Latest revision as of 07:11, 20 October 2019

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NEI Presentation Re January 31 Digital I_C Public Meeting
	ML19025A307
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Site:	Nuclear Energy Institute
Issue date:	01/28/2019
From:	; Nuclear Energy Institute
To:	; Division of Licensing Projects
	Paige J, NRR/DLP, 415-1474
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ML19025A311 -Pkg.	List: ML19025A307; ML19025A308; ML19025A310; ML19029B200;
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Digital I&C Strategy NEI DI&C Working Group January 31, 2019 NRC Public Meeting

Overarching Principles Incorporate defined boundaries Apply risk-informed insights Leverage robust design processes Capitalize on international operational experience and standards

Discussion topics Identify desired outcomes Identify barriers to progress Propose solutions to overcome barriers Summary

What does the end look like?

Utilities successfully design, develop, implement, and license digital upgrades to protection and control systems to support plant modernization and improve plant safety and reliability

Barrier #1 - Common Cause Failure (CCF)

BTP 7-19 guidance has evolved over the years and expanded the scope of the SRM-SECY-93-087 policy Concerns with SRM-SECY-93-087:

Deterministic solutions to mitigate the potential for CCF

Outdated and not aligned with current DI&C technology

Solution #1 - CCF Revise BTP 7-19 to be consistent with the concepts and scope of CCF treatment as described in Revision 4, a more risk-informed and graded approach Develop a Digital I&C Policy that reflects a more risk-informed and graded approach to safety Employ concepts from the EPRI Digital Engineering Guide, which leverages principles from International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Standards

Solution #1 - Potential Solutions to CCF Safety Related Safety Related Non-Safety Related (Protection) (Non-Protection)

Standardized Digital Design Standardized Digital Design Standardized Digital Design Short Term Process Process Process Industry EPRI Technical Guidance EPRI Technical Guidance EPRI Technical Guidance Guidance RIS 2002-22 Supp. 1 RIS 2002-22 Supp. 1 Short Term NRC Review BTP 7-19, Revision 4 Concepts RIS 2002-22 Supp. 1 No Changes Needed Guidance Standardized Digital Design Standardized Digital Design Standardized Digital Design Long Term Process Process Process Industry NEI YY-XX link to EPRI Technical NEI YY-XX link to EPRI Technical NEI YY-XX link to EPRI Technical Guidance Guidance Guidance Guidance Long Term Approval of NEI YY-XX Content of RIS 2002-22, Supp. 1 NRC Review No Changes Needed Develop DI&C Commission Policy Captured as Durable Guidance Guidance

Barrier #2 - Software Development Standards and Guidance Software development standards for safety-related SSCs are not commensurate with safety and not aligned with current technology BTP 7-14 Guidance does not follow a graded and risk-informed approach

Solution #2 - Software Development Standards and Guidance Consider guidance from international standards associated with safety-related software development Revise BTP 7-14 to follow a graded and risk-informed approach that is flexible (i.e., not constrained to prescriptive adherence)

Leverage digital I&C operating experience from the international nuclear community (e.g., Électricité de France)

Barrier #3 - I&C System Architecture Development Chapter 7 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) has fragmented and incomplete review guidance for I&C system architectures

Solution #3 - I&C System Architecture Development Consider international guidance related to the design and development of I&C system architectures Employ concepts from the EPRI Digital Engineering Guide (DEG)

Barrier #4 - Limited Functionality I&C Devices Insufficient guidance on limited functionality I&C devices

Solution #4 - Limited Functionality I&C Devices Consider international guidance associated with limited functionality I&C devices

Summary Strategy is outcome oriented Proposed solutions overcome barriers Leverage international successes in DI&C Alignment with NRC initiatives and principles

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-{{#Wiki_filter:&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute NEI DI&C Working Group Digital I&C Strategy January 31, 2019 NRC Public Meeting
+{{#Wiki_filter:Digital I&C Strategy NEI DI&C Working Group January 31, 2019 NRC Public Meeting
+&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute
-&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 2 Incorporate defined boundaries Apply risk
+Overarching Principles Incorporate defined boundaries Apply risk-informed insights Leverage robust design processes Capitalize on international operational experience and standards
--informed insights Leverage robust design processes Capitalize on international operational experience and standards Overarching Principles
+                                                 &#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 2
-&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 3 Identify desired outcomes Identify barriers to progress Propose solutions to overcome barriers Summary Discussion topics
+Discussion topics Identify desired outcomes Identify barriers to progress Propose solutions to overcome barriers Summary
+                                         &#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 3
-&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 4 Utilities successfully design, develop, implement, and license digital upgrades to protection and control systems to support plant modernization and improve plant safety and reliability What does the end look like?
+What does the end look like?
+Utilities successfully design, develop, implement, and license digital upgrades to protection and control systems to support plant modernization and improve plant safety and reliability
+                                                  &#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 4
-&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 5 BTP 7-19 guidance has evolved over the years and expanded the scope of the SRM-SECY-93-087 policy Concerns with SRM
+Barrier #1 - Common Cause Failure (CCF)
--SECY-93-087:  *Deterministic solutions to mitigate the potential for CCF
+BTP 7-19 guidance has evolved over the years and expanded the scope of the SRM-SECY-93-087 policy Concerns with SRM-SECY-93-087:
- *Outdated and not aligned with current DI&C technology Barrier #1
+* Deterministic solutions to mitigate the potential for CCF
-- Common Cause Failure (CCF)
+* Outdated and not aligned with current DI&C technology
+                                                     &#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 5
-&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 6 Revise BTP 7-19 to be consistent with the concepts and scope of CCF treatment as described in Revision 4, a more risk
+Solution #1 - CCF Revise BTP 7-19 to be consistent with the concepts and scope of CCF treatment as described in Revision 4, a more risk-informed and graded approach Develop a Digital I&C Policy that reflects a more risk-informed and graded approach to safety Employ concepts from the EPRI Digital Engineering Guide, which leverages principles from International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Standards
--informed and graded approach Develop a Digital I&C Policy that reflects a more risk
+                                                       &#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 6
--informed and graded approach to safety Employ concepts from the EPRI Digital Engineering Guide, which leverages principles from International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Standards Solution #1
-- CCF
-&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 7 Solution #1
-- Potential Solutions to CCF Safety Related (Protection)
-Safety Related (Non-Protection)
-Non-Safety Related Short Term Industry Guidance Standardized Digital Design Process  EPRI Technical Guidance Standardized Digital Design Process  EPRI Technical Guidance RIS 2002-22 Supp. 1 Standardized Digital Design Process  EPRI Technical Guidance RIS 2002-22 Supp. 1 Short Term NRC Review Guidance  BTP 7-19, Revision 4 Concepts RIS 2002-22 Supp. 1 No Changes Needed Long Term Industry Guidance  Standardized Digital Design Process  NEI YY-XX link to EPRI Technical Guidance  Standardized Digital Design Process  NEI YY-XX link to EPRI Technical Guidance Standardized Digital Design Process  NEI YY-XX link to EPRI Technical Guidance Long Term NRC Review Guidance  Approval of NEI YY-XX Develop DI&C Commission Policy Content of RIS 2002-22, Supp. 1 Captured as Durable Guidance No Changes Needed
-&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 8 Software development standards for safety
+Solution #1 - Potential Solutions to CCF Safety Related                   Safety Related Non-Safety Related (Protection)                   (Non-Protection)
--related SSCs are not commensurate with safety and not aligned with current technology BTP 7-14 Guidance does not follow a graded and risk
+Standardized Digital Design      Standardized Digital Design      Standardized Digital Design Short Term Process                          Process                          Process Industry EPRI Technical Guidance          EPRI Technical Guidance          EPRI Technical Guidance Guidance RIS 2002-22 Supp. 1              RIS 2002-22 Supp. 1 Short Term NRC Review  BTP 7-19, Revision 4 Concepts        RIS 2002-22 Supp. 1              No Changes Needed Guidance Standardized Digital Design      Standardized Digital Design      Standardized Digital Design Long Term Process                          Process                          Process Industry NEI YY-XX link to EPRI Technical NEI YY-XX link to EPRI Technical NEI YY-XX link to EPRI Technical Guidance Guidance                         Guidance                         Guidance Long Term Approval of NEI YY-XX       Content of RIS 2002-22, Supp. 1 NRC Review                                                                        No Changes Needed Develop DI&C Commission Policy    Captured as Durable Guidance Guidance
--informed approach Barrier #2
+                                                                                    &#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 7
-- Software Development Standards and Guidance
-&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 9 Consider guidance from international standards associated with safety-related software development Revise BTP 7
+Barrier #2 - Software Development Standards and Guidance Software development standards for safety-related SSCs are not commensurate with safety and not aligned with current technology BTP 7-14 Guidance does not follow a graded and risk-informed approach
--14 to follow a graded and risk
+                                               &#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 8
--informed approach that is flexible (i.e., not constrained to prescriptive adherence)
+Solution #2 - Software Development Standards and Guidance Consider guidance from international standards associated with safety-related software development Revise BTP 7-14 to follow a graded and risk-informed approach that is flexible (i.e., not constrained to prescriptive adherence)
 Leverage digital I&C operating experience from the international nuclear community (e.g., &#xc9;lectricit&#xe9; de France)
-Solution #2 - Software Development Standards and Guidance
+                                                          &#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 9
-&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 10 Chapter 7 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) has fragmented and incomplete review guidance for I&C system architectures Barrier #3
+Barrier #3 - I&C System Architecture Development Chapter 7 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) has fragmented and incomplete review guidance for I&C system architectures
-- I&C System Architecture Development
+                                              &#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 10
-&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 11 Consider international guidance related to the design and development of I&C system architectures Employ concepts from the EPRI Digital Engineering Guide (DEG) Solution #3 - I&C System Architecture Development
+Solution #3 - I&C System Architecture Development Consider international guidance related to the design and development of I&C system architectures Employ concepts from the EPRI Digital Engineering Guide (DEG)
+                                                 &#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 11
-&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 12 Insufficient guidance on limited functionality I&C devices Barrier #4
+Barrier #4 - Limited Functionality I&C Devices Insufficient guidance on limited functionality I&C devices
-- Limited Functionality I&C Devices
+                                                   &#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 12
-&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 13 Consider international guidance associated with limited functionality I&C devices Solution #
+Solution #4 - Limited Functionality I&C Devices Consider international guidance associated with limited functionality I&C devices
-- Limited Functionality I&C Devices
+                                                &#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 13
-&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 14 Strategy is outcome oriented Proposed solutions overcome barriers Leverage international successes in DI&C Alignment with NRC initiatives and principles Summary}}
+Summary Strategy is outcome oriented Proposed solutions overcome barriers Leverage international successes in DI&C Alignment with NRC initiatives and principles
+                                                &#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 14}}

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