05000528/FIN-2012002-06
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Provide an Adequate Operating Procedure for Cold-Leg Boration |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, for the failure of the licensee to provide an adequate operating procedure for cold leg boration. Specifically, on November 19, 2011, Unit 1 operators exceeded the allowed maximum pressure of the low pressure safety injection system during cold-leg boration of the safety injection piping. Pressure instrument errors caused by the specific valve lineup in the operating procedure caused the operators to exceed the pressure limits. The licensee placed the procedure for cold leg boration on administrative hold as a corrective action to restore compliance. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report Disposition Request 3989295 and is evaluating further corrective actions. The failure of the licensee to provide an adequate operating procedure was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the significance of the issue under the Significance Determination Process, as defined in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase I Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and concluded the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding: (1) is not a design or qualification issue; (2) did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; (3) did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and (4) did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate a problem such that the resolution addressed cause and extent of condition. Specifically, the 2009 engineering evaluation identified the pressure instrument inaccuracies but did not consider the extent of condition and potential impact on plant operating procedures |
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2012002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Guerra R Lantz M Brown E Uribe M Baquera D Reinert S Hedger D Bradley |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2012002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
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