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| | issue date = 05/07/1987 | | | issue date = 05/07/1987 |
| | title = LER 87-004-00:on 870407 & 14,discovered Two Fire Seal Penetrations That Were Not Sealed Properly & One Fire Door Not Included in Surveillance Procedures.Caused by Inadequate Communication.Engineering Review underway.W/870507 Ltr | | | title = LER 87-004-00:on 870407 & 14,discovered Two Fire Seal Penetrations That Were Not Sealed Properly & One Fire Door Not Included in Surveillance Procedures.Caused by Inadequate Communication.Engineering Review underway.W/870507 Ltr |
| | author name = ARBUCKLE J D, POWERS C M | | | author name = Arbuckle J, Powers C |
| | author affiliation = WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM | | | author affiliation = WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
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| {{#Wiki_filter:REQUL~)lghINFORMATIQN DISTRIBUT~ | | {{#Wiki_filter:REQUL~)lghINFORMATIQN DISTRIBUT~ TEN (R IDS) |
| TEN (R IDS)P C~E~~ION,NBR: 8705 130234 DOC.DATE: 87'05/07 NQTAR I 7.ED: FACIL: 50-397 WPPSS Nucleav Pro Jecti Unit Zi Washington Pub li c Po:.Ie AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION | | C~E~~ ION,NBR: 8705 130234 DOC. DATE: 87 '05/07 NQTAR I 7.ED: D~.!z;:T li P |
| *RBUCKLE, J.D.Washington Public Pouer Supply System POWER.C.M.Washington Pub li c Pouer Supply System RECIP.NAME'ECIPIENT AFFILIATION D~.!z;:T 05000397 SUB JECT: LER 87-004-00: | | FACIL: 50-397 WPPSS Nucleav Pro Jecti Unit Zi Washington Pub c Po:.Ie 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION |
| on 870407-14I discovered two fiv e seal penetv'ations that were not sealed pv operlg 5 one fire door not included in surveillance pv oceduv es.Caused bg inadequate communication. | | *RBUCKLE, J. D. Washington Public Pouer Supply System POWER. C. M. |
| Eng ineev ing v evi ex comp dieted.W/870507 I tr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIEB RECEIVED: LTR/ENCL j SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Repov t (LFR)i Incident Rpti etc.NOTES: RECIP IENT ID CODE/NAI'1E PD5 LA SAMWORTHi R INTERNAL: ACRS MI CHELSQN AEQD/DOA AEQD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DEST/ADE NRR/DEBT/CEB NRR/DEBT/ICSB NRR/DEST/MTB NRR/DEST/RSB NRR/DLPG/HFB NRR/DOEA/EAB NRR/DREP/RAB NRR/PMA ILRB EC F 02 CN5 FILE 01 CQP IES LTTR ENCL.1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 j 1 1 1 1 1 REC IP I ENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD*CRS MOELLER AEOD/DSP/RQAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/ADS NRR/DEST/ELB NRR/DEBT/MEB NRR/DEST/PSB h!RR/DEST/SGB NRR/DLPG/GAB NRR/DREP/EPB NRR/DREP/RPB h!RR/PMAS/PTSB RES SPEISI T COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 EXTERNAL: EC8(Q QRQHi M LPDR NSIC HARRIS'5 5 H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC NAYS>Q TOTAL NUI'1BER QF COPIES REQUIRED: LT I R'42 ENCL 40 NRC Form 3ddA (8431 i I(ENSEE EVENT PiEPORT (L"<<'p".,I EXT CON":iro J<<<<T<<3r'.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION AFP/IGUEO OMC NO,EINSWr M EXPIRES: 8/31/85 FACILITY NAME ill OOCKET NUMSER IEI LER NUMSER Idl PACE 131 Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT/I/rrroro d/rsco/s rsdodorL oss aAFN'or<<s/
| | RECIP. NAME li Washington Pub c Pouer Supply System |
| F//IC Forrrr 3/FSA3/IITI Plant Conditions o s o o o YEA/I N/I 8 7 sdovdNTIAL NUM drl 0 rl 8 v IS IO N NVMSSA 000 2 OF 0 4 a)Power Level-OX b)Plant Mode-4 (Cold Shutdown)Event Descri tion In November, 1986 during a review of the Fire Protection Plan, the Plant System Engineer noted some apparent discrepancies.
| | 'ECIPIENT AFFILIATION SUB JECT: LER 87-004-00: on 870407-14I discovered two fiv e seal penetv'ations that were not sealed pv operlg 5 one fire door not included in surveillance pv oceduv es. Caused bg inadequate DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIEB RECEIVED: LTR ENCL TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Repov t (LFR)i Incident Rpti etc. |
| Accordingly, to determine the validity of those potential discrepancies the System Engineer requested a formal engineering review.In the process of performing this review, it was discovered that the drawings the Supply System had been using as the base design docunents were incomplete.
| | j communication. Eng ineev ing v evi ex comp dieted. W/870507 I tr. |
| The drawings were incomplete because of an apparent lack of communication between two separate Architect Engineer (Burns and Roe, Inc.)groups responsible for performing 10CFR50, Appendix R reviews, and Fire Barrier analyses.The drawings used by the Supply System were provided by the Fire Barrier Analysis Group.The assunption was made by the Supply System that the Fire Barrier Analysis Group properly communicated with the 10CFR50, Appendix R, Review Group during the preparation of those drawings.However, the assumption was incorrect and, as a result, the base drawings uere incomplete.
| | / SIZE: |
| Also, during this review process it was determined that the original interpretation of Technical Specification fire rated assemblies and seals was incorrect.
| | NOTES: |
| This was confirmed in discussions with the Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)Branch of the NRC and resulted in a new clarification of the definition which was subsequently incorporated into the ongoing engineering review.As the engineering review progressed, the following items were identified through surveillance and review as meeting the new interpretation of Technical Specification fire barriers, but were not being surveilled as such: a)On April 7, 1987 fire seal penetrations P027-1052 (Reactor Building-522 Elevation) and C405-5019 (Radwaste Building-507 Elevation) were identified as not being sealed as required by the Plant Technical Specifications.
| | RECIP IENT CQP IES REC IP I ENT COPIES ID CODE/NAI'1E LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA .1 PD5 PD SAMWORTHi R 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSQN 1 *CRS MOELLER 1 1 AEQD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/RQAB AEQD/DSP/TPAB 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADE 0 NRR/DEST/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEBT/CEB 1 NRR/DEST/ELB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/ICSB 1 NRR/DEBT/MEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 1 1 h!RR/DEST/SGB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB j 1 NRR/DREP/EPB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 2 NRR/PMA ILRB 1 h!RR/PMAS/PTSB 1 1 EC F 02 1 RES SPEISI T 1 1 CN5 FILE 01 1 EXTERNAL: EC8(Q QRQHi M 5 5 H ST LOBBY WARD LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR NSIC HARRIS' 1 1 NSIC NAYS> Q TOTAL NUI'1BER QF COPIES REQUIRED: LT I R '42 ENCL 40 |
| b)On April 14, 1987 it was discovered that Fire Door C-.322 (Radwaste Building-487 Elevation:
| | |
| Post Accident Sampling System Room)had not been included in Technical Specification surveillance procedures.
| | NRC Form 3ddA (8431 i I( ENSEE EVENT PiEPORT (L"<<'p".,I EXT CON":iro J<<<<T<<3r |
| The independent.engineering review is nearing completion, at which time a supplemental report will be submitted.
| | '.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION AFP/IGUEO OMC NO,EINSWr M EXPIRES: 8/31/85 FACILITY NAME ill OOCKET NUMSER IEI LER NUMSER Idl PACE 131 YEA/I N/I sdovdNTIAL rl8 v IS IO N NUM drl NVMSSA Washington Nuclear Plant Unit 2 o s o o o 8 7 0 000 2 OF 0 4 TEXT /I/ rrroro d/rsco /s rsdodorL oss aAFN'or<<s/ F//IC Forrrr 3/FSA3/ IITI Plant Conditions a) Power Level - OX b) Plant Mode - 4 (Cold Shutdown) |
| Immediate Corrective Action a)Fire penetrations seals P027-1502 and C405-5019 were placed on an hourly fire tour.8705130234 870507 PDR ADOCK 05000397 S PDR NAC FOAM SddA ISA/
| | Event Descri tion In November, 1986 during a review of the Fire Protection Plan, the Plant System Engineer noted some apparent discrepancies. Accordingly, to determine the validity of those potential discrepancies the System Engineer requested a formal engineering review. In the process of performing this review, it was discovered that the drawings the Supply System had been using as the base design docunents were incomplete. The drawings were incomplete because of an apparent lack of communication between two separate Architect Engineer (Burns and Roe, Inc.) groups responsible for performing 10CFR50, Appendix R reviews, and Fire Barrier analyses. The drawings used by the Supply System were provided by the Fire Barrier Analysis Group. The assunption was made by the Supply System that the Fire Barrier Analysis Group properly communicated with the 10CFR50, Appendix R, Review Group during the preparation of those drawings. However, the assumption was incorrect and, as a result, the base drawings uere incomplete. Also, during this review process it was determined that the original interpretation of Technical Specification fire rated assemblies and seals was incorrect. This was confirmed in discussions with the Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) Branch of the NRC and resulted in a new clarification of the definition which was subsequently incorporated into the ongoing engineering review. |
| NRC FOIIII.ESSA ISA)LI.":."Cl-:~J"=.'3T REPORT (LER)TE)~T COST!.""';TION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
| | As the engineering review progressed, the following items were identified through surveillance and review as meeting the new interpretation of Technical Specification fire barriers, but were not being surveilled as such: |
| 'PP'YEO O'IS';O.SI59-0184 EXPIRES: SISI/85 FACILITY NAME Ill DOCKET NUMSER IEI LER NUMSER ISl YEAR II:.I SEOVENTIAL zX;IIEYISION NVM tll.++NVMttA~AOE ISI Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT IN mme NWCF lI Ittuied, vFF ARSt'VANE NRC%%dnII SRlATU Illl 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 7 0 4-0 0 0 3 OF 0 4 b)Fire Door C-322 was incorporated (by means of a procedure deviation) into Plant Procedures 7.4.7.7.2.1,"Fire Door Operability," and 7.4.7.7.2.3,"Locked Fire Door Operability." The door was verified to be locked and operable.c)Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs)were written to: o Grout fire penetration seal P027-1502 o Seal fire penetration seal C405-5019 Further Evaluation and Corrective Action a)Further Evaluation o Fire seal penetration P027-1502 is located in an area containing Appendix R, Division 2, Safe Shutdown components (specifically, Reactor level and pressure control instrumentation).
| | a) On April 7, 1987 fire seal penetrations P027-1052 (Reactor Building-522 Elevation) and C405-5019 (Radwaste Building-507 Elevation) were identified as not being sealed as required by the Plant Technical Specifications. |
| However, as stated in the FSAR, loss of all unprotected equipment in this fire area is not considered a credible event due to the low fire loading and geometrical configuration of the Reactor Building.o Fire seal penetration C405-5019 is located in a corridor floor.Located below this penetration is Fire Area RC-XX (Radwaste Building-Elevation 487).Although this area contains safety-related equipment, there are no components or cabling in the area required for operation of the Appendix R, Division 1, Safe Shutdown System.o Due to the fact that several years have passed since the original drawing omissions occurred and that Burns and Roe is no longer acting in the capacity of the WNP-2 Architect Engineer, it is not possible (nor constructive) to positively identify the cause of this event.However, all indications at this time point to a lack of complete comunication between the two separate groups responsible for the review process.It has been determined that the original Appendix R design basis is correct and has not changed.o Internal Engineering Program controls have already been incorporated into the Plant Modification process to ensure that resealing instructions are in the design package for each modification affecting the integrity of any fire seal.In addition, the Fire Protection Engineer reviews each design modification prior to issuance to determine program impact.These controls complement the seal inspections required by Technical Specifications and the additional efforts presently on-going to verify the integrity of all non-Technical Specification fire seals.NIIC FOIIM 90$A I988I NAC FoIIR 3SSA ICOSI U.S.NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION
| | b) On April 14, 1987 it was discovered that Fire Door C-.322 (Radwaste Building-487 Elevation: Post Accident Sampling System Room) had not been included in Technical Specification surveillance procedures. |
| 'APPROYEO OMS N3,3!A IiIG'XPIRES:
| | The independent .engineering review is nearing completion, at which time a supplemental report will be submitted. |
| 8/31/85 FACILITY NAME Ill OOCKET NUMSER ISI YEAR LER NUMSER ISI SCQVSNSIAL
| | Immediate Corrective Action a) Fire penetrations seals P027-1502 and C405-5019 were placed on an hourly fire tour. |
| ~<iY: NVM REVISION NVM SR PAOE ISl Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT//F IIRSO NMCO ie IOSMied, vss oISEOSN/H/IC Fons/3/SSA>/I IT/b)Further Corrective Action OS OOO 8 7 0 4 0 0 4 OF 0 4 o An independent engineering review that applies the new definition of fire-rated assemblies and seals is currently being performed to ensure that all fire doors, barriers and penetrations are properly identified on Plant drawings and in Plant procedures.
| | 8705130234 870507 PDR ADOCK 05000397 S PDR NAC FOAM SddA ISA/ |
| o At the completion of the review, all associated drawings and documentation will be updated as required.In addition, a supplemental report describing any further deficiencies discovered will be submitted.
| | |
| Saf et Si nificance There is no safety significance associated with this event in that 1)the fire door was verified to be locked and operable, and 2)the two penetrations were located in areas which either were considered to be low-risk with respect to fire occurrences, or did not contain components or cabling required for the operation of the 10CFR50, Appendix R, Division 1, Safe Shutdown System.Similar Events None ElIS Information Text Reference EIIS Reference Fire Door C322 Miscellaneous Buildings and Structures Fire Seal Penetrations P027-1502 and C405-5019 Fire Protection System System KP KP Component Door Penetration NRC SORM 3OOA IS83l WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O.Box 968~3000 George'l1'ashington l1'ay~Richland, 11'ashinglon 99352 Docket No.50-397 May 7, 1987 Document Control Desk U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555
| | NRC FOIIII.ESSA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ISA) LI .":."C l-:~J"=.'3T REPORT (LER) TE)~T COST!.""';TION 'PP'YEO O'IS ';O. SI59-0184 EXPIRES: SISI/85 FACILITY NAME Ill DOCKET NUMSER IEI LER NUMSER ISl ~ AOE ISI II:.I SEOVENTIAL zX; IIEYISION YEAR NVM tll .++ NVMttA Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 7 0 4 0 0 0 3 OF 0 4 TEXT IN mme NWCF lI Ittuied, vFF ARSt'VANE NRC %%dnII SRlATU Illl b) Fire Door C-322 was incorporated (by means of a procedure deviation) into Plant Procedures 7.4.7.7.2.1, "Fire Door Operability," and 7.4.7.7.2.3, "Locked Fire Door Operability." The door was verified to be locked and operable. |
| | c) Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs) were written to: |
| | o Grout fire penetration seal P027-1502 o Seal fire penetration seal C405-5019 Further Evaluation and Corrective Action a) Further Evaluation o Fire seal penetration P027-1502 is located in an area containing Appendix R, Division 2, Safe Shutdown components (specifically, Reactor level and pressure control instrumentation). However, as stated in the FSAR, loss of all unprotected equipment in this fire area is not considered a credible event due to the low fire loading and geometrical configuration of the Reactor Building. |
| | o Fire seal penetration C405-5019 is located in a corridor floor. |
| | Located below this penetration is Fire Area RC-XX (Radwaste Building |
| | - Elevation 487). Although this area contains safety-related equipment, there are no components or cabling in the area required for operation of the Appendix R, Division 1, Safe Shutdown System. |
| | o Due to the fact that several years have passed since the original drawing omissions occurred and that Burns and Roe is no longer acting in the capacity of the WNP-2 Architect Engineer, it is not possible (nor constructive) to positively identify the cause of this event. |
| | However, all indications at this time point to a lack of complete comunication between the two separate groups responsible for the review process. It has been determined that the original Appendix R design basis is correct and has not changed. |
| | o Internal Engineering Program controls have already been incorporated into the Plant Modification process to ensure that resealing instructions are in the design package for each modification affecting the integrity of any fire seal. In addition, the Fire Protection Engineer reviews each design modification prior to issuance to determine program impact. These controls complement the seal inspections required by Technical Specifications and the additional efforts presently on-going to verify the integrity of all non-Technical Specification fire seals. |
| | NIIC FOIIM 90$ A I988I |
| | |
| | ICOSI NAC FoIIR 3SSA U.S. NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION |
| | 'APPROYEO OMS N3,3!A IiIG'XPIRES: |
| | 8/31/85 FACILITY NAME Ill OOCKET NUMSER ISI LER NUMSER ISI PAOE ISl YEAR SCQVSNSIAL ~<iY: REVISION NVM NVM SR Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 OS OOO 8 7 0 4 0 0 4 OF 0 4 TEXT //F IIRSO NMCO ie IOSMied, vss oISEOSN/H/IC Fons/ 3/SSA>/ I IT/ |
| | b) Further Corrective Action o An independent engineering review that applies the new definition of fire-rated assemblies and seals is currently being performed to ensure that all fire doors, barriers and penetrations are properly identified on Plant drawings and in Plant procedures. |
| | o At the completion of the review, all associated drawings and documentation will be updated as required. In addition, a supplemental report describing any further deficiencies discovered will be submitted. |
| | Saf et Si nificance There is no safety significance associated with this event in that 1) the fire door was verified to be locked and operable, and 2) the two penetrations were located in areas which either were considered to be low-risk with respect to fire occurrences, or did not contain components or cabling required for the operation of the 10CFR50, Appendix R, Division 1, Safe Shutdown System. |
| | Similar Events None ElIS Information Text Reference EIIS Reference System Component Fire Door C322 Door Miscellaneous Buildings and Structures Fire Seal Penetrations P027-1502 and C405-5019 KP Penetration Fire Protection System KP NRC SORM 3OOA IS83l |
| | |
| | WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George 'l1'ashington l1'ay ~ Richland, 11'ashinglon 99352 Docket No. 50-397 May 7, 1987 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 |
|
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| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| NUCLEAR PLANT NO.2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.87-004 | | NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 87-004 |
|
| |
|
| ==Dear Sir:== | | ==Dear Sir:== |
| Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.87-004 for WNP-2 Plant.This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence. | | |
| Very truly yours, C.M.Powers (M/D 927M)WNP-2 Plant Manager CMP;db | | Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 87-004 for WNP-2 Plant. |
| | This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence. |
| | Very truly yours, C.M. Powers (M/D 927M) |
| | WNP-2 Plant Manager CMP;db |
|
| |
|
| ==Enclosure:== | | ==Enclosure:== |
|
| |
|
| Licensee Event Report No.'87-004 cc: Mr.John B.Martin, NRC-Region V Mr.R.T.Dodds, NRC Site (M/D 901A)Hr.B.Hi lbrot, BPA (M/D 399)INPO Records Center-Atlanta, GA Hs.Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr.C.E.Revell, BPA (H/D 399) | | Licensee Event Report No. '87-004 cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V Mr. R. T. Dodds, NRC Site (M/D 901A) |
| NRC F<<rm$50 (Se$)LlCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERl U.'S.NUCLEAR hEOULATORY COSNSISSION A-R)VED OME NO.$150M10<<EXPIRES: SJSI JSS fACILITY NAME III Washin ton Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCKET NUMSEh (21 0 5 0 0 0 1 OF TITLE ICl Missed Fire Door Surveillance and Im ro er Identification of Fire S P EVENT DATE (Sl LFR RUIN)Eh (51 REPORT OATK (7(OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (Sl MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SSQVSNYIAL NVMSSR:FM ASYtQON NVMSSII MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMSER(SI 0 5 0 0 0 0 4 7 8 7 8 7 0 0 4 0 0 5 0 7 8 7 0 5 0 0 0 OPS RAT I NO MOOS (Sl 4~OPISR LEVEL 0 20A02(5)20AOS(<<l(1)(0 20A054)(l 1(S)20AOH~)(1)(SII 20AOS(<<)ill()el 20AOS 4)(1)(<<I 20A05(<<l SOM(<<)(1)SOW(<<)(2)50.7$(<<l(2)(II 50.7$(el(2)(SI 50.734)(21(IS)50,724)(21(I<<)50.7241(21(rl 50.7$4)(2)(<<SI 50.724((2)(<<NI) | | Hr. B. Hi lbrot, BPA (M/D 399) |
| IA)50,724 H2)(TIKI~(S)50.7$(<<l 12)4)THIS REPORT IS SUSMITTED PURSUANT 7 0 THS REOVIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (It JCnectt one or more of tne lotto<<tint)
| | INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA Hs. Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr. C. E. Revell, BPA (H/D 399) |
| I'III 7$.7((SI 7$.71(<<l CTHE R fspectfy ln Apt<<rect Oetow entf ln Text, HRC Form SFEAJ HAMS J.D.Arbuckle Com liance En ineer LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER l12)TELKPHONE NVMSER AREA CODE 50 93 77-COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT f AILURE DESCRI~EO IN THIS REPORT 11$)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MAHUFAC.TURER EPORTASLE TO NPRDS K~J%CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MAHUFAC.TURER KPORTASL~~@8/TO NPRDS e ex SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (ISI EXPECTED SVSMISSION DATE II 5)MONTH DAY YSAII YES llf yet, complete fXPECTEJJ Stld<<IISSIOH DATE)NO AssTRAcT lLlmlt to Jedt)toe<<et, l.e., eppntxlmetely lift<<en tlnple epee<<typeerntten flnNJ (ISI As the result of performing a Technical Specification surveillance and subsequent review, during the period of April 7-14, 1987, a Plant System Engineer discovered that 1)two fire seal penetrations were not sealed as required by the Plant Technical Specifications, and 2)one fire door had not been included in Technical Specification surveillance procedures.
| | |
| The two unsealed penetrations were immediately placed on the hourly fire tour and Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs)were written to have the penetrations sealed.The fire door was incorporated into plant surveillance procedures and verified to be locked and operable.The cause of this event has been determined to be inadequate communication between two Architect Engineer (Burns and Roe, Inc.)groups during the design and construct'ion phase of the plant.This led to incorrect design basis information being used in procedure preparation. | | U.'S. NUCLEAR hEOULATORY COSNSISSION NRC F<<rm $ 50 (Se$ ) A- R )VED OME NO. $ 150M10<< |
| Accordingly, an independent engineering review by the Supply System is currently being completed to ensure that all Technical Specification fire doors, barriers and penetrations are properly identified. | | EXPIRES: SJSI JSS LlCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERl fACILITYNAME III DOCKET NUMSEh (21 Washin ton Nuclear Plant Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 1 OF TITLE ICl Missed Fire Door Surveillance and Im ro er Identification of Fire S P EVENT DATE (Sl LFR RUIN)Eh (51 REPORT OATK (7( OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (Sl SSQVSNYIAL ASYtQON OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMSER(SI MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NVMSSR:FM NVMSSII MONTH 0 5 0 0 0 0 4 7 8 7 8 7 0 0 4 0 0 5 0 7 8 7 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUSMITTED PURSUANT 7 0 THS REOVIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (It JCnectt one or more of tne lotto<<tint) I'III OPS RATI NO MOOS (Sl 4 20A02(5) 20A05(<<l 50,724) (21(I<<) 7$ .7((SI (TIKI |
| At the completion of this review, a supplemental report will be submitted. | | ~ OPISR 20AOS(<<l(1)(0 SOM(<<) (1) 50.7241(21(rl 7$ .71(<<l LEVEL fspectfy ln Apt<<rect 0 20A054)(l 1(S) SOW(<<) (2) 50.7$ 4)(2)(<<SI CTHE R Oetow entf ln Text, HRC Form 20AOH ~ )(1)(SII 50.7$ (<<l(2)(II 50.724((2)(<<NI) IA) SFEAJ 20AOS(<<)ill()el 50.7$ (el(2)(SI 50,724 H2) (S) 20AOS 4)(1) (<<I 50.734) (21(IS) 50.7$ (<<l 12) 4) |
| ~d'd-NRC Penn$05 (Se2)
| | LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER l12) |
| | HAMS TELKPHONE NVMSER AREA CODE J.D. Arbuckle Com liance En ineer 50 93 77-COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT fAILURE DESCRI ~ EO IN THIS REPORT 11$ ) |
| | MAHUFAC. ~~@8/ |
| | CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MAHUFAC. |
| | TURER EPORTASLE TO NPRDS K~J% CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER KPORTASL TO NPRDS e ex SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (ISI MONTH DAY YSAII EXPECTED SVSMISSION DATE II5) |
| | YES llfyet, complete fXPECTEJJ Stld<<IISSIOH DATE) NO AssTRAcT lLlmlt to Jedt) toe<<et, l.e., eppntxlmetely lift<<en tlnple epee<< typeerntten flnNJ (ISI As the result of performing a Technical Specification surveillance and subsequent review, during the period of April 7-14, 1987, a Plant System Engineer discovered that 1) two fire seal penetrations were not sealed as required by the Plant Technical Specifications, and 2) one fire door had not been included in Technical Specification surveillance procedures. |
| | The two unsealed penetrations were immediately placed on the hourly fire tour and Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs) were written to have the penetrations sealed. The fire door was incorporated into plant surveillance procedures and verified to be locked and operable. |
| | The cause of this event has been determined to be inadequate communication between two Architect Engineer (Burns and Roe, Inc.) groups during the design and construct'ion phase of the plant. This led to incorrect design basis information being used in procedure preparation. |
| | Accordingly, an independent engineering review by the Supply System is currently being completed to ensure that all Technical Specification fire doors, barriers and penetrations are properly identified. At the completion of this review, a supplemental report will be submitted. |
| | NRC Penn $ 05 (Se2) |
| | ~ d'd- |
| | |
| ~4 Oy}} | | ~4 Oy}} |
|
|---|
Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr
ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr
ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr
ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr
ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes
ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr
ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr
ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr
ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action
ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr
ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr
ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D
ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr
ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr
ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997
LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr
ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997
LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established
ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997
LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr
ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997
LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr
ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr
ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997
LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr
ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr
ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr
ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr
ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr
ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr
ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr
ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr
ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997
LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr
ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997
LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr
ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996
LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr
ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996
LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr
ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996
LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr
ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996
LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr
ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996
LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr
ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996
LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr
ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996
LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr
ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995
LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr
ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995
LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr
ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995
LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr
ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995
LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup
ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995
LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr
ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995
LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid
ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995
LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr
ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995
LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr
ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995
LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr
ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995
LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr
1999-07-20
[Table view]
Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr
ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr
ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr
ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr
ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes
ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr
ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr
ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr
ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action
ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr
ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr
ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D
ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr
ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr
ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997
LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr
ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997
LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established
ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997
LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr
ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997
LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr
ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr
ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997
LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr
ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr
ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr
ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr
ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr
ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr
ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr
ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr
ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997
LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr
ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997
LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr
ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996
LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr
ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996
LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr
ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996
LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr
ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996
LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr
ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996
LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr
ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996
LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr
ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996
LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr
ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995
LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr
ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995
LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr
ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995
LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr
ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995
LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup
ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995
LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr
ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995
LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid
ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995
LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr
ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995
LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr
ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995
LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr
ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995
LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr
1999-07-20
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17284A9001999-10-31031 October 1999
Rev 0 to COLR 99-15, WNP-2 Cycle 15,COLR
GO2-99-177, LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With1999-10-0101 October 1999
LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With
ML17284A8941999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for WNP-2.With 991012 Ltr
ML17284A8801999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for WNP-2.With 990910 Ltr
ML17284A8691999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for WNP-2.With 990813 Ltr
ML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr
ML17292B7271999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for WNP-2.With 990707 Ltr
ML17292B6961999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for WNP-2.With 990608 Ltr
ML17292B6641999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for WNP-2.With 990507 Ltr
ML17292B6391999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for WNP-2.With 990413 Ltr
ML17292B5871999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for WNP-2.With 990311 Ltr
ML17292B5571999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for WNP-2.With 990210 Ltr
ML17292B5621999-01-31031 January 1999
Rev 1 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2 Cycle 14 Colr.
ML17292B5341999-01-15015 January 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Incorrect Modeling of BWR Lower Plenum Vol in Bison.Defect Applies Only to Reload Fuel Assemblies Currently in Operation at WNP-2.BISON Code Model for WNP-2 Has Been Revised to Correct Error
ML17292B5331999-01-15015 January 1999
Part 21 Rept Re XL-S96 CPR Correlation for SVEA-96 Fuel. Defect Applies Only to WNP-2,during Cycles 12,13 & 14 Operation.Evaluations of Defect Performed by ABB-CE
ML17292B4791998-12-31031 December 1998
Washington Public Power Supply Sys 1998 Annual Rept. with 981215 Ltr
ML17292B5351998-12-31031 December 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for WNP-2.With 990112 Ltr
ML17292B5741998-12-31031 December 1998
WNP-2 1998 Annual Operating Rept. with 990225 Ltr
ML17284A8231998-11-30030 November 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for WNP-2.With 981207 Ltr
ML17284A8081998-10-31031 October 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for WNP-2.With 981110 Ltr
ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr
ML17284A7831998-09-30030 September 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for WNP-2.With 981007 Ltr
ML17284A7491998-09-10010 September 1998
WNP-2 Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Refueling Outage RF13 Spring,1998.
ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr
ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7681998-08-31031 August 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for WNP-2.With 980915 Ltr
ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr
ML17284A7261998-07-31031 July 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for WNP-2.W/980810 Ltr
ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes
ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr
ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr
ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr
ML17284A6751998-06-30030 June 1998
Ro:On 980617,flooding of RB Northeast Stairwell with Consequential Flooding of Two ECCS Pump Rooms.Caused by Inadequate Fire Protection Sys Design.Pumped Out Water from Affected Areas to Point Below Berm Areas of Pump Rooms
ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action
ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr
ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr
ML17284A6491998-05-31031 May 1998
Rev 0 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2,Cycle 14 Colr.
ML17292B4031998-05-31031 May 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for WNP-2.W/980608 Ltr
ML17292B3921998-04-30030 April 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for WNP-2.W/980513 Ltr
ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr
ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D
ML17292B3371998-03-31031 March 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for WNP-2.W/980409 Ltr
ML17292B2641998-03-0404 March 1998
Performance Self Assessment,WNP-2.
ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr
ML17292B2911998-02-28028 February 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for WNP-2.W/980313 Ltr
ML17284A7971998-02-17017 February 1998
Rev 28 to Operational QA Program Description, WPPSS-QA-004.With Proposed Rev 29
ML17292B3591998-02-12012 February 1998
WNP-2 Cycle 14 Reload Design Rept.
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
REQUL~)lghINFORMATIQN DISTRIBUT~ TEN (R IDS)
C~E~~ ION,NBR: 8705 130234 DOC. DATE: 87 '05/07 NQTAR I 7.ED: D~.!z;:T li P
FACIL: 50-397 WPPSS Nucleav Pro Jecti Unit Zi Washington Pub c Po:.Ie 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
- RBUCKLE, J. D. Washington Public Pouer Supply System POWER. C. M.
RECIP. NAME li Washington Pub c Pouer Supply System
'ECIPIENT AFFILIATION SUB JECT: LER 87-004-00: on 870407-14I discovered two fiv e seal penetv'ations that were not sealed pv operlg 5 one fire door not included in surveillance pv oceduv es. Caused bg inadequate DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIEB RECEIVED: LTR ENCL TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Repov t (LFR)i Incident Rpti etc.
j communication. Eng ineev ing v evi ex comp dieted. W/870507 I tr.
/ SIZE:
NOTES:
RECIP IENT CQP IES REC IP I ENT COPIES ID CODE/NAI'1E LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA .1 PD5 PD SAMWORTHi R 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSQN 1 *CRS MOELLER 1 1 AEQD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/RQAB AEQD/DSP/TPAB 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADE 0 NRR/DEST/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEBT/CEB 1 NRR/DEST/ELB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/ICSB 1 NRR/DEBT/MEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 1 1 h!RR/DEST/SGB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB j 1 NRR/DREP/EPB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 2 NRR/PMA ILRB 1 h!RR/PMAS/PTSB 1 1 EC F 02 1 RES SPEISI T 1 1 CN5 FILE 01 1 EXTERNAL: EC8(Q QRQHi M 5 5 H ST LOBBY WARD LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR NSIC HARRIS' 1 1 NSIC NAYS> Q TOTAL NUI'1BER QF COPIES REQUIRED: LT I R '42 ENCL 40
NRC Form 3ddA (8431 i I( ENSEE EVENT PiEPORT (L"<<'p".,I EXT CON":iro J<<<<T<<3r
'.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION AFP/IGUEO OMC NO,EINSWr M EXPIRES: 8/31/85 FACILITY NAME ill OOCKET NUMSER IEI LER NUMSER Idl PACE 131 YEA/I N/I sdovdNTIAL rl8 v IS IO N NUM drl NVMSSA Washington Nuclear Plant Unit 2 o s o o o 8 7 0 000 2 OF 0 4 TEXT /I/ rrroro d/rsco /s rsdodorL oss aAFN'or<<s/ F//IC Forrrr 3/FSA3/ IITI Plant Conditions a) Power Level - OX b) Plant Mode - 4 (Cold Shutdown)
Event Descri tion In November, 1986 during a review of the Fire Protection Plan, the Plant System Engineer noted some apparent discrepancies. Accordingly, to determine the validity of those potential discrepancies the System Engineer requested a formal engineering review. In the process of performing this review, it was discovered that the drawings the Supply System had been using as the base design docunents were incomplete. The drawings were incomplete because of an apparent lack of communication between two separate Architect Engineer (Burns and Roe, Inc.) groups responsible for performing 10CFR50, Appendix R reviews, and Fire Barrier analyses. The drawings used by the Supply System were provided by the Fire Barrier Analysis Group. The assunption was made by the Supply System that the Fire Barrier Analysis Group properly communicated with the 10CFR50, Appendix R, Review Group during the preparation of those drawings. However, the assumption was incorrect and, as a result, the base drawings uere incomplete. Also, during this review process it was determined that the original interpretation of Technical Specification fire rated assemblies and seals was incorrect. This was confirmed in discussions with the Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) Branch of the NRC and resulted in a new clarification of the definition which was subsequently incorporated into the ongoing engineering review.
As the engineering review progressed, the following items were identified through surveillance and review as meeting the new interpretation of Technical Specification fire barriers, but were not being surveilled as such:
a) On April 7, 1987 fire seal penetrations P027-1052 (Reactor Building-522 Elevation) and C405-5019 (Radwaste Building-507 Elevation) were identified as not being sealed as required by the Plant Technical Specifications.
b) On April 14, 1987 it was discovered that Fire Door C-.322 (Radwaste Building-487 Elevation: Post Accident Sampling System Room) had not been included in Technical Specification surveillance procedures.
The independent .engineering review is nearing completion, at which time a supplemental report will be submitted.
Immediate Corrective Action a) Fire penetrations seals P027-1502 and C405-5019 were placed on an hourly fire tour.
8705130234 870507 PDR ADOCK 05000397 S PDR NAC FOAM SddA ISA/
NRC FOIIII.ESSA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ISA) LI .":."C l-:~J"=.'3T REPORT (LER) TE)~T COST!.""';TION 'PP'YEO O'IS ';O. SI59-0184 EXPIRES: SISI/85 FACILITY NAME Ill DOCKET NUMSER IEI LER NUMSER ISl ~ AOE ISI II:.I SEOVENTIAL zX; IIEYISION YEAR NVM tll .++ NVMttA Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 7 0 4 0 0 0 3 OF 0 4 TEXT IN mme NWCF lI Ittuied, vFF ARSt'VANE NRC %%dnII SRlATU Illl b) Fire Door C-322 was incorporated (by means of a procedure deviation) into Plant Procedures 7.4.7.7.2.1, "Fire Door Operability," and 7.4.7.7.2.3, "Locked Fire Door Operability." The door was verified to be locked and operable.
c) Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs) were written to:
o Grout fire penetration seal P027-1502 o Seal fire penetration seal C405-5019 Further Evaluation and Corrective Action a) Further Evaluation o Fire seal penetration P027-1502 is located in an area containing Appendix R, Division 2, Safe Shutdown components (specifically, Reactor level and pressure control instrumentation). However, as stated in the FSAR, loss of all unprotected equipment in this fire area is not considered a credible event due to the low fire loading and geometrical configuration of the Reactor Building.
o Fire seal penetration C405-5019 is located in a corridor floor.
Located below this penetration is Fire Area RC-XX (Radwaste Building
- Elevation 487). Although this area contains safety-related equipment, there are no components or cabling in the area required for operation of the Appendix R, Division 1, Safe Shutdown System.
o Due to the fact that several years have passed since the original drawing omissions occurred and that Burns and Roe is no longer acting in the capacity of the WNP-2 Architect Engineer, it is not possible (nor constructive) to positively identify the cause of this event.
However, all indications at this time point to a lack of complete comunication between the two separate groups responsible for the review process. It has been determined that the original Appendix R design basis is correct and has not changed.
o Internal Engineering Program controls have already been incorporated into the Plant Modification process to ensure that resealing instructions are in the design package for each modification affecting the integrity of any fire seal. In addition, the Fire Protection Engineer reviews each design modification prior to issuance to determine program impact. These controls complement the seal inspections required by Technical Specifications and the additional efforts presently on-going to verify the integrity of all non-Technical Specification fire seals.
NIIC FOIIM 90$ A I988I
ICOSI NAC FoIIR 3SSA U.S. NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION
'APPROYEO OMS N3,3!A IiIG'XPIRES:
8/31/85 FACILITY NAME Ill OOCKET NUMSER ISI LER NUMSER ISI PAOE ISl YEAR SCQVSNSIAL ~<iY: REVISION NVM NVM SR Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 OS OOO 8 7 0 4 0 0 4 OF 0 4 TEXT //F IIRSO NMCO ie IOSMied, vss oISEOSN/H/IC Fons/ 3/SSA>/ I IT/
b) Further Corrective Action o An independent engineering review that applies the new definition of fire-rated assemblies and seals is currently being performed to ensure that all fire doors, barriers and penetrations are properly identified on Plant drawings and in Plant procedures.
o At the completion of the review, all associated drawings and documentation will be updated as required. In addition, a supplemental report describing any further deficiencies discovered will be submitted.
Saf et Si nificance There is no safety significance associated with this event in that 1) the fire door was verified to be locked and operable, and 2) the two penetrations were located in areas which either were considered to be low-risk with respect to fire occurrences, or did not contain components or cabling required for the operation of the 10CFR50, Appendix R, Division 1, Safe Shutdown System.
Similar Events None ElIS Information Text Reference EIIS Reference System Component Fire Door C322 Door Miscellaneous Buildings and Structures Fire Seal Penetrations P027-1502 and C405-5019 KP Penetration Fire Protection System KP NRC SORM 3OOA IS83l
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George 'l1'ashington l1'ay ~ Richland, 11'ashinglon 99352 Docket No. 50-397 May 7, 1987 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.87-004
Dear Sir:
Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.87-004 for WNP-2 Plant.
This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.
Very truly yours, C.M. Powers (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager CMP;db
Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No. '87-004 cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V Mr. R. T. Dodds, NRC Site (M/D 901A)
Hr. B. Hi lbrot, BPA (M/D 399)
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA Hs. Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr. C. E. Revell, BPA (H/D 399)
U.'S. NUCLEAR hEOULATORY COSNSISSION NRC F<<rm $ 50 (Se$ ) A- R )VED OME NO. $ 150M10<<
EXPIRES: SJSI JSS LlCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERl fACILITYNAME III DOCKET NUMSEh (21 Washin ton Nuclear Plant Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 1 OF TITLE ICl Missed Fire Door Surveillance and Im ro er Identification of Fire S P EVENT DATE (Sl LFR RUIN)Eh (51 REPORT OATK (7( OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (Sl SSQVSNYIAL ASYtQON OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMSER(SI MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NVMSSR:FM NVMSSII MONTH 0 5 0 0 0 0 4 7 8 7 8 7 0 0 4 0 0 5 0 7 8 7 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUSMITTED PURSUANT 7 0 THS REOVIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (It JCnectt one or more of tne lotto<<tint) I'III OPS RATI NO MOOS (Sl 4 20A02(5) 20A05(<<l 50,724) (21(I<<) 7$ .7((SI (TIKI
~ OPISR 20AOS(<<l(1)(0 SOM(<<) (1) 50.7241(21(rl 7$ .71(<<l LEVEL fspectfy ln Apt<<rect 0 20A054)(l 1(S) SOW(<<) (2) 50.7$ 4)(2)(<<SI CTHE R Oetow entf ln Text, HRC Form 20AOH ~ )(1)(SII 50.7$ (<<l(2)(II 50.724((2)(<<NI) IA) SFEAJ 20AOS(<<)ill()el 50.7$ (el(2)(SI 50,724 H2) (S) 20AOS 4)(1) (<<I 50.734) (21(IS) 50.7$ (<<l 12) 4)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER l12)
HAMS TELKPHONE NVMSER AREA CODE J.D. Arbuckle Com liance En ineer 50 93 77-COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT fAILURE DESCRI ~ EO IN THIS REPORT 11$ )
MAHUFAC. ~~@8/
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MAHUFAC.
TURER EPORTASLE TO NPRDS K~J% CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER KPORTASL TO NPRDS e ex SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (ISI MONTH DAY YSAII EXPECTED SVSMISSION DATE II5)
YES llfyet, complete fXPECTEJJ Stld<<IISSIOH DATE) NO AssTRAcT lLlmlt to Jedt) toe<<et, l.e., eppntxlmetely lift<<en tlnple epee<< typeerntten flnNJ (ISI As the result of performing a Technical Specification surveillance and subsequent review, during the period of April 7-14, 1987, a Plant System Engineer discovered that 1) two fire seal penetrations were not sealed as required by the Plant Technical Specifications, and 2) one fire door had not been included in Technical Specification surveillance procedures.
The two unsealed penetrations were immediately placed on the hourly fire tour and Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs) were written to have the penetrations sealed. The fire door was incorporated into plant surveillance procedures and verified to be locked and operable.
The cause of this event has been determined to be inadequate communication between two Architect Engineer (Burns and Roe, Inc.) groups during the design and construct'ion phase of the plant. This led to incorrect design basis information being used in procedure preparation.
Accordingly, an independent engineering review by the Supply System is currently being completed to ensure that all Technical Specification fire doors, barriers and penetrations are properly identified. At the completion of this review, a supplemental report will be submitted.
NRC Penn $ 05 (Se2)
~ d'd-
~4 Oy
