05000528/FIN-2012003-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Perform Boric Acid Evaluation |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure of engineering personnel to follow Procedure 70TI-9ZC01 Boric Acid Walkdown Leak Detection, to provide an evaluation of an active boric acid leak prior to the end of the outage. Specifically, a boric acid leak from the packing of the charging backpressure header control valve did not receive an evaluation prior to the end of the outage when it was left in service as an active leak and corrective actions were deferred. The licensee performed the boric acid leakage evaluation and determined that monitoring coupled with mitigating actions of cleaning and greasing were sufficient to support the functionality of the valve. The licensee plans to repair the valve at the soonest available opportunity and prior to restart after any maintenance or refueling outage. This finding has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PVAR 4191552. The failure of engineering personnel to provide an evaluation of an active boric acid leak prior to the end of the outage is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, therefore a finding, because if left uncorrected the performance deficiency could possibly become a more significant safety concern in that unevaluated boric acid leaks could result with unmitigated boric acid corrosion of components. The inspectors evaluated the significance of the issue under the Significance Determination Process, as defined in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings. Inspectors determined that the finding affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and screened the finding using 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at-Power. Inspectors concluded the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding is a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in the loss of operability or functionality. The inspectors determined this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance with the decision making component because the licensee failed to make decisions using a systematic process when faced with unexpected circumstances because decisions associated with boric acid corrosion mitigation and management were made outside of the boric acid corrosion control program |
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2012003 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Greene D You T Skaggs-Ryan L Ricketson R Lantz M Brown M Davis B Parks M Baquera I Anchondo D Reinert |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2012003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
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