05000528/FIN-2012003-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | ||
| Inspector = N Greene, D You, T Skaggs | | Inspector = N Greene, D You, T Skaggs-Ryan, L Ricketson, R Lantz, M Brown, M Davis, B Parks, M Baquera, I Anchondo, D Reinert | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3 for the failure of plant personnel to place Unit 2 in Mode 3 within 7 hours of initiation of a condition not permitted by Technical Specifications. Specifically, following the failure of essential ventilation dampers during a surveillance test that rendered the train B DC equipment, inverters, and ESF switchgear inoperable, operators exceeded the Technical Specification time requirements before restoring operability of the equipment. The licensee initiated corrective actions to evaluate equipment operability following essential ventilation system failures, revise procedural guidance and implement compensatory measures to ensure the supported equipment remains capable of performing its required safety functions in the event of essential ventilation system failures. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Palo Verde Action Request (PVAR) 4033786. The failure of the licensee to comply with Technical Specifications is a performance deficiency. The resident inspectors performed the initial significance determination for the essential ventilation damper failures using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power. The finding screened to a detailed analysis because it involved an actual loss of safety function of a single train of equipment for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. A Region IV senior reactor analyst performed a bounding Phase 3 significance determination and found the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The bounding change to the core damage frequency was 9E-8/year. The dominant core damage sequences included: loss of offsite power sequences; failure of remaining safety related train A ventilation; failure of operators to provide alternate room cooling; and the failure of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The very short exposure period helped to minimize the significance. The inspectors did not assign a cross-cutting aspect to this finding because the inadequate procedural guidance for responding to essential ventilation system failures was made in 1991 and is not reflective of present performance | | description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3 for the failure of plant personnel to place Unit 2 in Mode 3 within 7 hours of initiation of a condition not permitted by Technical Specifications. Specifically, following the failure of essential ventilation dampers during a surveillance test that rendered the train B DC equipment, inverters, and ESF switchgear inoperable, operators exceeded the Technical Specification time requirements before restoring operability of the equipment. The licensee initiated corrective actions to evaluate equipment operability following essential ventilation system failures, revise procedural guidance and implement compensatory measures to ensure the supported equipment remains capable of performing its required safety functions in the event of essential ventilation system failures. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Palo Verde Action Request (PVAR) 4033786. The failure of the licensee to comply with Technical Specifications is a performance deficiency. The resident inspectors performed the initial significance determination for the essential ventilation damper failures using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power. The finding screened to a detailed analysis because it involved an actual loss of safety function of a single train of equipment for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. A Region IV senior reactor analyst performed a bounding Phase 3 significance determination and found the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The bounding change to the core damage frequency was 9E-8/year. The dominant core damage sequences included: loss of offsite power sequences; failure of remaining safety related train A ventilation; failure of operators to provide alternate room cooling; and the failure of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The very short exposure period helped to minimize the significance. The inspectors did not assign a cross-cutting aspect to this finding because the inadequate procedural guidance for responding to essential ventilation system failures was made in 1991 and is not reflective of present performance | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:45, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2012003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Greene D You T Skaggs-Ryan L Ricketson R Lantz M Brown M Davis B Parks M Baquera I Anchondo D Reinert |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |