|
|
(One intermediate revision by the same user not shown) |
Line 3: |
Line 3: |
| | issue date = 05/26/1994 | | | issue date = 05/26/1994 |
| | title = LER 94-008-00:on 940426,CROs Observed Slight Reactor Power Fluctuations on Six Aprms.Caused by Degraded Condition of Reactor Recirculation (RRC) FCV Position Transmitter. Replaced RRC FCV Position transmitters.W/940526 Ltr | | | title = LER 94-008-00:on 940426,CROs Observed Slight Reactor Power Fluctuations on Six Aprms.Caused by Degraded Condition of Reactor Recirculation (RRC) FCV Position Transmitter. Replaced RRC FCV Position transmitters.W/940526 Ltr |
| | author name = MACKAMAN C D, PARRISH J V | | | author name = Mackaman C, Parrish J |
| | author affiliation = WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM | | | author affiliation = WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
Line 16: |
Line 16: |
|
| |
|
| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:~ACCELERATED D STRIBUTION DEMONS ATION SYSTEM S~REGULATORY INFORMATXON DXSTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9406020024 DOC.DATE: 94/05/26 NOTARIZED: | | {{#Wiki_filter:~ |
| NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397, WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington, Public Powe 05000397 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MACKAMAN,C.D. | | ACCELERATED D STRIBUTION DEMONS ATION SYSTEM S ~ |
| Washington Public Power Supply System PARRISH,J.V. | | REGULATORY INFORMATXON DXSTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS) |
| Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION | | ACCESSION NBR:9406020024 DOC.DATE: 94/05/26 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397, WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington, Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MACKAMAN,C.D. Washington Public Power Supply System PARRISH,J.V. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION |
|
| |
|
| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER 94-008-00:on 940426,CROs observed slight reactor power fluctuations on six APRMs.Caused by degraded condition of reactor recirculation (RRC)FCV position transmitter. | | LER 94-008-00:on 940426,CROs observed slight reactor power fluctuations on six APRMs.Caused by degraded condition of reactor recirculation (RRC) FCV position transmitter. |
| Replaced RRC FCV position transmitters.W/940526 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR L ENCL/SIZE: 7 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PDIV-3 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/DS P/TPAB NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DORS/OEAB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRIL/RPEB NRRggSS SPLB EG FX 02 RGN4 FI~01 EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCE,J.H NRC PDR NSIC POORE1W~COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 RECXPIENT ID CODE/NAME CLIFFORD,J AEOD/DOA'EOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRSS/PRPB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RES/DSIR/EIB L ST LOBBY WARD NSIC MURPHY,G.A NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D R I D NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS: | | Replaced RRC FCV position transmitters.W/940526 ltr. |
| D D PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT.20079)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 28 ENCL 28 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O.Box 968~3000 George Washington Way~Richland, Washington 99352 May 26, 1994 G02-94-125 Docket No.50-397 Document Control Desk U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555
| | DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR L TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc. |
| | ENCL / SIZE: 7 NOTES RECIPIENT COPIES RECXPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PDIV-3 PD 1 1 CLIFFORD,J 1 1 D INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 1 1 AEOD/DOA'EOD/ROAB/DSP AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 2 2 NRR/DE/EELB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DORS/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRIL/RPEB 1 1 NRR/DRSS/PRPB 2 2 NRRggSS SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 EG FX 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN4 FI~ 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCE,J.H 2 2 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NSIC POORE1W ~ 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 R |
| | I D |
| | D D |
| | NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED! |
| | FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 28 ENCL 28 |
| | |
| | WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 May 26, 1994 G02-94-125 Docket No. 50-397 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 |
|
| |
|
| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| NUCLEAR PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.94-008-00 Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.94-008-00 for the WNP-2 Plant.This report is submitted in response to the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence. | | NUCLEAR PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 94-008-00 Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 94-008-00 for the WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence. |
| Should you have any questions or desire additional information, please call me or D.A.Swank at (509)377-4563.Sincerely, J.Parrish (Mail Drop 1023)Assistant Managing Director, Operations JVP/CDM/my Enclosure CC: LJ Callan, NRC-RIV KE Perkins, Jr., NRC RIV, Walnut Creek Field Office NS Reynolds, Winston&Strawn NRC Sr.Resident Inspector (Mail Drop 927N, 2 Copies)INPO Records Center-Atlanta, GA DL Williams, BPA (Mail Drop 399)9406020024 940526 PDR ADOCK 05000397 8"'DR LICENSEE EVEIOREPORT (LER)ACILITY NAME (1)Washin ton Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCKET NUMB R ()PAGE (3)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 I OF ITLE (4)MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS EVENT DATE 5 MONTH DAY YEAR LER NUMBER SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 6)AA EVI SION UMBER REPORT DATE (7)MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES CKE 50 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 NUMB 0 0 R (5)0 4 26 94 9 4 00 8 0 0 0 5 2 6 9 4 5 0 00 P ERAT ING ODE (9)MIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following)(ll)I OWER LEVEL (10)20.402(b)20.405(a)(1)(i) 0.405(a)(1)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 20.405(C)50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 77.71(b)73.73(c)THER (Specify in Abstract elow and in Text, NRC orm 366A)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 C.D.Mackaman, Licensing Engineer TELEPHONE NUMBER REA CODE 5 0 9 7 7-4 4 5 1 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IH THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPOHEHT MANUFACTURER EPORTABLE jc:,.',4::",;Qh;CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MAHUFACTURER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS BD A D 0 5 2 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (If yes, cTNpiete EXPECTED SUBMISSIOH DATE)X NO TRACY IIeI EXPECTED SUSHI SSI OH MONTH DA'Y TEAR ATE (15)At 1010 hours on April 26, 1994, with the plant at 50%reactor power and 55%core flow, plant Control Room Operators (CROs)observed slight reactor power fluctuations on the six average power range monitors (APRMs).Based on an indication of potential core instabilities, Control Room personnel manually scrammed the reactor in accordance with Plant Abnormal Operating Procedure PPM 4.12.4.7,"Unintentional Entry Into Region of Potential Core Power Instabilities." Immediate corrective actions were taken by the Control Room staff to bring the plant to a safe shutdown.condition in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)5.1.1,"RPV Control," and Recovery Procedure PPM 3.3.1,"Reactor Scram." The root causes for this event were the degraded condition of a Reactor Recirculation (RRC)flow control valve (FCV)position transmitter and the lack of procedural criteria to determine when to"lock up" the degraded FCV.Further corrective actions include: (1)replacement of the RRC FCV position transmitters, (2)calibration and testing of the replacement FCV position transmitters, and (3)required reading of this Licensee Event Report (LER)by WNP-2 licensed operators. | | Should you have any questions or desire additional information, please call me or D.A. Swank at (509) 377-4563. |
| | Sincerely, J . Parrish (Mail Drop 1023) |
| | Assistant Managing Director, Operations JVP/CDM/my Enclosure CC: LJ Callan, NRC-RIV KE Perkins, Jr., NRC RIV, Walnut Creek Field Office NS Reynolds, Winston & Strawn NRC Sr. Resident Inspector (Mail Drop 927N, 2 Copies) |
| | INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA DL Williams, BPA (Mail Drop 399) |
| | PDR 8 "'DR 9406020024 940526 ADOCK 05000397 |
| | |
| | LICENSEE EVEIOREPORT (LER) |
| | ACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMB R ( ) PAGE (3) |
| | Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 I OF ITLE (4) |
| | MANUALSCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS EVENT DATE 5 LER NUMBER 6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 MONTH DAY YEAR SEQUENTIAL EVI SION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES CKE NUMB R (5) |
| | NUMBER UMBER AA 50 0 0 0 4 26 94 9 4 00 8 0 0 0 5 2 6 9 4 5 0 00 P ERAT ING MIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (ll) |
| | ODE (9) I OWER LEVEL 20.402(b) 20.405(C) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 77.71(b) |
| | (10) 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.73(c) 0.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) THER (Specify in Abstract 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) elow and in Text, NRC 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) orm 366A) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) |
| | LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 TELEPHONE NUMBER REA CODE C.D. Mackaman, Licensing Engineer - |
| | 5 0 9 7 7 4 4 5 1 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IH THIS REPORT (13) |
| | MANUFACTURER EPORTABLE jc:,.',4::", CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MAHUFACTURER EPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPOHEHT TO NPRDS |
| | ; Qh; BD A D 0 5 2 EXPECTED SUSHI SSI OH DA'Y TEAR SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH ATE (15) |
| | YES (If yes, cTNpiete EXPECTED SUBMISSIOH DATE) X NO TRACY IIeI At 1010 hours on April 26, 1994, with the plant at 50% reactor power and 55% core flow, plant Control Room Operators (CROs) observed slight reactor power fluctuations on the six average power range monitors (APRMs). Based on an indication of potential core instabilities, Control Room personnel manually scrammed the reactor in accordance with Plant Abnormal Operating Procedure PPM 4.12.4.7, "Unintentional Entry Into Region of Potential Core Power Instabilities." |
| | Immediate corrective actions were taken by the Control Room staff to bring the plant to a safe shutdown. |
| | condition in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) 5.1.1, "RPV Control," and Recovery Procedure PPM 3.3.1, "Reactor Scram." |
| | The root causes for this event were the degraded condition of a Reactor Recirculation (RRC) flow control valve (FCV) position transmitter and the lack of procedural criteria to determine when to "lock up" the degraded FCV. |
| | Further corrective actions include: (1) replacement of the RRC FCV position transmitters, (2) calibration and testing of the replacement FCV position transmitters, and (3) required reading of this Licensee Event Report (LER) by WNP-2 licensed operators. |
| This event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or plant personnel. | | This event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or plant personnel. |
| LICENSEE EVENT REPOR ER)TEXl CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME (I)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 OOCKET NUMBER (2)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 ear LER NUMBER (8)umber ev.No.4 08 00 AGE (3)2 F 6 ITLE (4)MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS Pl n ndii n Power Level-50%Plant Mode-1{Power Operation)
| |
| Even Descri i n At 0831 hours on April 26, 1994, WNP-2 experienced an overload trip of a 480 VAC load center breaker, (E-CB-31/3) and loss of a nonsafety-related 480 VAC motor control center (E-MC-3A).
| |
| The loss of the motor control center{MCC)caused a loss of power to the bleed steam (BS)dump and turbine non-return (backflow preventer) valve solenoid pilot valves for Low Pressure (LP)Feedwater Heaters 1A, 2A, 3A, and 4A.The loss of power to the solenoid pilot valves resulted in isolation of extraction steam to the four.LP heaters and opening of the dump valves to the main condenser.
| |
| By 0841 hours, reactor feedwater (RFW)inlet temperature had decreased approximately 6.5'ahrenheit.
| |
| At 0850 hours, in accordance with Plant Abnormal Operating Procedure PPM 4.2.7.2,"Loss Of Feedwater Heating," plant Control Room Operators (CROs)reduced reactor power from 70%to 50%and core flow from 100%to 55%.At 1010 hours, plant CROs observed slight reactor power fluctuations on the six average power range monitors (APRMs)during an approximate four minute time period.The maximum amplitude of the fluctuations was approximately 8%peak-to-peak and the interval between fluctuations was approximately 20 seconds.Based on the increasing amplitude of the fluctuations, Control Room personnel manually scrammed the reactor less than one minute after the maximum amplitude was experienced using guidance outlined in Plant Abnormal Operating Procedure PPM 4.12.4.7,"Unintentional Entry Into Region of Potential Core Power Instabilities." All control rods fully inserted and no safety relief valves actuated.Plant response to the scram was as expected.The reactor pressure vessel (RPV)level reached a minimum of-15.4 inches and a maximum of+60.1 inches.mmediate rrective A i n Following the reactor scram, the Control Room staff promptly entered Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)5.1.1,"RPV Control," as required when the RPV level decreased to+13 inches.RPV level was recovered using the RFW pumps and the plant was stabilized in accordance with Recovery Procedure PPM 3.3.1,"Reactor Scram." EOP 5.1.1 was exited at 1043 hours.
| |
|
| |
|
| 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPOR ER), TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME'1)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 OOCKET NUMBER (2)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 LER NUMBER (8)ear umber ev.No.08 00 AGE (3)3 OF 6 ITLE (4)MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS Fu her Ev lua i n d orr ive Action F h rEv lu tion 1.Pursuant to'0CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii), this event was reported to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System (ENS)at 1111 hours as an unplanned manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS).This event is also being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an unplanned manual actuation of the RPS.2.The overload trip of Load Center Breaker E-CB-31/3 and loss of Motor Control Center E-MC-3A occurred while performing a test run of a new turbine building exhaust fan (TEA-FN-1C) motor with it coupled to the fan, The motor had been upgraded from 100 HP to 200 HP as part of a plant modification (BDC 92-0220-0).
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPOR ER) |
| The overload trip condition was caused by concurrently running the new fan motor and an old fan (TEA-FN-1A) motor while both were still powered from the same MCC.Due to E-MC-3A loading limitations, later steps in the modification installation sequence provided for the relocation of the TEA-FN-1A motor power feed to another MCC.The field engineer did not recognize that the modification sequence of running the old and the new fan motors concurrently on the same MCC would cause an overload of the MCC.Problem Evaluation Report (PER)294-0324 was initiated following the loss of E-MC-3A and an Incident Review Board (IRB)was convened to investigate the event.As an immediate action, an Engineering"Time Out" was taken on April 27, 1994 to review ongoing design changes with Project Engineers, System Engineers, Design Engineers, and Operations personnel to ensure adequate implementation and test planning.A formal root cause analysis was subsequently performed for the PER and a corrective action plan was developed to preclude the recurrence of a similar event.3, Following the scram, investigation of the observed reactor power fluctuations showed that they were not the result of reactor core instability or oscillations.
| | TEXl CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME (I) OOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No. |
| The power fluctuations were caused by a degraded position transmitter (RRC-POT-26A) for a Reactor Recirculation (RRC)System flow control valve (FCV)(RRC-FCV-60A).
| | Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 4 08 00 2 F 6 ITLE (4) |
| The position transmitter produced slight perturbations in the output signal that caused small step changes in actual FCV position.These valve position changes caused corresponding changes in reactor core flow and power.When the FCV was in operation at rated power and flow conditions, slight perturbations in the position transmitter output signal do not result in significant changes in reactor core flow because the valve is near full open.However, these same transmitter output perturbations can cause relatively significant changes in reactor core flow when the FCV is near its lower limit such as the 55%flow condition that existed during this event.
| | MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS Pl n ndii n Power Level - 50% |
| LICENSEE EVENT REPOR ER)TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NANE (1)DOCKET NUNBER (2)Washington Nucleai Plant-Unit 2 ear LER NUMBER (8)umber ev.No.AGE (3)4 008 D ITLE (4)MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS 4 F 6 4.Indications of RRC-FCV-60A position fluctuations were previously identified on August 16, 1993.As a result of the investigation, a Work Order was initiated and scheduled to replace RRC-FCV-60A position transmitter RRC-POT-26A.
| | Plant Mode - 1 {Power Operation) |
| As an interim measure until'ransmitter replacement, the system engineer provided recommendations in an Interoffice Memorandum (IOM)for operating RRC-FCV-60A in the degraded condition.
| | Even Descri i n At 0831 hours on April 26, 1994, WNP-2 experienced an overload trip of a 480 VAC load center breaker, (E-CB-31/3) and loss of a nonsafety-related 480 VAC motor control center (E-MC-3A). The loss of the motor control center {MCC) caused a loss of power to the bleed steam (BS) dump and turbine non-return (backflow preventer) valve solenoid pilot valves for Low Pressure (LP) Feedwater Heaters 1A, 2A, 3A, and 4A. The loss of power to the solenoid pilot valves resulted in isolation of extraction steam to the four |
| One of the recommendations was for the FCV hydraulic power unit (HPU)to be shutdown after the valve was placed in the desired position.This action establishes a hydraulic"lock up" of the valve and prevents the valve operator from moving the valve.Operating Procedure PPM 2.2.1,"Reactor Recirculation System," was revised to incorporate the recommendations for interim operation of RRC-FCV-60A; however, the procedure revision did not provide criteria for determining when to"lock up" the FCV other than to say: "[a]fter[the FCV]is in the desired position..
| | . LP heaters and opening of the dump valves to the main condenser. By 0841 hours, reactor feedwater (RFW) inlet temperature had decreased approximately 6.5'ahrenheit. At 0850 hours, in accordance with Plant Abnormal Operating Procedure PPM 4.2.7.2, "Loss Of Feedwater Heating," plant Control Room Operators (CROs) reduced reactor power from 70% to 50% and core flow from 100% to 55%. |
| ~." 5.RRC-FCV-60A had been maintained in a"lock up" condition most of the time, except during plant maneuvering, since August 1993.However, approximately two weeks before this event, maintenance activities began to replace control rod solenoid scram pilot valves (SSPVs).With the plant power maneuvering requirements necessary to support this maintenance effort, Operations crew management decided not to"lock up" RRC-FCV-60A after each power maneuver.During this two week time period, the FCV was observed to have been operating normally, with no indications of spurious valve position changes.After reducing reactor power to 50%and core flow to 55%(and having taken the FCV out of"lock up")in response to the E-MC-3A outage and loss of the LP feedwater heaters, Operations crew management decided not to"lock up" RRC-FCV-60A until the plant was returned to the power and flow conditions that existed prior to the event.They expected to promptly recover from the MCC outage, restore the lost heaters, and increase reactor power and flow to the previous values of approximately 70%and 100%, respectively; then they would"lock up" the FCV.The Supply System believes that the decision not to"lock up" RRC-FCV-60A was consistent with procedure provisions.
| | At 1010 hours, plant CROs observed slight reactor power fluctuations on the six average power range monitors (APRMs) during an approximate four minute time period. The maximum amplitude of the fluctuations was approximately 8% peak-to-peak and the interval between fluctuations was approximately 20 seconds. Based on the increasing amplitude of the fluctuations, Control Room personnel manually scrammed the reactor less than one minute after the maximum amplitude was experienced using guidance outlined in Plant Abnormal Operating Procedure PPM 4.12.4.7, "Unintentional Entry Into Region of Potential Core Power Instabilities." All control rods fully inserted and no safety relief valves actuated. |
| However, this event did reveal that there was insufficient criteria in the governing procedure for determining when to"lock up" the FCV.The action to manually scram the reactor was consistent with Supply System expectations as conveyed to the plant staff through procedures and training.However, for instances such as in this event, where there are no clear indications that reactor core oscillations are occurring, the Supply System has concluded that refined guidance and training may be prudent to assure additional confirmatory information is taken into consideration prior to scramming the reactor.Efforts are underway to evaluate and implement, if appropriate, additional guidance and training for unexplained power oscillations.
| | Plant response to the scram was as expected. The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level reached a minimum of -15.4 inches and a maximum of +60.1 inches. |
| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT R)TEXT CONTINUATION
| | mmediate rrective A i n Following the reactor scram, the Control Room staff promptly entered Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) 5.1.1, "RPV Control," as required when the RPV level decreased to +13 inches. RPV level was recovered using the RFW pumps and the plant was stabilized in accordance with Recovery Procedure PPM 3.3.1, "Reactor Scram." EOP 5.1.1 was exited at 1043 hours. |
| ~AGILITY NAHE (1)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCKET NUHBER (2)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 LER NUHBER (8)ear umber ev.No.4 08 00 AGE (3)5 F 6 ITLE (4)MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS The primary root cause for this event (manual scram)was the degraded condition of FCV position transmitter RRC-POT-26A.
| | |
| A secondary root cause was insufficient procedural criteria for determining when to"lock up" the degraded FCV.i her rr tive Ac i n 1.Replacement of RRC-FCV-60A and 60B position transmitters will be completed prior to plant startup from the Spring 1994 Refueling Outage (R9).2.Calibration and testing of the replacement FCV position transmitters will be completed prior to plant startup from R9.3.This Licensee Event Report (LER)will be required to be read by WNP-2 licensed operators prior to plant startup from R9.Jlffi ifi A manual reactor scram is the required immediate action in response to unexplained observed power oscillations.
| | 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPOR ER) |
| Although an actual RPV low level condition did exist when the water level decreased to-15.4 inches following the reactor scram, the transient was well within the bounds of the WNP-2 safety analysis.This event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or plant personnel.
| | , TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME'1) OOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No. |
| imil r Event LERs 89-031 and 93-002 reported events where degraded RRC flow control valve system controls contributed to reactor scrams.The degraded system controls in these previous events involved inappropriate setpoints and the negative effects of component interactions following system design changes, modifications, and maintenance.
| | Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 08 00 3 OF 6 ITLE (4) |
| The degraded system controls were not attributed to control circuit or component failures.Thus, these previous event LERs did not include corrective actions that would be expected to prevent the conditions described in this LER.
| | MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS Fu her Ev lua i n d orr ive Action F h rEv lu tion |
| lt E LICENSEE EVENT REPORlER)TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME (I)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 OOCKET NUMBER (2)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 LER NUMBER (8)ear umber ev.Mo.4 08 0 AGE (3)6 F 6 ITLE (4)MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS R f R f~/em Qgmmgnent Reactor Recirculation (RRC)System Flow Control Valve (RRC-FCV-60A)
| | : 1. Pursuant to'0CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii), this event was reported to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) at 1111 hours as an unplanned manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS). This event is also being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an unplanned manual actuation of the RPS. |
| Position Transmitter (RRC-POT-26A)
| | : 2. The overload trip of Load Center Breaker E-CB-31/3 and loss of Motor Control Center E-MC-3A occurred while performing a test run of a new turbine building exhaust fan (TEA-FN-1C) motor with it coupled to the fan, The motor had been upgraded from 100 HP to 200 HP as part of a plant modification (BDC 92-0220-0). The overload trip condition was caused by concurrently running the new fan motor and an old fan (TEA-FN-1A) motor while both were still powered from the same MCC. Due to E-MC-3A loading limitations, later steps in the modification installation sequence provided for the relocation of the TEA-FN-1A motor power feed to another MCC. The field engineer did not recognize that the modification sequence of running the old and the new fan motors concurrently on the same MCC would cause an overload of the MCC. |
| Load Center Breaker (E-CB-31/3)
| | Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 294-0324 was initiated following the loss of E-MC-3A and an Incident Review Board (IRB) was convened to investigate the event. As an immediate action, an Engineering "Time Out" was taken on April 27, 1994 to review ongoing design changes with Project Engineers, System Engineers, Design Engineers, and Operations personnel to ensure adequate implementation and test planning. A formal root cause analysis was subsequently performed for the PER and a corrective action plan was developed to preclude the recurrence of a similar event. |
| Motor Control Center (E-MC-3A)Reactor Protection System (RPS)Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs)Reactor Feedwater (RF%)System Low Pressure (LP)Feedwater Heaters Bleed Steam (BS)Dump Valve Turbine Non-Return Valve AD AD AD EC EC JC JC SJ SM SM SM FCV ZT BKR (52)MCC MON HX FSV FSV2}}
| | 3, Following the scram, investigation of the observed reactor power fluctuations showed that they were not the result of reactor core instability or oscillations. The power fluctuations were caused by a degraded position transmitter (RRC-POT-26A) for a Reactor Recirculation (RRC) System flow control valve (FCV) (RRC-FCV-60A). The position transmitter produced slight perturbations in the output signal that caused small step changes in actual FCV position. These valve position changes caused corresponding changes in reactor core flow and power. |
| | When the FCV was in operation at rated power and flow conditions, slight perturbations in the position transmitter output signal do not result in significant changes in reactor core flow because the valve is near full open. However, these same transmitter output perturbations can cause relatively significant changes in reactor core flow when the FCV is near its lower limit such as the 55% flow condition that existed during this event. |
| | |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPOR ER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NANE (1) DOCKET NUNBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No. |
| | Washington Nucleai Plant - Unit 2 4 008 D 4 F 6 ITLE (4) |
| | MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS |
| | : 4. Indications of RRC-FCV-60A position fluctuations were previously identified on August 16, 1993. As a result of the investigation, a Work Order was initiated and scheduled to replace RRC-FCV-60A position transmitter RRC-POT-26A. As an interim measure until replacement, the system engineer provided recommendations in an Interoffice 'ransmitter Memorandum (IOM) for operating RRC-FCV-60A in the degraded condition. One of the recommendations was for the FCV hydraulic power unit (HPU) to be shutdown after the valve was placed in the desired position. This action establishes a hydraulic "lock up" of the valve and prevents the valve operator from moving the valve. Operating Procedure PPM 2.2.1, "Reactor Recirculation System," was revised to incorporate the recommendations for interim operation of RRC-FCV-60A; however, the procedure revision did not provide criteria for determining when to "lock up" the FCV other than to say: "[a]fter [the FCV] is in the desired position.. ." ~ |
| | : 5. RRC-FCV-60A had been maintained in a "lock up" condition most of the time, except during plant maneuvering, since August 1993. However, approximately two weeks before this event, maintenance activities began to replace control rod solenoid scram pilot valves (SSPVs). With the plant power maneuvering requirements necessary to support this maintenance effort, Operations crew management decided not to "lock up" RRC-FCV-60A after each power maneuver. During this two week time period, the FCV was observed to have been operating normally, with no indications of spurious valve position changes. |
| | After reducing reactor power to 50% and core flow to 55% (and having taken the FCV out of "lock up") in response to the E-MC-3A outage and loss of the LP feedwater heaters, Operations crew management decided not to "lock up" RRC-FCV-60A until the plant was returned to the power and flow conditions that existed prior to the event. They expected to promptly recover from the MCC outage, restore the lost heaters, and increase reactor power and flow to the previous values of approximately 70% and 100%, respectively; then they would "lock up" the FCV. The Supply System believes that the decision not to "lock up" RRC-FCV-60A was consistent with procedure provisions. However, this event did reveal that there was insufficient criteria in the governing procedure for determining when to "lock up" the FCV. |
| | The action to manually scram the reactor was consistent with Supply System expectations as conveyed to the plant staff through procedures and training. However, for instances such as in this event, where there are no clear indications that reactor core oscillations are occurring, the Supply System has concluded that refined guidance and training may be prudent to assure additional confirmatory information is taken into consideration prior to scramming the reactor. |
| | Efforts are underway to evaluate and implement, if appropriate, additional guidance and training for unexplained power oscillations. |
| | |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT R) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION |
| | ~ AGILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No. |
| | Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 9 |
| | 0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4 08 00 5 F 6 ITLE (4) |
| | MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS The primary root cause for this event (manual scram) was the degraded condition of FCV position transmitter RRC-POT-26A. A secondary root cause was insufficient procedural criteria for determining when to "lock up" the degraded FCV. |
| | i her rr tive Ac i n |
| | : 1. Replacement of RRC-FCV-60A and 60B position transmitters will be completed prior to plant startup from the Spring 1994 Refueling Outage (R9). |
| | : 2. Calibration and testing of the replacement FCV position transmitters will be completed prior to plant startup from R9. |
| | : 3. This Licensee Event Report (LER) will be required to be read by WNP-2 licensed operators prior to plant startup from R9. |
| | Jlffi ifi A manual reactor scram is the required immediate action in response to unexplained observed power oscillations. Although an actual RPV low level condition did exist when the water level decreased to -15.4 inches following the reactor scram, the transient was well within the bounds of the WNP-2 safety analysis. This event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or plant personnel. |
| | imil r Event LERs 89-031 and 93-002 reported events where degraded RRC flow control valve system controls contributed to reactor scrams. The degraded system controls in these previous events involved inappropriate setpoints and the negative effects of component interactions following system design changes, modifications, and maintenance. The degraded system controls were not attributed to control circuit or component failures. Thus, these previous event LERs did not include corrective actions that would be expected to prevent the conditions described in this LER. |
| | |
| | lt E |
| | |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORl ER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME (I) OOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. Mo. |
| | Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 3 9 0 5 0 0 7 4 08 0 6 F 6 ITLE (4) |
| | MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS R f R f |
| | ~/em Qgmmgnent Reactor Recirculation (RRC) System AD Flow Control Valve (RRC-FCV-60A) AD FCV Position Transmitter (RRC-POT-26A) AD ZT Load Center Breaker (E-CB-31/3) EC BKR (52) |
| | Motor Control Center (E-MC-3A) EC MCC Reactor Protection System (RPS) JC Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs) JC MON Reactor Feedwater (RF%) System SJ Low Pressure (LP) Feedwater Heaters SM HX Bleed Steam (BS) Dump Valve SM FSV Turbine Non-Return Valve SM FSV2}} |
|
---|
Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997 LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997 LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995 LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995 LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995 LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr 1999-07-20
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997 LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997 LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995 LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995 LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995 LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr 1999-07-20
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17284A9001999-10-31031 October 1999 Rev 0 to COLR 99-15, WNP-2 Cycle 15,COLR GO2-99-177, LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With1999-10-0101 October 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With ML17284A8941999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for WNP-2.With 991012 Ltr ML17284A8801999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for WNP-2.With 990910 Ltr ML17284A8691999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for WNP-2.With 990813 Ltr ML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B7271999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for WNP-2.With 990707 Ltr ML17292B6961999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for WNP-2.With 990608 Ltr ML17292B6641999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for WNP-2.With 990507 Ltr ML17292B6391999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for WNP-2.With 990413 Ltr ML17292B5871999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for WNP-2.With 990311 Ltr ML17292B5571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for WNP-2.With 990210 Ltr ML17292B5621999-01-31031 January 1999 Rev 1 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2 Cycle 14 Colr. ML17292B5341999-01-15015 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Incorrect Modeling of BWR Lower Plenum Vol in Bison.Defect Applies Only to Reload Fuel Assemblies Currently in Operation at WNP-2.BISON Code Model for WNP-2 Has Been Revised to Correct Error ML17292B5331999-01-15015 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re XL-S96 CPR Correlation for SVEA-96 Fuel. Defect Applies Only to WNP-2,during Cycles 12,13 & 14 Operation.Evaluations of Defect Performed by ABB-CE ML17292B4791998-12-31031 December 1998 Washington Public Power Supply Sys 1998 Annual Rept. with 981215 Ltr ML17292B5351998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for WNP-2.With 990112 Ltr ML17292B5741998-12-31031 December 1998 WNP-2 1998 Annual Operating Rept. with 990225 Ltr ML17284A8231998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for WNP-2.With 981207 Ltr ML17284A8081998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for WNP-2.With 981110 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7831998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for WNP-2.With 981007 Ltr ML17284A7491998-09-10010 September 1998 WNP-2 Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Refueling Outage RF13 Spring,1998. ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7681998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for WNP-2.With 980915 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7261998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for WNP-2.W/980810 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6751998-06-30030 June 1998 Ro:On 980617,flooding of RB Northeast Stairwell with Consequential Flooding of Two ECCS Pump Rooms.Caused by Inadequate Fire Protection Sys Design.Pumped Out Water from Affected Areas to Point Below Berm Areas of Pump Rooms ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17284A6491998-05-31031 May 1998 Rev 0 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2,Cycle 14 Colr. ML17292B4031998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for WNP-2.W/980608 Ltr ML17292B3921998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for WNP-2.W/980513 Ltr ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3371998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for WNP-2.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2641998-03-0404 March 1998 Performance Self Assessment,WNP-2. ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B2911998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for WNP-2.W/980313 Ltr ML17284A7971998-02-17017 February 1998 Rev 28 to Operational QA Program Description, WPPSS-QA-004.With Proposed Rev 29 ML17292B3591998-02-12012 February 1998 WNP-2 Cycle 14 Reload Design Rept. 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
~
ACCELERATED D STRIBUTION DEMONS ATION SYSTEM S ~
REGULATORY INFORMATXON DXSTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9406020024 DOC.DATE: 94/05/26 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397, WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington, Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MACKAMAN,C.D. Washington Public Power Supply System PARRISH,J.V. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 94-008-00:on 940426,CROs observed slight reactor power fluctuations on six APRMs.Caused by degraded condition of reactor recirculation (RRC) FCV position transmitter.
Replaced RRC FCV position transmitters.W/940526 ltr.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR L TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
ENCL / SIZE: 7 NOTES RECIPIENT COPIES RECXPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PDIV-3 PD 1 1 CLIFFORD,J 1 1 D INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 1 1 AEOD/DOA'EOD/ROAB/DSP AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 2 2 NRR/DE/EELB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DORS/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRIL/RPEB 1 1 NRR/DRSS/PRPB 2 2 NRRggSS SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 EG FX 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN4 FI~ 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCE,J.H 2 2 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NSIC POORE1W ~ 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 R
I D
D D
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 28 ENCL 28
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 May 26, 1994 G02-94-125 Docket No. 50-397 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
NUCLEAR PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 94-008-00 Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 94-008-00 for the WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.
Should you have any questions or desire additional information, please call me or D.A. Swank at (509) 377-4563.
Sincerely, J . Parrish (Mail Drop 1023)
Assistant Managing Director, Operations JVP/CDM/my Enclosure CC: LJ Callan, NRC-RIV KE Perkins, Jr., NRC RIV, Walnut Creek Field Office NS Reynolds, Winston & Strawn NRC Sr. Resident Inspector (Mail Drop 927N, 2 Copies)
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA DL Williams, BPA (Mail Drop 399)
PDR 8 "'DR 9406020024 940526 ADOCK 05000397
LICENSEE EVEIOREPORT (LER)
ACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMB R ( ) PAGE (3)
Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 I OF ITLE (4)
MANUALSCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS EVENT DATE 5 LER NUMBER 6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 MONTH DAY YEAR SEQUENTIAL EVI SION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES CKE NUMB R (5)
NUMBER UMBER AA 50 0 0 0 4 26 94 9 4 00 8 0 0 0 5 2 6 9 4 5 0 00 P ERAT ING MIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (ll)
ODE (9) I OWER LEVEL 20.402(b) 20.405(C) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 77.71(b)
(10) 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.73(c) 0.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) THER (Specify in Abstract 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) elow and in Text, NRC 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) orm 366A) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 TELEPHONE NUMBER REA CODE C.D. Mackaman, Licensing Engineer -
5 0 9 7 7 4 4 5 1 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IH THIS REPORT (13)
MANUFACTURER EPORTABLE jc:,.',4::", CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MAHUFACTURER EPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPOHEHT TO NPRDS
- Qh; BD A D 0 5 2 EXPECTED SUSHI SSI OH DA'Y TEAR SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH ATE (15)
YES (If yes, cTNpiete EXPECTED SUBMISSIOH DATE) X NO TRACY IIeI At 1010 hours0.0117 days <br />0.281 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.84305e-4 months <br /> on April 26, 1994, with the plant at 50% reactor power and 55% core flow, plant Control Room Operators (CROs) observed slight reactor power fluctuations on the six average power range monitors (APRMs). Based on an indication of potential core instabilities, Control Room personnel manually scrammed the reactor in accordance with Plant Abnormal Operating Procedure PPM 4.12.4.7, "Unintentional Entry Into Region of Potential Core Power Instabilities."
Immediate corrective actions were taken by the Control Room staff to bring the plant to a safe shutdown.
condition in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) 5.1.1, "RPV Control," and Recovery Procedure PPM 3.3.1, "Reactor Scram."
The root causes for this event were the degraded condition of a Reactor Recirculation (RRC) flow control valve (FCV) position transmitter and the lack of procedural criteria to determine when to "lock up" the degraded FCV.
Further corrective actions include: (1) replacement of the RRC FCV position transmitters, (2) calibration and testing of the replacement FCV position transmitters, and (3) required reading of this Licensee Event Report (LER) by WNP-2 licensed operators.
This event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or plant personnel.
LICENSEE EVENT REPOR ER)
TEXl CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME (I) OOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 4 08 00 2 F 6 ITLE (4)
MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS Pl n ndii n Power Level - 50%
Plant Mode - 1 {Power Operation)
Even Descri i n At 0831 hours0.00962 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.161955e-4 months <br /> on April 26, 1994, WNP-2 experienced an overload trip of a 480 VAC load center breaker, (E-CB-31/3) and loss of a nonsafety-related 480 VAC motor control center (E-MC-3A). The loss of the motor control center {MCC) caused a loss of power to the bleed steam (BS) dump and turbine non-return (backflow preventer) valve solenoid pilot valves for Low Pressure (LP) Feedwater Heaters 1A, 2A, 3A, and 4A. The loss of power to the solenoid pilot valves resulted in isolation of extraction steam to the four
. LP heaters and opening of the dump valves to the main condenser. By 0841 hours0.00973 days <br />0.234 hours <br />0.00139 weeks <br />3.200005e-4 months <br />, reactor feedwater (RFW) inlet temperature had decreased approximately 6.5'ahrenheit. At 0850 hours0.00984 days <br />0.236 hours <br />0.00141 weeks <br />3.23425e-4 months <br />, in accordance with Plant Abnormal Operating Procedure PPM 4.2.7.2, "Loss Of Feedwater Heating," plant Control Room Operators (CROs) reduced reactor power from 70% to 50% and core flow from 100% to 55%.
At 1010 hours0.0117 days <br />0.281 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.84305e-4 months <br />, plant CROs observed slight reactor power fluctuations on the six average power range monitors (APRMs) during an approximate four minute time period. The maximum amplitude of the fluctuations was approximately 8% peak-to-peak and the interval between fluctuations was approximately 20 seconds. Based on the increasing amplitude of the fluctuations, Control Room personnel manually scrammed the reactor less than one minute after the maximum amplitude was experienced using guidance outlined in Plant Abnormal Operating Procedure PPM 4.12.4.7, "Unintentional Entry Into Region of Potential Core Power Instabilities." All control rods fully inserted and no safety relief valves actuated.
Plant response to the scram was as expected. The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level reached a minimum of -15.4 inches and a maximum of +60.1 inches.
mmediate rrective A i n Following the reactor scram, the Control Room staff promptly entered Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) 5.1.1, "RPV Control," as required when the RPV level decreased to +13 inches. RPV level was recovered using the RFW pumps and the plant was stabilized in accordance with Recovery Procedure PPM 3.3.1, "Reactor Scram." EOP 5.1.1 was exited at 1043 hours0.0121 days <br />0.29 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.968615e-4 months <br />.
1 LICENSEE EVENT REPOR ER)
, TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME'1) OOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 08 00 3 OF 6 ITLE (4)
MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS Fu her Ev lua i n d orr ive Action F h rEv lu tion
- 1. Pursuant to'0CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii), this event was reported to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) at 1111 hours0.0129 days <br />0.309 hours <br />0.00184 weeks <br />4.227355e-4 months <br /> as an unplanned manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS). This event is also being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an unplanned manual actuation of the RPS.
- 2. The overload trip of Load Center Breaker E-CB-31/3 and loss of Motor Control Center E-MC-3A occurred while performing a test run of a new turbine building exhaust fan (TEA-FN-1C) motor with it coupled to the fan, The motor had been upgraded from 100 HP to 200 HP as part of a plant modification (BDC 92-0220-0). The overload trip condition was caused by concurrently running the new fan motor and an old fan (TEA-FN-1A) motor while both were still powered from the same MCC. Due to E-MC-3A loading limitations, later steps in the modification installation sequence provided for the relocation of the TEA-FN-1A motor power feed to another MCC. The field engineer did not recognize that the modification sequence of running the old and the new fan motors concurrently on the same MCC would cause an overload of the MCC.
Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 294-0324 was initiated following the loss of E-MC-3A and an Incident Review Board (IRB) was convened to investigate the event. As an immediate action, an Engineering "Time Out" was taken on April 27, 1994 to review ongoing design changes with Project Engineers, System Engineers, Design Engineers, and Operations personnel to ensure adequate implementation and test planning. A formal root cause analysis was subsequently performed for the PER and a corrective action plan was developed to preclude the recurrence of a similar event.
3, Following the scram, investigation of the observed reactor power fluctuations showed that they were not the result of reactor core instability or oscillations. The power fluctuations were caused by a degraded position transmitter (RRC-POT-26A) for a Reactor Recirculation (RRC) System flow control valve (FCV) (RRC-FCV-60A). The position transmitter produced slight perturbations in the output signal that caused small step changes in actual FCV position. These valve position changes caused corresponding changes in reactor core flow and power.
When the FCV was in operation at rated power and flow conditions, slight perturbations in the position transmitter output signal do not result in significant changes in reactor core flow because the valve is near full open. However, these same transmitter output perturbations can cause relatively significant changes in reactor core flow when the FCV is near its lower limit such as the 55% flow condition that existed during this event.
LICENSEE EVENT REPOR ER)
TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NANE (1) DOCKET NUNBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No.
Washington Nucleai Plant - Unit 2 4 008 D 4 F 6 ITLE (4)
MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS
- 4. Indications of RRC-FCV-60A position fluctuations were previously identified on August 16, 1993. As a result of the investigation, a Work Order was initiated and scheduled to replace RRC-FCV-60A position transmitter RRC-POT-26A. As an interim measure until replacement, the system engineer provided recommendations in an Interoffice 'ransmitter Memorandum (IOM) for operating RRC-FCV-60A in the degraded condition. One of the recommendations was for the FCV hydraulic power unit (HPU) to be shutdown after the valve was placed in the desired position. This action establishes a hydraulic "lock up" of the valve and prevents the valve operator from moving the valve. Operating Procedure PPM 2.2.1, "Reactor Recirculation System," was revised to incorporate the recommendations for interim operation of RRC-FCV-60A; however, the procedure revision did not provide criteria for determining when to "lock up" the FCV other than to say: "[a]fter [the FCV] is in the desired position.. ." ~
- 5. RRC-FCV-60A had been maintained in a "lock up" condition most of the time, except during plant maneuvering, since August 1993. However, approximately two weeks before this event, maintenance activities began to replace control rod solenoid scram pilot valves (SSPVs). With the plant power maneuvering requirements necessary to support this maintenance effort, Operations crew management decided not to "lock up" RRC-FCV-60A after each power maneuver. During this two week time period, the FCV was observed to have been operating normally, with no indications of spurious valve position changes.
After reducing reactor power to 50% and core flow to 55% (and having taken the FCV out of "lock up") in response to the E-MC-3A outage and loss of the LP feedwater heaters, Operations crew management decided not to "lock up" RRC-FCV-60A until the plant was returned to the power and flow conditions that existed prior to the event. They expected to promptly recover from the MCC outage, restore the lost heaters, and increase reactor power and flow to the previous values of approximately 70% and 100%, respectively; then they would "lock up" the FCV. The Supply System believes that the decision not to "lock up" RRC-FCV-60A was consistent with procedure provisions. However, this event did reveal that there was insufficient criteria in the governing procedure for determining when to "lock up" the FCV.
The action to manually scram the reactor was consistent with Supply System expectations as conveyed to the plant staff through procedures and training. However, for instances such as in this event, where there are no clear indications that reactor core oscillations are occurring, the Supply System has concluded that refined guidance and training may be prudent to assure additional confirmatory information is taken into consideration prior to scramming the reactor.
Efforts are underway to evaluate and implement, if appropriate, additional guidance and training for unexplained power oscillations.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT R)
TEXT CONTINUATION
~ AGILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 9
0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4 08 00 5 F 6 ITLE (4)
MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS The primary root cause for this event (manual scram) was the degraded condition of FCV position transmitter RRC-POT-26A. A secondary root cause was insufficient procedural criteria for determining when to "lock up" the degraded FCV.
i her rr tive Ac i n
- 1. Replacement of RRC-FCV-60A and 60B position transmitters will be completed prior to plant startup from the Spring 1994 Refueling Outage (R9).
- 2. Calibration and testing of the replacement FCV position transmitters will be completed prior to plant startup from R9.
- 3. This Licensee Event Report (LER) will be required to be read by WNP-2 licensed operators prior to plant startup from R9.
Jlffi ifi A manual reactor scram is the required immediate action in response to unexplained observed power oscillations. Although an actual RPV low level condition did exist when the water level decreased to -15.4 inches following the reactor scram, the transient was well within the bounds of the WNP-2 safety analysis. This event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or plant personnel.
imil r Event LERs89-031 and 93-002 reported events where degraded RRC flow control valve system controls contributed to reactor scrams. The degraded system controls in these previous events involved inappropriate setpoints and the negative effects of component interactions following system design changes, modifications, and maintenance. The degraded system controls were not attributed to control circuit or component failures. Thus, these previous event LERs did not include corrective actions that would be expected to prevent the conditions described in this LER.
lt E
LICENSEE EVENT REPORl ER)
TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME (I) OOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. Mo.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 3 9 0 5 0 0 7 4 08 0 6 F 6 ITLE (4)
MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO OBSERVED REACTOR CORE POWER FLUCTUATIONS R f R f
~/em Qgmmgnent Reactor Recirculation (RRC) System AD Flow Control Valve (RRC-FCV-60A) AD FCV Position Transmitter (RRC-POT-26A) AD ZT Load Center Breaker (E-CB-31/3) EC BKR (52)
Motor Control Center (E-MC-3A) EC MCC Reactor Protection System (RPS) JC Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs) JC MON Reactor Feedwater (RF%) System SJ Low Pressure (LP) Feedwater Heaters SM HX Bleed Steam (BS) Dump Valve SM FSV Turbine Non-Return Valve SM FSV2