four minutes of the isolation per Plant procedures. The increase in Reactor coolant temperature was less than-1'F. Furthermore, the Reactor Operators were aware of the possibility of the isolati'on and were prepared to respond to the occurrence. This event posed no threat to the operability of safety-related equipment or to the health and safety of Plant personnel or the public. |
| | imilar Events LER 89-23 documents ESF actuations that occurred during testing of the ASS Recirculation Pump "A" Trip System while in Mode 5. Evaluations by the Plant Test Engineers and Plant Operators incorrectly concluded that other activities related to the recirculation pump could be performed in parallel with the test activities. This resulted in tripping the associated EPA breaker and caused the corresponding unplanned ESF actuations. |
| There have been other events leading to Shutdown Cooling isolation or inadvertent NSSSS actuations. | | There have been other events leading to Shutdown Cooling isolation or inadvertent NSSSS actuations. |
| However, the events were related to equipment malfunction or errors that occurred during maintenance activities. | | However, the events were related to equipment malfunction or errors that occurred during maintenance activities. = |
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| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME (I)'ashington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 OOCKET NUMBER (2)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 LER NUMBER (8)ear umber ev.No.2 29 0 AGE (3)5 F 5 ITLE (4)SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION DUE TO TRANSFER OF RPS"B" TO ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY II Infrm i n R f~Iem Q~m~nn Reactor Protection System (RPS-EPA-3B and-3D)Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation (RHR-V-9)RHR/Containment Spray Containment Leakage Control JC JM BO BD BKR ISV}} | | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME (I) OOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No. |
| | 'ashington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 2 29 0 5 F 5 ITLE (4) |
| | SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION DUE TO TRANSFER OF RPS "B" TO ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY II Infrm i n R f |
| | ~Iem Q~m~nn Reactor Protection System JC BKR (RPS-EPA-3B and -3D) |
| | Containment and Reactor Vessel JM ISV Isolation (RHR-V-9) |
| | RHR/Containment Spray BO Containment Leakage Control BD}} |
|
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997 LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997 LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995 LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995 LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995 LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr 1999-07-20
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997 LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997 LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995 LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995 LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995 LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr 1999-07-20
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17284A9001999-10-31031 October 1999 Rev 0 to COLR 99-15, WNP-2 Cycle 15,COLR GO2-99-177, LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With1999-10-0101 October 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With ML17284A8941999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for WNP-2.With 991012 Ltr ML17284A8801999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for WNP-2.With 990910 Ltr ML17284A8691999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for WNP-2.With 990813 Ltr ML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B7271999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for WNP-2.With 990707 Ltr ML17292B6961999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for WNP-2.With 990608 Ltr ML17292B6641999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for WNP-2.With 990507 Ltr ML17292B6391999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for WNP-2.With 990413 Ltr ML17292B5871999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for WNP-2.With 990311 Ltr ML17292B5571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for WNP-2.With 990210 Ltr ML17292B5621999-01-31031 January 1999 Rev 1 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2 Cycle 14 Colr. ML17292B5341999-01-15015 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Incorrect Modeling of BWR Lower Plenum Vol in Bison.Defect Applies Only to Reload Fuel Assemblies Currently in Operation at WNP-2.BISON Code Model for WNP-2 Has Been Revised to Correct Error ML17292B5331999-01-15015 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re XL-S96 CPR Correlation for SVEA-96 Fuel. Defect Applies Only to WNP-2,during Cycles 12,13 & 14 Operation.Evaluations of Defect Performed by ABB-CE ML17292B4791998-12-31031 December 1998 Washington Public Power Supply Sys 1998 Annual Rept. with 981215 Ltr ML17292B5351998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for WNP-2.With 990112 Ltr ML17292B5741998-12-31031 December 1998 WNP-2 1998 Annual Operating Rept. with 990225 Ltr ML17284A8231998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for WNP-2.With 981207 Ltr ML17284A8081998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for WNP-2.With 981110 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7831998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for WNP-2.With 981007 Ltr ML17284A7491998-09-10010 September 1998 WNP-2 Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Refueling Outage RF13 Spring,1998. ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7681998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for WNP-2.With 980915 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7261998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for WNP-2.W/980810 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6751998-06-30030 June 1998 Ro:On 980617,flooding of RB Northeast Stairwell with Consequential Flooding of Two ECCS Pump Rooms.Caused by Inadequate Fire Protection Sys Design.Pumped Out Water from Affected Areas to Point Below Berm Areas of Pump Rooms ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17284A6491998-05-31031 May 1998 Rev 0 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2,Cycle 14 Colr. ML17292B4031998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for WNP-2.W/980608 Ltr ML17292B3921998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for WNP-2.W/980513 Ltr ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3371998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for WNP-2.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2641998-03-0404 March 1998 Performance Self Assessment,WNP-2. ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B2911998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for WNP-2.W/980313 Ltr ML17284A7971998-02-17017 February 1998 Rev 28 to Operational QA Program Description, WPPSS-QA-004.With Proposed Rev 29 ML17292B3591998-02-12012 February 1998 WNP-2 Cycle 14 Reload Design Rept. 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
ACCELERATED QISTRJBUTION DEMObRATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9207240201 DOC.DATE: 92/07/15 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FULLER,R.E. Washington Public Power Supply System BAKER,J.W. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 92-029-00:on 920624,RHR shutdown cooling isolation occurred a shutdown cooling supply line inboard isolation valve automatically closed. Caused by inadequate personnel work practices. Shutdown cooling reestablished.W/920717 ltr..
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
NOTES:
RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 DEANiW. 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1
"
NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2
"
2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 1 1 NR~DSR/~PLB8Dl 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 REG FILE~ 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL EG&G BRYCE g J ~ H 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NSIC POOREgW. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK.
ROOM P 1-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 32 ENCL 32
ti WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O..Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99362 July 17, 1992 G02-92-170 Docket No. 50-397 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
SUBJECT:
NUCLEAR PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 92-29 Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 92-29 for the WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.
Sincerely, J. W. Baker WNP-2 Plant Manager (Mail Drop 927M)
JWB/REF/cgeh Enclosure CC: Mr. J. B. Martin, NRC - Region V Mr. C. Sorensen, NRC Resident Inspector (Mail Drop 901A, 2 Copies)
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA Mr. D. L. Williams, BPA (Mail Drop 399)
~ ~ 1 ri ~ I
~ )
920724020i 'ti207i5 050003'P7 PDR ADOCK 8 PDR
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
AGILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUHB R ( ) PAGE (3)
Mashin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 1 OF 5 ITLE (4)
SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION DUE TO TRANSFER OF RPS "B" TO ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY EVENT DATE 5 LER NUMBER 6 REPORT DATE 7 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 HONTH DAY YEAR YEAR ;:, SEQUENTIAL EVI 5 ION HOHTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES CKE NUMB R (5)
NUHBER UHBER 5 0 0 0 0 6 2 4 9 2 9 2 0 2 9 0 0 0 7 1 5 9 2 5 0 0 0 P ERAT IHG HIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREHENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11 ODE (9) 5 OWER LEVEL 20.402(b) 20.405(C) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 77.71(b) 0.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.73(c) 0.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) THER (Specify in Abstract 0.405(a) (1) (1 1 1) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) elow and in Text. NRC 0.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) orm 366A) 0.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LICENSEE COHTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHOHE NUMBER R. E. Fuller, Compliance Engineer REA CODE
-
5 0 9 7 7 4 1 4 8 COMPLETE OHE LINE FOR EACH COMPOHEHT FAILURE DESCRIBED IH INIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER EPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPOHEHI'ANUFACTURER EPORTABLE 0 HPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED SUBMISSIOH MONTH DAY YEAR ATE (15)
YES (If yes, compiete EXPECTED SUBHISSIOH DATE) X NO
}RACZd}
On June 24, 1992, at 0439 hours, a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling (SDC) isolation occurred. The RHR SDC supply line inboard isolation valve, RHR-V-9, automatically closed while Operations was manually transferring the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Bus "B" from its normal power source to its alternate source. The power transfer was being done in preparation to do work on the RPS Bus "B" Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPA).
The root cause of this event is inadequate personnel work practices.
Plant Operators responded by restoring RHR SDC to pre-event lineup status.
The safety significance of this event is negligible. The increase in Reactor coolant temperature was less than 1'F. This event posed no threat to the operability of safety-related equipment or to the health and safety of Plant personnel or the public.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION "ACILITY NAME (I) OOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (B) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7.
2 29 0 2 F 5 ITLE (4)
SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION DUE TO TRANSFER OF RPS "B" TO ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY Plant n ii n Power Level - 0%
Plant Mode - 5 (Refueling)
Event D cri i n On June 24, 1992, at 0439 hours, a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling (SDC) isolation occurred. The RHR SDC supply line inboard isolation valve, RHR-V-9, automatically closed while Operations was manually transferring the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Bus "B" from its normal power source to its alternate source, The power transfer was being done in preparation to do work on the RPS Bus "B" Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPA).
The transfer operation causes a momentary loss of power to the respective bus. The loss of RPS Bus "B" power causes, among other actuations, closure of selected inboard and outboard Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NSSSS) isolation valves, which includes, RHR-V-8, RHR-V-9 and RHR-V-53B. Inboard SDC supply line isolation valve RHR-V-9 and SDC return line valve RHR-V-53B closed as designed. The outboard SDC supply line isolation valve RHR-V-8 did not close as designed because maintenance activities mm i'r being performed at the time precluded actuation.
iv A i n of the isolation per Plant The Reactor Operators rapidly re-established RHR SDC within four minutes procedures. There was no other impact to Plant operations.
Fu her Evaluation and rrective Ac i n A. her Evaluati n This event is considered reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as any event that resulted in automatic actuation of any ESF, including the RPS.,NSSSS is an ESF.'he loss of power to the RPS Bus "B" caused actuation of the associated division of NSSSS logic and corresponding closure of the open SDC supply line valve RHR-V-9 and SDC return line valve RHR-V-53B.
The control circuit for RHR-V-8 is powered by RPS Bus "A". The contacts for NSSSS manual isolation of RHR-V-8 are on Relay K81B. Relay K81B is powered from RPS 13us "B." Upon loss of power to RPS Bus "B", the NSSSS contacts to RHR-V-8, t3 and 6'4 contacts on K81B relay, open causing RHR-V-8 to close. However, RHR-V-8 did not close during this event because ongoing maintenance activities on RPS Division "B" had the RHR-V-8 NSSSS contacts jumpered to preclude such an actuation. RPS Bus "A" had power during this event. All other Plant systems responded as designed.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXl CONTINUATION FACILITY HAHE (I) DOCKET HUHBER (2) LER HUHBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. Ho.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 I '
2 29 0 3 5 ITLE (4)
SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION DUE TO TRANSFER OF RPS'.B" TO ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY The NRC was verbally notified of the unplanned ESF actuation at 0511 PST on June 24, 1992, per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii).
h
- 2. Emergent maintenance work was identified for the RPS Bus "B" EPA breakers (RPS-EPA-3B and RPS-EPA-3D). Through some miscommunication in the Work Control Group (WCG), the EPA breaker work package was submitted to the Shift Manager without
. WCG preapproval. The WCG provides a review of the maintenance activities to assist the Shift Manager in assessing the impact of implementation on Plant operation. The package was provided to the Control Room with the intent of being worked in parallel with the RPS Division "B" work. However, the package did not have any cautions that 'cheduled normally accompany WCG preapproval.
In order to perform the EPA breaker work, the RPS Bus "B" power supply was required to be transferred from its normal supply, Bus SM-8, to its alternate supply, Bus SH-6. This transfer results in a momentary interruption of power to the loads until the transfer is completed at the switch. An unplanned ESF actuation from an RPS power transfer may be prevented while in SDC. The RHR pump that is being used for SDC is shutdown prior to the transfer and restarted upon completion of the transfer. Also, all other systems that normally actuate on loss of RPS power on the affected bus are aligned to their post-actuation state prior to the transfer. Therefore, no ESF actuations take place.
The Shift Manager accepted the work package because he determined it would have minimal impact on Plant operation. There were no cautions associated with the power transfer nor the affect the RPS Division "B" work would have on the EPA breaker work.
The scheduled RPS Division "B" work jumpered out the manual isolation push buttons for the inboard NSSSS isolation valves to prevent inadvertent actuation of this logic circuit. The Shift Manager and Contxol Room Supervisor (CRS) did not take adequate time to review the RPS Division "B" jumpers and EPA breaker work. They incorrectly assumed that the jumpers would prevent an interruption of power to RPS Bus "B" during a manual transfer of the power supply. Prior to the transfer, the Reactor Operators aligned all of the systems that would be affected by a loss of power to RPS Bus "B" to their post actuation state except for the RPS Channel "B" scram solenoid valves and the SDC system. Consequently, when the power transfer was made, the SDC isolation occurred as designed with closure of RHR-V-9 and RHR-V-53B.
The jumpers provided by the RPS Division "B" work were downstream of the RPS Bus.
The power transfer evolution interrupts the power upstream of the RPS bus. Therefore, the jumpers in question would not preclude interruption of power to the bus.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 2 029 0 4 F 5 ITLE (4)
SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION DUE TO TRANSFER OF RPS "B" TO ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY, The root cause of this event is Personnel - Work Practices - Other Intended or Required VeriTication Not Performed to ensure the actions taken would cause the expected results.
The Shift Manager and the CRS did not take adequate time to verify that the jumpers would prevent power interruption to the RPS bus during the transfer to the alternate power supply.
- 4. There were no other structures, components, or systems inoperable prior to the event which contributed to the event.
B. rrective Acti n T ken
- 1. Management expectations have been communicated to the Shift Managers and all licensed Reactor Operator personnel to take the necessary time to adequately review Plant
'aintenance related documents for impact on Plant systems and components prior to allowing the job to be performed.
irther C rrecive A i n No further corrective actions were identified.
The safety significance of this event is negligible. The Reactor Operators restored SDC within four minutes of the isolation per Plant procedures. The increase in Reactor coolant temperature was less than-1'F. Furthermore, the Reactor Operators were aware of the possibility of the isolati'on and were prepared to respond to the occurrence. This event posed no threat to the operability of safety-related equipment or to the health and safety of Plant personnel or the public.
imilar Events LER 89-23 documents ESF actuations that occurred during testing of the ASS Recirculation Pump "A" Trip System while in Mode 5. Evaluations by the Plant Test Engineers and Plant Operators incorrectly concluded that other activities related to the recirculation pump could be performed in parallel with the test activities. This resulted in tripping the associated EPA breaker and caused the corresponding unplanned ESF actuations.
There have been other events leading to Shutdown Cooling isolation or inadvertent NSSSS actuations.
However, the events were related to equipment malfunction or errors that occurred during maintenance activities. =
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME (I) OOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No.
'ashington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 2 29 0 5 F 5 ITLE (4)
SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION DUE TO TRANSFER OF RPS "B" TO ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY II Infrm i n R f
~Iem Q~m~nn Reactor Protection System JC BKR (RPS-EPA-3B and -3D)
Containment and Reactor Vessel JM ISV Isolation (RHR-V-9)
RHR/Containment Spray BO Containment Leakage Control BD}}