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{{#Wiki_filter:q O                                                 J COM ANCHE                   PE AK     I i
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STE AM ELECTRIC STATION                       l UNIT 1 and COMMON l
J COM ANCHE PE AK i
STE AM ELECTRIC STATION l
UNIT 1 and COMMON l
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM O
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM O
PROJECT STATUS REPORT SMALL BO lE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS 5=5E *EW RI       II OI
PROJECT STATUS REPORT SMALL BO lE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS 5=5E *EW RI II OI
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Revision O' I
Revision O' TU ELECTRIC COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT-1 AND COMMON.
TU ELECTRIC COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT-1 AND COMMON.
STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION PROJECT STATUS REPORT SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS i
STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION PROJECT STATUS REPORT SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS i
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                                            /C R. P. Klause       J Project Manager     j i
/C R. P. Klause J
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Project Manager j
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p_                                                TABLE OF CONTENTS                             )
TABLE OF CONTENTS p_
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  !\- -)                                                                                           J Section   Title                                         Page             i EXECUTIVE  
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Section Title Page i
EXECUTIVE  


==SUMMARY==
==SUMMARY==
iv               l ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS                   vii I
iv l
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS vii I


==1.0       INTRODUCTION==
==1.0 INTRODUCTION==
1-1             l l
1-1 l
Figure 1-1 Small Bore Piping and Pipe Support Correc-tive Action Program (CAP) 2.0       PURPOSE                                       2-1 3.0       SCOPE                                         3-1             {
l Figure 1-1 Small Bore Piping and Pipe Support Correc-tive Action Program (CAP) 2.0 PURPOSE 2-1 3.0 SCOPE 3-1
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4.0       SPECIFIC ISSUES                               4-1 1
4.0 SPECIFIC ISSUES 4-1 1
5.0       CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM                     5-1             1 METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS                                     l 5.1       METHODOLOGY AND WORK PERFORMED               5-1 5.1.1     Licensing Commitments, Design Criteria,       5-1
5.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM 5-1 1
  ,/''g                               .and Procedures
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS l
( ,)                   5.1.1.1   Verification and Validation of Design         5-2 Methodology                                                 l 5.1.1.2   Resolution of Piping-Related Design Issues   5-4             i 5.1.2     Design Validation Process                     5-6             l 5.1.2.1   Piping System Input Validation               5-7             l 5.1.2.2   Pipe Stress Analysis                         5-8             ]
5.1 METHODOLOGY AND WORK PERFORMED 5-1 5.1.1 Licensing Commitments, Design Criteria, 5-1
5.1.2.3   Pipe Support Analysis                         5-11             i 5.1.2.4   Validation of Seismic Category II             5-12 Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports                         ,
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Over Seismic Category I Equipment                           j 5.1.2.5   SWEC-PSAS Clearance Walkdowns                 5-13             l 5.1.2.6   Testing                                       5-13             l 5.1.2.7   Final Reconciliation of Small Bore Piping     5-15             l and Pipe Supports 5.1.3     Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program 5-16 (PCRVP) 5.1.3.1   Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program 5-20 (PCHVP) Procedures 5.2       RESULTS                                       5-23 5.2.1     Pipe Stress Analysis Resulte                 5-23             j 5.2.2     Pipe Support Analysis Results                 3-24             ,
.and Procedures
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5.1.1.1 Verification and Validation of Design 5-2 Methodology l
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5.1.1.2 Resolution of Piping-Related Design Issues 5-4 i
5.1.2 Design Validation Process 5-6 l
5.1.2.1 Piping System Input Validation 5-7 l
5.1.2.2 Pipe Stress Analysis 5-8
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5.1.2.3 Pipe Support Analysis 5-11 i
5.1.2.4 Validation of Seismic Category II 5-12 Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Over Seismic Category I Equipment j
5.1.2.5 SWEC-PSAS Clearance Walkdowns 5-13 l
5.1.2.6 Testing 5-13 l
5.1.2.7 Final Reconciliation of Small Bore Piping 5-15 l
and Pipe Supports 5.1.3 Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program 5-16 (PCRVP) 5.1.3.1 Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program 5-20 (PCHVP) Procedures 5.2 RESULTS 5-23 5.2.1 Pipe Stress Analysis Resulte 5-23 j
5.2.2 Pipe Support Analysis Results 3-24 I
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p               Section   Title                                         Page, 5.2.2.1   Pipe Support Modifications Identified Prior to Stress Analysis                           5-24 5.2.2.2   Special Pipe Support Frame Analyses           5-26 5.2.2.3   SWEC As-Built Verification of Modifications   5-26 5.2.3     Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program 5-26 (PCHVP) Results 5.3       QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM                     5-28 5.3.1     Summary of SWEC Engineering Assurance (EA)     5-30 Audits 5.3.2     Summary of Audits by TU Electric - QA/ TAP,   5-31 NRC-VPB, and SWEC-QAAD 5.4       CORRECTIVE AND PREVENTIVE ACTION               5-33 Figure 5-1 Corrective Action Program (CAP) Flow Chart and Governing Procedures - Small Bore Piping and Supports Figure 5-2 Corrective Action Program (CAP) Technical Interfaces - Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Figure 5-3 SWEC-PSAS Pipe Stress Validation Flow Chart Figure 5-4 SWEC-PSAS Pipe Support Validation Flow Chart
p Section Title
: Page, 5.2.2.1 Pipe Support Modifications Identified Prior to Stress Analysis 5-24 5.2.2.2 Special Pipe Support Frame Analyses 5-26 5.2.2.3 SWEC As-Built Verification of Modifications 5-26 5.2.3 Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program 5-26 (PCHVP) Results 5.3 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 5-28 5.3.1 Summary of SWEC Engineering Assurance (EA) 5-30 Audits 5.3.2 Summary of Audits by TU Electric - QA/ TAP, 5-31 NRC-VPB, and SWEC-QAAD 5.4 CORRECTIVE AND PREVENTIVE ACTION 5-33 Figure 5-1 Corrective Action Program (CAP) Flow Chart and Governing Procedures - Small Bore Piping and Supports Figure 5-2 Corrective Action Program (CAP) Technical Interfaces - Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Figure 5-3 SWEC-PSAS Pipe Stress Validation Flow Chart Figure 5-4 SWEC-PSAS Pipe Support Validation Flow Chart Figure 5-5 Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program
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Figure 5-5 Table 5-1 Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP)
(PCHVP)
Piping System Input Data Table 5-2 Fluid Transient Loadings Table 5-3 PCHVP Reinspection Attributes and Resolutions in Response to CPRT Quality of Construction ISAP-VII.C Results Report Table 5-4 Unit 1 and Common Small Bore Pipe Supports Modification Summary Table 5-5 Seismic Category II Small Bore Piping Over Seismic Category I Equipment Piping Checklist Table 5-6 PCHVP Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports -
Table 5-1 Piping System Input Data Table 5-2 Fluid Transient Loadings Table 5-3 PCHVP Reinspection Attributes and Resolutions in Response to CPRT Quality of Construction ISAP-VII.C Results Report Table 5-4 Unit 1 and Common Small Bore Pipe Supports Modification Summary Table 5-5 Seismic Category II Small Bore Piping Over Seismic Category I Equipment Piping Checklist Table 5-6 PCHVP Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports -
Installation / Inspection Procedures Table 5-7 Seismic Category II Small Bore Piping Over Seismic Category I Equipment Pipe Support Checklist Table 5-8 Typical SWEC-PSAS Technical and Design Control Practices Table 5-9 Summary of SWEC Engineering Assurance Audits Table 5-10 Summary of TU Electric Audits
Installation / Inspection Procedures Table 5-7 Seismic Category II Small Bore Piping Over Seismic Category I Equipment Pipe Support Checklist Table 5-8 Typical SWEC-PSAS Technical and Design Control Practices Table 5-9 Summary of SWEC Engineering Assurance Audits Table 5-10 Summary of TU Electric Audits


==6.0       REFERENCES==
==6.0 REFERENCES==
6-1 O                                                   11
6-1 O
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Section   Tit 1e                                           Pay APPENDIX A COMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM (CPRT) AND           A-1 EXTERNAL ISSUES APPENDIX B ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING PERFORMANCE OF           B-1 THE CAP APPENDIX C PREVENTIVE ACTIONS                               C-1 w                                 lii
Section Tit 1e Pay APPENDIX A COMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM (CPRT) AND A-1 EXTERNAL ISSUES APPENDIX B ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING PERFORMANCE OF B-1 THE CAP APPENDIX C PREVENTIVE ACTIONS C-1 lii w


EXECUTIVE  
EXECUTIVE  


==SUMMARY==
==SUMMARY==
 
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            .Li l               This Project Status Report (PSR) summarizes the systematic validation process for safety-related small bore piping (2 in. nominal pipe size and smaller) and pipe supports implemented by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation - Pipe Stress Analysis and Support Project (SWEC-PSAS) at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), Unit I and Common     1
This Project Status Report (PSR) summarizes the systematic validation process for safety-related small bore piping (2 in. nominal pipe size and smaller) and pipe supports implemented by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation - Pipe Stress Analysis and Support Project (SWEC-PSAS) at Comanche Peak Steam Electric 1
                                                            . This Project Status Report (PSR) presents i                the results of the design validation and describes the Post-Construction Hard-l               ware Validation Program (PCHVP). SWEC-PSAS's activities were governed by the TU Electric Corrective Action Program (CAP) which required SWEC-PSAS to:
Station (CPSES), Unit I and Common. This Project Status Report (PSR) presents the results of the design validation and describes the Post-Construction Hard-i l
: 1. Establish a consistent set of CPSES safety-related piping and pipe support design criteria that complies with the CPSES licensing commitments.
ware Validation Program (PCHVP).
: 2. Produce a set of design control procedures that assures compliance with the design criteria.
SWEC-PSAS's activities were governed by the TU Electric Corrective Action Program (CAP) which required SWEC-PSAS to:
: 3. Evaluate systems, structures, and components, and direct the correc-tive actions recommended by the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and those determined by the Corrective Action Program (CAP) investi-gations to be necessary to demonstrate that systems, structures, and components are in conformance with the design.
1.
: 4. Assure that the validation resolves the piping-related design and O
Establish a consistent set of CPSES safety-related piping and pipe support design criteria that complies with the CPSES licensing commitments.
2.
Produce a set of design control procedures that assures compliance with the design criteria.
3.
Evaluate systems, structures, and components, and direct the correc-tive actions recommended by the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and those determined by the Corrective Action Program (CAP) investi-gations to be necessary to demonstrate that systems, structures, and components are in conformance with the design.
4.
Assure that the validation resolves the piping-related design and O
hardware issues identified by the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT),
2
(_/
(_/
hardware issues identified by the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT),
external sources, and the Corrective Action Program (CAP).
external sources 2, and the Corrective Action Program (CAP).
2 Common refers to areas in CPSES that contain both Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems, structures, and components 2External issues are issues identified by the following:
2 Common refers to areas in CPSES that contain both Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems, structures, and components 2
External issues are issues identified by the following:
NRC Staff Special Review Team (SRT-NRC)
NRC Staff Special Review Team (SRT-NRC)
NRC Staff Special Inspection Team (SIT)
NRC Staff Special Inspection Team (SIT)
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NRC Region IV Inspection Reports NRC Staff Technical Review Team (TRT) [SSERs 7-11]
NRC Region IV Inspection Reports NRC Staff Technical Review Team (TRT) [SSERs 7-11]
CYGNA Independent Assessment Program (IAP)
CYGNA Independent Assessment Program (IAP)
Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT)             issues are issues identified by the following:
Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) issues are issues identified by the following:
CPRT Design Adequacy Program (DAP)
CPRT Design Adequacy Program (DAP)
CPRT Quality of Construction Program (QOC) n                                               iv
CPRT Quality of Construction Program (QOC) n iv J
_ _ _ _ __                                                                                                                  J


                                                                                                                      )
)
O       5. Validate that the design of safety-related piping systems is in con-i             formance with the licensing commitments and that the installed hard-ware is in conformance with the validated design.
O 5.
: 6. Produce a set of consistent and validated design documentation.
Validate that the design of safety-related piping systems is in con-i formance with the licensing commitments and that the installed hard-ware is in conformance with the validated design.
A consistent set of design criteria for CPSES safety-related piping and pipe supports has been developed and used by SWEC-PSAS for the design validation process. This set of design criteria and methodologies is in conformance with the CPSES licensing commitments.       It has been independently and extensively reviewed and was accepted by Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and by CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA).
6.
Produce a set of consistent and validated design documentation.
A consistent set of design criteria for CPSES safety-related piping and pipe supports has been developed and used by SWEC-PSAS for the design validation process.
This set of design criteria and methodologies is in conformance with the CPSES licensing commitments.
It has been independently and extensively reviewed and was accepted by Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and by CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA).
SWEC-PSAS established design control procedures to implement the design crite-ria and methodologies described above, and to govern the work flow and techni-cal interfaces with other disciplines, for both the design and hardware validation processes. These procedures specify the processes (such as the val-idation of piping system inputs, piping and pipe support checklists, documen-tation control, and final reconciliation) that have been implemented throughout the safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Pro-gram (CAP).
SWEC-PSAS established design control procedures to implement the design crite-ria and methodologies described above, and to govern the work flow and techni-cal interfaces with other disciplines, for both the design and hardware validation processes. These procedures specify the processes (such as the val-idation of piping system inputs, piping and pipe support checklists, documen-tation control, and final reconciliation) that have been implemented throughout the safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Pro-gram (CAP).
SWEC-PSAS has performed analyses to validate the design of as-built CPSES Unit I and Common safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports.3 The results are documented in 457 pipe stress analysis packages 4 that contain ap-proximately 6,630 pipe supports.       The as-built hardware for safety-related b)
SWEC-PSAS has performed analyses to validate the design of as-built CPSES Unit I and Common safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports.3 The 4 that contain ap-results are documented in 457 pipe stress analysis packages proximately 6,630 pipe supports.
V small bore piping and pipe supports is being validated to the design by the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP).
The as-built hardware for safety-related b) small bore piping and pipe supports is being validated to the design by the V
Methodologies have been incorporated into the SWEC-PSAS design criteria and the                                     ,
Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP).
Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) implementation procedures which have resolved the piping-related design and hardware issues identified by the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT), external sources, and the Corrective Action Program (CAP). Consequently, the validated design of the CPSES safety-related small bore pipe and pipe supports has resolved these piping-related issues.
Methodologies have been incorporated into the SWEC-PSAS design criteria and the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) implementation procedures which have resolved the piping-related design and hardware issues identified by the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT), external sources, and the Corrective Action Program (CAP).
  " Analysis of the ASME Section III Code Class 1 small bore piping for the Cor-rective Action Program (CAP) was performed by Westinghouse, except one small bore pipe stress analysis package was performed by SWEC-PSAS. SWEC performed the analysis of the ASFE Section III Code Class 1 pipe supports as well as the                                   l' ASME Section III Code Class 2 and 3 piping and pipe supports.
Consequently, the validated design of the CPSES safety-related small bore pipe and pipe supports has resolved these piping-related issues.
4 The term " pipe stress analysis package" is used in this Project Status Report to describe the engineering documentation required to validate the design adequacy of piping.
" Analysis of the ASME Section III Code Class 1 small bore piping for the Cor-rective Action Program (CAP) was performed by Westinghouse, except one small bore pipe stress analysis package was performed by SWEC-PSAS.
SWEC performed the analysis of the ASFE Section III Code Class 1 pipe supports as well as the l
ASME Section III Code Class 2 and 3 piping and pipe supports.
4The term " pipe stress analysis package" is used in this Project Status Report to describe the engineering documentation required to validate the design adequacy of piping.
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i p                                           The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) assures that the safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports are installed in conformance with the validated design.                 SWEC-PSAS has reviewed and revised the CPSES piping-related               installation   specifications,                                           construction   procedures, and reviewed quality control inspection procedures to assure that the validated design requirements are implemented. The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP)               for safety-related small bore piping ' and pipe supports, including the . inspections, engineering walkdowns and evaluations, implemt.nts the corrective actions recommended by the: Comanche Peak Response -Team (CPRT),
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The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) assures that the safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports are installed in conformance with the validated design.
SWEC-PSAS has reviewed and revised the CPSES piping-related installation specifications, construction procedures, and reviewed quality control inspection procedures to assure that the validated design requirements are implemented. The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) for safety-related small bore piping ' and pipe supports, including the. inspections, engineering walkdowns and evaluations, implemt.nts the corrective actions recommended by the: Comanche Peak Response -Team (CPRT),
as well as those required by Corrective Action Program (CAP) investigations.
as well as those required by Corrective Action Program (CAP) investigations.
SWEC-PSAS will provide TU Electric a complete set of validated design documen-tation for CPSES safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports, including the pipe stress and pipe support calculations, drawings, and interface disci-pline transmittals. This documentation, in conjunction with the updated speci-fications and procedures,                 can provide the basis for CPSES configuration contro15 to facilitate maintenance and operation throughout the life of the plant.
SWEC-PSAS will provide TU Electric a complete set of validated design documen-tation for CPSES safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports, including the pipe stress and pipe support calculations, drawings, and interface disci-pline transmittals. This documentation, in conjunction with the updated speci-fications and procedures, can provide the basis for CPSES configuration contro15 to facilitate maintenance and operation throughout the life of the plant.
In-depth quality and technical audits have been performed by SWEC Quality Assurance, TU Electric Quality Assurance, and the independent Engineering                                                                 ,
In-depth quality and technical audits have been performed by SWEC Quality Assurance, TU Electric Quality Assurance, and the independent Engineering Functional Evaluations (EFE).
Functional Evaluations (EFE). These audits, in addition to the third party overview performed by TENERA,                 L.P. (TERA) for Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT), assured that the SWEC-PSAS procedures and the established design criteria complied with the licensing commitments.                                                                                         t O                                           The Unit 1 and Common safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports Cor-rective Action Program (CAP) validates that:
These audits, in addition to the third party overview performed by TENERA, L.P.
* The design of the small bore piping and pipe supports complies with                                                 i the CPSES licensing commitments.
(TERA) for Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT), assured that the SWEC-PSAS procedures and the established design criteria complied with the licensing commitments.
* The as-built safety-related small bore piping and supports comply with the validated design.
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* The small bore piping and pipe supports comply with the CPSES licens-ing commitments and will perform their safety-related functions.
The Unit 1 and Common safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports Cor-rective Action Program (CAP) validates that:
The design of the small bore piping and pipe supports complies with i
the CPSES licensing commitments.
The as-built safety-related small bore piping and supports comply with the validated design.
The small bore piping and pipe supports comply with the CPSES licens-ing commitments and will perform their safety-related functions.
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i configuration control is a system to assure that the design and hardware                                                                 j remain in compliance with the licensing commitments throughout the life of the                                                           1 plant.
i configuration control is a system to assure that the design and hardware j
remain in compliance with the licensing commitments throughout the life of the 1
plant.
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f q                                    ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS V
f ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS q
AISC                   American Institute of Steel Construction ANSI                   American National Standards Institute ARS                   Amplified Response Spectra ASLB                   Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ASME Section III American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler                                                     j and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1, Nuclear Power Plant Components                                                             ]
V AISC American Institute of Steel Construction ANSI American National Standards Institute ARS Amplified Response Spectra ASLB Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ASME Section III American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler j
BRP                   Piping Isometric Drawing                                                                     j CAP                   Corrective Action Program (TU Electric)
and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1, Nuclear Power Plant Components
CASE                   Citizens Association for Sound Energy CAT                   Construction Assessment Team (NRC)                                                           i CFR                   Code of Federal Regulations CMC                   Component Modification Card CPE                   Comanche Peak Engineering (TU Electric)
]
CPPP                   Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPRT                   Comanche Peak Response Team (TU Electric)
BRP Piping Isometric Drawing j
CPSES                 Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station CYGNA                 CYGNA Energy Services DAP                   Design Adequacy Program (CPRT)
CAP Corrective Action Program (TU Electric)
DBCP                   Design Basis Consolidation Program (SVEC-PSAS)
CASE Citizens Association for Sound Energy CAT Construction Assessment Team (NRC) i CFR Code of Federal Regulations CMC Component Modification Card CPE Comanche Peak Engineering (TU Electric)
DBD                   Design Basis Document                                                                       l DCA                   Design Change Authorization                                                                 3 DIR                   Discrepancy / Issue Resolution Report (CPRT-DAP)
CPPP Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPRT Comanche Peak Response Team (TU Electric)
(9
CPSES Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station CYGNA CYGNA Energy Services DAP Design Adequacy Program (CPRT)
  \,_/
DBCP Design Basis Consolidation Program (SVEC-PSAS)
DR DSAP Deviation Report Discipline Specific Action Plan (CPRT)
DBD Design Basis Document l
DVP                   Design Validation Package DWG                   Design Drawing EA                     Engineering Assurance (SWEC)
3 DCA Design Change Authorization DIR Discrepancy / Issue Resolution Report (CPRT-DAP)
Ebasco                 Ebasco Services Incorporated EFE                   Engineering Functional Evaluation FSAR                   Final Safety Analysis Report FVM                   Field Verification Method GIR                   Generic Issues Report HELB                   High-Energy Line Break HVAC                   Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning IAP                   Independent Assessment Program (CYGNA)                                                         ,
(9 DR Deviation Report
IEB                   Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin (NRC)                                                   j Impell                 Impell Corporation ISAP                   Issue-Specific Action Plan (CPRT)
\\,_/
IWA                   Integral Welded Attachment LOCA                   Loss-of-Coolant Accident MELC                   Moderate Energy Line Crack NCR                   Nonconformance Report NOV                   Notice of Violation (NRC)
DSAP Discipline Specific Action Plan (CPRT)
NRC                   United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission V                                                 vii l
DVP Design Validation Package DWG Design Drawing EA Engineering Assurance (SWEC)
Ebasco Ebasco Services Incorporated EFE Engineering Functional Evaluation FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report FVM Field Verification Method GIR Generic Issues Report HELB High-Energy Line Break HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning IAP Independent Assessment Program (CYGNA)
IEB Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin (NRC) j Impell Impell Corporation ISAP Issue-Specific Action Plan (CPRT)
IWA Integral Welded Attachment LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident MELC Moderate Energy Line Crack NCR Nonconformance Report NOV Notice of Violation (NRC)
NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission V
vii l


q                                                                   NRR       Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRC)
q NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRC)
Nuclear Steam Supply System (Westinghouse)
Q NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System (Westinghouse)
Q                                                                  NSSS NUREG     NRC Document NUREG/CR NRC Document Developed by NRC Contractor PCHVP     Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program PM       Project Memorandum PSAS     Pipe Stress Analysis and Support PSR       Project Status Report PWR       Pressurized Water Reactor                           l QA       Quality Assurance                                   j QAAD     Quality Assurance Auditing Division (SWEC)
NUREG NRC Document NUREG/CR NRC Document Developed by NRC Contractor PCHVP Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program PM Project Memorandum PSAS Pipe Stress Analysis and Support PSR Project Status Report PWR Pressurized Water Reactor l
QC       Quality Control QOC       Quality of Construction and QA/QC Adequacy Program (CPRT)
QA Quality Assurance j
RIL       Review Issue List (CYGNA)
QAAD Quality Assurance Auditing Division (SWEC)
SDAR     Significant Deficiency Analysis Report (TU Electric)
QC Quality Control QOC Quality of Construction and QA/QC Adequacy Program (CPRT)
SER       Safety Evaluation Report (NRC, NUREG-0797)
RIL Review Issue List (CYGNA)
SIT       Special Inspection Team (NRC Staff)
SDAR Significant Deficiency Analysis Report (TU Electric)
SRT       Senior Review Team (CPRT)
SER Safety Evaluation Report (NRC, NUREG-0797)
SRT-NRC   Special Review Team (NRC)
SIT Special Inspection Team (NRC Staff)
SSE       Safe Shutdown Earthquake SSER     Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (NRC, NUREG-0797)
SRT Senior Review Team (CPRT)
SWEC     Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation SWEC-PSAS Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation - Pipe Stress and Support Project
SRT-NRC Special Review Team (NRC)
(                                                                   TAP       Technical Audit Program (TU Electric) k                                                                   TERA     TENERA, L. P.
SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SSER Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (NRC, NUREG-0797)
TET       Thermal Expansion Testing TRT       Technical Review Team (NRC Staff, SSERs 7-11)
SWEC Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation SWEC-PSAS Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation - Pipe Stress and Support Project
UT       Ultrasonic Testing VMG       Vibration Monitoring Group VPB       Vendor Program Branch (NRC) vitt
(
TAP Technical Audit Program (TU Electric) k TERA TENERA, L. P.
TET Thermal Expansion Testing TRT Technical Review Team (NRC Staff, SSERs 7-11)
UT Ultrasonic Testing VMG Vibration Monitoring Group VPB Vendor Program Branch (NRC) vitt


  ,m          
,m


==1.0   INTRODUCTION==
==1.0 INTRODUCTION==
 
k In October 1984, TU Electric established the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) to evaluate issues that have been raised at CPSES and to prepare a plan for resolving those issues.
k           In October 1984, TU Electric established the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) to evaluate issues that have been raised at CPSES and to prepare a plan for resolving those issues.     The Comanche 2cak Response Team (CPRT) program plan was developed and submitted to the NRC.
The Comanche 2cak Response Team (CPRT) program plan was developed and submitted to the NRC.
In mid-1986, TU Electric performed a qualitative and quantitative review of the preliminary results of the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) (References 79 and 84) . This review identified that the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) issues were very broad in scope and included each discipline.         TU Electric decided that the appropriate method to correct the issues r.aised and to identi-fy and correct any other issues that potentially existed at CPSES would be through one integrated program rather than a separate program for each issue.
In mid-1986, TU Electric performed a qualitative and quantitative review of the preliminary results of the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) (References 79 and 84).
This review identified that the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) issues were very broad in scope and included each discipline.
TU Electric decided that the appropriate method to correct the issues r.aised and to identi-fy and correct any other issues that potentially existed at CPSES would be through one integrated program rather than a separate program for each issue.
TUElectricdecidedtoinitiateacomprehensiveCorrectiveActionProgram(CAPg (Reference 49) to validate the entirety of CPSES safety-related designs.1, The scope of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) has the following objectives:
TUElectricdecidedtoinitiateacomprehensiveCorrectiveActionProgram(CAPg (Reference 49) to validate the entirety of CPSES safety-related designs.1, The scope of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) has the following objectives:
* Demonstrate that the design of safety-related systems, structures and components complies with licensing commitments.
Demonstrate that the design of safety-related systems, structures and components complies with licensing commitments.
* Demonstrate that the existing systems, structures and components are in compliance with the design; or develop modifications which will bring systems, structures, and components into compliance with design.
Demonstrate that the existing systems, structures and components are in compliance with the design; or develop modifications which will bring systems, structures, and components into compliance with design.
  /
(7,/
* Develop procedures, an organizational plan, and documentation to (7,/                   maintain compliance with licensing commitments throughout the life of CPSES.
maintain compliance with licensing commitments throughout the life of Develop procedures, an organizational plan, and documentation to
/
CPSES.
The Corrective Action Program (CAP) is thus a comprehensive program to validate both the design and the hardware at CPSES, including resolution of specific Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues.
The Corrective Action Program (CAP) is thus a comprehensive program to validate both the design and the hardware at CPSES, including resolution of specific Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues.
IPortions of selected nonsafety-related systems, structures and components are included in the Corrective Action Program (CAP).       These are Seismic Cate-gory II systems, structures and components, and Fire Protection Systems.
IPortions of selected nonsafety-related systems, structures and components are included in the Corrective Action Program (CAP).
These are Seismic Cate-gory II systems, structures and components, and Fire Protection Systems.
2 Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) design and vendor hardware design and their respective QA/QC programs are reviewed by the NRC independently of CPSES, and are not included in the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as noted in SSER 13; however, the design interface is validated by the CAP.
2 Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) design and vendor hardware design and their respective QA/QC programs are reviewed by the NRC independently of CPSES, and are not included in the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as noted in SSER 13; however, the design interface is validated by the CAP.
    \
\\
  \*)                                                   1-1
\\*)
1-1


r l
r l
l /-~s                       TU Electric contracted and provided overall management to Stone & Webster Engi-( '')                     neering Corporation (SWEC), Ebasco Services Incorporated (Ebasco), and Impell                         i Corporation (Impell) to implement the Corrective Action Program (CAP) and di-                         I vided the CAP into eleven disciplines as follows:
l
/-~s TU Electric contracted and provided overall management to Stone & Webster Engi-( '')
neering Corporation (SWEC), Ebasco Services Incorporated (Ebasco), and Impell i
Corporation (Impell) to implement the Corrective Action Program (CAP) and di-I vided the CAP into eleven disciplines as follows:
l l
l l
Discipline                               Responsible Contractor                                 l Mechanical                               SWEC                                                 !
Discipline Responsible Contractor l
                                    -Systems Interaction                     Ebasco
Mechanical SWEC
                                    -Fire Protection                         Impell Civil / Structural                       SWEC Electrical                               SWEC Instrumentation & Control                 SWEC Large Bore Piping and Pipe               SWEC-PSAS Supports Cable Tray and Cable Tray Hangers       Ebasco/Impell                                         '
-Systems Interaction Ebasco
Conduit Supports Trains A,B, & C >2"     Ebasco Conduit Supports Train C < 2"             Impell Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports       SWEC-PSAS Heating, Ventilating, and Air           Ebasco Conditioning (HVAC)
-Fire Protection Impell Civil / Structural SWEC Electrical SWEC Instrumentation & Control SWEC Large Bore Piping and Pipe SWEC-PSAS Supports Cable Tray and Cable Tray Hangers Ebasco/Impell Conduit Supports Trains A,B, & C >2" Ebasco Conduit Supports Train C < 2" Impell Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports SWEC-PSAS Heating, Ventilating, and Air Ebasco Conditioning (HVAC)
Equipment Qualification                   Impell A Design Basis Consolidation Program (DBCP) (Reference 30) was developed to define the methodology by which SWEC - Pipe Stress and Support Project (SWEC-PSAS) performed the design and hardware validation. The approach of this DBCP f-~g                       is consistent with other contractors' efforts and products.
Equipment Qualification Impell A Design Basis Consolidation Program (DBCP) (Reference 30) was developed to define the methodology by which SWEC - Pipe Stress and Support Project (SWEC-PSAS) performed the design and hardware validation. The approach of this DBCP f-~g is consistent with other contractors' efforts and products.
U                         The design validation portion of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) identified the design-related licensing commitments. The design criteria were developed from the licensing commitments and consolidated in the Design Basis Documents (DBDs) (References 1, 2, 3, 61, and 62). The DBDs identify the design criteria for the design validation effort. If the existing design did not satisfy the design criteria, it was modified to satisfy the criteria.       The design valida-tion effort for each of the eleven Corrective Action Program (CAP) disciplines is documented in Design Validation Packages (DVPs).         The Design Validation Packages (DVPs) provide the documented assurance (e.g. , calculations and draw-ings) that the validated design meets the licensing commitments, including res-olution of all Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues.
U The design validation portion of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) identified the design-related licensing commitments.
The design validation effort revised the installation specifications to reflect the validated design requirements. The validated installation specifications also contain the inspection requirements necessary to assure that the as-built hardware complies with the validated design.
The design criteria were developed from the licensing commitments and consolidated in the Design Basis Documents (DBDs) (References 1, 2, 3, 61, and 62).
The DBDs identify the design criteria for the design validation effort.
If the existing design did not satisfy the design criteria, it was modified to satisfy the criteria.
The design valida-tion effort for each of the eleven Corrective Action Program (CAP) disciplines is documented in Design Validation Packages (DVPs).
The Design Validation Packages (DVPs) provide the documented assurance (e.g., calculations and draw-ings) that the validated design meets the licensing commitments, including res-olution of all Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues.
The design validation effort revised the installation specifications to reflect the validated design requirements.
The validated installation specifications also contain the inspection requirements necessary to assure that the as-built hardware complies with the validated design.
The hardware validation portion cf the Corrective Action Program (CAP) is im-plemented by the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP), which demonstrates that existing systems, structures, and components are in compli-ance with the installation specifications (validated design), including the modifications that are necessary to bring the hardware into compliance with the validated design.
The hardware validation portion cf the Corrective Action Program (CAP) is im-plemented by the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP), which demonstrates that existing systems, structures, and components are in compli-ance with the installation specifications (validated design), including the modifications that are necessary to bring the hardware into compliance with the validated design.
(D 1-2
(D 1-2


The results of the performance of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) for each discipline are described in a-Project Status Report (PSR). This Project Status
The results of the performance of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) for each
[\ /}  Report (PSR) describes the results for the Small Bore Piping and Pipe Sup-ports - Corrective Action Program (CAP).
[\\ /}
discipline are described in a-Project Status Report (PSR).
This Project Status Report (PSR) describes the results for the Small Bore Piping and Pipe Sup-ports - Corrective Action Program (CAP).
SWEC-PSAS has performed a comprehensive design validation of safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) in order to demonstrate that the design of piping systems and supports.
SWEC-PSAS has performed a comprehensive design validation of safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) in order to demonstrate that the design of piping systems and supports.
complies with licensing commitments, and is performing the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) to demonstrate that the as-built piping and pipe supports comply with the validated design.                   SWEC-PSAS was initially con-tracted by TU Electric in 1985 to validate small bore piping and pipe supports at CPSES. When the TU Electric Corrective Action Program was created in 1986, it incorporated and expanded the exicting SWEC-PSAS program. The validation process is conducted in accordance with the Piping - Design Basis Consolidation Program (Piping-DBCP), which controls implementation of the piping portion of the TU Electric Corrective Action Program (CAP).                   The Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports - Corrective Action Program (CAP) encompassed the Comanche Peak Response Team Action Plan DSAP IX, Piping and Pipe Supports Discipline Specific Action Plan (CPRT-DSAP IX) (Reference 4). The Small Bore Piping and Pipe Sup-ports - Corrective Action Program (CAP), shown schematically in Figure 1-1, was developed by SWEC-PSAS to implement the corrective actions for the small bore piping and pipe supports discipline following the directions specified in the TU Electric's Corrective Action Program (CAP).               The design bases of the Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports - Corrective Action Program (CAP) are contained within a consolidated set of CPSES Design Basis Documents (DBDs) for safety-related piping and pipe supports.                                                                   ;
complies with licensing commitments, and is performing the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) to demonstrate that the as-built piping and pipe supports comply with the validated design.
.O'     Validation of the CPSES small bore piping and pipe supports is . accomplished by pipe stress and pipe support analyses and implementation of required field mod-ifications. The results and the methodology used in implementing both the de-sign and hardware-related validations for Unit 1 and Common small bore piping
SWEC-PSAS was initially con-tracted by TU Electric in 1985 to validate small bore piping and pipe supports at CPSES.
      .and pipe supports are presented in this Project Status Report (PSR).
When the TU Electric Corrective Action Program was created in 1986, it incorporated and expanded the exicting SWEC-PSAS program.
This Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Project Status Report (PSR) represents a road map of the validation effort from the early stages of design criteria development through the establishment and implementation of the detailed design and design control procedures.       The report traces the updating of design /
The validation process is conducted in accordance with the Piping - Design Basis Consolidation Program (Piping-DBCP), which controls implementation of the piping portion of the TU Electric Corrective Action Program (CAP).
The Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports - Corrective Action Program (CAP) encompassed the Comanche Peak Response Team Action Plan DSAP IX, Piping and Pipe Supports Discipline Specific Action Plan (CPRT-DSAP IX) (Reference 4).
The Small Bore Piping and Pipe Sup-ports - Corrective Action Program (CAP), shown schematically in Figure 1-1, was developed by SWEC-PSAS to implement the corrective actions for the small bore piping and pipe supports discipline following the directions specified in the TU Electric's Corrective Action Program (CAP).
The design bases of the Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports - Corrective Action Program (CAP) are contained within a consolidated set of CPSES Design Basis Documents (DBDs) for safety-related piping and pipe supports.
.O' Validation of the CPSES small bore piping and pipe supports is. accomplished by pipe stress and pipe support analyses and implementation of required field mod-ifications.
The results and the methodology used in implementing both the de-sign and hardware-related validations for Unit 1 and Common small bore piping
.and pipe supports are presented in this Project Status Report (PSR).
This Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Project Status Report (PSR) represents a road map of the validation effort from the early stages of design criteria development through the establishment and implementation of the detailed design and design control procedures.
The report traces the updating of design /
installation specifications, construction and Quality Control (QC) procedures, the implementation of the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) to validate the as-built piping and pipe support design, and the completion of the Unit 1 and Common small bore pipe stress analysis packages and pipe support calculations.
installation specifications, construction and Quality Control (QC) procedures, the implementation of the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) to validate the as-built piping and pipe support design, and the completion of the Unit 1 and Common small bore pipe stress analysis packages and pipe support calculations.
1-3
1-3


FIGURE 1-1 SMALL BORE PIPING AND PlPE SUPPORT l
FIGURE 1-1 SMALL BORE PIPING AND PlPE SUPPORT
((~                                                                 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)
((~
IDENTIFY LICENSING   I                         FSAR COMMITMENTS     'd                         OTHER LICENSING DOCUMENTS DEVELOP DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS (DBDs)
CORRECTIVE ACTION l
PERFORM DESIGN     I                           CPRT (DAP & 000) ISSUES           ;
PROGRAM (CAP)
VALIDATION       y                           EXTERNAL ISSUES:                 l
IDENTIFY LICENSING I
                                                                                                          -NRC (SRT, SIT, TRT, C AT)
FSAR COMMITMENTS
                                                                                                          -CYGN A (IAP)
'd OTHER LICENSING DOCUMENTS DEVELOP DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS (DBDs)
                                                                                                          -CASE ASLB
PERFORM DESIGN I
                                                                                                          .NRC INSPECTION REPORTS
CPRT (DAP & 000) ISSUES VALIDATION y
                                                              ,g MODIFICATION N YES   L         DESIGN r     MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED
EXTERNAL ISSUES:
                                                          ~e u                                             ,
l
I POST CONSTRUCTION                                                                   l 2       BUILD / INSPECT                                     j H ARDWARE VALIDATION   '        MODIFICATION PROGR AM (PCHVP)                                                                 J FINAL DESIGN                                                                   l l
-NRC (SRT, SIT, TRT, C AT)
RECONCILIATION lS YES       ADDITIONAL                                                                     l VALIDATION                                                                     j REQUIRED                                                                     i
-CYGN A (IAP)
                                                                ?
-CASE ASLB
O                                               NO l
.NRC INSPECTION REPORTS
I FINAL DOCUMENTATION                                                                 l (DESIGN VALIDATION PACKAGES)
,g MODIFICATION N YES L
DESIGN r
MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED
~e u
I POST CONSTRUCTION l
2 BUILD / INSPECT j
H ARDWARE VALIDATION MODIFICATION PROGR AM (PCHVP)
J FINAL DESIGN l
l RECONCILIATION lS YES ADDITIONAL l
VALIDATION j
REQUIRED i
?
O NO l
I FINAL DOCUMENTATION l
(DESIGN VALIDATION PACKAGES)
CH47 6FT
CH47 6FT


l 2.0 PURPOSE                                                                               )
l 2.0 PURPOSE
O   The purpose of this ' Project Status Report (PSR) is to demonstrate _ that the safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports in Unit I and Common are in conformance with the CPSES licensing commitments, satisfy the design criteria, and will satisfactorily perform their safety-related functions.
)
O The purpose of this ' Project Status Report (PSR) is to demonstrate _ that the safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports in Unit I and Common are in conformance with the CPSES licensing commitments, satisfy the design criteria, and will satisfactorily perform their safety-related functions.
I i
I i
I
I
                                                                                              )
)
O 4
O 4
l l
l l
I i
I i
1 0                                           2-1                                                 )
1 0
l l
2-1
)
l


3.0 SCOPE
3.0 SCOPE
\_ /         The scope of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) implemented for CPSES Unit 1 and Common small bore piping and pipe supports as summarized in this Project Status Report (PSR) includes:
\\_ /
: 1. Seismic Category I I
The scope of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) implemented for CPSES Unit 1 and Common small bore piping and pipe supports as summarized in this Project Status Report (PSR) includes:
* ASME Section III Code Class       1, 2, and 3 piping and pipe supports.
I 1.
: 2. Seismic Category II 2
Seismic Category I ASME Section III Code Class 1,
* Piping and supports required to be included as extensions of a Seismic Category I Pipe Stress Analysis Package.
2, and 3 piping and pipe supports.
* Piping and supports of high and moderate energy lines which are computer analyzed (for break and crack postul.ation purposes).
2 2.
* Other piping and     supports   as defined in the CPSES FSAR (Reference 26), the failure of which could cause damage to Seis-mic Category I structures, systems, or components.
Seismic Category II Piping and supports required to be included as extensions of a Seismic Category I Pipe Stress Analysis Package.
Piping and supports of high and moderate energy lines which are computer analyzed (for break and crack postul.ation purposes).
Other piping and supports as defined in the CPSES FSAR (Reference 26), the failure of which could cause damage to Seis-mic Category I structures, systems, or components.
The CPSES Piping and Pipe Supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) is shown schematically in Figure 1-1 and discussed below. The program requires:
The CPSES Piping and Pipe Supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) is shown schematically in Figure 1-1 and discussed below. The program requires:
f-'s                 1. Establishment of small bore piping and pipe support design criteria
f-'s 1.
(,          )             which comply with licensing commitments.
Establishment of small bore piping and pipe support design criteria
v
(
: 2. Development of the Design Basis Documents (DBDs) for CPSES small bore piping and pipe supports, which contain the design criteria.       These TStructures, systems, and components that are designed and constructed to with-stand the effects of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and remain functional are designated as Seismic Category I in accordance with the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29 (Reference 78). All ASME Section III Code     Class 1, 2, and 3 piping and pipe supports in CPSES are Seismic Category I.
)
2 Those portions of structures, systems, or components whose continued function is not required, but whose failure could reduce the functioning of any Seismic Category I system or component required to satisfy the requirements of Regula-tory Guide 1.29 to an unacceptable safety level or could result in incapaci-tating injury to occupants of the control room, are designated Seismic Cate-gory II and are designed and constructed so that the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) would not cause such failure.
which comply with licensing commitments.
}         h I           h
,v 2.
\.J                                                     3-1
Development of the Design Basis Documents (DBDs) for CPSES small bore piping and pipe supports, which contain the design criteria.
These TStructures, systems, and components that are designed and constructed to with-stand the effects of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and remain functional are designated as Seismic Category I in accordance with the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29 (Reference 78).
All ASME Section III Code Class 1, 2, and 3 piping and pipe supports in CPSES are Seismic Category I.
Those portions of structures, systems, or components whose continued function 2
is not required, but whose failure could reduce the functioning of any Seismic Category I system or component required to satisfy the requirements of Regula-tory Guide 1.29 to an unacceptable safety level or could result in incapaci-tating injury to occupants of the control room, are designated Seismic Cate-gory II and are designed and constructed so that the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) would not cause such failure.
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Design Basis Documents (DBDs) pro 7ide the basis for corrective and
                                                                                                        '    ~(
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      ,'                    Design Basis Documents (DBDs) pro 7ide the basis for corrective and preventive actions through the life of the plant.           These documents V) also identify the updated design / installation specifications, Quality Control (QC)/ Construction procedures, and technical and design control procedures used in the Salidation process.
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: 3. Implementation of design and hardware validations, consisting of analysis, identification and implementation of necessary modifica-tions, and field verifications as identified in the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP). The as-built design of all small bore piping and pipe supports is validated by Quality Control (QC) inspections, engineering walkdowns, and engineering evaluations.
o preventive actions through the life of the plant.
These documents
!V) also identify the updated design / installation specifications, Quality Control (QC)/ Construction procedures, and technical and design control procedures used in the Salidation process.
3.
Implementation of design and hardware validations, consisting of analysis, identification and implementation of necessary modifica-tions, and field verifications as identified in the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP).
The as-built design of all small bore piping and pipe supports is validated by Quality Control (QC) inspections, engineering walkdowns, and engineering evaluations.
Analysis results are dociunented in Small Bore Piping Design Valida-tion Packages (DVPs).
Analysis results are dociunented in Small Bore Piping Design Valida-tion Packages (DVPs).
: 4. Resolution of[the design and hardware-relatUd issues of CPSES small bore piping,and pipe nupports and implementation of a corrective ac-tion plan for closure of these issues. These isrees include external issues, Comanche Peak Resper.oe Teem (CPRT) issues, and issues identi-fied during the . ' performance 'if the Corrective Action Program (CAP)
4.
Resolution of[the design and hardware-relatUd issues of CPSES small bore piping,and pipe nupports and implementation of a corrective ac-tion plan for closure of these issues.
These isrees include external issues, Comanche Peak Resper.oe Teem (CPRT) issues, and issues identi-fied during the. ' performance 'if the Corrective Action Program (CAP)
(See Section 4.0).
(See Section 4.0).
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: 5. The validated design documentation forms the basis for< configuration control of CPSES small bore piping and pipe supports. The validated design documentation and updated procedures /r. specifications will be provided to TU Electric to facilitate operation, maintenance, and A
The validated design documentation forms the basis for< configuration control of CPSES small bore piping and pipe supports. The validated design documentation and updated procedures /r. specifications will be provided to TU Electric to facilitate operation, maintenance, and A
e    t future modifications following issuance of an operating license.
future modifications following issuance of an operating license.
Within Section 5.1, Section 5.1.1 describes the methodology by chich the CPSES                       i licensing commitments were identified, the design criterla were established, and the procedures were developed. These technical and design control proce-dures, in conjuncti_on with the CPSES quality assurance procedures and design and installation d ecifications that were updated to me'et'the corrective ac-tions for small bore piping and supports, are ektsolidated in the CPSES De11gn Basis Documents (DBDs).                                       /
e t
Section S.1.2 describes the design velidation process, including,the calcula-tion input / output ren ews and inter {aci requirements with other di'sciplines ,
Within Section 5.1, Section 5.1.1 describes the methodology by chich the CPSES i
and the preoperationti testing program.                                                             J f
licensing commitments were identified, the design criterla were established, and the procedures were developed.
Section 5.1.3     describes the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) process and the procedures .for field verifications (inspections, engi-neering walkdowns, and engineering evaluatiom) required to be implemented to validate that the as-built small .bere piping and 1,ipe supports are in compli-ance .wlth the design documentation /
These technical and design control proce-dures, in conjuncti_on with the CPSES quality assurance procedures and design updated to me'et'the corrective ac-and installation d ecifications that were tions for small bore piping and supports, are ektsolidated in the CPSES De11gn Basis Documents (DBDs).
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Section S.1.2 describes the design velidation process, including,the calcula-tion input / output ren ews and inter {aci requirements with other di'sciplines,
and the preoperationti testing program.
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Section 5.1.3 describes the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) process and the procedures.for field verifications (inspections, engi-neering walkdowns, and engineering evaluatiom) required to be implemented to validate that the as-built small.bere piping and 1,ipe supports are in compli-ance.wlth the design documentation /
Section 5.2 presents a summary of the design validation and Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) results. including the hardware modifica-tions resulting from the Corrective Action Program (CAP).
Section 5.2 presents a summary of the design validation and Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) results. including the hardware modifica-tions resulting from the Corrective Action Program (CAP).
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Section 5.3 describes the quality assurance program implemented for the valiaa-
Section 5.3 describes the quality assurance program implemented for the valiaa-
['') tion process, including the SWEC Engineering Assurance audits, the Engineering (s / Functional Evaluation (EFE) audits, and the TU Electric Technical Auditing Pro-gram audits.
['')
tion process, including the SWEC Engineering Assurance audits, the Engineering (s /
Functional Evaluation (EFE) audits, and the TU Electric Technical Auditing Pro-gram audits.
Section 5.4 describes the SWEC-PSAS inputs to the TU Electric preventive ac-tions including the training of TU Electric Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) personnel and the transfer of a complete set of the validated design documen-tation and procedures to CPE. These procedures can provide the basis for CPSES configuration control throughout the life of the plant.
Section 5.4 describes the SWEC-PSAS inputs to the TU Electric preventive ac-tions including the training of TU Electric Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) personnel and the transfer of a complete set of the validated design documen-tation and procedures to CPE. These procedures can provide the basis for CPSES configuration control throughout the life of the plant.
The design of the Unit I and Common small bore piping and pipe supports has been validated as follows:
The design of the Unit I and Common small bore piping and pipe supports has been validated as follows:
Number of Small Bore Pipe Stress       Number of Description                     Analysis Packages       Pipe Supports Unit 1 and Common - ASME         455 (SWEC-PSAS)         6,626 (SWEC-PSAS)
Number of Small Bore Pipe Stress Number of Description Analysis Packages Pipe Supports Unit 1 and Common - ASME 455 (SWEC-PSAS) 6,626 (SWEC-PSAS)
Section III Code Class 2 and 3 (Seismic Category I)
Section III Code Class 2 and 3 (Seismic Category I)
Unit I and Common - ASME           1 (Westinghouse)           3 (SWEC-PSAS)
Unit I and Common - ASME 1 (Westinghouse) 3 (SWEC-PSAS)
Section III Code Class 1           1 (SWEC-PSAS)               7 (SWEC-PSAS)
Section III Code Class 1 1 (SWEC-PSAS) 7 (SWEC-PSAS)
(Seismic Category I)
(Seismic Category I)
                ~s                   TOTAL               457                     6,636 Appendix A of this Project Status Report (PSR) describes the details of Correc-tive Action Program (CAP) resolution of the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues.
~s TOTAL 457 6,636 Appendix A of this Project Status Report (PSR) describes the details of Correc-tive Action Program (CAP) resolution of the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues.
Appendix B of this Project Status Report (PSR) describes the details of resolu-tions of issues identified during the performance of small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP). These issues are Significant Defi-ciency Analysis Reports (SDARs) (10CFR50.55(e)) (Reference 58) initiated by TU Electric.
Appendix B of this Project Status Report (PSR) describes the details of resolu-tions of issues identified during the performance of small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP).
These issues are Significant Defi-ciency Analysis Reports (SDARs) (10CFR50.55(e)) (Reference 58) initiated by TU Electric.
Appendix C of this Project Status Report (PSR) describes the preventive action taken resulting from the implementation of the small bore piping and pipe sup-ports Corrective Action Program (CAP).
Appendix C of this Project Status Report (PSR) describes the preventive action taken resulting from the implementation of the small bore piping and pipe sup-ports Corrective Action Program (CAP).
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                                          ) SPECIFIC ISSUES 1t'.                                                                                                                         l l                                 Th(small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) re-
) SPECIFIC ISSUES 1t'.
                    ; ,- solved all the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) issues, external issues, and                                                             '
l l
isshes identified during the performance of CAP. . Thin section presents a list'ing of piping-related issues addressed in this Project Status Report (PSR).
Th(small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) re-
Technical. review and resolution of external and Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT)Lissues are described in Appendix A, including responses to the NRC staff                                                   4 evaluatic>ns within the CFSESj Supplements to the Safety Evaluation Report (SER)                                             s
;,- solved all the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) issues, external issues, and isshes identified during the performance of CAP.. Thin section presents a list'ing of piping-related issues addressed in this Project Status Report (PSR).
  'I                             (Reference 28). Resolutions = and corrective action' taken for issues identified                                                 .
Technical. review and resolution of external and Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT)Lissues are described in Appendix A, including responses to the NRC staff 4
.;g-                             during the performance of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) are described in                                               ,
evaluatic>ns within the CFSESj Supplements to the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) s
l Q
'I (Reference 28).
    , \\                      r Appendix B.
Resolutions = and corrective action' taken for issues identified
I Y                .s        External issues were originally identified in the Large Bore Piping and Pipe Sigports* Generic Issues Report (GIR) (References 5 and '35). This Generic Is-4( [ ^ , ' uvs Report (GIR) was transmitted 'to NRC, Citizens Association for Sound Energy
.;g-during the performance of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) are described in l
[                                (CASE), ',iar_d CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA). Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) cont >; acted TENERA,              L.P. (TERA) to perform the Third Party overview (Refer-ence 19)/for the tdonpleieness and adequacy of these issues /resolut. ions, and the overview of correttive / actions implemented by SWEC-PSAS to resolve these is-sues. The results,of these Third Party overviews are presented by TENERA, L.P.
Q Appendix B.
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                                -(TERA) in the Discipline Specific Results Report (Reference 46).
h Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues are listed'below (issue
                    .I Y
number corresponds to subappendix number in Appendix A):
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: d.             /                       Issue No.       ),
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(, Qsue Title Al                       Richmond Inserts A2                       Local Stress in Piping M                               A3                       Walbto-Wall and Floor-to-Ceiling Supports l ,/ \ .                         A4             ', . Pipe Support /F,ystem Stability
r Y
                                                          '          Pipe Support Generic Stiffness A5 A6                     .Uncinched U-Bolt Acting as a Two-Way Restraint
External issues were originally identified in the Large Bore Piping and Pipe
: p.                  '
.s 4( [ ^, Sigports Generic Issues Report (GIR) (References 5 and '35).
A7                       Friction Forces
This Generic Is-
  ' '      '                                A8                       AWS Versus ASME. Code Provisions-A9                       A500, Grade B, Tube Steel A10                     Tube Steel Section Properties i'
' uvs Report (GIR) was transmitted 'to NRC, Citizens Association for Sound Energy
All                     U-Bolt Cinching
[
                                      ,1lA12                       Axial / Rotational Restraints J6'A13                         Bolt Hole Gap                                                                                   !
(CASE), ',iar_d CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA).
ts                                 A14                     OBE/SSE - Damping A15                     Support Mass in Piping Analysis A16 Programmatic Aspects and QA Including Iterative                                               ;
Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) cont >; acted TENERA, L.P.
Design                                                                                         l
(TERA) to perform the Third Party overview (Refer-ence 19)/for the donpleieness and adequacy of these issues /resolut. ions, and the t
          /
overview of correttive / actions implemented by SWEC-PSAS to resolve these is-sues. The results,of these Third Party overviews are presented by TENERA, L.P.
A17                     Mass Point Spacing
-(TERA) in the Discipline Specific Results Report (Reference 46).
                        ^
t h Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues are listed'below (issue
A18                      High-Frequency Mass Participation
.I number corresponds to subappendix number in Appendix A):
                ,                          A19                     Fluid Transients                                                                                 i e                      A20                     Seismic Excitation of Pipe Support Mass                                                         ;
Y
A21                     Local Stress in Pipe Support Members
(, Qsue Title I
                                                      ,                                                                                                              t
d.
      ,                                                                                          4-1
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Issue No.
),
Al Richmond Inserts A2 Local Stress in Piping
<M A3 Walbto-Wall and Floor-to-Ceiling Supports l,/ \\.
A4
',. Pipe Support /F,ystem Stability A5 Pipe Support Generic Stiffness A6
.Uncinched U-Bolt Acting as a Two-Way Restraint A7 Friction Forces p.
A8 AWS Versus ASME. Code Provisions-A9 A500, Grade B, Tube Steel A10 Tube Steel Section Properties i'
All U-Bolt Cinching
,1lA12 Axial / Rotational Restraints J6'A13 Bolt Hole Gap ts A14 OBE/SSE - Damping A15 Support Mass in Piping Analysis A16 Programmatic Aspects and QA Including Iterative Design l
/
A17 Mass Point Spacing High-Frequency Mass Participation A18
^
A19 Fluid Transients i
A20 Seismic Excitation of Pipe Support Mass e
A21 Local Stress in Pipe Support Members t
4-1


A22             Safety. Factors A23             SA-36 and A307 Steel
A22 Safety. Factors
:Q(,/        A24             U-Bolt Twisting 1
:Q(,/
            -A25             Fischer/ Crosby Valve Modeling/ Qualification A26             Piping Modeling A27             Welding A28             Anchor Bolts /Embedment Plates A29             Strut / Snubber Angularity                                                           l A30             Component Qualification A31             Structural Modeling for Frame Analysis A32             Computer Program Verification and Use A33             Hydrotest A34             Seismic /Nonseismic Interface A35             Other Issues A36             SSER-8 Review A37             SSER-10 Review A38             SSER-11 Review A39             CPRT Quality.of Construction Review on Piping and Pipe Supports Issues identified during the performance of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) are listed     below (issue number corresponds to subappendix number in Appendix B):
A23 SA-36 and A307 Steel 1
Issue No.       Issue Title                                                                         1 B1'             SDAR-CP-86-33, Stiffness Values for Class 1 Stress O.           B2 Analysis SDAR-CP-86-72, Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports B3             SDAR-CP-86-63, Pipe Support Installations B4             SDAR-CP-86-67, Preoperational Vibration Test Criteria B5             SDAR-CP-86-73, ASME Snubber Attachment Brackets l
A24 U-Bolt Twisting
-A25 Fischer/ Crosby Valve Modeling/ Qualification A26 Piping Modeling A27 Welding A28 Anchor Bolts /Embedment Plates A29 Strut / Snubber Angularity l
A30 Component Qualification A31 Structural Modeling for Frame Analysis A32 Computer Program Verification and Use A33 Hydrotest A34 Seismic /Nonseismic Interface A35 Other Issues A36 SSER-8 Review A37 SSER-10 Review A38 SSER-11 Review A39 CPRT Quality.of Construction Review on Piping and Pipe Supports Issues identified during the performance of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) are listed below (issue number corresponds to subappendix number in Appendix B):
Issue No.
Issue Title 1
B1' SDAR-CP-86-33, Stiffness Values for Class 1 Stress O.
Analysis B2 SDAR-CP-86-72, Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports B3 SDAR-CP-86-63, Pipe Support Installations B4 SDAR-CP-86-67, Preoperational Vibration Test Criteria B5 SDAR-CP-86-73, ASME Snubber Attachment Brackets l
l 4-2
l 4-2


l 5.0   CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS t
l 5.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS O)
O)                 5.1  METH0'D0 LOGY AND WORK PERFORMED i
METH0'D0 LOGY AND WORK PERFORMED t
5.1.1   Licensing Commitments, Design Criteria, and Procedures                                                             !
5.1 i
l l
5.1.1 Licensing Commitments, Design Criteria, and Procedures l
SWEC-PSAS reviewed the piping-relatcd CPSES licensing documentation (such as                                               )
l SWEC-PSAS reviewed the piping-relatcd CPSES licensing documentation (such as
the FSAR, NRC Regulatory Guides, NRC Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins, ASME                                           !
)
Section III Code, and NRC/TU Electric correspondences) and identified licensing commitments related to the small bore piping and pipe supports. SWEC-PSAS es-tablished design criteria to assure compliance with the licensing commitments.
the FSAR, NRC Regulatory Guides, NRC Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins, ASME Section III Code, and NRC/TU Electric correspondences) and identified licensing commitments related to the small bore piping and pipe supports.
SWEC-PSAS es-tablished design criteria to assure compliance with the licensing commitments.
The design criteria are documented in the Design Basis Documents (DBDs).
The design criteria are documented in the Design Basis Documents (DBDs).
SWEC-PSAS then developed design procedures which encompass the following:
SWEC-PSAS then developed design procedures which encompass the following:
* Design criteria e    Resolution of Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues
Design criteria Resolution of Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues e
* SWEC's experience gained through the design of piping and pipe sup-ports for several recently licensed and operating United States nu-clear power plants
SWEC's experience gained through the design of piping and pipe sup-ports for several recently licensed and operating United States nu-clear power plants Regulatory and Professional Society Guidance, such as applicable codes and standards; Welding Research Council Bulletin 300, Technical Positions on Criteria Establishment (Reference 13); and Sections 3.6, 3.7, and 3.9 of NUREG-0800 (Reference 7).
* Regulatory and Professional Society Guidance, such as applicable codes and standards; Welding Research Council Bulletin 300, Technical Positions on Criteria Establishment (Reference 13); and Sections 3.6, 3.7, and 3.9 of NUREG-0800 (Reference 7).
O()
O
SWEC-PSAS Procedures CPPP-7 (Reference 8) and CPPP-6 (Reference 9) are the pri-mary technical and design control procedures, respectively, for the small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP).
(),
CPPP-6 is supple-mented by SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-15 (Reference 80).
SWEC-PSAS Procedures CPPP-7 (Reference 8) and CPPP-6 (Reference 9) are the pri-mary technical and design control procedures, respectively, for the small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP). CPPP-6 is supple-mented by SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-15 (Reference 80). CPPP-15 identifies three items unique to the small bore pipe stress analysis validation process:
CPPP-15 identifies three items unique to the small bore pipe stress analysis validation process:
* Identification of small bore pipe stress analysis package boundaries were validated by SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPSP-16 (Reference 82)
Identification of small bore pipe stress analysis package boundaries were validated by SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPSP-16 (Reference 82)
* Equivalent-static analysis was performed for small bore pipe stress analysis packages which have no supports (see Section 5.3.2.2)
Equivalent-static analysis was performed for small bore pipe stress analysis packages which have no supports (see Section 5.3.2.2)
* The review jointly performed by the pipe stress and pipe support en-gineers is not applicable to small bore pipe stress analysis packages which have no supports (see Section 5.1.2.2)
The review jointly performed by the pipe stress and pipe support en-gineers is not applicable to small bore pipe stress analysis packages which have no supports (see Section 5.1.2.2)
Engineering methodology, based on SWEC-PSAS experience, has been incorporated within the SWEC-PSAS procedures. A list of typical technical and design con-trol practices that are specified within the SWEC-PSAS procedures is presented in Table 5-8.
Engineering methodology, based on SWEC-PSAS experience, has been incorporated within the SWEC-PSAS procedures.
I                     The governing procedures implementing the Corrective Action Program (CAP) of small bore piping and pipe supports are shown in Figure 5-1. These procedures assure compliance with the design criteria and the resolution of the Comanche C\
A list of typical technical and design con-trol practices that are specified within the SWEC-PSAS procedures is presented in Table 5-8.
(_ l                                                     5-1
I The governing procedures implementing the Corrective Action Program (CAP) of small bore piping and pipe supports are shown in Figure 5-1.
These procedures assure compliance with the design criteria and the resolution of the Comanche C\\
(_ l 5-1


Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues.       Resolutions of these piping-
Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues.
Resolutions of these piping-
[_
[_
related issues, whenever applicable, have been implemented for both the small
(
(
related issues, whenever applicable, have been implemented for both the small bore and large bore piping and prpe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) .
bore and large bore piping and prpe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP).
To assure that the licensing commitments related to small bore piping and pipe supports have been identified, appropriate design criteria established, and procedures developed which comply with the design criteria, several audits and overviews were conducted by the SWEC Corporate Quality Assurance Program and the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT).       SWEC Quality Assurance audits were performed as described in Section 5.3. The Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) overview of large bore piping and pipe supports was performed by TENERA, L.P. (TERA). The TENERA, L.P. (TERA) conclusions for large bore piping and pipe supports are discussed in detail in the TERA Discipline Specific Results Report:   Piping and Supports (DAP-RR-P-001), Revision 1.       In this report, TENERA, L.P. (TERA) states on page 1-2:
To assure that the licensing commitments related to small bore piping and pipe supports have been identified, appropriate design criteria established, and procedures developed which comply with the design criteria, several audits and overviews were conducted by the SWEC Corporate Quality Assurance Program and the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT).
                    "SWEC procedures were reviewed for compliance with applicable CPSES FSAR and licensing criteria. Licensing commitments applicable to CPSES were used to establish a listing of criteria which were then used to check SWEC procederes. The procedures were determined to be in compliance either with the existing criteria or criteria changes that were accepted by the NRC for submittals as FSAR amendments (see NRC letter to TUGC0 dated November 4, 1986, Reference 7.4.)"
SWEC Quality Assurance audits were performed as described in Section 5.3.
The Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) overview of large bore piping and pipe supports was performed by TENERA, L.P. (TERA).
The TENERA, L.P.
(TERA) conclusions for large bore piping and pipe supports are discussed in detail in the TERA Discipline Specific Results Report:
Piping and Supports (DAP-RR-P-001), Revision 1.
In this report, TENERA, L.P. (TERA) states on page 1-2:
"SWEC procedures were reviewed for compliance with applicable CPSES FSAR and licensing criteria.
Licensing commitments applicable to CPSES were used to establish a listing of criteria which were then used to check SWEC procederes.
The procedures were determined to be in compliance either with the existing criteria or criteria changes that were accepted by the NRC for submittals as FSAR amendments (see NRC letter to TUGC0 dated November 4, 1986, Reference 7.4.)"
The small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) used the same technical and design control procedures as used in the large bore pip-ing and pipe supports CAP.
The small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) used the same technical and design control procedures as used in the large bore pip-ing and pipe supports CAP.
The TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP) is performing an overview of the SWEC-PSAS Corrective Action Program (CAP) implementation and is auditing the CAP to assure that the design criteria are reconciled with the licensing com-mitments. In addition, CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA) has reviewed and accepted SWEC-PSAS's resolution of piping and pipe supports issues that were identified by the Independent Assessment Program (IAP) of CYGNA.
The TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP) is performing an overview of the SWEC-PSAS Corrective Action Program (CAP) implementation and is auditing the CAP to assure that the design criteria are reconciled with the licensing com-mitments.
5.1.1.1   Verification and Validation of Design Methodology SWEC-PSAS performed two sep.trate walkdowns of sauples of Unit 1 and Common as-built piping systems to verify and refine the design methodology used for     ;
In addition, CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA) has reviewed and accepted SWEC-PSAS's resolution of piping and pipe supports issues that were identified by the Independent Assessment Program (IAP) of CYGNA.
the design validation process. These walkdowns were performed by experienced )
5.1.1.1 Verification and Validation of Design Methodology SWEC-PSAS performed two sep.trate walkdowns of sauples of Unit 1 and Common as-built piping systems to verify and refine the design methodology used for the design validation process.
SWEC-PSAS personnel and are described below.                                     ]
These walkdowns were performed by experienced
l The first walkdown, called the Small Bore Walkdown, was, conducted in accordance {
)
with SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-5 (Reference 14) . The results of this walkdown j are documented in References 15 and 83       The small bore piping walkdown was performed to determine whether the existing design documentation was adequate     i to initiate the pipe stress analyses. As a result of this walkdown, the exist-ing design documentation was determined to be adequate to initiate pipe stress analyses.                                                                         I l
SWEC-PSAS personnel and are described below.
]
l The first walkdown, called the Small Bore Walkdown, was, conducted in accordance
{
with SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-5 (Reference 14).
The results of this walkdown j
are documented in References 15 and 83 The small bore piping walkdown was performed to determine whether the existing design documentation was adequate i
to initiate the pipe stress analyses. As a result of this walkdown, the exist-ing design documentation was determined to be adequate to initiate pipe stress analyses.
I l
5-2
5-2


l l
l l
i The second walkdown, called the Engineering Walkdown, was performed in accor-q                     dance with SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-8 (Reference 10) to determine:
i The second walkdown, called the Engineering Walkdown, was performed in accor-q dance with SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-8 (Reference 10) to determine:
V
V Whether there were any additional technical issues related to the functional behavior of the piping system that should be evaluated during the Corrective Action Program (CAP).
* Whether there were any additional technical issues related to the functional behavior of the piping system that should be evaluated during the Corrective Action Program (CAP).
Whether additional design inputs (or refinements thereof), guide-lines, or procedures were necessary to complete the small bore piping and pipe support validation effort.
* Whether additional design inputs (or refinements thereof), guide-lines, or procedures were necessary to complete the small bore piping and pipe support validation effort.
The engineering walkdown was performed by 10 teama composed of both SWEC-PSAS pipe stress and pipe support engineers and encompassed 70 Unit 1 and Common large bore pipe stress analysis packages, including approximately 2,400 pipe supports.
The engineering walkdown was performed by 10 teama composed of both SWEC-PSAS pipe stress and pipe support engineers and encompassed 70 Unit 1 and Common large bore pipe stress analysis packages, including approximately 2,400 pipe supports.           The results of this walkdown are documented in Reference 11. This walkdown identified the need for additional refinements that were then incorpo-         '
The results of this walkdown are documented in Reference 11.
rated into the technical procedure, CPPP-7, and design control procedure, CPPP-6 (such as the requirement to validate the valve stem extension depicted on the as-built drawing, which                 was incorporated into CPPP-6, see also Table 5-8), which have also been implemented in the small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP).
This walkdown identified the need for additional refinements that were then incorpo-rated into the technical procedure, CPPP-7, and design control procedure, CPPP-6 (such as the requirement to validate the valve stem extension depicted on the as-built drawing, which was incorporated into CPPP-6, see also Table 5-8), which have also been implemented in the small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP).
The engineering walkdown resulted in assurance that no additional technical issues existed, and that the SWEC-PSAS procedures, with the refinements incor-porated, were satisfactory to perform the validation of the small bore piping and pipe supporta.
The engineering walkdown resulted in assurance that no additional technical issues existed, and that the SWEC-PSAS procedures, with the refinements incor-porated, were satisfactory to perform the validation of the small bore piping and pipe supporta.
pd                   Evaluation of Deviation Reports from CPRT - Quality of Construction (QOC)
pd Evaluation of Deviation Reports from CPRT - Quality of Construction (QOC)
Program SWEC-PSAS reviewed Deviation Reports (DRs) related to the piping system valida-tion program generated by the Quality of Construction (QOC) program of the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT), as discussed in Subappendix A39.           This re-   !
Program SWEC-PSAS reviewed Deviation Reports (DRs) related to the piping system valida-tion program generated by the Quality of Construction (QOC) program of the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT), as discussed in Subappendix A39.
view was performed in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-18 (Refer-               !
This re-view was performed in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-18 (Refer-ence 17).
ence 17).           The purposes of the review were to determine 1) whether any changes   )
The purposes of the review were to determine 1) whether any changes
were required to the inputs or the procedures that control the inputs to the SWEC-PSAS Piping and Pipe Supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) as a result of specific deviations or trends identified during the review, and 2) whether any additional programs, procedures, or changes to existing programs or proce-dures were required to enhance the inputs to the SWEC-PSAS Piping and Pipe Sup-ports CAP. The review concluded (Reference 18) that no changes to the Piping and Pipe Supports CAP (which includes the PCHVP) in the form of programs or procedures were required to account for the Deviation Reports (DRs) identified by the Quality of Construction program (QOC). However, certain inspection at-tributes for piping and pipe supports were added to the piping and pipe sup-ports         Post-Construction     Hardware   Validation Program   (PCHVP) inspection attributes matrix as a result of the Deviation Report (DR) reviews.           Corrective action for the hardware-related concerns identified by the Quality of Construc-tion program (QOC) or SWEC-PSAS, such as missing washers, spacers, and locking devices, is implemented through the TU Electric Post-Construction Hardware Val-idation Program (PCHVP) as described in Section 5.1.3.
)
were required to the inputs or the procedures that control the inputs to the SWEC-PSAS Piping and Pipe Supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) as a result of specific deviations or trends identified during the review, and 2) whether any additional programs, procedures, or changes to existing programs or proce-dures were required to enhance the inputs to the SWEC-PSAS Piping and Pipe Sup-ports CAP.
The review concluded (Reference 18) that no changes to the Piping and Pipe Supports CAP (which includes the PCHVP) in the form of programs or procedures were required to account for the Deviation Reports (DRs) identified by the Quality of Construction program (QOC). However, certain inspection at-tributes for piping and pipe supports were added to the piping and pipe sup-ports Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) inspection attributes matrix as a result of the Deviation Report (DR) reviews.
Corrective action for the hardware-related concerns identified by the Quality of Construc-tion program (QOC) or SWEC-PSAS, such as missing washers, spacers, and locking devices, is implemented through the TU Electric Post-Construction Hardware Val-idation Program (PCHVP) as described in Section 5.1.3.
5-3
5-3


5.1.1.2   Resolution of Piping-Related Design Issues
5.1.1.2 Resolution of Piping-Related Design Issues
          ' ()       SWEC-PSAS evaluated the issues described in Section 4.0 and Appendixes A and B, and developed technical and design control procedures to resolve the issues.
' ()
Resolutions of all issues in Appendix A were reviewed by TU Electric Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE), and the resolutions of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were reviewed by TENERA, L.P. (TERA). The resolutions of the is-sues in Appendix B were reviewed by Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) and the TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP).         These resolutions were incorporated into the updated design and installation specifications, as well as the CPSES quality control and construction procedures.
SWEC-PSAS evaluated the issues described in Section 4.0 and Appendixes A and B, and developed technical and design control procedures to resolve the issues.
l The issue resolution and implementation processes were as follows:                 )
Resolutions of all issues in Appendix A were reviewed by TU Electric Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE), and the resolutions of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were reviewed by TENERA, L.P.
i
(TERA).
: 1. For each issue that affected the small bore piping and pipe supports validation effort, SWEC-PSAS reviewed the associated documentation to gain an understanding of the background. SWEC-PSAS then defined its understanding of the issue.                                             ;
The resolutions of the is-in Appendix B were reviewed by Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) and the TU sues Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP).
1
These resolutions were incorporated into the updated design and installation specifications, as well as the CPSES quality control and construction procedures.
: 2. With the issue thus defined, SWEC-PSAS developed and executed an ac-tion plan to resolve the issue.
l The issue resolution and implementation processes were as follows:
: 3. The resolutions were implemented in appropriate SWEC-PSAS project procedures used for the CPSES Corrective Action Program (CAP). Com-pliance with these procedares is assured by the SWEC Corporate Quali-ty Assurance program.
)
Third Party Overview Results The methodology to resolve Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external is-sues was documented in SWEC-PSAS's Evaluation and Resolution of Generic Techni-cal Issues Report dated June 27, 1986. Final revision to this Generic Issues Report (GIR) dated July 24, 1987, updates the resolution sections to encompass current revisions of SWEC-PSAS's procedures and memoranda , and its contents have been incorporated into Appendix A of this report.
i 1.
TEKERA,   L.P.   (TERA), the lead contractor for the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) Design Adequacy Program (DAP), conducted the third party overview of the large bore piping and pipe supports to assure that all CPRT and external issues are clearly identified and resolved in accordance with the CPRT Discipline Spe-cific Action Plan IX (DSAP-IX). The scope of third party overview included the completeness of issue identification, adequacy of issue resolution, and techni-cal procedures implemented by SWEC-PSAS. During performance of Design Adequacy Program (DAP) overview, TENERA, L.P. (TERA) identified and documented issues in Discrepancy Issue Reports (DIRs). SWEC-PSAS has responded to and closed all of the 972 Discrepancy Issue Reports (DIRs) received from TENERA, L.P. (TERA).
For each issue that affected the small bore piping and pipe supports validation effort, SWEC-PSAS reviewed the associated documentation to gain an understanding of the background.
TENERA,   L.P. (TERA) has completed the third party overview of the large bore piping and pipe supports and presented the results in the Discipline Specific Action Plan Results Report for Piping and Pipe Supports.           As described on O
SWEC-PSAS then defined its understanding of the issue.
V                                                  5-4
1 2.
With the issue thus defined, SWEC-PSAS developed and executed an ac-tion plan to resolve the issue.
3.
The resolutions were implemented in appropriate SWEC-PSAS project procedures used for the CPSES Corrective Action Program (CAP).
Com-pliance with these procedares is assured by the SWEC Corporate Quali-ty Assurance program.
Third Party Overview Results The methodology to resolve Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external is-sues was documented in SWEC-PSAS's Evaluation and Resolution of Generic Techni-cal Issues Report dated June 27, 1986.
Final revision to this Generic Issues Report (GIR) dated July 24, 1987, updates the resolution sections to encompass current revisions of SWEC-PSAS's procedures and memoranda, and its contents have been incorporated into Appendix A of this report.
: TEKERA, L.P.
(TERA), the lead contractor for the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) Design Adequacy Program (DAP), conducted the third party overview of the large bore piping and pipe supports to assure that all CPRT and external issues are clearly identified and resolved in accordance with the CPRT Discipline Spe-cific Action Plan IX (DSAP-IX). The scope of third party overview included the completeness of issue identification, adequacy of issue resolution, and techni-cal procedures implemented by SWEC-PSAS.
During performance of Design Adequacy Program (DAP) overview, TENERA, L.P. (TERA) identified and documented issues in Discrepancy Issue Reports (DIRs).
SWEC-PSAS has responded to and closed all of the 972 Discrepancy Issue Reports (DIRs) received from TENERA, L.P.
(TERA).
: TENERA, L.P.
(TERA) has completed the third party overview of the large bore piping and pipe supports and presented the results in the Discipline Specific Action Plan Results Report for Piping and Pipe Supports.
As described on OV 5-4


page 2-1 of Reference 46, three areas of overview identified in the Discipline Specific Action Plan IX (DSAP-IX) are discussed as follows:
page 2-1 of Reference 46, three areas of overview identified in the Discipline Specific Action Plan IX (DSAP-IX) are discussed as follows:
: 1. Issues "The Third - Party identified, reviewed, and tracked external source identified issues which were raised regarding pipe analysis and pipe support design.     This effort also included consideration of TRT     ;
1.
Issues ISAP .V.c   (Reference 7.5), which addresses design considera-   i tions for piping between seismic Category I and nonseismic Category I buildings. The criteria and methodology used by the Project (SWEC) for analysis of these systems were reviewed by the Third Party. This review provides reasonable assurance that the external source issues have been identified and that criteria and methodology used by the       !
Issues "The Third - Party identified, reviewed, and tracked external source identified issues which were raised regarding pipe analysis and pipe support design.
Project address all identified issues."                                 l
This effort also included consideration of TRT Issues ISAP.V.c (Reference 7.5), which addresses design considera-i tions for piping between seismic Category I and nonseismic Category I buildings.
: 2. Commitment Verification                                                 i "The Third Party verified that commitments which establish piping and support-related design criteria and standards are adequately ad-         ,
The criteria and methodology used by the Project (SWEC) for analysis of these systems were reviewed by the Third Party. This review provides reasonable assurance that the external source issues have been identified and that criteria and methodology used by the Project address all identified issues."
dressed in procedures and other Project documents.       The commitment '
l 2.
sources included the FSAR, design specifications, and the ASME Codes of Record for piping (Reference 7.6) and piping supports (Refer-ence 7.7). For each criterion source and standard identified, the appropriate criteria and commitments were summarized. These criteria were used in the development of checklists for the review of specific   ,
Commitment Verification i
program areas. This review ensures that Project procedures are con-   i sistent with applicable criteria and commitments.
"The Third Party verified that commitments which establish piping and support-related design criteria and standards are adequately ad-dressed in procedures and other Project documents.
Where criteria changes have been submitted by the project to resolve differences between the approved FSAR and Project procedures (docu-mented on C-DIRs) closure is based on the assumption that the NRC       ;
The commitment sources included the FSAR, design specifications, and the ASME Codes of Record for piping (Reference 7.6) and piping supports (Refer-ence 7.7).
will approve the amendments."
For each criterion source and standard identified, the appropriate criteria and commitments were summarized. These criteria were used in the development of checklists for the review of specific i
: 3. Procedure Review "The Third Party reviewed procedures (including appropriate SWEC Pro-ject Management memoranda) developed by the Proj ect (SWEC) for the performance of the SWEC scope involving large bore piping analysis and support design to verify, by evaluation of the supporting analys-es, that they are adequate to achieve their intended purpose. This review verifies that the proj ect procedures resolve the external source issues."
program areas.
This review ensures that Project procedures are con-sistent with applicable criteria and commitments.
Where criteria changes have been submitted by the project to resolve differences between the approved FSAR and Project procedures (docu-mented on C-DIRs) closure is based on the assumption that the NRC will approve the amendments."
3.
Procedure Review "The Third Party reviewed procedures (including appropriate SWEC Pro-ject Management memoranda) developed by the Proj ect (SWEC) for the performance of the SWEC scope involving large bore piping analysis and support design to verify, by evaluation of the supporting analys-es, that they are adequate to achieve their intended purpose.
This review verifies that the proj ect procedures resolve the external source issues."
TENERA, L.P.'s (TERA) conclusion on the Third Party review of large bore piping and pipe supports is cited in their Discipline Specific Action Plan Results Report No. DAP-RR-P-001 on page 1-2.
TENERA, L.P.'s (TERA) conclusion on the Third Party review of large bore piping and pipe supports is cited in their Discipline Specific Action Plan Results Report No. DAP-RR-P-001 on page 1-2.
                          "For each of the thirty-two issues, the resolution methodology has been reviewed by the Third Party and found to be responsive to the concern and in compliance with applicable FSAR and licensing criteria.           The Third
"For each of the thirty-two issues, the resolution methodology has been reviewed by the Third Party and found to be responsive to the concern and in compliance with applicable FSAR and licensing criteria.
(                                                             5-5
The Third
(
5-5


I L       '
I L
Party has concluded that the overall objectives of the review have been
Party has concluded that the overall objectives of the review have been l
  /                                 met, and considers all piping-related external source issues applicable to l
/
L the large bore piping scope to be closed with respect to the methodology being applied to the requalification effort assuming the NRC approves the           i FSAR amendments."
met, and considers all piping-related external source issues applicable to L
the large bore piping scope to be closed with respect to the methodology being applied to the requalification effort assuming the NRC approves the i
FSAR amendments."
Small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) used the same technical and design control procedures as used in large bore piping and pipe supports CAP.
Small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) used the same technical and design control procedures as used in large bore piping and pipe supports CAP.
CYGNA Independent Assessment Program CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA), a consulting firm, was originally contracted by                         <
CYGNA Independent Assessment Program CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA), a consulting firm, was originally contracted by TU Electric to perform a project review identified as the Independent Assess-ment Program (IAP). As a result of this review, CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA) identified issues which they summarized in the CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4 (Piping-RIL) (Reference 86) and the Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4 (Supports-RIL) (Reference 16).
TU Electric to perform a project review identified as the Independent Assess-ment Program (IAP). As a result of this review, CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA) identified issues which they summarized in the CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4 (Piping-RIL) (Reference 86) and the Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4 (Supports-RIL) (Reference 16).
CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA) and SWEC held public meetings on November 13 and 14, 1986, at SWEC's Cherry Hill office and December 15 and 16,1986, at CPSES site to discuss the issue resolutions contained in the CYGNA Review Issue List (RIL) in conjunction with SWEC Project Procedures CPPP-7 and CPPP-6.
CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA) and SWEC held public meetings on November 13 and 14, 1986, at SWEC's Cherry Hill office and December 15 and 16,1986, at CPSES site to discuss the issue resolutions contained in the CYGNA Review Issue List (RIL) in conjunction with SWEC Project Procedures CPPP-7 and CPPP-6. CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA) then performed audits on the basis of SWEC-PSAS design criteria between November 1986 and May 1987.
CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA) then performed audits on the basis of SWEC-PSAS design criteria between November 1986 and May 1987.
At the public meeting in Glen Rose, Texas, on May 19, 1987, CYGNA Energy Ser-()             vices (CYGNA) announced that all pipe stress and pipe support issues were closed.                 All issues relating to embedment plate design, anchorage allowables, j
At the public meeting in Glen Rose, Texas, on May 19, 1987, CYGNA Energy Ser-()
spacing, and edge distances were transferred to the Civil / Structural Review Issues List, Revision 0, dated July 12, 1987 (Reference 19), and their resolu-tion                 is reported in the Civil / Structural Project Status Report (PSR)
vices (CYGNA) announced that all pipe stress and pipe support issues were j
closed.
All issues relating to embedment plate design, anchorage allowables, spacing, and edge distances were transferred to the Civil / Structural Review Issues List, Revision 0, dated July 12, 1987 (Reference 19), and their resolu-tion is reported in the Civil / Structural Project Status Report (PSR)
(Reference 63).
(Reference 63).
5.1.2                 Design Validation Process The SWEC-PSAS design validation program assures that the design conforms to the licensing commitments. The program can be visualized as a three-step process.
5.1.2 Design Validation Process The SWEC-PSAS design validation program assures that the design conforms to the licensing commitments.
The first step, described in Section 5.1.2.1, is to establish the input and the analytical models of the pipe stress analysis packages, to identify and imple-ment the necessary pipe support optimization and modifications in the analys-es, and to produce a set of pipe stress analysis results (e.g., pipe stresses, support loads, and equipment nozzle loads). The first-step results, described in Section 5.1.2.2, provide the pipe support design loads and determine that the computerized pipe stress analysis results are within the ASME Section III Code allowables. The second step includes the detailed evaluation and design                           )
The program can be visualized as a three-step process.
of pipe supports (described in Section 5.1.2.3), the local stresses in piping (integral welded attachments), equipment nozzle and containment penetration loads, valve accelerations, pipe break locations, and floor-to-ceiling / wall-to-wall supports, as specified in SWEC-PSAS Procedures CPPP-15, CPPP-6 and CPPP-7.                 Discrepancies identified in this step are resolved either by support O                                                                   5-6
The first step, described in Section 5.1.2.1, is to establish the input and the analytical models of the pipe stress analysis packages, to identify and imple-ment the necessary pipe support optimization and modifications in the analys-es, and to produce a set of pipe stress analysis results (e.g., pipe stresses, support loads, and equipment nozzle loads). The first-step results, described in Section 5.1.2.2, provide the pipe support design loads and determine that the computerized pipe stress analysis results are within the ASME Section III Code allowables.
The second step includes the detailed evaluation and design
)
of pipe supports (described in Section 5.1.2.3), the local stresses in piping (integral welded attachments), equipment nozzle and containment penetration loads, valve accelerations, pipe break locations, and floor-to-ceiling / wall-to-wall supports, as specified in SWEC-PSAS Procedures CPPP-15, CPPP-6 and CPPP-7.
Discrepancies identified in this step are resolved either by support O
5-6
_-____-__m
_-____-__m


I i   modifications or by additional analyses. The third step, or final reconcilia-tion, described in Section 5.1.2.7, is the final process to consolidate analy-( sis, hardware modifications, and inspection documentation from Step 2 into the piping design documentation. The technical interfaces and flow charts for the small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) are shown schematically in Figures 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4.
I i
5.1.2.1         Piping System Input Validation The design validation process of piping and supports requires a large quantity of input information, as identified in Table 5-1.           The SWEC-Mechanical Group and the SWEC-Civil / Structural Group validate the piping system input. The pip-ing system input validation by SWEC and the design inputs developed by SWEC-PSAS are described below.
modifications or by additional analyses. The third step, or final reconcilia-tion, described in Section 5.1.2.7, is the final process to consolidate analy-(
SWEC-Mechanical Group The SWEC-Mechanical Group reviewed CPSES system design and operating condi-tions, which describe the temperatures and pressures of piping systems. These design and operating conditions are evaluated and revised as necessary based on the validated design.         Design and operating system temperatures and pressures for a wide range of plant conditions were documented and transmitted to the SWEC-PSAS pipe stress analysts for use in validation.                     The SWEC-Mechanical Group validation effort is described in the Mechanical Project Status Report (PSR) (Reference 64).         The SWEC-Mechanical Group identified essentia1 safety-     1 related piping systems and components, high energy lines, and potential system fluid transients for evaluation by the SWEC-PSAS Fluid Transients Group. These O fluid transients (such as quickly opening or closing control valves , relief O valve discharge, pump startup or trip) were identified by following the guid-ance given in NUREG-0582 (Reference 23), using SWEC's past experience with oth-er pressurized water reactors (PWRs), and by an overall review of the CPSES system design descriptions and flow diagrams.
sis, hardware modifications, and inspection documentation from Step 2 into the piping design documentation.
The technical interfaces and flow charts for the small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) are shown schematically in Figures 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4.
5.1.2.1 Piping System Input Validation The design validation process of piping and supports requires a large quantity of input information, as identified in Table 5-1.
The SWEC-Mechanical Group and the SWEC-Civil / Structural Group validate the piping system input. The pip-ing system input validation by SWEC and the design inputs developed by SWEC-PSAS are described below.
SWEC-Mechanical Group The SWEC-Mechanical Group reviewed CPSES system design and operating condi-tions, which describe the temperatures and pressures of piping systems. These design and operating conditions are evaluated and revised as necessary based on the validated design.
Design and operating system temperatures and pressures for a wide range of plant conditions were documented and transmitted to the SWEC-PSAS pipe stress analysts for use in validation.
The SWEC-Mechanical Group validation effort is described in the Mechanical Project Status Report 1
(PSR) (Reference 64).
The SWEC-Mechanical Group identified essentia1 safety-related piping systems and components, high energy lines, and potential system fluid transients for evaluation by the SWEC-PSAS Fluid Transients Group. These O
fluid transients (such as quickly opening or closing control valves, relief O
valve discharge, pump startup or trip) were identified by following the guid-ance given in NUREG-0582 (Reference 23), using SWEC's past experience with oth-er pressurized water reactors (PWRs), and by an overall review of the CPSES system design descriptions and flow diagrams.
The SWEC-Mechanical Group reviewed the CPSES flow diagrams and stress boundary isometric drawings (BRPs) to assure that applicable piping lines were included in the pipe stress analysis packages.
The SWEC-Mechanical Group reviewed the CPSES flow diagrams and stress boundary isometric drawings (BRPs) to assure that applicable piping lines were included in the pipe stress analysis packages.
SWEC-PSAS Fluid Transient Group The SWEC-PSAS Fluid Transient Group was responsible for developing the fluid transient loads (e.g., water hammer or steam hammer) f rom the potential tran-sients identified by the SWEC-Mechanical Group. These loads were used to vali-                   i date the design of safety-related piping systems. These efforts were necessary to address the issue of Subappendix A19.           The fluid transient loads developed by SWEC-PSAS for safety-related piping are summarized in Table 5-2.
SWEC-PSAS Fluid Transient Group The SWEC-PSAS Fluid Transient Group was responsible for developing the fluid transient loads (e.g., water hammer or steam hammer) f rom the potential tran-sients identified by the SWEC-Mechanical Group.
These loads were used to vali-i date the design of safety-related piping systems.
These efforts were necessary to address the issue of Subappendix A19.
The fluid transient loads developed by SWEC-PSAS for safety-related piping are summarized in Table 5-2.
lEssential systems and components are required to shut down the reactor and mitigate the consequences of a postulated piping failure, without offsite power.
lEssential systems and components are required to shut down the reactor and mitigate the consequences of a postulated piping failure, without offsite power.
O                                             5-2
O 5-2


1 I
1 I
p The fluid transient loads used for CPSES design validation process are docu-mented as specified in CPPP-10 (Reference 21). Criteria for evaluation of the piping system responses due to fluid transient loads are described in CPPP-7.
p The fluid transient loads used for CPSES design validation process are docu-mented as specified in CPPP-10 (Reference 21).
Criteria for evaluation of the piping system responses due to fluid transient loads are described in CPPP-7.
SWEC-Civil / Structural Group The SWEC-Civil / Structural Group has provided validated seismic Amplified Response Spectra (ARS), as discussed in Civil / Structural Project Status Report (PSR) (Reference 63).
SWEC-Civil / Structural Group The SWEC-Civil / Structural Group has provided validated seismic Amplified Response Spectra (ARS), as discussed in Civil / Structural Project Status Report (PSR) (Reference 63).
5.1.2.2 Pipe Stress Analysis Stress analysis of piping computes the responses (such as pipe stresses, load-ing on pipe supports, valve accelerations, and equipment nozzle loads) of a piping analytical model under the specified loading combinations (such as loads from deadweight, thermal, pressure, seismic, fluid transients, and Loss of Coolant Accident [LOCA)). In Unit 1 and Common, there are 457 small bore Seis-                       l mic Category I and Seismic Category II pipe stress analysis packages with ap-proximately 6,630 pipe supports.
5.1.2.2 Pipe Stress Analysis Stress analysis of piping computes the responses (such as pipe stresses, load-ing on pipe supports, valve accelerations, and equipment nozzle loads) of a piping analytical model under the specified loading combinations (such as loads from deadweight, thermal, pressure, seismic, fluid transients, and Loss of Coolant Accident [LOCA)).
SWEC-PSAS has validated 456 ASME Section III Code Class 1, 2, and 3 (Seismic Category I) pipe stress analysis packages. Westinghouse validated the other one ASME Section III Code Class 1 (Seismic Category I) pipe stress analysis package, including the continuation of Class 2 and nonsafety-related piping within the pipe stress analysis package boundary. The pipe stress validation flow chart is shown schematically in Figure 5.3.
In Unit 1 and Common, there are 457 small bore Seis-l mic Category I and Seismic Category II pipe stress analysis packages with ap-proximately 6,630 pipe supports.
SWEC-PSAS has validated 456 ASME Section III Code Class 1, 2, and 3 (Seismic Category I) pipe stress analysis packages.
Westinghouse validated the other one ASME Section III Code Class 1 (Seismic Category I) pipe stress analysis package, including the continuation of Class 2 and nonsafety-related piping within the pipe stress analysis package boundary.
The pipe stress validation flow chart is shown schematically in Figure 5.3.
(
(
SWEC-PSAS Piping and Pipe Support System Review Prior to the initiation of the pipe stress analysis, each pipe stress analysis package, including the associated pipe supports, was jointly reviewed as a sys-tem by the pipe stress and pipe support engineers. The purposes of this review were to establish the piping physical configuration, to determine the location and orientation of the pipe supports with respect to the piping configuration, to evaluate the appropriateness of support types, and to identify areas of pip-ing or pipe support designs which may require special modeling techniques to account for the interactions between the pipe and the pipe supports.
SWEC-PSAS Piping and Pipe Support System Review Prior to the initiation of the pipe stress analysis, each pipe stress analysis package, including the associated pipe supports, was jointly reviewed as a sys-tem by the pipe stress and pipe support engineers. The purposes of this review were to establish the piping physical configuration, to determine the location and orientation of the pipe supports with respect to the piping configuration, to evaluate the appropriateness of support types, and to identify areas of pip-ing or pipe support designs which may require special modeling techniques to account for the interactions between the pipe and the pipe supports.
SWEC-PSAS reviewed the pipe support drawings and support location drawings to determine whether the existing supporting system was appropriate and could per-form its safety-related function. SWEC-PSAS reviewed the pipe support drawings to determine the appropriate stiffness values for the input to the pipe stress analysis. The piping and pipe support system review also determined whether certain snubbers or other supports should be considered for elimination and whether additional pipe support optimization should be performed.
SWEC-PSAS reviewed the pipe support drawings and support location drawings to determine whether the existing supporting system was appropriate and could per-form its safety-related function.
The results of this review were documented as a separate piping system review / stiffness assessment calculation for each pipe stress analysis package, which was used as design input for the pipe stress analysis. By the incorpo-ration of this review into the validation process, SWEC-PSAS has assured that i
SWEC-PSAS reviewed the pipe support drawings to determine the appropriate stiffness values for the input to the pipe stress analysis.
an integrated process, with consistent criteria for both pipe stress analysis O                                           5-8
The piping and pipe support system review also determined whether certain snubbers or other supports should be considered for elimination and whether additional pipe support optimization should be performed.
The results of this review were documented as a separate piping system review / stiffness assessment calculation for each pipe stress analysis package, which was used as design input for the pipe stress analysis.
By the incorpo-ration of this review into the validation process, SWEC-PSAS has assured that i
an integrated process, with consistent criteria for both pipe stress analysis O
5-8


l I
l I
Piping Analytical Model l
Piping Analytical Model l
                      .)
.)
NJ           The first step in the pipe stress analysis is the formation of the pipe stress isometric drawings and mathematical models, which are developed by using the input information shown in Table 5-1,     in conjunction with the results of the Piping and Pipe Support System Review.
NJ The first step in the pipe stress analysis is the formation of the pipe stress isometric drawings and mathematical models, which are developed by using the input information shown in Table 5-1, in conjunction with the results of the Piping and Pipe Support System Review.
The mathematical model analytically describes the piping configuration, mass, and boundary conditions. Piping mass is considered, including the applicable l pipe support mass that affects the dynamic responses. Eccentric masses such as   j valve operators also are accounted for in the pipe stress analytical model.     j Sufficient mass points are included to assure that all significant dynamic       <
The mathematical model analytically describes the piping configuration, mass, and boundary conditions.
modes are represented. Appropriate representation of pipe support stiffness from the piping and pipe support system review is included.
Piping mass is considered, including the applicable l
Static and dynamic piping analyses were performed using the computer program NUPIPE-SW (Reference 24). The computer program output consists of pipe stress-es, displacements , valve accelerations, and interface loadings (e.g., loadings at pipe supports and equipment nozzles). This output was used to qualify the piping, pipe supports, and related components in accordance with the applicable codes and licensing commitments as specified in the governing Design Basis Doc-uments (DBDs).
pipe support mass that affects the dynamic responses. Eccentric masses such as j
Static analysis was used for deadweight, thermal, and anchor movement loading cases. The time-history analysis method2 was used for fluid transient loading cases, and the response spectrum analysis method2 was used for seismic loading f ~'         cases. Modal contributions above the cutoff frequency in the response spectrum i             method analyses were addressed by an analytical technique in accordance with NUREG/CR-1161 (Reference 25). This technique, which incorporated the resolu-tion for the issues in Subappendix A18, assures that high frequency dynamic responses are included in the response spectrum analysis. For small bore can-tilever vent and drain lines with no supports, standard and conservative equiv-alent static calculations can be performed in accordance with Section 4.1 of CPPP-15.
valve operators also are accounted for in the pipe stress analytical model.
Based on the mathematical model and specified inputs, the computerized pipe stress analysis validates the following: the piping pressure boundary integri-ty, the piping system structural adequacy, and that maximum calculated stresses are within the specified code allowables.
j Sufficient mass points are included to assure that all significant dynamic modes are represented.
Appropriate representation of pipe support stiffness from the piping and pipe support system review is included.
Static and dynamic piping analyses were performed using the computer program NUPIPE-SW (Reference 24). The computer program output consists of pipe stress-es, displacements, valve accelerations, and interface loadings (e.g., loadings at pipe supports and equipment nozzles).
This output was used to qualify the piping, pipe supports, and related components in accordance with the applicable codes and licensing commitments as specified in the governing Design Basis Doc-uments (DBDs).
Static analysis was used for deadweight, thermal, and anchor movement loading 2
cases.
The time-history analysis method was used for fluid transient loading 2
cases, and the response spectrum analysis method was used for seismic loading f ~'
cases. Modal contributions above the cutoff frequency in the response spectrum i
method analyses were addressed by an analytical technique in accordance with NUREG/CR-1161 (Reference 25).
This technique, which incorporated the resolu-tion for the issues in Subappendix A18, assures that high frequency dynamic responses are included in the response spectrum analysis.
For small bore can-tilever vent and drain lines with no supports, standard and conservative equiv-alent static calculations can be performed in accordance with Section 4.1 of CPPP-15.
Based on the mathematical model and specified inputs, the computerized pipe stress analysis validates the following:
the piping pressure boundary integri-ty, the piping system structural adequacy, and that maximum calculated stresses are within the specified code allowables.
Additional results (otber than the computed pipe stresses) that were generated from the computerized pipe stress analysis and transmitted to other interfacing disciplines for acceptance (see Figure 5-3), are summarized as follows:
Additional results (otber than the computed pipe stresses) that were generated from the computerized pipe stress analysis and transmitted to other interfacing disciplines for acceptance (see Figure 5-3), are summarized as follows:
* Analytical technique used to determine the response of structures to dynamic loads.
* Analytical technique used to determine the response of structures to dynamic loads.
Line 458: Line 687:
5-9
5-9


l l
l Pipe Stress Analysis Results
l m                                          Pipe Stress Analysis Results                                                                           )
)
                                \
m
(                                                                                                                                                    f
(
: 1. Pipe support loads                                                                               l
\\
: 2. Equipment nozzle loads
f 1.
: 3. Containment penetration loads
Pipe support loads 2.
: 4. Expansion joint movements                                                                         i
Equipment nozzle loads 3.
: 5. Valve accelerations
Containment penetration loads 4.
: 6. Valve operator support loads                                                                     ;
Expansion joint movements i
: 7. Valve nozzle loads                                                                               j
5.
: 8. Flance loads                                                                                     !
Valve accelerations 6.
: 9. Pipe movements at wall or floor sleeves                                                           1
Valve operator support loads 7.
: 10. Instrument root valve movements                                                                   l
Valve nozzle loads j
: 11. Pipe movements at pipe rupture restraints
8.
: 12. Stress levels for pipe break / crack evaluations Transmittal of Pipe Stress Analysis Results Package Following completion of each pipe stress calculation, a results package that                                 j contains a summary of pipe stress analysis results was compiled and distributed                               )
Flance loads 9.
to the SWEC-PSAS Pipe Support Group and other interfacing disciplines as shown                               i in Figure 5-2.     The results package, consisting of information such as the                               d equipment nozzle loads and valve accelerations, was sent to other disciplines                                 j for acceptance. The pipe support summary transmittal identifies supports re-                             >
Pipe movements at wall or floor sleeves 10.
quiring modification and/or deletion and lists for each pipe support the sup-port function, orientation, loads, and movements.
Instrument root valve movements l
Q                                     Integral Welded Attachment Analysis                                                                           I b                                     A separate analysis was performed for each location on the piping which is fit-ted with an integrally welded pipe support attachment to assure that the local piping stress is within the allowable stress limit.         For Integral Welded At-                         l tachments (IWAs) that could not be validated by the standard methods used by                                 j SWEC-PSAS for typical lug and trunnion configurations, the validation was based                               I on finite element analysis techniques for the specific support, comparison to a                               .
11.
similar specific support analysis, or comparison to a parametric . finite element analysis study.
Pipe movements at pipe rupture restraints 12.
Pipe Break / Crack Analysis As part of the CPSES licensing commitments, the locations of the postulated high energy line breaks (HELBs) and moderate energy line cracks (MELCs) have been evaluated and assessed using the validated results of SWEC-PSAS pipe stress analysis. Piping stresses, including the local pipe stress from Inte-grally Welded Attachment (IWA) pipe supports, were reviewed to postulate break and crack locations in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-20 (Refer-ence 65). New mandatory break and crack postulation points were compared to previous locations, and the results were forwarded to the Ebasco Services In-corporated (Ebasco) - System Interaction Group to determine the impact.                     This impact may include elimination or addition of pipe rupture restraints or jet impingement shields, jet impingement system interaction studies, or reanalysis of the pipe stress if the consequences of the new postulated break locations                                   i 1
Stress levels for pipe break / crack evaluations Transmittal of Pipe Stress Analysis Results Package Following completion of each pipe stress calculation, a results package that j
(Q /
contains a summary of pipe stress analysis results was compiled and distributed to the SWEC-PSAS Pipe Support Group and other interfacing disciplines as shown i
                                                                                                                                                      )
in Figure 5-2.
5-10                                                                 !
The results package, consisting of information such as the d
I
equipment nozzle loads and valve accelerations, was sent to other disciplines j
for acceptance.
The pipe support summary transmittal identifies supports re-quiring modification and/or deletion and lists for each pipe support the sup-port function, orientation, loads, and movements.
Q Integral Welded Attachment Analysis b
A separate analysis was performed for each location on the piping which is fit-ted with an integrally welded pipe support attachment to assure that the local piping stress is within the allowable stress limit.
For Integral Welded At-tachments (IWAs) that could not be validated by the standard methods used by j
SWEC-PSAS for typical lug and trunnion configurations, the validation was based on finite element analysis techniques for the specific support, comparison to a similar specific support analysis, or comparison to a parametric. finite element analysis study.
Pipe Break / Crack Analysis As part of the CPSES licensing commitments, the locations of the postulated high energy line breaks (HELBs) and moderate energy line cracks (MELCs) have been evaluated and assessed using the validated results of SWEC-PSAS pipe stress analysis.
Piping stresses, including the local pipe stress from Inte-grally Welded Attachment (IWA) pipe supports, were reviewed to postulate break and crack locations in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-20 (Refer-ence 65).
New mandatory break and crack postulation points were compared to previous locations, and the results were forwarded to the Ebasco Services In-corporated (Ebasco) - System Interaction Group to determine the impact.
This impact may include elimination or addition of pipe rupture restraints or jet impingement shields, jet impingement system interaction studies, or reanalysis of the pipe stress if the consequences of the new postulated break locations (Q
/
5-10


are _ unacceptable. The evaluation results from System Interaction Group are
are _ unacceptable.
            ;  described in the Mechanical Project Status Report (PSR).
The evaluation results from System Interaction Group are described in the Mechanical Project Status Report (PSR).
Piping and Pipe Supports Attached to Secondary Walls Special pipe stress analyses were performed in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Proce-dure CPPP-35 (Reference 59) to validate supports / penetrations that have been identified as being attached to a secondary wall.
Piping and Pipe Supports Attached to Secondary Walls Special pipe stress analyses were performed in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Proce-dure CPPP-35 (Reference 59) to validate supports / penetrations that have been identified as being attached to a secondary wall.
5.1.2.3   Pipe Support Analysis Based on the pipe support loads from the SWEC and Westinghouse stress analyses results (see Figures 5-3 and 5-4), individual calculations for all small bore pipe supports were prepared to assure code compliance with the design criteria.
5.1.2.3 Pipe Support Analysis Based on the pipe support loads from the SWEC and Westinghouse stress analyses results (see Figures 5-3 and 5-4), individual calculations for all small bore pipe supports were prepared to assure code compliance with the design criteria.
The pipe support validation process is shown schematically in Figure 5-4 and can be summarized as a process whereby the support analysis in conjunction with required modifications provide the final validation of the pipe support design.
The pipe support validation process is shown schematically in Figure 5-4 and can be summarized as a process whereby the support analysis in conjunction with required modifications provide the final validation of the pipe support design.
Pipe support analysis results are distributed to the interface disciplines for acceptance as shown in Figure 5.4. The validated pipe support calculations and drawings are distributed and filed in accordance with project procedures and are included within each Piping - Design Validation Package (DVP).
Pipe support analysis results are distributed to the interface disciplines for acceptance as shown in Figure 5.4.
The validated pipe support calculations and drawings are distributed and filed in accordance with project procedures and are included within each Piping - Design Validation Package (DVP).
The CPSES Unit I and Common small bore pipe supports can be categorized into four types as follows:
The CPSES Unit I and Common small bore pipe supports can be categorized into four types as follows:
p       1. Standard Component Supports - Struts, spring hangers, and snubbers V       2. Structural Frame Supports - Including supports for multiple pipes and modified rigid supports 3,   Integrally Welded Attachment (IWA) Supports - Trunnions and lugs
p 1.
: 4. Clamp Anchor Supports - Special type of pipe supports for small bore piping to provide transnational and rotational restraints Validation of these pipe support types is described below.
Standard Component Supports - Struts, spring hangers, and snubbers V
Standard Component Supporg Standard component supports were evaluated to assure that they are suitable to perform their design function. Loads f rom the pipe stress analysis were com-pared with the manufacturer's standard component support capacities. In addi-tion, the relative displacements under all specified load conditions were evaluated to validate the displacement ranges and swing angles of standard components.
2.
Structural Frame Supports                                                         l Frame type supports were validated by using hand calculations with standard structural analysis methods for simple designs or by computer analysis using n
Structural Frame Supports - Including supports for multiple pipes and modified rigid supports 3,
5-11 1
Integrally Welded Attachment (IWA) Supports - Trunnions and lugs 4.
1
Clamp Anchor Supports - Special type of pipe supports for small bore piping to provide transnational and rotational restraints Validation of these pipe support types is described below.
Standard Component Supporg Standard component supports were evaluated to assure that they are suitable to perform their design function.
Loads f rom the pipe stress analysis were com-pared with the manufacturer's standard component support capacities.
In addi-tion, the relative displacements under all specified load conditions were evaluated to validate the displacement ranges and swing angles of standard components.
Structural Frame Supports Frame type supports were validated by using hand calculations with standard structural analysis methods for simple designs or by computer analysis using n
5-11


STRUDL, STRUDAT, and SANDUL computer programs (described in CPPP-7) for more complex designs. In addition to validating the adequacy of local stresses in O-                  the pipe, the validation included the evaluation of:
STRUDL, STRUDAT, and SANDUL computer programs (described in CPPP-7) for more O-complex designs.
* Member stress versus applicable stress allowables
In addition to validating the adequacy of local stresses in the pipe, the validation included the evaluation of:
* Reactions at all support joints, including local stress effects on tube steel members
Member stress versus applicable stress allowables Reactions at all support joints, including local stress effects on tube steel members Weld adequacy at welded joints Adequacy of bolted connections, including washer plate design and local stress effects on tube steel members Adequacy of concrete anchors and base plates Adequacy of clearances between piping and the frame Special Pipe Support Frame Analysis Two special groups of pipe support frames, (i) the wall-to-wall and floor-to-ceiling supports and (ii) corner supports, required special analysis to address the effects of differential building movement at the support attachment loca-tions to the building and for restrained thermal expansion of the wall-to-wall and floor-to-ceiling supports.
* Weld adequacy at welded joints
These designs are validated in accordance with the criteria contained in Attachment 4-19 of CPPP-7 in resolution of the exter-nal issue described in Subappendix A3.
* Adequacy of bolted connections, including washer plate design and local stress effects on tube steel members
Integral Welded Attachment Analysis A separate analysis was performed for each location on the piping with an inte-grally welded pipe support attachment to assure that the local piping stresses and support member stresses are within the applicable stress allowables.
* Adequacy of concrete anchors and base plates
The piping local stress is discussed in Section 5.1.2.2.
* Adequacy of clearances between piping and the frame Special Pipe Support Frame Analysis Two special groups of pipe support frames, (i) the wall-to-wall and floor-to-ceiling supports and (ii) corner supports, required special analysis to address the effects of differential building movement at the support attachment loca-tions to the building and for restrained thermal expansion of the wall-to-wall and floor-to-ceiling supports.           These designs are validated in accordance with the criteria contained in Attachment 4-19 of CPPP-7 in resolution of the exter-nal issue described in Subappendix A3.
Clamp Anchors Clamp anchors are used in small bore piping systems as an effective method to establish boundaries of pipe stress analysis packages.
Integral Welded Attachment Analysis A separate analysis was performed for each location on the piping with an inte-grally welded pipe support attachment to assure that the local piping stresses and support member stresses are within the applicable stress allowables. The piping local stress is discussed in Section 5.1.2.2.
Standard clamp anchor designs have been established in CPPP-7.
Clamp Anchors Clamp anchors are used in small bore piping systems as an effective method to establish boundaries of pipe stress analysis packages.           Standard clamp anchor designs have been established in CPPP-7.           The pipe support engineers can speci-fy a standardized and easy-to-install anchor in lieu of integral welded                 1 attachment.
The pipe support engineers can speci-fy a standardized and easy-to-install anchor in lieu of integral welded 1
5.1.2.4         Validation of Seismic Category II Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Over Seismic Category I Equipment SWEC-PSAS developed a Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-82 (Ref-crence 52) to validate the integrity of seismic Category II piping and pipe supports in accordance with the FSAR and CPPP-30 (Reference 56).             The purpose of this validation process is to provide additional assurance by engineering walkdown and evaluation that during or after a seismic event,                   Seismic 5-12
attachment.
5.1.2.4 Validation of Seismic Category II Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Over Seismic Category I Equipment SWEC-PSAS developed a Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-82 (Ref-crence 52) to validate the integrity of seismic Category II piping and pipe supports in accordance with the FSAR and CPPP-30 (Reference 56).
The purpose of this validation process is to provide additional assurance by engineering walkdown and evaluation that during or after a seismic event, Seismic 5-12


Category II piping systems identified in the FSAR will not fall and damage h
Category II piping systems identified in the FSAR will not fall and damage h
U nearby Seismic Category I systems, structures, or components.
nearby Seismic Category I systems, structures, or components.
fication Method (FVM) specifies the engineering field walkdowns necessary to This Field Veri-assure that the as-built Seismic Category II piping and pipe supports are in compliance with the acceptance criteria. A detailed discussion of this valida-tion process is contained in Section 5.1.3.1.
This Field Veri-U fication Method (FVM) specifies the engineering field walkdowns necessary to assure that the as-built Seismic Category II piping and pipe supports are in compliance with the acceptance criteria. A detailed discussion of this valida-tion process is contained in Section 5.1.3.1.
5.1.2.5   SWEC-PSAS Clearance Walkdowns SWEC-PSAS developed                           a Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-80 (Reference 50) to assure that sufficient clearance exists around validated pip-ing in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-22 (Reference 32).                                                           ,
5.1.2.5 SWEC-PSAS Clearance Walkdowns SWEC-PSAS developed a Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-80 (Reference 50) to assure that sufficient clearance exists around validated pip-ing in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-22 (Reference 32).
Clearance is required to permit those anticipated piping displacements that                                                         I could occir under plant operating conditions without any impediment to those displacements. Impediment is defined as any structure, system, or component (e.g., pipe, conduit, cable tray, equipment) that encroaches on the envelope of anticipated pipe displacement.                           A detailed discussion of this validation pro-cess is contained in Section 5.1.3.1.
Clearance is required to permit those anticipated piping displacements that could occir under plant operating conditions without any impediment to those displacements.
5.1.2.6   Testing                                                                                                                   l The CPSES preoperational and startup testing program provides assurance that piping systems, components, supports, and related structures have been ade-quately designed and installed. The correctness or conservatism of assumptions made in predicting plant responses is validated by analyzing data obtained in a controlled testing environment.
Impediment is defined as any structure, system, or component (e.g., pipe, conduit, cable tray, equipment) that encroaches on the envelope of anticipated pipe displacement.
[~'i                                             The testing includes verification by observation and measurement (as appropri-tj ate) to assure that movement, vibration, and expansion of piping and components are acceptable for:
A detailed discussion of this validation pro-cess is contained in Section 5.1.3.1.
* ASME Section III Code Class 1, 2, and 3 piping systems.
5.1.2.6 Testing The CPSES preoperational and startup testing program provides assurance that piping systems, components, supports, and related structures have been ade-quately designed and installed. The correctness or conservatism of assumptions made in predicting plant responses is validated by analyzing data obtained in a controlled testing environment.
* Other nonsafety-related high energy piping systems inside seismic Category I structures whose failure could reduce the functioning of any seismic Category I structure, system, or component.
[~'i tj The testing includes verification by observation and measurement (as appropri-ate) to assure that movement, vibration, and expansion of piping and components are acceptable for:
* Seismic Category I portions of moderate energy piping systems located outside the containment.
ASME Section III Code Class 1, 2, and 3 piping systems.
Other nonsafety-related high energy piping systems inside seismic Category I structures whose failure could reduce the functioning of any seismic Category I structure, system, or component.
Seismic Category I portions of moderate energy piping systems located outside the containment.
The testing program consists of the following categories:
The testing program consists of the following categories:
Vibration Testing The CPSES vibration testing program is set forth in SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-25 (Reference 57). This program follows the guidelines of NRC Regu-latory Guide 1.68 (Reference 85) and ANSI /ASME Standard OM-3 (Refer-ence 27) for steady state and transient vibration testing of piping systems. Piping systems are classified as Vibration Monitoring Group (VMG) VMG-1, VMG-2, or VMG-3, as defined in Reference 27. Piping systems which have no potential vibration problems are classified as VMG-3.                                             If O'                                                                                                               5-13 l
Vibration Testing The CPSES vibration testing program is set forth in SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-25 (Reference 57).
This program follows the guidelines of NRC Regu-latory Guide 1.68 (Reference 85) and ANSI /ASME Standard OM-3 (Refer-ence 27) for steady state and transient vibration testing of piping systems.
Piping systems are classified as Vibration Monitoring Group (VMG) VMG-1, VMG-2, or VMG-3, as defined in Reference 27.
Piping systems which have no potential vibration problems are classified as VMG-3.
If O'
l 5-13


unexpected vibrations are observed during testing, additional inspections are performed to determine the degree of the problem and the resolution.
unexpected vibrations are observed during testing, additional inspections
[%)4 If a piping system is identified as posing a potential vibration problem, the affected portion of the system is classified as Vibration Monitoring Group 2 (VMG-2). This piping will be instrumented during testing to pro-vide a means for ascertaining the maximum vibration response.
[ )4 are performed to determine the degree of the problem and the resolution.
If a piping system is identified as posing a potential vibration problem, the affected portion of the system is classified as Vibration Monitoring Group 2 (VMG-2).
This piping will be instrumented during testing to pro-vide a means for ascertaining the maximum vibration response.
Piping systems which exhibit a response not characterized by simple piping vibration modes, and piping systems for which the methods of Vibration Monitoring Group 2 (VMG-2) and Vibration Monitoring Group 3 (VMG-3) are not applicable, are classified as Vibration Monitoring Group 1 (VMG-1).
Piping systems which exhibit a response not characterized by simple piping vibration modes, and piping systems for which the methods of Vibration Monitoring Group 2 (VMG-2) and Vibration Monitoring Group 3 (VMG-3) are not applicable, are classified as Vibration Monitoring Group 1 (VMG-1).
In these cases, more refined monitoring methods are utilized during testing.
In these cases, more refined monitoring methods are utilized during testing.
All personnel who perform pipe vibration observations and measurements receive training and must pass a written certification examination (Reference 53).
All personnel who perform pipe vibration observations and measurements receive training and must pass a written certification examination (Reference 53).
The vibration data is aralyzed subsequent to collection. Transient vibra-tion test data which does not meet the acceptance criteria established f rom CPPP-25 must be referred to SWEC-PSAS for further analysis and reso-lution.                 When appropriate, corrective action is implemented and retesting is conducted to verify final acceptance.
The vibration data is aralyzed subsequent to collection. Transient vibra-tion test data which does not meet the acceptance criteria established f rom CPPP-25 must be referred to SWEC-PSAS for further analysis and reso-lution.
When appropriate, corrective action is implemented and retesting is conducted to verify final acceptance.
For steady-state pipe vibration, the vibration measurements are taken if
For steady-state pipe vibration, the vibration measurements are taken if
  /               vibration can be visually observed. When the measured peak-to-peak pipe V]               velocity exceeds the acceptance criteria, displacement measurements are obtained and compared to calculated allowable values.                             If the system steady-state displacement exceeds the calculated allowable values, correc-tive action will be implemented and appropriate retesting will be conduct-ed to verify final acceptance.
/
Thermal Expansion Testing As part of the piping and pipe support validation program, SWEC-PSAS has reviewed the impact of analysis and modification on thermal expansion tests (TET). Systems or portions of systems which require testing have been identified.
vibration can be visually observed.
SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-24 (Reference 66) sets forth the methods for identifying piping for thermal expansion tests, for identifying the loca-tions and the supports to be monitored, for establishing acceptance crite-ria,                 for reconciling results, and for recommending modifications to correct discrepancies.                     Upon completion of all thermal expansion tests, an engineering report will be prepared summarizing the results.                                               ,
When the measured peak-to-peak pipe V]
l In summary, the CPSES piping and pipe support validation program encompasses                                     j appropriate field testing.                       Rigorous requirements for evaluating and document-ing piping systems under static, dynamic steady-state and transient conditions l             are set f orth in the SWEC-PSAS procedures .                       The results of field testing will O
velocity exceeds the acceptance criteria, displacement measurements are obtained and compared to calculated allowable values.
U.                                                                    5-14 l
If the system steady-state displacement exceeds the calculated allowable values, correc-tive action will be implemented and appropriate retesting will be conduct-ed to verify final acceptance.
                                                                                                                .__ __________ a
Thermal Expansion Testing As part of the piping and pipe support validation program, SWEC-PSAS has reviewed the impact of analysis and modification on thermal expansion tests (TET).
Systems or portions of systems which require testing have been identified.
SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-24 (Reference 66) sets forth the methods for identifying piping for thermal expansion tests, for identifying the loca-tions and the supports to be monitored, for establishing acceptance crite-
: ria, for reconciling results, and for recommending modifications to correct discrepancies.
Upon completion of all thermal expansion tests, an engineering report will be prepared summarizing the results.
l In summary, the CPSES piping and pipe support validation program encompasses j
appropriate field testing.
Rigorous requirements for evaluating and document-ing piping systems under static, dynamic steady-state and transient conditions l
are set f orth in the SWEC-PSAS procedures.
The results of field testing will OU.
5-14 l
.__ __________ a


provide physical confirmation that large bore piping and pipe support design
provide physical confirmation that large bore piping and pipe support design
(''s and installation comply with the design criteria, b   5.1.2.7 Final Reconciliation of Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports The purpose of final reconciliation is to resolve and incorporate pipe stress and pipe support analysis results (see Figure 1-1) with the final design input and as-built configuration.     The final reconciliation process is conducted in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-23, Pipe Stress / Pipe Support Reconcil-iation Procedure (Reference 29). The final reconciliation of small bore piping and pipe supports incorporates the following:
(''s and installation comply with the design criteria, b
* The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCRVP) results which provide the as-built small bore piping and pipe support config-urations (see Section 5.1.3).
5.1.2.7 Final Reconciliation of Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports The purpose of final reconciliation is to resolve and incorporate pipe stress and pipe support analysis results (see Figure 1-1) with the final design input and as-built configuration.
* Resolution of the open items in NRC Staff positions in Supplementary St.fety Evaluation Reports (SSERs) as described in Subappendixes A36, A)7, and A38.
The final reconciliation process is conducted in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-23, Pipe Stress / Pipe Support Reconcil-iation Procedure (Reference 29). The final reconciliation of small bore piping and pipe supports incorporates the following:
* Resolution of the piping-related Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) issue-specific action plans (ISAPs) and external issues.
The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCRVP) results which provide the as-built small bore piping and pipe support config-urations (see Section 5.1.3).
Final reconciliation also includes confirmation that the interfacing organiza-tions have accepted the SWEC-PSAS results as compatible with their validated design. Interfacing organizations receive results as described below and in Figure 5-2:
Resolution of the open items in NRC Staff positions in Supplementary St.fety Evaluation Reports (SSERs) as described in Subappendixes A36, A)7, and A38.
i V
Resolution of the piping-related Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) issue-specific action plans (ISAPs) and external issues.
* SWEC-Mechanical Group - Required reflective insulation removal at sleeves, penetrations, or f rame supports; expansion joint movements.
Final reconciliation also includes confirmation that the interfacing organiza-tions have accepted the SWEC-PSAS results as compatible with their validated design.
* Ebasco System Interaction Group - Postulated pipe break locations; pipe movements at pipe rupture restraint locations.
Interfacing organizations receive results as described below and in Figure 5-2:
* Westinghouse - Results of ASME Section III Code Class 1 pipe supports                                               I validation, loads imposed by SWEC-PSAS analyzed piping on ASKE Sec-tion III Code Class 1 piping, support reaction loads on Westinghouse-designed equipment supports, and valve accelerations and equipment nozzle loads for Westinghouse-supplied valves and equipment.
iV SWEC-Mechanical Group - Required reflective insulation removal at sleeves, penetrations, or f rame supports; expansion joint movements.
* SWEC-Civil / Structural Group - Structural interface reaction loads, including penetration loads, load patterns on embedments.
Ebasco System Interaction Group - Postulated pipe break locations; pipe movements at pipe rupture restraint locations.
* Impell Equipment Qualification Group - Valve nozzle loads, valve ac-celebrations and valve operator support requirements, and pipe move-ments at sealed sleeves.
Westinghouse - Results of ASME Section III Code Class 1 pipe supports I
* SWEC-Instrument and Control Group - Root valve movements for instru-ment systems, bv                                             5-15 l
validation, loads imposed by SWEC-PSAS analyzed piping on ASKE Sec-tion III Code Class 1 piping, support reaction loads on Westinghouse-designed equipment supports, and valve accelerations and equipment nozzle loads for Westinghouse-supplied valves and equipment.
i 4
SWEC-Civil / Structural Group - Structural interface reaction loads, including penetration loads, load patterns on embedments.
Impell Equipment Qualification Group - Valve nozzle loads, valve ac-celebrations and valve operator support requirements, and pipe move-ments at sealed sleeves.
SWEC-Instrument and Control Group - Root valve movements for instru-ment systems, bv 5-15 i
4


In addition, the validated piping weld locations are provided to TU Electric for the identification of locations for preservice and inservice inspections.
In addition, the validated piping weld locations are provided to TU Electric O) for the identification of locations for preservice and inservice inspections.
O)
Closure of open items, observations, and deviations related to small bore pip-ing and pipe supports that were identified by TU Electric Quality Assurance, SWEC Engineering Assurance, and Engineering Functional Evaluation (EFE) are resolved prior to the completion of this reconciliation phase.
Closure of open items, observations, and deviations related to small bore pip-ing and pipe supports that were identified by TU Electric Quality Assurance, SWEC Engineering Assurance, and Engineering Functional Evaluation (EFE) are resolved prior to the completion of this reconciliation phase.     Open items from the NRC Notices of Violation (NOVs), and the TU Electric Significant Deficiency Analysis Reports (SDARs) (10CFR50.55[e]) are also resolved during the final reconciliation.
Open items from the NRC Notices of Violation (NOVs), and the TU Electric Significant Deficiency Analysis Reports (SDARs) (10CFR50.55[e]) are also resolved during the final reconciliation.
Each pipe stress analysis package, at the conclusion of final reconciliation, will be compiled into the Piping - Design Validation Package (DVP) as described in Section 3.0 and SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-23. The Piping-DVP consists of the pipe stress analysis calculations, the hanger location drawings (identifying the pipe support locations and stress problem boundaries), the pipe supports calculations and drawings (including the design changes and as-built modifica-tions) within its pipe stress analysis package boundary, and related interface transmittals.                                                                                                  .
Each pipe stress analysis package, at the conclusion of final reconciliation, will be compiled into the Piping - Design Validation Package (DVP) as described in Section 3.0 and SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-23.
5.1.3   Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP)                                                 {
The Piping-DVP consists of the pipe stress analysis calculations, the hanger location drawings (identifying the pipe support locations and stress problem boundaries), the pipe supports calculations and drawings (including the design changes and as-built modifica-tions) within its pipe stress analysis package boundary, and related interface transmittals.
The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) (Reference 48) is the portion of TU Electric's Corrective Action Program (CAP) which validates the final acceptance attributes for safety-related hardware.     The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) process is shown diagrammatically in Figure 5-5.
5.1.3 Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP)
The input to the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is con-tained in the installation specifications.         The installation specifications implement the licensing commitments and design criteria of the Design Basis Documents (DBDs), which were developed during the Corrective Action Program (CAP) Design Validation process.
{
Acceptance inspection requirements identified in the validated installation specifications were used to develop the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) attribute matrix.     This matrix is a complete set of final ac-ceptance attributes identified for installed hardware. The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP), by either physical validations or through an engineering evaluation methodology, assures that each of the attributes de-fined in the attribute matrix is validated.                                                                     :
The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) (Reference 48) is the portion of TU Electric's Corrective Action Program (CAP) which validates the final acceptance attributes for safety-related hardware.
I Physical validation of an attribute is performed by Quality Control inspection                                   f or engineering walkdown, for accessible components.       Quality Control inspec-                               I tions and engineering walkdowns are controlled by appropriate Field Verifica-                                   f tion Method (FVM) procedures.                                                                                   l l
The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) process is shown diagrammatically in Figure 5-5.
The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) engineering evalua-                                   I tion depicted in Figure 5-5 is procedurally controlled to guide the Corrective                                   j Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer through the evaluation of each item                                   l on the attribute matrix to be dispositioned by the engineering evaluation                                       l l
The input to the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is con-tained in the installation specifications.
\
The installation specifications implement the licensing commitments and design criteria of the Design Basis Documents (DBDs), which were developed during the Corrective Action Program (CAP) Design Validation process.
l V                                                         5-16                                                                     l I
Acceptance inspection requirements identified in the validated installation specifications were used to develop the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) attribute matrix.
                                                                                                  .- _ - - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - _s
This matrix is a complete set of final ac-ceptance attributes identified for installed hardware.
The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP), by either physical validations or through an engineering evaluation methodology, assures that each of the attributes de-fined in the attribute matrix is validated.
I Physical validation of an attribute is performed by Quality Control inspection f
or engineering walkdown, for accessible components.
Quality Control inspec-I tions and engineering walkdowns are controlled by appropriate Field Verifica-f tion Method (FVM) procedures.
l l
The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) engineering evalua-I tion depicted in Figure 5-5 is procedurally controlled to guide the Corrective j
Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer through the evaluation of each item l
on the attribute matrix to be dispositioned by the engineering evaluation l
l l
\\
V 5-16 l
I
_s


method.         Dispositions of each attribute will be clearly documented.       If the
method.
  / ~s\         technical disposition of the final acceptance attribute is "not acceptable" or
Dispositions of each attribute will be clearly documented.
  \~-           the attribute cannot be dispositioned based on available information, an alter-nate plan consisting of additional evaluations, testing, inspections /walkdowns or modification as necessary will be developed to demonstrate and document the acceptability of the attribute.                                                         <
If the
Recommendations from the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) effort comprise a significant portion of this evaluation. A major component of the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) program has been the inspection of a comprehensive, random sample of existing hardware using an independently derived set of inspection attributes.         The inspection was performed and the results evaluated by third party personnel in accordance with Appendix E to the Comanche Peak Recponse Team (CPRT) Program Plan (Reference 33).           The scope of the inspection covered the installed safety-related hardware by segregating the hardware into homoge-neous populations (by virtue of the work activities which produced the finished product). Samples of these populations were inspected to provide reasonable assurance of hardware acceptability in accordance with Appendix D to the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) Program Plan.
/ ~s\\
technical disposition of the final acceptance attribute is "not acceptable" or
\\~-
the attribute cannot be dispositioned based on available information, an alter-nate plan consisting of additional evaluations, testing, inspections /walkdowns or modification as necessary will be developed to demonstrate and document the acceptability of the attribute.
Recommendations from the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) effort comprise a significant portion of this evaluation.
A major component of the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) program has been the inspection of a comprehensive, random sample of existing hardware using an independently derived set of inspection attributes.
The inspection was performed and the results evaluated by third party personnel in accordance with Appendix E to the Comanche Peak Recponse Team (CPRT) Program Plan (Reference 33).
The scope of the inspection covered the installed safety-related hardware by segregating the hardware into homoge-neous populations (by virtue of the work activities which produced the finished product).
Samples of these populations were inspected to provide reasonable assurance of hardware acceptability in accordance with Appendix D to the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) Program Plan.
Corrective action recommendations were made to TU Electric based on the evalu-ated findings when a Construction Deficiency existed, an Adverse Trend existed, or an Unclassified Trend existed, as defined in accordance with Appendix E to the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) Program Plan.
Corrective action recommendations were made to TU Electric based on the evalu-ated findings when a Construction Deficiency existed, an Adverse Trend existed, or an Unclassified Trend existed, as defined in accordance with Appendix E to the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) Program Plan.
The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) assures that all
The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) assures that all Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) recommendations are properly dispositioned.
    '''        Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) recommendations are properly dispositioned.
Figure 5-5 illustrates that during the evaluation of a given attribute from the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) attribute matrix, the initial task of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer is to determine if any of the following statements are true:
Figure 5-5 illustrates that during the evaluation of a given attribute from the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) attribute matrix, the initial task of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer is to determine if any of the following statements are true:
: a.         The attribute was recommended for reinspection by the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT).
a.
: b.         Design Validation resulted in a change to design or to hardware final acceptance attribute that is more stringent than the original accep-tance attribute, or Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) did not in-spect the attribute,
The attribute was recommended for reinspection by the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT).
: c.         Design Validation resulted in new work, including modification to existing hardware.
b.
If the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) had no recommendations and Items b or         ,
Design Validation resulted in a change to design or to hardware final acceptance attribute that is more stringent than the original accep-tance attribute, or Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) did not in-spect the attribute, c.
e above do not apply, the attribute under consideration will be accepted. This conclusion is justified by the comprehensive coverage of the Comanche Peak Re-sponse Team (CPRT) reinspection and the consistently conservative evaluation of each finding from both a statistical and adverse trend perspective.             The at- ,
Design Validation resulted in new work, including modification to existing hardware.
tribute matrix is then updated to indicate that neither the engineering walk-           l down nor quality control inspection of the attribute is necessary.         A completed
If the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) had no recommendations and Items b or e above do not apply, the attribute under consideration will be accepted.
(
This conclusion is justified by the comprehensive coverage of the Comanche Peak Re-sponse Team (CPRT) reinspection and the consistently conservative evaluation of each finding from both a statistical and adverse trend perspective.
N                                                          5-17 1
The at-tribute matrix is then updated to indicate that neither the engineering walk-l down nor quality control inspection of the attribute is necessary.
A completed (N
5-17 1


I 1
I 1
evaluation package is prepared and forwarded to the Comanche Peak Engineering g) (CPE) organization for concurrence. The evaluation package becomes part of the                                               l (d Design Validation Package (DVP) after Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) concur-                                                 <
evaluation package is prepared and forwarded to the Comanche Peak Engineering g)
rence is obtained.
(CPE) organization for concurrence. The evaluation package becomes part of the l
(d Design Validation Package (DVP) after Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) concur-rence is obtained.
If any of the three statements are true, it is assumed that the final accep-tance attribute must be further evaluated as follows:
If any of the three statements are true, it is assumed that the final accep-tance attribute must be further evaluated as follows:
I Determine Attribute Accessibility l
I Determine Attribute Accessibility l
The Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer will determine if the attribute is accessible. If the attribute is accessible, a field val-idation of the item's acceptability will be performed and documented in accordance with an approved Field Verification Method (FVM).
The Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer will determine if the attribute is accessible.
If the Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer reaches the conclusion that the attribute is inaccessible, an engineering evaluation                                                 1 will be conducted by technical disposition of available information.
If the attribute is accessible, a field val-idation of the item's acceptability will be performed and documented in accordance with an approved Field Verification Method (FVM).
If the Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer reaches the conclusion that the attribute is inaccessible, an engineering evaluation 1
will be conducted by technical disposition of available information.
After completing the attribute accessibility review, the responsible engi-neer will update the attribute matrix as necessary to reflect the results of that review.
After completing the attribute accessibility review, the responsible engi-neer will update the attribute matrix as necessary to reflect the results of that review.
Technical Disposition The Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer identifies.the (7     data to be considered during the subsequent technical disposition process.
Technical Disposition The Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer identifies.the (7
()     Examples of such items used in this disposition. may ine)ude, but are not limited to:
data to be considered during the subsequent technical disposition process.
* Historical documents   (e.g., specifications, procedures, inspection results)
()
* Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues
Examples of such items used in this disposition. may ine)ude, but are not limited to:
* Construction practices
Historical documents (e.g.,
* Quality records
specifications, procedures, inspection results)
* Test results
Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues Construction practices Quality records Test results Audit reports Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) records Surveillance reports NCRs, DRs, SDARs, and CARS Inspections conducted to date l
* Audit reports
1 b
* Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) records
5-18 I
* Surveillance reports
* NCRs, DRs, SDARs, and CARS
* Inspections conducted to date l
1 b                                         5-18 I


I l
I l
* Results of Third Party reviews
Results of Third Party reviews
(
(
* Purchasing documents 1
Purchasing documents 1
* Construction packages                                                                         l
Construction packages l
                        *                      . Hardware receipt inspections                                                                   i Af ter compiling the data identified as pertinent to the attribute, the technical disposition will be performed. The actual steps.and sequence of actions required for each technical disposition will differ; however, the                                                 j tangible results from each technical disposition will be consistent.                                                     ;
. Hardware receipt inspections i
Af ter compiling the data identified as pertinent to the attribute, the technical disposition will be performed.
The actual steps.and sequence of actions required for each technical disposition will differ; however, the j
tangible results from each technical disposition will be consistent.
These results will' include as a minimum:
These results will' include as a minimum:
: a.                           A written description of the attribute.
a.
: b.                           A written justification by the Corrective Action Program (CAP) re-sponsible engineer for acceptance of the attribute.
A written description of the attribute.
: c.                         A written explanation of the logic utilized to conclude that the at-                         !
b.
tribute need not be field validated,
A written justification by the Corrective Action Program (CAP) re-sponsible engineer for acceptance of the attribute.
: d.                         A chronology demonstrating that the attribute has not been signifi-                         f cantly altered by redesign.
c.
: e.                         All documents viewed to support the disposition.                                             j
A written explanation of the logic utilized to conclude that the at-tribute need not be field validated, d.
: f.                         Concurrence of the acceptance of the attribute's validity by Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE).
A chronology demonstrating that the attribute has not been signifi-f cantly altered by redesign.
If the Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer' concludes that                                             i the data evaluated represents evidence of the attribute's acceptability, the conclusion will be documented. The documentation will be reviewed and                                               i approved by Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) and filed in the Design Vali-dation Package (DVP). If the Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible I
e.
engineer determines that ' the data reviewed does not provide evidence of the attribute's acceptability, the documentation will explain why the at-                                               ,
All documents viewed to support the disposition.
tribute cannot be accepted and recommend an alternate course of action.                                                 l The alternate course of action may take various forms such as making the attribute accessible and inspecting it, or testing to support the at-tribute's acceptability.                         This alternate plan, after approval by Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE), will be implemented to validate the attribute.                                                   !
j f.
In stumnary, the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is a com-prehensive process by which each attribute in the PCHVP attribute matrix is validated to the validated design.                                             The TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP) will audit the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP).                                                                     l This audit program is complemented by the Engineering Functional Evaluation being performed by an independent team comprised of Stone & Webster, Impell, and Ebasco engineering personnel working under the Stone & Webster QA Program and subject to oversight directed by the Comanche Peak Response Team's (CPRT) 5-19
Concurrence of the acceptance of the attribute's validity by Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE).
If the Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer' concludes that i
the data evaluated represents evidence of the attribute's acceptability, the conclusion will be documented.
The documentation will be reviewed and i
approved by Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) and filed in the Design Vali-I dation Package (DVP).
If the Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer determines that ' the data reviewed does not provide evidence of the attribute's acceptability, the documentation will explain why the at-tribute cannot be accepted and recommend an alternate course of action.
l The alternate course of action may take various forms such as making the attribute accessible and inspecting it, or testing to support the at-tribute's acceptability.
This alternate plan, after approval by Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE), will be implemented to validate the attribute.
In stumnary, the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is a com-prehensive process by which each attribute in the PCHVP attribute matrix is validated to the validated design.
The TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP) will audit the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP).
l This audit program is complemented by the Engineering Functional Evaluation being performed by an independent team comprised of Stone & Webster, Impell, and Ebasco engineering personnel working under the Stone & Webster QA Program and subject to oversight directed by the Comanche Peak Response Team's (CPRT) 5-19
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_.m.._....____.-._._____
_.m.._....____.-._._____


l Senior Review Team.     The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) will provide reasonable assurance that the validated design has been imple-h(/          mented for safety-related hardware.
l Senior Review Team.
SWEC-PSAS prepared Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) imple-mentation procedures for small bore piping and pipe supports.             The hardware                                 j validation process includes modifications, whenever necessary, to bring the                                           ,
The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) h(/
piping and pipe supports into compliance with the validated design.             The at-
will provide reasonable assurance that the validated design has been imple-mented for safety-related hardware.
              -tributes contained within the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program                                             l (PCHVP) Attribute Matrix for piping and pipe supports incorporate the recom-                                           I mended   corrective   actions   in the   CPRT-QOC Issue-Specific Action Plan, ISAP-VII .c Results Report (Reference 36), thus resolving the hardware-related issues (see Subappendix A39).       The complete tabulation of piping-related in-spection attributes to address CPRT-QOC recommendations is presented in Table 5-3.
SWEC-PSAS prepared Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) imple-mentation procedures for small bore piping and pipe supports.
1 5.1.3.1   Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) Procedures 1
The hardware j
SWEC-PSAS developed procedures to validate that the as-built small bore piping                                         I and pipe supports are in compliance with the validated design procedures listed                                         j in Table 5-6. These procedures are designated as Field Verification Methods                                       ]
validation process includes modifications, whenever necessary, to bring the piping and pipe supports into compliance with the validated design.
(FVMs) and are described below.                                                                                         l FVM-81, Piping and Pipe Supports Inspection and Hardware Validation SWEC-PSAS ' developed the Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-81 (Reference 51) to coordinate the Unit 1 and Common piping and pipe support in-Q           spection validation activities.
The at-
These piping inspections are performed and documented by Quality Control (QC)                                         l personnel to assure that applicable inspection attributes are acceptable.                                         The !
-tributes contained within the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program l
piping inspection attributes are as below.                                                                           )
I (PCHVP) Attribute Matrix for piping and pipe supports incorporate the recom-mended corrective actions in the CPRT-QOC Issue-Specific Action Plan, ISAP-VII.c Results Report (Reference 36), thus resolving the hardware-related issues (see Subappendix A39).
l Equipment and piping configuration Piping wall thickness at shop / field bends Radial weld shrinkage at stainless steel piping joints Equipment anchoring f
The complete tabulation of piping-related in-spection attributes to address CPRT-QOC recommendations is presented in Table 5-3.
Remote valve operators Branch connections All pressure boundary items installation / base metal defects Valve orientations Pipe / sleeve details Permanent pipe support installation (no temporary or voided supports)
1 5.1.3.1 Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) Procedures 1
Verify location (span) dimensions / tolerances Applicable dielectric insulating sleeves over bolts / studs Linear dimensions of piping segments and in-line components The hardware validation of pipe supports assures that the removable items on a pipe support are installed as required by the design documentation.           The hard-ware validation is implemented by Quality Control (QC) personnel in compliance                                       ll!
SWEC-PSAS developed procedures to validate that the as-built small bore piping I
with the validated support drawing.           Quality Control personnel verify and                                   l i
and pipe supports are in compliance with the validated design procedures listed j
k                                                      5-20 l
in Table 5-6.
These procedures are designated as Field Verification Methods
]
(FVMs) and are described below.
l FVM-81, Piping and Pipe Supports Inspection and Hardware Validation SWEC-PSAS ' developed the Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-81 (Reference 51) to coordinate the Unit 1 and Common piping and pipe support in-Q spection validation activities.
These piping inspections are performed and documented by Quality Control (QC) l personnel to assure that applicable inspection attributes are acceptable.
The piping inspection attributes are as below.
)
l Equipment and piping configuration Piping wall thickness at shop / field bends Radial weld shrinkage at stainless steel piping joints f
Equipment anchoring Remote valve operators Branch connections All pressure boundary items installation / base metal defects Valve orientations Pipe / sleeve details Permanent pipe support installation (no temporary or voided supports)
Verify location (span) dimensions / tolerances Applicable dielectric insulating sleeves over bolts / studs Linear dimensions of piping segments and in-line components The hardware validation of pipe supports assures that the removable items on a pipe support are installed as required by the design documentation.
The hard-l ware validation is implemented by Quality Control (QC) personnel in compliance with the validated support drawing.
Quality Control personnel verify and l
i k
5-20 l
l
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document that all applicable hardware attributes listed on the hardware valida-tion checklists are acceptable. The following pipe support hardware validation
document that all applicable hardware attributes listed on the hardware valida-
[,,s\s_-}                                  checklists are used, sr applicable:
[,,s\\s_-} tion checklists are acceptable. The following pipe support hardware validation checklists are used, sr applicable:
Adjacent Weld Checklist Bolted Connection Checklist Hilti Bolt Checklist Pipe Clamp Checklist Richmond Insert Checklist Snubber Checklist Support Checklist Sway Strut Checklist Through Bolt / Embedded Bolt Checklist U-Bolt / Bolted U-Guide Checklist Variable / Constant Spring Checklist In addition to the hardware validation pipe support inspections, Quality Con-trol (QC) personnel also conduct inspections for pipe support configuration attributes as below:
Adjacent Weld Checklist Bolted Connection Checklist Hilti Bolt Checklist Pipe Clamp Checklist Richmond Insert Checklist Snubber Checklist Support Checklist Sway Strut Checklist Through Bolt / Embedded Bolt Checklist U-Bolt / Bolted U-Guide Checklist Variable / Constant Spring Checklist In addition to the hardware validation pipe support inspections, Quality Con-trol (QC) personnel also conduct inspections for pipe support configuration attributes as below:
Material acceptability Support configuration compliance with validated design drawing, including dimensions Support overhang length / tolerance Support projection length / tolerance Sway strut / snubber pin-to-pin dimension / tolerance g 'S e                                            Alignment and circumferential deviation of shear lugs
Material acceptability Support configuration compliance with validated design drawing, including dimensions Support overhang length / tolerance Support projection length / tolerance Sway strut / snubber pin-to-pin dimension / tolerance g 'S Alignment and circumferential deviation of shear lugs e
( ,)                                             Hilti bolt size /embedment Weld length of structural member on base plate Welded connection in accordance with validated drawing Edge distance for structural members and base plates Slope of bolted part with bolt head or nut Shim size / weld FVM-080, Clearance Walkdowns SWEC-PSAS developed the Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-80 (Reference 50) to assure that sufficient clearance exists around the validated piping.     Clearance is required to permit those anticipated piping displacements that could occur under plant operating conditions without any impediment to those displacements. An impediment is defined as any structure, pipe, conduit, cable tray, equipment, etc, that encroaches on the envelope of anticipated pipe displacement.
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This field verification effort is performed by the SWEC-PAS engineering person-nel. SWEC-PSAS has established clearance criteria and is responsible for training the clearance walkdown teams, evaluating clearance problems, and issu-ing design changes to correct any clearance violations, as follows:
Hilti bolt size /embedment Weld length of structural member on base plate Welded connection in accordance with validated drawing Edge distance for structural members and base plates Slope of bolted part with bolt head or nut Shim size / weld FVM-080, Clearance Walkdowns SWEC-PSAS developed the Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-80 (Reference 50) to assure that sufficient clearance exists around the validated piping.
Clearance is required to permit those anticipated piping displacements that could occur under plant operating conditions without any impediment to those displacements. An impediment is defined as any structure, pipe, conduit, cable tray, equipment, etc, that encroaches on the envelope of anticipated pipe displacement.
This field verification effort is performed by the SWEC-PAS engineering person-nel.
SWEC-PSAS has established clearance criteria and is responsible for training the clearance walkdown teams, evaluating clearance problems, and issu-ing design changes to correct any clearance violations, as follows:
i
i
  \                                                                                   5-21 w_____-____                                           __                                                                        _:
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: 1. SWEC-PSAS Site Engineering Group shall establish and train the clear-ance walkdown teams, consisting of a stress engineer, a pipe support
5-21 w_____-____
/(-)T                      engineer, and others as required.
 
: 2. Displacement and clearance criteria established by other disciplines '
1.
will be used in the walkdown (e.g. , conduit displacements, equipment displacements, proximity of heat sources), as applicable.
SWEC-PSAS Site Engineering Group shall establish and train the clear-
: 3. A table will identify each pipe stress analysis package and the asso-ciated maximum displacements for other components, such as equipment, conduit, cable trays, piping, and pipe supports.
/ )T ance walkdown teams, consisting of a stress engineer, a pipe support
: 4. An engineering walkdown is being performed for each pipe stress anal-ysis package to validate the as-built clearances acceptance criteria.
(-
engineer, and others as required.
2.
Displacement and clearance criteria established by other disciplines will be used in the walkdown (e.g., conduit displacements, equipment displacements, proximity of heat sources), as applicable.
3.
A table will identify each pipe stress analysis package and the asso-ciated maximum displacements for other components, such as equipment, conduit, cable trays, piping, and pipe supports.
4.
An engineering walkdown is being performed for each pipe stress anal-ysis package to validate the as-built clearances acceptance criteria.
A Clearance Evaluation Form shall be completed for each violation of the clearance criteria.
A Clearance Evaluation Form shall be completed for each violation of the clearance criteria.
Quality Control (QC) personnel will periodically accompany the SWEC-PSAS engi-neering walkdown teams and perform surveillance inspections to assure compli-ance with the Field Verification Methods (FVMs).
Quality Control (QC) personnel will periodically accompany the SWEC-PSAS engi-neering walkdown teams and perform surveillance inspections to assure compli-ance with the Field Verification Methods (FVMs).
FVM-82, Validation of Seismic Category II Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Over Seismic Category I Equipment SWEC-PSAS developed the Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-82 (Reference 52) to validate the integrity of seismic Category II piping and pipe (p-)
FVM-82, Validation of Seismic Category II Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Over Seismic Category I Equipment SWEC-PSAS developed the Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-82 (Reference 52) to validate the integrity of seismic Category II piping and pipe supports over Seismic Category I equipment as specified in the FSAR and (p
supports over Seismic Category I equipment as specified in the FSAR and CPPP-30. The purpose of this Field Verification Method (FVM) is to assure, by engineering inspection and evaluation, that during or after a seismic event, the Seismic Category II piping systems as identified in the FSAR will not fall and damage nearby Seismic Category I systems, structures, or components. This Field Verification Method (FVM) specifies the engineering field walkdowns re-quired to assure that the installation of the piping and pipe supports is in compliance with the validated design.
- )
The field verification effort is performed by SWEC-PSAS engineering personnel using the acceptance criteria for the configuration of the supports and the tolerances specified in Piping Erection Specification No. 2323-MS-100 (Refer-ence 38). Tables 5-5 and 5-7 contain the piping and pipe supports checklists   t for this field verification effort.
CPPP-30.
The purpose of this Field Verification Method (FVM) is to assure, by engineering inspection and evaluation, that during or after a seismic event, the Seismic Category II piping systems as identified in the FSAR will not fall and damage nearby Seismic Category I systems, structures, or components. This Field Verification Method (FVM) specifies the engineering field walkdowns re-quired to assure that the installation of the piping and pipe supports is in compliance with the validated design.
The field verification effort is performed by SWEC-PSAS engineering personnel using the acceptance criteria for the configuration of the supports and the tolerances specified in Piping Erection Specification No. 2323-MS-100 (Refer-ence 38).
Tables 5-5 and 5-7 contain the piping and pipe supports checklists t
for this field verification effort.
Quality Control (QC) personnel will periodically accompany the SWEC-PSAS engi-neering walkdown teams and perform surveillance inspections to assure compli-ance with the Field Verification Methods (FVMs).
Quality Control (QC) personnel will periodically accompany the SWEC-PSAS engi-neering walkdown teams and perform surveillance inspections to assure compli-ance with the Field Verification Methods (FVMs).
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5.2 RESULTS This section discusses the results of the SWEC-PSAS Small Bore Pipe Stress and Pipe Support Corrective Action Program (CAP).
5.2 RESULTS This section discusses the results of the SWEC-PSAS Small Bore Pipe Stress and Pipe Support Corrective Action Program (CAP).
5.2.1                                             Pipe Stress Analysis Results The pipe stress analysis packages validated by SWEC-PSAS are within the allow-t      able stress criteria of the ASME Section III Code.                                                                                                             )
5.2.1 Pipe Stress Analysis Results The pipe stress analysis packages validated by SWEC-PSAS are within the allow-able stress criteria of the ASME Section III Code.
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                                    - The pipe stress analysis results are described below.
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* Pipe Support Optimization (As a Result of Pipe Stress Design Valida-                                     ,
- The pipe stress analysis results are described below.
tion Process)                                                                                         {
Pipe Support Optimization (As a Result of Pipe Stress Design Valida-tion Process)
A total of 160 snubber supports were deleted through the pipe support optimization process. Approximately 90 additional snubber supports                                 j were converted to rigid supports, bringing the total number of snub-                                 j bers eliminated for Unit 1 and Common to 250. This large reduction of snubbers (approximately 36 percent of the original total) is part of the overall plant improvement incorporated into the SWEC-PSAS val-idation effort.     -It represents a significant improvement in plant reliability and reduction in inservice inspection, worker radiation exposure, and cost of maintenance.
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* Integral Welded Attachments (IWAs)
A total of 160 snubber supports were deleted through the pipe support optimization process.
All Integral Welded Attachments (IWAs) in small bore pipe stress analysis packages within Unit 1 and Common were analyzed, and 3 re-quire modification.                                                                                   j
Approximately 90 additional snubber supports j
* Pipe Rupture Analysis
were converted to rigid supports, bringing the total number of snub-j bers eliminated for Unit 1 and Common to 250.
                                                                                                  'High energy piping arrangement in CPSES Unit 1 and Common utilized the design criteria of postulated pipe ruptures protection by physi-                                     .
This large reduction of snubbers (approximately 36 percent of the original total) is part of the overall plant improvement incorporated into the SWEC-PSAS val-idation effort.
cal separation.     Consequently, of the 457 small bore pipe stress                                 I packages, pipe rupture analyses are required for 21 high energy and 2 moderate energy small bore pipe stress analysis packages.                                       These stress analyses were analyzed with the following results:
-It represents a significant improvement in plant reliability and reduction in inservice inspection, worker radiation exposure, and cost of maintenance.
High Energy Line Break (HELB) Postulation - No mandatory postu-                                 )'
Integral Welded Attachments (IWAs)
All Integral Welded Attachments (IWAs) in small bore pipe stress analysis packages within Unit 1 and Common were analyzed, and 3 re-quire modification.
j Pipe Rupture Analysis
'High energy piping arrangement in CPSES Unit 1 and Common utilized the design criteria of postulated pipe ruptures protection by physi-I cal separation.
Consequently, of the 457 small bore pipe stress packages, pipe rupture analyses are required for 21 high energy and 2 moderate energy small bore pipe stress analysis packages.
These stress analyses were analyzed with the following results:
High Energy Line Break (HELB) Postulation - No mandatory postu-
)
lated intermediate breaks were identified.
lated intermediate breaks were identified.
Moderate Energy Line Crack (MELC) Postulation - A total of one mandatory postulated crack was identified.
Moderate Energy Line Crack (MELC) Postulation - A total of one mandatory postulated crack was identified.
* Piping and Pipe Supports Attached to Secondary Walls The piping and pipe support validation procedure for secondary wall displacements, CPPP-35 was used to qualify 202 small bore pipe sup-ports / penetrations that have been identified as being attached to a 5-23 1
Piping and Pipe Supports Attached to Secondary Walls The piping and pipe support validation procedure for secondary wall displacements, CPPP-35 was used to qualify 202 small bore pipe sup-ports / penetrations that have been identified as being attached to a 5-23 1


,o                                   secondary       wall. Approximately 83 percent   of these   supports   comply with     the   flexibility   criteria of   CPPP-35,   and no further evaluation is required.       Those supports which did not comply with the flexibil-ity   criteria     affect   26 small bore pipe stress analysis packages in Unit I     and Common.     This validation requires no modifications of pipe supports     that spanned secondary and primary *:.11s       within   these small bore pipe stress analysis packages.
,o secondary wall.
5.2.2 Pipe Support Analysis Results The Pipe Support Analyses validated that approximately 6,630 pipe supports within the 457 small bore pipe stress analysis packages comply with the design criteria.     During the SWEC-PSAS pipe support validation process, required sup-port modifications were identified. The pipe support modifications are catego-rized as follows:
Approximately 83 percent of these supports comply with the flexibility criteria of CPPP-35, and no further evaluation is required.
: 1. Prudent - Supports in this category may have been technically accept-able; however, more time and expense would have been involved in the detailed analysis than that required to physically modify the support and qualify the modification.
Those supports which did not comply with the flexibil-ity criteria affect 26 small bore pipe stress analysis packages in Unit I and Common.
: 2. Recent Industry Practice - Modifications implemented to eliminate snubbers to enhance plant maintainability, reduce inservice inspec-tion, and minimize worker radiation exposure during operating plant conditions.
This validation requires no modifications of pipe supports that spanned secondary and primary *:.11s within these small bore pipe stress analysis packages.
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5.2.2 Pipe Support Analysis Results The Pipe Support Analyses validated that approximately 6,630 pipe supports within the 457 small bore pipe stress analysis packages comply with the design criteria.
: 3. Adjustment - Minor modifications (such as retorquing or shimming) implemented to meet installation criteria contained in the resolution of the CPRT and external issues.
During the SWEC-PSAS pipe support validation process, required sup-port modifications were identified. The pipe support modifications are catego-rized as follows:
: 4. Cumulative Effects - Modifications that are required due to the com-bined effect of previous issues.
1.
From the results of the stress analysis, 449 supports were deleted and 315 sup-ports were added (including the addition of 132 pipe anchors). The result of SWEC-PSAS pipe stress and support analysis has identified a total of 1,896 supports     that   require modification   (including deletions and additions).
Prudent - Supports in this category may have been technically accept-able; however, more time and expense would have been involved in the detailed analysis than that required to physically modify the support and qualify the modification.
Table 5-4 contains a description of the types of modifications by the above           I categories.
2.
The plant modifications resulting from the Small Bore Pipe Stress and Support Corrective Action Program (CAP) has been determined by TU Electric to be re-portable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). TU Electric reported to the NRC the small bore piping modifications in the Significant Deviation Analysis Report SDAR-CP-86-72 (see Subappendix B2).
Recent Industry Practice - Modifications implemented to eliminate snubbers to enhance plant maintainability, reduce inservice inspec-tion, and minimize worker radiation exposure during operating plant conditions.
5.2.2.1   Pipe Support Modifications Identified Prior to Stress Analysis The following types of pipe supports were identified for modification prior to       i stress analysis as a result of the resolution of the CPRT and external issues.       l n.,
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Adjustment - Minor modifications (such as retorquing or shimming)
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V implemented to meet installation criteria contained in the resolution of the CPRT and external issues.
4.
Cumulative Effects - Modifications that are required due to the com-bined effect of previous issues.
From the results of the stress analysis, 449 supports were deleted and 315 sup-ports were added (including the addition of 132 pipe anchors).
The result of SWEC-PSAS pipe stress and support analysis has identified a total of 1,896 supports that require modification (including deletions and additions).
Table 5-4 contains a description of the types of modifications by the above categories.
The plant modifications resulting from the Small Bore Pipe Stress and Support Corrective Action Program (CAP) has been determined by TU Electric to be re-portable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).
TU Electric reported to the NRC the small bore piping modifications in the Significant Deviation Analysis Report SDAR-CP-86-72 (see Subappendix B2).
5.2.2.1 Pipe Support Modifications Identified Prior to Stress Analysis The following types of pipe supports were identified for modification prior to i
stress analysis as a result of the resolution of the CPRT and external issues.
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                          *i / Cinched U-Bolts on SinglegStruts or Snubbers                                                                                             !
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                                    /To avoid lengthy detailed stress evaluations for the pipe , ' '$b'olt,,
/To avoid lengthy detailed stress evaluations for the pipe, ' '$b'olt,,
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                                  / and crosspiece, all cinched U-bolt's on single strut or snubber small y ;bcre pipe supports for Unit 1 and Conunon are< identified for eldmina-
y ;bcre pipe supports for Unit 1 and Conunon are< identified for eldmina-
                  ,.      .'/'N tion or modification.                                                                                               >#                f
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                  /                                                          ,
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                                ,                                                                                                                          ,\
/
All cinched U-bolt trapeze supports in Unit <1 and Common small bore pipe supports were identified for deletion hr modification.                                                                                                                                           '
Cinched U-Bolt Trapeze Supports f
                                                                                                                                                              \
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PotentiallyUnstableSupportf[,0                                                                                                                                                                       .
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All cinched U-bolt trapeze supports in Unit <1 and Common small bore pipe supports were identified for deletion hr modification.
In addition to the cinched U-bolt supports,; both single strut and trapeze, . Project Procedure CPPP-7, Attachment 4-9, requires that po-tentially unstable supports be modified.                                                                     Such configurations identi-                                                                           ,
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fied are trapeze supports with zero clearance box frames, spring hangers on trapeze, and spring hangers without a U-bolt. These rupa ports mere redesigned, or identified for elimination during the vali-dation' p roces s.
PotentiallyUnstableSupportf[,0 i
                                                                                ,                                  t               i;;
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      '/-t
~
                                                          !                /                                                                                                                                                                        0
In addition to the cinched U-bolt supports,; both single strut and trapeze,. Project Procedure CPPP-7, Attachment 4-9, requires that po-tentially unstable supports be modified.
* Clearance on, Rigid' Supports                                                       ,                                                                                                                        ,'-
Such configurations identi-fied are trapeze supports with zero clearance box frames, spring hangers on trapeze, and spring hangers without a U-bolt.
                                                                                                              ,/
These rupa ports mere redesigned, or identified for elimination during the vali-dation' p roces s.
                                                                                                                      \ .
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Thefelearance''uccee'n the pipe a}ryi the restraining surfaces for rigid 1
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rtstraints such as frames, straps, unclin.hed U-bolts and lugs is in-p                                     spected an'd ' adjusted where required to meet the clearance require-( .
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0 Clearance on, Rigid' Supports
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Thefelearance''uccee'n the pipe a}ryi the restraining surfaces for rigid
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rtstraints such as frames, straps, unclin.hed U-bolts and lugs is in-1 p
spected an'd ' adjusted where required to meet the clearance require-(
ments specified in Project Procedure CPPP-7, Attachment 4-11.
ments specified in Project Procedure CPPP-7, Attachment 4-11.
* Uncinched U-Bolts on Rigid Frames $
Uncinched U-Bolts on Rigid Frames $
Uncioched U-bolts on rigid frames for pipe sizes 6 in. and smaller
Uncioched U-bolts on rigid frames for pipe sizes 6 in. and smaller were analyzed and designed as two-way restraints in accordence with Project Procedure CPPP-7, Attachment 4-3.
                            ,              were analyzed and designed as two-way restraints in accordence with Project Procedure CPPP-7, Attachment 4-3.                                                                                     ,
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t Single Tube Steel with Richmond Insert Bolts
* Single Tube Steel with Richmond Insert Bolts                                                                                                                                                                           )
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r,                                                                                                                                   t' Supports with single tube steel Richraond ins-rt connections loaded                                                                                                                                                     j
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          \
Supports with single tube steel Richraond ins-rt connections loaded j
primarily in shear and/or torsion, were identified for elimination or                                                                                                                                                     ,
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to be modified by the addition of " outriggers" to increase the rigid-ity of the support'.                                                 ,
primarily in shear and/or torsion, were identified for elimination or to be modified by the addition of " outriggers" to increase the rigid-ity of the support'.
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                                                                                                                                                                                '(
i Long Tube Steel with Richmond Insert Bolts
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* Long Tube Steel with Richmond Insert Bolts i-7                            Pipe supports yKh long tube steel anch'ored by Richmond inserts and subject to LOCA temperature effects were identified for elimination                                                                                                                                                         '
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w                                      or to be modified by limiting the tube steel length.                                                                                                             These s6pports                                                     i
Pipe supports yKh long tube steel anch'ored by Richmond inserts and 7
                                        'were primarily "run t'gether"               o                          multiple pipe supports.                                                                                                                                           ,
subject to LOCA temperature effects were identified for elimination w
or to be modified by limiting the tube steel length.
These s6pports i
'were primarily "run t'gether" multiple pipe supports.
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i 5.2.2.2   Special Pipe Support Frame Results b                   Special analyses were required for certain supports to evaluate the effect of differential movement of the attachment points and/or restrained thermal expansion.
i 5.2.2.2 Special Pipe Support Frame Results b
* Wall-to-Wall and Floor-to-Ceiling Supports                                 l Four wall-to-wall small bore pipe supports were identified in small bore pipe stress analysis packages within CPSES Unit I and Common.
Special analyses were required for certain supports to evaluate the effect of differential movement of the attachment points and/or restrained thermal expansion.
These supports were validated by meeting the requirements specified       jl in Table 4.7.2-1 and Attachment 4-19 of SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-7, and three modifications were required as a result of differential movement of attachment points and restrained thermal expansion.
Wall-to-Wall and Floor-to-Ceiling Supports l
* Corner Supports                                                         ,
Four wall-to-wall small bore pipe supports were identified in small bore pipe stress analysis packages within CPSES Unit I and Common.
SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-39 (Reference 54) identifies the pro-cedure for the identification, evaluation, and disposition of corner supports with wall-to-floor or wall-to-ceiling attachments encoun-tered during the validation effort, with 30 small bore corner pipe supports identified in small bore pipe stress analysis packages with-in Unit 1 and Common.     The design of all corner supports on CPSES Unit 1 and Common has been validated by meeting the requirements specified in Table 4.7.2-1 and Attachment 4-19 of SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-7, and no modifications were required as a result of differen-p                             tial building movements.
These supports were validated by meeting the requirements specified jl in Table 4.7.2-1 and Attachment 4-19 of SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-7, and three modifications were required as a result of differential movement of attachment points and restrained thermal expansion.
Corner Supports SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-39 (Reference 54) identifies the pro-cedure for the identification, evaluation, and disposition of corner supports with wall-to-floor or wall-to-ceiling attachments encoun-tered during the validation effort, with 30 small bore corner pipe supports identified in small bore pipe stress analysis packages with-in Unit 1 and Common.
The design of all corner supports on CPSES Unit 1 and Common has been validated by meeting the requirements specified in Table 4.7.2-1 and Attachment 4-19 of SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-7, and no modifications were required as a result of differen-p tial building movements.
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5.2.2.3   SWEC-PSAS As-Built Verification of Modifications SWEC-PSAS performs the as built piping validation of the CPSES Unit I and Com-         4 mon small bore piping and pipe support modifications in compliance with NRC I&E Bulletin 79-14.     This process is conducted as part of the final reconciliation process described in' Section 5.1. 2. 7 in accordance with SWEC-PSAS procedure CPSP-12 (Reference 37).     The piping linear dimensions, elevations, valve orien-tations, angles, wall and floor sleeve penetrations, and interconnecting equip-ment are validated.       The modified pipe supports are validated to the as-built drawings, including configuration, mark number, dimensional location, function, angularity, and directions.
5.2.2.3 SWEC-PSAS As-Built Verification of Modifications SWEC-PSAS performs the as built piping validation of the CPSES Unit I and Com-4 mon small bore piping and pipe support modifications in compliance with NRC I&E Bulletin 79-14.
5.2.3   Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) Results               4 The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP)           is implemented       i through the verification of the hardware-related attributes described in Sec-tion 5.1.3 for the small bore piping and pipe supports in Unit I and Common.
This process is conducted as part of the final reconciliation process described in' Section 5.1. 2. 7 in accordance with SWEC-PSAS procedure CPSP-12 (Reference 37).
The piping linear dimensions, elevations, valve orien-tations, angles, wall and floor sleeve penetrations, and interconnecting equip-ment are validated.
The modified pipe supports are validated to the as-built drawings, including configuration, mark number, dimensional location, function, angularity, and directions.
5.2.3 Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) Results 4
The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is implemented i
through the verification of the hardware-related attributes described in Sec-tion 5.1.3 for the small bore piping and pipe supports in Unit I and Common.
These field verifications listed below are in progress:
These field verifications listed below are in progress:
* Field Verification Method (FVM) for hardware inspection / validation (CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081).
Field Verification Method (FVM) for hardware inspection / validation (CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081).
A U                                                          5-26 l
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i (CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-080).
* Field   Verification         Method     (FVM)     for clearance walkdowns D                             i (CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-080).
D Field Verification Method (FVM) for Seismic Category II small bore piping and pipe supports over Seismic Category I equipment (CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-08,2)'.
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* Field Verification Method (FVM) for Seismic Category II small bore piping   and     pipe       supports   over   Seismic Category I equipment (CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-08,2)'.
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            /"N 5.3 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM ij All activities of the Unit 1 and Common small bore piping and pipe support Cor-rective Action Program (CAP) were performed in accordance with SWEC's Quality Assurance (QA) program. This program is consistent with SWEC's Topical Report SWSQAP 1-74A (Reference 20), Stone & Webster Standard Quality Assurance Pro-gram, which has been approved by the NRC.
/"N 5.3 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM ij All activities of the Unit 1 and Common small bore piping and pipe support Cor-rective Action Program (CAP) were performed in accordance with SWEC's Quality Assurance (QA) program.
In accordance with the Quality Assurance (QA) program, a project-specific QA program (Reference 6) including procedures covering the essentials of the SWEC-PSAS     validation   process were developed.     These SWEC-PSAS proj ect procedures were distributed to all supervisory engineers and were readily available to SWEC-PSAS personnel.     The issuance of design criteria, validation procedures, and major revisions of these documents was followed up with detailed training prog rams for applicable personnel.         In particular, pipe stress and support engineers on the project received training in the technical
This program is consistent with SWEC's Topical Report SWSQAP 1-74A (Reference 20), Stone & Webster Standard Quality Assurance Pro-gram, which has been approved by the NRC.
In accordance with the Quality Assurance (QA) program, a project-specific QA program (Reference 6) including procedures covering the essentials of the SWEC-PSAS validation process were developed.
These SWEC-PSAS proj ect procedures were distributed to all supervisory engineers and were readily available to SWEC-PSAS personnel.
The issuance of design criteria, validation procedures, and major revisions of these documents was followed up with detailed training prog rams for applicable personnel.
In particular, pipe stress and support engineers on the project received training in the technical
_ procedure (CPPP-7), and the design control procedure (CPPP-6).
_ procedure (CPPP-7), and the design control procedure (CPPP-6).
A Project Quality Assurance (QA) Manager, who is directly responsible to the SWEC Vice President of QA and has management experience in auditing and QA pro-gram procedure development for engineering activities, was assigned to the pro-ject   in the earliest stages of project mobilization.             This reporting responsibility assures independence of the Quality Assurance (QA) functions.
A Project Quality Assurance (QA) Manager, who is directly responsible to the SWEC Vice President of QA and has management experience in auditing and QA pro-gram procedure development for engineering activities, was assigned to the pro-ject in the earliest stages of project mobilization.
The SWEC-PSAS Quality Assurance (QA) Manager has a staff of Engineering Assur-ance (EA) engineers assigned to assist him in his duties. SWEC's EA Division is an integral part of SWEC's QA Program (Reference 20). These individuals h
This reporting responsibility assures independence of the Quality Assurance (QA) functions.
NJ provide assurance that the QA program properly addresses all project activities and assist SWEC-PSAS personnel to understand and properly implement the QA program.
The SWEC-PSAS Quality Assurance (QA) Manager has a staff of Engineering Assur-ance (EA) engineers assigned to assist him in his duties.
To date, more than 164,000 man-hours have been expended by SWEC in activities directly attributable to the overall SWEC-PSAS Project Quality Assurance pro-gram (i.e. , training, procedure development, auditing, and the project QA Man-ager's staff).
SWEC's EA Division is an integral part of SWEC's QA Program (Reference 20).
These individuals h
provide assurance that the QA program properly addresses all project activities NJ and assist SWEC-PSAS personnel to understand and properly implement the QA program.
To date, more than 164,000 man-hours have been expended by SWEC in activities directly attributable to the overall SWEC-PSAS Project Quality Assurance pro-gram (i.e., training, procedure development, auditing, and the project QA Man-ager's staff).
The adequacy and implementation of this Quality Assurance program was exten-sively audited by SWEC's Engineering Assurance Division, SWEC's Quality Assur-ance Auditing Division (QAAD), TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP) and the NRC's Vendor Program Branch (VPB) and Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
The adequacy and implementation of this Quality Assurance program was exten-sively audited by SWEC's Engineering Assurance Division, SWEC's Quality Assur-ance Auditing Division (QAAD), TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP) and the NRC's Vendor Program Branch (VPB) and Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
l A total of 23 audits were performed by these organizations to date for both       i Units 1 and Common small bore piping and pipe supports as follows:                 l l
l A total of 23 audits were performed by these organizations to date for both i
Units 1 and Common small bore piping and pipe supports as follows:
l l
l 5-28
l 5-28


            ~g             SWEC - EA               16 (j                   SWEC - QAAD               1 TU Electric - TAP 4 5
~g SWEC - EA 16 (j
NRC                       1 The SWEC, NRC, and TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP) audits evaluated the technical adequacy of the engineering product           (e.g., calculations, draw-ings, and specifications) and assessed the adequacy and implementation of the SWEC Quality Assurance Prograw. A summary of these audits is presented in Sec-tions 5.3.1 and 5.3.2.
SWEC - QAAD 1
TU Electric conducted technical audits as part of the TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP). The details of calculations, drawings, and procedural compliance and technical interfaces were evaluated. These technical audits have resulted in enhancements to the procedures and methods and thus contrib-uted to the overall quality of the CPSES small bore pipe and support design.
TU Electric - TAP 4 5
NRC 1
The SWEC, NRC, and TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP) audits evaluated the technical adequacy of the engineering product (e.g.,
calculations, draw-ings, and specifications) and assessed the adequacy and implementation of the SWEC Quality Assurance Prograw. A summary of these audits is presented in Sec-tions 5.3.1 and 5.3.2.
TU Electric conducted technical audits as part of the TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP).
The details of calculations, drawings, and procedural compliance and technical interfaces were evaluated.
These technical audits have resulted in enhancements to the procedures and methods and thus contrib-uted to the overall quality of the CPSES small bore pipe and support design.
The NRC Staff performed surveillance on the SWEC-PSAS validaton process, in-cluding in process reviews of SWEC-PSAS's progress and methods of resolving the generic technical issues and verification of the adequacy of SWEC-PSAS walk-downs. The NRC-VPB performed an audit of the SWEC-PSAS piping and pipe support Corrective Action Program (CAP).
The NRC Staff performed surveillance on the SWEC-PSAS validaton process, in-cluding in process reviews of SWEC-PSAS's progress and methods of resolving the generic technical issues and verification of the adequacy of SWEC-PSAS walk-downs. The NRC-VPB performed an audit of the SWEC-PSAS piping and pipe support Corrective Action Program (CAP).
A Third Party organization (TENERA, L.P.) was contracted by CPRT to overview the adequacy of SWEC-PSAS large bore piping and pipe support design methodology as discussed in Section 5.1.1.           The Third Party concluded that SWEC-PSAS's large bore pipe stress analysis and pipe support validation program was compre-O-            hensive and capable of resolving Comanche Peak Review Team (CPRT) and external issues. This third party overview provides additional assurance that the CPSES large bore piping and supports meet the licensing commitments. Small bore pip-ing and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) used the same technical and design control procedure as used in the large bore piping and pipe supports CAP.
A Third Party organization (TENERA, L.P.) was contracted by CPRT to overview the adequacy of SWEC-PSAS large bore piping and pipe support design methodology as discussed in Section 5.1.1.
1 In addition to these audits, TU Electric has initiated the Independent Engi-neering Functional Evaluation (EFE) program to provide an overview of the tech-nical activities being conducted on the CPSES project.           The Engineering Func-                         3' tional Evaluation (EFE) team has audited the SWEC-PSAS performance since June 1987.         Technical specialists have been assigned to the EFE group to per-form a detailed technical audit on samples of small bore pipe stress analysis package and pipe supports of the containment spray piping system. This effort evaluates the containment spray system validation process, which begins from the licensing commitments, through the design validation process (such as de-sign basis documents, design criteria, calculations, drawings, and specifica-tions in discipline interfaces), and finally the hardware validation process of the small bore piping and pipe supports.
The Third Party concluded that SWEC-PSAS's O-large bore pipe stress analysis and pipe support validation program was compre-hensive and capable of resolving Comanche Peak Review Team (CPRT) and external issues. This third party overview provides additional assurance that the CPSES large bore piping and supports meet the licensing commitments.
4 The     TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP) has been in effect since L
Small bore pip-ing and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) used the same technical and design control procedure as used in the large bore piping and pipe supports CAP.
j                       January 1987.     Prior to this the TU Electric Quality Assurance Department performed audits of selected engineering service contractors using technical f-~g           specialists as part of its vendor audit program.
1 In addition to these audits, TU Electric has initiated the Independent Engi-neering Functional Evaluation (EFE) program to provide an overview of the tech-nical activities being conducted on the CPSES project.
The Engineering Func-
'3 tional Evaluation (EFE) team has audited the SWEC-PSAS performance since June 1987.
Technical specialists have been assigned to the EFE group to per-form a detailed technical audit on samples of small bore pipe stress analysis package and pipe supports of the containment spray piping system.
This effort evaluates the containment spray system validation process, which begins from the licensing commitments, through the design validation process (such as de-sign basis documents, design criteria, calculations, drawings, and specifica-tions in discipline interfaces), and finally the hardware validation process of the small bore piping and pipe supports.
L The TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP) has been in effect since 4
j January 1987.
Prior to this the TU Electric Quality Assurance Department performed audits of selected engineering service contractors using technical f-~g specialists as part of its vendor audit program.
V 5-29
V 5-29


i L                                                                                                                                             l em                Surveillance activities have also been conducted by SWEC Engineering Assurance personnel to assure conformance to procedures and standards.             Similar sur-veillances are performed by the TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP).
i l
L Surveillance activities have also been conducted by SWEC Engineering Assurance m
e personnel to assure conformance to procedures and standards.
Similar sur-veillances are performed by the TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP).
These audits described above represent a very detailed and complete assessment of the following:
These audits described above represent a very detailed and complete assessment of the following:
: 1. Adequacy of the Project Quality Assurance program.
1.
: 2. Implementation of the Quality Assurance program.                                                               ,
Adequacy of the Project Quality Assurance program.
: 3. Technical adequacy of the design criteria and procedures.                                                   l
2.
: 4. Implementation of the design criteria and procedures.
Implementation of the Quality Assurance program.
These audits and surveillance       identified instances in which some action was required to clarify or modify procedures to more clearly address some activi-ties, revise calculations to address an omission of clarifying statements or                                               ,
3.
more properly address a situation, and provide additional training or project                                             I guidance to assure continued compliance with procedures.       A timely and complete                                   ]
Technical adequacy of the design criteria and procedures.
l 4.
Implementation of the design criteria and procedures.
These audits and surveillance identified instances in which some action was required to clarify or modify procedures to more clearly address some activi-ties, revise calculations to address an omission of clarifying statements or more properly address a situation, and provide additional training or project I
guidance to assure continued compliance with procedures.
A timely and complete
]
response was developed for every item identified throughout the audit process.
response was developed for every item identified throughout the audit process.
Whenever a question that suggests a need to improve any of these items was identified, the cause, extent of conditions, and any required corrective /
Whenever a question that suggests a need to improve any of these items was identified, the cause, extent of conditions, and any required corrective /
preventive actions were determined, properly documented, and implemented. Sub-sequent audits have verified that appropriate actions were taken to address previously identified items in these cases, and identified a trend of improved fs overall performance by SWEC-PSAS.     No audit items which would result in ques-tions of technical adequacy of SWEC-PSAS's overall validation program have been identified.
preventive actions were determined, properly documented, and implemented. Sub-sequent audits have verified that appropriate actions were taken to address previously identified items in these cases, and identified a trend of improved f
overall performance by SWEC-PSAS.
No audit items which would result in ques-tions of technical adequacy of SWEC-PSAS's overall validation program have been s
identified.
In addition to the audits and surveillance, a rigorous Quality Control (QC) inspection program is in place on the CPSES site. QC personnel are responsible for performing inspections of attributes as delineated in the inspection procedures.
In addition to the audits and surveillance, a rigorous Quality Control (QC) inspection program is in place on the CPSES site. QC personnel are responsible for performing inspections of attributes as delineated in the inspection procedures.
In summary, an appropriate level of attention has been given to the quality of activities; the Quality Assurance (QA) program is appropriate for the scope of work; project performance has been demonstrated to be in compliance with the QA program, and appropriate corrective and preventive actions were taken when-ever they were required.
In summary, an appropriate level of attention has been given to the quality of activities; the Quality Assurance (QA) program is appropriate for the scope of work; project performance has been demonstrated to be in compliance with the QA program, and appropriate corrective and preventive actions were taken when-ever they were required.
5.3.1   Summary of SWEC Engineering Assurance (EA) Audits To date, SWEC EA has performed 16 audits of the SWEC-PSAS small bore piping and pipe support validation process.       An average of five subjects were reviewed during each of these audits.       The following list of audit subjects describes the depth of auditing that has been performed:
5.3.1 Summary of SWEC Engineering Assurance (EA) Audits To date, SWEC EA has performed 16 audits of the SWEC-PSAS small bore piping and pipe support validation process.
: 1. Adequacy of the SWEC-PSAS Design Procedures.
An average of five subjects were reviewed during each of these audits.
: 2. Adequacy of the SWEC-PSAS Project Procedures.
The following list of audit subjects describes the depth of auditing that has been performed:
  !                                                                                                                                          t
1.
    '                                                        5-30
Adequacy of the SWEC-PSAS Design Procedures.
2.
Adequacy of the SWEC-PSAS Project Procedures.
t 5-30


1 1
1 1
: 3. ARS Data Conversion.
3.
(V                         4. Calculations - Technical adequacy.
ARS Data Conversion.
: 5. Calculations - Documentation
(V 4.
: 6. Compliance with project procedures.
Calculations - Technical adequacy.
: 7. Construction support activities.
5.
: 8. Document Control.
Calculations - Documentation 6.
: 9. Field walkdown activities.
Compliance with project procedures.
: 10. Indoctrination and training.
7.
: 11. Licensing activities.
Construction support activities.
: 12. Records maintenance.
8.
: 13. Maintenance of Project Procedure manuals.
Document Control.
: 14. Personnel qualification and experience verification.
9.
: 15. System inputs to pipe stress and pipe support analyses.
Field walkdown activities.
A chronological tabulation of SWEC Engineering Assurance (EA) audits is pre-Q                     sented in Table 5-9.
10.
5.3.2       Summary of Audits by TU Electric-TAP, NRC-VBP, and SWEC-QAAD In addition to the SWEC Engineering Assurance (EA) Audits, the SWEC-PSAS was audited by TU Electric Quality Assurance (QA), NRC Vendor Program Branch (VPB),
Indoctrination and training.
11.
Licensing activities.
12.
Records maintenance.
13.
Maintenance of Project Procedure manuals.
14.
Personnel qualification and experience verification.
15.
System inputs to pipe stress and pipe support analyses.
A chronological tabulation of SWEC Engineering Assurance (EA) audits is pre-Q sented in Table 5-9.
5.3.2 Summary of Audits by TU Electric-TAP, NRC-VBP, and SWEC-QAAD In addition to the SWEC Engineering Assurance (EA) Audits, the SWEC-PSAS was audited by TU Electric Quality Assurance (QA), NRC Vendor Program Branch (VPB),
and SWEC Quality Assurance Auditing Division (QAAD).
and SWEC Quality Assurance Auditing Division (QAAD).
To date, TU Electric's Technical Audit Program (TAP) has performed 5 audits of the SWEC-PSAS. Each SWEC-PSAS location has been audited at least once. An average of nine (9) subjects were reviewed during each of these audits. These audits are essentially equivalent to the SWEC Engineering Assurance (EA) audits discussed in Section 5.3.1.       Therefore, the list of audit subjects in Sec-tion 5.3.1 is representative for these audits. A chronological tabulation of the TU Electric Quality Assurance (QA) TAPS audits is presented in Table 5-10. I The NRC-Vendor Program Branch (VPB) performed one audit in mid-1986 of SWEC-PSAS validation process (Reference 31) and reviewed the following activities:
To date, TU Electric's Technical Audit Program (TAP) has performed 5 audits of the SWEC-PSAS.
: 1. Design control (pipe stress and support analyses).
Each SWEC-PSAS location has been audited at least once.
: 2. Document control (incoming and outgoing).                             ,
An average of nine (9) subjects were reviewed during each of these audits.
These audits are essentially equivalent to the SWEC Engineering Assurance (EA) audits discussed in Section 5.3.1.
Therefore, the list of audit subjects in Sec-tion 5.3.1 is representative for these audits.
A chronological tabulation of the TU Electric Quality Assurance (QA) TAPS audits is presented in Table 5-10.
I The NRC-Vendor Program Branch (VPB) performed one audit in mid-1986 of SWEC-PSAS validation process (Reference 31) and reviewed the following activities:
1.
Design control (pipe stress and support analyses).
2.
Document control (incoming and outgoing).
l 3.
Procurement control, n
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: 3. Procurement control, n
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: 4. Training.
[.
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: 5. Audits (SWEC-EA and TU Electric-TAP).
4.
The SWEC Quality Assurance Auditing Division-(QAAD) performed one audit of the SWEC-PSAS.                                       This audit was performed to assess the Project Quality Assurance Manager's adherence to Corporate QA Program requirements, 'the adequacy of the Project's QA Program (CPPP-1), the Document Control Program, and the Records Management Program.                                                                                               i i
Training.
                                                                                                                                  }
5.
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Audits (SWEC-EA and TU Electric-TAP).
l f
The SWEC Quality Assurance Auditing Division-(QAAD) performed one audit of the SWEC-PSAS.
f 'O                                                                                                                               1 Q
This audit was performed to assess the Project Quality Assurance Manager's adherence to Corporate QA Program requirements, 'the adequacy of the Project's QA Program (CPPP-1), the Document Control Program, and the Records Management Program.
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p                                                  5.4 CORRECTIVE AND PREVENTIVE ACTION v                                                SWEC-PSAS has developed technical and design control procedures and updated the design and installation / inspection specifications to implement the corrective actions resulting from the small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Ac-tion Program (CAP). These procedures and specifications are identified within the Piping - Design Basis Documents (DBDs) which contain the bases for validat-ing the small' bore piping and pipe supports in Unit 1 and Common. As a result of this effort, the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Unit 1 and Common small bore piping systems and supports are validated as being capable of per-forming their safety-related functions.
5.4 CORRECTIVE AND PREVENTIVE ACTION pv SWEC-PSAS has developed technical and design control procedures and updated the design and installation / inspection specifications to implement the corrective actions resulting from the small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Ac-tion Program (CAP).
This validation is documented in the drawings, calculations, and specifica-tions. The validated design documentation will be provided to TU Electric.
These procedures and specifications are identified within the Piping - Design Basis Documents (DBDs) which contain the bases for validat-ing the small' bore piping and pipe supports in Unit 1 and Common.
As a result of this effort, the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Unit 1 and Common small bore piping systems and supports are validated as being capable of per-forming their safety-related functions.
This validation is documented in the drawings, calculations, and specifica-tions.
The validated design documentation will be provided to TU Electric.
This validated design documentation can provide the basis for configuration control of CPSES small bore piping and pipe supports to facilitate operation, maintenance, and future modifications following issuance of an operating license.
This validated design documentation can provide the basis for configuration control of CPSES small bore piping and pipe supports to facilitate operation, maintenance, and future modifications following issuance of an operating license.
At the completion of the validation, SWEC-PSAS will provide TU Electric Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) with the complete set of drawings and calcula-tions, contained within the Small Bore Piping - Design Validation Packages (DVPs) for Unit 1 and Common.       SWEC-PSAS procedures used for small bore piping and pipe supports validation will be provided to Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE). Implementation of these procedures by CPE assures that future CPSES small bore piping and pipe supports design is performed in accordance with the licensing commitments.
At the completion of the validation, SWEC-PSAS will provide TU Electric Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) with the complete set of drawings and calcula-tions, contained within the Small Bore Piping - Design Validation Packages (DVPs) for Unit 1 and Common.
Training fo r Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) personnel will be provided by SWEC-PSAS.     The training will cover background assumptions and the methodology used in the validation of the piping and pipe support design. The importance of quality assurance will be stressed throughout the training program.
SWEC-PSAS procedures used for small bore piping and pipe supports validation will be provided to Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE).
Practical experience has been provided to Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) engi-neers who have worked alongside SWEC-PSAS engineers during the ongoing valida-tion process.     Experience gained by CPE engineers included changes in design documents     and   familiarization   with procedures followed and regulatory requirements.
Implementation of these procedures by CPE assures that future CPSES small bore piping and pipe supports design is performed in accordance with the licensing commitments.
TU Electric Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) is developing a program to assure a complete and orderly transfer of the engineering and design function from             i SWEC-PSAS to CPE. The plan will provide for the identification of those tasks presently being performed by SWEC-PSAS which are to be transferred to CPE and the identification of all procedures, programs, training, and staffing require-ments. The program will be based upon three prerequisites, 1) the piping-related Corrective Action Program (CAP) effort to support plant completion is       ,
Training fo r Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) personnel will be provided by SWEC-PSAS.
finished for the particular task; 2) the Piping - Design Validation Packages       I (DVPs) are complete; and 3) any required preventive action taken, as discussed     !
The training will cover background assumptions and the methodology used in the validation of the piping and pipe support design. The importance of quality assurance will be stressed throughout the training program.
in Appendix C, is complete.                                                         1
Practical experience has been provided to Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) engi-neers who have worked alongside SWEC-PSAS engineers during the ongoing valida-tion process.
                          \
Experience gained by CPE engineers included changes in design documents and familiarization with procedures followed and regulatory requirements.
TU Electric Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) is developing a program to assure a complete and orderly transfer of the engineering and design function from i
SWEC-PSAS to CPE.
The plan will provide for the identification of those tasks presently being performed by SWEC-PSAS which are to be transferred to CPE and the identification of all procedures, programs, training, and staffing require-ments.
The program will be based upon three prerequisites, 1) the piping-related Corrective Action Program (CAP) effort to support plant completion is finished for the particular task; 2) the Piping - Design Validation Packages I
(DVPs) are complete; and 3) any required preventive action taken, as discussed in Appendix C, is complete.
1
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                                        _                                                                              i
i


This program will assure the transfer of complete design document and procedures to Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE).
This program will assure the transfer of complete design document and procedures to Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE).
I J
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n                                                                       FIGURE 5-1 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)
n FIGURE 5-1 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)
FLOW CHART AND GOVERNING PROCEDURES SMALL BORE PlPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS DESIGN VALIDATION CPPP 1(REF.6)                     CPPP-28 (REF. 67)
FLOW CHART AND GOVERNING PROCEDURES SMALL BORE PlPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS DESIGN VALIDATION CPPP 1(REF.6)
CPPP 5 (REF.14)                   CPPP 29(REF 77)
CPPP-28 (REF. 67)
CPP P-6 (REF. 9)                   CPPP-30 (REF. 56)
CPPP 5 (REF.14)
CPPP 7 (REF. 8)                   CPPP-31 (R EF. 30)
CPPP 29(REF 77)
CPPP 15 (REF. 80)                 CPPP-35 (REF. 59)
CPP P-6 (REF. 9)
CPPP 18 (REF.17)                 DBD CS 065(REF.1)
CPPP-30 (REF. 56)
CPPP 19 (REF. 71)                 DBD CS 066 (REF.2)
CPPP 7 (REF. 8)
CPPP 20 (REF.65)                 DBD-CS 067 (REF. 3)
CPPP-31 (R EF. 30)
CPPP 24(REF.66)                   DBD CS-069 (REF. 61)
CPPP 15 (REF. 80)
CPPP 25 (REF. 57)                 DBD CS 070(REF.62)
CPPP-35 (REF. 59)
SPEC. 2323 MS46A (REF. 44)       CPSP 16 (REF.82)
CPPP 18 (REF.17)
SPEC. 2323 MS200 A (REF. 41) t ISSUE MODIFICATIONS CPPP 6 (REF. 9)       CPSP 10 (REF. 73)
DBD CS 065(REF.1)
[D                                           CPSP 14 (REF. 72) 1 P BUILD AND INSPECT l f POST CONSTRUCTION HARDWARE VALID ATION                                       AS BUILT INSPECTION (ECE 9.04 .04/ECE 9.04 05)                                     OF PlPING & PIPE (REF 47/55)                                               SUPPORTS FVM.PS-080 (R EF. 50)           CP CPM 9.10 (REF. 43)           CP OAP 12.1 (REF. 34)
CPPP 19 (REF. 71)
FVM PS 081 (REF. 51)           CP CPM 9.10A (REF. 40)         ECE DC 7 (REF.75)
DBD CS 066 (REF.2)
FVM PS 082 (REF. 52)           AQP 11.2 (REF. 60)             CPSP 12 (REF. 37)
CPPP 20 (REF.65)
FVM SI 040 (REF. 76)           010 AP 11.1.28 (REF. 45)
DBD-CS 067 (REF. 3)
CPPP 22 (REF.32)               CP OAP 12.1 (REF. 34)
CPPP 24(REF.66)
SPEC. 2323 MS 100 (REF. 38)     CP AOP 12.1 (REF.12)
DBD CS-069 (REF. 61)
CPPP 25 (REF. 57)
DBD CS 070(REF.62)
SPEC. 2323 MS46A (REF. 44)
CPSP 16 (REF.82)
SPEC. 2323 MS200 A (REF. 41) t ISSUE MODIFICATIONS CPPP 6 (REF. 9)
CPSP 10 (REF. 73)
[D CPSP 14 (REF. 72) 1 P BUILD AND INSPECT l f POST CONSTRUCTION HARDWARE VALID ATION AS BUILT INSPECTION (ECE 9.04.04/ECE 9.04 05)
OF PlPING & PIPE (REF 47/55)
SUPPORTS FVM.PS-080 (R EF. 50)
CP CPM 9.10 (REF. 43)
CP OAP 12.1 (REF. 34)
FVM PS 081 (REF. 51)
CP CPM 9.10A (REF. 40)
ECE DC 7 (REF.75)
FVM PS 082 (REF. 52)
AQP 11.2 (REF. 60)
CPSP 12 (REF. 37)
FVM SI 040 (REF. 76) 010 AP 11.1.28 (REF. 45)
CPPP 22 (REF.32)
CP OAP 12.1 (REF. 34)
SPEC. 2323 MS 100 (REF. 38)
CP AOP 12.1 (REF.12)
CPSP 12 (REF. 37)
CPSP 12 (REF. 37)
I f FINAL RECONCILIATION         J 7
I f FINAL RECONCILIATION J
CPPP 23 (REF. 29)   CPPP 33 (REF. 68)
7 CPPP 23 (REF. 29)
O                                                               ' r FIN AL DESIGN                     L PlPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS I                                                         DOCUMENTATION                         F           COMPLETE CPPP 4 (REF. 69)     CPSP 11 (REF. 74) cHer. ors CPPP 11 (REF. 70)
CPPP 33 (REF. 68)
O
' r FIN AL DESIGN L PlPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS I
DOCUMENTATION F
COMPLETE CPPP 4 (REF. 69)
CPSP 11 (REF. 74)
CPPP 11 (REF. 70) cHer. ors


3                                                                                                                        FIGURE 5-2 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP) TECHNICAL INTERFACES SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS TU ELECTRIC COM ANCHf PG All EN04NEf RtNG CAP MANAGEMENT e e WELO LOCAflONS FOA PAf st AvlCE ANO INSERvict to SPECTeoes$
FIGURE 5-2 3
IMPELL COAPCA Afl0N                                                                                                                   ESASCO f QUSPMENT GUALIFICAfl0N OAOUP                                                                                                       SYSTEM iNf ERACTISN OROUP e ALLOA ASLE WALvf ACCEtE AAfi0 set e W ALVE ADOL #LE ALLOW Aett LOADS e SE ALE 0 SLEEVE ALLOW ASLE MOWEMENTS JET IMP 8NCEMENT e             e pept enE A# POSTutAf t0N L O A05             e P6PE MOWEMEsett af PIPE AuPf utE WALVE et0GLE LOA 06 e                                                                                                           RE STA ArNT LOC A70888 vAiWS ACCELE#AfeDNS AND e V Atwf OPE AAf0A SUPPont RE0uiAtMEnts PIPE MOVEMENT Af SE AL80 SLEEVES e e OESs0N Af 0ut#EWENTS FOR e AEWlEW AESOLuflCN 0p                                                                                                                 WESTiesGHoust. SUPPLito Esf enesAL f tCNNIC Ak aSBUES                                             3 f                                                       V ALVE S< toutPME N T e IttviEW PROCEDUAE AND -                                                                                                           0 SPECIAL REQUmEMENTS 80A Rf SULTS Of VALIDAfs0N                                                                                                               CLASS l SUPPOAf 8 PAOGRAM                                                                                                                           e CLASS 5 ptPE SUPP0Af LOADS gggg pggg CPRf                                                                             F                                     7                                                                    II    " $
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP) TECHNICAL INTERFACES SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS TU ELECTRIC COM ANCHf PG All EN04NEf RtNG CAP MANAGEMENT e e WELO LOCAflONS FOA PAf st AvlCE ANO INSERvict to SPECTeoes$
W AL10Afl0N OF Ovt Avlt w                                                                                       PlPtNG ANO                                                                                 CLASS 1 FIPING
IMPELL COAPCA Afl0N ESASCO f QUSPMENT GUALIFICAfl0N OAOUP SYSTEM iNf ERACTISN OROUP e ALLOA ASLE WALvf ACCEtE AAfi0 set e W ALVE ADOL #LE ALLOW Aett LOADS e SE ALE 0 SLEEVE ALLOW ASLE MOWEMENTS JET IMP 8NCEMENT e e pept enE A# POSTutAf t0N L O A05 e P6PE MOWEMEsett af PIPE AuPf utE WALVE et0GLE LOA 06 e RE STA ArNT LOC A70888 vAiWS ACCELE#AfeDNS AND e V Atwf OPE AAf0A SUPPont RE0uiAtMEnts PIPE MOVEMENT Af SE AL80 SLEEVES e e OESs0N Af 0ut#EWENTS FOR e AEWlEW AESOLuflCN 0p WESTiesGHoust. SUPPLito Esf enesAL f tCNNIC Ak aSBUES 3 f V ALVE S< toutPME N T e IttviEW PROCEDUAE AND -
                                                                '                                                                            PIPE SUPP0ATS               e AEBuLf B of CLASS t SUPPOAf e AESOLu110N 0f TfCNNtCAL IStutS                                                           W AUD AT@N e RESutfB 0F ANAlfStB                                                   i                e LOADS feePOS40 $W CL ASS i AND 3
0 SPECIAL REQUmEMENTS 80A Rf SULTS Of VALIDAfs0N CLASS l SUPPOAf 8 PAOGRAM e CLASS 5 ptPE SUPP0Af LOADS gggg pggg II CPRf F
* OEI         "U                                                 M k   l                 Pipme ON CLAS8 i PtP980 e VALVf ACCELERAfl0NS ANO foUIPMENT Nol2LE LOAOS FOA W8SfmONOUSg.
W AL10Afl0N OF 7
Ovt Avlt w PlPtNG ANO CLASS 1 FIPING PIPE SUPP0ATS e AEBuLf B of CLASS t SUPPOAf e AESOLu110N 0f TfCNNtCAL IStutS W AUD AT@N e RESutfB 0F ANAlfStB e LOADS feePOS40 $W CL ASS i AND 3 i
* OEI "U
M k l
Pipme ON CLAS8 i PtP980 e VALVf ACCELERAfl0NS ANO foUIPMENT Nol2LE LOAOS FOA W8SfmONOUSg.
SUPPUED WALvtSe EOUSPMENT e SUP90Af RE ACTION LOA 08 04 WESfletONOUSE DESf08sE0 E0utPMGNT SUPPCATS SYSTEM 0PERAftese e CNAA ACTERelftCS STSTiif DES 80h e MOO 4FIC Af 9NS
SUPPUED WALvtSe EOUSPMENT e SUP90Af RE ACTION LOA 08 04 WESfletONOUSE DESf08sE0 E0utPMGNT SUPPCATS SYSTEM 0PERAftese e CNAA ACTERelftCS STSTiif DES 80h e MOO 4FIC Af 9NS
                                                                                                                    &AS DA f A (INCt UDisse fME e A   CAfmM Of CODE CASE N 410            ,egg DE,sa,c,es   ,C HAN04,AE g og jom    uo Eugn,g CO,MME se0 A rtoes$
&AS DA f A (INCt UDisse fME e A
CONTAMINAflON PElef fR ATION e             e ADOT WAkvf M0vtMENTS FOA CONFIOuR A fl001               INSf AuMENT STSfEWS GEOLOGICAL MPut DAT A e               e STRUCTUAAL leef t Af ACE AE ACTION A L Clou0 A880CIAfg5                         SueL0ml AND SEiteetc e               LOADS ST AYIC DISPLACEMENTS                 e CONT AiNME NT PENE TA Afs0el LO ADS ASSIST fu ELECTRIC ANO                       SinuCfuRAL mtEns ACE e               e REf tECievE mSut Afiose nEMov&L Af StGEVES PENE T A Af t000S SWIC PS AS IN RESOkufl0N                                   AE0ulAEMENT OA P A&Mt SUPPORTS OF TECHNIC AL ISSU(S                     PtPI AuPfuRE LOA 08 ON e M0efENT Af BTRAsedTS l I
CAfmM Of CODE e DE,sa,c,es,C HAN04,AE CO,MME se0 A rtoes$
                                                                                                                                                    !"LC e R$ECHAleeCAL GA0ur e CivlL/9T AVCfun AL 0A0up e (LECYAtCAL OAOUP e lleSTAUMENT4fl0N 4 CONTROL 0Aout taer su l
CASE N 410
, gg g og jom uo Eugn,g CONTAMINAflON PElef fR ATION e e ADOT WAkvf M0vtMENTS FOA CONFIOuR A fl001 INSf AuMENT STSfEWS GEOLOGICAL MPut DAT A e e STRUCTUAAL leef t Af ACE AE ACTION A L Clou0 A880CIAfg5 SueL0ml AND SEiteetc e LOADS ST AYIC DISPLACEMENTS e CONT AiNME NT PENE TA Afs0el LO ADS ASSIST fu ELECTRIC ANO SinuCfuRAL mtEns ACE e e REf tECievE mSut Afiose nEMov&L Af StGEVES PENE T A Af t000S SWIC PS AS IN RESOkufl0N AE0ulAEMENT OA P A&Mt SUPPORTS OF TECHNIC AL ISSU(S PtPI AuPfuRE LOA 08 ON e M0efENT Af BTRAsedTS l I
!"LC e R$ECHAleeCAL GA0ur e CivlL/9T AVCfun AL 0A0up e (LECYAtCAL OAOUP e lleSTAUMENT4fl0N 4 CONTROL 0Aout l
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  ,A                                                                   FIGURE 5-3
,A FIGURE 5-3
  \
!\\
SWEC-PSAS PlPE STRESS DESIGN VAllDATION FLOW CHART 1
SWEC-PSAS PlPE STRESS DESIGN VAllDATION FLOW CHART 1
SWEC_
SWEC_
e PIPING OR AWINGS e SYSTEM P ARAMETERS e ARS CURVES
e PIPING OR AWINGS e SYSTEM P ARAMETERS e ARS CURVES
                                                                  # SYSTEM OPER ATING CONDITIONS e ESSENTIAL SYSTEMS
# SYSTEM OPER ATING CONDITIONS e ESSENTIAL SYSTEMS
* BRE AN EXCLUSION SOUNDARIES SW EC . PSAS e SYSTEM REVIEW AND M ANGER OPisMlZATION REvtEW         E8ASCO e INPUTS ANO MODELING         M ING NUPIPE S               e JETIMPlNCEMENT e FLUID TRANSIENT ANALYSIS         LO ADS ON PIPING RESULTS l
* BRE AN EXCLUSION SOUNDARIES SW EC. PSAS e SYSTEM REVIEW AND M ANGER OPisMlZATION REvtEW E8ASCO e INPUTS ANO MODELING M
e MAXIMUM CALCULATED STRESSES                                                         l e PIPE SUPPORT / CONTAINMENT                                                         j PENETRAflON LOADS e EOulPMENT/V ALVE/ NOZZLE FLANGE LOAOS e VALVE ACCELER ATIONS ANO VALVE OPERATOR SUPPORT REQUIREMENT e EXPANSION JOINT MOVEMENTS e PIPF MOVEMENTS AT SLEEVES e ROOT VALVE MOVEMENTS FOR                                                         .
e JETIMPlNCEMENT ING NUPIPE S e FLUID TRANSIENT ANALYSIS LO ADS ON PIPING RESULTS l
INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS e STRESS LEVEL FOR PIPE SRE AR POSTUL ATION
e MAXIMUM CALCULATED STRESSES e PIPE SUPPORT / CONTAINMENT j
(                                                            e PIPE MOVEMENTS AT PlPE RUPTURE RESTRAINT AND PlPE SUPPORTS L OC A TIONS EBASCO                         e FUNCTIONAL CAPABluTY EVALUAflON OF ESSENTIAL PIPING e                    LA  N RE e POSTULATEO 8RE AA LOC ATIONS                       L,E,CTIVE IN SL vtLOCAT NS RUPT RE R     R NT OCATIONS                   E   NI       LOSINPI NG IMPELL CORPOR ATION e LOADS FROM CLASS E/3 PIPING e PIPE MOVEMENT AT SEALEO                                                                       ON CLASS 1 PIPING SLEEVES                                                         y                        e E QUIPMENT /V ALVE LO AD$
PENETRAflON LOADS e EOulPMENT/V ALVE/ NOZZLE FLANGE LOAOS e VALVE ACCELER ATIONS ANO VALVE OPERATOR SUPPORT REQUIREMENT e EXPANSION JOINT MOVEMENTS e PIPF MOVEMENTS AT SLEEVES e ROOT VALVE MOVEMENTS FOR INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS e STRESS LEVEL FOR PIPE SRE AR POSTUL ATION e PIPE MOVEMENTS AT PlPE RUPTURE
e VALVE ACCELERATION                                               F                           FOR WESTINGHOUSE SUPPLIEO e VALVE AND EQUIPMENT NOZZLE                                                                   EQUIPMENT                         ,
(
LOADS FOR NON WESTINGHOUSE       1
RESTRAINT AND PlPE SUPPORTS L OC A TIONS EBASCO e FUNCTIONAL CAPABluTY EVALUAflON OF ESSENTIAL PIPING e POSTULATEO 8RE AA LOC ATIONS L,E,CTIVE IN e
* VALVE ACCELERATIONS FOR             {
LA N RE SL vtLOCAT NS RUPT RE R R NT OCATIONS E
SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT             j                   STRESS CALCULATION                        wEsimoNOUSE Supputo e V ALVE OPER ATOR SUPPORT WITN             DOCUMENTATION / TRANSMITTALS                       '
NI LOSINPI NG IMPELL CORPOR ATION e LOADS FROM CLASS E/3 PIPING e PIPE MOVEMENT AT SEALEO ON CLASS 1 PIPING SLEEVES e E QUIPMENT /V ALVE LO AD$
                    "'*CI'U"'0*"I                                   FOR DESIGN ACCEPTANCE
y FOR WESTINGHOUSE SUPPLIEO e VALVE ACCELERATION F
                                                                                    +                                       SWEC TU ELECTRIC SWEC PSAS e WELO LOCAflONS FOR
e VALVE AND EQUIPMENT NOZZLE EQUIPMENT LOADS FOR NON WESTINGHOUSE 1
* CONTAINMENT PENETRATION e PIPE SUPPORT V AllOATION                                                               LOADS PRE SERVICE AND (SEE FIGURE 6 4)                               IN SERVICE INSPE CTIONS               e EXPANSION JOINT MOVEMENTS e ROOT V ALVE MOVEMENTS FOR INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS e REFLECTIVE INSULAftON REMOVAL AT SLEEVES OR PENETRATION LOC ATIONS 1 5 O
* VALVE ACCELERATIONS FOR
{
STRESS CALCULATION SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT j
wEsimoNOUSE Supputo e V ALVE OPER ATOR SUPPORT WITN DOCUMENTATION / TRANSMITTALS
"'*CI'U"'0*"I FOR DESIGN ACCEPTANCE
+
TU ELECTRIC SWEC SWEC PSAS e WELO LOCAflONS FOR
* CONTAINMENT PENETRATION e PIPE SUPPORT V AllOATION PRE SERVICE AND LOADS (SEE FIGURE 6 4)
IN SERVICE INSPE CTIONS e EXPANSION JOINT MOVEMENTS e ROOT V ALVE MOVEMENTS FOR INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS e REFLECTIVE INSULAftON REMOVAL AT SLEEVES OR PENETRATION LOC ATIONS O
1 5
i CHaf-843 I
i CHaf-843 I


l 1
l 1
A                                                                             FIGURE 5-4 5N' SWEC-PSAS PIPE SUPPORT DESIGN VALIDATION FLOW CHART I
A FIGURE 5-4 5N SWEC-PSAS PIPE SUPPORT DESIGN VALIDATION FLOW CHART I
l i
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SWEC PSAS PIPE STRESS RESULTS                                           I (FROM FIGURE 5-3)
SWEC PSAS PIPE STRESS RESULTS I
                                                                                              +                             #SAS I
(FROM FIGURE 5-3)
WESTINGHOUSE SWEC PSAS           AS-BUILT INFORMATION AND           ,
+
CLASS 1 PIPE SUPPORT LOADS                                               NON-ASME ATTACHMENT LOADS PIPE SUPPORT GROUP FORMATION OF LOADING                                           l COMBINATIONS FOR                                             l' PIPE SUPPORT VALIDATION A
I
#SAS WESTINGHOUSE SWEC PSAS AS-BUILT INFORMATION AND CLASS 1 PIPE SUPPORT LOADS NON-ASME ATTACHMENT LOADS PIPE SUPPORT GROUP FORMATION OF LOADING l
COMBINATIONS FOR l
PIPE SUPPORT VALIDATION A
k VALIDATION e COMPONENT STANDARD SUPPORTS e STRUCTURAL FRAMES e tNTEGRAL WELDED ATTACHMENTS e STIFFNESS FOR PIPE SUPPORTS WITHIN CLASS 1 PIPE STRESS ANALYSIS PACKAGE e ASME SECTION ill CODE CHECK e WELD / BOLT JOINT DESIGN
k VALIDATION e COMPONENT STANDARD SUPPORTS e STRUCTURAL FRAMES e tNTEGRAL WELDED ATTACHMENTS e STIFFNESS FOR PIPE SUPPORTS WITHIN CLASS 1 PIPE STRESS ANALYSIS PACKAGE e ASME SECTION ill CODE CHECK e WELD / BOLT JOINT DESIGN
* LOCAL STRESS e BASEPLATES, RICHMOND INSERTS, AND ANCHOR BOLTS SWEC MECHANICAL                                                         WESTINGHOUSE SWEC CIVIL / STRUCTURAL                                                 e CLASS 1 PIPE SUPPORT UPPORT CALCULATION           RESULTS, INCLUDING PIPE e SUPPORT (INCLUDING MOMENT DOCUMENTATION /           SUPPORT STIFFNESSES RESTR AINTS)/ STRUCTUR AL INTERFACE REACTION LOADS                       TRANSMITTALS FOR         e SWING ANGLE EXCEEDANCE o REFLECTIVE INSULATlON                       DESIGN ACCEPTANCE
* LOCAL STRESS e BASEPLATES, RICHMOND INSERTS, AND ANCHOR BOLTS SWEC MECHANICAL WESTINGHOUSE SWEC CIVIL / STRUCTURAL e CLASS 1 PIPE SUPPORT UPPORT CALCULATION e SUPPORT (INCLUDING MOMENT RESULTS, INCLUDING PIPE DOCUMENTATION /
* SUPPORT REACTION LOADS REMOVAL AT BOX FRAME                                                     ON WESTINGHOUSE DESIGNED PIPE SUPPORT LOCATIONS                                                   EQUIPMENT SUPPORTS l
SUPPORT STIFFNESSES RESTR AINTS)/ STRUCTUR AL INTERFACE REACTION LOADS TRANSMITTALS FOR e SWING ANGLE EXCEEDANCE o REFLECTIVE INSULATlON DESIGN ACCEPTANCE
* SUPPORT REACTION LOADS REMOVAL AT BOX FRAME ON WESTINGHOUSE DESIGNED PIPE SUPPORT LOCATIONS EQUIPMENT SUPPORTS
(*
(*
r TU ELECTRIC CONSTRUCTION /OUALITY CONTROL INSTALL AND INSPECT MODIFICATIONS CH87 644
TU ELECTRIC CONSTRUCTION /OUALITY CONTROL r
INSTALL AND INSPECT l
MODIFICATIONS CH87 644


FIGURE 5-5
FIGURE 5-5
            \
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POST CONSTRUCTION HARDWARE VALIDATION PROGRAM (PCHVP) rum.menmes,                         ,m.mm.meme ,
POST CONSTRUCTION HARDWARE VALIDATION PROGRAM (PCHVP) rum.menmes,
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nEsut? IN CHANotD                   g                                                                                                 g
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TABLE 5-1 O                                           PIPING SYSTEM INPUT DATA
TABLE 5-1
:1.         Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
'O PIPING SYSTEM INPUT DATA
: 2.         ASME III Code Class 1,           2, and 3 piping drawings and Seismic Category II piping drawings within the same piping stress analysis package
:1.
: 3.         Pipeline designation list
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) 2.
: 4.         Piping design specifications
ASME III Code Class 1, 2, and 3 piping drawings and Seismic Category II piping drawings within the same piping stress analysis package 3.
: 5.         Flow diagrams, system description'and operating conditions 1
Pipeline designation list 4.
: 6.         Seismic response spectra . (including the application of ASME Code Case N-411)
Piping design specifications 5.
: 7.         Seismic structural displacements data
Flow diagrams, system description'and operating conditions 1
: 8.         General arrangement and civil / structural drawings
6.
: 9.         As-built piping support location drawings
Seismic response spectra. (including the application of ASME Code Case N-411) 7.
: 10.         Pipe support drawings
Seismic structural displacements data 8.
: 11.         Thermal structural displacements data
General arrangement and civil / structural drawings 9.
: 12.         Containment pressure test displacement data
As-built piping support location drawings 10.
: 13.         Wall and floor sleeve sealant design data l
Pipe support drawings 11.
l     14.         Jet impingement loads
Thermal structural displacements data 12.
: 15.         Pipe whip impact loads
Containment pressure test displacement data 13.
: 16.         Structural and equipment layout drawings
Wall and floor sleeve sealant design data l
: 17.         Valve and valve operator weights (including extended attachments), center of gravity, yoke natural frequency and acceptable valve acceleration limit
l 14.
: 18.         Equipment movement data and allowable nozzle loads
Jet impingement loads 15.
: 19.         As-built location of pipe with respect to wall and floor sleeves
Pipe whip impact loads 16.
: 20.         Existing pipe break locations, pipe rupture restraint locations and de-tailed drawings
Structural and equipment layout drawings 17.
: 21.         Valve nozzle allowables                                                           j 1
Valve and valve operator weights (including extended attachments), center of gravity, yoke natural frequency and acceptable valve acceleration limit 18.
Equipment movement data and allowable nozzle loads 19.
As-built location of pipe with respect to wall and floor sleeves 20.
Existing pipe break locations, pipe rupture restraint locations and de-tailed drawings 21.
Valve nozzle allowables j
1


i TABLE 5-1 (Cont)
i TABLE 5-1 (Cont) 22.
: 22.                 As-built pipe thickness
As-built pipe thickness
          '23.                 Westinghouse Class 1 pipe stress reports                                                             1
'23.
: 24.                 ADLPIPE computer listing for'each pipe stress analysis package-
Westinghouse Class 1 pipe stress reports 1
: 25.                 Containment displacements due to loss of coolant accident (LOCA)
24.
ADLPIPE computer listing for'each pipe stress analysis package-25.
Containment displacements due to loss of coolant accident (LOCA)
: 26. ' Component drawings (equipment, penetration, valve, etc)
: 26. ' Component drawings (equipment, penetration, valve, etc)
: 27. . Calculations
: 27.. Calculations a.
: a. Pipe stress analysis (if applicable).
Pipe stress analysis (if applicable).
: b. Pipe support analysis and stress report (if applicable)
b.
: c. Fluid transient analysis (if applicable)
Pipe support analysis and stress report (if applicable) c.
: 28.                 Loads from non-ASME attachments on pipe supports
Fluid transient analysis (if applicable) 28.
: 29.                 Geotechnical data for buried pipe analysis
Loads from non-ASME attachments on pipe supports 29.
: 30. ' Flexible hose design criteria and vendor's design report
Geotechnical data for buried pipe analysis
: 31.                 As-built information for tie-back support
: 30. ' Flexible hose design criteria and vendor's design report 31.
: 32.                 As-built pipe weld shrinkage and locations i
As-built information for tie-back support 32.
As-built pipe weld shrinkage and locations i
l i
l i
I o                                                               2
I o
2


                                                              . TABLE 5-2 FLUID TRANSIENT LOADINGS                                       l
. TABLE 5-2 FLUID TRANSIENT LOADINGS l
                                                                                                                      )
)
Containment Spray System i
Containment Spray System i
* Containment spray pump startup Safety Injection System
Containment spray pump startup Safety Injection System Check valve closure following pump-trip Senice Water System Pump trip and pump start j
                              *-    Check valve closure following pump-trip Senice Water System
Residual Heat Removal System Relief valve discharge Chemical and Volume Control System Relief valve discharge Main Steam System l
* Pump trip and pump start                                                         j Residual Heat Removal System
Main steam turbine trip Auxiliary feedpump turbine trip Feedpump turbine trip.
* Relief valve discharge Chemical and Volume Control System
. Safety and relief valve discharge l
* Relief valve discharge Main Steam System                                                                           l
Feedwater System Check valve closure following pump trip j
* Main steam turbine trip       .                                                !
Rapid closure of isolation or control valve Check valve closure analysis following postulated pipe rupture Auxiliary Feedwater System Check valve closure following trip of one auxiliary feedwater pump Boron Recycle System Relief valve discharge Component Cooling Water System Relief valve discharge LO
* Auxiliary feedpump turbine trip
                              *. Feedpump turbine trip.          .
                              *    . Safety and relief valve discharge l
Feedwater System
* Check valve closure following pump trip                                         j
* Rapid closure of isolation or control valve                                     >
* Check valve closure analysis following postulated pipe rupture Auxiliary Feedwater System
* Check valve closure following trip of one auxiliary feedwater pump Boron Recycle System
* Relief valve discharge Component Cooling Water System
* Relief valve discharge LO


l I
l I
TABLE 5-3 PCHVP, REINSPECTION ATTRIBUTES AND RESOLUTIONS
TABLE 5-3 PCHVP, REINSPECTION ATTRIBUTES AND RESOLUTIONS
                              .IN. RESPONSE TO CPRT QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION ISAP-VII.C RESULTS REPORT                                 l SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS                             .,
.IN. RESPONSE TO CPRT QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION ISAP-VII.C RESULTS REPORT l
i Construction               ISAP-VII.c Results                   PCHVP Attributes Work Category               Report Recommendations               FVM/ Procedures Small Bore                 Reinspect flow elements to           CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081             !
SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS i
Piping Configur-           verify that they are orien-           (Reference 51) ation                       ted in the proper direction         CP-QAP-12.1.                     i Figure F.23                       ,
Construction ISAP-VII.c Results PCHVP Attributes Work Category Report Recommendations FVM/ Procedures Small Bore Reinspect flow elements to CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 Piping Configur-verify that they are orien-(Reference 51) ation ted in the proper direction CP-QAP-12.1.
(Reference 34)                 !
i Figure F.23 (Reference 34)
                                      ' Verify existing piping-             CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-080 clearance criteria and               (Reference 50) walk down all insulated             CPPP-22,' Clearance small bore piping                   Walkdown Procedure (Reference 32)
' Verify existing piping-CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-080 clearance criteria and (Reference 50) walk down all insulated CPPP-22,' Clearance small bore piping Walkdown Procedure (Reference 32)
Reinspect safety-related             CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 piping expansion joints               CP-QAP-12.1 Figure F.23 Verify the accuracy and               CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 consistency of linear and             CPSP-12, As-Built locating dimensions in               Verification piping isometrics                     (Reference 37)
Reinspect safety-related CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 piping expansion joints CP-QAP-12.1 Figure F.23 Verify the accuracy and CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 consistency of linear and CPSP-12, As-Built locating dimensions in Verification piping isometrics (Reference 37)
Pipe Bend                   Verify by Ultrasonic Testing CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 Fabrication                 (UT) that installed pipe             CP-QAP-12.1                     ,
Pipe Bend Verify by Ultrasonic Testing CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 Fabrication (UT) that installed pipe CP-QAP-12.1 bends meet the minimum wall Figures F.23 and F.26 l-thickness requirement j
bends meet the minimum wall           Figures F.23 and F.26           l-thickness requirement                                               j I
Revise QC Procedure Procedure AQP-11.2 I
Revise QC Procedure                   Procedure AQP-11.2 QI-QAP-11.1-26 to require             (Reference 60) Super-         l that wall thickness after           seded QI-QAP-11.1-26 t
QI-QAP-11.1-26 to require (Reference 60) Super-l t
bending be verified by Ultrasonic Testing (UT) and                                         l' recorded Pipe Welds                 Reinspect butt welds in             CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 and Materials               Schedule 80 or thinner               Figure F.23
that wall thickness after seded QI-QAP-11.1-26 bending be verified by Ultrasonic Testing (UT) and l'
'                                        stainless steel piping made                                             l prior to 1982 that are                                               ]
recorded Pipe Welds Reinspect butt welds in CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 and Materials Schedule 80 or thinner Figure F.23 stainless steel piping made l
replacement welds and/or                                               !
prior to 1982 that are
have received extensive                                                 j repairs                                                                 q 1
]
replacement welds and/or have received extensive j
repairs q
1
(
(


i
i TABLE 5-3 (Cont)
      .-                            TABLE 5-3 (Cont)
'V.
  'V.                                                                                             !
l
l
          . Construction ISAP-VII.c Results               PCHVP Attributes                         !
. Construction ISAP-VII.c Results PCHVP Attributes Work Category Report Reconsnendations FVM/ Procedures Small Bore Inspect for proper gaps be-CPE-SWEC-IVM-PS-080
Work Category Report Reconsnendations         FVM/ Procedures Small Bore   Inspect for proper gaps be-     CPE-SWEC-IVM-PS-080                     <
' Pipe Supports tween pipe and pipe support CPPP-22, Clearance l
        ' Pipe Supports tween pipe and pipe support     CPPP-22, Clearance                       l I
I and verify adequate clearance Walkdown Procedure between pipe weld and pipe CP-QAP-12.1 l
and verify adequate clearance Walkdown Procedure between pipe weld and pipe       CP-QAP-12.1                             l support                         Figure F 9
support Figure F 9
                                                                                                -]
-]
Inspect and install suitable CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081                         l' locking devices.on all           Figures F.15, F.16, vendor-supplied components       F.13, and F.20 that do not have high-                                                   l strength bolting; install                                               1 locking devices-on all high-                                             t strength bolting that is not torqued to an acceptable pre-                                             ,
Inspect and install suitable CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 l
load                                                                     l I
locking devices.on all Figures F.15, F.16, vendor-supplied components F.13, and F.20 that do not have high-l strength bolting; install 1
Verify that the fasteners       CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 have been secured for all       CP-QAP-12.1                             ,
locking devices-on all high-t strength bolting that is not torqued to an acceptable pre-load l
vendor-supplied components       Figures F.13, F.15, (sway struts, snubbers, and     F.16, and F.17 t                                                                                              j spring cans) during plant.
I Verify that the fasteners CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 have been secured for all CP-QAP-12.1 vendor-supplied components Figures F.13, F.15, t
A startup and reoperation                                                   ;
(sway struts, snubbers, and F.16, and F.17 j
using a complete and de-                                                 t tailed procedure and check-list provided and verified                                               ,
A spring cans) during plant.
i by QC 4
startup and reoperation using a complete and de-t tailed procedure and check-list provided and verified i
by QC 4
1
1
{
{
Line 1,126: Line 1,681:
J
J


TABLE 5-4 v                                         UNIT 1 AND COMMON SMALL BORE PIPE SUPPORTS MODIFICATION  
TABLE 5-4
. v UNIT 1 AND COMMON SMALL BORE PIPE SUPPORTS MODIFICATION  


==SUMMARY==
==SUMMARY==
 
i Category Number of Modifications Prudent 189 Recent Industry Practice 626 I
i Category                                     Number of Modifications Prudent                                                 189 Recent Industry Practice                                 626                               I Adjustment                                               76 Cumulative Effects                                     1005 TOTAL                                                   1896 Modification Description                                       Category Richmond Insert Single Tubes                       Prudent Allowable Stress Exceeded for Structural Member   Cumulative Effects Support Deleted                                   Recent Industry Practice Support Added                                     Cumulative Effects Rigid Trapeze                                     Prudent Trapeze Snubber                                   Prudent                                 !'
Adjustment 76 Cumulative Effects 1005 TOTAL 1896 Modification Description Category Richmond Insert Single Tubes Prudent Allowable Stress Exceeded for Structural Member Cumulative Effects Support Deleted Recent Industry Practice Support Added Cumulative Effects Rigid Trapeze Prudent Trapeze Snubber Prudent Allowable Stress Exceeded for Welds Cumulative Effects Allowable Load Exceeded for Standard Component Cumulative Effects O
Allowable Stress Exceeded for Welds               Cumulative Effects Allowable Load Exceeded for Standard Component     Cumulative Effects O
Allowable Load Exceeded for Concrete Anchor Cumulative Effects C/
C/
Cinched U-Bolt Modification Prudent Component Exceeds 5 Degree Offset Adj ustment Revise Clearances Adjustment To be Modified Into a Clamp Anchor Prudent Box Frame on Pin Connection Prudent Modify to Increase Stiffness Prudent Preliminary Study Revises this into a Clamp Anchor Prudent Change from Rigid to Anchor or from Anchor to Rigid Prudent Change from Snubber to Rigid Recent Industry Practice Change from Rigid to Snubber Cumulative Effects Two Way Rigid Restraint Changed to a One Way Restraint or One Way Changed to Two Way Restraint Cumulative Effects Three Way Changed to One or Two Way Restraint Cumulative Effects U-Bolt on a Rigid Frame (One or Two Way Restraint)
Allowable Load Exceeded for Concrete Anchor Cinched U-Bolt Modification Cumulative Effects Prudent Component Exceeds 5 Degree Offset                 Adj ustment Revise Clearances                                 Adjustment To be Modified Into a Clamp Anchor                 Prudent Box Frame on Pin Connection                       Prudent Modify to Increase Stiffness                       Prudent Preliminary Study Revises this into a Clamp Anchor                                           Prudent Change from Rigid to Anchor or from Anchor to Rigid                                         Prudent Change from Snubber to Rigid                       Recent Industry Practice Change from Rigid to Snubber                       Cumulative Effects Two Way Rigid Restraint Changed to a One Way Restraint or One Way Changed to Two Way Restraint                                         Cumulative Effects Three Way Changed to One or Two Way Restraint     Cumulative Effects U-Bolt on a Rigid Frame (One or Two Way Restraint)                                       Cumulative Effects Change from Rigid Hanger to Spring or Spring to Rigid                                         Cumulative Effects Relocate Hanger                                   Cumulative Effects Pipe Bearing Stress Failure                       Cumulative Effects Reset Spring or Snubber Settings                   Adj ustment Exceeds Lateral Movement for Spring               Adjustment O
Cumulative Effects Change from Rigid Hanger to Spring or Spring to Rigid Cumulative Effects Relocate Hanger Cumulative Effects Pipe Bearing Stress Failure Cumulative Effects Reset Spring or Snubber Settings Adj ustment Exceeds Lateral Movement for Spring Adjustment O
1 l
1 l
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                                                                                            )
)


p                                        TABLE 5-5 SEISMIC CATEGORY II SMALL BORE PIPING OVER SEISMIC CATEGORY I EQUIPMENT PIPING CHECKLIST The field verification of Seismic Category II piping located over Seismic Category I systems, structures, or components is documented using a checklist addressing these attributes:
TABLE 5-5 p
: 1. Establish seismic to nonseismic boundaries in piping systems and de-termine whether the boundary requires further evaluation to ensure the integrity of'the seismic portion during a seismic event.
SEISMIC CATEGORY II SMALL BORE PIPING OVER SEISMIC CATEGORY I EQUIPMENT PIPING CHECKLIST The field verification of Seismic Category II piping located over Seismic Category I systems, structures, or components is documented using a checklist addressing these attributes:
: 2. Determine if. pipe supports restrain thermal expansion of a long straight piping run.
1.
: 3. Determine if supports have existing design loads that are less than calculated threshold loads.
Establish seismic to nonseismic boundaries in piping systems and de-termine whether the boundary requires further evaluation to ensure the integrity of'the seismic portion during a seismic event.
: 4. Determine if supports are next to a heavy concentrated weight (valves or components).                                                                                 ;
2.
: 5. Determine if long straight runs or ricers are not adequately support-ed for seismic in axial direction of pipe.
Determine if. pipe supports restrain thermal expansion of a long straight piping run.
    /;
3.
V       6. Determine if piping extends to different buildings.
Determine if supports have existing design loads that are less than calculated threshold loads.
: 7. Determine if the system design temperature exceeds 150*F.
4.
: 8. Verify that hot piping configuration and component alignment are in accordance with the design drawings.
Determine if supports are next to a heavy concentrated weight (valves or components).
l f
5.
}U E__ _                                                                                                           J
Determine if long straight runs or ricers are not adequately support-ed for seismic in axial direction of pipe.
/;
V 6.
Determine if piping extends to different buildings.
7.
Determine if the system design temperature exceeds 150*F.
8.
Verify that hot piping configuration and component alignment are in accordance with the design drawings.
l f}U E__ _
J


      - g- g                                                 TABLE 5-6 PCHVP SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS INSTALLATION / INSPECTION PROCEDURES SWEC-PSAS Field Verification Methods (FVMs) for large bore piping and pipe sup-ports Post Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) are in compliance with the following procedures:
TABLE 5-6
: 1. Comanche     Peak   Piping     Erection   Specification   No. 2323-MS-100 (Reference 38)
- g-g PCHVP SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS INSTALLATION / INSPECTION PROCEDURES SWEC-PSAS Field Verification Methods (FVMs) for large bore piping and pipe sup-ports Post Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) are in compliance with the following procedures:
: 2. Comanche Peak ASME Section III Code Class 2 and 3 Piping Design Spec-ification No. 2323-MS-200 (Reference 41)
1.
: 3. Comanche Peak Nuclear Safety Class Pipe Hangers and Supports Specifi-cation No. 2323-MS-46A (Reference 44)
Comanche Peak Piping Erection Specification No. 2323-MS-100 (Reference 38) 2.
: 4. Comanche Peak Structural Embedments Specification No. 2323-SS-30           j (Reference 39)
Comanche Peak ASME Section III Code Class 2 and 3 Piping Design Spec-ification No. 2323-MS-200 (Reference 41) 3.
: 5. Comanche Peak Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10, Component Support       i Installation (Reference 43)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Safety Class Pipe Hangers and Supports Specifi-cation No. 2323-MS-46A (Reference 44) 4.
: 6. Comanche Peak Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10A, Installation of Vendor-Supplied Component Supports         Catalog Items (Reference 40)
Comanche Peak Structural Embedments Specification No. 2323-SS-30 j
[d
(Reference 39) 5.
        ' ~'T
Comanche Peak Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10, Component Support i
: 7. CPSES Quality Assuratice Procedure CP-QAP-12.1, Mechanical Component Installation Verification (Reference 34)
Installation (Reference 43) 6.
: 8. CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28, Fabrication and Installation Inspection of Safety Component Supports (Reference 45)
Comanche Peak Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10A, Installation of
: 9. CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-26, Piping and Equip-ment Installation Inspection (Reference 42) l
' ~'T Vendor-Supplied Component Supports Catalog Items (Reference 40)
                                                                                                            )
[d 7.
CPSES Quality Assuratice Procedure CP-QAP-12.1, Mechanical Component Installation Verification (Reference 34) 8.
CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28, Fabrication and Installation Inspection of Safety Component Supports (Reference 45) 9.
CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-26, Piping and Equip-ment Installation Inspection (Reference 42) l
)
1 1
1 1
O b
Ob


1 N                                                          TABLE 5-7                                                           j
1 TABLE 5-7 j
  ^N
N
  ~
^N i
~
SEISMIC CATEGORY II SMALL BORE PIPING OVER i
SEISMIC CATEGORY II SMALL BORE PIPING OVER i
i SEISMIC CATEGORY I EQUIPMENT PIPE SUPPORT CHECKLIST                                                     j i
SEISMIC CATEGORY I EQUIPMENT PIPE SUPPORT CHECKLIST j
l The field verification of Seismic Category II piping located over Seismic                                 ;
i l
                        . Category I systems , structures, or components is documented using a checklist                           l addressing these attributes:                                                                             l
The field verification of Seismic Category II piping located over Seismic
: 1. -General Support Requirements                                                                   !
. Category I systems, structures, or components is documented using a checklist l
i
addressing these attributes:
: a. Location
l 1.
: b. Function
-General Support Requirements i
: c. Orientation
a.
: d. Dimensions / configuration / material per control drawing /
Location b.
I document
Function c.
: e. Physical damage / completeness
Orientation d.
: f. Hole edge distance in structural members                                                 l
Dimensions / configuration / material per control drawing /
: g. Gap clearances
I document e.
: h. Minimum 1 in. clearance                                                                   l
Physical damage / completeness f.
: 1. Voided supports removed                                                                   1
Hole edge distance in structural members l
: 2. Welding                                                                                         ,
g.
I
Gap clearances h.
: a. Weld type
Minimum 1 in. clearance l
: b. Welds properly wrapped                                                                   j
1.
: 3. Base Plates / Anchor Bolts
Voided supports removed 1
: a. Bolt size
2.
: b. Edge di' stance of holes
Welding I
: c. Size and hole spacing
a.
: d. Attachment location
Weld type b.
: e. Nut tightness / thread engagement
Welds properly wrapped j
: f. Locking devices
3.
: g. Washers
Base Plates / Anchor Bolts a.
: h. Clearance with adjacent Hilti bolt
Bolt size b.
: 4. Bolted Connections (Including Clamps)
Edge di' stance of holes c.
: a. Bolt / pin size                                                                             j
Size and hole spacing d.
: b. Thread engagement
Attachment location e.
: c. Nut tightness                                                                               )
Nut tightness / thread engagement f.
: d. Locking devices / cotter pins                                                           j
Locking devices g.
: e. Clamp size / proper spacer                                                                 i
Washers h.
: f. Tightness of bolt and clamp                                                             :)
Clearance with adjacent Hilti bolt 4.
I h
Bolted Connections (Including Clamps) a.
lo l
Bolt / pin size j
                                                                    ,                                                            )
b.
i
Thread engagement c.
Nut tightness
)
d.
Locking devices / cotter pins j
e.
Clamp size / proper spacer i
f.
Tightness of bolt and clamp I
hlo
)
l i


l l
l l
L' l
L' l
l                                                                           TABLE 5-7 (Cont)
l TABLE 5-7 (Cont)
I
I 5.
: 5. Snubber / Strut / Spring Components
Snubber / Strut / Spring Components a.
: a. Size / type / load pin size
Size / type / load pin size b.
: b. Spherical bearing adequacy / free to swivel
Spherical bearing adequacy / free to swivel c.
: c. Angularity with tolerance
Angularity with tolerance d.
: d. Setting adequate per drawing
Setting adequate per drawing e.
: e. Eye rod thread engagement / nut tightness
Eye rod thread engagement / nut tightness f.
: f. Ends not binding
Ends not binding g.
: g. Locking devices
Locking devices h.
: h. Extension weld adequacy                                       4
Extension weld adequacy 4
: 1. Lubrite plate 0
1.
: 6. Design Considerations
Lubrite plate 0
: a. Support instability (e.g., uncinched U-bolts)
6.
: b. Threshold loads exceed previous design load                 !
Design Considerations Support instability (e.g., uncinched U-bolts) a.
: c. Nonseismic interface loads
b.
: d. Seismic loading inclusion in original support load
Threshold loads exceed previous design load c.
: e. Adequacy of gang support
Nonseismic interface loads d.
: f. Integral attachment adequacy 7 Aircraft Cables i
Seismic loading inclusion in original support load e.
  /"'s                                           a. Cable diameter
Adequacy of gang support f.
(                                             b.
Integral attachment adequacy 7
c.
Aircraft Cables i
Ceiling / wall connection Clamp type / rod type
/"'s a.
: d. End loop configuration
Cable diameter
: e. Eye nut tightness / lock washers
(
: f. Cable clamp tightness
b.
: g. Cable slack / configuration
Ceiling / wall connection c.
: h. Tie spacing / bundled cables tied together
Clamp type / rod type d.
: i. Support location / span J. Cable restraint modifications for 12 in. and 10 in.
End loop configuration Eye nut tightness / lock washers e.
* diameter pipe
f.
: k. End of cables wrapped to prevent fraying D
Cable clamp tightness g.
Cable slack / configuration h.
Tie spacing / bundled cables tied together i.
Support location / span J.
Cable restraint modifications for 12 in. and 10 in.
diameter pipe k.
End of cables wrapped to prevent fraying D
2
2


l 1
l 1
1 1
1 1
TABLE 5-8 TYPICAL SWEC-PSAS TECHNICAL AND DESIGN CONTROL PRACTICES
TABLE 5-8 TYPICAL SWEC-PSAS TECHNICAL AND DESIGN CONTROL PRACTICES 1.
: 1. Add terminal anchors in the pipe stress problem boundary to bound the                                                   l stress problem,                                                                                                         i
Add terminal anchors in the pipe stress problem boundary to bound the l
: 2. Establish     a seismic-to-nonseismic   piping   interface           anchor                                   design   i requirement.
stress problem, i
: 3. Revise pipe stress analysis package boundary decoupling requirement.
2.
: 4. Establish branch line mass effect on main piping requirement.
Establish a
: 5. Establish functional capability evaluation requirement.
seismic-to-nonseismic piping interface anchor design i
: 6. Document the validation of thermal stress cycles and stress range reduc-tion factor requirement.
requirement.
: 7. Establish stiffness modeling of sleeve sealant.
3.
: 8. Revise clearance requirement between pipe and structural frame.
Revise pipe stress analysis package boundary decoupling requirement.
: 9. Establish a clamp anchor design for 6 in. and smaller nominal size pipe.
4.
p     10. Revise the seismic design loads for nonsafety-related piping attached to
Establish branch line mass effect on main piping requirement.
(         safety-related ganged pipe supports.
5.
: 11. Revise the tube steel wraparound welding length evaluation requirement.                                                 ;
Establish functional capability evaluation requirement.
: 12. Document the strut, snubber, and spring hanger swing angle evaluation re-quirement, including thermal, seismic, and fluid transient movements.
6.
: 13. Establish an integrated clearance validation program (engineering walkdown to validate clearance).
Document the validation of thermal stress cycles and stress range reduc-tion factor requirement.
: 14. Establish the requirement to validate the valve weight list and the valve stem extension in the as-built drawing.
7.
: 15. Establish the pipe stress and pipe support system review documentation requirement.
Establish stiffness modeling of sleeve sealant.
: 16. Establish the review and validation of CPSES plant design and operating conditions.
8.
A A
Revise clearance requirement between pipe and structural frame.
    . (G l
9.
(                                                 _                      . _ _ _ _    - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
Establish a clamp anchor design for 6 in. and smaller nominal size pipe.
p 10.
Revise the seismic design loads for nonsafety-related piping attached to
(
safety-related ganged pipe supports.
11.
Revise the tube steel wraparound welding length evaluation requirement.
12.
Document the strut, snubber, and spring hanger swing angle evaluation re-quirement, including thermal, seismic, and fluid transient movements.
13.
Establish an integrated clearance validation program (engineering walkdown to validate clearance).
14.
Establish the requirement to validate the valve weight list and the valve stem extension in the as-built drawing.
15.
Establish the pipe stress and pipe support system review documentation requirement.
16.
Establish the review and validation of CPSES plant design and operating conditions.
A
. (G A
l
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==6.0 REFERENCES==
==6.0 REFERENCES==
                                                                        ,          i[/                                      l                                          .!
tO:
t tO:                      1. CPSES Design Basis Document DBD-CS-065 ASME Class 1 Iiping Analysis, l,
t 1.
Revision 0, October 1, 1987                                                                                                                               /
CPSES Design Basis Document DBD-CS-065 ASME Class 1 Iiping Analysis,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        )
)
                                                                                  \                                                                                 ./                                               \
Revision 0, October 1, 1987
P                             '2. CPSES Design Basis Document                 BD-CS-066 ASME Class 2 and 3 Piping                                                                                                 d Analysis, Revision 0, July 31, 1987                                                                                       /
/
: 3. CPSES Design Basis Document DBD-CS-067 ASME Class 1, 2, a'nd 3 Pipe Support Design, Revision 0, July 31,1987                                                     i I                                                                                                                                     ..
l,
: 4. TU Electric Comanche Peak Response Team Acthn Plan, DSAP IX, Piping and   Supports   Discipline ' Specific . Action                           Plan,                   Revision 2, June 18, 1987                                       y, (} }                                                             ,
\\
j
./
: 5. SWEC-PSAS   CPSES   Generic Technicil Issue Report, Revisionfo, June 27, 1986                                                                                                                                               ,
\\
s?                       '
P
e p,               j
'2.
: 6. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-1, Management'(P)sn Vor? , t Project Quality- (Piping System Qualification /Requalifics, tion) Reki O sion 7, March 25, 1987                                               s                                                                  (
CPSES Design Basis Document BD-CS-066 ASME Class 2 and 3 Piping d
i
Analysis, Revision 0, July 31, 1987
: 7. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, Section 3.6,     Revision 1,           July 1981,           Section 3.7,                           Revision 1, July 1981,   Sections 3.9.1,             3.9.2,       Revision 2,             July 1981,                                                   and ,,                           .
/
Section 3.9.3,     Revision 1,             July 1981,       Appendix A,                           Revision 1, April 1984
3.
: 8. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPN', Design Criteria for s
CPSES Design Basis Document DBD-CS-067 ASME Class 1, 2, a'nd 3 Pipe Support Design, Revision 0, July 31,1987 i
Pipe Stress and Pipe Supports, Revision 3, fe' uary 23, 1987
I 4.
: 9. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-6l Pipe Stress /Suppotj Requalificat' ion Procedure - Unit 1, Revision 4, April 8, 1987                                                                               iG                   \
TU Electric Comanche Peak Response Team Acthn Plan, DSAP IX, Piping and Supports Discipline ' Specific. Action
: 10. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-8, Piping and Support                                                                                                           l System Engineering Walkdcwn j Procedure, Revision 1,                               April 25, 1986                                                                             1 s
: Plan, Revision 2, June 18, 1987 y,
c '7                             l
(}
: 11. SWEC-PSAS Piping and Support System Engineering Walkdown Final Re-port, CPSES Unit 1, June 4', 1986
}
: 12. CPSES ASME Quality Proc 4/ure AQP '1?.il, Prftssure Testing Inspection, Revision 0, July 10, 1987' ,                                                                                                                                  4,  ,
j 5.
SWEC-PSAS CPSES Generic Technicil Issue
: Report, Revisionfo, June 27, 1986 e
s?
p, j
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-1, Management'(P)sn Vor?, t 6.
Project Quality- (Piping System Qualification /Requalifics, tion) Reki O sion 7, March 25, 1987
(
s i
7.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, Section 3.6, Revision 1, July 1981, Section 3.7, Revision 1, July 1981, Sections 3.9.1, 3.9.2, Revision 2, July 1981, and,,
Section 3.9.3, Revision 1, July 1981, Appendix A, Revision 1, April 1984 8.
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPN', Design Criteria for Pipe Stress and Pipe Supports, Revision 3, fe' uary 23, 1987 s
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-6l Pipe Stress /Suppotj 9.
Requalificat' ion Procedure - Unit 1, Revision 4, April 8, 1987 iG
\\
10.
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-8, Piping and Support l
System Engineering Walkdcwn j Procedure, Revision 1, April 25, 1986 1
c '7 l
s 11.
SWEC-PSAS Piping and Support System Engineering Walkdown Final Re-port, CPSES Unit 1, June 4',
1986 12.
CPSES ASME Quality Proc 4/ure AQP '1?.il, Prftssure Testing Inspection, Revision 0, July 10, 1987' 4,
: 13. I Welding Renearch Coused (WBC) Bulletin [300, Technical Positions on s
: 13. I Welding Renearch Coused (WBC) Bulletin [300, Technical Positions on s
                                  , Critub Establishment { 1)amping Valuer, in Piping, Response Spectra Broadening, and IndusuJ Practice by Tech'nical Committee on Piping                                                                                                             I, Systems,, December 1984 <
, Critub Establishment { 1)amping Valuer, in Piping, Response Spectra Broadening, and IndusuJ Practice by Tech'nical Committee on Piping I,
: 14. SWEC-hSAS Comanche Peak Proje                   Procedure CPPP-5, Field Walkdown Procedure - Unit 1, Revision 2, March 12, 1986                             \
Systems,, December 1984 <
                                              /
14.
                                                                                                                    /
SWEC-hSAS Comanche Peak Proje Procedure CPPP-5, Field Walkdown Procedure - Unit 1, Revision 2, March 12, 1986
\\
/
/
q
q
      \
\\
6-1                 )   ,y f
6-1
                                                            \   >                  {
)
                        ,f'                                 k               i
,y f
\\
{
,f' k
i


l l
l l
t
t 15.
: 15. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Unit 1, Small Bore Field Walkdown Report,
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Unit 1, Small Bore Field Walkdown Report,
  ~' (%       June 19, 1986 l       16. Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4,                               September 17, 1987,               l l             transmitted     from   N. H. Williams   (CYGNA)                             to W. G. Counsil             '
~' (%
l            (TU Electric) on September 18, 1987,       CYGNA Letter No. 84056.120                                   ,
June 19, 1986 l
1 l'7 . SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure, . CPPP-18, Procedure for Evaluation of ERC Deviation Reports, Revision 2, June 17, 1987                                   -
16.
Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, September 17, 1987, l
l transmitted from N. H. Williams (CYGNA) to W. G. Counsil l
(TU Electric) on September 18,
: 1987, CYGNA Letter No. 84056.120 1
l'7.
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure,. CPPP-18, Procedure for Evaluation of ERC Deviation Reports, Revision 2, June 17, 1987 l
18.
SWEC-PSAS Report No. 15454-N(C)-010, Impact of Construction Devia-tions on Stress Requalification Program, Revision 1, October 1, 1987 l
\\
19.
Civil-Structural Review Issues List, Revision 0, July 21, 1987; transmitted from N. H. Williams (CYGNA) to W. G. Counsil I
(TU Electric) on July 22, 1987 20.
SWEC-PSAS Topical Report SWSQAP-1-74A, Stone & Webster Engineering -
Corporation Standard Quality Assurance
: Program, Revision E, February 21, 1986 I
21.
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-10', Procedure for Re-view of Plant Operating Mode Conditions, Revision 1, April 1, 1986 22.
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1 Nuclear Power Plant Components, 1974 Edition, including the 1975 Summer Ad-denda of Subsections NC and ND and 1975 Winter Addenda bf l
(
Subsection NF 23.
NUREG-0582, Waterhammer in iluclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, July 1979 24.
NUPIPE-SW, Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation Computer Program ME-110U, Stress Analysis of Nuclear Piping, Version 4, Level 2 (Proprietary) 25.
NUREG/CR-1161, Recommended Revisions to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Design Criteria, Prepared by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory for USNRC, May 1980 26.
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Units 1 and 2, Final Safety Analysis Report, current as amended 27.
ANSI /ASME OM-3-1982, Requirements for Preoperational and Initial '
Startup Vibration Testing of Nuclear Power Plant Systems, Revision 1
,]
(Proposed), May 1985 28.
NUREG-0797, Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and Supplement (SSER) f Nos. I through 4 and 6 through 13, Comanche Peak Steam Electric Sta-tion, Units'1 and 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1981, Supplements dated through May 1986 4
6-2 c
 
?
1 l
l
l
: 18. SWEC-PSAS Report No. 15454-N(C)-010, Impact of Construction Devia-tions on Stress Requalification Program, Revision 1, October 1, 1987 l                                                                                                                          \
'29.
: 19. Civil-Structural Review Issues List, Revision 0, July 21, 1987;                                              !
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Proj ect I?rocedure CPPP-23, Pipe Stress /
transmitted    from    N. H. Williams    (CYGNA)                              to  W. G. Counsil              <
,. m
(TU Electric) on July 22, 1987                                                                                I
% -)
: 20. SWEC-PSAS Topical Report SWSQAP-1-74A, Stone & Webster Engineering -
Support Final Reconciliation Procedure, Revision 1, July 31, 1987
Corporation    Standard    Quality  Assurance                            Program, Revision E,               ,
(
February 21, 1986                                                                                            I
7 30.
: 21. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-10', Procedure for Re-view of Plant Operating Mode Conditions, Revision 1, April 1, 1986
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-31, CPSES Safety-Related' Piping and Pipe Supports Desiga Basis Consolidation Program, Revision 1, May 15, 1987 31.
: 22. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1 Nuclear Power Plant Components, 1974 Edition, including the 1975 Summer Ad-                                           !
NRC
denda of Subsections NC and ND and 1975 Winter Addenda bf                                                    l
: Letter, R. F. Heishman, Vendor Program Branch
(          Subsection NF
: Chief, to R. B. Kelly, Docket No. 99900509/86-01 dated January 2,1987 32.
: 23. NUREG-0582, Waterhammer in iluclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, July 1979
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-22, Clearance Walkdown Procedure, Revision 0, November 21, 1986 33.
: 24. NUPIPE-SW, Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation Computer Program ME-110U, Stress Analysis of Nuclear Piping, Version 4,                                   Level 2 (Proprietary)
Comanche Peak Response Team Program Plan and Issue-Specific Action Plans, Appendix D, CPRT Sampling Policy, Applications and Guidelines, Revision
: 25. NUREG/CR-1161, Recommended Revisions to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Design Criteria, Prepared by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory for USNRC, May 1980
'1, January 31, 1986, and Appendix E, Resolution of Discrep-ancies Identified by the CPRT, Revision 3, June 18, 1987 34.
: 26. Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Units 1 and 2,                             Final Safety    >
CPSES Quality ' Control Procedure CP-QAP-12.1, Mechanical Component Installation Verification, Revision 20, July 10, 1987 35.
Analysis Report, current as amended
SWEC-PSAS CPSES Large Bore Pipe Stress and Pipe Support Generic Is-sues Report, Revision 1, July 24, 1987
: 27. ANSI /ASME OM-3-1982, Requirements for Preoperational and Initial '                                      .
' 6..
Startup Vibration Testing of Nuclear Power Plant Systems, Revision 1                              ,]
CFRT-QOC Issue-Specific Action Plan, ISAP-VII.c Results Report, Con-c struction Reinspection / Documentation Review Plan, Revision 0, May 19,
(Proposed), May 1985                                                                                "
.j Q M87
: 28. NUREG-0797, Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and Supplement (SSER)                                          f Nos. I through 4 and 6 through 13, Comanche Peak Steam Electric Sta-                                 >
' %,I 37.
tion, Units'1 and 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1981, Supplements dated through May 1986                                                                           4 6-2                                                              c
SWEC-PSAS Site Procedure CPSP-12 Piping As-Built Verification, Revision 4, September 3, 1987 38.
CPSES Piping Erection Specification-No. 2323-MS-100, Revision 9, August 17, 1987 39.
CPSEfDStructural Embedments Specification No. 2323-SS-30, Revision 2, Jime 13,1986 40.
CPSN Construction Procedaro CP-CPM-9.10A, Installation of Ven'4b -Supplied Component Supports Catalog
: Items, Revision 1, August 15, 1985 41.
CPSES Piping,Engin2ering and Design ASKE III Code Classes 1, 2, and 3,
ANSI B31/1, Classes 5 and G,
Specification No. 2323-MS-200, Revision 5, August 6, 1987 42.
CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure Q1-QAP-11.1-26, Piping and Equip-ment Installation Inspection, Revision 0 43.
CPSES Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10, Component Support Installa-tion, Revision 16, December 29, 1986
, n.;
U/
6-3 1
I A:
na


                  ?
1 44.
1 l
CPSES Nuclear Safety Class Pipe Hangers and Supports Specification I
l                              .
ml No. 2323-MS-46A, Revision 7, May 12, 1987 45.
      ,. m                  '29.            SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Proj ect I?rocedure CPPP-23, Pipe Stress /
CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28, Fabrication and Installation Inspection of Safety Class Component Supports, Revi-sion 36, April 22, 1987 46.
(                                      Support Final Reconciliation Procedure, Revision 1, July 31, 1987
: TENERA, L.P.,
      % -)            7
Discipline Specific Results Report, Piping and Sup-ports, DAP-RR-P-001, Revision 1, August 27, 1987 47.
: 30.         SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-31, CPSES Safety-Related' Piping and Pipe Supports Desiga Basis Consolidation Program, Revision 1, May 15, 1987
TU Electric Engineering and Construction Engineering Procedure ECE-9.04-04, Post Construction Hardware Validation Program - Imple-mentation Plan - SWEC-PSE, Revision 0, July 28, 1987 48.
: 31.        NRC    Letter,   R. F. Heishman,   Vendor  Program  Branch  Chief, to R. B. Kelly, Docket No. 99900509/86-01 dated January 2,1987
TU Electric Engineering and Construction Procedure EC-9.04, Post Con-struction Hardware Validation Program, July 29, 1987 49.
: 32.         SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-22, Clearance Walkdown Procedure, Revision 0, November 21, 1986
TU Electric Engineering and Construction Policy No. 1, CPSES Correc-tive Action Program, Revision 1, August 30, 1987 50.
: 33.        Comanche Peak Response Team Program Plan and Issue-Specific Action Plans, Appendix D, CPRT Sampling Policy, Applications and Guidelines, Revision '1, January 31, 1986, and Appendix E, Resolution of Discrep-ancies Identified by the CPRT, Revision 3, June 18, 1987
SWEC-PSAS CPSES Field Verification Method, Clearance Walkdown, CPE-SWEC-FV':-PS-080, Revision 0, July 29,1987 51.
: 34.        CPSES Quality ' Control Procedure CP-QAP-12.1, Mechanical Component Installation Verification, Revision 20, July 10, 1987
SWEC-PSAS CPSES Field Verification Method, Hardware Validation and Supplemental Inspection Programs, CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081, Revision 0, July 29, 1987
: 35.          SWEC-PSAS CPSES Large Bore Pipe Stress and Pipe Support Generic Is-sues Report, Revision 1, July 24, 1987 c' 6. . CFRT-QOC Issue-Specific Action Plan, ISAP-VII.c Results Report, Con-struction Reinspection / Documentation Review Plan, Revision 0, May 19,
.O(,)
    .j Q                                    M87
52.
    ' % ,I
SWEC-PSAS CPSES Field Verification Method, Validation of Seismic Category II Large Bore Pipe Support Designs, CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-082, Revision 0, July 29, 1987 53.
: 37.       SWEC-PSAS   Site    Procedure CPSP-12  Piping  As-Built  Verification, Revision 4, September 3, 1987
ANSI /ASME N45.2.6 - 1978, Qualification of Inspection, Examination, and Testing Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants, January 15, 1979 54.
: 38.        CPSES Piping Erection Specification- No. 2323-MS-100, Revision 9, August 17, 1987
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Memorandum PM-39, Administrative Pro-cedure for Qualifying Wall-to-Wall, Floor-to-Floor, and Corner Pipe Supports, Revision 3, June 2, 1987 55.
: 39.       CPSEfDStructural Embedments Specification No. 2323-SS-30, Revision 2, Jime 13,1986
TU Electric Engineering and Construction Procedure ECE 9.04-05, Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program - Engineering Evalua-tions, Revision 0, September 1, 1987 56.
: 40.        CPSN      Construction    Procedaro  CP-CPM-9.10A,     Installation  of Ven'4b -Supplied Component Supports Catalog Items,             Revision 1, August 15, 1985
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-30, Validation of Seismic Category II Large Bore Piping and Pipe Support Designs, Revision 1, August 5, 1987 57.
: 41.        CPSES Piping ,Engin2ering and Design ASKE III Code Classes 1, 2, and 3, ANSI B31/1, Classes 5 and G, Specification No. 2323-MS-200, Revision 5, August 6, 1987
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-25, Piping Vibration Test Procedure - Unit 1, Revision 0, December 8, 1986 58.
          <                      42.        CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure Q1-QAP-11.1-26, Piping and Equip-ment Installation Inspection, Revision 0
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 13, Part 50, Paragraph 50.55(e)
: 43.        CPSES Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10, Component Support Installa-tion, Revision 16, December 29, 1986
!!r l
      , n.;
l 6-4
U/        ,                                                        6-3 1
\\
I A:                                                na
L


1 m 44. CPSES Nuclear Safety Class Pipe Hangers and Supports Specification                                              I l        No. 2323-MS-46A, Revision 7, May 12, 1987
59.
: 45. CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28, Fabrication and Installation Inspection of Safety Class Component Supports, Revi-sion 36, April 22, 1987
SVEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-35, Piping and Pipe l'mI Support Qualification Procedure for Secondary Wall Displacements, U
: 46. TENERA,  L.P., Discipline Specific Results Report, Piping and Sup-ports, DAP-RR-P-001, Revision 1, August 27, 1987
Revision 0, June 8, 1987 60.
: 47. TU Electric    Engineering and Construction Engineering Procedure ECE-9.04-04, Post Construction Hardware Validation Program - Imple-mentation Plan - SWEC-PSE, Revision 0, July 28, 1987
CPSES ASME Quality Procedure _, AQP-11.2, Fabrication and Installation Inspection of Pipe and Equipment, Revision 0, July 10, 1987 j
: 48. TU Electric Engineering and Construction Procedure EC-9.04, Post Con-struction Hardware Validation Program, July 29, 1987
61.
: 49. TU Electric Engineering and Construction Policy No. 1, CPSES Correc-tive Action Program, Revision 1, August 30, 1987
CPSES Design Basis Document DBD-CS-069, Thermal Expansion Testing and Piping Vibration Monitoring, Revision 0, July 31, 1987 62.
: 50. SWEC-PSAS    CPSES Field Verification Method,      Clearance Walkdown, CPE-SWEC-FV':-PS-080, Revision 0, July 29,1987
CPSES Design Basis Document DBD-CS-070, Reactor Coolant Loop Piping and Support Design, Revision 0, October 1, 1987 63.
: 51. SWEC-PSAS CPSES Field Verification Method, Hardware Validation and Supplemental Inspection Programs , CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081, Revision 0, July 29, 1987
TU Electric CPSES Unit I and Common, Civil / Structural Project Status Report, Revision 0 64.
  .O
TU Electric CPSES Unit 1 and Common, Mechanical Project Status Re-port, Revision 0 65.
(,) 52. SWEC-PSAS CPSES Field Verification Method, Validation of Seismic Category II Large Bore Pipe Support Designs, CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-082, Revision 0, July 29, 1987
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-20, Pipe Break / Crack Postulation Analysis Procedure, Revision 1, April 30, 1987 66.
: 53. ANSI /ASME N45.2.6 - 1978, Qualification of Inspection, Examination, and Testing Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants, January 15, 1979
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-24, Thermal Expansion Test Procedure - Unit 1, Revision 0, December 1, 1986 67.
: 54. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Memorandum PM-39, Administrative Pro-cedure for Qualifying Wall-to-Wall, Floor-to-Floor, and Corner Pipe Supports, Revision 3, June 2, 1987
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-28, Procedure for (7
: 55. TU Electric Engineering and Construction Procedure ECE 9.04-05, Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program - Engineering Evalua-tions, Revision 0, September 1, 1987
Identification and Evaluation of Interfaces between Seismic and Non-(,,/
: 56. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-30, Validation of Seismic Category II Large Bore Piping and Pipe Support Designs, Revision 1, August 5, 1987
seismic Piping, Revision 0, February 20, 1987 68.
: 57. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-25, Piping Vibration Test Procedure - Unit 1, Revision 0, December 8, 1986
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-33, Engineering Activ-ities to Support SWEC Certification of ASME III, Class 2 and 3 System N-5 Data Reports as Piping System Designer, Revision 0, May 21,1987 69.
: 58. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 13, Part 50, Paragraph 50.55(e)
SWEC-PSAS Coma. he Peak Project Procedure CPPP-4, Project Records Management Procedure, Revision 2, February 27, 1987 70.
!r<
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-11, Administrative Control of Calculations, Revision 1, February 13, 1987 71.
l l
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Site Procedure CPSP-19, Preparation, Review, and Approval of Specifications and Specification Revisions, Revi-sion 0, May 27, 1987 72.
    \                                    6-4 L                                          _                        _ __ _ - -                -                ----_____
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Site Procedure CPSP-14, Processing Design Changes Utilizing DCAs, Revision 4, July 27, 1987 73.
: 59. SVEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-35, Piping and Pipe l'mI     Support Qualification Procedure for Secondary Wall Displacements, U         Revision 0, June 8, 1987
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Site Procedure CPSP-10, New Pipe Support De-signs, Revision 0, October 15, 1987 74.
: 60. CPSES ASME Quality Procedure _, AQP-11.2, Fabrication and Installation Inspection of Pipe and Equipment, Revision 0, July 10, 1987                                 j
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Site Procedure CPSP-11, TSMD Drawing Prepara-tion, Revision 4, June 22, 1987 A
: 61. CPSES Design Basis Document DBD-CS-069, Thermal Expansion Testing and Piping Vibration Monitoring, Revision 0, July 31, 1987
: 62. CPSES Design Basis Document DBD-CS-070, Reactor Coolant Loop Piping and Support Design, Revision 0, October 1, 1987
: 63. TU Electric CPSES Unit I and Common, Civil / Structural Project Status Report, Revision 0
: 64. TU Electric CPSES Unit 1 and Common, Mechanical Project Status Re-port, Revision 0
: 65. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-20, Pipe Break / Crack Postulation Analysis Procedure, Revision 1, April 30, 1987
: 66. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-24, Thermal Expansion Test Procedure - Unit 1, Revision 0, December 1, 1986
: 67. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-28, Procedure for (7       Identification and Evaluation of Interfaces between Seismic and Non-(,,/     seismic Piping, Revision 0, February 20, 1987
: 68. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-33, Engineering Activ-ities to Support SWEC Certification of ASME III, Class 2 and 3 System N-5 Data Reports as Piping System Designer, Revision 0, May 21,1987
: 69. SWEC-PSAS Coma. he Peak Project Procedure CPPP-4, Project Records Management Procedure, Revision 2, February 27, 1987
: 70. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-11, Administrative Control of Calculations, Revision 1, February 13, 1987
: 71. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Site Procedure CPSP-19, Preparation, Review, and Approval of Specifications and Specification Revisions, Revi-sion 0, May 27, 1987
: 72. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Site Procedure CPSP-14, Processing Design Changes Utilizing DCAs, Revision 4, July 27, 1987
: 73. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Site Procedure CPSP-10, New Pipe Support De-signs, Revision 0, October 15, 1987
: 74. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Site Procedure CPSP-11, TSMD Drawing Prepara-tion, Revision 4, June 22, 1987 A
6-5
6-5


              ,-            75. TU Electric CPSES Engirrering Procedure ECE-DC-7, Preparation and Review of Design Drawings, Revision 19, October 31, 1986
75.
: 76. TU Electric Field Verification Method CPE-EB-FVM-SI-40, Seismic /
TU Electric CPSES Engirrering Procedure ECE-DC-7, Preparation and Review of Design Drawings, Revision 19, October 31, 1986 76.
Nonseismic Walkdowns,     System Interaction   Program,   Revision 0, June 15, 1987
TU Electric Field Verification Method CPE-EB-FVM-SI-40, Seismic /
: 77. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-29, Moment Restraint Support Qualification Procedure and Design Criteria, Revision 0,                                           1 September 25, 1987
Nonseismic Walkdowns, System Interaction
: 78. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.29,     Revi-sion 2, Seismic Design Classification, February 1976
: Program, Revision 0, June 15, 1987 77.
: 79. TU Electric Letter No. TXX 6631, W. G. Counsil to U.S. Nuclear Regu-latory Commission, Comanche Peak Programs, August 20, 1987
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-29, Moment Restraint Support Qualification Procedure and Design Criteria, Revision 0, 1
: 80. SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-15, Small Bore Stress /
September 25, 1987 78.
Support Requalification - Unit 1, Revision 1, January 7, 1987
U.S.
: 81. TU Electric CPSES Unit 1 and Common, SWEC-PSAS Large Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Project Status Report, Revision 0, October 1, 1987
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.29, Revi-sion 2, Seismic Design Classification, February 1976 79.
: 82. SWEC-PSAS Site Procedure CPSP-16, Preparation of Problem Boundary Sketches for Small Bore Piping Unit 1,     Revision 2,   July 17, 1987
TU Electric Letter No. TXX 6631, W. G. Counsil to U.S. Nuclear Regu-latory Commission, Comanche Peak Programs, August 20, 1987 80.
SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-15, Small Bore Stress /
Support Requalification - Unit 1, Revision 1, January 7, 1987 81.
TU Electric CPSES Unit 1 and Common, SWEC-PSAS Large Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Project Status Report, Revision 0, October 1, 1987 82.
SWEC-PSAS Site Procedure CPSP-16, Preparation of Problem Boundary Sketches for Small Bore Piping Unit 1, Revision 2, July 17, 1987
(')
(')
V
83.
: 83. SWEC-PSAS CPSES Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Generic Issues Report, Revision 0, December 5, 1986
SWEC-PSAS CPSES Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Generic Issues V
: 84. TU Electric Letter No. TXX6500, W. G. Counsil to U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, Comanche Peak Programs, June 25, 1987
Report, Revision 0, December 5, 1986 84.
: 85. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.68, Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2, August 1978
TU Electric Letter No. TXX6500, W. G. Counsil to U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, Comanche Peak Programs, June 25, 1987 85.
: 86. Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4,       September 16,   1987, transmitted from N. H. Williams (CYGNA) to W. G. Counsil (TU Elec-tric) on September 16, 1987, CYGNA Letter No. 84056.119                                                     )
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.68, Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2, August 1978 86.
Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4, September 16,
: 1987, transmitted from N. H. Williams (CYGNA) to W. G. Counsil (TU Elec-tric) on September 16, 1987, CYGNA Letter No. 84056.119
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p                                                                                        APPENDIX A b                                                                  COMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM (CPRT) AND EXTERNAL ISSUES 1
APPENDIX A pb COMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM (CPRT) AND EXTERNAL ISSUES 1
INTRODUCTION This appendix describes the details of the resolutions of issues resulting from the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and from external issues. Each of thir-ty-nine issues listed below is described in an individual subappendix which includes discussions of resolution methodology and corrective and preventive actions.
INTRODUCTION This appendix describes the details of the resolutions of issues resulting from the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and from external issues. Each of thir-ty-nine issues listed below is described in an individual subappendix which includes discussions of resolution methodology and corrective and preventive actions.
SWEC-PSAS has' reviewed the CPSES Supplemental Safety Evaluation Reports (SSERs) l
SWEC-PSAS has' reviewed the CPSES Supplemental Safety Evaluation Reports (SSERs) l
                                                    -(NUREG-0797), and determined that the procedures and design criteria for the     ;
-(NUREG-0797), and determined that the procedures and design criteria for the piping and pipe support Corrective Action Program (CAP) are consistent with the l
piping and pipe support Corrective Action Program (CAP) are consistent with the   l actions required of TU Electric by the NRC staff as stated in the SSERs.
actions required of TU Electric by the NRC staff as stated in the SSERs.
Issue No. Issue Title Al           Richmond Inserts A2           Local Stress - Piping A3           Wall-to-Wall and Floor-to-Ceiling Supports                 l A4           Pipe Support / System Stability A5           Pipe Support Generic Stiffness                             i A6           Uncinched U-Bolt Acting as a Two-Way Restraint A7           Friction Forces
Issue No.
(                                                           A8           AWS Versus ASME Code Provisions A9           A500, Grade B Tube Steel A10           Tube Steel Section Properties All           U-Bolt Cinching A12           Axial / Rotational Restraints A13           Bolt Hole Gap                                               {
Issue Title Al Richmond Inserts A2 Local Stress - Piping A3 Wall-to-Wall and Floor-to-Ceiling Supports l
A14           OBE/SSE Damping                                             ]
A4 Pipe Support / System Stability A5 Pipe Support Generic Stiffness i
A15           Support Mass in Piping Analysis                             1 A16           Programmatic Aspects and QA Including Iterative           {
A6 Uncinched U-Bolt Acting as a Two-Way Restraint A7 Friction Forces
Design A17           Mass Point Spacing A18           High-Frequency Mass Participation                           i A19           Fluid Transients                                             l A20           Seismic Excitation of Pipe Support Mass A21           Local Stress in Pipe Support Members                         l I
(
A22           Safety Factors A23           SA-36 and A307 Steel A24           U-Bolt Twisting                                             l A25           Fischer/ Crosby Valve Modeling/ Qualification A26           Piping Modeling A27           Welding l
A8 AWS Versus ASME Code Provisions A9 A500, Grade B Tube Steel A10 Tube Steel Section Properties All U-Bolt Cinching A12 Axial / Rotational Restraints A13 Bolt Hole Gap
A28           Anchor Bolts /Embedment Plates A29           Strut / Snubber Angularity A-1 i
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                                                                                    J
A14 OBE/SSE Damping
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A15 Support Mass in Piping Analysis 1
A16 Programmatic Aspects and QA Including Iterative
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Design A17 Mass Point Spacing A18 High-Frequency Mass Participation i
A19 Fluid Transients l
A20 Seismic Excitation of Pipe Support Mass A21 Local Stress in Pipe Support Members l
I A22 Safety Factors A23 SA-36 and A307 Steel A24 U-Bolt Twisting l
A25 Fischer/ Crosby Valve Modeling/ Qualification A26 Piping Modeling A27 Welding l
A28 Anchor Bolts /Embedment Plates A29 Strut / Snubber Angularity A-1 i
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fs      Issue No. Isrue Title i, j A30       Component Qualification A31       Structural Modeling for Frame Analysis A32       Computer Program Verification and Use A33       Hydrotest A34       Seismic /Nonseismic Interface A35       Other Issues A36       SSER-8 Review A37       SSER-10 Review A38       SSER-11 Review A39       CPRT Quality of Construction Review on Piping and Pipe Supports
Issue No.
                                                                                )
Isrue Title fsi, j A30 Component Qualification A31 Structural Modeling for Frame Analysis A32 Computer Program Verification and Use A33 Hydrotest A34 Seismic /Nonseismic Interface A35 Other Issues A36 SSER-8 Review A37 SSER-10 Review A38 SSER-11 Review A39 CPRT Quality of Construction Review on Piping and Pipe Supports
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SUBAPPENDIX Al t
  \~ /                                                     RICHMOND INSERTS 1.0 Definition of the Issue There were several interrelated issues regarding the use of Richmond in-     I serts (see Figure Al-1)       The issues were related to design allowables,   j methods for calculating bolt loads in tube steel connections, and modeling   ,
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of insert / tube steel connections. The specific issues are as follows (see "
RICHMOND INSERTS 1.0 Definition of the Issue There were several interrelated issues regarding the use of Richmond in-I serts (see Figure Al-1)
References 4.1 through 4.9):
The issues were related to design allowables, j
1.1  Safety Factors / Testing The issue was that a safety factor of two was used for Richmond insert designs instead of the manufacturer's recommended safety factor of three.
methods for calculating bolt loads in tube steel connections, and modeling References 4.1 through 4.9):
Related questions were raised regarding the tests performed by TU Electric on Richmond inserts to determine the load-carrying capacity of the insert and to examine the behavior of the connection for combined loading.       In specific, the representativeness of the tests to actual plant conditions and the interpretation of the test results was questioned.
of insert / tube steel connections.
1.2   Concrete Strength The issue was that Richmond inserts may have been installed in concrete f-~'                         weaker than the 4000 psi design strength used in the analyses.
The specific issues are as follows (see 1.1 Safety Factors / Testing The issue was that a safety factor of two was used for Richmond insert designs instead of the manufacturer's recommended safety factor of three.
Related questions were raised regarding the tests performed by TU Electric on Richmond inserts to determine the load-carrying capacity of the insert and to examine the behavior of the connection for combined loading.
In specific, the representativeness of the tests to actual plant conditions and the interpretation of the test results was questioned.
1.2 Concrete Strength The issue was that Richmond inserts may have been installed in concrete f-~'
weaker than the 4000 psi design strength used in the analyses.
s 1.3 Fatigue Life The issue was that the reduction in fatigue life of the threaded rod in Richmond insert tube steel connections caused by cyclic loading was not considered.
s 1.3 Fatigue Life The issue was that the reduction in fatigue life of the threaded rod in Richmond insert tube steel connections caused by cyclic loading was not considered.
1.4 Simplified Evaluation Method The issue was that justification of the simplified method of Richmond in-sert design was based on improperly interpreted finite element analysis results.
1.4 Simplified Evaluation Method The issue was that justification of the simplified method of Richmond in-sert design was based on improperly interpreted finite element analysis results.
1.5 Richmond Insert / Tube Steel Finite Element Modeling The issue was that a simplified method was used in evaluating connections made with tube steel without considering bolt angularity or bending in the bolt due to the torsion in the tube steel member.
1.5 Richmond Insert / Tube Steel Finite Element Modeling The issue was that a simplified method was used in evaluating connections made with tube steel without considering bolt angularity or bending in the bolt due to the torsion in the tube steel member.
Tube steel / insert connections were inconsistently modeled as pin or fixed connections. This affects the support stiffness, support frame stresses, and the evaluations of the loads on bolts / rods and inserts.
Tube steel / insert connections were inconsistently modeled as pin or fixed connections.
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This affects the support stiffness, support frame stresses, and the evaluations of the loads on bolts / rods and inserts.
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1.6 Allowable Spacing 5                             The issue was that the lack of a structural attachment interface program may have resulted- in a failure to consider spacing effects of nearby anchors / sleeves in the structural evaluation of inserts.                                                                   '
1.6 Allowable Spacing 5
1 1.7 Allowable Shear Loads The issue was that allowable shear loads for 1 1/2 in. Richmond inserts,                                                       l which were extrapolated from test data for 1 in. and 1 1/4 in. size in-serts, may not be. conservative.                                                                                             J
The issue was that the lack of a structural attachment interface program may have resulted-in a failure to consider spacing effects of nearby anchors / sleeves in the structural evaluation of inserts.
                                                                                                                                                                    )
1 1.7 Allowable Shear Loads The issue was that allowable shear loads for 1 1/2 in. Richmond inserts, l
1.8 Thermal Expansion of Long Tube Steel Members The issue was that thermal expansion of long tube steel members, under LOCA . conditions, anchored by two or more inserts was not considered.
which were extrapolated from test data for 1 in. and 1 1/4 in. size in-J serts, may not be. conservative.
1.9 Tube Steel Local Stress The issue was that the local stress in tube steel walls, which may cause punching-type failure, was not evaluated.                                                                                     t 1.10 Oversized Holes The issue was that the holes made in the connections are oversized, and therefore the sharing of shear loads cannot be assumed to be equal for all of the bolts.
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1.8 Thermal Expansion of Long Tube Steel Members The issue was that thermal expansion of long tube steel members, under LOCA. conditions, anchored by two or more inserts was not considered.
1.9 Tube Steel Local Stress The issue was that the local stress in tube steel walls, which may cause punching-type failure, was not evaluated.
t 1.10 Oversized Holes The issue was that the holes made in the connections are oversized, and therefore the sharing of shear loads cannot be assumed to be equal for all of the bolts.
1.11 Misuse of Allowable Loads Tt.e issue was that tension and shear allowables for inserts were occasion-ally used to evaluate threaded rods / bolts in the analyses.
1.11 Misuse of Allowable Loads Tt.e issue was that tension and shear allowables for inserts were occasion-ally used to evaluate threaded rods / bolts in the analyses.
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Safety Factors / Testing SWEC-PSAS has specified a safety factor of 3 for Richmond inserts under normal, upset, and emergency loading conditions, as recommended by the Richmond Screw Company. For faulted conditions, a safety factor of 2 has been specified based on ACI 318-71 (Reference 4.10).                                                     The allowables are based on averaging TU Electric insert capacity failure loads based on test results as described in References 4.11 and 4.12.                                               SWEC-Civil / Structural Group has verified (Reference 4.13) that the tests were representative of CPSES Richmond insert installation and that the tests were performed in accordance with the industry-wide                     accepted ASTM Standard E488-76 (Reference 4.14).
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Safety Factors / Testing SWEC-PSAS has specified a safety factor of 3 for Richmond inserts under normal, upset, and emergency loading conditions, as recommended by the Richmond Screw Company.
For faulted conditions, a safety factor of 2 has been specified based on ACI 318-71 (Reference 4.10).
The allowables are based on averaging TU Electric insert capacity failure loads based on test results as described in References 4.11 and 4.12.
SWEC-Civil / Structural Group has verified (Reference 4.13) that the tests were representative of CPSES Richmond insert installation and that the tests were performed in accordance with the industry-wide accepted ASTM Standard E488-76 (Reference 4.14).
The allowable loads for Richmond inserts and threaded rods, based on the appropriate safety factors, are provided in Attachment 4-5 of CPPP-7.
The allowable loads for Richmond inserts and threaded rods, based on the appropriate safety factors, are provided in Attachment 4-5 of CPPP-7.
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l-2.2 Concrete Strength gn, V         This issue is addressed in Subappendix A36, 2.3 Fatigue Life CPPP-7, Section 4.3.1,     specifies that threaded rods used in Richmond inserts / tube steel connections are designed in accordance with AISC re-quirements. SWEC-PSAS has demonstrated by analysis that the number of equivalent stress cycles on pipe supports at CPSES is less than 7,000, and therefore in accordance with AISC 7th Edition (Reference 4.15), Sec-tions 1.7.1 and 1.7.2 and Appendix B, fatigue is not a concern for thread-ed rods used in these connections.
l-2.2 Concrete Strength gn, V
This issue is addressed in Subappendix A36, 2.3 Fatigue Life CPPP-7, Section 4.3.1, specifies that threaded rods used in Richmond inserts / tube steel connections are designed in accordance with AISC re-quirements.
SWEC-PSAS has demonstrated by analysis that the number of equivalent stress cycles on pipe supports at CPSES is less than 7,000, and therefore in accordance with AISC 7th Edition (Reference 4.15), Sec-tions 1.7.1 and 1.7.2 and Appendix B, fatigue is not a concern for thread-ed rods used in these connections.
2.4 Simplified Evaluation Method The procedure developed and implemented by SWEC-PSAS for the qualification of Richmond inserts and bolts (Attachment 4-5 of CPPP-7) is independent of previously completed finite element analyses.
2.4 Simplified Evaluation Method The procedure developed and implemented by SWEC-PSAS for the qualification of Richmond inserts and bolts (Attachment 4-5 of CPPP-7) is independent of previously completed finite element analyses.
2.5 Richmond Insert / Tube Steel Finite Element Modeling SWEC-PSAS established the tube steel to bolt load transfer mechanism for shear and torsion loads (with respect to the tube steel) and developed a conservative design methodology for evaluating these connections.
2.5 Richmond Insert / Tube Steel Finite Element Modeling SWEC-PSAS established the tube steel to bolt load transfer mechanism for shear and torsion loads (with respect to the tube steel) and developed a conservative design methodology for evaluating these connections.
R. L. Cloud and Associates (RLCA) performed an independent analysis of the g        tube steel to bolt load transfer mechanism and confirmed that the SWEC-(J l      PSAS methodology is appropriate (Reference 4.16).
R. L. Cloud and Associates (RLCA) performed an independent analysis of the tube steel to bolt load transfer mechanism and confirmed that the SWEC-g(J PSAS methodology is appropriate (Reference 4.16).
The SWEC-PSAS model simulated a member with bolt properties (in the STRUDL computer program) to connect the center of tube steel to the face of con-crete. Support joints were modeled as fixed except for the bolt's tor-sional moment. The force and moment reactions were first used directly in the interaction equation for qualifying the bolts and were later converted to tension for evaluating the inserts. This interaction equation was doc-umented by both RLCA (Reference 4.17) and SWEC-PSAS (Reference 4.18).
l The SWEC-PSAS model simulated a member with bolt properties (in the STRUDL computer program) to connect the center of tube steel to the face of con-crete.
This method of analysis represents a conservative means of transferring shear and torsion loads from the tube steel to the bolts.                         Single tube steel members, subject to torsion, were modified by outriggers installed at the connections to eliminate the moment on the bolt.
Support joints were modeled as fixed except for the bolt's tor-sional moment. The force and moment reactions were first used directly in the interaction equation for qualifying the bolts and were later converted to tension for evaluating the inserts. This interaction equation was doc-umented by both RLCA (Reference 4.17) and SWEC-PSAS (Reference 4.18).
Attachment 4-5 of CPPP-7 provides the modeling procedure for qualifying the Richmond insert when used in conjunction with tube steel for all sup-port configuration types, including the proper interaction equation for qualifying the bolts / rods.
This method of analysis represents a conservative means of transferring shear and torsion loads from the tube steel to the bolts.
2.6 Allowable Spacing Attachment 4-5 of CPPP-7 specified spacing requirements and the effects of reduced spacing on Richmond insert allowables. A project-wide program on Richmond insert spacing, conducted by the SWEC Civil / Structural Group as b
Single tube steel members, subject to torsion, were modified by outriggers installed at the connections to eliminate the moment on the bolt. -5 of CPPP-7 provides the modeling procedure for qualifying the Richmond insert when used in conjunction with tube steel for all sup-port configuration types, including the proper interaction equation for qualifying the bolts / rods.
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2.6 Allowable Spacing -5 of CPPP-7 specified spacing requirements and the effects of reduced spacing on Richmond insert allowables.
A project-wide program on Richmond insert spacing, conducted by the SWEC Civil / Structural Group as bd Al-3


l fs                                              discussed in the   Civil / Structural PSR (Reference 4.13), is being imple-mented (also see Subappendix A28, Sections 1.1 and 2.1).
l discussed in the Civil / Structural PSR (Reference 4.13), is being imple-fs (O
(O) 2.7 Allowable Shear Loads TU Electric performed additional tests (see Section 2.1 above and Refer-ences 4.11 and 4.12) to establish shear allowables for all discrete sizes of Richmond inserts used at CPSES including the 1 1/2 in. Richmond insert.
mented (also see Subappendix A28, Sections 1.1 and 2.1).
)
2.7 Allowable Shear Loads TU Electric performed additional tests (see Section 2.1 above and Refer-ences 4.11 and 4.12) to establish shear allowables for all discrete sizes of Richmond inserts used at CPSES including the 1 1/2 in. Richmond insert.
Design allowable values were based on these tests.
Design allowable values were based on these tests.
2.8 Thermal Expansion of Long Tube Steel Members The effects of thermal expansion on long tube steel members anchored by two or more inserts was evaluated by RLCA in Reference 4.19, and limits on tube steel length were established.
2.8 Thermal Expansion of Long Tube Steel Members The effects of thermal expansion on long tube steel members anchored by two or more inserts was evaluated by RLCA in Reference 4.19, and limits on tube steel length were established. -5 of CPPP-7 provides limits on tube steel length of long tube steel members anchored by two or more inserts due to the effects of LOCA-induced thermal expansion.
Attachment 4-5 of CPPP-7 provides limits on tube steel length of long tube steel members anchored by two or more inserts due to the effects of LOCA-induced thermal expansion.
2.9 Tube Steel Local Stress SWEC-PSAS developed and implemented a procedure for the evaluation of lo-cal stresses due to nuts bearing on tube steel walls.
2.9 Tube Steel Local Stress SWEC-PSAS developed and implemented a procedure for the evaluation of lo-cal stresses due to nuts bearing on tube steel walls. This was incorpo-rated into Attachment 4-13 of CPPP-7. For additional discussion of this issue, refer to Subappendix A21, Section 2.0.
This was incorpo-rated into Attachment 4-13 of CPPP-7.
A (j                                           2.10 Oversized Holes SWEC-PSAS procedures assume equal distribution of shear loads resulting from rod and hole fit-up tolerances, where tubing is anchored by two or more Richmond inserts. However, for Richmond inserts and threaded rods with high shear interaction ratios (greater than 0.25), potential unequal shear loading is addressed by checking that these Richmond inserts and roJ3 are capable of resisting twice the calculated shear (Reference 4.20).
For additional discussion of this issue, refer to Subappendix A21, Section 2.0.
A(j 2.10 Oversized Holes SWEC-PSAS procedures assume equal distribution of shear loads resulting from rod and hole fit-up tolerances, where tubing is anchored by two or more Richmond inserts.
However, for Richmond inserts and threaded rods with high shear interaction ratios (greater than 0.25), potential unequal shear loading is addressed by checking that these Richmond inserts and roJ3 are capable of resisting twice the calculated shear (Reference 4.20).
2.11 Misuse of Allowable Loads The SWEC-PSAS procedure for the validation of Richmond inserts and bolts (Attachment 4-5 of CPPP-7) requires separate evaluations for the inserts and for the threaded rods / bolts using specified allowables and interaction equations.
2.11 Misuse of Allowable Loads The SWEC-PSAS procedure for the validation of Richmond inserts and bolts (Attachment 4-5 of CPPP-7) requires separate evaluations for the inserts and for the threaded rods / bolts using specified allowables and interaction equations.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution l
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution l of the issue.                                                         i
of the issue.
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
i Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
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(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
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l The corrective action to resolve the issues regarding the analysis l',h and design of Richmond inserts used in conjunction with tube steel V
* The corrective action to resolve the issues regarding the analysis l',h           '
was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided l
and design of Richmond inserts used in conjunction with tube steel V                     was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided l in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-5 during the design validation.             I
I in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-5 during the design validation.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Sections VII and VIII, August 22, 1983 4.2 Reply to NRC Staff questions from W. A. Horin to G. Mizuno, June 11, 1984 4.3 Reply to NRC Staff questions, September 1984 4.4 Affidavit of CASE witness M. Walsh before the ASLB, September 11, 1984 4.5 Structural Embedments Specification No. 2323-SS-30, Revision 1, Gibbs &
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Sections VII and VIII, August 22, 1983 4.2 Reply to NRC Staff questions from W. A. Horin to G. Mizuno, June 11, 1984 4.3 Reply to NRC Staff questions, September 1984 4.4 Affidavit of CASE witness M. Walsh before the ASLB, September 11, 1984 4.5 Structural Embedments Specification No. 2323-SS-30, Revision 1, Gibbs &
Hill, Inc., February 10, 1984 4.6 Richmond Inserts / Anchorages for Concrete Constructions, Bulletin No. 6, Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 1971 4.7 Testimony of     N. H. Williams in response to CASE questions of Febru-ary 22, 1984, to CYGNA Energy Services, April 12, 1984
Hill, Inc., February 10, 1984 4.6 Richmond Inserts / Anchorages for Concrete Constructions, Bulletin No. 6, Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 1971 4.7 Testimony of N. H. Williams in response to CASE questions of Febru-ary 22, 1984, to CYGNA Energy Services, April 12, 1984
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()         4.8 June 20, 1984, and August 9, 1984, meeting with NRC Staff discussing Rich-mond Inserts' affidavit 4.9 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 4.10 ACI     Code 1971, Building Code Requirements   for Reinforced Concrete, American Concrete Institute, Detroit 4.11 TU Electric Test Report, Shear Tests on Richmond 1 1/2 in. Type EC-6W In-serts, March 30, 1983 4.12 TU Electric Test Report, Shear and Tension Loading on Richmond Inserts, 1 1/2 in. Type EC-6W and 1 in. Type EC-2W, April 19, 1984 4.13 TU Electric Units 1 and Common, Civil / Structural Project Status Report, Revision 0, October 1987 4.14 ASTM Standard 488-76, Standard Test Methods for Strength of Anchors in Concrete and Masonary Elements 4.15 AISC Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural l                   Steel for Buildings, 7th Edition, 1969 p
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4.8 June 20, 1984, and August 9, 1984, meeting with NRC Staff discussing Rich-mond Inserts' affidavit 4.9 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 4.10 ACI Code 1971, Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete, American Concrete Institute, Detroit 4.11 TU Electric Test Report, Shear Tests on Richmond 1 1/2 in. Type EC-6W In-serts, March 30, 1983 4.12 TU Electric Test Report, Shear and Tension Loading on Richmond Inserts, 1 1/2 in. Type EC-6W and 1 in. Type EC-2W, April 19, 1984 4.13 TU Electric Units 1 and Common, Civil / Structural Project Status Report, Revision 0, October 1987 4.14 ASTM Standard 488-76, Standard Test Methods for Strength of Anchors in Concrete and Masonary Elements 4.15 AISC Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural l
Steel for Buildings, 7th Edition, 1969 p
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4.16 RLCA Report No. RLCA/P142/01-85/003, Richmond Insert / Structural Tube Steel O
4.16 RLCA Report No. RLCA/P142/01-85/003, Richmond Insert / Structural Tube Steel O
Connection, Revision 0, September 10, 1986                                   ]
Connection, Revision 0, September 10, 1986
4.17 RLCA Report No. RLCA/P142/01-86/008, Richmond Insert / Structural Tube Steel Connection, Design Interaction Equation for Bolt / Threaded Rod, Revision 0, September 10, 1986                                                           .]
]
4.18 SWEC-PSAS Report No. 15454.05-N(C)-002, Interaction Relation for a Struc-tural Member of Circular Cross Section, May 1986 4.19 RLCA Report, Richmond Insert / Structural Tube Steel Connection Effect of Thermal Expansion of Tube Steel on Richmond Inserts and Bolts                 1 4.20 SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum 141, Unequal Shear Loading Effect on Richmond Insert and Threaded Rods Used in Conjunction with Tube Steel O
4.17 RLCA Report No. RLCA/P142/01-86/008, Richmond Insert / Structural Tube Steel Connection, Design Interaction Equation for Bolt / Threaded Rod, Revision 0, September 10, 1986
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4.18 SWEC-PSAS Report No. 15454.05-N(C)-002, Interaction Relation for a Struc-tural Member of Circular Cross Section, May 1986 4.19 RLCA Report, Richmond Insert / Structural Tube Steel Connection Effect of Thermal Expansion of Tube Steel on Richmond Inserts and Bolts 1
4.20 SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum 141, Unequal Shear Loading Effect on Richmond Insert and Threaded Rods Used in Conjunction with Tube Steel O
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_                                                                            SUBAPPENDIX A2
SUBAPPENDIX A2
        \/                                                                               LOCAL STRESS - PIPING 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue was (References 4.1 through 4.4) that local stresses in piping, due to the relative displacements between the pipe and supports, were not properly addressed at CPSES in the items listed below:
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1.1   Zero Gap Restraints Zero gap restraints are box frame pipe supports with the specified gap on the pipe support drawing less than the predicted radial ther-mal expansion of the pipe.     Therefore, these support types restrain the radial thermal expansion of the pipe. The loads due to the re-strained pipe expansion, combined with the mechanical loads, have the potential to overstress the frame, welds, and pipe.         In addition, zero gap restraints used in conjunction with struts or snubbers are potentially unstable.
LOCAL STRESS - PIPING 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue was (References 4.1 through 4.4) that local stresses in piping, due to the relative displacements between the pipe and supports, were not properly addressed at CPSES in the items listed below:
1.2   Integral Welded Attachments (IWAs)
1.1 Zero Gap Restraints Zero gap restraints are box frame pipe supports with the specified gap on the pipe support drawing less than the predicted radial ther-mal expansion of the pipe.
Integral welded pipe support attachments (IWAs), such as trunnions and lugs, induce local stresses in the pipe wall.         Anchor supports r-'s                                                       with opposing trunnions attached to different support structures may
Therefore, these support types restrain the radial thermal expansion of the pipe.
()                                                         restrain the radial thermal pipe expansion and induce additional loe,d in the pipe, trunnions, and support structures.
The loads due to the re-strained pipe expansion, combined with the mechanical loads, have the potential to overstress the frame, welds, and pipe.
In addition, zero gap restraints used in conjunction with struts or snubbers are potentially unstable.
1.2 Integral Welded Attachments (IWAs)
Integral welded pipe support attachments (IWAs), such as trunnions and lugs, induce local stresses in the pipe wall.
Anchor supports r-'s with opposing trunnions attached to different support structures may
()
restrain the radial thermal pipe expansion and induce additional loe,d in the pipe, trunnions, and support structures.
The load from restrained radial thermal pipe expansion, when combined with the mechanical loads, has the potential to overstress the pipe, trunnion, welds, support structure, and support structure anchorage.
The load from restrained radial thermal pipe expansion, when combined with the mechanical loads, has the potential to overstress the pipe, trunnion, welds, support structure, and support structure anchorage.
2.0 Issue Resolution The issue of local stress on piping was resolved as follows:
2.0 Issue Resolution The issue of local stress on piping was resolved as follows:
2.1 Zero Gap Restraints                                                               i i
2.1 Zero Gap Restraints i
Frame-type pipe supports, designed to restrain the lateral movement               J of the pipe through point, line, or surface contact, induce local               j stresses in the pipe wall due to the bearing contact force. The is-sue of local pipe stress due to bearing contact was resolved as follows:
i Frame-type pipe supports, designed to restrain the lateral movement J
2.1.1     Zero clearance box frames are eliminated or modified to               l provide sufficient gaps to allow for the thermal expansion           i l                                                                               of the pipe in accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-11.
of the pipe through point, line, or surface contact, induce local j
stresses in the pipe wall due to the bearing contact force. The is-sue of local pipe stress due to bearing contact was resolved as follows:
2.1.1 Zero clearance box frames are eliminated or modified to l
provide sufficient gaps to allow for the thermal expansion i
l of the pipe in accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-11.
The modification of zero gap restraints on struts or snub-bers, to provide stability, is discussed in Subappendix A4.
The modification of zero gap restraints on struts or snub-bers, to provide stability, is discussed in Subappendix A4.
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2.1.2     Guidelines were provided in CPPP-7, Attachments 4-6B and
2.1.2 Guidelines were provided in CPPP-7, Attachments 4-6B and
    'i                             4-6C, to assess the local longitudinal line/ point contact U                           and circumferential bearing stresses in piping restrained by pipe support frames, 2.2 Integral Welded Attachments CPPP-7, Attachment 4-6A provided simplified analysis methods for the evaluation of pipe local stress at trunnions and lugs, with and with-out pipe reinforcing pads.     The local pipe stress for trunnions on elbows is evaluated in accordance with PM-162.     Local pipe stresses at IWAs that did not meet the geometric limitations of the simplified methods (such as multiple trunnions attached at the same location, or pipe-through trunnions) were qualified based on finite element analy-sis techniques.
'i 4-6C, to assess the local longitudinal line/ point contact U
In accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.6.4.1,     supports with opposing trunnions attached to different support structures were specially analyzed to predict the additional load induced on the pipe, trun-         l nion, support structure, welds, and support structure anchorage due       -
and circumferential bearing stresses in piping restrained by pipe support frames, 2.2 Integral Welded Attachments CPPP-7, Attachment 4-6A provided simplified analysis methods for the evaluation of pipe local stress at trunnions and lugs, with and with-out pipe reinforcing pads.
to the restrained thermal expansion of the pipe. This load was added to the thermal load due to the longitudinal thermal expansion of the pipe to determine the thermal design load for the pipe local stress evaluation and the design of the trunnion, support structure, welds, and support structure anchorage. The trunnion was then analyzed in accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-6A as discussed above.
The local pipe stress for trunnions on elbows is evaluated in accordance with PM-162.
m 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
Local pipe stresses at IWAs that did not meet the geometric limitations of the simplified methods (such as multiple trunnions attached at the same location, or pipe-through trunnions) were qualified based on finite element analy-sis techniques.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
In accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.6.4.1, supports with opposing trunnions attached to different support structures were specially analyzed to predict the additional load induced on the pipe, trun-l nion, support structure, welds, and support structure anchorage due to the restrained thermal expansion of the pipe.
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
This load was added to the thermal load due to the longitudinal thermal expansion of the pipe to determine the thermal design load for the pipe local stress evaluation and the design of the trunnion, support structure, welds, and support structure anchorage.
* The corrective action to resolve the local pipe stress issues with zero clearance box frames was to eliminate the support or modify the support to provide proper gaps between the pipe and support during         i the design validation. The corrective action to resolve the stabili-ty issue for zero gap restraints is discussed in Subappendix A4. The corrective action to resolve the local pipe stress issue with frames and IWAs was to provide analysis methodologies and acceptance crite-ria   consistent with   licensing commitments in CPPP-7, Attach-ments 4-6A, B, and C during the design validation.       All local pipe stress design validation analyses were performed in accordance with         .
The trunnion was then analyzed in accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-6A as discussed above.
these attachments.
m 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.           l A2-2                                             ,
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
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(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
                                                                                                        \
The corrective action to resolve the local pipe stress issues with zero clearance box frames was to eliminate the support or modify the support to provide proper gaps between the pipe and support during i
the design validation. The corrective action to resolve the stabili-ty issue for zero gap restraints is discussed in Subappendix A4.
The corrective action to resolve the local pipe stress issue with frames and IWAs was to provide analysis methodologies and acceptance crite-ria consistent with licensing commitments in CPPP-7, Attach-ments 4-6A, B, and C during the design validation.
All local pipe stress design validation analyses were performed in accordance with these attachments.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
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4.0 References O                                                           4.1 CASE's Proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section IV, August 22, 1983.
4.0 References O
i 4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no Genuine Issue Regarding Consideration of Local Displace-ments and Stressos, August 24, 1984.
i 4.1 CASE's Proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section IV, August 22, 1983.
4.3 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Reply to ' CASE's Answer to App 1! cant's Motion for Summary , Disposition Regarding Local Displaceme..ts and     I Stresses, October 4, 1984.
4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no Genuine Issue Regarding Consideration of Local Displace-ments and Stressos, August 24, 1984.
                                                            -4.4 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987.
4.3 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Reply to ' CASE's Answer to App 1! cant's I
Motion for Summary, Disposition Regarding Local Displaceme..ts and Stresses, October 4, 1984.
-4.4 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987.
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SUBAPPENDIX A3                                   l WALL-TO-WALL AND FLOOR-TO-CEILING SUPPORTS 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 and 4.2) was that when a pipe support is at-tached from floor-to-ceiling or wall-to-wall, the support members effec-       )
SUBAPPENDIX A3 WALL-TO-WALL AND FLOOR-TO-CEILING SUPPORTS 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 and 4.2) was that when a pipe support is at-tached from floor-to-ceiling or wall-to-wall, the support members effec-tively act as building structural members.
tively act as building structural members.       Loadings due to the thermal   ;
Loadings due to the thermal expansion of the frame, relative displacements between building attachment j
expansion of the frame, relative displacements between building attachment     j points from seismic building movements, time-dependent displacements such       ]
points from seismic building movements, time-dependent displacements such
as concrete creep, and the cumulative effects of these could be signifi-       I cant. Since these loads and displacements were not considered in the de-     l sign, the potential existed for support members to become overstressed.       ]
]
2.0       Issue Resolution 1
as concrete creep, and the cumulative effects of these could be signifi-cant.
2.1 Floor-to-Ceiling and Wall-to-Wall (F-C/W-W) Supports                       l I
Since these loads and displacements were not considered in the de-sign, the potential existed for support members to become overstressed.
j The large F-C/W-W frames were qualified for loading combinations that include frame thermal expansion, differential building displacements.
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2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Floor-to-Ceiling and Wall-to-Wall (F-C/W-W) Supports The large F-C/W-W frames were qualified for loading combinations that j
include frame thermal expansion, differential building displacements.
due to seismic movements, long-term concrete creep, and live loads.
due to seismic movements, long-term concrete creep, and live loads.
Relative building displacements, long-term creep, and live load ef-fects were demonstrated to be insignificant for corner supports. The loading combinations and the allowable stresses are delineated in       i Attachment 4-19 of CPPP-7.                                             {
Relative building displacements, long-term creep, and live load ef-fects were demonstrated to be insignificant for corner supports.
2.1.1     Large Frames Outside the Service Water Tunnel l
The loading combinations and the allowable stresses are delineated in i -19 of CPPP-7.
All large F-C/W-W frames, except those in the service water i tunnel, are being modified by adding slip joints.
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l 2.1.2     Large Frames in the Service Water Tunnel                     1 l
2.1.1 Large Frames Outside the Service Water Tunnel l
The large F-C/W-W frames in the service water tunnel were assessed for stresses caused by floor live load, differen-tial floor / wall displacements due to long-term concrete creep, thermal expansion, and seismic excitation as speci-fled in Section 2.1. Supports assessed as being inadequate i are being modified (Reference 4.3).                           l l
i All large F-C/W-W frames, except those in the service water tunnel, are being modified by adding slip joints.
2.2 Corner Supports A generic study of these supports was performed utilizing the assess-   4 ment methods in Section 2.1. The supports were then reviewed based on the study results, and the designs were validated.
2.1.2 Large Frames in the Service Water Tunnel 1
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
l The large F-C/W-W frames in the service water tunnel were assessed for stresses caused by floor live load, differen-tial floor / wall displacements due to long-term concrete creep, thermal expansion, and seismic excitation as speci-fled in Section 2.1.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
Supports assessed as being inadequate are being modified (Reference 4.3).
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2.2 Corner Supports A generic study of these supports was performed utilizing the assess-4 ment methods in Section 2.1.
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The supports were then reviewed based on the study results, and the designs were validated.
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3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
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All the pipe support modifications tesulting from resolution of is-f
* All the pipe support modifications tesulting from resolution of is-sues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable f
!g sues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable l
l              under     provisions     of     10CFR50.55(e)                     (see           Subappendix B2,   l f
under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
SDAR-CP-86-72).
(see Subappendix B2, l
* The corrective action to resolve the issue with the proper evaluation l
f SDAR-CP-86-72).
!              of floor-to-ceiling and wall-to-wall and corner supports was accom-i             plished through the implementation of the criteria of CPPP-7, Attach-ment 4-19 during the design validation.
l The corrective action to resolve the issue with the proper evaluation of floor-to-ceiling and wall-to-wall and corner supports was accom-i plished through the implementation of the criteria of CPPP-7, Attach-ment 4-19 during the design validation.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References i
4.0 References i
4.1 CASE's. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section VI, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Partial Answer to Applicant's Statement of Material Facts, in the Form of Af fidavit of CASE Witness, Mark Walsh, August 27, 1984 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Report No. 15454.05-N(C)-013, Qualification of Wall-to-Wall / Floor-to-Floor Supports, April 1987 4.4 SWEC-PSAS Report No. 15454.05-N(C)-012, Revision                             1,. Qualification of   .
4.1 CASE's. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section VI, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Partial Answer to Applicant's Statement of Material Facts, in the Form of Af fidavit of CASE Witness, Mark Walsh, August 27, 1984 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Report No. 15454.05-N(C)-013, Qualification of Wall-to-Wall / Floor-to-Floor Supports, April 1987 4.4 SWEC-PSAS Report No. 15454.05-N(C)-012, Revision 1,. Qualification of Corner Supports, June 2, 1987
Corner Supports, June 2, 1987                                                                       )
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SUBAPPENDIX A4 t
SUBAPPENDIX A4 t
PIPE SUPPORT / SYSTEM STABILITY 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 through 4.5) was that certain pipe support con-figurations installed at CPSES were potentially unstable or their buckling capacity was not properly evaluated. An unstable support is defined as a support that can shift or move to an unqualified position. An unqualified position is a position other than that assumed in the piping stress analy-sis. A related issue was that the stability of the overall piping systems must be assured.
PIPE SUPPORT / SYSTEM STABILITY 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 through 4.5) was that certain pipe support con-figurations installed at CPSES were potentially unstable or their buckling capacity was not properly evaluated.
An unstable support is defined as a support that can shift or move to an unqualified position. An unqualified position is a position other than that assumed in the piping stress analy-sis. A related issue was that the stability of the overall piping systems must be assured.
1.1 Potentially Unstable Support Configurations The following are configurations whose buckling capacity was not properly assessed, or which were potentially unstable because they had the potential to move axially along the pipe and/or rotate around the pipe, creating a three pin linkage system.
1.1 Potentially Unstable Support Configurations The following are configurations whose buckling capacity was not properly assessed, or which were potentially unstable because they had the potential to move axially along the pipe and/or rotate around the pipe, creating a three pin linkage system.
1.1.1         Zero-Clearance Box Frames Supported by Single and/or Multiple Struts or Snubbers D
1.1.1 Zero-Clearance Box Frames Supported by Single and/or Multiple Struts or Snubbers DO l
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1.1.2                                         Uncinched U-Bolts on Single Strut or Snubber l/r f. Ja SHUG OR G.AP I           I                   I bI O
1.1.2 Uncinched U-Bolts on Single Strut or Snubber l/r f. Ja SHUG OR G.AP I
1.1.3                                     Multi-Strutted Frame Gang Supports i
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1.1.4         Trapeze Supports With U-Bolts dp l                                                                                                         W JD                     _
1.1.4 Trapeze Supports With U-Bolts dp l
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Peg-f 1.2 System Stability The stability of the overall piping system is dependent upon the sta-bility of each individual support.             The issue was that if there were unstable supports in a piping system, then the overall system would be unstable.
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2.0         Issue Resolution 2.1 Potentially Unstable Support Configurations t
12 Lt Peg-f 1.2 System Stability The stability of the overall piping system is dependent upon the sta-bility of each individual support.
The issue was that if there were unstable supports in a piping system, then the overall system would be unstable.
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Potentially Unstable Support Configurations t
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l A stable support is a support that cannot shift or move to an unqual-5 ified position.     Unqualified position means a position that exceeds the specified tolerances from the position assumed in the pipe stress analysis.
l A stable support is a support that cannot shift or move to an unqual-ified position.
Unqualified position means a position that exceeds 5
the specified tolerances from the position assumed in the pipe stress analysis.
The stability of supports was assured by qualifying column-strut sup-ports and by modifying potentially unstable configurations in accor-dance with CPPP-7, Section 4.2.4 and Attachment 4.9, as follows:
The stability of supports was assured by qualifying column-strut sup-ports and by modifying potentially unstable configurations in accor-dance with CPPP-7, Section 4.2.4 and Attachment 4.9, as follows:
2.1.1       Zero-Clearance Box Frame Supported by Single or Multiple Struts or Snubbers These support types were either eliminated or modified, such as by removing the existing box frame and replacing it with a standard pipe clamp or rigid frame.
2.1.1 Zero-Clearance Box Frame Supported by Single or Multiple Struts or Snubbers These support types were either eliminated or modified, such as by removing the existing box frame and replacing it with a standard pipe clamp or rigid frame.
2.1.2     Uncinched U-Bolts on Single Strut or Snubber All supports of this nature were eliminated or are being modified by replacing the U-bolt assembly with a design consistent with the required support function.
2.1.2 Uncinched U-Bolts on Single Strut or Snubber All supports of this nature were eliminated or are being modified by replacing the U-bolt assembly with a design consistent with the required support function.
2.1.3     Multi-Strutted Gang Support Frames These supports were redesigned as rigid frames.
2.1.3 Multi-Strutted Gang Support Frames These supports were redesigned as rigid frames.
      /         2.1.4     Trapeze Supports With U-Bolto All supports of this nature were eliminated or are being modified as described in Subappendix A12, Axial, Rotation-al, and Trapeze-Type Restraints.
/
2.1.5     Column-Strut Stability A procedure to evaluate the critical buckling load of a column-supported strut was developed and is included in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-9.
2.1.4 Trapeze Supports With U-Bolto All supports of this nature were eliminated or are being modified as described in Subappendix A12, Axial, Rotation-al, and Trapeze-Type Restraints.
2.2 System Stability The stability of the overall piping system was assured by the                         i following:                                                                             j l               1)   Each installed support was individually qualified to be stable l
2.1.5 Column-Strut Stability A procedure to evaluate the critical buckling load of a column-supported strut was developed and is included in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-9.
(in accordance with the definition in Section 2.1).
2.2 System Stability The stability of the overall piping system was assured by the i
: 2)   The system integrity was analyzed and qualified to the ASME Section III, Division 1 Code allowables for deadweight, thermal, and applicable occasional loads (fluid transients) and seismic excitations in three orthogonal directions.
following:
j l
1)
Each installed support was individually qualified to be stable (in accordance with the definition in Section 2.1).
l 2)
The system integrity was analyzed and qualified to the ASME Section III, Division 1 Code allowables for deadweight, thermal, and applicable occasional loads (fluid transients) and seismic excitations in three orthogonal directions.
A4-4
A4-4
_. _. ___ _-_ __-___-________O
__-___-________O


3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
* The corrective action to resolve the issue of pipe support and system stability was accomplished through the analysis methods and support modifications specified in CPPP-7, Section 4.2.4 and Attachment 4-9 during the design validation.
The corrective action to resolve the issue of pipe support and system stability was accomplished through the analysis methods and support modifications specified in CPPP-7, Section 4.2.4 and Attachment 4-9 during the design validation.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1   CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section III, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Motions and Answer to TU Electric's Motions for Summary Dispo-sition Regarding Stability of Pipe Supports, October 15, 1984 4.3 Testimony     of N. H. Williams   in Response   to CASE Question of February 22, 1984, to CYGNA Energy Services 4.4 Letter to Mr. J. B. George of TU Electric from N. H. Williams of
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section III, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Motions and Answer to TU Electric's Motions for Summary Dispo-sition Regarding Stability of Pipe Supports, October 15, 1984 4.3 Testimony of N. H. Williams in Response to CASE Question of February 22, 1984, to CYGNA Energy Services
(]
(]
CYGNA in reference to stability of pipe supports, April 30, 1985 4.5 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987.
4.4 Letter to Mr. J. B. George of TU Electric from N. H. Williams of CYGNA in reference to stability of pipe supports, April 30, 1985 4.5 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987.
l O
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l  D                                         A4-5
D A4-5 l
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I                                                             SUBAPPENDIX A5 f-~
I SUBAPPENDIX A5 f-~
          %'                                        PIPE SUPPORT GENERIC STIFFNESS 1.0 Definition of the Issue 1.1 Generic Stiffness Methodology The issue (References 4.1 through 4.6) was that there is no assurance that the assumed set of generic stiffness values used in the piping stress analyses were sufficiently representative of the stiffnesses of the installed supports. Therefore, the results of the pipe stress analyses may not be valid.
PIPE SUPPORT GENERIC STIFFNESS 1.0 Definition of the Issue 1.1 Generic Stiffness Methodology The issue (References 4.1 through 4.6) was that there is no assurance that the assumed set of generic stiffness values used in the piping sufficiently representative of the stiffnesses stress analyses were of the installed supports. Therefore, the results of the pipe stress analyses may not be valid.
Supports were designed to allowable stresses and to a deflection lim-it of 1/16 in. for Level B (upset condition) loads.       No check was performed on the support stiffness, since it was assumed that the 1/16-in. deflection limit would ensure that the actual support stiff-ness was acceptably close to the assumed values used in the piping stress analyses.
Supports were designed to allowable stresses and to a deflection lim-it of 1/16 in. for Level B (upset condition) loads.
1.2 Pipe Support Stiffness Evaluation It was also noted that the flexibilities of all pipe support compo-nents, such as U-bolts and base plates, should have been included in the support stiffness calculation.                                     )
No check was performed on the support stiffness, since it was assumed that the 1/16-in. deflection limit would ensure that the actual support stiff-ness was acceptably close to the assumed values used in the piping stress analyses.
1.2 Pipe Support Stiffness Evaluation It was also noted that the flexibilities of all pipe support compo-nents, such as U-bolts and base plates, should have been included in
)
the support stiffness calculation.
O
O
(_,/                   1.3 Effect of Oversize Holes on Pipe Support Stiffness Evaluation The bolt hole sizes for 1 in, diameter bolts were 1/16 in. larger than allowed by the ASHE Section III Code of record. The issue was that these oversized holes were ignored in the pipe support deflec-tion check and therefore could have an unconservative impact on the seismic analysis of the piping system.
(_,/
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1   Generic Stiffness Methodology Pipe support stiffnesses were represented in the pipe stress analysis in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 3.10.8.
1.3 Effect of Oversize Holes on Pipe Support Stiffness Evaluation The bolt hole sizes for 1 in, diameter bolts were 1/16 in. larger than allowed by the ASHE Section III Code of record.
The issue was that these oversized holes were ignored in the pipe support deflec-tion check and therefore could have an unconservative impact on the seismic analysis of the piping system.
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Generic Stiffness Methodology Pipe support stiffnesses were represented in the pipe stress analysis in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 3.10.8.
The following approach was followed to develop a generic stiffness methodology for CPSES.
The following approach was followed to develop a generic stiffness methodology for CPSES.
2.1.1     Determination of Generic Values The following three types of supports were selected from the CPSES pipe supports installed in the plant:
2.1.1 Determination of Generic Values The following three types of supports were selected from the CPSES pipe supports installed in the plant:
: 1)   Rigid supports, including frames and struts t
1)
Rigid supports, including frames and struts t
AS-1
AS-1


      -s                                                                                                    2)     Anchors
2)
  ./                     \
Anchors
: 3)     Snubbers                                                                 ,
-s
l i
./
For rigid supports, generic values were analytically devel-oped (Reference 4.7) for groups of pipe sizes.                     For snub-bers, generic values were based on snubber sizes.
\\
3)
Snubbers l
i For rigid supports, generic values were analytically devel-oped (Reference 4.7) for groups of pipe sizes.
For snub-bers, generic values were based on snubber sizes.
The generic values for anchors were developed in terms of nondimensional values, which are independent of pipe sizes.
The generic values for anchors were developed in terms of nondimensional values, which are independent of pipe sizes.
The nondimensional stiffness values of all sample anchors for all pipe sizes can thus be used together in developing histograms.
The nondimensional stiffness values of all sample anchors for all pipe sizes can thus be used together in developing histograms.
2.1.2     Pipe Support Stiffness Histograms For all the supports evaluated, stiffness values were calculated.
2.1.2 Pipe Support Stiffness Histograms For all the supports evaluated, stiffness values were calculated.
Histograms of the calculated stiffnesses (Reference 4.8) were developed and representative values (median values) determined.
Histograms of the calculated stiffnesses (Reference 4.8) were developed and representative values (median values) determined.
2.1.3     Minimum Acceptable Stiffness for Use of the General Value To assure that the use of generic values produce valid pipe Q                                                                                                       stress analyses, a minimum stiffness value was established.                      .
2.1.3 Minimum Acceptable Stiffness for Use of the General Value To assure that the use of generic values produce valid pipe Q
V                                                                                                       The minimum stiffness was determined with consideration of its effect on thermal, static,                       and dynamic responses (Reference 4.7). This approach utilized simplified                   piping models end fundamental engineering principles.
stress analyses, a minimum stiffness value was established.
2.1.4     Screening Procedure Before the beginning of pipe stress analyses, each pipe support was assessed to determine if its stiffness falls                         l above the minimum stiffness; if so, it was assigned the generic stiffness.                   When a pipe support's stiffness had been determined to fall below the minimum value, the calcu-lated stiffness value was used in the pipe stress analysis in lieu of the generic value.                     A set of CPSES generic stiffness values and acceptable minimum values have been incorporated               in         the   design     criteria,   CPPP-7, Section 3.10.8.
V The minimum stiffness was determined with consideration of its effect on thermal, static, and dynamic responses (Reference 4.7).
2.2                       Pipe Support Stiffness Evaluation In accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.3.2.2,                     the stiffness of each component in the support assembly, such as vendor-supplied compo-nents, structural members, and base plates was assessed in the evalu-ation of the support stiffness.
This approach utilized simplified piping models end fundamental engineering principles.
O i                                                                                                                                           A5-2 L.                         _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
2.1.4 Screening Procedure Before the beginning of pipe stress analyses, each pipe support was assessed to determine if its stiffness falls l
above the minimum stiffness; if so, it was assigned the generic stiffness.
When a pipe support's stiffness had been determined to fall below the minimum value, the calcu-lated stiffness value was used in the pipe stress analysis in lieu of the generic value.
A set of CPSES generic stiffness values and acceptable minimum values have been incorporated in the design
: criteria, CPPP-7, Section 3.10.8.
2.2 Pipe Support Stiffness Evaluation In accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.3.2.2, the stiffness of each component in the support assembly, such as vendor-supplied compo-nents, structural members, and base plates was assessed in the evalu-ation of the support stiffness.
O i
A5-2 L.


To facilitate the support stiffness evaluation, the stiffnesses of 3                                                       commonly used supports and subassemblies have been provided in graph-ic and tabular forms and incorporated in Attachment 4-18 of CPPP-7.
To facilitate the support stiffness evaluation, the stiffnesses of 3
2.3 Effect of Oversize Bolt Holes on Pipe Support Stiffness Evaluation As discussed in Subappendix A13, Bolt Hole Gaps, CPSES anchor-bolt hole     sizes   were   in   compliance   with   ASME 1985 Summer Addenda NF-4721(a) and are not oversized. Therefore, consistent with industry practice, the effects of bolt hole gaps were not included in the support stiffness assessments.
commonly used supports and subassemblies have been provided in graph-ic and tabular forms and incorporated in Attachment 4-18 of CPPP-7.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
2.3 Effect of Oversize Bolt Holes on Pipe Support Stiffness Evaluation As discussed in Subappendix A13, Bolt Hole Gaps, CPSES anchor-bolt hole sizes were in compliance with ASME 1985 Summer Addenda NF-4721(a) and are not oversized. Therefore, consistent with industry practice, the effects of bolt hole gaps were not included in the support stiffness assessments.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
* The corrective action to resolve the issues regarding pipe support generic stiffness was accomplished by implementing the procedures provided in CPPP-7, Sections 3.10.8 and 4.3.2 and Attachment 4-18 during the design validation.
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
        /
The corrective action to resolve the issues regarding pipe support generic stiffness was accomplished by implementing the procedures provided in CPPP-7, Sections 3.10.8 and 4.3.2 and Attachment 4-18 during the design validation.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
/
4.0 References 4.1       CA3E's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations) Section IX, August 22, 1983 4.2 Affidavit of CASE Witnesses             J. Doyle and M. Walsh, CASE's . Partial Answer to Applicants' Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no Genuine Issue Regarding Applicants' Use of Generic Stiffnesses Instead of Actual Stiffnesses in Piping Analysis, August 24, 1984,           ,
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
and August 27, 1984 4.3 CYGNA Phase 3 Final Report, TR-84042-01, Revision 1,               Appendix J, Note 8, November 20, 1984 4.4       N. H. Williams (CYGNA) letter to V. Noonan (USNRC), Open Items Asso-ciated with Walsh/Doyle Allegations, CYGNA Letter No. 84042.022 dated January 18, 1985 4.5 Testimony of           N. H. Williams   in response   to CASE questions of February 22, 1984, to CYGNA Energy Services 4.6 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List Revision 4, CYGNA Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987
4.0 References 4.1 CA3E's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations) Section IX, August 22, 1983 4.2 Affidavit of CASE Witnesses J. Doyle and M. Walsh, CASE's. Partial Answer to Applicants' Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no Genuine Issue Regarding Applicants' Use of Generic Stiffnesses Instead of Actual Stiffnesses in Piping Analysis, August 24, 1984, and August 27, 1984 4.3 CYGNA Phase 3 Final Report, TR-84042-01, Revision 1, Appendix J, Note 8, November 20, 1984 4.4 N. H. Williams (CYGNA) letter to V. Noonan (USNRC), Open Items Asso-ciated with Walsh/Doyle Allegations, CYGNA Letter No. 84042.022 dated January 18, 1985 4.5 Testimony of N. H. Williams in response to CASE questions of February 22, 1984, to CYGNA Energy Services 4.6 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List Revision 4, CYGNA Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987
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r    .g'I SUBAPPENDIX A6                                                                3                N
UNCINCHED U-BOLT ACTING AS A TWO-WAY RESTRAINT
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(                  UNCINCHED U-BOLT ACTING AS A TWO-WAY RESTRAINT                                                                     i
                                                                                                                                        \
l 1.0 Definition of the Issue i
l 1.0 Definition of the Issue i
The issue (References 4.1 and 4.2) was that certain uncinched U-bolts at-tached to rigid frames were modeled and analyzed as one-way restraints (i.e., as providing restraint in the direction parallel to the axis of the                                                   ,
The issue (References 4.1 and 4.2) was that certain uncinched U-bolts at-tached to rigid frames were modeled and analyzed as one-way restraints (i.e., as providing restraint in the direction parallel to the axis of the threaded portion of the U-bolt) but will actually behave as two-way re-straints (i.e., as stated above and laterally). This was viewed as having a two-fold effect:
threaded portion of the U-bolt) but will actually behave as two-way re-                                                       !
1 1.1 Modeling I
straints (i.e., as stated above and laterally). This was viewed as having a two-fold effect:
l Failure to include the two-way restraining action of the U-bolts may invalidate the results of pipe stress analyses that utilized U-bolts modeled as one-way restraints.
1 1.1 Modeling                                                                                                               I l
t 1.2 Uncinched U-Bolt Qualification Guideline i
l Failure to include the two-way restraining action of the U-bolts may invalidate the results of pipe stress analyses that utilized U-bolts                                               ;
4 Such U-bolts may not meet the manufacturer's recommended interaction limits when the lateral loads are applied.
modeled as one-way restraints.                                                                                     !'
2.0 Issue Resolution
t 1.2 Uncinched U-Bolt Qualification Guideline                                                                                 i 4         >
(
Such U-bolts may not meet the manufacturer's recommended interaction limits when the lateral loads are applied.                                                         '-
2.1 Modeling 2.1.1 For pipe sizes equal to or greater than 8 in.
2.0 Issue Resolution
: NPS, uncinched U-bolts were replaced in the model with e compo-nent commensurate with the support function.
(       2.1 Modeling 2.1.1     For pipe sizes equal to or greater than 8 in.                                           NPS, uncinched U-bolts were replaced in the model with e compo-nent commensurate with the support function.
2.1.2 In the piping analysis, uncinched U-bolt supports for pipe sizes 6 in, and smaller that are attached to rigid. frames were modeled as two-way restraints.
2.1.2     In the piping analysis, uncinched U-bolt supports for pipe sizes 6 in, and smaller that are attached to rigid . frames were modeled as two-way restraints.
1 2.2 Uncinched U-Bolt Qualification Guideline 2.2.1 STRUDL models of U-bolts were developed to derive the stiffness value and resultant loading (moment, shear,.and tension) at the attachment to the frame. For static (i.e.,
1 2.2 Uncinched U-Bolt Qualification Guideline 2.2.1     STRUDL models of U-bolts were developed to derive the stiffness value and resultant loading (moment, shear,.and                                                 '
signed) loads, a friction coefficient of 0.3 was considered to act in the axial direction of the pipe.
tension) at the attachment to the frame. For static (i.e.,
Res olution; of the friction issue is discussed in Subappendix A7.
signed) loads, a friction coefficient of 0.3 was considered to act in the axial direction of the pipe. Res olution; of the friction issue is discussed in Subappendix A7.
2.2.2 Based on the above STRUDL analyses, allowable U-bolt load I
2.2.2     Based on the above STRUDL analyses, allowable U-bolt load                                                       .
ratings were developed.
ratings were developed.                                                                                       I 2.2.3     The uncinched U-bolt qualification procedure was incorpo-rated in Section 4.2.5.2 and Attachment 4-3 of C PPP -7 .
2.2.3 The uncinched U-bolt qualification procedure was incorpo-rated in Section 4.2.5.2 and Attachment 4-3 of C PPP -7.
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73 j                                                      2.2.4     Stiffness values for uncinhed U-bolts, modeled as two-way
2.2.4 Stiffness values for uncinhed U-bolts, modeled as two-way 73 j restraints were developed and issued in CPPP-7, Sec-
    ,                                                                      restraints were developed and issued in CPPP-7,         Sec-
'd tion 4.3.2.2 and Attachment 4-18.
      'd                                                                   tion 4.3.2.2 and Attachment 4-18.
3.0. Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
3.0 . Corrective and Preventive Action
/
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subsppendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under
                                                                                                                  /
/
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subsppendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under
provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
  /                                                             provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
* The corrective action to resolve the concern of U-bolts e.cting as two-way restraints was accomplished by implementing the criteria of CPPP-7, Sections 4.2.5.2 and 4.3.2.2, and Attachments 4-3 and 4-18 during the design validation.
The corrective action to resolve the concern of U-bolts e.cting as two-way restraints was accomplished by implementing the criteria of CPPP-7, Sections 4.2.5.2 and 4.3.2.2, and Attachments 4-3 and 4-18 during the design validation.
* The preventive action for dis issue is identified in Appendix C.
The preventive action for dis issue is identified in Appendix C.
                                                    . 4.0 References                                                                                 l 4.1   CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Walsh/Doyle Allegations) Section -II, August 22, 1983 Answer to Applicant.'s Motion for Sunuary Disposition of CASE's 4.2 CASE
. 4.0 References l
      /~T                                                       Allegations     Regarding     U-Bolts Acti.ng as   Two-Way Restraints, i                                                         August 20, 1984
4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Walsh/Doyle Allegations) Section -II, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE Answer to Applicant.'s Motion for Sunuary Disposition of CASE's
                                                                                    /
/~T Allegations Regarding U-Bolts Acti.ng as Two-Way Restraints, i
i
August 20, 1984
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SUBAPPENDIX A7 FRICTION FORCES 1.0 Definition of the Issue
SUBAPPENDIX A7 FRICTION FORCES 1.0 Definition of the Issue
                                .The issue (References.4.1 through 4.4) was that friction loads were not considered in the original pipe support designs when the predicted pipe movement was less than 1/16 in.
.The issue (References.4.1 through 4.4) was that friction loads were not considered in the original pipe support designs when the predicted pipe movement was less than 1/16 in.
2.0 Issue Resolution Friction loads were considered in the validation of pipe supports at CPSES. Section 4.7.3 and Attachment 4-7 of CPPP-7 required that friction be considered in all load cases for noneyclic loads (i.e., static and/or steady state loads) regardless of the magnitude of pipe movement.
2.0 Issue Resolution Friction loads were considered in the validation of pipe supports at CPSES.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
Section 4.7.3 and Attachment 4-7 of CPPP-7 required that friction be considered in all load cases for noneyclic loads (i.e., static and/or steady state loads) regardless of the magnitude of pipe movement.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolut. ion                                             i of the issue.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolut. ion i
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were . determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
of the issue.
* The corrective action to resolve the issue of friction forces ' was
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were. determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
(                                   accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-7 during the design valiation.
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
The corrective action to resolve the issue of friction forces ' was
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section XVI, August 22, 1983.
(
accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-7 during the design valiation.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section XVI, August 22, 1983.
4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition Regarding Consideration of Friction Forces in the Design of Pipe Supports with Small Thermal Movements, August 6, 1984.
4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition Regarding Consideration of Friction Forces in the Design of Pipe Supports with Small Thermal Movements, August 6, 1984.
4.3 CASE's Answer to Applicants' Reply to CASE's Answer to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition Regarding Consideration of Friction Forces, October 1, 1984.
4.3 CASE's Answer to Applicants' Reply to CASE's Answer to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition Regarding Consideration of Friction Forces, October 1, 1984.
4.4 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4,                     and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 A7-1
4.4 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 A7-1


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p                                                                       SUBAPPENDIX A8 V                                                             AWS VERSUS ASME CODE PROVISIONS i
i AWS VERSUS ASME CODE PROVISIONS 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 through 4.4) was that certain aspects of weld design, welding practices, and the effects of punching shear (local stress) on structural members were not adequately addressed.
1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 through 4.4) was that certain aspects of weld design, welding practices, and the effects of punching shear (local stress) on structural members were not adequately addressed.       The items discussed are grouped into the following four groups:                                 ,!
The items discussed are grouped into the following four groups:
1.1 Skewed T-Joint Welds The issue was that the effective throats of skewed T-joint welds were incorrectly calculated in the original design. The AWS angle limita-tion between the joined parts was violated in the evaluations of skewed T-joint welds at CPSES.
1.1 Skewed T-Joint Welds The issue was that the effective throats of skewed T-joint welds were incorrectly calculated in the original design.
The AWS angle limita-tion between the joined parts was violated in the evaluations of skewed T-joint welds at CPSES.
1.2 Effective Throat of Flare Bevel Welds The issue was that since the ASME Code does not adequately address the determination of the effective throat for flare bevel welds, there is no assurance that the evaluations of these welds were prop-erly performed.
1.2 Effective Throat of Flare Bevel Welds The issue was that since the ASME Code does not adequately address the determination of the effective throat for flare bevel welds, there is no assurance that the evaluations of these welds were prop-erly performed.
1.3 Welding Practices
1.3 Welding Practices
  /
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  ,\
/b The issue was that since the ASME Code does not adequately address various welding practice related items such as preheat requirements, cap welding, ceave welding, downhill welding, drag and work angles (which limit the space allowed for welders to function), and lap joint requirements, that these welding processes may not have been l
b                                             The issue was that since the ASME Code does not adequately address various welding practice related items such as preheat requirements, cap welding, ceave welding, downhill welding, drag and work angles (which limit the space allowed for welders to function), and lap joint requirements, that these welding processes may not have been                 l properly addressed in the existing welding procedures.
properly addressed in the existing welding procedures.
1.4 Punching Shear (Local Stress)
1.4 Punching Shear (Local Stress)
The issue was that punching shear has not been considered in the de-signs at CPSES since the ASME Code does not adequately address this subject. Local stresses, which can be significant, develop in the immediate vicinity of the joint between two members.       Based on the relative sizes of items joined, one member tends to punch through the wall of the other.                                                                 !
The issue was that punching shear has not been considered in the de-signs at CPSES since the ASME Code does not adequately address this subject.
2.0     Issue Resolution 2.1 Skewed T-Joint Welds Pipe support welds at CPSES were installed in accordance with Weld Procedure BR-WPS-11032. Weld configurations contained in this proce-dure were qualified by testing in accordance with ASME Section III, A8-1
Local stresses, which can be significant, develop in the immediate vicinity of the joint between two members.
Based on the relative sizes of items joined, one member tends to punch through the wall of the other.
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Skewed T-Joint Welds Pipe support welds at CPSES were installed in accordance with Weld Procedure BR-WPS-11032. Weld configurations contained in this proce-dure were qualified by testing in accordance with ASME Section III, A8-1


Subsection NF                         requirements;                                                     therefore,   the   limitations of prequalified welds did not apply.
Subsection NF requirements; therefore, the limitations of prequalified welds did not apply.
Cuidelines for the design . validation of the effective throat of skewed T-j oint welds were incorporated in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-2.
Cuidelines for the design. validation of the effective throat of skewed T-j oint welds were incorporated in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-2.
These requirements were consistent with AWS D1.1.
These requirements were consistent with AWS D1.1.
[                                       2.2 ~ Effective Throat of Flare Bevel Welds Resolution of the issue regarding the determination of the effective throat for flare bevel welds is addressed in Subappendix A10.
[
2.3 Welding Practices l                                              Resolution of the issues regarding inadequate weld procedure-related i                                             items is addressed in Subappendix A27.                                                                                                         l 2.4 Punching Shear-(Local Stress)
2.2 ~ Effective Throat of Flare Bevel Welds Resolution of the issue regarding the determination of the effective throat for flare bevel welds is addressed in Subappendix A10.
Resolution of the issue regarding the evaluation of local stresses in the- walls of structural pipe support members is addressed in Subappendix A21, 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
2.3 Welding Practices Resolution of the issues regarding inadequate weld procedure-related l
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution                                                                         l' of this issue.
i items is addressed in Subappendix A27.
* Pipe support modifications resulting from the resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions     of' 10CFR50,55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
l 2.4 Punching Shear-(Local Stress)
                                                                                                                                                                                            .l
Resolution of the issue regarding the evaluation of local stresses in the-walls of structural pipe support members is addressed in Subappendix A21, 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution l
* The corrective . action to resolve the issue of AWS versus ASME Code
of this issue.
                                              . provisions was accomplished through the implementation of the crite-ria provided in Section 4.4 and Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7 during the design validation.
Pipe support modifications resulting from the resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of' 10CFR50,55(e)
l
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
.l The corrective. action to resolve the issue of AWS versus ASME Code
4.0 References                                                                                                                                           ;
. provisions was accomplished through the implementation of the crite-ria provided in Section 4.4 and Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7 during the design validation.
i 4.1   CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L1w (Walsh/Doyle allegations), Section V, August 22, 1983.
l The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no Genuine Issue Regarding Certain Case Allegations Regard-ing AWS and ASME Code Provisions                                                                                 Related   to Design Issues, August 4, 1984.                                                                                                                               j 4.3 NRC Staff Response to Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition on                                                                             j f                                             AWS and ASME Code Provisions on Weld Design, November 2, 1984.
4.0 References i
4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L1w (Walsh/Doyle allegations), Section V, August 22, 1983.
4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no Genuine Issue Regarding Certain Case Allegations Regard-ing AWS and ASME Code Provisions Related to Design Issues, August 4, 1984.
j 4.3 NRC Staff Response to Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition on j
f AWS and ASME Code Provisions on Weld Design, November 2, 1984.
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A8-2


4.4 Affidavit of David Terao on AWS and ASME Code Provisions on Weld De-sign, November 2, 1984, 1
4.4 Affidavit of David Terao on AWS and ASME Code Provisions on Weld De-sign, November 2, 1984, 1
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SUBAPPENDIX A9 O) t A500, GRADE B TUBE STEEL 1.0 Definition of the Issue The original design of CPSES pipe supports used a design yield strength Sy of 42 ksi for A500, Grade B, tube steel (cold formed) in accordance with ASME Code Case N-71-9.       Later versions of ASME Code Cases N-71-10 through N71-14 revised the yield strength from 42 ksi to 36 ksi. Therefore, the issue (References 4.1 through 4.4) was that all designs for tube steel supports at CPSES should be revised to incorporate the lower design yield strength.
SUBAPPENDIX A9 O) t A500, GRADE B TUBE STEEL 1.0 Definition of the Issue The original design of CPSES pipe supports used a design yield strength Sy of 42 ksi for A500, Grade B, tube steel (cold formed) in accordance with ASME Code Case N-71-9.
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1   Basis of ASME Code Case Revision The basis of the ASME Section III NF Code Committee revision of ASME Code Case N-71-9 (42 ksi) to N-71-10 (36 ksi) is the concern that the yield strength in the heat-affected zone at weldments could be slightly reduced. Since test data were not available at the time to quantify the reduction, the ASME Section III Code allowable for A500 Grade B (cold-formed tube steel) was reduced to that of A501 (hot-formed). The Code Committee's action was considered a conservative measure.
Later versions of ASME Code Cases N-71-10 through N71-14 revised the yield strength from 42 ksi to 36 ksi.
(\~-)             The Code Committee has evaluated test data on this issue.     The test data demonstrate that the yield strength in the heat-affected zone of A500 Grade B tube steel is not reduced below 46 ksi.
Therefore, the issue (References 4.1 through 4.4) was that all designs for tube steel supports at CPSES should be revised to incorporate the lower design yield strength.
ASME Code Case N-71-15, which specifies Sy = 46 ksi for A500 Grade B7   j tube steel in rectangular shapes, was issued in December 1986.         j l
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Basis of ASME Code Case Revision The basis of the ASME Section III NF Code Committee revision of ASME Code Case N-71-9 (42 ksi) to N-71-10 (36 ksi) is the concern that the yield strength in the heat-affected zone at weldments could be slightly reduced.
2.2   SWEC-PSAS Validation                                                   l The design of pipe supports using A500, Grade B tube steel at CPSES     I were validated using a yield strength of 36 ksi in accordance with     !
Since test data were not available at the time to quantify the reduction, the ASME Section III Code allowable for A500 Grade B (cold-formed tube steel) was reduced to that of A501 (hot-formed).
CPPP-7, Section 4.7.2.1.                                               l
The Code Committee's action was considered a conservative measure.
(\\~-)
The Code Committee has evaluated test data on this issue.
The test data demonstrate that the yield strength in the heat-affected zone of A500 Grade B tube steel is not reduced below 46 ksi.
ASME Code Case N-71-15, which specifies Sy = 46 ksi for A500 Grade B7 j
tube steel in rectangular shapes, was issued in December 1986.
j l
2.2 SWEC-PSAS Validation l
The design of pipe supports using A500, Grade B tube steel at CPSES I
were validated using a yield strength of 36 ksi in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.7.2.1.
l
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Pipe supports where the calculated stress exceeded 36 ksi but did not   I exceed 42 ksi were not modified. The yield stress of 42 ksi is based on ASMG Section III Code Case N-71-9 which is consistent with CPSES licensing commitments and is acceptable and conservative in light of ASME Section III Code Case N-71-15 which specifies the allowable yield strength of A500 Grade B tube steel as 46 ksi.
Pipe supports where the calculated stress exceeded 36 ksi but did not I
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action                                               l
exceed 42 ksi were not modified. The yield stress of 42 ksi is based on ASMG Section III Code Case N-71-9 which is consistent with CPSES licensing commitments and is acceptable and conservative in light of ASME Section III Code Case N-71-15 which specifies the allowable yield strength of A500 Grade B tube steel as 46 ksi.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action l
(~~\
No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
A9-1                                             1 1
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l L____________________.   - _                                                                        l
A9-1 1
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in
1 l
L____________________.
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  \                     /           Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in
* The corrective action to resolve the A500, Grade B tube steel issue was accomplished through the implementation of criteria provided in CPPP-7, Section 4.7.2.1, during the design validation.
\\
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
/
4.0 References 4.1 Affidavit   of W. P. Chen on Revised A500 Steel Yield Values, May 29, 1984 4.2 Testimony of     N. H. Williams in Response     to CASE Questions of February 22, 1984, to CYGNA Energy Services 4.3 Meeting Between CASE and TU Electric with SWEC in Attendance, Large Bore Pipe Supports, March 12, 13, and 14, 1987 4.4 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987
Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
  /%.
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
The corrective action to resolve the A500, Grade B tube steel issue was accomplished through the implementation of criteria provided in CPPP-7, Section 4.7.2.1, during the design validation.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1 Affidavit of W. P. Chen on Revised A500 Steel Yield Values, May 29, 1984 4.2 Testimony of N. H. Williams in Response to CASE Questions of February 22, 1984, to CYGNA Energy Services 4.3 Meeting Between CASE and TU Electric with SWEC in Attendance, Large Bore Pipe Supports, March 12, 13, and 14, 1987 4.4 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987
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                  '^                                       SUBAPPENDIX A10 TUBE STEEL SECTION PROPERTIES 1.0 Definition of the Issue 1.1 Section Properties The section properties for A500 Grade B cold-formed tube steel used in the pipe support design at CPSES had been obtained from three au-thoritative source documents. Each source documen' listed small dif-ferences in section properties based on different nominal corner tangent radii (RT) as follows:
SUBAPPENDIX A10
: a. AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 7th Edition, RT E 3t.
'^
(t = thickness of tube steel wall)
TUBE STEEL SECTION PROPERTIES 1.0 Definition of the Issue 1.1 Section Properties The section properties for A500 Grade B cold-formed tube steel used in the pipe support design at CPSES had been obtained from three au-thoritative source documents.
: b. 1974 Welded Structural Tube Institute (WSTI) Manual of Cold-Formed Welded Structural Steel Tubing, RT e it.
Each source documen' listed small dif-ferences in section properties based on different nominal corner tangent radii (RT) as follows:
: c. AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 8th Edition, RT 2 2t.
a.
AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 7th Edition, RT E 3t.
(t = thickness of tube steel wall) b.
1974 Welded Structural Tube Institute (WSTI) Manual of Cold-Formed Welded Structural Steel Tubing, RT e it.
c.
AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 8th Edition, RT 2 2t.
These small differences in nominal section properties led to the con-tention that tube steel milled prior to 1980 had different corner radii and that tube steel had been procured for use at CPSES both
These small differences in nominal section properties led to the con-tention that tube steel milled prior to 1980 had different corner radii and that tube steel had been procured for use at CPSES both
['
prior to and after 1980.
Therefore, the issue was that the vintage
[V-}-
[V-}-
['                prior to and after 1980. Therefore, the issue was that the vintage of the tube steel must be established and the proper section proper-ties used (References 4.1 and 4.2).
of the tube steel must be established and the proper section proper-ties used (References 4.1 and 4.2).
1.2 Effective Throat of Flare Bevel Welds The 8th Edition of AISC states that the effective throat of flare bevel groove welds is t = 5/16 R unless it can be established that a                                       >
1.2 Effective Throat of Flare Bevel Welds The 8th Edition of AISC states that the effective throat of flare bevel groove welds is t = 5/16 R unless it can be established that a larger effective throat
larger effective throat
* can be obtained.
* can be obtained. The design of flare bevel                                       l welds at CPSES used two different effective throats of te = 0.645t and t = t.
The design of flare bevel l
welds at CPSES used two different effective throats of t = 0.645t e
and t = t.
Because of the differences in assumed corner radii of tube steel, the effective throat evaluation of flare bevel welds was questioned.
Because of the differences in assumed corner radii of tube steel, the effective throat evaluation of flare bevel welds was questioned.
1.3 Bolt Hole Effects The issue was that the effect of bolt holes on section properties had not been considered in the design.
1.3 Bolt Hole Effects The issue was that the effect of bolt holes on section properties had not been considered in the design.
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l Issue Resolution 1
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2.0 Issue Resolution 1 d
  -                        2.1 .Section Properties                                                                           i SWEC reviewed the material manufacturer's dimensional standards for A500, Grade B tube steel supplied to CPSES.
.f j
The- review was performed for ASTM A500 (standard specification for                         l cold-formed welded and seamless structural tubing in rounds and                         ~j shapes), which included a 12-year span starting from issue date 1974                       l l-through 1986. Since the standard mill tolerances did not. change dur-
2.1.Section Properties i
!.                                ing this period of time, it was concluded that the fabrication toler-ances and section properties of tube steel members in CPSES have been                       ;
SWEC reviewed the material manufacturer's dimensional standards for A500, Grade B tube steel supplied to CPSES.
maintained to a consistent standard.
The-review was performed for ASTM A500 (standard specification for l
,                                SWEC-PSAS also confirmed that Welded Steel Tube Institute (WSTI)                         .
cold-formed welded and seamless structural tubing in rounds and
amended its 1974 issue to agree with the 8th Edition of the AISC.
~j shapes), which included a 12-year span starting from issue date 1974 l
This amendment is the latest revision to date. These section proper-                     {
l-through 1986.
ties are based on a nominal corner tangent radius of 2t and are con-                       l sidered representative of cold-formed tube. steel.                                       (
Since the standard mill tolerances did not. change dur-ing this period of time, it was concluded that the fabrication toler-ances and section properties of tube steel members in CPSES have been maintained to a consistent standard.
SWEC-PSAS also confirmed that Welded Steel Tube Institute (WSTI) amended its 1974 issue to agree with the 8th Edition of the AISC.
This amendment is the latest revision to date.
These section proper-
{
ties are based on a nominal corner tangent radius of 2t and are con-l sidered representative of cold-formed tube. steel.
(
l SWEC-PSAS resolutions are summarized as follows:
l SWEC-PSAS resolutions are summarized as follows:
J
J The use of section properties in AISC Manual of Steel Construc-j i
* The use of section properties in AISC Manual of Steel Construc-                     j tion, 8th Edition is appropriate, since it represents the actual                     i cold-formed tube steel used at CPSES.
tion, 8th Edition is appropriate, since it represents the actual cold-formed tube steel used at CPSES.
O                                 The 8th Edition of AISC is used by SWEC-PSAS in the selection of D
O The 8th Edition of AISC is used by SWEC-PSAS in the selection of D
* section properties for structural tube steel.
section properties for structural tube steel.
* SWEC-PSAS surveyed tube steel corner dimensions on installed                       '
SWEC-PSAS surveyed tube steel corner dimensions on installed supports at CPSES (Reference 4.3) and confirmed that the in-stalled supports have a nominal 2t corner radius.
supports at CPSES (Reference 4.3) and confirmed that the in-stalled supports have a nominal 2t corner radius.
Section 4.3.2.1 of CPPP-7 specifies that structural tube steel section properties are selected from the 8th Edition of the AISC
* Section 4.3.2.1 of CPPP-7 specifies that structural tube steel section properties are selected from the 8th Edition of the AISC                 .f steel manual.
.f steel manual.
2.2 Effective Throat of Flare Bevel Welds SWEC-PSAS performed a survey of tube steel dimensions on installed                         ,
2.2 Effective Throat of Flare Bevel Welds SWEC-PSAS performed a survey of tube steel dimensions on installed ASME Section III, Subsection NF pipe supports at CPSES and weld tests l
ASME Section III, Subsection NF pipe supports at CPSES and weld tests                     l of worst-case configurations to determine the appropriate effective                       l throat to be used for flare bevel welds (Reference 4.3). Based on                         i the results of this survey, it was concluded that an effective throat                     i of t = t - 1/16 in. is justified for all tube sizes except TS 2 x 2.
of worst-case configurations to determine the appropriate effective l
For "TS 2x2 sections, an effective throat             = t- 1/8 in. is t,
throat to be used for flare bevel welds (Reference 4.3).
appropriate.                                                                             j l
Based on i
the results of this survey, it was concluded that an effective throat i
of t = t - 1/16 in. is justified for all tube sizes except TS 2 x 2.
=
t-1/8 in. is For "TS 2x2 sections, an effective throat t,
appropriate.
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Existing welds on TS 2x2 sections are qualified to the t               =
Existing welds on TS 2x2 sections are qualified to the t
e t- 1/8 in. criteria, unless it is verified that the weld has a (o'v)          larger effective throat by performing a field inspection of the weld in accordance with the methods described in SWEC-PSAS Project Memo-randum No. 140 (PM-140).
=
Specification No. 2323-MS-100 was revised on March 2, 1987 to assure that an effective throat of t     =t-   1/16 in. is achieved for welds on TS 2 x 2 tube steel for any* subsequent work.
(o'v) e t-1/8 in.
criteria, unless it is verified that the weld has a larger effective throat by performing a field inspection of the weld in accordance with the methods described in SWEC-PSAS Project Memo-randum No. 140 (PM-140).
Specification No. 2323-MS-100 was revised on March 2, 1987 to assure that an effective throat of t
=t-1/16 in. is achieved for welds on TS 2 x 2 tube steel for any* subsequent work.
Section 4.4 and Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7, as amended by SWEC-PSAS PM-140, specify the effective throats of flare bevel welds.
Section 4.4 and Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7, as amended by SWEC-PSAS PM-140, specify the effective throats of flare bevel welds.
2.3 Bolt Hole Effects The section properties for tube steel are reduced for the effects of bolt holes as required by CPPP-7, Section 4.3.2.1 which is in accor-dance with the requirements of ASME Section III, Appendix XVII requirements.
2.3 Bolt Hole Effects The section properties for tube steel are reduced for the effects of bolt holes as required by CPPP-7, Section 4.3.2.1 which is in accor-dance with the requirements of ASME Section III, Appendix XVII requirements.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in
/7 Subappendix Al through A35 were determined tc be reportable under
  /7             Subappendix Al through A35 were determined tc be reportable under
()
()             provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
* The corrective action for tube steel section properties and bolt hole effects was provided in Section 4.3.2.1 of CPPP-7.       The corrective action for the effective throats of flare bevel welds was accom-plished through the implementation of the criteria provided in Attach-ment 4-2 of CPPP-7 and SWEC-PSAS PM-140 during the design validation.
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
The corrective action for tube steel section properties and bolt hole effects was provided in Section 4.3.2.1 of CPPP-7.
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section XVIII, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicants' Statements of Material Facts as to Which There Is No Genuine Issue Regarding CASE's Allegations Regarding Sec-tion Property Values, August 12, 1984 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Report No. 15454-N(C)-004, Survey of Structural Tube Steel Dimensions to Verify the Effective Throat of Flare Bevel Welds, March 1987 A
The corrective action for the effective throats of flare bevel welds was accom-plished through the implementation of the criteria provided in Attach-ment 4-2 of CPPP-7 and SWEC-PSAS PM-140 during the design validation.
'  (   1
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
  'w_/                                         A10-3 I
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section XVIII, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicants' Statements of Material Facts as to Which There Is No Genuine Issue Regarding CASE's Allegations Regarding Sec-tion Property Values, August 12, 1984 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Report No. 15454-N(C)-004, Survey of Structural Tube Steel Dimensions to Verify the Effective Throat of Flare Bevel Welds, March 1987 A
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A10-3 I


fru.g SUBAPPENDIX All C       1
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  '''"#                                          U-BOLT CINCHING 1.0 Definition of the Issue The following issues (References 4.1 through 4.6) were raised regarding the use of cinched U-bolt supports with single struts or snubbers.
SUBAPPENDIX All f g C
1.1 Evaluation of the Cinched '-Bolt U   Assembly The stresses in the run pipe, the U-bolt, and the support cross-piece               ,
1 U-BOLT CINCHING 1.0 Definition of the Issue The following issues (References 4.1 through 4.6) were raised regarding the use of cinched U-bolt supports with single struts or snubbers.
due to the combined effect of preload (i.e., cinching), pipe thermal and pressure expansion, and external loadings were not considered in the design of the cinched U-bolt supports.
1.1 Evaluation of the Cinched '-Bolt Assembly U
1.2   Use of SA-36 and A307 Material for Cinched U-Bolts.
The stresses in the run pipe, the U-bolt, and the support cross-piece due to the combined effect of preload (i.e., cinching), pipe thermal and pressure expansion, and external loadings were not considered in the design of the cinched U-bolt supports.
1.2.1   Preload Maintenance SA-36 material is similar to A307 material, which is prohibited in the AISC Code, 7th Edition, Table 1.5.2.1, as bolting materi-al in friction connections. Maintenance of joint preload is the underlying issue.
1.2 Use of SA-36 and A307 Material for Cinched U-Bolts.
  /"'N                 1.2.2   Fatigue t,
1.2.1 Preload Maintenance SA-36 material is similar to A307 material, which is prohibited in the AISC Code, 7th Edition, Table 1.5.2.1, as bolting materi-al in friction connections. Maintenance of joint preload is the underlying issue.
ASME Section III, Appendix XVII, Table XVII-3230-1, Footnote 4, and AISC 7th Edition, Appendix B, Table B2, Footnote 4, recom-mend that A307 bolts not be used in connections subject to stress reversal. Fatigue of the A307 material is the issue.
/"'N 1.2.2 Fatigue t,
ASME Section III, Appendix XVII, Table XVII-3230-1, Footnote 4, and AISC 7th Edition, Appendix B, Table B2, Footnote 4, recom-mend that A307 bolts not be used in connections subject to stress reversal.
Fatigue of the A307 material is the issue.
Both these issues regarding the use of A307 material were ex-tended to the SA-36 U-bolt used in cinched U-bolt supports.
Both these issues regarding the use of A307 material were ex-tended to the SA-36 U-bolt used in cinched U-bolt supports.
1.3 Preload-Torque Relationship The established preload-torque relationship was questioned, especial-ly in light of the potential for galling under U-bolt nuts while tightening.
1.3 Preload-Torque Relationship The established preload-torque relationship was questioned, especial-ly in light of the potential for galling under U-bolt nuts while tightening.
1.4 Stability of Cinched U-Bolt Supports                                                 {
1.4 Stability of Cinched U-Bolt Supports
The stability of the cinched U-bolt pipt support assembly is depen-dent on attaining and maintalaing the required preload. In light of l
{
the uncertainty in the praload-torque relationship, as discussed in Section 1.3,   and the issue regarding the fatigue life and preload maintenance ability of A307 material, as discussed in Section 1.2, l
The stability of the cinched U-bolt pipt support assembly is depen-dent on attaining and maintalaing the required preload.
the stability of cinched U-bolt supports with struts and snubbers was questioned.
In light of l
l         '
the uncertainty in the praload-torque relationship, as discussed in Section 1.3, and the issue regarding the fatigue life and preload maintenance ability of A307 material, as discussed in Section 1.2, the stability of cinched U-bolt supports with struts and snubbers was l
l N-                                       A11-1 1
questioned.
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2.0 Issue Resolution t7,1                                                                                               i l
2.0 Issue Resolution l
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        'd       Due to the extensive engineering effort required to validate cinched U-bolt type supports with struts or snubbers, and the uncertainty in the ability to attain and inaintain required preload levels, all cinched U-bolt supports with struts or snubbers are deleted or modified to other stable support designs consistent with the required support functions.                           l l
i 1
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
'd Due to the extensive engineering effort required to validate cinched U-bolt type supports with struts or snubbers, and the uncertainty in the ability to attain and inaintain required preload levels, all cinched U-bolt supports with struts or snubbers are deleted or modified to other stable support designs consistent with the required support functions.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
l l
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in                   )
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under                 i provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)       (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).             j
)
* The corrective action to resolve the issues of 1)     the proper evalua-             I tion of the pipe and cinched U-bolt assembly, 2) the use of SA-36 material in cinehed U-bolts,       3) the preload-torque relationship, and 4) stability, is being accomplished through the elimination or                   l modification of cinched U-bolt supports with struts or snubbers in                 j accordance with the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Section 4.2.5.1 used during the design validation.
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under i
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
j The corrective action to resolve the issues of 1) the proper evalua-I tion of the pipe and cinched U-bolt assembly, 2) the use of SA-36 material in cinehed U-bolts, 3) the preload-torque relationship, and 4) stability, is being accomplished through the elimination or l
modification of cinched U-bolt supports with struts or snubbers in j
accordance with the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Section 4.2.5.1 used during the design validation.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
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()   4.0 References 4.1   CASE's Proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Walsh/Doyle Allegations) Section IV, August 22, 1983 4.2   ASLB Memorandum and Order at 27, 28, 33-41, December 28, 1983, and reconsidered     in   Memorandum   and   Order   at   25-6A,     20-4C, February 8, 1984 4.3 Westinghouse     Report   No. WCAP-10620,   U-bolt   Support / Pipe   Test, July 1984 4.4 Westinghouse Report No. WCAP-10627, U-bolt Support Assembly Finite Element Analysis, July 26, 1984 4.5 CASE Answer to Applicant's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue Regarding to Consideration of Cinched U-bolts, Affidavit of CASE Witness J. Doyle, October 8,     1984 4.6 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List (RIL), Revision 4, Transmittal                 !
()
Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987                                       {
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Walsh/Doyle Allegations) Section IV, August 22, 1983 4.2 ASLB Memorandum and Order at 27, 28, 33-41, December 28, 1983, and reconsidered in Memorandum and Order at 25-6A, 20-4C, February 8, 1984 4.3 Westinghouse Report No. WCAP-10620, U-bolt Support / Pipe
: Test, July 1984 4.4 Westinghouse Report No. WCAP-10627, U-bolt Support Assembly Finite Element Analysis, July 26, 1984 4.5 CASE Answer to Applicant's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue Regarding to Consideration of Cinched U-bolts, Affidavit of CASE Witness J. Doyle, October 8, 1984 4.6 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List (RIL), Revision 4, Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987
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l SUBAPPENDIX A12
  , ~s                                                                 SUBAPPENDIX A12 l                     I
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  \- '                                                         AXIAL / ROTATIONAL RESTRAINTS 1.0 Definition of the Issue Three groups of axial and/or trapeze-type supports listed below use welded lug or trunnion attachments to transfer loads to frames or component hardware.                                                                       ;
I
: a. Single or dual trunnions with component supports
\\- '
: b. Non-trunnion component supports
AXIAL / ROTATIONAL RESTRAINTS 1.0 Definition of the Issue Three groups of axial and/or trapeze-type supports listed below use welded lug or trunnion attachments to transfer loads to frames or component hardware.
* Trapeze supports with U-bolts
a.
* Riser clamps with dual components
Single or dual trunnions with component supports b.
* Riser clamps with single components
Non-trunnion component supports Trapeze supports with U-bolts Riser clamps with dual components Riser clamps with single components c.
: c. Frame supports with lugs                                           ,
Frame supports with lugs i
i The issues (References 4.1 and 4.2) regarding these specific types of sup-ports are summarized as follows:
The issues (References 4.1 and 4.2) regarding these specific types of sup-ports are summarized as follows:
1.1 Rotational Load The issue was that rotational restraint effects must be treated as a g'')g
1.1 Rotational Load The issue was that rotational restraint effects must be treated as a g'')g
(,                                         primary load for the support design.
(,
1.2 Eccentric Loading The issue was that eccentric loading, which can result from effects such as differential snubber lockup and support steel stiffness vari-     ,
primary load for the support design.
ations, must be considered in the design process.
1.2 Eccentric Loading The issue was that eccentric loading, which can result from effects such as differential snubber lockup and support steel stiffness vari-ations, must be considered in the design process.
1.3 Snubber Lockup                                                             l The issue was that snubber end clearance effects may cause signifi-cant increase in loads or invalidate linear analysis results.
1.3 Snubber Lockup l
1.4   Lug / Frame Design Load The issue was that multiple lug configurations must consider a con-servative loading distribution for lug and frame design.
The issue was that snubber end clearance effects may cause signifi-cant increase in loads or invalidate linear analysis results.
1.5   Clearances The issue was that insufficient clearances or eccentricities may ex-art rotational restraint on the pipe.
1.4 Lug / Frame Design Load The issue was that multiple lug configurations must consider a con-servative loading distribution for lug and frame design.
1.5 Clearances The issue was that insufficient clearances or eccentricities may ex-art rotational restraint on the pipe.
.A A12-1
.A A12-1


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      '2.0 Issue Resolution r
'2.0 Issue Resolution r
2 .1' Rotational Load                                                                                                 j i
2.1' Rotational Load j
The eccentric line of action of single component riser clamps and single axial' trunnion, and the rotational resistance to the pipe of dual . trunnion-type supports , were modeled in the pipe stress analy-sis. The pipe supports were design validated considering the result-ing load as.a primary load.
i The eccentric line of action of single component riser clamps and single axial' trunnion, and the rotational resistance to the pipe of dual. trunnion-type supports, were modeled in the pipe stress analy-sis.
2.2 Eccentric Loading                                                                                                 i The effect of differential snubber lockup in the dual trunnion sup-port was addressed by increasing the design load on each trunnion snubber and its supporting structure by 20 percent. The variation in                                           !
The pipe supports were design validated considering the result-ing load as.a primary load.
support steel stiffnesses for dual component riser clamps was ad-                                               !
2.2 Eccentric Loading i
dressed by limit'ing the acceptable variation in stiffness between the supporting structures for each component and increasing the component design load from 50 percent to 75 percent of the total support design load.
The effect of differential snubber lockup in the dual trunnion sup-port was addressed by increasing the design load on each trunnion snubber and its supporting structure by 20 percent. The variation in support steel stiffnesses for dual component riser clamps was ad-dressed by limit'ing the acceptable variation in stiffness between the supporting structures for each component and increasing the component design load from 50 percent to 75 percent of the total support design load.
Four lugs are typically used for nonintegral axial clamp supports.                                               I Each lug was validated to 50 percent of the total load for dual com-ponent supports modeled as a single component.
Four lugs are typically used for nonintegral axial clamp supports.
Dual component riser clamps with variations in support stiffnesses exceeding the acceptable value were modeled in the stress analysis as                                           l' 1 E               eccentric (one-sided) transnational restraints, and the support is being modified by the removal of the component on the sof ter side.
I Each lug was validated to 50 percent of the total load for dual com-ponent supports modeled as a single component.
                  'For such eccentrically modeled supports, the load for each lug is                                               l based on statics with the assumption that all of the moment is react-ed at the lugs, i.e., the clamp-to pipe connection does not resist the moment.
Dual component riser clamps with variations in support stiffnesses exceeding the acceptable value were modeled in the stress analysis as l
Trapeze supports with cinched U-bolts are being eliminated or modi-fied to provide a stable support configuration consistent with sup-                                             I port function as discussed in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-8.
1 E
2.3 Snubber Lockup To assure valid stress analysis results, snubber pairs used in dual component applications (dual trunnions and riser clamps) are matched as defined in Reference 4.3.                                                                                   I 1
eccentric (one-sided) transnational restraints, and the support is being modified by the removal of the component on the sof ter side.
2.4 Lug / Frame Design Load i
'For such eccentrically modeled supports, the load for each lug is l
Lugs for rigid frame-type axial restraints were each validated for 1-                 the total load if only two lugs are used, or 50 percent of the total load if four lugs are used.
based on statics with the assumption that all of the moment is react-ed at the lugs, i.e.,
the clamp-to pipe connection does not resist the moment.
Trapeze supports with cinched U-bolts are being eliminated or modi-fied to provide a stable support configuration consistent with sup-I port function as discussed in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-8.
2.3 Snubber Lockup To assure valid stress analysis results, snubber pairs used in dual component applications (dual trunnions and riser clamps) are matched as defined in Reference 4.3.
I 1
2.4 Lug / Frame Design Load Lugs for rigid frame-type axial restraints were each validated for i
1-the total load if only two lugs are used, or 50 percent of the total load if four lugs are used.
A12-2 i
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Analysis of load distribution at lug / frame interfaces was based on
Analysis of load distribution at lug / frame interfaces was based on
        /~^             CPPP-7, Attachment 4-8, which maximized the critical stress in the frame.
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2.5 Clearances                                                                                                 .
CPPP-7, Attachment 4-8, which maximized the critical stress in the frame.
The clearances between the pipe and   the frame and the lugs and riser clamps and frame are controlled in   accordance with CPPP-7, Attach-                                     !
2.5 Clearances The clearances between the pipe and the frame and the lugs and riser clamps and frame are controlled in accordance with CPPP-7, Attach-ment 4-11 to assure proper function of the pipe support.
ment 4-11 to assure proper function   of the pipe support. Pipe sup-port eccentricities are discussed in Section 2.2 above.                                                 <
Pipe sup-port eccentricities are discussed in Section 2.2 above.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution                                     ,
t Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
t of the issue.
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
The corrective action to resolve the issue of axial / rotational re-straints was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria in CPPP-7, Section 3.10.5.2 and Attachment 4-8 of CPPP-7.
* The corrective action to resolve the issue of axial / rotational re-straints was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria in CPPP-7, Section 3.10.5.2 and Attachment 4-8 of CPPP-7.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References fs
4.0 References fs
        \-~'1     4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section XII, August 22, 1983 4.2 Affidavit of Lase Witness Mark Walsh - CASE's Partial Answer to Ap-plicant's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There was No Genu-ine Issue Regarding Allegations Concerning Consideration of Force Distribution in Axial Restraints, August 27, 1984 4.3 Nuclear Standard, Mechanical and Hydraulic Snubbers for Nuclear Ap-plication, NE-E7-9T, September 1984, U.S. Department of Energy, Nu-clear Energy Program l       p-~3 l
\\-~'1 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section XII, August 22, 1983 4.2 Affidavit of Lase Witness Mark Walsh - CASE's Partial Answer to Ap-plicant's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There was No Genu-ine Issue Regarding Allegations Concerning Consideration of Force Distribution in Axial Restraints, August 27, 1984 4.3 Nuclear Standard, Mechanical and Hydraulic Snubbers for Nuclear Ap-plication, NE-E7-9T, September 1984, U.S. Department of Energy, Nu-clear Energy Program l
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SUBAPPENDIX A13 A
SUBAPPENDIX A13 A
BOLT H0LE GAP
BOLT H0LE GAP
        .1. 0 Definition of the Issue Bolt _ hole gap, as used herein, refers to the radial clearance between an anchor bolt and the bolt hole edge . in pipe support member / base plates.
.1. 0 Definition of the Issue Bolt _ hole gap, as used herein, refers to the radial clearance between an anchor bolt and the bolt hole edge. in pipe support member / base plates.
Issues regarding the effect of bolt ' hole gaps are as follows (Refer-ences 4.1 to 4.4):
Issues regarding the effect of bolt ' hole gaps are as follows (Refer-ences 4.1 to 4.4):
                            -1.1   Oversized Holes l                                 The issue was that. bolt holes in support base plates are oversized.
-1.1 Oversized Holes l
The issue was that. bolt holes in support base plates are oversized.
Bearing connections are not allowed if the. bolt hole is greater than the standard size hole specified by the AISC Code.
Bearing connections are not allowed if the. bolt hole is greater than the standard size hole specified by the AISC Code.
1.2 Shear Distribution                                                                 j 3
1.2 Shear Distribution j
The issue was that it is impossible to predict how many bolts are involved in the transfer of shear. . Inelastic action that distributes the shear load to all anchor bolts is appropriate for static loads only.
The issue was that it is impossible to predict how many bolts are 3
involved in the transfer of shear.. Inelastic action that distributes the shear load to all anchor bolts is appropriate for static loads only.
1.3 Effect on Support Stiffness The issue was that the presence of gaps in joints under dynamic con-ditions adversely affects the stiffness of the pipe support and its seismic response. -The usual procedure is to assume that two bolts react to the load regardless of the number of bolts in the pattern.
1.3 Effect on Support Stiffness The issue was that the presence of gaps in joints under dynamic con-ditions adversely affects the stiffness of the pipe support and its seismic response. -The usual procedure is to assume that two bolts react to the load regardless of the number of bolts in the pattern.
2.0                 Issue Resolution 2.1 Oversized Holes Hole sizes allowed by the ASME Section III Code, paragraph NF-4721, were compared to existing hole sizes at CPSES as shown below.
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Oversized Holes Hole sizes allowed by the ASME Section III Code, paragraph NF-4721, were compared to existing hole sizes at CPSES as shown below.
ASME Code Table NF-4721(a)-1 specifies the allowable bolt hole sizes for bearing-type connections as follows:
ASME Code Table NF-4721(a)-1 specifies the allowable bolt hole sizes for bearing-type connections as follows:
Bolt Size                           Hole Size Equal to or less than 1 in.         Bolt diameter +1/16 in.
Bolt Size Hole Size Equal to or less than 1 in.
Between 1 and 2 in.                   Bolt diameter +1/8 in.
Bolt diameter +1/16 in.
I The allowable bolt hole sizes of the installed CPSES base plates were           j as follows:
Between 1 and 2 in.
Bolt diameter +1/8 in.
I The allowable bolt hole sizes of the installed CPSES base plates were j
as follows:
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Bolt Size                         Hole Size i
Bolt Size Hole Size p
p i                         Equal to or less than 3/4 in.     Bolt diameter +1/16 in.
i Equal to or less than 3/4 in.
1 in, to 1 1/2 in.                 Bolt diameter +1/8 in.
Bolt diameter +1/16 in.
Therefore, it was concluded that only the bolt holes for 1-in, diame-ter bolts at CPSES have an allowable size larger than the code allow-able (by 1/16 in.). The 1985 Summer addenda of the ASME Section III Code, paragraph NF-4721(a) clarified that for anchor bolts, the hole size may be increased by 1/16 in. over the values specified in Table NF-4721(a)-1.
i 1 in, to 1 1/2 in.
ASME Section III, 1985 Summer Addenda NF-4721(a) was added to the CPSES Code of Record in CPPP-7, Section 2.2,       and Specification No. MS-46A (Reference 4.5).
Bolt diameter +1/8 in.
Therefore, it was concluded that only the bolt holes for 1-in, diame-ter bolts at CPSES have an allowable size larger than the code allow-able (by 1/16 in.).
The 1985 Summer addenda of the ASME Section III Code, paragraph NF-4721(a) clarified that for anchor bolts, the hole size may be increased by 1/16 in. over the values specified in Table NF-4721(a)-1.
ASME Section III, 1985 Summer Addenda NF-4721(a) was added to the CPSES Code of Record in CPPP-7, Section 2.2, and Specification No. MS-46A (Reference 4.5).
2.2 Shear Distribution Design af base plate connections at CPbES is based on standard steel design practices where equal shear load sharing among bolts is used.
2.2 Shear Distribution Design af base plate connections at CPbES is based on standard steel design practices where equal shear load sharing among bolts is used.
This practice is described in References 4.6 and 4.7, which compare the ultimate shear load sharing in plate connections to the equal distribution assumed at design levels.
This practice is described in References 4.6 and 4.7, which compare the ultimate shear load sharing in plate connections to the equal distribution assumed at design levels.
Support designs at CPSES were examined and it was concluded that the Richmond ir. sert to tube steel connection may not be covered by these fg                normal practices. Therefore, Richmond insert to tube steel connec-tion drugns are reviewed in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Project Memo-
Support designs at CPSES were examined and it was concluded that the Richmond ir. sert to tube steel connection may not be covered by these normal practices.
{'}                randum No. 141 (PM-141) to confirm that unequal shear load sharing is not an issue.
Therefore, Richmond insert to tube steel connec-fg{'}
tion drugns are reviewed in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Project Memo-randum No. 141 (PM-141) to confirm that unequal shear load sharing is not an issue.
2.3 Effect on Support Stiffness The effect of bolt hole gap on support stiffness is discussed in Appendix AS.
2.3 Effect on Support Stiffness The effect of bolt hole gap on support stiffness is discussed in Appendix AS.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
* The corrective action to resolve the bolt hole gap issue was accom-plished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachments 4-4 and 4-5, SWEC-PSAS PM-141, and Specification No MS-46A during the design validation.
The corrective action to resolve the bolt hole gap issue was accom-plished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachments 4-4 and 4-5, SWEC-PSAS PM-141, and Specification No MS-46A during the design validation.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
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'4.0 References O
                        '4.0   References l
l 4.1 : CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle l
l   O                                                .
-Allegations), Section XXI, August-22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Answer to the' Applicants' Statement of Material Facts in the l --
4.1 : CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle
Form of Affidavit of CASE Witness M. Walsh, August 12, 1984 4.3 CYGNA's response to CASE Question No. Doyle 16 4.4 CASE's'4th Round Answer to Applicants' Reply to CASE's Answer to Ap-plicants' Motion. for Sumnary Disposition Regarding the Effects of.
                                      -Allegations), Section XXI, August- 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Answer to the' Applicants' Statement of Material Facts in the l --
Gaps, December 19, 1984-4.5 Comacche Peak Nuclear Safety Class Pipe Hangers and Supports Specifi-cation No. 2323-MS-46A, Revision 7, July 6, 1987 4.6 B. Kuzmanovic and N. Williams, Steel Design for Structurel Engineer, 2nd Edition, 1983, Prentice Hall, Inc., page 321 4.7 C. Salmon and J. Johnson, Steel Structures Design and Behavior, 1971, Intext Educational Publishers I.
Form of Affidavit of CASE Witness M. Walsh, August 12, 1984 4.3 CYGNA's response to CASE Question No. Doyle 16 4.4 CASE's'4th Round Answer to Applicants' Reply to CASE's Answer to Ap-plicants' Motion . for Sumnary Disposition Regarding the Effects of.
Gaps, December 19, 1984-4.5   Comacche Peak Nuclear Safety Class Pipe Hangers and Supports Specifi-                   !
cation No. 2323-MS-46A, Revision 7, July 6, 1987 4.6   B. Kuzmanovic and N. Williams, Steel Design for Structurel Engineer, 2nd Edition, 1983, Prentice Hall, Inc., page 321 4.7   C. Salmon and J. Johnson, Steel Structures Design and Behavior, 1971, Intext Educational Publishers
                                                                                                                                -(
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SUBAPPENDIX A14 s.
l tN '/                                       OBE/SSE DAMPING                                   !
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1.0 Definition of the Issues                                                       )
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OBE/SSE DAMPING l
i 1.0 Definition of the Issues
)
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The issue (References 4.1 to 4.4) was that the improper damping values         I were used in the stress analysis at CPSES.                                   j 1.1 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 Damping The issue was that piping systems containing active components (e.g.,
The issue (References 4.1 to 4.4) was that the improper damping values I
were used in the stress analysis at CPSES.
j 1.1 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 Damping The issue was that piping systems containing active components (e.g.,
valves) used the damping for piping which was higher than the damping prescribed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Reference 4.5) for active valves.
valves) used the damping for piping which was higher than the damping prescribed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Reference 4.5) for active valves.
Damping   values higher than the allewables in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 were used in the pipe stress analysis at CPSES.
Damping values higher than the allewables in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 were used in the pipe stress analysis at CPSES.
1.2 Damping for Mixed Size Piping The issue was that in certain pipe stress analysis packages which are comprised of piping of different sizes, the damping values for the 12-in. or greater piping were used even though the pipe stress analy-sis package contained piping smaller than 12 in.
1.2 Damping for Mixed Size Piping The issue was that in certain pipe stress analysis packages which are comprised of piping of different sizes, the damping values for the 12-in. or greater piping were used even though the pipe stress analy-sis package contained piping smaller than 12 in.
A k ,)     2.0 Issue Resolution 1
Ak,)
2.1 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 Damping CPPP-7 Section 3.4.5.4.1 specified the use of NRC-recommended damping values for piping addressed in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61.       In fact, the NRC has recently approved the higher damping values for piping systems contained in ASME Code Case N-411 (Reference 4.6).       There- <
2.0 Issue Resolution 1
fore, the lower damping for active components in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 is not applicable to the CPSES piping system analysis.
2.1 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 Damping CPPP-7 Section 3.4.5.4.1 specified the use of NRC-recommended damping values for piping addressed in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61.
In fact, the NRC has recently approved the higher damping values for piping systems contained in ASME Code Case N-411 (Reference 4.6).
There-fore, the lower damping for active components in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 is not applicable to the CPSES piping system analysis.
I 2.2 Damping for Mixed Size Piping CPPP-7 specified that mixed-size piping systems (containing pipes above and below 12-in. NPS) are conservatively evaluated with the lower damping values of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61.
I 2.2 Damping for Mixed Size Piping CPPP-7 specified that mixed-size piping systems (containing pipes above and below 12-in. NPS) are conservatively evaluated with the lower damping values of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61.
l Use of the damping values specified in ASME Code Case N-411 that are applicable to all pipe sizes was approved for implementation at CPSES by the NRC Staff. CPPP-7 authorized the use of Code Case N-411 for all systems, including mixed-size CPSES piping systems, except where stress analysis is perfo rmed using the Independent Support Motion Method.                                                                     I i
l Use of the damping values specified in ASME Code Case N-411 that are applicable to all pipe sizes was approved for implementation at CPSES by the NRC Staff.
[ \
CPPP-7 authorized the use of Code Case N-411 for all systems, including mixed-size CPSES piping systems, except where stress analysis is perfo rmed using the Independent Support Motion Method.
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n  3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action n
    \
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O No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
All the pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of is-sues in Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
* All the pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of is-sues in Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under     provisions   of     10CFR50.55(e)   (see   Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
* The corrective action to resolve OBE/SSE damping issue was accom-plished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Section 3.4.5.4.1 during the design validation.
The corrective action to resolve OBE/SSE damping issue was accom-plished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Section 3.4.5.4.1 during the design validation.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section XXII, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition Regarding Alleged Errors Made in Determining Damping Factors for OBE and SSE Loading Conditions, August 6, 1984 4.3 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Reply to CASE's Answer to Applicant's Motion Regarding Alleged Errors Made in Determining Damping Factors
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section XXII, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition Regarding Alleged Errors Made in Determining Damping Factors for OBE and SSE Loading Conditions, August 6, 1984 4.3 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Reply to CASE's Answer to Applicant's Motion Regarding Alleged Errors Made in Determining Damping Factors
(/             for OBE and SSE Loading Conditions, October 2, 1984 4.4 CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4,       and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 4.5 USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1973 4.6 NRC Letter from V. S. Noonan to W. G. Counsil dated March 13, 1986, Evaluation of Request for Use of ASME Code Cases N-397 and N-411 l
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for OBE and SSE Loading Conditions, October 2, 1984 4.4 CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 4.5 USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1973 4.6 NRC Letter from V. S. Noonan to W. G. Counsil dated March 13, 1986, Evaluation of Request for Use of ASME Code Cases N-397 and N-411 l
O                                          A14-2
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: i7                                                                                                 i i-SUBAPPENDIX A15 C
: i7 i
    %                                                            SUPPORT MASS IN PIPIN0 ANALYSIS-1.0 Definition of the Issue i                                           The issue was that the mass contribution of the support to the piping sys-tem is     significant   and   it cannot be omitted from the- analysis
i-SUBAPPENDIX A15 C
                                            .(Reference 4.1).
SUPPORT MASS IN PIPIN0 ANALYSIS-1.0 Definition of the Issue i
The issue was that the mass contribution of the support to the piping sys-tem is significant and it cannot be omitted from the-analysis
.(Reference 4.1).
The support mass contribution to the piping model was not always consid--
The support mass contribution to the piping model was not always consid--
ered. in the CPSES pipe stress analysis, because it was considered small relative to the total mass of the piping system.                             ,
ered. in the CPSES pipe stress analysis, because it was considered small relative to the total mass of the piping system.
2.0 Issue Resolution The ' support mass, eccentric and noneccentric, was accounted for in pipe stress analyses in 'accordance with CPPP-7, Section 3.10.4. A detailed procedure for pipe support mass determination and inclusion in the piping system analysis was included in Attachment 3-4 of CPPP-7, with additional guidance on the . modeling of eccentric mass included in Attachment 3-11.
2.0 Issue Resolution The ' support mass, eccentric and noneccentric, was accounted for in pipe stress analyses in 'accordance with CPPP-7, Section 3.10.4.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
A detailed procedure for pipe support mass determination and inclusion in the piping system analysis was included in Attachment 3-4 of CPPP-7, with additional guidance on the. modeling of eccentric mass included in Attachment 3-11.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.-
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.-
* All the pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of is-sues'in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under-   provisions     of   10CFR50.55(e)       (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
All the pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of is-sues'in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under-provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
* The corrective action to resolve the support mass in piping analysis issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachments 3-4 and 3-11 during the design validation.
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
* The preventive action for this issue is specified in Appendix C.
The corrective action to resolve the support mass in piping analysis issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachments 3-4 and 3-11 during the design validation.
The preventive action for this issue is specified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1 CASE'S Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section XIV, August 22, 1983 i
4.0 References 4.1 CASE'S Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section XIV, August 22, 1983 i
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ii SUBAPPENDIX A16 n
ii SUBAPPENDIX A16 nj t
tj                                                                        PROGRAMMATIC ASPECTS AND QA INCLUDING ITERATIVE DESIGN 1.0 Definition of the Issue The following miscellaneous issues with programmatic aspects and QA were identified (References 4.1 and 4.2).
PROGRAMMATIC ASPECTS AND QA INCLUDING ITERATIVE DESIGN 1.0 Definition of the Issue The following miscellaneous issues with programmatic aspects and QA were identified (References 4.1 and 4.2).
1.1 Fragmented Responsibility and Interface Control The issue was that inadequate interface control and f ragmented re-                   ,
1.1 Fragmented Responsibility and Interface Control The issue was that inadequate interface control and f ragmented re-sponsibilities between analysis, design, and construction phases of piping'and support design phases resulted in. numerous inadequacies and inconsistencies.
sponsibilities between analysis, design, and construction phases of piping'and support design phases resulted in. numerous inadequacies and inconsistencies.
1.2 Iterative Design The issue was that the identification and correction of design errors was delayed until the end of the iterative design process.
1.2   Iterative Design The issue was that the identification and correction of design errors was delayed until the end of the iterative design process.                         -}
-}
1.3 Quality Assurance and Personnel The issue was that calculations did not follow project guidelines for f                                                         quality assurance. No standards were specified for the qualification               ''
1.3 Quality Assurance and Personnel The issue was that calculations did not follow project guidelines for f
    \                                                         of personnel at different levels.
quality assurance. No standards were specified for the qualification
1.4- Timeliness The issue was that problems which were generic in nature .were not resolved promptly, resulting in numerous ' deficiencies of a similar               ,
\\
nature.
of personnel at different levels.
1.4-Timeliness The issue was that problems which were generic in nature.were not resolved promptly, resulting in numerous ' deficiencies of a similar nature.
1.5 Construction and Field Changes The issue was that procedures for construction and :. installation were inadequate and were not kept up to date. Field changes were not ap-proved, and resulted in calculations justifying as-built conditions.
1.5 Construction and Field Changes The issue was that procedures for construction and :. installation were inadequate and were not kept up to date. Field changes were not ap-proved, and resulted in calculations justifying as-built conditions.
1.6 Procedures The issue was that frequent changes and lack of adequate control of procedures resulted in many violations of the procedures.
1.6 Procedures The issue was that frequent changes and lack of adequate control of procedures resulted in many violations of the procedures.
1.7 Calculation Errors l
1.7 Calculation Errors l
The issue was that in random checks of calculations, numerous errors were found.                                                                         ;
The issue was that in random checks of calculations, numerous errors were found.
L                                                                                                                                                     !
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_ - - . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - . . . . _ .                      _                                                                          4


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l I           r,                        1.8 Miscellaneous x/                               The issue was that various other issues were raised regarding the updating of criteria and the adequacy of various practices used in design / qualification activities.
l I
1.8 Miscellaneous r,
x/
The issue was that various other issues were raised regarding the updating of criteria and the adequacy of various practices used in design / qualification activities.
2.0 Issue Resolution SWEC-PS AS 's Management Plan for Project Quality, CPPP-1 (Reference 4.3),
2.0 Issue Resolution SWEC-PS AS 's Management Plan for Project Quality, CPPP-1 (Reference 4.3),
outlines SWEC-PSAS's approach to resolving the various programmatic issues through issuance of Project Procedures, which implement SWEC corporate procedures   (Engineering Assurance Procedures, and Quality Standards).
outlines SWEC-PSAS's approach to resolving the various programmatic issues through issuance of Project Procedures, which implement SWEC corporate procedures (Engineering Assurance Procedures, and Quality Standards).
CPPP-1 addrerses each of the 18 criteria of 10CFR50, Appendix B. The in-dividual issues listed in Section 1.0 are resolved as follows:
CPPP-1 addrerses each of the 18 criteria of 10CFR50, Appendix B.
2.1   Fragmented Responsibility and Interface Control The issue of fragmented responsibility between piping analysis and support design was resolved by the integrated design process in the SWEC-PSAS validation program.
The in-dividual issues listed in Section 1.0 are resolved as follows:
All ASME Section III Code Class 2 and 3 piping systems and all ASME Section III Code Class 1,     2, and 3 supports were validated by SWEC-PSAS in accordance with CPPP-7 which provides consistent crite-ria for both pipe stress analysis and pipe support design. Each pipe stress analysis package was reviewed in accordance with Section 7.3 of CPPP-6, as a system, by pipe stress and pipe support engineers to
2.1 Fragmented Responsibility and Interface Control The issue of fragmented responsibility between piping analysis and support design was resolved by the integrated design process in the SWEC-PSAS validation program.
(("')N, assure that the interactions between the pipe stress and the pipe support efforts are properly accounted for in the SWEC-PSAS portion of the Corrective Action Program (CAP).
All ASME Section III Code Class 2 and 3 piping systems and all ASME Section III Code Class 1, 2,
As part of the integrated design process, interfaces between analy-sis, design, and construction are controlled in accordance with CPPP-6. Personnel performing the validation effort are trained by project management in the use of the applicable project procedures.
and 3 supports were validated by SWEC-PSAS in accordance with CPPP-7 which provides consistent crite-ria for both pipe stress analysis and pipe support design. Each pipe stress analysis package was reviewed in accordance with Section 7.3
2.2   Iterative Design Design criteria changes were issued during the pipe stress and pipe support validation by means of controlled documents (project memoran-da) and revisions to CPPP-7. Prompt review was required for any de-                       l sign criteria changes containing the potential for support modifi-                         I cation.
("')N of CPPP-6, as a system, by pipe stress and pipe support engineers to
As-built verification of piping and pipe supports is being performed as part of the PCHVP.       All modifications are provided to TU Con-struction via procedurally controlled design change documentation                           ,
(
prepared by SWEC-PSAS.
assure that the interactions between the pipe stress and the pipe support efforts are properly accounted for in the SWEC-PSAS portion of the Corrective Action Program (CAP).
[
As part of the integrated design process, interfaces between analy-sis, design, and construction are controlled in accordance with CPPP-6.
(                                                            A16-2                                                         l l
Personnel performing the validation effort are trained by project management in the use of the applicable project procedures.
2.2 Iterative Design Design criteria changes were issued during the pipe stress and pipe support validation by means of controlled documents (project memoran-da) and revisions to CPPP-7.
Prompt review was required for any de-l sign criteria changes containing the potential for support modifi-I cation.
As-built verification of piping and pipe supports is being performed as part of the PCHVP.
All modifications are provided to TU Con-struction via procedurally controlled design change documentation prepared by SWEC-PSAS.
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2.3 Quality Assurance and Personnel
2.3 Quality Assurance and Personnel
                  /   1                                                                                     I V                 SWEC-PSAS's Management Plan for Project Quality (CPPP-1) identifies     )
/
the procedures to be followed during the generation and review of       !
1 I
project calculations. These procedures appropriately emphasize re-view of calculations for technical adequacy of the resulting designs (calculation conclusions). The emphasis on review for technical ade-quacy assures that any inconsistencies / documentation discrepancies will ' not affect the overall conclusion of the calculations.       All l identified occurrences of inconsistencies and documentation discre-     j pancies are promptly resolved.                                         1 Engineering personnel are assigned to tasks after an evaluation of     i their ability to perform that task. This evaluation is initiated by     l verification of the employee's academic and professional credentials   <
V SWEC-PSAS's Management Plan for Project Quality (CPPP-1) identifies
and employment history in conjunction with the normal employment in-terviews. Personnel are then assigned to work at an appropriate lev-el under a supervisor. The supervisor is responsible for evaluating and training the employee. This process assures that appropriately qualified personnel are assigned to all engineering tasks.
)
the procedures to be followed during the generation and review of project calculations.
These procedures appropriately emphasize re-view of calculations for technical adequacy of the resulting designs (calculation conclusions).
The emphasis on review for technical ade-quacy assures that any inconsistencies / documentation discrepancies l
will ' not affect the overall conclusion of the calculations.
All identified occurrences of inconsistencies and documentation discre-j pancies are promptly resolved.
1 Engineering personnel are assigned to tasks after an evaluation of i
their ability to perform that task. This evaluation is initiated by l
verification of the employee's academic and professional credentials and employment history in conjunction with the normal employment in-terviews. Personnel are then assigned to work at an appropriate lev-el under a supervisor.
The supervisor is responsible for evaluating and training the employee.
This process assures that appropriately qualified personnel are assigned to all engineering tasks.
Personnel involved in the validation effort were trained in the use of the applicable project procedures.
Personnel involved in the validation effort were trained in the use of the applicable project procedures.
2.4 Timeliness A                 Early in the validation process, all CPRT and external issues were Q                 identified and SWEC-PSAS resolutions to these issues were developed.
2.4 Timeliness A
During the design validation, any additional issues identified were addressed in a timely manner and appropriate corrective and preven-tive actions identified and implemented.                               ;
Early in the validation process, all CPRT and external issues were Q
2.5 Construction and Field Changes l
identified and SWEC-PSAS resolutions to these issues were developed.
Field changes were controlled by SWEC-PSAS project procedures which required that new designs, modifications, or reconciliations with as-built conditions be documented and approved by qualified respon-sible engineers. Walkdowns in accordance with SWEC-PSAS procedures, as well as inspection under the PCHVP, as. ured that the as-built con-dition of piping and pipe supports was properly reflected in the de-   .
During the design validation, any additional issues identified were addressed in a timely manner and appropriate corrective and preven-tive actions identified and implemented.
sign validation.
2.5 Construction and Field Changes l
2.6   Procedures Controlled copies of CPPP-6 and CPPP-7 (and revisions / changes there-to) were issued to the pipe stress and pipe support supervisory per-sonnel assigned to the SWEC-PSAS CPSES effort.
Field changes were controlled by SWEC-PSAS project procedures which required that new designs, modifications, or reconciliations with as-built conditions be documented and approved by qualified respon-sible engineers.
The issuance and modification of these procedures are controlled in     ,
Walkdowns in accordance with SWEC-PSAS procedures, as well as inspection under the PCHVP, as. ured that the as-built con-dition of piping and pipe supports was properly reflected in the de-sign validation.
accordance with CPPP-14 (Reference 4.4).                                 I m
2.6 Procedures Controlled copies of CPPP-6 and CPPP-7 (and revisions / changes there-to) were issued to the pipe stress and pipe support supervisory per-sonnel assigned to the SWEC-PSAS CPSES effort.
A16-3
The issuance and modification of these procedures are controlled in accordance with CPPP-14 (Reference 4.4).
                        - - - -                                                                              3
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  ,.m '              Revisions to these procedures were followed by detailed training of
Revisions to these procedures were followed by detailed training of
(     i             pipe stress and support personnel.
,.m
  'LJ 2.7 Calculation Errors As addressed under paragraph 2.3 above, the SWEC QA Program assures the technical adequacy of the engineering product.       SWEC-PSAS re-quires all employees to develop technically correct and precise cal-culations. Whenever documentation discrepanices are observed, they are promptly corrected.
(
i pipe stress and support personnel.
'LJ 2.7 Calculation Errors As addressed under paragraph 2.3 above, the SWEC QA Program assures the technical adequacy of the engineering product.
SWEC-PSAS re-quires all employees to develop technically correct and precise cal-culations.
Whenever documentation discrepanices are observed, they are promptly corrected.
2.8 Miscellaneous The various project procedures used in the validation effort along with the corporate engineering and quality assurance procedures were sufficient to address any issues related to the validation of pipe stress and pipe supports at CPSES. This conclusion was also reached by the third party reviewers (see Section 5.1.1).
2.8 Miscellaneous The various project procedures used in the validation effort along with the corporate engineering and quality assurance procedures were sufficient to address any issues related to the validation of pipe stress and pipe supports at CPSES. This conclusion was also reached by the third party reviewers (see Section 5.1.1).
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action                                                           I
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action I
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution               :
No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution l
of the issue.                                                                       l l
of the issue.
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
l Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under
  /]
/]
N/                                                                                                      {
provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
* The corrective action to control discipline interfaces and to provide               ]
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
consistent design criteria between pipe stress analysis and pipe sup-               l port design was accomplished through the issue and control of CPPP-1, CPPP-6, CPPP-7, and other project procedures during the design vali-dation. Many audits were conducted to assure that SWEC-PSAS person-               j nel followed the procedures (see Section 5.3).                                       !
N/
{
The corrective action to control discipline interfaces and to provide
]
consistent design criteria between pipe stress analysis and pipe sup-l port design was accomplished through the issue and control of CPPP-1, CPPP-6, CPPP-7, and other project procedures during the design vali-dation.
Many audits were conducted to assure that SWEC-PSAS person-j nel followed the procedures (see Section 5.3).
1 1
1 1
* The preventive action for this issue is specified in Appendix C.
The preventive action for this issue is specified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle                 I Allegations), August 22, 1983                                                       !
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle I
4.2 Comanche Peak Response Team, Design Adequacy Program, Discipline Spe-               l cific Results Report, Piping and Supports, DAP-RR-P-001, Revision 1, August 27, 1987                                                                     l l
Allegations), August 22, 1983 4.2 Comanche Peak Response Team, Design Adequacy Program, Discipline Spe-l cific Results Report, Piping and Supports, DAP-RR-P-001, Revision 1, August 27, 1987 l
4.3 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-1, Revision 7, Management Plan for Project   Quality     (Piping System Qualification /Requalification),
l 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-1, Revision 7, Management Plan for Project Quality (Piping System Qualification /Requalification),
l                     March 25, 1987 l                                                                                                         l l               4.4 SWEC-PSAS Project Pro"edure CPPP-14, Revision 3, Procedure for the                   l l                     Preparation and Control of Proj ect Procedures, September 19, 1986 l
l March 25, 1987 l
  'w/
l l
4.4 SWEC-PSAS Project Pro"edure CPPP-14, Revision 3, Procedure for the l
l Preparation and Control of Proj ect Procedures, September 19, 1986 l
'w/
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____________A
____________A


SUBAPPENDIX A17 p-x-                                MASS POINT SPACING 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (Reference 4.1) was that the project procedures which estab-lished requirements for minimum mass point spacing were not followed and that the computer program used improperly lumped concentrated masses.
SUBAPPENDIX A17 p-MASS POINT SPACING x-1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (Reference 4.1) was that the project procedures which estab-lished requirements for minimum mass point spacing were not followed and that the computer program used improperly lumped concentrated masses.
2.0 Issue Resolution Modeling guidelines for locating the mass points in the computerized pipe stress analysis were included in Section 3.10.6.1 and Attachment 3-7 of CPPP-7. To assure adherence to these requirements, mass point spacing was included as a review item in the pipe stress analysis checklist in CPPP-6, Attachment 9-9.
2.0 Issue Resolution Modeling guidelines for locating the mass points in the computerized pipe stress analysis were included in Section 3.10.6.1 and Attachment 3-7 of CPPP-7.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
To assure adherence to these requirements, mass point spacing was included as a review item in the pipe stress analysis checklist in CPPP-6, -9.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
* All the pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of is-sues  in Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable                           ,
All the pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of is-in Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable sues 1
provisions           10CFR50.55(e)   (see   Subappendix B2,                         1
/''N ander provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
            /''N              ander                  of
(see Subappendix B2,
( ,)             SDAR-CP-86-72).
(,)
* The corrective action to resolve the issue of mass point spacing was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7,   Section 3.10.6.1   and Attachment 3-7   during the design validation.
SDAR-CP-86-72).
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
The corrective action to resolve the issue of mass point spacing was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Section 3.10.6.1 and -7 during the design validation.
4.0 References 4.1 CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.119, dated September 16, 1987 A
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
s-                                          A17-1
4.0 References 4.1 CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.119, dated September 16, 1987 A
A17-1 s-


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                              ,                                                                            o f SUBAPPENDIX A18 pf b                                                             b         .t V                         j                             HIGH IREQUEhlCY MASS PARTICIPATION h,                                           s l'.'O'' Definition of the Issue. F               q.                                           7/
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                                                                                      /                                                                     ;
pf SUBAPPENDIX A18 b
The issue (References 4.1 and , 4. 2) was that the 33-Hz cutoff, frequancy                                                 I criteria used in the CPSES pipe stress seismic analysis may rltSt .be ade-                                         ..
b
                                .quate.     The .- pipe stress Analysis did not comply' with the CPSES FSAR re-'                         ,    ['4l quirement1 that the inclusion of high frequhacy modes beyond the cutoff                                       ,
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frequency in the . resp 8ase spectrum analysis do not result in more than a
j HIGH IREQUEhlCY MASS PARTICIPATION h,
                                                                                                                                              /
s l'.'O'' Definition of the Issue. F q.
10-percent increase in the system res onse. j                                   g                             (
7/
J 2.0- Issue Resolution                                     L k
/
Two analysis options were developed andt utilized to address the high-                                     gg frequency mass participation issue.
The issue (References 4.1 and, 4. 2) was that the 33-Hz cutoff, frequancy I
* Perform seismic amplified response spectrum (ARS) modal analysis withr.'
criteria used in the CPSES pipe stress seismic analysis may rltSt.be ade-
50-Hz cutoff frequency, including a high-frequency missing mass corpl rection' option, by using NUPIPE-SW (V04/LO2) or later issue.
.quate.
E
The.- pipe stress Analysis did not comply' with the CPSES FSAR re-'
                                                                                                                                    /
['4l quirement1 that the inclusion of high frequhacy modes beyond the cutoff frequency in the. resp 8ase spectrum analysis do not result in more than a
                                                        ,  i       c'
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* Perform an e utva: Lent stati,c enalysis by using the zero-period accel-                     y
10-percent increase in the system res onse. j g
                                                                                                                                                #g. .
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eration (ZPA balues in all three directions. Combine these results                                       '
2.0-Issue Resolution L
by the square root of s the sum of the squares (SRSS) method with the results of the seismic analysis with a 50-Hz cutoff frequency that                                             !
J k
did not include the' high-frequency missing mass correction.                       Addi-i                                     tional studies (Ref erence 4.3) verified the' adequacy of this method-V ology for CPSES piping systems whose ZPA is less than 50 Hz.
Two analysis options were developed andt utilized to address the high-gg frequency mass participation issue.
                                                                                    '                                                  i r The high-frequency mass payticipatio'n teriteria j                    '
Perform seismic amplified response spectrum (ARS) modal analysis withr.'
was specified in Section                 g         .,'
50-Hz cutoff frequency, including a high-frequency missing mass corpl E
3.10.6.8 of CPPP-7.                                                                                         i 'i s                                                   iI 7
rection' option, by using NUPIPE-SW (V04/LO2) or later issue.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action                                                       ,    ;
/
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resoiution of the issue.                           O
i c'
                                                                                ' l,                                                       '
Perform an e utva: Lent stati,c enalysis by using the zero-period accel-
                                  *      'All the pipe support modification.s resulting from resolution of is-                                  .
#g..
sues in Subappendix Al through A35 were > determined to be, report-                                   '\y ,
y eration (ZPA balues in all three directions. Combine these results by the square root of s the sum of the squares (SRSS) method with the results of the seismic analysis with a 50-Hz cutoff frequency that did not include the' high-frequency missing mass correction.
able under provisions of 10CFR50.55(ejt (see Subappf tdix B2,                                                     l SDAR-CP-86-72).
Addi-i tional studies (Ref erence 4.3) verified the' adequacy of this method-V ology for CPSES piping systems whose ZPA is less than 50 Hz.
* The corrective action to resolse the high frequency mass participc-                               s, y tion issue was accomplished through the' implementation of the crite-                         N         ,
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ria     provided in CPPP-7,                 Section 3.10.6.8 and the use 'pf                            '
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NUPIPE-SW(V04/LO2) during design validation.                                         /
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7 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resoiution of the issue.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.                                               a L                                                                                                 x s                                                                        A18-1 4
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'All the pipe support modification.s resulting from resolution of is-able under provisions of 10CFR50.55(ejt (see Subappf tdix B2, l
SDAR-CP-86-72).
The corrective action to resolse the high frequency mass participc-s, y tion issue was accomplished through the' implementation of the crite-N
'pf ria provided in CPPP-7, Section 3.10.6.8 and the use
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NUPIPE-SW(V04/LO2) during design validation.
\\i The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
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4.0 References D       4.1 Question 2,   CYGNA Communications   Reports,   J.O.No. 83090   dated October 5, 1983 4.2 CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4,         CYGNA Lettet No. 84056.119 dated September 16, 1987 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Letter No. CH-1CP0-1456       dated   February 6, 1987, from A. Chan to L. Nace, Attachment A,     Justification for Terminating Comanche Peak Piping Response Spectrum Analysis at 50 Hz Instead of at the Frequency Corresponding to the Zero Period Acceleration i
4.0 References D
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4.1 Question 2, CYGNA Communications
: Reports, J.O.No. 83090 dated October 5, 1983 4.2 CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4, CYGNA Lettet No. 84056.119 dated September 16, 1987 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Letter No. CH-1CP0-1456 dated February 6, 1987, from A. Chan to L. Nace, Attachment A, Justification for Terminating Comanche Peak Piping Response Spectrum Analysis at 50 Hz Instead of at the Frequency Corresponding to the Zero Period Acceleration i
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F_LU,ID TRANSIENTS 1.0 Definition of the"7ssue i
F_LU,ID TRANSIENTS 1.0 Definition of the"7ssue i
Fluid transients are occasional mechanical loads that should be considered in stress evaluation of ASME Section III Code Class 2 and 3 piping. The previous analysis prepared for CPSES considered fluid transients on sever-al piping systems.       The issue was that the adequacy of the analysis and the completeness of the identification of these fluid transients was ques-tioned (Reference 4.1).
Fluid transients are occasional mechanical loads that should be considered in stress evaluation of ASME Section III Code Class 2 and 3 piping.
The previous analysis prepared for CPSES considered fluid transients on sever-al piping systems.
The issue was that the adequacy of the analysis and the completeness of the identification of these fluid transients was ques-tioned (Reference 4.1).
2.0 Issue Resolution The following process was followed to assure that fluid transients were properly addressed in the SWEC-PSAS validation of the pipe stress analysis.
2.0 Issue Resolution The following process was followed to assure that fluid transients were properly addressed in the SWEC-PSAS validation of the pipe stress analysis.
* Specific fluid transients were identified and summarized in Attach-ment 1 of CPPP-10. These transients were identified by following the     t guidelines given in NUREG-0582, past experience with other PWRs, and by assessing an overall review of the CPSES system flow diagrams.
Specific fluid transients were identified and summarized in Attach-ment 1 of CPPP-10. These transients were identified by following the t
guidelines given in NUREG-0582, past experience with other PWRs, and by assessing an overall review of the CPSES system flow diagrams.
Additionally, system engineers reviewed the piping system operating components which could produce significant fluid transients, such as
Additionally, system engineers reviewed the piping system operating components which could produce significant fluid transients, such as
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rapid valve opening or closing actions of control valves, relief
rapid valve opening or closing actions of control valves, relief valve discharge, pump startup or trip, and turbine trip.
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* The piping systems identified in Attachment 1-1 of CPPP-10 were ana-lyzed for the effects of fluid transients in accordance with the re-quirements of CPPP-7, Section 3.4.5.5 and Attachment 3-1.         These analysis methods resolve CPRT and external fluid transient issues.
valve discharge, pump startup or trip, and turbine trip.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
The piping systems identified in Attachment 1-1 of CPPP-10 were ana-lyzed for the effects of fluid transients in accordance with the re-quirements of CPPP-7, Section 3.4.5.5 and Attachment 3-1.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
These analysis methods resolve CPRT and external fluid transient issues.
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
* The corrective action to resolve the fluid transient issue was accom-plished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachment 3-1 during the design validation.
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
The corrective action to resolve the fluid transient issue was accom-plished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachment 3-1 during the design validation.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
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4.0 References 4.1 TES         draft   Letter   No. 6216-7   dated   February 21, 1985, from D. F. Landers to V. S. Noonan, Director, Comanche Peak Project, U.S.
4.0 References 4.1 TES draft Letter No. 6216-7 dated February 21, 1985, from D. F. Landers to V. S. Noonan, Director, Comanche Peak Project, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which transmitted Technical Report No. TR-6216B, Preliminary Consulting Report on Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Piping and Support Design O
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which transmitted Technical Report No. TR-6216B, Preliminary Consulting Report on Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Piping and Support Design OO
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  ,es                                     SUBAPPENDIX A20 SEISMIC EXCITATION OF PIPE SUPPORT MASS 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue was that the effect of seismic acceleration of the support mass (i.e., self-weight excitation) was not included in the design of the CPSES pipe support structures (References 4.1 and 4.2).
,es SUBAPPENDIX A20 SEISMIC EXCITATION OF PIPE SUPPORT MASS 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue was that the effect of seismic acceleration of the support mass (i.e., self-weight excitation) was not included in the design of the CPSES pipe support structures (References 4.1 and 4.2).
2.0 Issue Resolution SWEC-PSAS resolved these issues by the following methodology:
2.0 Issue Resolution SWEC-PSAS resolved these issues by the following methodology:
* Seismic acceleration of pipe support mass was evaluated for all pipe supports with frames on seismic systems.
Seismic acceleration of pipe support mass was evaluated for all pipe supports with frames on seismic systems.
* The procedure to include the effects of pipe support self-weight ex-citation in the pipe support evaluation was incorporated in CPPP-7 as Attachment 4-21.
The procedure to include the effects of pipe support self-weight ex-citation in the pipe support evaluation was incorporated in CPPP-7 as -21.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in
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  \_             Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
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* The corrective action to resolve the seismic excitation of pipe sup-port mass issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-21 during the design validation.
Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
I 4.0 References 4.1   CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), August 22, 1983, Section X 4.2 NRC       Inspection     Report 50-445/82-26   and   50-446/82-14,       Febru-ary 14, 1983 (NRC Staff Exhibit 207, pages 34, 35, and 36)
The corrective action to resolve the seismic excitation of pipe sup-port mass issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-21 during the design validation.
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The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
I 4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), August 22, 1983, Section X 4.2 NRC Inspection Report 50-445/82-26 and 50-446/82-14, Febru-ary 14, 1983 (NRC Staff Exhibit 207, pages 34, 35, and 36)
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      ~s                                                     SUBAPPENDIX A21 LOCAL STRESS IN PIPE SUPPORT MEMBERS 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issues (References 4.1 through 4.6) regarding the evaluation of local stress in pipe support members are as follows:
~s SUBAPPENDIX A21 LOCAL STRESS IN PIPE SUPPORT MEMBERS 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issues (References 4.1 through 4.6) regarding the evaluation of local stress in pipe support members are as follows:
1.1 Local Stress in Tube Steel Members The issue was that local stress in tube steel members , induced by attached support components, such as beam brackets, lugs, or other tube steel members, was not considered in the design.
1.1 Local Stress in Tube Steel Members The issue was that local stress in tube steel members, induced by attached support components, such as beam brackets, lugs, or other tube steel members, was not considered in the design.
1.2 Other Support Configurations Requiring Local Stress Evaluations The issue was that several other support types and support details were identified as requiring evaluations for local stresses:-
1.2 Other Support Configurations Requiring Local Stress Evaluations The issue was that several other support types and support details were identified as requiring evaluations for local stresses:-
* Cinched U-bolt supports with struts and snubbers
Cinched U-bolt supports with struts and snubbers Piping anchors Zero gap box frames Wide flange webs at connections
* Piping anchors
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* Zero gap box frames
1.3 Short Beam Stresses (O
* Wide flange webs at connections
The issue was that short structural members were incorrectly analyzed in full flexure.
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It was noted that more localized stress distribu-tion due to plate behavior would result.
(O 1.3 Short Beam Stresses The issue was that short structural members were incorrectly analyzed in full flexure. It was noted that more localized stress distribu-tion due to plate behavior would result.
2.0 Issue Resolution -13 of CPPP-7 specified the requirements to evaluate local stresses in pipe support members.
2.0 Issue Resolution Attachment 4-13 of CPPP-7 specified the requirements to evaluate local stresses in pipe support members.                                                 ,
I 2.1 Local Stress in Tube Steel Members
I 2.1   Local Stress in Tube Steel Members                                         )
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l A procedure to evaluate local stress in tube steel members based on       i I
l A procedure to evaluate local stress in tube steel members based on i
the methods of AWS Code D1.1 Section 10.5, including yield line anal-ysis, was developed and incorporated in Attachment 4-13 of CPPP-7.
I the methods of AWS Code D1.1 Section 10.5, including yield line anal-ysis, was developed and incorporated in Attachment 4-13 of CPPP-7.
2.2 Other Support Configurations Requiring Local Stress Evaluations Resolutions for the issue regarding the need for local stress evalua-       l tions on other support configurations is as listed below:
2.2 Other Support Configurations Requiring Local Stress Evaluations Resolutions for the issue regarding the need for local stress evalua-l tions on other support configurations is as listed below:
* Cinched U-bolt supports on struts and snubbers are being elimi-nated or modified as discussed in Subappendix All.
Cinched U-bolt supports on struts and snubbers are being elimi-nated or modified as discussed in Subappendix All.
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* Resolution of the issue regarding the local stress evaluation 73                                                                                                           j i           j                               for piping anchors is addressed in Subappendix A2-               ,
Resolution of the issue regarding the local stress evaluation j
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* Zero gap box frames are being eliminated or modified as dis-
j for piping anchors is addressed in Subappendix A2-x/
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Zero gap box frames are being eliminated or modified as dis-cussed in Subappendix A2 l
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Requirements for the evaluation of local stresses in wide flange l
* Requirements for the evaluation of local stresses in wide flange l member webs at connections, consistent with the AISC Code re-   i quirements, were developed and incorporated into Attachment 4-13 i of CPPP-7                                                       l 2.3 Short Beam Stresses Attachment 4-13 of CPPP-7 requires that short beam support members be I analyzed for local stress effect.
member webs at connections, consistent with the AISC Code re-i quirements, were developed and incorporated into Attachment 4-13 i
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
of CPPP-7 l
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution )
2.3 Short Beam Stresses -13 of CPPP-7 requires that short beam support members be I
analyzed for local stress effect.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution
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of the issue.
of the issue.
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1 Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in     !
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Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under     {
provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).       1
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
* The corrective action to resolve the issue of local stress in pipe
1 The corrective action to resolve the issue of local stress in pipe
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support membe rs was accomplished through the implementation of the
support membe rs was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-13 during the design validation.
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* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-13 during the design validation.
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section IX, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicants' Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Geniune Issue Regarding Consideration of Local Displace-ments and Stresses, August 27, 1984.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section IX, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicants' Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Geniune Issue Regarding Consideration of Local Displace-ments and Stresses, August 27, 1984.
4.3 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Reply to CASE's Answer to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition Regarding Local Displacements and Stresses, October 9, 1984.
4.3 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Reply to CASE's Answer to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition Regarding Local Displacements and Stresses, October 9, 1984.
4.4 NRC Staf f Response to Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition on AWS and ASHE Code Provisions on Weld Design, November 2, 1984         j 4.5 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition of Cer-tain CASE Allegations Regarding AWS and ASME Code Provisions Related to Design Issues, August 6, 1984
4.4 NRC Staf f Response to Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition on AWS and ASHE Code Provisions on Weld Design, November 2, 1984 j
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4.6 Transcript of Proceedings Before the United States Nuclear Regulatory O                         Commission, Washington, DC, in the Matter of Meeting to Conduct Feed-V                         back Discussions with Messrs. Walsh and Doyle Re Concerns About the Comanche Peak Plant Held March 23, 1986                               i I
4.6 Transcript of Proceedings Before the United States Nuclear Regulatory O
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Commission, Washington, DC, in the Matter of Meeting to Conduct Feed-V back Discussions with Messrs. Walsh and Doyle Re Concerns About the Comanche Peak Plant Held March 23, 1986 i
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SUBAPPENDIX A22 SAFETY FACTORS l
SUBAPPENDIX A22 SAFETY FACTORS l
1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 and 4.2) was that the industry practice of ne-glecting to factor small potential loads into design calculations is not supported by adequate CPSES factors of safety. The issue also was that CPSES safety factors had already been eroded by poor and insufficient de-sign practices.
1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 and 4.2) was that the industry practice of ne-glecting to factor small potential loads into design calculations is not supported by adequate CPSES factors of safety.
2.0 Issue Resolution CPRT and external issues have been resolved and incorporated into the technical and design control procedures. Therefore, the inherent design margin (safety factor) accumulated from the built-in conservatism                 in codes, inputs, and regulatory positions is applicable.
The issue also was that CPSES safety factors had already been eroded by poor and insufficient de-sign practices.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
2.0 Issue Resolution CPRT and external issues have been resolved and incorporated into the technical and design control procedures.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
Therefore, the inherent design margin (safety factor) accumulated from the built-in conservatism in codes, inputs, and regulatory positions is applicable.
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
* The corrective action to resolve the issue of safety factors has been implemented in the SWEC-PSAS Corrective Action Program (CAP) through the resolution of all applicable CPRT and external issues which have been inco rporated into the technical and design control procedures.
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section I, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Partial Answer to TU Electric's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue Regarding Safety Factors, August 27, 1984
The corrective action to resolve the issue of safety factors has been implemented in the SWEC-PSAS Corrective Action Program (CAP) through the resolution of all applicable CPRT and external issues which have been inco rporated into the technical and design control procedures.
  /
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section I, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Partial Answer to TU Electric's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue Regarding Safety Factors, August 27, 1984
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SUBAPPENDIX A23 J                                     SA-36 AND A307 STEEL 1.0 Definition of the Issue The following issues were identified (References 4.1 through 4.3) regarding the use of SA-36 and A307 material in pipe supports at CPSES.
SUBAPPENDIX A23 J
1.1     Design Allowables Derived from Tests The issue was that the material allowables used in the design of cinched U-bolts, U-bolts as two-way restraints, and SA-36 threaded rod used with Richmond inserts for pipe supports at CPSES were derived from tests and not from the ASME Section III Code minimum yield stress, since questions arose as La whether the material tested in the following tests represented the actual material used onsite.
SA-36 AND A307 STEEL 1.0 Definition of the Issue The following issues were identified (References 4.1 through 4.3) regarding the use of SA-36 and A307 material in pipe supports at CPSES.
1.1.1   Cinched U-Bolt Tests Conducted by Westinghouse 1.1.2   U-Bolts as Two-Way Restraints Tests Conducted by ITT Grinnell 1.1.3   Richmond Insert Tests Conducted by TU Electric 1.2     Friction Connections The issue was that AISC Code 7th Edition Table 1.5.2.1 prohibits the use of A307 as bolting material in friction connections. Attainment ano main-tenance of joint preload is the underlying issue. SA-36 and A307 materi-als are similar. ASME Section III Code Inquiry NI86-030 (Reference 4.4) clarifies that cinched U-bolts are not friction connections.         However, since the U-bolt design relies on friction and preload to provide stabili-ty, the AISC prohibition needs to be addressed.
1.1 Design Allowables Derived from Tests The issue was that the material allowables used in the design of cinched U-bolts, U-bolts as two-way restraints, and SA-36 threaded rod used with Richmond inserts for pipe supports at CPSES were derived from tests and not from the ASME Section III Code minimum yield stress, since questions arose as La whether the material tested in the following tests represented the actual material used onsite.
1.3 Fatigue The issue was that SA-36 material used in cinched U-bolts, U-bolts as two-wtj restraints, and as rod, threaded into Richmond inserts, are sub-ject to load cycling, which must be considered in the qualification. ASME Section III, Appendix XVII, Table XVII-3230-1, footnote 4; and AISC 7th edition, Appendix B, Table B2, footnote 4, state "Where stress reversal is involved, use of A307 bolts is not recommended." Fatigue of the A307 ma-terial is the issue. Since SA-36 material is similar to A307, this issue was extended to SA-36 U-bolts and threaded rods used with Richmond inserts.
1.1.1 Cinched U-Bolt Tests Conducted by Westinghouse 1.1.2 U-Bolts as Two-Way Restraints Tests Conducted by ITT Grinnell 1.1.3 Richmond Insert Tests Conducted by TU Electric 1.2 Friction Connections The issue was that AISC Code 7th Edition Table 1.5.2.1 prohibits the use of A307 as bolting material in friction connections.
Attainment ano main-tenance of joint preload is the underlying issue.
SA-36 and A307 materi-als are similar.
ASME Section III Code Inquiry NI86-030 (Reference 4.4) clarifies that cinched U-bolts are not friction connections.
: However, since the U-bolt design relies on friction and preload to provide stabili-ty, the AISC prohibition needs to be addressed.
1.3 Fatigue The issue was that SA-36 material used in cinched U-bolts, U-bolts as two-wtj restraints, and as rod, threaded into Richmond inserts, are sub-ject to load cycling, which must be considered in the qualification. ASME Section III, Appendix XVII, Table XVII-3230-1, footnote 4; and AISC 7th edition, Appendix B, Table B2, footnote 4, state "Where stress reversal is involved, use of A307 bolts is not recommended." Fatigue of the A307 ma-terial is the issue.
Since SA-36 material is similar to A307, this issue was extended to SA-36 U-bolts and threaded rods used with Richmond inserts.
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1.4 Allowable Stresses in Bolting Material
1.4 Allowable Stresses in Bolting Material
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l                 The issue was that the allowable stresses used in the design of bolting material exceed the material yield strength under the faulted condition (Level D) service limit. This does not conform to the guidance of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.124, Reference 4.5, which limits the load increases to   l 1.5 times the normal operating (Level A) service limit, because of the potential for nonductile behavior.
/
1.5 Use of Low-Strength Nuts with High-Strength Bolts The issue was that low-strength nuts, A563 Grade A, were used with high-strength bolting, instead of the code compatible A194 Grade B nut. The issue was that the resultant connection capacity should have been reduced in the analysis.
l The issue was that the allowable stresses used in the design of bolting material exceed the material yield strength under the faulted condition (Level D) service limit.
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Design Allowables Derived from Tests In accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.2.5.1,     cinched U-bolts with struts or snubbers are being eliminated or modified.
This does not conform to the guidance of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.124, Reference 4.5, which limits the load increases to l
Design allowables for linear components, such as SA-36 U-bolts and SA-36 threaded rod used with Richmond inserts, were derived by SWEC-PSAS from the ASME Section III Code minimum yield strength specified in Section 2.2 of CPPP-7 O   and not from tests.
1.5 times the normal operating (Level A) service limit, because of the potential for nonductile behavior.
Y 2.2 Friction Connections In accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.2.5.1,     cinched U-bolts with struts or snubbers are being eliminated or modified.
1.5 Use of Low-Strength Nuts with High-Strength Bolts The issue was that low-strength nuts, A563 Grade A, were used with high-strength bolting, instead of the code compatible A194 Grade B nut.
The issue was that the resultant connection capacity should have been reduced in the analysis.
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Design Allowables Derived from Tests In accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.2.5.1, cinched U-bolts with struts or snubbers are being eliminated or modified.
Design allowables for linear components, such as SA-36 U-bolts and SA-36 threaded rod used with Richmond inserts, were derived by SWEC-PSAS from the ASME Section III Code minimum yield strength specified in Section 2.2 of CPPP-7 O
and not from tests.
Y 2.2 Friction Connections In accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.2.5.1, cinched U-bolts with struts or snubbers are being eliminated or modified.
U-bolts used as two-way restraints do not rely on preload for load transfer.
U-bolts used as two-way restraints do not rely on preload for load transfer.
Richmond insert connections were designed as bearing connections and do not rely on friction (preload) for load transfer capability.
Richmond insert connections were designed as bearing connections and do not rely on friction (preload) for load transfer capability.
2.3 Fatigue U-bolts used as two-way restraints and SA-36 threaded rod used with Richmond inserts were subject to reversing stress fields due to seismic and fluid tran-sient loads.
2.3 Fatigue U-bolts used as two-way restraints and SA-36 threaded rod used with Richmond inserts were subject to reversing stress fields due to seismic and fluid tran-sient loads.
The SA-36 U-bolts used as two-way restraints as well as the threaded rod used with Richmond insert tube steel joints were designed as ASME Section III, lin-ear NF support components in accordance with ASPE Section III, Appendix XVII, and AISC, respectively. ASME Section III Code Appendix XVII Table XVII-3230-1 and AISC Code 7th Edition, Appendix B, Table B2, footnote 4 define the lower bound value for consideration of stress cycles as 20,000.       SWEC-PSAS demon-O A23-2
The SA-36 U-bolts used as two-way restraints as well as the threaded rod used with Richmond insert tube steel joints were designed as ASME Section III, lin-ear NF support components in accordance with ASPE Section III, Appendix XVII, and AISC, respectively.
ASME Section III Code Appendix XVII Table XVII-3230-1 and AISC Code 7th Edition, Appendix B, Table B2, footnote 4 define the lower bound value for consideration of stress cycles as 20,000.
SWEC-PSAS demon-O A23-2


strated that the number of equivalent stress cycles for these components was p                                   less than 7,000.     Therefore, fatigue was not relevant as defined in these codes.
strated that the number of equivalent stress cycles for these components was p
2.4 Allowable Stresses in Bolting Material                                         3 Bolting material was esigned in accordance with ASME Section III, Para-graph NF-3225 Summer 1983 addenda, which limited the stresses at temperature at the faulted condition (Level D) to yield. The use of this later code paragraph assures ductile behavior and thus conforms to the guidance of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.124.
less than 7,000.
2.5 Use of Low-Strength Nuts with liigh-Strength Bolting In accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-5, the tensile allowable load for           l high-strength bolts using low-strength nuts was reduced to 60 percent of the normal high-strength bolt allowable, to account for the reduced proof load stress of the A563 Gude A nut.                                                     :
Therefore, fatigue was not relevant as defined in these codes.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action                                               !
2.4 Allowable Stresses in Bolting Material 3
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
Bolting material was esigned in accordance with ASME Section III, Para-graph NF-3225 Summer 1983 addenda, which limited the stresses at temperature at the faulted condition (Level D) to yield. The use of this later code paragraph assures ductile behavior and thus conforms to the guidance of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.124.
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)       (see Subappendix B2,   SDAR-CP-86-72).
2.5 Use of Low-Strength Nuts with liigh-Strength Bolting In accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-5, the tensile allowable load for l
* The corrective action to resolve the SA-36 and A307 steel issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in       l CPPP-7, Sections 2.2 and 4.2.5.1, and Attachment 4-5 during the           j design validation.                                                       !
high-strength bolts using low-strength nuts was reduced to 60 percent of the normal high-strength bolt allowable, to account for the reduced proof load stress of the A563 Gude A nut.
l
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Alle-     l gations, Section III), August 22, 1983.
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
4.2 CASE's Fourth Motion for Summary Disposition to Disqualify the Use of A307 and SA-36 Threaded Parts, January 14, 1985.
The corrective action to resolve the SA-36 and A307 steel issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in l
4.3 CASE's Partial Answer to Applicants' Statement of Material Facts Relating to   Richmond   Inserts as to   Which   There are   No   Material   Facts, September 10, 1984 4.4 ASME   III   Code   Inquiry NI86-030   "Section III, Division 1,   NF-3324.6 (a)(3)(b) Friction Type Joints, NF-3324.6(a)(4) Slip Resistance, Friction Type Joints, NF-3225.4, Friction Type Joints,         1983 Edition with the Winter 1985 Addenda," June 25, 1986 l
CPPP-7, Sections 2.2 and 4.2.5.1, and Attachment 4-5 during the j
design validation.
l The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Alle-l gations, Section III), August 22, 1983.
4.2 CASE's Fourth Motion for Summary Disposition to Disqualify the Use of A307 and SA-36 Threaded Parts, January 14, 1985.
4.3 CASE's Partial Answer to Applicants' Statement of Material Facts Relating to Richmond Inserts as to Which There are No Material
: Facts, September 10, 1984 4.4 ASME III Code Inquiry NI86-030 "Section III, Division 1, NF-3324.6 (a)(3)(b) Friction Type Joints, NF-3324.6(a)(4) Slip Resistance, Friction Type Joints, NF-3225.4, Friction Type Joints, 1983 Edition with the Winter 1985 Addenda," June 25, 1986 l
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i 4.5 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.124, Service Limits and Loading Combinations for Class 1 Linear Type Component Supports, Revision 1, January 1978 l
i 4.5 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.124, Service Limits and Loading Combinations for Class 1 Linear Type Component Supports, Revision 1, January 1978 l
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SUBAPPENDIX A24 l O                                   U-BOLT TWISTING 1.0 Definition of the Issue This issue (References 4.1 through 4.3) was that out-of-plane rotation of the l   crosspiece of a trapeze cinched U-bolt support may result when the struts are in compression. This rotation would induce twisting on the U-bolt, for which it was not designed.
SUBAPPENDIX A24 l
2.0 Issue Resolution Due to the extensive engineering effort required to demonstrate the acceptabil-ity of this type of support, cinched U-bolt trapeze supports with struts or snubbers are being eliminated or modified. Modification options are discussed in Subappendix A12, Axial / Rotational and Trapeze Restraints.
O U-BOLT TWISTING 1.0 Definition of the Issue This issue (References 4.1 through 4.3) was that out-of-plane rotation of the l
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
crosspiece of a trapeze cinched U-bolt support may result when the struts are in compression.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
This rotation would induce twisting on the U-bolt, for which it was not designed.
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
2.0 Issue Resolution Due to the extensive engineering effort required to demonstrate the acceptabil-ity of this type of support, cinched U-bolt trapeze supports with struts or snubbers are being eliminated or modified.
* The corrective action for the twisting of U-bolts on trapeze supports with struts or snubbers is being accomplished through the elimination or modification of this support type in accordance with CPPP-7, Sec-tion 4.2.5.1 during the design validation.                                                             ,;
Modification options are discussed in Subappendix A12, Axial / Rotational and Trapeze Restraints.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section III, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Motions and Answer to Applicants' Motions for Summary Disposi-tion Regarding Stability of Pipe Supports, October 15, 1984 4.3 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4,       and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
  \                                       A24-1
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
The corrective action for the twisting of U-bolts on trapeze supports with struts or snubbers is being accomplished through the elimination or modification of this support type in accordance with CPPP-7, Sec-tion 4.2.5.1 during the design validation.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section III, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Motions and Answer to Applicants' Motions for Summary Disposi-tion Regarding Stability of Pipe Supports, October 15, 1984 4.3 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987
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A24-1


SUBAPPENDIX A25
SUBAPPENDIX A25
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FISHER / CROSBY VALVE MODELING/ QUALIFICATION i
FISHER / CROSBY VALVE MODELING/ QUALIFICATION i
1.0 Definition of the 1ssue i
1.0 Definition of the 1ssue i
The issues (References 4.1 through 4.4) related to Fisher and Crosby valve modeling and qualification were as follows:
The issues (References 4.1 through 4.4) related to Fisher and Crosby valve modeling and qualification were as follows:
1.1 Crosby Valves The issue was that the main steam (MS) safety relief valves (SRV) which have a double ported outlet configuration used an unconserv-ative assumption of a 55/45 split in the flow distribution in lieu of the 60/40 split flow distribution, as suggested by Crosby Valve.
1.1 Crosby Valves The issue was that the main steam (MS) safety relief valves (SRV) which have a double ported outlet configuration used an unconserv-ative assumption of a 55/45 split in the flow distribution in lieu of the 60/40 split flow distribution, as suggested by Crosby Valve.
There are five such valves located along the MS line that discharges into vent stacks.
There are five such valves located along the MS line that discharges into vent stacks.
1.2 Fisher Valves The issue was that the Fisher valve operators may not be qualified to withstand the loads imposed on them by the snubbers that support the valve operator.
1.2 Fisher Valves The issue was that the Fisher valve operators may not be qualified to withstand the loads imposed on them by the snubbers that support the valve operator.
The Fisher valve is a control valve that is used to control main steam (MS) flow by relieving stear. to the atmosphere.
The Fisher valve is a control valve that is used to control main steam (MS) flow by relieving stear. to the atmosphere.
p)
p)
(,,         1.3 Flexible Valves The issue was that the modeling of " flexible" valves (frequency less than 33 cycles per second) was inadequate. It was found that valves noted in Reference 4.4 (excluding Fisher valves) were the only " flex-ible" valves within the original scope of work.         It was determined that the valve accelerations for those valves were acceptable; howev-cr, the modeling of the Fisher valve yoke, which is laterally sup-ported at the end, was not addressed.       If the yoke is modeled much stiffer than it actually is, it may have an effect on the analysis results.
(,,
1.3 Flexible Valves The issue was that the modeling of " flexible" valves (frequency less than 33 cycles per second) was inadequate.
It was found that valves noted in Reference 4.4 (excluding Fisher valves) were the only " flex-ible" valves within the original scope of work.
It was determined that the valve accelerations for those valves were acceptable; howev-cr, the modeling of the Fisher valve yoke, which is laterally sup-ported at the end, was not addressed.
If the yoke is modeled much stiffer than it actually is, it may have an effect on the analysis results.
1.4 Valve Accelerations and Loads The issue was that the validity of a sampling process to assure the acceptability of valve accelerations and valve flange loads has not been demonstrated.
1.4 Valve Accelerations and Loads The issue was that the validity of a sampling process to assure the acceptability of valve accelerations and valve flange loads has not been demonstrated.
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Crosby Valves
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Crosby Valves SWEC-PSAS discussed the flow distribution of doubled-ported SRV with Crosby (Reference 4.5), and Crosby verified that the SRV has an equal O
* SWEC-PSAS discussed the flow distribution of doubled-ported SRV with Crosby (Reference 4.5), and Crosby verified that the SRV has an equal O
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  \s /                                         A25-1
A25-1


  ,.S           (50/50) flow distribution ratio (instead of 60/40, as was thought).
,.S (50/50) flow distribution ratio (instead of 60/40, as was thought).
i              For conservatism, a 55/45 SRV flow distribution ratio was used to k}           calculate the blowdown force.
For conservatism, a 55/45 SRV flow distribution ratio was used to k}
* SWEC-PSAS evaluated the multiple SRV loading combination issue and concurred that all five valves opening simultaneously must be consid-ered for piping and pipe support design. Since valves may open in a set or random sequence, those cases were also considered. The vali-dation process identified the design basis for multiple SRV openings, including five simultaneous valves opening, for stress analysis eval-uation. The cases evaluated covered all possible circumstances based on the system design, including the worst load condition.
i calculate the blowdown force.
2.2 Fisher Valves The SWEC-PSAS validation of the Fisher relief valve branch connection piping model included the effects of the snubber supports at the valve. In accordance with Section 7.4.3 of CPPP-6 both valve accel-erations and support loads on the valves were transmitted to the equipment qualification organization (Impell Corporation) for valida-tion, except for Westinghouse-supplied valves, which were transmitted to Westinghouse for validation.                                                                         ;
SWEC-PSAS evaluated the multiple SRV loading combination issue and concurred that all five valves opening simultaneously must be consid-ered for piping and pipe support design.
4 2.3 Flexible Valves The yokes of flexible valves were modeled to properly predict the Q             yoke frequency. CPPP-7, Section 3.10.6.5 specified the proper valve                                   l V             yoke modeling of flexible valves.
Since valves may open in a set or random sequence, those cases were also considered. The vali-dation process identified the design basis for multiple SRV openings, including five simultaneous valves opening, for stress analysis eval-uation.
The cases evaluated covered all possible circumstances based on the system design, including the worst load condition.
2.2 Fisher Valves The SWEC-PSAS validation of the Fisher relief valve branch connection piping model included the effects of the snubber supports at the valve.
In accordance with Section 7.4.3 of CPPP-6 both valve accel-erations and support loads on the valves were transmitted to the equipment qualification organization (Impell Corporation) for valida-tion, except for Westinghouse-supplied valves, which were transmitted to Westinghouse for validation.
4 2.3 Flexible Valves The yokes of flexible valves were modeled to properly predict the Q
yoke frequency.
CPPP-7, Section 3.10.6.5 specified the proper valve l
V yoke modeling of flexible valves.
{
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l 2.4 Valve Accelerations and Loads l
l 2.4 Valve Accelerations and Loads l
All valves were validated for applicable accelerations and valve noz-                                   j zie loadings in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 3.10.5.2.                                       Also,   j since all valves were validated, the concern regarding sampling has                                     {
All valves were validated for applicable accelerations and valve noz-j zie loadings in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 3.10.5.2.
been satisfied.                                                                                         i 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
: Also, j
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
since all valves were validated, the concern regarding sampling has
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)       (see Subappendix B2,   SDAR-CP-86-72).
{
* The corrective action to resolve the issue of valve modeling and qualification was sceomplished through the implementation of the cri-teria provided in G"'P-6, Section 7.4.3 and CPPP-7, Sections 3.10.5.2
been satisfied.
;                and 3.10.6.5 during the design validation.
i 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
i
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
!
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
The corrective action to resolve the issue of valve modeling and qualification was sceomplished through the implementation of the cri-teria provided in G"'P-6, Section 7.4.3 and CPPP-7, Sections 3.10.5.2 and 3.10.6.5 during the design validation.
    /^
i The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
l                                           A25-2 l
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I 4.0 References 4.1 Tel-con dated October 21, 1976, between Crosby Valve and Gibbs &
I 4.0 References 4.1 Tel-con dated October 21, 1976, between Crosby Valve and Gibbs &
Hill, J. R. Zahorsky and M. H. Giden, regarding Contract No. 2323A, i
Hill, J. R. Zahorsky and M. H. Giden, regarding Contract No. 2323A, i
Double-Ported Safety Valves 4.2 Telex from Crosby Valve to Gibbs & Hill regarding Contract No. 2323A, Main Steam Safety Valves, J. R. Zahorsky to Dr. Kim, October 12, 1976 4.3 CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4,                                                                     and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.119 dated September 16, 1987.
Double-Ported Safety Valves 4.2 Telex from Crosby Valve to Gibbs & Hill regarding Contract No. 2323A, Main Steam Safety Valves, J. R. Zahorsky to Dr. Kim, October 12, 1976 4.3 CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.119 dated September 16, 1987.
4.4 Communications Report between Krishnan/ Ray                                                   (Gibbs & Hill)                                       and Minichiello (CYGNA), June 18, 1984.
4.4 Communications Report between Krishnan/ Ray (Gibbs & Hill) and Minichiello (CYGNA), June 18, 1984.
4.5 Tel-con dated February 21, 1986, between R. Martin and J. R. Zahorsky of Crosby Valve and W. Wang, A. J. Cokonis, and W. H. Green of SWEC, regarding Crosby double ported relief valve discharge loads.
4.5 Tel-con dated February 21, 1986, between R. Martin and J. R. Zahorsky of Crosby Valve and W. Wang, A. J. Cokonis, and W. H. Green of SWEC, regarding Crosby double ported relief valve discharge loads.
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A25-3                                                                                                                   '
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q                                         SUBAPPENDIX A26 PIPING MODELING 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue was that incorrect inputs were used in the pipe stress analysis as follows (Reference 4.1):
q SUBAPPENDIX A26 PIPING MODELING 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue was that incorrect inputs were used in the pipe stress analysis as follows (Reference 4.1):
* Incorrect pipe wall thickness was used to calculate an allowable noz-zle load (Reference 4.1, Issue 2).
Incorrect pipe wall thickness was used to calculate an allowable noz-zle load (Reference 4.1, Issue 2).
* Improper stress intensification factors were used (Reference 4.1, Issue 10).
Improper stress intensification factors were used (Reference 4.1, Issue 10).
* Fluid content and insulation weights were not included for valves and flanges (Reference 4.1, Issue 4).
Fluid content and insulation weights were not included for valves and flanges (Reference 4.1, Issue 4).
* Valve acceleration and flange loads were not always checked in the piping analysis (Reference 4.1, Issue 21).
Valve acceleration and flange loads were not always checked in the piping analysis (Reference 4.1, Issue 21).
* Two piping segments were input into the stress analysis with the in-correct wall thickness (Reference 4.1, Issue 12).
Two piping segments were input into the stress analysis with the in-correct wall thickness (Reference 4.1, Issue 12).
2.0 Issue Resolution
2.0 Issue Resolution
[~T         All pipe stress analysis packages were validated in accordance with Pro-(m.)         ject Procedures CPPP-6 and CPPP-7, which provided direction for the proper modeling of piping systems. SWEC Engineering Assurance Procedure EAP 5.3 provided guidance on the preparation and review of calculations, including the need to assure that proper input is used. Checklists were included in project procedures to provide additional assurance that correct piping models were created and that proper review of the input and output was performed.
[~T All pipe stress analysis packages were validated in accordance with Pro-(m.)
In addition, personnel were trained in the implementation of the proce-dures. This training was further enhanced by daily contact with the expe-rienced on-project technical supervision. The SWEC Engineering Assurance Division performed audits of project activities to verify that procedural requirements were met and that calculations were technically acceptable.
ject Procedures CPPP-6 and CPPP-7, which provided direction for the proper modeling of piping systems.
SWEC Engineering Assurance Procedure EAP 5.3 provided guidance on the preparation and review of calculations, including the need to assure that proper input is used.
Checklists were included in project procedures to provide additional assurance that correct piping models were created and that proper review of the input and output was performed.
In addition, personnel were trained in the implementation of the proce-dures.
This training was further enhanced by daily contact with the expe-rienced on-project technical supervision.
The SWEC Engineering Assurance Division performed audits of project activities to verify that procedural requirements were met and that calculations were technically acceptable.
The combination of the procedures, the procedural control, and the audit program provided assurance that the inputs were correct and the calcula-tions were complete and technically acceptable.
The combination of the procedures, the procedural control, and the audit program provided assurance that the inputs were correct and the calcula-tions were complete and technically acceptable.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
1 1
1 1
U                                           A26-1 f
U A26-1 f
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* Pipe support modifications resulting frcm resolution of issues in (f
 
k-s\           Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)       (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
Pipe support modifications resulting frcm resolution of issues in (f s\\
* The corrective action to resolve the issues related to piping model-ing was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria pro-vided in Sect. ion 3.0 of CPPP-7 during the design validation.
Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under k-provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.                                                                     l 4.0 References i
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
4.1 CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4,       a .d Transmittal Letter No. 84056.119 dated September 16, 1987                                                                                         .
The corrective action to resolve the issues related to piping model-ing was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria pro-vided in Sect. ion 3.0 of CPPP-7 during the design validation.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
l 4.0 References i
4.1 CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4, a.d Transmittal Letter No. 84056.119 dated September 16, 1987 I
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l SUBAPPENDIX A27                                                       l WELDING 1.0 Definition of the Issue The following welding-related issues were identified (Reference 4.1):
l SUBAPPENDIX A27 l
1.1 Undersized Fillet Welds The issue was that the sizes of two fillet welds were found to be less than the minimum requirements of Table XVII-2452.1-1 in Appen-dix XVII of the ASME Code Section III.
WELDING 1.0 Definition of the Issue The following welding-related issues were identified (Reference 4.1):
1.2 Penetration Veld Subsurface Cracking The issue was that there is a potential for subsurface cracking on welds with deep penetrations. The shrinkage due to weld cooling may be resisted where the joined surfaces approach being parallel. Under these conditions, subsurface cracking can occur without the crack propagating to the surface. Upon loading, this subsurface crack may propagate through the weld causing joint failure.
1.1 Undersized Fillet Welds The issue was that the sizes of two fillet welds were found to be less than the minimum requirements of Table XVII-2452.1-1 in Appen-dix XVII of the ASME Code Section III.
1.2 Penetration Veld Subsurface Cracking The issue was that there is a potential for subsurface cracking on welds with deep penetrations.
The shrinkage due to weld cooling may be resisted where the joined surfaces approach being parallel. Under these conditions, subsurface cracking can occur without the crack propagating to the surface.
Upon loading, this subsurface crack may propagate through the weld causing joint failure.
1.3 Eccentricity of Three-Sided Welds (Unsymmetrical Welds)
1.3 Eccentricity of Three-Sided Welds (Unsymmetrical Welds)
  /             The issue was that analyses of three-sided welds have not consistent-(]_/          ly considered the eccentricity between the center of gravity of the member and the weld.
(]_/
/
The issue was that analyses of three-sided welds have not consistent-ly considered the eccentricity between the center of gravity of the member and the weld.
1.4 Linear Versus Plate and Shell Weld Design for Base Plates The issue was that the practice of qualifying base plate welds using Jinear analyses (as opposed to plate and shell analyses) was questioned.
1.4 Linear Versus Plate and Shell Weld Design for Base Plates The issue was that the practice of qualifying base plate welds using Jinear analyses (as opposed to plate and shell analyses) was questioned.
1.5 Combination Welded / Bolted Connections The issue was that no evidence was found to support the fact that combination welded / bolted connections are designed in accordance with Appendix XVII, subparagraph XVII-2442, Section III of the ASME Code.
1.5 Combination Welded / Bolted Connections The issue was that no evidence was found to support the fact that combination welded / bolted connections are designed in accordance with Appendix XVII, subparagraph XVII-2442, Section III of the ASME Code.
1.6 Crosspiece Cover Plate Welds The issue was that it was observed that shear flow has not always been considered in the analysis of welds attaching cover plates to crosspiece members.
1.6 Crosspiece Cover Plate Welds The issue was that it was observed that shear flow has not always been considered in the analysis of welds attaching cover plates to crosspiece members.
l 1.7 One-Third Increase of Weld Allowable Stress for Emergency and Faulted Conditions
l 1.7 One-Third Increase of Weld Allowable Stress for Emergency and Faulted Conditions O
! O A27-1 l                                                                       ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ __
A27-1 l


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The issue was that the practice of increasing weld allowable stresses
The issue was that the practice of increasing weld allowable stresses
(             by one-third for emergency and faulted conditions was questioned.
(
1.8 Welding Practices The issue was whether welding procedures qualified by test in accor-dance with the ASME Code are adequate in light of AWS requirements for prequalified welds. This issue involves the following inadequate                                             l welding practices: cap welding, weave welding, lap joint require-ments, downhill welding, and preheat requirements.
by one-third for emergency and faulted conditions was questioned.
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Undersized Fillet Welds ASME Code Case N-413 eliminated the minimum weld size requirements of Table XVII-2452.1-1 in the ASME Section III Code. Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7 incorporates ASME Code Case N-413.
1.8 Welding Practices The issue was whether welding procedures qualified by test in accor-dance with the ASME Code are adequate in light of AWS requirements for prequalified welds.
2.2 Penetration Weld Subsurface Cracking As part of the resolution of this issue, SWEC-PSAS reviewed Refer-ence 4.3, which states that the tendency to develop subsurface weld cracks stems from the "... misuse of a welding process that can achieve deep penetration or poor joint design. A few preventive mea-sures can ensure elimination of both of these factors.     Limiting the
This issue involves the following inadequate l
['^\         penetration and the volume of weld metal deposited per pass, through
welding practices:
  \m-           speed and amperage control, and using reasonable depth of fusion are                                             )
cap welding, weave welding, lap joint require-ments, downhill welding, and preheat requirements.
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Undersized Fillet Welds ASME Code Case N-413 eliminated the minimum weld size requirements of Table XVII-2452.1-1 in the ASME Section III Code. -2 of CPPP-7 incorporates ASME Code Case N-413.
2.2 Penetration Weld Subsurface Cracking As part of the resolution of this issue, SWEC-PSAS reviewed Refer-ence 4.3, which states that the tendency to develop subsurface weld cracks stems from the "... misuse of a welding process that can achieve deep penetration or poor joint design.
A few preventive mea-sures can ensure elimination of both of these factors.
Limiting the
['^\\
penetration and the volume of weld metal deposited per pass, through
\\m-speed and amperage control, and using reasonable depth of fusion are
)
both steps in the right direction."
both steps in the right direction."
All CPSES pipe support welds are fabricated in accordance with CPSES Weld Procedure WPS-11032.
All CPSES pipe support welds are fabricated in accordance with CPSES Weld Procedure WPS-11032.
SWEC-PSAS reviewed WPS-11032 and concluded that it is a qualified                                                 i procedure in accordance with ASME Section IX which adequately con-                                                 l trols the joint design, travel speed, electrode size, and amperage                                                 )
SWEC-PSAS reviewed WPS-11032 and concluded that it is a qualified i
and that the SMAW process is not a deep penetration process.                                                       )
procedure in accordance with ASME Section IX which adequately con-l trols the joint design, travel speed, electrode size, and amperage
)
and that the SMAW process is not a deep penetration process.
)
I Therefore, all pipe support welds fabricated in accordance with CPSES Weld Procedure WPS-11032 are in compliance with the ASME Code.
I Therefore, all pipe support welds fabricated in accordance with CPSES Weld Procedure WPS-11032 are in compliance with the ASME Code.
2.3 Eccentricity of Three-Sided Welds (Unsymmetrical Welds)
2.3 Eccentricity of Three-Sided Welds (Unsymmetrical Welds)
In accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-2, paragraph 3, the eccen-tricity between the center of gravity of the member and the weld has been considered.
In accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-2, paragraph 3, the eccen-tricity between the center of gravity of the member and the weld has been considered.
O A27-2                                                                                 i
O A27-2 i


2.4                     Linear Versus Plate and Shell Weld Design for Base Plates ASME Section III, Subsection NF-1230 allows the use of either plate-and-shell or linear-type support analysis for the design of welds connecting linear and plate and shell elements. In accordance with                 '
2.4 Linear Versus Plate and Shell Weld Design for Base Plates ASME Section III, Subsection NF-1230 allows the use of either plate-and-shell or linear-type support analysis for the design of welds connecting linear and plate and shell elements.
;                                                                  CPPP-7, Attachment 4-2, these welds were validated using the linear-l                                                                 type support analysis.
In accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-2, these welds were validated using the linear-l type support analysis.
I 2.5                     Combination Welded / Bolted Connections Welds used in combination welded / bolted connections were designed in accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-2, paragraph 3.1.3 for the en-tire     shear     force,     which   complies   with   ASME Section III, paragraph XVII-2442, 2.6 Crosspiece Cover Plate Welds In accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-2, paragraph 3.1.5, members which use cover plates for strength purposes had the plate-to-member attachment weld validated for shear flow.
I 2.5 Combination Welded / Bolted Connections Welds used in combination welded / bolted connections were designed in accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-2, paragraph 3.1.3 for the en-tire shear
2.7 One-Third Increase in Allowable Weld Stress for Emergency and Faulted Conditions 2.7.1     A one-third increase in allowable weld stress for emergency and faulted conditions is acceptable.           ASME Code, Sec-
: force, which complies with ASME Section III, paragraph XVII-2442, 2.6 Crosspiece Cover Plate Welds In accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-2, paragraph 3.1.5, members which use cover plates for strength purposes had the plate-to-member attachment weld validated for shear flow.
  ,x tion III Subsection NF, paragraph NF 3231.1(b), Design of Linear-Type Supports by Analysis for Class 1 Component Sup-ports, and Appendix XVII-2110(a), Linear Elastic Analysis, specify an allowable stress increase for emergency and faulted conditions.     The emergency condition is stated as having   a   one-third     allowable   increase. Both para-graph NF 3231.1(b) and Appendix XVII-21100 refer to ASME                 ,
2.7 One-Third Increase in Allowable Weld Stress for Emergency and Faulted Conditions 2.7.1 A one-third increase in allowable weld stress for emergency and faulted conditions is acceptable.
Section III, Subsection NF for the faulted condition, where the factor is always greater than one-third.
ASME Code, Sec-tion III Subsection NF, paragraph NF 3231.1(b), Design of
2.7.2     AISC   has   allowed   the   one-third   increase   since   the 7th edition.
,x Linear-Type Supports by Analysis for Class 1 Component Sup-ports, and Appendix XVII-2110(a), Linear Elastic Analysis, specify an allowable stress increase for emergency and faulted conditions.
2.7.3     Correspondence from K. Ennis, Assistant Secretary of ASME, to W. M. Eifert of SWEC, dated September 25, 1985, confirms this position (Reference 4.2).
The emergency condition is stated as having a
one-third allowable increase.
Both para-graph NF 3231.1(b) and Appendix XVII-21100 refer to ASME Section III, Subsection NF for the faulted condition, where the factor is always greater than one-third.
2.7.2 AISC has allowed the one-third increase since the 7th edition.
2.7.3 Correspondence from K. Ennis, Assistant Secretary of ASME, to W. M. Eifert of SWEC, dated September 25, 1985, confirms this position (Reference 4.2).
2.8 Welding Practices SWEC-PSAS reviewed WPS-11032 and concluded that it is a qualified procedure in accordance with ASME Section IX, and thus, the limita-tions of AWS for prequalified weld configurations do not apply.
2.8 Welding Practices SWEC-PSAS reviewed WPS-11032 and concluded that it is a qualified procedure in accordance with ASME Section IX, and thus, the limita-tions of AWS for prequalified weld configurations do not apply.
Therefore, all pipe support welds fabricated in accordance with weld procedure WPS-11032 are in compliance with the ASME Code.
Therefore, all pipe support welds fabricated in accordance with weld procedure WPS-11032 are in compliance with the ASME Code.
A27-3                                                   '
A27-3


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      . p*                                                 Furthermore, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), using an     I 1                                              NRC staf f comparison of ASME versus AWS and their own review of ex-     I isting welding procedures, concluded (on June 29, 1984, Refer-ence 4.4) that compliance with the ASME code has been adequate to         ,
. p*
assure the acceptability of the CPSES welding procedures.
Furthermore, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), using an I
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
NRC staf f comparison of ASME versus AWS and their own review of ex-I 1
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
isting welding procedures, concluded (on June 29, 1984, Refer-ence 4.4) that compliance with the ASME code has been adequate to assure the acceptability of the CPSES welding procedures.
* All the pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of is-sues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under     provisions     of     10CFR50.55(e)   (see   Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
* The corrective action to resolve pipe support welding concerns was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7 during the design validation.
All the pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of is-sues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.       j 4.0 References 4.1 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987.
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
O\
The corrective action to resolve pipe support welding concerns was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in -2 of CPPP-7 during the design validation.
(s/                                   4.2 Letter from K. Ennis, Assistant Secretary of ASME, to W. M. Eifert of SWEC dated September 25, 1985.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.3 Design of Welded Structures, Omer W. Blodgett, 1966.
j 4.0 References 4.1 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987.
4.4 ASLB Memorandum and Order LBP-84-25         (Written - Filing Decisions, No. 1:   Some AWS/ASME Issues), June 29, 1984.
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4.2 Letter from K. Ennis, Assistant Secretary of ASME, to W. M. Eifert of SWEC dated September 25, 1985.
4.3 Design of Welded Structures, Omer W.
Blodgett, 1966.
4.4 ASLB Memorandum and Order LBP-84-25 (Written - Filing Decisions, No. 1:
Some AWS/ASME Issues), June 29, 1984.
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l A27-4


eg                                              SUBAPPENDIX A28 I             i ANCHOR BOLTS /EMBEDMENT PLATES 1.0 Definition of the Issue Issues were raised (Reference 4.1) involving embedment plate, anchor bolt, and base place designs at CPSES. They are as follows:
SUBAPPENDIX A28 eg I
1.1   Embedment Plates and Through-Bolts The issue was that there was no evidence that the spacing between attachments to embedment plates was checked at CPSES and that for existing designs, moment connections to the embedments require stiff-eners, but no procedure for the design of a stiffener was provided.
i ANCHOR BOLTS /EMBEDMENT PLATES 1.0 Definition of the Issue Issues were raised (Reference 4.1) involving embedment plate, anchor bolt, and base place designs at CPSES. They are as follows:
1.1 Embedment Plates and Through-Bolts The issue was that there was no evidence that the spacing between attachments to embedment plates was checked at CPSES and that for existing designs, moment connections to the embedments require stiff-eners, but no procedure for the design of a stiffener was provided.
Also, there was no written evidence documenting that as-built loads from pipe supports that use through-bolts were transmitted to the Civil / Structural Group for acceptance.
Also, there was no written evidence documenting that as-built loads from pipe supports that use through-bolts were transmitted to the Civil / Structural Group for acceptance.
In addition, several instances were observed of Hilti Kwik-bolts in-stalled close to through-bolt base plates that were not shown on the support drawing.
In addition, several instances were observed of Hilti Kwik-bolts in-stalled close to through-bolt base plates that were not shown on the support drawing.
1.2   Base Plate Edge Distance i
1.2 Base Plate Edge Distance iV The issue was that anchor bolt edge distance tolerances could result in a 15-percent increase in base plate stresses for base plate de-signs with struts, springs, or snubbers with a 5-degree offset.
V                          The issue was that anchor bolt edge distance tolerances could result in a 15-percent increase in base plate stresses for base plate de-signs with struts, springs, or snubbers with a 5-degree offset.
1.3 Hilti Kwik-Bolt Embedment Length The issue was that there was a discrepancy identified between the bolt embedment lengths on support drawings and the lengths used in calculations.
1.3   Hilti Kwik-Bolt Embedment Length The issue was that there was a discrepancy identified between the bolt embedment lengths on support drawings and the lengths used in           <
calculations.
1.4 Concrete Edge Distance Violation The issue was that instances were observed where pipe sleeve penetra-tions exist close to support base plates but were not shown on sup-port drawings.
1.4 Concrete Edge Distance Violation The issue was that instances were observed where pipe sleeve penetra-tions exist close to support base plates but were not shown on sup-port drawings.
2.0   Issue Resolution These issues were addressed as described below:
2.0 Issue Resolution These issues were addressed as described below:
The SWEC Civil / Structural Corrective Action Program (SWEC-C/S-CAP) devel-oped uniform desi p;n criteria for all concrete anchorages (References 4.2 and 4.3), including the evaluation of spacing between different discipline         i commodities. The   design   criteria were     incorporated into   CPPP-7, I
The SWEC Civil / Structural Corrective Action Program (SWEC-C/S-CAP) devel-oped uniform desi p;n criteria for all concrete anchorages (References 4.2 i
and 4.3), including the evaluation of spacing between different discipline commodities.
The design criteria were incorporated into CPPP-7, I
A28-1 i
A28-1 i


Attachments 4-4, 4-5, and 4-25 via SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-210.
Attachments 4-4, 4-5, and 4-25 via SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-210.
(                         Pipe support anchorage validation was performed in accordance with these attachments.                   Specific resolutions of these issues are as follows:
(
2.1     Embedment Plates and Through-Bolts SWEC Civil / Structural is responsible for structural attachment load evaluations. CPPP-6 controlled the transmittal of pipe support at-tachment loads on embedded plates, through-bolts, and base plates to SWEC Civil / Structural discipline. SWEC Civil / Structural will identi-fy base plates installed close to through-bolts to SWEC-PSAS for val-idation.                   SWEC Civil / Structural design validation of embedded plates and                 structures   is     described     in   the   Civil / Structural PSR (Reference 4.3).
Pipe support anchorage validation was performed in accordance with these attachments.
Specific resolutions of these issues are as follows:
2.1 Embedment Plates and Through-Bolts SWEC Civil / Structural is responsible for structural attachment load evaluations.
CPPP-6 controlled the transmittal of pipe support at-tachment loads on embedded plates, through-bolts, and base plates to SWEC Civil / Structural discipline.
SWEC Civil / Structural will identi-fy base plates installed close to through-bolts to SWEC-PSAS for val-idation.
SWEC Civil / Structural design validation of embedded plates and structures is described in the Civil / Structural PSR (Reference 4.3).
2.2 Base Plate Edge Distance An analysis was performed by SWEC-PSAS to determine the effects of edge distance tolerances on the bolt loads and plate stresses, and it was concluded that the edge distance tolerance was acceptable.
2.2 Base Plate Edge Distance An analysis was performed by SWEC-PSAS to determine the effects of edge distance tolerances on the bolt loads and plate stresses, and it was concluded that the edge distance tolerance was acceptable.
Furthermore, the PCHVP will validate the as-built base plate bolt hole edge distances.
Furthermore, the PCHVP will validate the as-built base plate bolt hole edge distances.
2.3 Hilti Kwik-Bolt Embedment Length Embedment lengths shown on the drawings were used in calculations to
2.3 Hilti Kwik-Bolt Embedment Length Embedment lengths shown on the drawings were used in calculations to
              *O                               validate pipe support anchorage designs in accordance with Attach-ment 4-4 of CPPP-7.
*O validate pipe support anchorage designs in accordance with Attach-ment 4-4 of CPPP-7.
2.4 Concrete Edge Distance Violation During PCHVP, SWEC Civil / Structural will identify base plates which are installed close to pipe sleeve penetrations and transmit this information to SWEC-PSAS for validation.                 Base plate validation is performed in accordance with CPPP-7.
2.4 Concrete Edge Distance Violation During PCHVP, SWEC Civil / Structural will identify base plates which are installed close to pipe sleeve penetrations and transmit this information to SWEC-PSAS for validation.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
Base plate validation is performed in accordance with CPPP-7.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
* The corrective action to resolve the anchorage issues has been accom-plished by the incorporation of the DBD (Reference 4.2) into CPPP-7 l                                                         for the validation of embedments in concrete and the PCHVP for the identification of anchorage spacing violations.
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
f L
The corrective action to resolve the anchorage issues has been accom-plished by the incorporation of the DBD (Reference 4.2) into CPPP-7 l
A28-2
for the validation of embedments in concrete and the PCHVP for the f
identification of anchorage spacing violations.
L A28-2


I
I The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C 4.0 References 4.1 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120, dated September 18, 1987.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C 4.0 References 4.1 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120, dated September 18, 1987.
4.2 TU Electric, CPSES Units 1 and 2, Design Basis Document DBD-CS-015, Revision 4, June 10, 1987 4.3 TU Electric, CPSES Unit I and Common, Civil / Structural Project Status Report, Revision 0, October 1987 13 V
4.2 TU Electric, CPSES Units 1 and 2, Design Basis Document DBD-CS-015, Revision 4, June 10, 1987 4.3 TU Electric, CPSES Unit I and Common, Civil / Structural Project Status Report, Revision 0, October 1987 13 V
o A28-3 L   __
o A28-3 L


SUBAPPENDIX A29 l  s                              STRUT / SNUBBER ANGULARITY 1.0 Definition of the Issue 1.1 The issue (Reference 4.1) was that the loading component                                 (" kick" load) resulting from the angular swing of' the strut / snubber from its nominal position, due to construction tolerances and pipe movements, was not assessed in designs.
SUBAPPENDIX A29 STRUT / SNUBBER ANGULARITY l
1.2 The NRC Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin IEB-79-14 program re-2 deg to be measured
s 1.0 Definition of the Issue 1.1 The issue (Reference 4.1) was that the loading component
                                            ~
(" kick" load) resulting from the angular swing of' the strut / snubber from its nominal position, due to construction tolerances and pipe movements, was not assessed in designs.
quires all as-built angular tolerances over and assessed (Reference 4.2). The issue was that the construction angular   tolerance   for the     installed CPSES struts / snubbers was i 5 degrees.
1.2 The NRC Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin IEB-79-14 program re-quires all as-built angular tolerances over 2 deg to be measured
2.0 Issue Resolution                                                                                       .
~
l 2.1 The angular swing .of struts / snubbers due to construction tolerances                             !
and assessed (Reference 4.2).
and pipe movements from applicable thermal, seismic, and/or fluid                                 I transients were assessed. The effect of the swing angle load compo-                               ;
The issue was that the construction angular tolerance for the installed CPSES struts / snubbers was i 5 degrees.
nent (maximum swing angle of         5 deg) was considered in the support design. If the i 5-deg tolerance was exceeded, the proper function and load rating of strut / snubber assemblies were ensured in addition to the component load consideration. These requirements were includ-O           ed in Sections 4.2 and 4.2.6 of CPPP-7, 2.2 All installed struts / snubbers were measured and those that exceeded i 2-deg tolerance were assessed in the validation program.
2.0 Issue Resolution l
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
2.1 The angular swing.of struts / snubbers due to construction tolerances and pipe movements from applicable thermal, seismic, and/or fluid I
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
transients were assessed.
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
The effect of the swing angle load compo-nent (maximum swing angle of 5 deg) was considered in the support design.
* The corrective action to resolte the issue of strut / snubber angulari-ty was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria pro-vided   in Sections 4.2     and   4.2.6 of CPPP-7 during the design validation and is physically validated in the Post Construction Hard-ware Validation Program (PCHVP) through the implementation of Field Verification Method CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 (Reference 4.3).
If the i 5-deg tolerance was exceeded, the proper function and load rating of strut / snubber assemblies were ensured in addition to the component load consideration. These requirements were includ-O ed in Sections 4.2 and 4.2.6 of CPPP-7, 2.2 All installed struts / snubbers were measured and those that exceeded i 2-deg tolerance were assessed in the validation program.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
The corrective action to resolte the issue of strut / snubber angulari-ty was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria pro-vided in Sections 4.2 and 4.2.6 of CPPP-7 during the design validation and is physically validated in the Post Construction Hard-ware Validation Program (PCHVP) through the implementation of Field Verification Method CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 (Reference 4.3).
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
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4.0 References O
4.0 References O
4.1 Transcript of Proceedings of Feedback Discussion Between USNRC and Walsh and Doyle on the Concerns About the CPSES, March 23, 1985 4.2 NUREG-0797, Supplementary No. 11, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of CPSES Units 1 and 2, USNRC, . Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, May 1985 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Field Verification Method, Hardware Valida-tion   and   Supplemental Inspection Programs CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081, Revision 0, July 29, 1987 A29-2
4.1 Transcript of Proceedings of Feedback Discussion Between USNRC and Walsh and Doyle on the Concerns About the CPSES, March 23, 1985 4.2 NUREG-0797, Supplementary No. 11, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of CPSES Units 1 and 2, USNRC,. Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, May 1985 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Field Verification Method, Hardware Valida-tion and Supplemental Inspection Programs CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081, Revision 0, July 29, 1987 A29-2


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SUBAPPENDIX A30 U                               COMPONENT QUALIFICATION 1
SUBAPPENDIX A30 U
l     1.0 Definition of the Issue j
COMPONENT QUALIFICATION 1
l 1.0 Definition of the Issue j
Issues related to the qualification of member components in CPSES pipe supports were identified as follows (Reference 4.1):
Issues related to the qualification of member components in CPSES pipe supports were identified as follows (Reference 4.1):
1.1 Dynamic Pipe Movements in Support Design                                 I The issue was that all dynamic piping movements were not included in     ;
I 1.1 Dynamic Pipe Movements in Support Design The issue was that all dynamic piping movements were not included in the support design when checking frame gaps, swing angles, or spring j
the support design when checking frame gaps, swing angles, or spring     j travel. Existing designs addressed only the seismic effects. This     l is applicable to frame gaps in the unrestrained direction, strut /       {
travel.
snubber swing angles, and both spring and snubber travel.               {
Existing designs addressed only the seismic effects.
1.2 Incorrect Standard Component Allowables                                 ;
This l
l The issue was that incorrect U-bolt allowables were used in the de-     l sign of support RH-1-064-011-S22R.                                       l 1.3 Untightened Locknut on Struts The issue was that the upper locknut on one strut was not tightened, O           which could lead to rotation of the strut and a subsequent load redistribution.
is applicable to frame gaps in the unrestrained direction, strut /
1.4 Inverted Snubbers The issue was that four supports were identified in which the snub-bers were installed 180 degrees from the configuration shown on the support drawings.                                                       l 2.0 Issue Resolution                                                             j 2.1 Dynamic Pipe Movements in Support Design                                 I l
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Predicted pipe movements for all design conditions for pipe supports were evaluated in the design validation in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.2.
snubber swing angles, and both spring and snubber travel.
2.2   Incorrect Standard Component Allowables RH-1-064-011-S22R was a cinched U-bolt support with a strut.       This support is being modified in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.2.5.1.
{
Component standard-type pipe supports were validated in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.1, by comparison to vendor-supplied load ca-       j pacity data sheets (LCD) or certified design report summaries (CDRS).
1.2 Incorrect Standard Component Allowables l
The issue was that incorrect U-bolt allowables were used in the de-l sign of support RH-1-064-011-S22R.
l 1.3 Untightened Locknut on Struts The issue was that the upper locknut on one strut was not tightened, O
which could lead to rotation of the strut and a subsequent load redistribution.
1.4 Inverted Snubbers The issue was that four supports were identified in which the snub-bers were installed 180 degrees from the configuration shown on the support drawings.
l 2.0 Issue Resolution j
2.1 Dynamic Pipe Movements in Support Design I
l Predicted pipe movements for all design conditions for pipe supports were evaluated in the design validation in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.2.
2.2 Incorrect Standard Component Allowables RH-1-064-011-S22R was a cinched U-bolt support with a strut.
This support is being modified in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.2.5.1.
Component standard-type pipe supports were validated in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.1, by comparison to vendor-supplied load ca-j pacity data sheets (LCD) or certified design report summaries (CDRS).
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2.3 Untightened Locknuts on Struts The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is being performed to validate the proper hardware installation including       '
2.3 Untightened Locknuts on Struts The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is being performed to validate the proper hardware installation including locknuts throuth inspections performed in accordance with Field Veri-fication Method CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081.
locknuts throuth inspections performed in accordance with Field Veri-fication Method CPE-SWEC- FVM-PS-081.
-2.4 Inverted Snubbers
                  -2.4     Inverted Snubbers
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The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is being performed to validate the proper hardware installation including
The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is being performed to validate the proper hardware installation including anubbers through inspections performed in accordance with Field Veri-fication Method CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081.
;                          anubbers through inspections performed in accordance with Field Veri-fication Method CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Actica l
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Actica                                                 !
No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
l
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in l
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.
Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under i
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in       l Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under     i provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
The corrective action to resolve the locknut and snubber installation issues is being accomplished through the implementation of pipe sup-port hardware inspections and rework.     The corrective action to re-solve the component allowable and dynamic pipe movement issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of .CPPP-7 during the design validation. The corrective action to resolve the design of Support RH-1-064-011-S22R was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided '
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
The corrective action to resolve the locknut and snubber installation issues is being accomplished through the implementation of pipe sup-port hardware inspections and rework.
The corrective action to re-solve the component allowable and dynamic pipe movement issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of.CPPP-7 during the design validation.
The corrective action to resolve the design of Support RH-1-064-011-S22R was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided '
in CPPP-7, Section 4.2.5.1.
in CPPP-7, Section 4.2.5.1.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1     CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 4.2 SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Fiel'd Verification Method, Hardware Valid-ation and Supplemental       Inspection Programs CPC-SWEC-FVM-PS-081, Revision 0, July 29, 1987 i
4.0 References 4.1 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 4.2 SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Fiel'd Verification Method, Hardware Valid-ation and Supplemental Inspection Programs CPC-SWEC-FVM-PS-081, Revision 0, July 29, 1987 i
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SilBAPPENDIX A31 STRUCTURAL MODELING FOR FRAME ANALYSIS 1.0 Definition of the Issue Issues were raised (Reference 4.1) relating to the structural modeling for frame supports:
SilBAPPENDIX A31 STRUCTURAL MODELING FOR FRAME ANALYSIS 1.0 Definition of the Issue Issues were raised (Reference 4.1) relating to the structural modeling for frame supports:
1.1 Torsion Evaluation The issue was that for wide flauge members, the torsional deflections were underestimated and members were not checked for local stresses at points of torsional loading.
1.1 Torsion Evaluation The issue was that for wide flauge members, the torsional deflections were underestimated and members were not checked for local stresses at points of torsional loading.
1.2 Boundary Conditions for Richmond Insert / Tube Steel Connections The issue was that modeling of member end restraints at Richmand insert / tube steel connections was inconsistent. Three different mem-ber end conditions varying from fully fixed to fully free were as-sumed. Each assxaption may be conservative for one member and uncon-servative for another.
1.2 Boundary Conditions for Richmond Insert / Tube Steel Connections The issue was that modeling of member end restraints at Richmand insert / tube steel connections was inconsistent.
1.3 Support Boundary Conditions The issue was that supports were identified in which the assumed A                   boundary conditions were questionable.
Three different mem-ber end conditions varying from fully fixed to fully free were as-sumed.
2.0   Issue Resolution 2.1 Torsion Evaluation In accordance with Section 4.3.2.1 of CPPP-7 member properties used in the pipe support validation, including values for torsional resis-tance, were taken from AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 8th Edi-tion. Tables 4.7.2-3 through 4.7.2-7 of CPPP-7 provided equations for evaluating member stresses,     including local effects due to tor-sional loading.
Each assxaption may be conservative for one member and uncon-servative for another.
2.2 Boundary Conditions for Richmond Insert Tube Steel Connections Consistent modeling techniques ware used for Richmond insert tube steel connection validation as specified in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-5 to assure that member end restraints were properly modeled.
1.3 Support Boundary Conditions The issue was that supports were identified in which the assumed A
2.3 Support Boundary Conditions Attachment of the pipe support to the building structure was reflect-l                       ed in the frame analysis by the proper modeling of the connection I                       stiffness in accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-18.
boundary conditions were questionable.
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2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Torsion Evaluation In accordance with Section 4.3.2.1 of CPPP-7 member properties used in the pipe support validation, including values for torsional resis-tance, were taken from AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 8th Edi-tion.
Tables 4.7.2-3 through 4.7.2-7 of CPPP-7 provided equations for evaluating member stresses, including local effects due to tor-sional loading.
2.2 Boundary Conditions for Richmond Insert Tube Steel Connections Consistent modeling techniques ware used for Richmond insert tube steel connection validation as specified in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-5 to assure that member end restraints were properly modeled.
2.3 Support Boundary Conditions Attachment of the pipe support to the building structure was reflect-l ed in the frame analysis by the proper modeling of the connection I
stiffness in accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-18.
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  ,_                            3.0 Correcti .y. gJ Preventive Action
3.0 Correcti.y. gJ Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A3' were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A3' were determined to be reportable under provisions of     10CFR50.55(e)   (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
* The corrective action to resolve this issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Sec-tion 4.3.2.1, Tables 4.7.2-3 and 4.7.2-7, and Attachments 4-5 and 4-18 during the design validation.
The corrective action to resolve this issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Sec-tion 4.3.2.1, Tables 4.7.2-3 and 4.7.2-7, and Attachments 4-5 and 4-18 during the design validation.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Sections VII and XII, August 22, 1983 O) i u.-
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Sections VII and XII, August 22, 1983 O) iu.-
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SUBAPPENDIX A32 O
SUBAPPENDIX A32 O
COMPUTER PROGRAM VERIFICATION AND USE 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 and 4.2) was whether there was adequate quality assurance for the verification and use of appropriate versions of the following computer programs:
COMPUTER PROGRAM VERIFICATION AND USE 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 and 4.2) was whether there was adequate quality assurance for the verification and use of appropriate versions of the following computer programs:
* ADLPIPE Version 2C (dated April 1977) - Piping Analysis FUB-II - Base Plate Qualification - ITT Grinnell
ADLPIPE Version 2C (dated April 1977) - Piping Analysis FUB-II - Base Plate Qualification - ITT Grinnell Corner and Lada Base Plate Qualification Program 2.0 Issue Resolution The computer programs for which specific issues were raised were not used in the pipe stress and pipe support validation effort.
* Corner and Lada Base Plate Qualification Program 2.0 Issue Resolution The computer programs for which specific issues were raised were not used in the pipe stress and pipe support validation effort.
The computer programs that were used for piping and pipe support valida-tion were identified in CPPP-7, Section 5.0.
The computer programs that were used for piping and pipe support valida-tion were identified in CPPP-7, Section 5.0.
The computer programs used in the validation effort were verified in ac-cordance with SWEC QA program requirements for verification, technical adequacy, and appropriate version.     The computer program verification was documented, and identified the various project applications.
The computer programs used in the validation effort were verified in ac-cordance with SWEC QA program requirements for verification, technical adequacy, and appropriate version.
: p.                               -
The computer program verification was documented, and identified the various project applications.
(/               3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
p.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
(/
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72) .
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
* The corrective action to resolve the concern regarding computer pro-gram verification was accomplished through the implementation of the SWEC Quality Assurance Program.
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
* Ths preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
The corrective action to resolve the concern regarding computer pro-gram verification was accomplished through the implementation of the SWEC Quality Assurance Program.
4.0 References 4.1   CYGNA Design Control Review Issues List, Revision 1,     June 21, 1985 4.2 NRC Inspection Report No. 50-445/83-12:50-446/83-07, Inspection Con-ducted by J. I. Tapia and W. Paul Chen, May 13, 1983 n
Ths preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
          !                                                      A32-1 1
4.0 References 4.1 CYGNA Design Control Review Issues List, Revision 1, June 21, 1985 4.2 NRC Inspection Report No. 50-445/83-12:50-446/83-07, Inspection Con-ducted by J. I. Tapia and W. Paul Chen, May 13, 1983 n
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SUBAPPENDIX A33 iO HYDROTEST Cj 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 and 4.2) was that hydrostatic test loading con-ditions were not properly considered for ASME Section III Code Class 2 and 3 piping analysis and pipe support designs.
SUBAPPENDIX A33 O
2.0 Issue Resolution The hydrotest loads for piping and supports were evaluated for 1.5 times the design pressure, in accordance with the ASME Section III Code of Record, except for the ASME Section III Class 2 and 3 piping, which was evaluated for 1.25 times the design pressure consistent with the actual hydrostatic test conditions.     The lower design pressure for Classes 2 and 3 piping is in accordance with a later code version which is accept-able, since the project met the requirements of ASME Section III Code pa ragraph NA-1140, which allows the use of later Code provisions where appropriate. Evaluation of piping and supports for hydrotest loading was performed as spec.ified in CPPP-7, bections 3.6.2.4 and 4.7.2.
i HYDROTEST Cj 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 and 4.2) was that hydrostatic test loading con-ditions were not properly considered for ASME Section III Code Class 2 and 3 piping analysis and pipe support designs.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
2.0 Issue Resolution The hydrotest loads for piping and supports were evaluated for 1.5 times the design pressure, in accordance with the ASME Section III Code of Record, except for the ASME Section III Class 2 and 3 piping, which was evaluated for 1.25 times the design pressure consistent with the actual hydrostatic test conditions.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution
The lower design pressure for Classes 2 and 3 piping is in accordance with a later code version which is accept-able, since the project met the requirements of ASME Section III Code pa ragraph NA-1140, which allows the use of later Code provisions where appropriate.
  /                           of thia issue.
Evaluation of piping and supports for hydrotest loading was performed as spec.ified in CPPP-7, bections 3.6.2.4 and 4.7.2.
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3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)       (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
/
* The corrective action to resolve the hydrotest issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, See-tions 3.6.2.4 and 4.7.2, during the design validation.
of thia issue.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
'u Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section XIII, August 22, 1983 4.2 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 I
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
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The corrective action to resolve the hydrotest issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, See-tions 3.6.2.4 and 4.7.2, during the design validation.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Section XIII, August 22, 1983 4.2 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 I
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SUBAPPENDIX A34
SUBAPPENDIX A34
  'V                                 SEISMIC /NONSEISMIC INTERFACE 1.0 Definition of the Issue The following issues (Reference 4.1) were raised relating to the design of isolation anchors:
'V SEISMIC /NONSEISMIC INTERFACE 1.0 Definition of the Issue The following issues (Reference 4.1) were raised relating to the design of isolation anchors:
1.1 Seismic Category I Piping Attached to Nonseismic Piping The issue was that the seismic effects of nonseismic piping attached to safety-related piping were not adequately considered.
1.1 Seismic Category I Piping Attached to Nonseismic Piping The issue was that the seismic effects of nonseismic piping attached to safety-related piping were not adequately considered.
1.1 Piping Routed Between Seismic Category I and Nonseismic Buildings 1.2.1     The issue was that safety-related piping was not seismi-cally isolated when it was routed between seismic Cate-gory I and nonseismic buildings.
1.1 Piping Routed Between Seismic Category I and Nonseismic Buildings 1.2.1 The issue was that safety-related piping was not seismi-cally isolated when it was routed between seismic Cate-gory I and nonseismic buildings.
1.2.2     Tbe issue was that postulated failure of the turbine build-ing due to an earthquake, which is a nonseismic building, was not considered in the design of safety-related piping which is routed between the turbine building and seismic Category I buildings.
1.2.2 Tbe issue was that postulated failure of the turbine build-ing due to an earthquake, which is a nonseismic building, was not considered in the design of safety-related piping which is routed between the turbine building and seismic Category I buildings.
Oi t         2.0 Issue Resolution J
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2.1 Seismic Category I Piping Attached to Nonseismic Piping In accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-10, Sections 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 the following two methods were used for the design validation of safety-related piping attached to nonseismic pipinS:
2.0 Issue Resolution J
2.1.1     A plastic hinge was assumed to occur on the nonseismic pip-ing immediately adjoining the anchor. The anchor was ana-lyzed for plastic moments.
2.1 Seismic Category I Piping Attached to Nonseismic Piping In accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-10, Sections 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 the following two methods were used for the design validation of safety-related piping attached to nonseismic pipinS:
2.1.2     One or mote restraints and the piping supported by these restraints on the nonseismic side were seismically ana-lyzed. In addition, the effect of the remaining portion of nonseismic piping was accounted for by the assumption of a plastic hinge.
2.1.1 A plastic hinge was assumed to occur on the nonseismic pip-ing immediately adjoining the anchor.
2.2 Piping Routed Between Seismic Category I and Nonseismic Buildings SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum No. PM-203 clarified the requirements of l                   CPPP-7, Attachment 4-10, and limits the use of Option 2.1.2 to piping in seismically analyzed buildings. Therefore, the interface between seismic Category I piping and nonseismic piping occurring at the       j
The anchor was ana-lyzed for plastic moments.
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2.1.2 One or mote restraints and the piping supported by these restraints on the nonseismic side were seismically ana-lyzed.
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In addition, the effect of the remaining portion of nonseismic piping was accounted for by the assumption of a plastic hinge.
2.2 Piping Routed Between Seismic Category I and Nonseismic Buildings SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum No. PM-203 clarified the requirements of l
CPPP-7, Attachment 4-10, and limits the use of Option 2.1.2 to piping in seismically analyzed buildings.
Therefore, the interface between seismic Category I piping and nonseismic piping occurring at the j
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      /'                           boundary between seismic Category I and nonseismic buildings (e.g.,
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boundary between seismic Category I and nonseismic buildings (e.g.,
the main steam line) was modeled by a plastic hinge as discussed in Item 2.1.2.
the main steam line) was modeled by a plastic hinge as discussed in Item 2.1.2.
i 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
i 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.                                                         !
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (See Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (See Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
The corrective action to resolve the seismic /nonseismic interface issue was a momplished through the implementation of criteria provid-ed in CPPP-/, Attachment 4-10 during the design validation.
* The corrective action to resolve the seismic /nonseismic interface issue was a momplished through the implementation of criteria provid-ed in CPPP-/, Attachment 4-10 during the design validation.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C. t 4.0 References 4.1 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revisicn 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987                         i l
t 4.0 References 4.1 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revisicn 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 i
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A34-2 C                                                         _                                          _
A34-2 C


SUBAPPENDIX A35 1%
SUBAPPENDIX A35 1%
kb                                   OTHER ISSUES 1.0 Definition of the Issue Subappendixes Al through A34 have addressed the CPRT and external issues (excluding the SSER and CPRT-QOC issues addressed in Subappendixes A36 through A39). These 34 subappendixes represent the consolidation of all but 51 of the 972 piping-related Discrepancy Issue Reports (DIRs), gener-ated by TENERA, L. P. to track closure of issues as part of their third party review. The remaining 51 DIRs (Reference 4.1, Attachment B) are unrelated to the 34 primary issue topics discussed in the previous 34 sub-appendixes. The issues raised by these 51 DIRs must be resolved by the SWEC-PSAS validation effort.
kb OTHER ISSUES 1.0 Definition of the Issue Subappendixes Al through A34 have addressed the CPRT and external issues (excluding the SSER and CPRT-QOC issues addressed in Subappendixes A36 through A39).
2.0 Issue Resolution SWEC-PSAS resolved the issue identified in each of the 51 DIRs described above by referencing the applicable design or administrative procedure that resolved each issue. These 51 DIRs are considered closed by SWEC-PSAS and TENERA, L. P.
These 34 subappendixes represent the consolidation of all but 51 of the 972 piping-related Discrepancy Issue Reports (DIRs), gener-ated by TENERA, L. P.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
to track closure of issues as part of their third party review.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution p           of this issue.
The remaining 51 DIRs (Reference 4.1, Attachment B) are unrelated to the 34 primary issue topics discussed in the previous 34 sub-appendixes.
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
The issues raised by these 51 DIRs must be resolved by the SWEC-PSAS validation effort.
* The corrective action to resolve this issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-6 and CPPP-7.
2.0 Issue Resolution SWEC-PSAS resolved the issue identified in each of the 51 DIRs described above by referencing the applicable design or administrative procedure that resolved each issue.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
These 51 DIRs are considered closed by SWEC-PSAS and TENERA, L. P.
4.0 References 4.1 CPRT Design Adequacy Program Descipline Specific Results Report:
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution p
Piping and Supports, DAP-RR-P-001, Revision 1, August 27, 1987 l                                         A35-1
of this issue.
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
The corrective action to resolve this issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-6 and CPPP-7.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1 CPRT Design Adequacy Program Descipline Specific Results Report:
Piping and Supports, DAP-RR-P-001, Revision 1, August 27, 1987 l
A35-1


l l
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SUBAPPENDIX A36
SUBAPPENDIX A36
; ( ,/                                     SSER-8 REVIEW 1.0 Definition of the Issue SSER-8 describes the NRC Staf f evaluation and resolution of technical is-sues relating to the civil, structural, and miscellaneous issues of CPSES (Reference 4.1).
(,/
SSER-8 REVIEW 1.0 Definition of the Issue SSER-8 describes the NRC Staf f evaluation and resolution of technical is-sues relating to the civil, structural, and miscellaneous issues of CPSES (Reference 4.1).
The issue war whether the concrete design strength of CPSES safety-related concrete installed between January 1976 and February 1977 was 4,000 psi or greater.
The issue war whether the concrete design strength of CPSES safety-related concrete installed between January 1976 and February 1977 was 4,000 psi or greater.
2.0   Issue Resolution The results of the concrete strength tests, performed between January 1976 and February 1977, were reviewed by the SWEC Civil / Structural Group (Reference 4.2). As a result of the consistency between the cylinder dats and the Schmidt-Hammer data, SWEC Civil / Structural concluded that there is no evidence of systematic falsification of cylinder data or improper test-ing; therefore, it was further concluded that the 4000 psi design strength of the safety-related concrete placed during that period was substantiated (Reference 4.3).
2.0 Issue Resolution The results of the concrete strength tests, performed between January 1976 and February 1977, were reviewed by the SWEC Civil / Structural Group (Reference 4.2).
As a result of the consistency between the cylinder dats and the Schmidt-Hammer data, SWEC Civil / Structural concluded that there is no evidence of systematic falsification of cylinder data or improper test-ing; therefore, it was further concluded that the 4000 psi design strength of the safety-related concrete placed during that period was substantiated (Reference 4.3).
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action N- '
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action N- '
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
* This issue has been determined to be not reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e).
This issue has been determined to be not reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e).
* No corrective action on the design basis is required due to this issue.
No corrective action on the design basis is required due to this issue.
* Current construction and QC concrete testing procedures are adequate.
Current construction and QC concrete testing procedures are adequate.
No additional preventive action is required due to this issue.
No additional preventive action is required due to this issue.
4.0 References 4.1   NUREG-0797, Supplement No. 8, Sections 3.1.3 and 4.1.2, Safety Evalu-ation Reported Related to the Operation of CPSES Units 1 and 2, Dock-et Nos. 50-a45 and 50-446, USNRC, February 1985 4.2 TU Electric CPSES Unit 1 and Common, Civil / Structural, Project Status Report, Revision 0                                                     j 4.3 CPRT Action Plan II.b Results Report, Concrete Compression Strength, Revision 1, February 28, 1986 1
4.0 References 4.1 NUREG-0797, Supplement No. 8, Sections 3.1.3 and 4.1.2, Safety Evalu-ation Reported Related to the Operation of CPSES Units 1 and 2, Dock-et Nos. 50-a45 and 50-446, USNRC, February 1985 4.2 TU Electric CPSES Unit 1 and Common, Civil / Structural, Project Status Report, Revision 0 j
(/~')s A36-1                                       i l
4.3 CPRT Action Plan II.b Results Report, Concrete Compression Strength, Revision 1, February 28, 1986
j
(/~')s 1
A36-1 i
l j


l SUBAPPENDIX A37                                                       l O.
l SUBAPPENDIX A37 l
V                                     SSER-10 REVIEW 1.0 Definition of the Issue                                                                             i j
O.
SSER-10 describes the NRC Staff evaluation and resolution of technical                             )
V SSER-10 REVIEW 1.0 Definition of the Issue i
issues relating to the mechanical and piping group (Reference 4.1). The                             !
j SSER-10 describes the NRC Staff evaluation and resolution of technical
four piping design related issues are:
)
1.1 Uncontrolled Weld Repairs by Plug Welding The SSER indicated that a plan is required for sampling inspection of plug welds in CPSES for cable tray supports, pipe supports, and base plates. A bounding analysis is required to assess the ranging ef-fects of uncontrolled plug welds on pipe supports, cable tray sup-ports, and base plates to serve their intended functions. A report documenting the results of the assessment is required.
issues relating to the mechanical and piping group (Reference 4.1).
1.2 Installation of Main Steam Line Pires - Unit 1, Loop 1 The SSER indicated that Tasks 4.5.1 through 4.5.8 in SSER-10, which iaclude stress assessment and nondestructive examination of Loop 1 msin steam (MS) and feedwater (FW) lines, must be performed. Results of analysis, examinations, and reviews are required to be documented fg           in a report.
The four piping design related issues are:
V       1.3 Isolation of Seismic Category I Piping from Nonseismic Piping The SSER indicated that an analysis shall be performed and documen-tation shall show that piping systems such as MS, FW, and auxiliary steam lines routed from seismic Category I to nonseismic Category I buildings are in conformance with the licensing commitments.
1.1 Uncontrolled Weld Repairs by Plug Welding The SSER indicated that a plan is required for sampling inspection of plug welds in CPSES for cable tray supports, pipe supports, and base plates.
A bounding analysis is required to assess the ranging ef-fects of uncontrolled plug welds on pipe supports, cable tray sup-ports, and base plates to serve their intended functions.
A report documenting the results of the assessment is required.
1.2 Installation of Main Steam Line Pires - Unit 1, Loop 1 The SSER indicated that Tasks 4.5.1 through 4.5.8 in SSER-10, which iaclude stress assessment and nondestructive examination of Loop 1 msin steam (MS) and feedwater (FW) lines, must be performed. Results of analysis, examinations, and reviews are required to be documented fg in a report.
V 1.3 Isolation of Seismic Category I Piping from Nonseismic Piping The SSER indicated that an analysis shall be performed and documen-tation shall show that piping systems such as MS, FW, and auxiliary steam lines routed from seismic Category I to nonseismic Category I buildings are in conformance with the licensing commitments.
1.4 As-Built Verification of Type 2 Skewed Welds on NF Supports The SSER indicated that confirmation is required that the Type 2 skewed welds on pipe supports are not undersized. This may be accom-plished through the verification of previous weld inspections or through reinspection.
1.4 As-Built Verification of Type 2 Skewed Welds on NF Supports The SSER indicated that confirmation is required that the Type 2 skewed welds on pipe supports are not undersized. This may be accom-plished through the verification of previous weld inspections or through reinspection.
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Uncontrolled Weld Repairs by Plug Welding SWEC-PSAS reviewed the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) Action Plan V.d Results Report (Reference 4.2) and concluded that since the unau-thorized repair of plug welds does not compromise the structural in-tegrity of the components, there is no impact of plug weld repairs on j               the validation of pipe supports at CPSES.
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Uncontrolled Weld Repairs by Plug Welding SWEC-PSAS reviewed the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) Action Plan V.d Results Report (Reference 4.2) and concluded that since the unau-thorized repair of plug welds does not compromise the structural in-tegrity of the components, there is no impact of plug weld repairs on j
  ,r j L                                         A37-1 1
the validation of pipe supports at CPSES.
,r j
L A37-1 1


2.2   Installation of Main Steam Line Pipes - Unit 1, Loop 1 b                                         The CPRT Action Plan V.e Results Report (Reference 4.3) was reviewed by SWEC-PSAS and, based on the main steam and feedwater pipe stress analysis, which incorporated bounding parameters, it was concluded that no deleterious effects resulted from the sequence of events as-sociated with Unit 1, Loop 1, main steam and feedwater (FW) lines hydrostatic tests.
2.2 Installation of Main Steam Line Pipes - Unit 1, Loop 1 b
The CPRT Action Plan V.e Results Report (Reference 4.3) was reviewed by SWEC-PSAS and, based on the main steam and feedwater pipe stress analysis, which incorporated bounding parameters, it was concluded that no deleterious effects resulted from the sequence of events as-sociated with Unit 1, Loop 1, main steam and feedwater (FW) lines hydrostatic tests.
2.3 Isolation of Seismic Category I Piping from Nonseismic Piping This topic is addressed in Subappendix A34.
2.3 Isolation of Seismic Category I Piping from Nonseismic Piping This topic is addressed in Subappendix A34.
2.4 As-Built Verification of Type 2 Skewed Welds on NF Supports Pipe support welds at CPSES are espected in accordance with Inspec-tion Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 (Reference 4.4). However, since Type 2 skewed welds are typically found on the weld of the trunnion to the pipe, inspection procedures for Type 2 skewed welds were included in the pipin8 weld inspection Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-26 (Reference 4.5).
2.4 As-Built Verification of Type 2 Skewed Welds on NF Supports Pipe support welds at CPSES are espected in accordance with Inspec-tion Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 (Reference 4.4).
CPRT Action Plan V.a Results Report (Reference 4.6) confirmed that inspections were performed in accordance with QI-QAP-11.1-26, and that skewed welds are not undersized. Pipe support weld inspection Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 has since been revised to include inspection procedures for Type 2 skewed welds.
However, since Type 2 skewed welds are typically found on the weld of the trunnion to the pipe, inspection procedures for Type 2 skewed welds were included in the pipin8 weld inspection Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-26 (Reference 4.5).
3.0 C,orrective and Preventive Action
CPRT Action Plan V.a Results Report (Reference 4.6) confirmed that inspections were performed in accordance with QI-QAP-11.1-26, and that skewed welds are not undersized.
* No additional issue was discovered during the review and resolu-tion of this issue.
Pipe support weld inspection Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 has since been revised to include inspection procedures for Type 2 skewed welds.
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of isola-tion of Seismic Category I piping from nonseismic piping has been determined reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
3.0 C,orrective and Preventive Action No additional issue was discovered during the review and resolu-tion of this issue.
(see Subcppendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72). No modifications were re-   ,
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of isola-tion of Seismic Category I piping from nonseismic piping has been determined reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
quired as a result of the resolution of the issues discussed in Sections 1.1, 1.2, and 1.4.
(see Subcppendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
* The corrective action to resolve the issue of the isola-tion of Seismic Category I piping from nonseismic piping has been accom-plished through the implementation of criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-10, during the design validation.
No modifications were re-quired as a result of the resolution of the issues discussed in Sections 1.1, 1.2, and 1.4.
The corrective action to resolve the issue of the installation     j of main steam line piping was accomplished through implementa-     l tion of CPSES Construction Procedure CP-CPM-1.2 (Reference 4.7) and SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPSP-30 (Reference 4.8), which requires engineering to evaluate the installed piping and pipe support configuration including the proper design of temporary supports   l prior to a piping system hydrostatic test to assure the inte-
The corrective action to resolve the issue of the isola-tion of Seismic Category I piping from nonseismic piping has been accom-plished through the implementation of criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-10, during the design validation.
                                                  ;;rity of the installed safety-related piping and pipe supports.
The corrective action to resolve the issue of the installation j
of main steam line piping was accomplished through implementa-l tion of CPSES Construction Procedure CP-CPM-1.2 (Reference 4.7) and SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPSP-30 (Reference 4.8), which requires engineering to evaluate the installed piping and pipe support configuration including the proper design of temporary supports l
prior to a piping system hydrostatic test to assure the inte-
;;rity of the installed safety-related piping and pipe supports.
1 O
1 O
V                                                                       A37-2 l                                                                                                                    i l                                                                                                                     l
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A37-2 i
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i l
i l
l l                               The corrective action for the issue of uncontrolled plug weld
l l
  /                             repair   was accomplished     through enhanced pipe   support l C]/                            installation and inspection criteria.
The corrective action for the issue of uncontrolled plug weld C]/
/
repair was accomplished through enhanced pipe support l
installation and inspection criteria.
The corrective action for the issue of verification of Type 2 skewed welds on NF supports was accomplished through the revi-sion of Weld Inspection Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 to include in-spection procedures for Type 2 skewed welds.
The corrective action for the issue of verification of Type 2 skewed welds on NF supports was accomplished through the revi-sion of Weld Inspection Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 to include in-spection procedures for Type 2 skewed welds.
l
l The preventive action for this issue is specified in Appendix C.
* The preventive action for this issue is specified in Appendix C.
l 1
l 1
1 4.0 References 4.1 NUREG-0797, Supplement No. 10, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of CPSES Units 1 and 2, USNRC, Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, April 1985 4.2 CPRT Action Plan       V.d   Results Report,   Plug Welds, Revision 1, December 18, 1986 4.3 CPRT Action Plan V.e Results Report, Installation of Main Steam Pipes, Revision 1, October 15, 1986 4.4 CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28, Fabrication and Installation Inspection of Safety Class Component Supports p                 4.5 CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-26, Piping and Equip-j                     ment Installation Inspection 4.6 CPRT Action Plan V.a Results Report, Inspection for Certain Types of Skewed Welds in NF Supports, Revision 1, October 22, 1986 4.7 CPSES Constre tion Procedure CP-CPM-1.2, Construction Activities for Systems and/or Areas Accepted and/or Controlled by TU Electric Plant                           ;
1 4.0 References 4.1 NUREG-0797, Supplement No. 10, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of CPSES Units 1 and 2, USNRC, Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, April 1985 4.2 CPRT Action Plan V.d Results Report, Plug Welds, Revision 1, December 18, 1986 4.3 CPRT Action Plan V.e Results Report, Installation of Main Steam Pipes, Revision 1, October 15, 1986 4.4 CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28, Fabrication and Installation Inspection of Safety Class Component Supports p
Operations, Revision 5, March 4, 1987 4.8 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPSP-30, Processing TU Electric Requests for Temporary Hangers, Revision 0, October 7,1987 O.
4.5 CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-26, Piping and Equip-j ment Installation Inspection 4.6 CPRT Action Plan V.a Results Report, Inspection for Certain Types of Skewed Welds in NF Supports, Revision 1, October 22, 1986 4.7 CPSES Constre tion Procedure CP-CPM-1.2, Construction Activities for Systems and/or Areas Accepted and/or Controlled by TU Electric Plant Operations, Revision 5, March 4, 1987 4.8 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPSP-30, Processing TU Electric Requests for Temporary Hangers, Revision 0, October 7,1987 O.
(,I                                                   A37-3
(,I A37-3


1 1
1 1
l f
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i SUBAPPENDIX A38                                   1
i
(~~
~
(s -                                   SSER-11 R2 VIEW 1.0 Definition of the Issue SSER-11 (Reference 4.1) describes the NRC Staff TRT position on the evalu-ation and resolution of technical questions and allegations relating to the QA/QC Group.
SUBAPPENDIX A38 1
(~
(s -
SSER-11 R2 VIEW 1.0 Definition of the Issue SSER-11 (Reference 4.1) describes the NRC Staff TRT position on the evalu-ation and resolution of technical questions and allegations relating to the QA/QC Group.
The issues identified by SSER-11 in the design process that are related to piping design are as follows:
The issues identified by SSER-11 in the design process that are related to piping design are as follows:
1.1   As-Built Inspection Program (Allegations AQ-50, AQ-21, AQ-22, and AQ-119, Reference 4.1)
1.1 As-Built Inspection Program (Allegations AQ-50, AQ-21, AQ-22, and AQ-119, Reference 4.1)
As-built issues were classified into hardware, procedural, as-built, and weld-related categories.     Specifically, six pipe support con-struction issues in Unit I were listed as follows:
As-built issues were classified into hardware, procedural, as-built, and weld-related categories.
1.1.1     Excessive snubber spherical bearing clearance.
Specifically, six pipe support con-struction issues in Unit I were listed as follows:
1.1.2     Missing strut and snubber load pin locking device.
1.1.1 Excessive snubber spherical bearing clearance.
1.1.3     Pipe clamp halves not parallel.
1.1.2 Missing strut and snubber load pin locking device.
  /O               1.1.4     Snubber adapter plate bolts not fully engaged.
1.1.3 Pipe clamp halves not parallel.
( j 1.1.5     Hilti-Kwik   bolts   installed   with   less   than minimum embedment.
/O
1.1.6     Absence of locking devices for threaded fasteners on NF supports.
( j 1.1.4 Snubber adapter plate bolts not fully engaged.
1.2 Isolation Anchors The issue was that isolation anchors were not always used in the de-aign of seismic-to-nonseismic piping.     The isolation anchor must be designed to withstand the combined loading imposed by both seismic Category I and nonseismic piping (Allegation SRT-13, Reference 4.2).
1.1.5 Hilti-Kwik bolts installed with less than minimum embedment.
1.1.6 Absence of locking devices for threaded fasteners on NF supports.
1.2 Isolation Anchors The issue was that isolation anchors were not always used in the de-aign of seismic-to-nonseismic piping.
The isolation anchor must be designed to withstand the combined loading imposed by both seismic Category I and nonseismic piping (Allegation SRT-13, Reference 4.2).
1.3 Main Steam Loop Hydro The issue was that the design of the main steam lines in Unit 1 did not take into account the stresses caused by repositioning of the line after flushing >and by the settling of tempora ry supports (Reference 4.1).
1.3 Main Steam Loop Hydro The issue was that the design of the main steam lines in Unit 1 did not take into account the stresses caused by repositioning of the line after flushing >and by the settling of tempora ry supports (Reference 4.1).
I C)
I C)
(,,e                                         A38-1 r
(,,e A38-1 rl
l


i s
i s
A                         1.4' Girth Welds 6                   i G                               The issue was that radial shrinkage of girth welds in thin-walled stainless steel pipe was not always adequately analyzed (Allegations     j AQ-50, Ref. 4.1; and AW-52, AW-59, AW-62, Ref. 4.2).
A 1.4' Girth Welds 6
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 As-Built Inspection Program The issue of the as-built QC verification of supports at CPSES was also identified in Subappendixes A39 and B3. The resolution of this issue and the corrective and preventive actions associated with this issue are addressed in Subappendixes A39 and B3.
i G
2.2 Isolation Anchors The isolation anchor issue was also identified in SSER-10 (Refer-ence 4.2) and is discussed in Subappendixes A34 and A37. The resolu-tion of this issue and the corrective and preventive actions associated with this issue are audressed in Subappendixes L4 and A37.
The issue was that radial shrinkage of girth welds in thin-walled stainless steel pipe was not always adequately analyzed (Allegations j
2.3 Main Steam Loop Hydro
AQ-50, Ref. 4.1; and AW-52, AW-59, AW-62, Ref. 4.2).
    ,                            The Unit 1 main stcam loop hydro issues were also identified in r                              SSER-10 and are discussed in Subappendix A37. The resolution of this U;                             issue and the corrective and preventive actions associated with this issue are addressed in Subappendix A37.
2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 As-Built Inspection Program The issue of the as-built QC verification of supports at CPSES was also identified in Subappendixes A39 and B3.
The resolution of this issue and the corrective and preventive actions associated with this issue are addressed in Subappendixes A39 and B3.
2.2 Isolation Anchors The isolation anchor issue was also identified in SSER-10 (Refer-ence 4.2) and is discussed in Subappendixes A34 and A37. The resolu-tion of this issue and the corrective and preventive actions associated with this issue are audressed in Subappendixes L4 and A37.
2.3 Main Steam Loop Hydro The Unit 1 main stcam loop hydro issues were also identified in SSER-10 and are discussed in Subappendix A37. The resolution of this U;
r issue and the corrective and preventive actions associated with this issue are addressed in Subappendix A37.
2.4 Girth Welds The effects of radial shrinkage of girth welds on the pipe stress analysis were analyzed in accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 3-15.
2.4 Girth Welds The effects of radial shrinkage of girth welds on the pipe stress analysis were analyzed in accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 3-15.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of the issue of isolation anchors and girth weld shrinkage have been determined re-portable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).
* Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of the issue of isolation anchors and girth weld shrinkage have been determined re-portable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72). Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of the issue of as-built verification of pipe supports have been de-termined reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)         (see Subappendix B3, SDAR-CP-86-63).
Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of the issue of as-built verification of pipe supports have been de-termined reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
* The corrective action to resolve the girth weld issue was accom-plished through the implementation of the criteria specified in Attachment 3-15 of CPPP-7 during the design validation.
(see Subappendix B3, SDAR-CP-86-63).
O) i A38-2 f
The corrective action to resolve the girth weld issue was accom-plished through the implementation of the criteria specified in -15 of CPPP-7 during the design validation.
i L-_----_------
O) i f
* The corrective actions to resolve the issues of the as-built inspec-
A38-2 i
    ,r 3 (j               tion program, the isolation anchors, and the main steam loop hydro-static test are discussed in Subappendixes A39, A34,       and A37, respectively.
L-_----_------
* The   preventive   actions for   these issues are   specified   in Attachment C.
 
4.0 References 4.1 NUREG-0797, Supplement No. 11, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of CPSES Units 1 and 2, USNRC, Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, May 1985 4.2 NUREG-0797, Supplement No. 10, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of CPSES Units 1 and 2, USNRC, Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, April 1985 l
The corrective actions to resolve the issues of the as-built inspec-
(N v)
,r 3 (j
tion program, the isolation anchors, and the main steam loop hydro-static test are discussed in Subappendixes A39, A34, and A37, respectively.
The preventive actions for these issues are specified in Attachment C.
4.0 References 4.1 NUREG-0797, Supplement No. 11, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of CPSES Units 1 and 2, USNRC, Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, May 1985 4.2 NUREG-0797, Supplement No. 10, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of CPSES Units 1 and 2, USNRC, Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, April 1985 l
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['                                   SUBAPPENDIX A39 CPRT QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION REVIEW ON PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS 1.0 Definition of the Issue Evaluation Research Corporation (ERC) was contracted by CPRT to perform the Quality of Construction (QOC) sample inspection of the safety-related components installed in CPSES, including piping and pipe supports. This task was impleraented in accordance with CFRT Action Plan VII.c, and the results were discussed in Section 5.2.5 of the CPRT Action Plan VII.c Re-sults Report (Reference 4.1).
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ERC inspection covered approximately 82,500 inspection points for piping and pipe supports. ERC evaluated the results and recommended corrective action on the adverse trends and construction deviations on the piping components, gaps, locking devices, pipe clamp spacers, pipe clamps, cotter keys, and angularity offsets.
SUBAPPENDIX A39 CPRT QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION REVIEW ON PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS 1.0 Definition of the Issue Evaluation Research Corporation (ERC) was contracted by CPRT to perform the Quality of Construction (QOC) sample inspection of the safety-related components installed in CPSES, including piping and pipe supports.
This task was impleraented in accordance with CFRT Action Plan VII.c, and the results were discussed in Section 5.2.5 of the CPRT Action Plan VII.c Re-sults Report (Reference 4.1).
ERC inspection covered approximately 82,500 inspection points for piping and pipe supports.
ERC evaluated the results and recommended corrective action on the adverse trends and construction deviations on the piping components, gaps, locking devices, pipe clamp spacers, pipe clamps, cotter keys, and angularity offsets.
The recommended corrective actions on the adverse trends and construction deviations of the pipe supports identified in the CPRT-QOC Results Report are summarized as follows:
The recommended corrective actions on the adverse trends and construction deviations of the pipe supports identified in the CPRT-QOC Results Report are summarized as follows:
g            Construction                   CPRT Action Plan VII.c Results t             Work Category                 Report Recommendations 1.1   Small Bore Piping             Reinspect flow elements to verify Configuration                 that they are oriented in the proper direction 1.2   Small Bore Piping             Verify existing piping clearance Configuration                 criteria and walkdown on all small bore piping with insulation installed 1.3   Small Bore Piping             Reinspect safety-related piping Configuration                 expansion joints 1.4   Small Bore Piping             Verify the accuracy and consis-Configuration                 tency of linear and locating dimensions in piping isometrics 1.5   Pipe Bend                     Verify by Ultrasonic Testing (UT)
Construction CPRT Action Plan VII.c Results g
Fabrication                   that installed pipe bends meet the minimum wall thickness requirement i                                                                                                                                 ,
t Work Category Report Recommendations 1.1 Small Bore Piping Reinspect flow elements to verify Configuration that they are oriented in the proper direction 1.2 Small Bore Piping Verify existing piping clearance Configuration criteria and walkdown on all small bore piping with insulation installed 1.3 Small Bore Piping Reinspect safety-related piping Configuration expansion joints 1.4 Small Bore Piping Verify the accuracy and consis-Configuration tency of linear and locating dimensions in piping isometrics 1.5 Pipe Bend Verify by Ultrasonic Testing (UT)
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Fabrication that installed pipe bends meet the minimum wall thickness requirement i
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CPRT Action Plan VII.c Results
Construction CPRT Action Plan VII.c Results
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Construction Work Category                 Report Recommendations I
Work Category Report Recommendations I
1.6   Pipe Bend                     Revise QC Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-26 Fabrication                   to require that wall thickness after bending be verified by Ultra-sonic Testing (UT) and recorded 1.7   Pipe Welds and                 Reinspect butt welds in Sched-Materials                     ule 80 or thinner stainless steel piping made prior to 1982 that are replacement welds and/or have received extensive repairs 1.8   Small Bore                     Inspect gaps and verify adequate Pipe Supports                 clearance between pipe welds and pipe support 1.9   Small Bore                     Inspect and install suitable Pipe Supports                 locking devices on all vendor-supplied components that do not have high-strength bolting; install locking devices on all high-strength bolting that is not torqued to an acceptable preload n)
1.6 Pipe Bend Revise QC Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-26 Fabrication to require that wall thickness after bending be verified by Ultra-sonic Testing (UT) and recorded 1.7 Pipe Welds and Reinspect butt welds in Sched-Materials ule 80 or thinner stainless steel piping made prior to 1982 that are replacement welds and/or have received extensive repairs 1.8 Small Bore Inspect gaps and verify adequate Pipe Supports clearance between pipe welds and pipe support 1.9 Small Bore Inspect and install suitable Pipe Supports locking devices on all vendor-supplied components that do not have high-strength bolting; install locking devices on all high-strength bolting that is not torqued to an acceptable preload n) 1.10 Small Bore Verify that the fasteners have (V
(V                                    1.10 Small Bore                     Verify that the fasteners have been secured for all vendor-Pipe Supports supplied components (sway struts, snubbers, and spring cans) during plant startup and reoperation using a complete and detailed procedure and checklist provided and verified by QC 2.0 Issue Resolution The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Progrsm (PCHVP) (Reference 4.2) is the portion of TU Electric's Corrective Action Program (CAP) which val-idates the final acceptance attributes for safety-related hardware.
Pipe Supports been secured for all vendor-supplied components (sway struts, snubbers, and spring cans) during plant startup and reoperation using a complete and detailed procedure and checklist provided and verified by QC 2.0 Issue Resolution The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Progrsm (PCHVP) (Reference 4.2) is the portion of TU Electric's Corrective Action Program (CAP) which val-idates the final acceptance attributes for safety-related hardware.
The input to the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is     l contained in the installation specifications. Final acceptance inspection requirements identified in the validated installation specifications were used to develop the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) attribute matrix. This matrix is a complete set of final acceptance at-tributes identified for installed hardware. The Post-Construction Hard-ware Validation Program (PCHVP), by either physical validations or through l                                       an engineering evaluation methodology, assures that each of the attributes defined in the attribute matrix is validated, O
The input to the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is l
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contained in the installation specifications.
Final acceptance inspection requirements identified in the validated installation specifications were used to develop the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) attribute matrix.
This matrix is a complete set of final acceptance at-tributes identified for installed hardware.
The Post-Construction Hard-ware Validation Program (PCHVP), by either physical validations or through l
an engineering evaluation methodology, assures that each of the attributes defined in the attribute matrix is validated, O
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l D                   SWEC-PSAS developed the Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-(,)                 PS-081 (Reference 4.3) to coordinate the Unit 1 and Common piping and pipe support inspection validation activities.
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SWEC-PSAS developed the Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-(,)
Piping inspections are performed and documented by Quality Control (QC) personnel to assure that applicable inspection attributes are acceptable.
PS-081 (Reference 4.3) to coordinate the Unit 1 and Common piping and pipe j
support inspection validation activities.
1 Piping inspections are performed and documented by Quality Control (QC) personnel to assure that applicable inspection attributes are acceptable.
The piping inspection attributes are as below:
The piping inspection attributes are as below:
Equipment and piping configuration Piping wall thickness at shop /fie}d bends Radial weld shrinkage at stainless steel piping joints Equipment anchoring Remote valve operators Branch connections All pressure boundary items installation / base metal defects Valve orientations Pipe / sleeve details Permanent pipe support installation (no emporary or voided supports)
Equipment and piping configuration Piping wall thickness at shop /fie}d bends Radial weld shrinkage at stainless steel piping joints Equipment anchoring Remote valve operators Branch connections All pressure boundary items installation / base metal defects Valve orientations Pipe / sleeve details Permanent pipe support installation (no emporary or voided supports)
Verify location (span) dimensions / tolerances Applicable dielectric insulating sleeves over bolts / studs Linear dimensions of piping segments and in-line components The hardware validation of pipe supports assures that the removable items on a pipe support are installed as required by the design documentation.
Verify location (span) dimensions / tolerances Applicable dielectric insulating sleeves over bolts / studs Linear dimensions of piping segments and in-line components The hardware validation of pipe supports assures that the removable items on a pipe support are installed as required by the design documentation.
The hardwart validation is implemented by Quality Control (QC) personnel
The hardwart validation is implemented by Quality Control (QC) personnel
[-s                 in compliance with the validated support drawing. Quality Control person-
[-s in compliance with the validated support drawing.
            \'                 nel verify and document that all applicable hardware attributes listed on the hardware validation checklist.s are acceptable.     The following pipe support hardware validation checklists are used, as applicable:
Quality Control person-
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nel verify and document that all applicable hardware attributes listed on the hardware validation checklist.s are acceptable.
The following pipe support hardware validation checklists are used, as applicable:
Adjacent Weld Checklist Bolted Connection Checklist Hilti Bolt Checklist Pipe Clamp Checklist Richmond Insert Checklist Snubber Checklist Support Checklist Sway Strut Checklist Through Bolt / Embedded Bolt Checklist U-Bolt / Bolted U-Guide Checklist Variable / Constant Spring Checklist In addition to the hardware validation pipe support inspections, Quality Control (QC) personnel also conduct inspections for pipe support configu-ration attributes as below:
Adjacent Weld Checklist Bolted Connection Checklist Hilti Bolt Checklist Pipe Clamp Checklist Richmond Insert Checklist Snubber Checklist Support Checklist Sway Strut Checklist Through Bolt / Embedded Bolt Checklist U-Bolt / Bolted U-Guide Checklist Variable / Constant Spring Checklist In addition to the hardware validation pipe support inspections, Quality Control (QC) personnel also conduct inspections for pipe support configu-ration attributes as below:
Material acceptability Support configuration compliance with validated design drawing, including dimensions A39-3
Material acceptability Support configuration compliance with validated design drawing, including dimensions A39-3


p         Support overhang length / tolerance Q         Support projection length / tolerance
p Support overhang length / tolerance Q
          ~ Sway strut / snubber pin-to-pin dimension / tolerance Alignment and circumferential deviation of shear lugs Hilti bolt size /embedment Weld length of structural member on base plate Welded connection in accordance with validated drawing Edge distance for structural members and base plates Slope of b lted part with bolt head or nut Shim size / weld SWEC-PSAS developed the Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-080 (Reference 4.4) to assure that sufficient clearance exists around the validated piping. Clearance is required to permit those anticipated piping displacements that could occur under plant operating conditions without any impediment to those displacements. An impediment is defined as any structure, pipe,' conduit, cable tray, or equipment that encroaches on the envelope of. anticipated pipe displacement.
Support projection length / tolerance
This field verification effort is performed by the SWEC-PSAS engineering personnel. SWEC-PSAS han established clearance criteria and is responsi-ble for training the clearance walkdown teams, evaluating clearance prob-lems, and issuing design changes to correct any clearance violations.
~ Sway strut / snubber pin-to-pin dimension / tolerance Alignment and circumferential deviation of shear lugs Hilti bolt size /embedment Weld length of structural member on base plate Welded connection in accordance with validated drawing Edge distance for structural members and base plates Slope of b lted part with bolt head or nut Shim size / weld SWEC-PSAS developed the Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-080 (Reference 4.4) to assure that sufficient clearance exists around the validated piping.
The physical validation of mechanical piping attributes                                 (e.g., flow ele-ment _ orientation and expansion joint installation) is performed by SWEC O     mechanical discipline PCHVP as discussed in the SWEC Mechanical Project U     Status Report (Reference 4.5).
Clearance is required to permit those anticipated piping displacements that could occur under plant operating conditions without any impediment to those displacements.
An impediment is defined as any structure, pipe,' conduit, cable tray, or equipment that encroaches on the envelope of. anticipated pipe displacement.
This field verification effort is performed by the SWEC-PSAS engineering personnel.
SWEC-PSAS han established clearance criteria and is responsi-ble for training the clearance walkdown teams, evaluating clearance prob-lems, and issuing design changes to correct any clearance violations.
The physical validation of mechanical piping attributes (e.g.,
flow ele-ment _ orientation and expansion joint installation) is performed by SWEC O
mechanical discipline PCHVP as discussed in the SWEC Mechanical Project U
Status Report (Reference 4.5).
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These corrective actions also envelop the resolution of issues in Sub-appendixes A29, A30, A38, and B3. The quality of construction require-                                       ,
These corrective actions also envelop the resolution of issues in Sub-appendixes A29, A30, A38, and B3.
ments for piping and pipe supports in the PCHVP were incorporated into the                                   J construction and QC inspection procedures to serve as the preventive action.
The quality of construction require-ments for piping and pipe supports in the PCHVP were incorporated into the J
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
construction and QC inspection procedures to serve as the preventive action.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
* The quality of construction of pipe support installation issue was determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
The quality of construction of pipe support installation issue was determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)
(see Subappendix B3, SDAR-CP-86-63).
(see Subappendix B3, SDAR-CP-86-63).
* The corrective action to resolve this issue is accomplished through the implementation of the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program.
The corrective action to resolve this issue is accomplished through the implementation of the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program.
* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
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          -g             4.0 References 4.1         CPRT Action Plan VII.c Results Report, Construction Reinspection /
-g 4.0 References 4.1 CPRT Action Plan VII.c Results Report, Construction Reinspection /
Documentation Review Plan, Revision 0, June 11, 1987 4.2 TU Electric Engineering and Construction Procedure EC-9.04, Post Con-struction Hardware Validation Program, July 17, 1987 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Field Verification Method, Hardware Valida-tion and Supplemental     Inspection Programs,   CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081, Revision 0, July 29, 1987 4.4 SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Field Verification Method, Clearance Walk-down, CPE-SWEC-FVM-P!1-080, Revision 0, July 28, 1987 4.5         TU Electric, CPSES Unit 1 and Common, Mechanical Project Status Re-                     I port, Revision 0
Documentation Review Plan, Revision 0, June 11, 1987 4.2 TU Electric Engineering and Construction Procedure EC-9.04, Post Con-struction Hardware Validation Program, July 17, 1987 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Field Verification Method, Hardware Valida-tion and Supplemental Inspection Programs, CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081, Revision 0, July 29, 1987 4.4 SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Field Verification Method, Clearance Walk-down, CPE-SWEC-FVM-P!1-080, Revision 0, July 28, 1987 4.5 TU Electric, CPSES Unit 1 and Common, Mechanical Project Status Re-I port, Revision 0
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APPENDIX B h   INTRODUCTION This appendix describes the details of resolutions of issues identified during the performance of the piping Corrective Action Program (CAP).       Included in this appendix are the piping-related Significant Deficiency Analysis Reports (SDARs) initiated by TU Electric.
APPENDIX B h
INTRODUCTION This appendix describes the details of resolutions of issues identified during the performance of the piping Corrective Action Program (CAP).
Included in this appendix are the piping-related Significant Deficiency Analysis Reports (SDARs) initiated by TU Electric.
Each of the five issues listed below is described in an individual sub-appendix which includes discussions of resolution methodology and corrective and pre-ventive actions.
Each of the five issues listed below is described in an individual sub-appendix which includes discussions of resolution methodology and corrective and pre-ventive actions.
Issue No.     Issue Title B1             SDAR-CP-86-33, Stiffness Values for Class 1 Stress Analysis B2             SDAR-CP-86-72, Small Bore Piping and Supports B3             SDAR-CP-86-63, Pipe Support Installations B4             SDAR-CP-86-67, Preopert tional Vibration Test Criteria B5             SDAR-CP-86-73, ASME Snubber Attachment Brackets O
Issue No.
Issue Title B1 SDAR-CP-86-33, Stiffness Values for Class 1 Stress Analysis B2 SDAR-CP-86-72, Small Bore Piping and Supports B3 SDAR-CP-86-63, Pipe Support Installations B4 SDAR-CP-86-67, Preopert tional Vibration Test Criteria B5 SDAR-CP-86-73, ASME Snubber Attachment Brackets O
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0 1778-1545405-HC4                         B-1
0 1778-1545405-HC4 B-1


SUBAPPENDIX B1 Ic\
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SDAR-CP-86-33, STIFFNESS VALUES FOR CLASS 1 STRESS ANALYSIS 1.0 Definition of Issue TU Electric identified a deficiency in the stiffness values of pipe sup-ports for ASME Section III Class I piping stress analysis (Reference 4.1).
SUBAPPENDIX B1 SDAR-CP-86-33, STIFFNESS VALUES FOR CLASS 1 STRESS ANALYSIS 1.0 Definition of Issue TU Electric identified a deficiency in the stiffness values of pipe sup-ports for ASME Section III Class I piping stress analysis (Reference 4.1).
The pipe support stiffness values used in the previous Westinghouse stress analysis of ASME Section III Code Class 1 piping in Unit I were based on input from the existing design.       These pipe support stiffness values changed with implementation of the corrective actions from the pipe stress and pipe support validation program, thus rendering the previous results of ASKE Section III Class 1 pipe stress analysis in Unit 1 inconsistent with the pipe stress and pipe support validation program.
The pipe support stiffness values used in the previous Westinghouse stress analysis of ASME Section III Code Class 1 piping in Unit I were based on input from the existing design.
These pipe support stiffness values changed with implementation of the corrective actions from the pipe stress and pipe support validation program, thus rendering the previous results of ASKE Section III Class 1 pipe stress analysis in Unit 1 inconsistent with the pipe stress and pipe support validation program.
Appropriate ASME Section III Code Class 1 pipe support stiffness values that incorporated corrective actions and modifications resulting from the pipe stress and pipe support validation program must be used in the vali-dated ASME Section III Code Class 1 pipe stress analysis.
Appropriate ASME Section III Code Class 1 pipe support stiffness values that incorporated corrective actions and modifications resulting from the pipe stress and pipe support validation program must be used in the vali-dated ASME Section III Code Class 1 pipe stress analysis.
2.0 Issue Resolution The calculations of the stiffness values for the pipe supports for the ASME Section III Code Class 1 pipe stress analysis packages were completed and these results were transmitted to Westinghouse in accordance with O                           Section 7.5.7 of project procedure CPPP-6 (Reference 4.2) and SWEC-PSAS
2.0 Issue Resolution The calculations of the stiffness values for the pipe supports for the ASME Section III Code Class 1 pipe stress analysis packages were completed and these results were transmitted to Westinghouse in accordance with O
        \d                           Project Memorandum PM-130 (Reference 4.3). Westinghouse reanalyzed these stress problems and issued revised support loads for pipe support validation.
Section 7.5.7 of project procedure CPPP-6 (Reference 4.2) and SWEC-PSAS
TU Electric determined that this issue was reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and submitted reports (References 4.1 and 4.4) to the NRC Staff on May 28, 1986, and October 17, 1986. The small bore pipe support modifications and hardware validation status is being updated under 10CFR50.55(e) via SDAR-CP-86-36 (Subappendix B2).
\\d Project Memorandum PM-130 (Reference 4.3).
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
Westinghouse reanalyzed these stress problems and issued revised support loads for pipe support validation.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
TU Electric determined that this issue was reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and submitted reports (References 4.1 and 4.4) to the NRC Staff on May 28, 1986, and October 17, 1986.
* This issue was dete rmined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).
The small bore pipe support modifications and hardware validation status is being updated under 10CFR50.55(e) via SDAR-CP-86-36 (Subappendix B2).
* The corrective action to resolve this issue was accomplished by the validation of the ASME Section III Code Class 1 pipe stress analysis by Westinghouse and by the SWEC-PSAS validation of the pipe supports in accordance with Sections 3.10.8 and 4.3.2.2, and Attachment 4-18 of CPPP-7.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
        /~'N t'v)                                                         B1-1
This issue was dete rmined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).
The corrective action to resolve this issue was accomplished by the validation of the ASME Section III Code Class 1 pipe stress analysis by Westinghouse and by the SWEC-PSAS validation of the pipe supports in accordance with Sections 3.10.8 and 4.3.2.2, and Attachment 4-18 of CPPP-7.
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The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
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* The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
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4.0     References 4.1 TU Electric Letter No. TXX-4831, W. G. Counsil to E. H. Johnson, Di-rector, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, Stiffness Values for Class 1 Pipe Stress Analysis, May 28, 1986 (SDAR-CP-86 Interim Report).
4.0 References 4.1 TU Electric Letter No. TXX-4831, W. G. Counsil to E. H. Johnson, Di-rector, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, Stiffness Values for Class 1 Pipe Stress Analysis, May 28, 1986 (SDAR-CP-86 Interim Report).
4.2 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-6, Pipe Stress / Support Requalifica-tion Procedure - Unit 1, Revision 4, April 8, 1987 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-130, Transmittal of Requalification Results to Westinghouse, December 19, 1986.
4.2 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-6, Pipe Stress / Support Requalifica-tion Procedure - Unit 1, Revision 4, April 8, 1987 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-130, Transmittal of Requalification Results to Westinghouse, December 19, 1986.
4.4 TU Electric Letter No. TXX-6025, W. G. Counsil to E. H. Johnson, Di-rector, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, Stiffness Values for Class 1 Pipe Stress Analysis, October 17, 1986 (SDAR-CP-86 Final Report).
4.4 TU Electric Letter No. TXX-6025, W. G. Counsil to E. H. Johnson, Di-rector, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, Stiffness Values for Class 1 Pipe Stress Analysis, October 17, 1986 (SDAR-CP-86 Final Report).
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i SUBAPPENDIX B2                                                   l l _g i                             SDAR-CP-86-72, SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS 1.0 Definition of Issue Impact of CPRT and external issues tabulated in Subappendixes Al through A35 on the adequacy of the piping and pipe support design and installation processes is significant.
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2.0 Issue Resolution l
SUBAPPENDIX B2 l
SWEC-PSAS was contracted to validate the piping and pipe supports at                         lI CPSES. Modification of certain pipe supports provided expedient accep-tance for the expanded requirements.       Support modifications are cate-Borized as follows.
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1.1 Prudent - Supports in this category may have been technically ac-ceptable; however, more time and expense would have been involved in the detailed analysis than that required to physically modify the support and qualify the modification.
SDAR-CP-86-72, SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS 1.0 Definition of Issue Impact of CPRT and external issues tabulated in Subappendixes Al through A35 on the adequacy of the piping and pipe support design and installation processes is significant.
1.2 Recent Industry Practice - Modifications implemented to eliminate                       j snubbers to enhance plant maintainability, reduce inservice inspec-tion, and minimize worker radiation exposure during operating plant conditions.
2.0 Issue Resolution l
v 1.3 Adjustment - Minor modifications (such as retorquing or shimming)                       i implemented to meet installation criteria contained in the resolution of the CPRT and external issues.
l SWEC-PSAS was contracted to validate the piping and pipe supports at CPSES.
Modification of certain pipe supports provided expedient accep-I tance for the expanded requirements.
Support modifications are cate-Borized as follows.
1.1 Prudent - Supports in this category may have been technically ac-ceptable; however, more time and expense would have been involved in the detailed analysis than that required to physically modify the support and qualify the modification.
1.2 Recent Industry Practice - Modifications implemented to eliminate j
snubbers to enhance plant maintainability, reduce inservice inspec-tion, and minimize worker radiation exposure during operating plant conditions.
v 1.3 Adjustment - Minor modifications (such as retorquing or shimming) i implemented to meet installation criteria contained in the resolution of the CPRT and external issues.
1.4 Cumulative effects - Modifications that are required due to the com-
1.4 Cumulative effects - Modifications that are required due to the com-
                                                                              ~
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bined effect of previous issues.
bined effect of previous issues.
The implementation of the physical modifications of pipe supports is be-                     l ing performed by TU Electric Construction and is being validated by the PCHVP.
The implementation of the physical modifications of pipe supports is be-l ing performed by TU Electric Construction and is being validated by the PCHVP.
TU Electric determined that this issue was reportable under the provisions                   i of 10CFR50.55(e) and submitted the initial Significant Deviation Analysis                   l Report No. SDAR-CP-86-72 (Reference 4.1) on October 15, 1986.       Periodic               I status reports are being submitted to the NRC Staff.                                         l 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
TU Electric determined that this issue was reportable under the provisions i
* No additional issues have been discovered during the review and reso-lution of this issue.
of 10CFR50.55(e) and submitted the initial Significant Deviation Analysis l
* This issue was determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).
Report No. SDAR-CP-86-72 (Reference 4.1) on October 15, 1986.
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status reports are being submitted to the NRC Staff.
 
l 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues have been discovered during the review and reso-lution of this issue.
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This issue was determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).
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The corrective ' action to resolve this issue is accomplished through t
* The corrective ' action to resolve this issue is accomplished through l    .,.
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the piping and. pipe supports CAP.
the piping and. pipe supports CAP.
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                                                        *-  The preventive actions for this - issue are described in Appendix C.
The preventive actions for this - issue are described in Appendix C.
                                            - '4 '. 0 References 4.1 TU Electric Letter No. TXX-6042 dated October. 15, 1986, W. G. Counsil to E. H. Johnson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Small Bore Piping and Supports, SDAR-CP-86-72 (Interim Report)
- '4 '. 0 References 4.1 TU Electric Letter No. TXX-6042 dated October. 15, 1986, W. G. Counsil to E. H. Johnson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Small Bore Piping and Supports, SDAR-CP-86-72 (Interim Report)
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i s''N-SUBAPPENDIX B3 SDAR-CP-86-63,-PIPE SUPPORT INSTALLATIONS 1
SUBAPPENDIX B3 SDAR-CP-86-63,-PIPE SUPPORT INSTALLATIONS                   1 1.0 Definition of the Issue-                                                                                 ;
1.0 Definition of the Issue-i on September 4, 1986, a deficiency was identified involving a broken cotter pin on a snubber (Reference 4.1).
i on September 4, 1986, a deficiency was identified involving a broken cotter pin on a snubber (Reference 4.1).                                                               l 2.0   Issue Resolution The piping CAP includes the PCHVP that will validate cotter pin installa-tion in accordance with field verification method CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081                                 ,
l 2.0 Issue Resolution The piping CAP includes the PCHVP that will validate cotter pin installa-tion in accordance with field verification method CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 (Reference 4.2).
(Reference 4.2).                                                                                       l 1
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3.0 . Corrective and Preventive Action                                                                       l 0
3.0. Corrective and Preventive Action l
See Section 3.0 of Subappendix A39.                                                                   j 4.0 References 4.1 - 1RJ Electric Letter No. TXX-6027, W. G. Counsil to E. H. Johnson, Di-                           i rector, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, Pipe Supports,                                 SDAR-CP-86-63 (Interim Report),
0 See Section 3.0 of Subappendix A39.
j 4.0 References 4.1 - 1RJ Electric Letter No. TXX-6027, W. G. Counsil to E. H. Johnson, Di-i rector, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, Pipe Supports, SDAR-CP-86-63 (Interim Report),
November 3,.1986
November 3,.1986
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  -(   /                                 4.2   SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Field Verification Method, Hardware Valida-tion                           and Supplemental       Inspection Programs CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081,
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                                                ' Revision 0, July 29,-1987
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4.2 SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Field Verification Method, Hardware Valida-tion and Supplemental Inspection Programs CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081,
' Revision 0, July 29,-1987
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SUBAPPENDIX B4 SDAR-CP-86-67, PREOPERATIONAL VIBRATION TEST CRITERIA 1.0 Definition of the Issue TU Electric identified a deficiency (Reference 4.1) in the preoperational vibration test criteria. The CPSES criteria document, Preoperational Vi-bration Test Program, Issue 1, June 1980, was reviewed, and it was found
SUBAPPENDIX B4 SDAR-CP-86-67, PREOPERATIONAL VIBRATION TEST CRITERIA 1.0 Definition of the Issue TU Electric identified a deficiency (Reference 4.1) in the preoperational vibration test criteria.
                          'that the mathematical formulas used to determine stress endurance limits, allowable deflections, and flexibility characteristics of certain piping systems may not have been accurate.     Vibration calculations and test re-sults   were   evaluated   to   determine   the validity of   the original calculations.
The CPSES criteria document, Preoperational Vi-bration Test Program, Issue 1, June 1980, was reviewed, and it was found
'that the mathematical formulas used to determine stress endurance limits, allowable deflections, and flexibility characteristics of certain piping systems may not have been accurate.
Vibration calculations and test re-sults were evaluated to determine the validity of the original calculations.
The evaluation yielded the following results:
The evaluation yielded the following results:
: 1. Two test data points (from a total of 21 system tests) were found to exceed the allowable deflection limits.
1.
: 2. The measured direction of deflection movement was not clearly identi-fled in all instances.
Two test data points (from a total of 21 system tests) were found to exceed the allowable deflection limits.
: 3. The test deflections were measured in only one direction in some
2.
                  -              cases.
The measured direction of deflection movement was not clearly identi-fled in all instances.
                'v   2.0 Issue Resolution As a result of the piping Corrective Action Program (CAP) and extensive modifications to the piping systems, TU Electric will repeat the preopera-tional vibration testing.     SWEC-PSAS has established Project Procedure CPPP-25, Unit 1 Piping Vibration Test Procedure (Reference 4.2), for the management and assessment of piping system vibration as required by the CPSES FSAR Section 3.9.B.2. This preoperational vibration test procedure is based on information contained in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.68 (Refer-ence 4.3) and Section 3.9 of NUREG-0800 (Reference 4.4). SWEC-PSAS will provide technical services to the testing program.
3.
The test deflections were measured in only one direction in some cases.
'v 2.0 Issue Resolution As a result of the piping Corrective Action Program (CAP) and extensive modifications to the piping systems, TU Electric will repeat the preopera-tional vibration testing.
SWEC-PSAS has established Project Procedure CPPP-25, Unit 1 Piping Vibration Test Procedure (Reference 4.2), for the management and assessment of piping system vibration as required by the CPSES FSAR Section 3.9.B.2.
This preoperational vibration test procedure is based on information contained in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.68 (Refer-ence 4.3) and Section 3.9 of NUREG-0800 (Reference 4.4). SWEC-PSAS will provide technical services to the testing program.
TU Electric determined that this issue is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and submitted SDAR-CP-86-67 on February 19, 1987.
TU Electric determined that this issue is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and submitted SDAR-CP-86-67 on February 19, 1987.
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
+
                          +     This issue vas determined to be reportable in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).
This issue vas determined to be reportable in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).
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/''N The correcti~e actions to resolve this issue will be implemented by
* The correcti~e actions to resolve this issue will be implemented by
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(_,)             repeating the preoperational piping vibration testing by a new test procedure to resolve the concerns.
repeating the preoperational piping vibration testing by a new test procedure to resolve the concerns.
* Preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
Preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1 TU Electric Letter No. TXX-6072 dated October 27, 1986, W. G. Counsil to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attention:     Document Control Desk, SDAR-CP-86-67 Preoperational Vibration Test Criteria 4.2 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-25, Piping Vibration Test Procedure, Revision 0, December 8, 1986 4.3 USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.68, Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled               3 Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2, January 1978                                   j i
4.0 References 4.1 TU Electric Letter No. TXX-6072 dated October 27, 1986, W. G. Counsil to U.S.
4.4 USNRC Standard Review Plan NUREG-0800, Section 3.9.2, Revision 2,                   {
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attention:
July 1981                                                                         !
Document Control Desk, SDAR-CP-86-67 Preoperational Vibration Test Criteria 4.2 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-25, Piping Vibration Test Procedure, Revision 0, December 8, 1986 4.3 USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.68, Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled 3
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SUBAPPENDIX B5 SDAR-CP-86-73, ASME SNUBBER ATTACl&fENT BRACKETS 1.0 Definition of the Issue TU Electric identified a deficiency (Reference 4.1) involving restriction of the snubber swing angle by the snubber rear brackets. Rear brackets on safety-related snubbers have the potential to cause restricted movement and binding due to the use of the incorrect rear bracket.
SUBAPPENDIX B5 SDAR-CP-86-73, ASME SNUBBER ATTACl&fENT BRACKETS 1.0 Definition of the Issue TU Electric identified a deficiency (Reference 4.1) involving restriction of the snubber swing angle by the snubber rear brackets.
2.0                     Issue Resolution l                               A drawing review of ASME Section III, Code Class 1, 2, and 3 snubbers was conducted to verify the adequacy of swing clearances, and identified 1063 anubbers as having attachment brackets. As a result of field examination, the number of snubbers requiring evaluation has been reduced to 165.
Rear brackets on safety-related snubbers have the potential to cause restricted movement and binding due to the use of the incorrect rear bracket.
2.1                   These 165 supports were evaluated by comparing the field verified swing angle data with the predicted movements.       The results are as ._
2.0 Issue Resolution l
follows:
A drawing review of ASME Section III, Code Class 1, 2, and 3 snubbers was conducted to verify the adequacy of swing clearances, and identified 1063 anubbers as having attachment brackets. As a result of field examination, the number of snubbers requiring evaluation has been reduced to 165.
* 83 supports were determined to have sufficient field verified swing angle to accommodate the predicted pipe movement.
2.1 These 165 supports were evaluated by comparing the field verified swing angle data with the predicted movements.
* 15 supports were determined to be unnecessary in a previously initiated   pipe   support validation   effort   (and are being deleted).
The results are as follows:
* 33 supports are being modified as a result of the pipe support validation effort (but not as a result of this deficiency).
83 supports were determined to have sufficient field verified swing angle to accommodate the predicted pipe movement.
* 31 supports have been identified as having less clearance than required by analysis and are being modified to correct the situation.
15 supports were determined to be unnecessary in a previously initiated pipe support validation effort (and are being deleted).
* 3 supports have no safety-related function and do not impair the safety-related function of other components and therefore re-quire no further evaluation for safety significance.
33 supports are being modified as a result of the pipe support validation effort (but not as a result of this deficiency).
31 supports have been identified as having less clearance than required by analysis and are being modified to correct the situation.
3 supports have no safety-related function and do not impair the safety-related function of other components and therefore re-quire no further evaluation for safety significance.
2.2 TU Electric determined that this issue was reportable under the pro-visions of 10CFR50.55(e) and submitted Significant Deficiency Analy-sis Report SDAR-CP-86-73 (Reference 4.1).
2.2 TU Electric determined that this issue was reportable under the pro-visions of 10CFR50.55(e) and submitted Significant Deficiency Analy-sis Report SDAR-CP-86-73 (Reference 4.1).
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action
3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
* No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.
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This issue was determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).
* This issue was determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).
The corrective action to resolve the snubber rear bracket issue is being accomplished through the implementation of CPSES Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10A, paragraph 3.6 and CPSES Quality Control Procedure Nos. CP-QAP-12.1 and QI-QAP-11.1-28, which require a check for bi'nding on the rear bracket. Additionally, a backfit inspection was ' implemented in accordance with Field Verification Method TNE-FVM-PS-038.
* The corrective action to resolve the snubber rear bracket issue is being accomplished through the implementation of CPSES Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10A,   paragraph 3.6 and CPSES Quality Control Procedure Nos. CP-QAP-12.1 and QI-QAP-11.1-28, which require a check for bi'nding on the rear bracket. Additionally, a backfit inspection was ' implemented   in accordance with Field Verification Method TNE-FVM-PS-038.
The preventive actions are identified in Appendix C.
* The preventive actions are identified in Appendix C.
4.0 References 4.1 TU Electric Letter No. TXX-6104, W. G. Counsil to E. H. Johnson, Di-rector, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, Snubber Rear Brackets, SDAR-CP-86-73, November 19, 1986
4.0 References 4.1   TU Electric Letter No. TXX-6104, W. G. Counsil to E. H. Johnson, Di-rector, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, Snubber Rear Brackets, SDAR-CP-86-73, November 19, 1986
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APPENDIX C - PREVENTIVE ACTIONS I
APPENDIX C - PREVENTIVE ACTIONS I(
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The preventive actions are embodied in the procedures developed and used for the Corrective Action Program.
The preventive actions are embodied in the procedures developed and used for the Corrective Action Program. These procedures resolve all CPRT and external issues as well as all issues identified during the performance of the CAP.
These procedures resolve all CPRT and external issues as well as all issues identified during the performance of the CAP.
l             Implementation of the preventive actions will assure that the design and hard-ware for CPSES Unit I and Common can continue to comply with the licensing commitments throughout the life of the plant as described in Section 5.4. The particular preventive actions preclude the recurrence of the issues identified in   Appendixes A and B   as summarized below in Sections'1.0 and     2.0, respectively, i
l Implementation of the preventive actions will assure that the design and hard-ware for CPSES Unit I and Common can continue to comply with the licensing commitments throughout the life of the plant as described in Section 5.4.
The particular preventive actions preclude the recurrence of the issues identified in Appendixes A and B
as summarized below in Sections'1.0 and 2.0, respectively, i
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1.0 APPENDIX A ISSUES - PREVENTIVE ACTION A1. Richmond Inserts Attachment 4-5 of CPPP-7 (Reference C.1) provides requirements and instructions for the inclusion of bending stress in the analysis of bolting used in Richmond inserts with tube steel, the proper modeling of Richmond insert to tube steel connections, length limits of tube l                                             steel members used with two or more Richmond inserts, and evaluations
1.0 APPENDIX A ISSUES - PREVENTIVE ACTION A1.
(                                             of spacing between inserts. Attachment 4-13 of CPPP-7 provides pro-i cedures for the evaluation of local stresses due to nuts bearing on tube steel walls.     SWEC-PSAS Proj ect Memorandum PM-141     (Refer-ence C.2) provides procedures to chect the potential unequal shear loading when the tube steel connectic:. is anchored by two or more Riclunond   inserts. Additionally,   Quality   Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 (Reference C.3) was revised to include inspection for proper thread engagement.                                                   I A2. Local Stress in Piping Attachments 4-6A, 4-6B, and 4-6C of CPPP-7 provide requirements and instructions for the evaluation of local run pipe stresses due to integral welded attachments (4-6A), and support bearing loads (4-6B and 4-6C).
Richmond Inserts -5 of CPPP-7 (Reference C.1) provides requirements and instructions for the inclusion of bending stress in the analysis of bolting used in Richmond inserts with tube steel, the proper modeling of Richmond insert to tube steel connections, length limits of tube l
steel members used with two or more Richmond inserts, and evaluations
(
of spacing between inserts. -13 of CPPP-7 provides pro-cedures for the evaluation of local stresses due to nuts bearing on i
tube steel walls.
SWEC-PSAS Proj ect Memorandum PM-141 (Refer-ence C.2) provides procedures to chect the potential unequal shear loading when the tube steel connectic:. is anchored by two or more Riclunond inserts.
Additionally, Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 (Reference C.3) was revised to include inspection for proper thread engagement.
I A2.
Local Stress in Piping Attachments 4-6A, 4-6B, and 4-6C of CPPP-7 provide requirements and instructions for the evaluation of local run pipe stresses due to integral welded attachments (4-6A), and support bearing loads (4-6B and 4-6C).
The use of zero-gap box frames, the evaluation of pipe support stiff-nesses and the evaluation of local stresses in pipe support members are discussed in the preventive actions of Subappendixes A4, AS, and A21, respectively.
The use of zero-gap box frames, the evaluation of pipe support stiff-nesses and the evaluation of local stresses in pipe support members are discussed in the preventive actions of Subappendixes A4, AS, and A21, respectively.
A3. Wall-to-Wall and Floor-to-Ceiling Supports Attachment 4-19 of CPPP-7 provides procedures for the inclusion of the effects of differential seismic displacements and the long-term effects of concrete creep on supports which span wall-to-wall and floor-to-ceiling.
A3.
A4. Pipe Support / System Stability Section 4.2.4 and Attachment 4-9 of CPPP-7 provide requirements for the modification of potentially unstable pipe support configurations.    .
Wall-to-Wall and Floor-to-Ceiling Supports -19 of CPPP-7 provides procedures for the inclusion of the effects of differential seismic displacements and the long-term effects of concrete creep on supports which span wall-to-wall and floor-to-ceiling.
A5. Pipe Support Generic Stiffness Section 3.10.8 of CPPP-7 provides baseline stiffness values for rigid pipe supports, anchors, and snubbers. Section 4.3.2.2 of CPPP-7 out-lines the approach to be used in determining pipe support stiffnesses and Attachment 4-18 is a tabular / graphic compilation of support com-ponent and standard support subassembly.
A4.
Pipe Support / System Stability Section 4.2.4 and Attachment 4-9 of CPPP-7 provide requirements for the modification of potentially unstable pipe support configurations.
A5.
Pipe Support Generic Stiffness Section 3.10.8 of CPPP-7 provides baseline stiffness values for rigid pipe supports, anchors, and snubbers.
Section 4.3.2.2 of CPPP-7 out-lines the approach to be used in determining pipe support stiffnesses and Attachment 4-18 is a tabular / graphic compilation of support com-ponent and standard support subassembly.
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Uncinched U-Bolt Acting as Two-Way Restraint 7-s
  \' '           Section 4.2.5.2 and Attachment 4-3 of CPPP-7 provide requirements and instructions for the proper application and evaluation of uncinched U-bolts used as two-way restraints.         Section 4.3.2.2 and Attach-ment 4-18 of CPPP-7 provide the stiffness values for uncinched           )
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Section 4.2.5.2 and Attachment 4-3 of CPPP-7 provide requirements and instructions for the proper application and evaluation of uncinched U-bolts used as two-way restraints.
Section 4.3.2.2 and Attach-ment 4-18 of CPPP-7 provide the stiffness values for uncinched
)
U-bolts used as two-way restraints.
U-bolts used as two-way restraints.
A7. Friction Forces Section 4.7.3 of CPPP-7 requires that the effects of friction forces     !
A7.
acting on pipe supports be included in the design for all noneyclic loads. Attachment 4-7 of CPPP-7 provides the methods of implementing this requirement.
Friction Forces Section 4.7.3 of CPPP-7 requires that the effects of friction forces acting on pipe supports be included in the design for all noneyclic loads. -7 of CPPP-7 provides the methods of implementing this requirement.
A8. AWS Versus ASME Code Provisions Section 4.4 and Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7 provide guidance for the design / qualification of skewed joint welds.
A8.
AWS Versus ASME Code Provisions Section 4.4 and Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7 provide guidance for the design / qualification of skewed joint welds.
The angular limits of skewed, T-joint welds requires no preventive action since CPSES weld procedures are qualified by testing, which overrides the AWS angle limitations.
The angular limits of skewed, T-joint welds requires no preventive action since CPSES weld procedures are qualified by testing, which overrides the AWS angle limitations.
A9. A500, Grade B Tube Steel
A9.
  't Section 4.7.2.1 of CPPP-7 specifies the design criterion of pipe sup-ports using A500, Grade B tube steel.
A500, Grade B Tube Steel
't Section 4.7.2.1 of CPPP-7 specifies the design criterion of pipe sup-ports using A500, Grade B tube steel.
A10. Tube Steel Section Properties Section 4.3.2.1 of CPPP-7 requires the use of the 8th Edition of the AISC Manual of Steel Construction (Reference C.4) in the selection of section properties for support design / qualification to preclude the use of inappropriate section properties for tube steel.
A10. Tube Steel Section Properties Section 4.3.2.1 of CPPP-7 requires the use of the 8th Edition of the AISC Manual of Steel Construction (Reference C.4) in the selection of section properties for support design / qualification to preclude the use of inappropriate section properties for tube steel.
Specification No. 2323-MS-100 (Reference C.5) has been revised to assure that an effective throat of t = t-1/16 in. is achieved for welds on all tube steel sizes for any new design in the future.         ]  i Section 4.4 and Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7, Revision 3, as amended by SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-140 (Reference C.6), specifies effec-tive throat dimensions for flare bevel welds which meet the criteria       !
Specification No. 2323-MS-100 (Reference C.5) has been revised to assure that an effective throat of t = t-1/16 in. is achieved for
of AWS. The revised guidelines of PM-140 will be followed for any future weld evaluation to preclude the recurrence of inadequate ef-fective throat size.
]
welds on all tube steel sizes for any new design in the future.
i Section 4.4 and Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7, Revision 3, as amended by SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-140 (Reference C.6), specifies effec-tive throat dimensions for flare bevel welds which meet the criteria of AWS.
The revised guidelines of PM-140 will be followed for any future weld evaluation to preclude the recurrence of inadequate ef-fective throat size.
All. U-Bolt Cinching I
All. U-Bolt Cinching I
Section 4.2.5.1 of CPPP-7 deleted the use         oi' cinched U-bolts /   {
Section 4.2.5.1 of CPPP-7 deleted the use oi' cinched U-bolts /
crosspiece supports with struts / snubbers.                               j C-3
{
crosspiece supports with struts / snubbers.
j C-3


A12. Axial / Rotational Restraints Sections 3.10.6.2 and 4.6.3, and Attachments 3-11 and 4-8 of CPPP-7 establish the procedure for the analysis of axial and rotational restraints.
A12. Axial / Rotational Restraints Sections 3.10.6.2 and 4.6.3, and Attachments 3-11 and 4-8 of CPPP-7 establish the procedure for the analysis of axial and rotational restraints.
A13. Bolt Hole Gap i            Attachments 4-4 and 4-5 of CPPP-7 and SWEC-PSAS Project ~ Mem-
A13. Bolt Hole Gap Attachments 4-4 and 4-5 of CPPP-7 and SWEC-PSAS Project ~ Mem-i l
'            orandum PM-141 provide procedures for the design and evaluation of base plate bolt holes.                                                         Specification No. MS-46A (Reference C.7) and Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 specify the design re-quirements and QA inspection tolerance of the bolt hole diameters.                                                            ..
orandum PM-141 provide procedures for the design and evaluation of base plate bolt holes.
Specification No. MS-46A (Reference C.7) and Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 specify the design re-quirements and QA inspection tolerance of the bolt hole diameters.
A14. OBE/SSE Damping Section 3.0 of CPPP-7 requires the use of OBE/SSE damping values that are consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Reference C.8) as modified by ASME Code Case N-411.
A14. OBE/SSE Damping Section 3.0 of CPPP-7 requires the use of OBE/SSE damping values that are consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Reference C.8) as modified by ASME Code Case N-411.
A15. Support Mass in Piping Analysis Section 3.10.4, Attachment 3-4, and Attachment 3-11 of CPPP-7 provide guidance for the determination of pipe support mass and require the inclusion of this mass in the piping stress analysis.
A15. Support Mass in Piping Analysis Section 3.10.4, Attachment 3-4, and Attachment 3-11 of CPPP-7 provide guidance for the determination of pipe support mass and require the inclusion of this mass in the piping stress analysis.
O     A16. Programmatic Aspects and Quality Assurance, Design Including Iterative Project Procedures CPPP-1, (Reference C.9) CPPP-6, (Reference C.10) and CPPP-7 control the validation of the piping and pipe supports.
O A16. Programmatic Aspects and Quality Assurance, Including Iterative Design Project Procedures CPPP-1, (Reference C.9) CPPP-6, (Reference C.10) and CPPP-7 control the validation of the piping and pipe supports.
This is an integrated effort within one organization and assures proper interface between piping analysis and pipe support design.
This is an integrated effort within one organization and assures proper interface between piping analysis and pipe support design.
Additionally, personnel involved in the validation process receive training in the proper application of the requirements.
Additionally, personnel involved in the validation process receive training in the proper application of the requirements.
Interface with Westinghouse for Class 1 stress analysis is discussed in Subappendix B.1.
Interface with Westinghouse for Class 1 stress analysis is discussed in Subappendix B.1.
A17. Mass Point Spacing Section 3.10.6.1 and Attachment 3-7 of CPPP-7 provides guidelines for the proper location of mass points in pipe stress analyses.
A17. Mass Point Spacing Section 3.10.6.1 and Attachment 3-7 of CPPP-7 provides guidelines for the proper location of mass points in pipe stress analyses.
A18. High-Frequency Mass Participation Section 3.10.6.8 of CPPP-7 specifies the criteria to account for high frequency mass participation in stress analyses.                                                             Use of computer program NUPIPE-SW (V04/LO2) has been revised to automatically account for high frequency mass corrections.
A18. High-Frequency Mass Participation Section 3.10.6.8 of CPPP-7 specifies the criteria to account for high frequency mass participation in stress analyses.
O                                                                                             C-4
Use of computer program NUPIPE-SW (V04/LO2) has been revised to automatically account for high frequency mass corrections.
O C-4


A19. Fluid Transients g!
A19. Fluid Transients g!
i V'             Project Procedure CPPP-10 (Reference C.11) describes the procedure by which fluid transient events are identified for applicable systems for incluaion in the pipe stress analyses.
iV' Project Procedure CPPP-10 (Reference C.11) describes the procedure by which fluid transient events are identified for applicable systems for incluaion in the pipe stress analyses.
Section 3.4.5.5 and Attachment 3-1 of CPPP-7 provide requirements and instructions for the inclusion of these load conditions in the stress analyses.
Section 3.4.5.5 and Attachment 3-1 of CPPP-7 provide requirements and instructions for the inclusion of these load conditions in the stress analyses.
A20. Seismic Excitation of Pipe Support Mass                                   )
A20. Seismic Excitation of Pipe Support Mass
l Attachment 4-21 of CPPP-7 specifies the requirements for inclusion of     )
)
l -21 of CPPP-7 specifies the requirements for inclusion of
)
the effects of pipe support self-weight excitation in the support evaluation.
the effects of pipe support self-weight excitation in the support evaluation.
A21. Local Stress in Pipe Support Members Attachment 4-13 of CPPP-7 establishes the requirements to evaluate       j local stresses which may occur in pipe support membern.                   <
A21. Local Stress in Pipe Support Members -13 of CPPP-7 establishes the requirements to evaluate j
A22. Safety Factors The technical and design control procedures assure that the piping systems are designed in accordance with the CPSES design criteria, and therefore,     they will perform their safety-related function.
local stresses which may occur in pipe support membern.
      ?                                                                                       l k         A23. SA-36 and A307 Steel Section 2.0 of CPPP-7 lists the applicable governing codes to be used to assure that the proper allowable stresses (determined from the minimum material yield strengths) are used in the design.           Sec-tion 4.2.5.1 of CPPP-7 deletes the use of cinched U-bolts / crosspiece   i supports with struts / snubbers. Attachment 4-5 of CPPP-7 establishes the requirement for the reduced allowables of high strength bolts used with A563 Grade A nuts.
A22. Safety Factors The technical and design control procedures assure that the piping systems are designed in accordance with the CPSES design criteria, and therefore, they will perform their safety-related function.
A24. U-Bolt Twisting Section 4.2.5.1   and Attachment 4-8 of CPPP-7 provides guidance for     !
?
the modification of U-bolt trapeze supports.       Cinched U-bolts used   l with struts or snubbers are deleted from CPSES.                           1 A25. Fisher / Crosby Valve Modeling/ Qualification                             '
l k
The validation process requires a conservative 55/45 flow distribu-tion ratio on the outlet configuration.
A23. SA-36 and A307 Steel Section 2.0 of CPPP-7 lists the applicable governing codes to be used to assure that the proper allowable stresses (determined from the minimum material yield strengths) are used in the design.
(                 Section 7.4.3 of CPPP-6 establishes the requirements for assuring that valves are properly qualified to the as-built loadings.
Sec-tion 4.2.5.1 of CPPP-7 deletes the use of cinched U-bolts / crosspiece i
l h                                               C-5 i
supports with struts / snubbers. -5 of CPPP-7 establishes the requirement for the reduced allowables of high strength bolts used with A563 Grade A nuts.
A24. U-Bolt Twisting Section 4.2.5.1 and Attachment 4-8 of CPPP-7 provides guidance for the modification of U-bolt trapeze supports.
Cinched U-bolts used l
with struts or snubbers are deleted from CPSES.
1 A25. Fisher / Crosby Valve Modeling/ Qualification The validation process requires a conservative 55/45 flow distribu-tion ratio on the outlet configuration.
(
Section 7.4.3 of CPPP-6 establishes the requirements for assuring that valves are properly qualified to the as-built loadings.
l h
C-5 i
l
l


f n                                   Section 3.10.6.5 of CPPP-7 addresses the proper valve yoke modeling G                                   of flexible valves.
f n
A26. Piping Modeling                                                         ;
Section 3.10.6.5 of CPPP-7 addresses the proper valve yoke modeling G
Section 3.0 of CPPP-7 provides direction and requirements for the proper modeling of piping systems.
of flexible valves.
A26. Piping Modeling Section 3.0 of CPPP-7 provides direction and requirements for the proper modeling of piping systems.
A27. Welding Section 4.4 and Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7 provide requirements for the design and analysis of welded joints.
A27. Welding Section 4.4 and Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7 provide requirements for the design and analysis of welded joints.
A28. Anchor Bolts /Embedment Plates Attachment 4-4 of CPPP-7 provides guidance and requirements for the evaluation of anchor bolt embedded depths and edge distances.         i Project Procedure CPPP-6 provides controls to assure that reaction loads on embedded plates, attachment spacing between embedded plates, and as-built loads for through-bolts are transmitted to responsible groups for evaluation.
A28. Anchor Bolts /Embedment Plates -4 of CPPP-7 provides guidance and requirements for the evaluation of anchor bolt embedded depths and edge distances.
A29. Strut / Snubber Angularity Section 4.2.6 of CPPP-7 specifies requirements to assure that force   J
i Project Procedure CPPP-6 provides controls to assure that reaction loads on embedded plates, attachment spacing between embedded plates, and as-built loads for through-bolts are transmitted to responsible groups for evaluation.
      /]                                   components resulting from off-axis loading of struts and snubbers is V                                   included in the support design.
A29. Strut / Snubber Angularity Section 4.2.6 of CPPP-7 specifies requirements to assure that force J
Specification No. 2323-MS-100, Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10A   l (Reference C.12), and Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1.28 have been revised to incorporate the resolutions of the items related to this issue.
/]
components resulting from off-axis loading of struts and snubbers is V
included in the support design.
Specification No. 2323-MS-100, Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10A l
(Reference C.12), and Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1.28 have been revised to incorporate the resolutions of the items related to this issue.
l A30. Component Qualification Sections 3.4.5 and 4.2 of CPPP-7 delineate the requirements to assure that piping movements due to system design conditions are considered in the evaluations of frame gaps, swing angles, and spring and snubber travel.
l A30. Component Qualification Sections 3.4.5 and 4.2 of CPPP-7 delineate the requirements to assure that piping movements due to system design conditions are considered in the evaluations of frame gaps, swing angles, and spring and snubber travel.
Quality Assurance Procedures QI-QAP-11.1-28 and CP-QAP-12.1 (Refer-ence C.13) have been revised to include inspections for the existence and tightness of all locking devices on pipe supports.
Quality Assurance Procedures QI-QAP-11.1-28 and CP-QAP-12.1 (Refer-ence C.13) have been revised to include inspections for the existence and tightness of all locking devices on pipe supports.
l                                   A31. Structural Modeling for Frame Analysis Section 4.3.2.1 of CPPP-7 requires the use of AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 8th Edition for the selection of the member properties used in the analysis, including values for torsional resistance.     j
l A31. Structural Modeling for Frame Analysis Section 4.3.2.1 of CPPP-7 requires the use of AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 8th Edition for the selection of the member properties used in the analysis, including values for torsional resistance.
        \                                                                                                       l C-6                                     j l
j l
1
\\
C-6 j
l 1


t I
t I
i Attachment 4-5 of CPPP-7 provides the modeling technique used for the O
i -5 of CPPP-7 provides the modeling technique used for the O
  ,s              Richmond insert / tube steel connection.                                                             l l
Richmond insert / tube steel connection.
Attachment 4-18 of CPPP-7 provides procedures for the proper modeling of the connection stiffness for use in the frame analysis.
l
,s l -18 of CPPP-7 provides procedures for the proper modeling of the connection stiffness for use in the frame analysis.
A32. Computer Program Verification and Use l
A32. Computer Program Verification and Use l
Section 5.0 of CPPP-7 identifies the computer programs acceptable for use in the validation of piping and pipe supports. This list assures that only those programs verified in accordance with SWEC standard QA                               ;
Section 5.0 of CPPP-7 identifies the computer programs acceptable for use in the validation of piping and pipe supports. This list assures that only those programs verified in accordance with SWEC standard QA program requirements for verification, technical adequacy, and appro-j priate version are used in the validation program.
program requirements for verification, technical adequacy, and appro-                             j priate version are used in the validation program.                                                 l A33. Hydrotest Sections 3.6.2.4 and 4.7.2 of CPPP-7 provide guidance for the evalua-tion of piping'and supports for hydrotest loading.
l A33. Hydrotest Sections 3.6.2.4 and 4.7.2 of CPPP-7 provide guidance for the evalua-tion of piping'and supports for hydrotest loading.
A34. Seismic /Nonseismic Interface Attactment 4-10 of CPPP-7 provides requirements and instruction for the design of safety-related piping attached to nonseismic piping.
A34. Seismic /Nonseismic Interface Attactment 4-10 of CPPP-7 provides requirements and instruction for the design of safety-related piping attached to nonseismic piping.
A35. Other Issues O               CPPP-6. and CPPP-7 provide technical and administrative procedures to
A35. Other Issues O
(/               address the concerns described in the 51 DIRs referenced in Subappendix A35.
CPPP-6. and CPPP-7 provide technical and administrative procedures to
(/
address the concerns described in the 51 DIRs referenced in Subappendix A35.
A36. SSER-8 Review Resolution of this issue requires no preventive action, since. design allowables for Richmond inserts and anchor bolts are based on the actual strength of concrete at CPSES.
A36. SSER-8 Review Resolution of this issue requires no preventive action, since. design allowables for Richmond inserts and anchor bolts are based on the actual strength of concrete at CPSES.
A37. SSER-10 Review No preventive action is required for the uncontrolled plug welding issue. As concluded by the CPRT Action Plan V.d Results Report                                 l (Reference C.14), the current procedures and practices for the repair of mislocated holes are adequate to preclude the recurrence of undoc-umented plug welds.
A37. SSER-10 Review No preventive action is required for the uncontrolled plug welding issue.
TU Electric Construction Procedure CP-CPM-1.2 (Reference C.15) and                                   i Project Procedure CPSP-30 (Reference C.16) provide procedures for                                   ]
As concluded by the CPRT Action Plan V.d Results Report l
the evaluation of the installed piping and pipe support configuration                               i including 'the proper design of temporary supports prior to a piping system hydro to assure the integrity of the installed safety-related                               j piping and pipe supports.                                                                           l l
(Reference C.14), the current procedures and practices for the repair of mislocated holes are adequate to preclude the recurrence of undoc-umented plug welds.
TU Electric Construction Procedure CP-CPM-1.2 (Reference C.15) and i
Project Procedure CPSP-30 (Reference C.16) provide procedures for
]
the evaluation of the installed piping and pipe support configuration i
including 'the proper design of temporary supports prior to a piping system hydro to assure the integrity of the installed safety-related j
piping and pipe supports.
l l
C-7 i
C-7 i


l 1
l 1
I Project Procedure CPPP-28 (Reference C.17) and Attachment 4-10 to       I g-~3                                                                                                  i
I g-~3 Project Procedure CPPP-28 (Reference C.17) and Attachment 4-10 to I
(   )                         CPPP-7 provide direction and requirements for the identification and
(
  '~''                          evaluation of interface anchors between seismic and nonseismic piping to assure   isolation of Category I systems from non-Category I systems.
)
CPPP-7 provide direction and requirements for the identification and i
evaluation of interface anchors between seismic and nonseismic piping
'~''
to assure isolation of Category I systems from non-Category I systems.
Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 has been revised (Revi-sion 30) to include acceptance criteria and measurement techniques for the inspection of Type 2 skewed welds.
Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 has been revised (Revi-sion 30) to include acceptance criteria and measurement techniques for the inspection of Type 2 skewed welds.
A38. SSER-11 Review Attachment 3-15 to CPPP-7 provides the procedure to analyze girth     j welds.
A38. SSER-11 Review -15 to CPPP-7 provides the procedure to analyze girth j
welds.
Quality Control Procedures QI-QAP-11.1-28 and CP-QAP-12.1 have been revised to assure that the items related to the QA Inspection Program have been addressed.
Quality Control Procedures QI-QAP-11.1-28 and CP-QAP-12.1 have been revised to assure that the items related to the QA Inspection Program have been addressed.
A39. CPRT Quality of Construction Review on Piping and Pipe Supports TU Electric instituted the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Pro-gram (PCHVP) (Reference C.18) to validate that the as-built hardware complied with the design for Unit 1 and Common safety-related piping and pipe supports. The quality of construction requirements for pipe supports in the PCHVP were incorporated into Quality Assurance Pro-cedures QI-QAP-1.11-28 and CP-QAP-12.1.
A39. CPRT Quality of Construction Review on Piping and Pipe Supports TU Electric instituted the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Pro-gram (PCHVP) (Reference C.18) to validate that the as-built hardware complied with the design for Unit 1 and Common safety-related piping and pipe supports.
('')T L.
The quality of construction requirements for pipe supports in the PCHVP were incorporated into Quality Assurance Pro-('')T cedures QI-QAP-1.11-28 and CP-QAP-12.1.
2.0 AP_PENDIX B ISSUES - PREVENTIVE ACTION Bl. SDAR-CP-86-33, Stiffness Values for Class 1 Stress Analysis Project Procedure CPPP-6 requires that support stiffness values for pipe supports for Class 1 lines be computed and provided to Westing-house for use in the stress analysis of Class 1 lines.
L.
B2. SDAR-CP-86-72, Small Bore Piping and Supports Design Basis Documents (DBD) (References C.19, C.20, and C.21) for small bore piping and the supports have been established. These doc-uments delineate the applicable specifications, detailed technical procedures, and construction and QC inspection procedures, required to maintain the validated design.
2.0 AP_PENDIX B ISSUES - PREVENTIVE ACTION Bl.
B3. SDAR-CP-86-63, Pipe Support Installation The as-built verification procedure, CPSP-12 (Reference C.22), and the Pipe Stress / Support Final Reconciliation Procedure, CPPP-23 (Reference C.23), combined with those Quality Assurance inspection procedures identified in the DBD-CS-067 (Reference C.18) provide as-o Y   h V                                                          C-8
SDAR-CP-86-33, Stiffness Values for Class 1 Stress Analysis Project Procedure CPPP-6 requires that support stiffness values for pipe supports for Class 1 lines be computed and provided to Westing-house for use in the stress analysis of Class 1 lines.
B2.
SDAR-CP-86-72, Small Bore Piping and Supports Design Basis Documents (DBD) (References C.19, C.20, and C.21) for small bore piping and the supports have been established.
These doc-uments delineate the applicable specifications, detailed technical procedures, and construction and QC inspection procedures, required to maintain the validated design.
B3.
SDAR-CP-86-63, Pipe Support Installation The as-built verification procedure, CPSP-12 (Reference C.22), and the Pipe Stress / Support Final Reconciliation Procedure, CPPP-23 (Reference C.23), combined with those Quality Assurance inspection procedures identified in the DBD-CS-067 (Reference C.18) provide as-o Y
h
}
}
l l
V C-8 l
w__-             _ _ _
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                ,3 _                                        surance that pipe support installations will meet the requirements of l the design.
surance that pipe support installations will meet the requirements of
lY B4. SDAR-CP-86-67, Preoperational Vibration Test Criteria The results of the preoperational vibration testing will be reviewed by SWEC-PSAS to assure that the results satisfy the design criteria.
,3 _
lY the design.
B4.
SDAR-CP-86-67, Preoperational Vibration Test Criteria The results of the preoperational vibration testing will be reviewed by SWEC-PSAS to assure that the results satisfy the design criteria.
No further preventive action is required because preoperational vi-bration testing is a one-time event, which will not be repeated fol-lowing the issuance of an operating license.
No further preventive action is required because preoperational vi-bration testing is a one-time event, which will not be repeated fol-lowing the issuance of an operating license.
B5. SDAR-CP-86-73, ASME Snubber Attachment Brackets Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 has been revised to in-spect for the incorrect use of the correct attachment brackets for snubbers.
B5.
SDAR-CP-86-73, ASME Snubber Attachment Brackets Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 has been revised to in-spect for the incorrect use of the correct attachment brackets for snubbers.


==REFERENCES:==
==REFERENCES:==
 
C.1 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-7, Design Criteria for Pipe Stress and Pipe Supports, Revision 3, February 27, 1987 C,2 SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-141, Unequal Shear Loading Effect on Richmond Insert and Threaded Rods Used in Conjunction with Tube Steel, Revision 0, March 25, 1987 O
C.1   SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-7, Design Criteria for Pipe Stress and Pipe Supports, Revision 3, February 27, 1987 C,2   SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-141, Unequal Shear Loading Effect on Richmond Insert and Threaded Rods Used in Conjunction with Tube Steel, Revision 0, March 25, 1987 O
,V C.3 CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28, Fabrication and Installation Inspection of Safety Component Supports, Revision 35, January 8, 1987 C.4 AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 8th Edition, 1980 C.5 CPSES Piping Erection Specification No. 2323-MS-100, Revision 9, August 17, 1987 C.6 SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-140, Flare Bevel Groove Welds, Revision 1, May 1, 1987 C.7 CPSES Nuclear Safety Class Pipe Hangers and Supports Specifica-tion No. 2323-46A, Revision 7, May 7, 1987 C.8 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1973 C.9 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-1, Management Plan for Project Quality (Piping System Qualification /Requalification), Revision 7, March 25, 1987 C.10 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-6, Pipe Stress / Support Requal-ification Procedure, Revision 4, April 8, 1987 O
              ,V                                         C.3   CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28, Fabrication and Installation Inspection of Safety Component Supports, Revision 35, January 8, 1987 C.4   AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 8th Edition, 1980 C.5   CPSES Piping Erection Specification No. 2323-MS-100, Revision 9, August 17, 1987 C.6   SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-140, Flare Bevel Groove Welds, Revision 1, May 1, 1987 C.7   CPSES Nuclear Safety Class Pipe Hangers and Supports Specifica-tion No. 2323-46A, Revision 7, May 7, 1987 C.8   NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1973 C.9   SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-1, Management Plan for Project Quality (Piping System Qualification /Requalification), Revision 7, March 25, 1987 C.10   SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-6, Pipe Stress / Support Requal-ification Procedure, Revision 4, April 8, 1987 O
C-9
C-9


L q                        C.11         SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-10, Procedure for Review of Plant
L C.11 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-10, Procedure for Review of Plant q
,'IV j3 Operating Mode Conditions, Revision 1, April 1, 1986 C.12         CPSES Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10A, Installation of Vendor                                           !
,'IV j3 Operating Mode Conditions, Revision 1, April 1, 1986 C.12 CPSES Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10A, Installation of Vendor Supplied Component Supports Catalog
Supplied     Component   Supports   Catalog Items,                                           Revision 1, August 15, 1985 C.13         CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure CP-QAP-12.1, Mechanical Component Installation and N-5 Certification, Revision 18, January 12, 1987 C.14         CPRT Action Plan V.d Results Report, Revision 1,                                               Plug Welds, December 18, 1986 C.15       CPSES Construction Procedure CP-CPM-1.2, Construction Activities for Systems and/or Areas Accepted and/or Controlled by TU Electric Plant Operations, Revision 5, March 4, 1987 C.16       SWEC-PSAS Project Site Engineering Procedure CPSP-30, Processing TU Electric     Requests     for   Temporary Hangers,                                         Revision 0, October 7, 1987 C.17       SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-28, Procedure for Identification and Evaluation of Interfaces Between Seismic and Nonseismic Piping, Revision 0, February 20, 1987 C.18       TU Electric Engineering and Construction Procedure EC-9.04, Post
: Items, Revision 1, August 15, 1985 C.13 CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure CP-QAP-12.1, Mechanical Component Installation and N-5 Certification, Revision 18, January 12, 1987 C.14 CPRT Action Plan V.d Results Report, Revision 1, Plug Welds, December 18, 1986 C.15 CPSES Construction Procedure CP-CPM-1.2, Construction Activities for Systems and/or Areas Accepted and/or Controlled by TU Electric Plant Operations, Revision 5, March 4, 1987 C.16 SWEC-PSAS Project Site Engineering Procedure CPSP-30, Processing TU Electric Requests for Temporary
'/     .                                        Construction Hardware Validation Program, July 29, 1987 C.19       TU Electric Design Basis Document DBD-CS-065, ASME Class 1 Piping Analysis (Draft), August 14, 1987                                                                           l
: Hangers, Revision 0, October 7, 1987 C.17 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-28, Procedure for Identification and Evaluation of Interfaces Between Seismic and Nonseismic Piping, Revision 0, February 20, 1987 C.18 TU Electric Engineering and Construction Procedure EC-9.04, Post
                                                                                                                                                              )
'/
C.20       TU Electric Design Basis Document DBD-CS-066, ASME Class 2 and 3                                           J Piping Analysis, Revision 0, July 31, 1987                                                                 )l C.21       TU Electric Design Basis Document DBD-CS-067, ASME Class 1, 2, and                                         )
Construction Hardware Validation Program, July 29, 1987 C.19 TU Electric Design Basis Document DBD-CS-065, ASME Class 1 Piping Analysis (Draft), August 14, 1987 l
3 Pipe Support Design, Revision 0, July 31, 1987 C.22       SWEC-PSAS Project Site Engineering Procedure CPSP-12, As-Built Ver-                                         !
)
ification (Piping), Revision 0, November 12, 1986                                                           '
C.20 TU Electric Design Basis Document DBD-CS-066, ASME Class 2 and 3 J
C.23       SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-23, Pipe Stress / Support Final Rec-conciliation Procedure, Revision 0, March 2, 1987
Piping Analysis, Revision 0, July 31, 1987
)
l C.21 TU Electric Design Basis Document DBD-CS-067, ASME Class 1, 2, and
)
3 Pipe Support Design, Revision 0, July 31, 1987 C.22 SWEC-PSAS Project Site Engineering Procedure CPSP-12, As-Built Ver-ification (Piping), Revision 0, November 12, 1986 C.23 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-23, Pipe Stress / Support Final Rec-conciliation Procedure, Revision 0, March 2, 1987
[
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Latest revision as of 16:33, 22 May 2025

Rev 0 to Small Bore Piping & Pipe Supports, Project Status Rept
ML20245C947
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 11/02/1987
From: Klause R
TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245C945 List:
References
TAC-R00243, TAC-R243, NUDOCS 8711040247
Download: ML20245C947 (197)
v • d • e


Text

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J COM ANCHE PE AK i

STE AM ELECTRIC STATION l

UNIT 1 and COMMON l

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM O

PROJECT STATUS REPORT SMALL BO lE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS 5=5E *EW RI II OI

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Revision O' TU ELECTRIC COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT-1 AND COMMON.

STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION PROJECT STATUS REPORT SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS i

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/C R. P. Klause J

Project Manager j

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TABLE OF CONTENTS p_

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Section Title Page i

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS vii I

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1-1 l

l Figure 1-1 Small Bore Piping and Pipe Support Correc-tive Action Program (CAP) 2.0 PURPOSE 2-1 3.0 SCOPE 3-1

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4.0 SPECIFIC ISSUES 4-1 1

5.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM 5-1 1

METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS l

5.1 METHODOLOGY AND WORK PERFORMED 5-1 5.1.1 Licensing Commitments, Design Criteria, 5-1

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.and Procedures

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5.1.1.1 Verification and Validation of Design 5-2 Methodology l

5.1.1.2 Resolution of Piping-Related Design Issues 5-4 i

5.1.2 Design Validation Process 5-6 l

5.1.2.1 Piping System Input Validation 5-7 l

5.1.2.2 Pipe Stress Analysis 5-8

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5.1.2.3 Pipe Support Analysis 5-11 i

5.1.2.4 Validation of Seismic Category II 5-12 Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Over Seismic Category I Equipment j

5.1.2.5 SWEC-PSAS Clearance Walkdowns 5-13 l

5.1.2.6 Testing 5-13 l

5.1.2.7 Final Reconciliation of Small Bore Piping 5-15 l

and Pipe Supports 5.1.3 Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program 5-16 (PCRVP) 5.1.3.1 Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program 5-20 (PCHVP) Procedures 5.2 RESULTS 5-23 5.2.1 Pipe Stress Analysis Resulte 5-23 j

5.2.2 Pipe Support Analysis Results 3-24 I

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p Section Title

Page, 5.2.2.1 Pipe Support Modifications Identified Prior to Stress Analysis 5-24 5.2.2.2 Special Pipe Support Frame Analyses 5-26 5.2.2.3 SWEC As-Built Verification of Modifications 5-26 5.2.3 Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program 5-26 (PCHVP) Results 5.3 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 5-28 5.3.1 Summary of SWEC Engineering Assurance (EA) 5-30 Audits 5.3.2 Summary of Audits by TU Electric - QA/ TAP, 5-31 NRC-VPB, and SWEC-QAAD 5.4 CORRECTIVE AND PREVENTIVE ACTION 5-33 Figure 5-1 Corrective Action Program (CAP) Flow Chart and Governing Procedures - Small Bore Piping and Supports Figure 5-2 Corrective Action Program (CAP) Technical Interfaces - Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Figure 5-3 SWEC-PSAS Pipe Stress Validation Flow Chart Figure 5-4 SWEC-PSAS Pipe Support Validation Flow Chart Figure 5-5 Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program

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(PCHVP)

Table 5-1 Piping System Input Data Table 5-2 Fluid Transient Loadings Table 5-3 PCHVP Reinspection Attributes and Resolutions in Response to CPRT Quality of Construction ISAP-VII.C Results Report Table 5-4 Unit 1 and Common Small Bore Pipe Supports Modification Summary Table 5-5 Seismic Category II Small Bore Piping Over Seismic Category I Equipment Piping Checklist Table 5-6 PCHVP Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports -

Installation / Inspection Procedures Table 5-7 Seismic Category II Small Bore Piping Over Seismic Category I Equipment Pipe Support Checklist Table 5-8 Typical SWEC-PSAS Technical and Design Control Practices Table 5-9 Summary of SWEC Engineering Assurance Audits Table 5-10 Summary of TU Electric Audits

6.0 REFERENCES

6-1 O

11

Section Tit 1e Pay APPENDIX A COMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM (CPRT) AND A-1 EXTERNAL ISSUES APPENDIX B ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING PERFORMANCE OF B-1 THE CAP APPENDIX C PREVENTIVE ACTIONS C-1 lii w

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

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This Project Status Report (PSR) summarizes the systematic validation process for safety-related small bore piping (2 in. nominal pipe size and smaller) and pipe supports implemented by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation - Pipe Stress Analysis and Support Project (SWEC-PSAS) at Comanche Peak Steam Electric 1

Station (CPSES), Unit I and Common. This Project Status Report (PSR) presents the results of the design validation and describes the Post-Construction Hard-i l

ware Validation Program (PCHVP).

SWEC-PSAS's activities were governed by the TU Electric Corrective Action Program (CAP) which required SWEC-PSAS to:

1.

Establish a consistent set of CPSES safety-related piping and pipe support design criteria that complies with the CPSES licensing commitments.

2.

Produce a set of design control procedures that assures compliance with the design criteria.

3.

Evaluate systems, structures, and components, and direct the correc-tive actions recommended by the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and those determined by the Corrective Action Program (CAP) investi-gations to be necessary to demonstrate that systems, structures, and components are in conformance with the design.

4.

Assure that the validation resolves the piping-related design and O

hardware issues identified by the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT),

2

(_/

external sources, and the Corrective Action Program (CAP).

2 Common refers to areas in CPSES that contain both Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems, structures, and components 2External issues are issues identified by the following:

NRC Staff Special Review Team (SRT-NRC)

NRC Staff Special Inspection Team (SIT)

NRC Staff Construction Appraisal Team (CAT)

Citizens Association for Sound Energy (CASE)

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB)

NRC Region IV Inspection Reports NRC Staff Technical Review Team (TRT) [SSERs 7-11]

CYGNA Independent Assessment Program (IAP)

Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) issues are issues identified by the following:

CPRT Design Adequacy Program (DAP)

CPRT Quality of Construction Program (QOC) n iv J

)

O 5.

Validate that the design of safety-related piping systems is in con-i formance with the licensing commitments and that the installed hard-ware is in conformance with the validated design.

6.

Produce a set of consistent and validated design documentation.

A consistent set of design criteria for CPSES safety-related piping and pipe supports has been developed and used by SWEC-PSAS for the design validation process.

This set of design criteria and methodologies is in conformance with the CPSES licensing commitments.

It has been independently and extensively reviewed and was accepted by Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and by CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA).

SWEC-PSAS established design control procedures to implement the design crite-ria and methodologies described above, and to govern the work flow and techni-cal interfaces with other disciplines, for both the design and hardware validation processes. These procedures specify the processes (such as the val-idation of piping system inputs, piping and pipe support checklists, documen-tation control, and final reconciliation) that have been implemented throughout the safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Pro-gram (CAP).

SWEC-PSAS has performed analyses to validate the design of as-built CPSES Unit I and Common safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports.3 The 4 that contain ap-results are documented in 457 pipe stress analysis packages proximately 6,630 pipe supports.

The as-built hardware for safety-related b) small bore piping and pipe supports is being validated to the design by the V

Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP).

Methodologies have been incorporated into the SWEC-PSAS design criteria and the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) implementation procedures which have resolved the piping-related design and hardware issues identified by the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT), external sources, and the Corrective Action Program (CAP).

Consequently, the validated design of the CPSES safety-related small bore pipe and pipe supports has resolved these piping-related issues.

" Analysis of the ASME Section III Code Class 1 small bore piping for the Cor-rective Action Program (CAP) was performed by Westinghouse, except one small bore pipe stress analysis package was performed by SWEC-PSAS.

SWEC performed the analysis of the ASFE Section III Code Class 1 pipe supports as well as the l

ASME Section III Code Class 2 and 3 piping and pipe supports.

4The term " pipe stress analysis package" is used in this Project Status Report to describe the engineering documentation required to validate the design adequacy of piping.

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The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) assures that the safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports are installed in conformance with the validated design.

SWEC-PSAS has reviewed and revised the CPSES piping-related installation specifications, construction procedures, and reviewed quality control inspection procedures to assure that the validated design requirements are implemented. The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) for safety-related small bore piping ' and pipe supports, including the. inspections, engineering walkdowns and evaluations, implemt.nts the corrective actions recommended by the: Comanche Peak Response -Team (CPRT),

as well as those required by Corrective Action Program (CAP) investigations.

SWEC-PSAS will provide TU Electric a complete set of validated design documen-tation for CPSES safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports, including the pipe stress and pipe support calculations, drawings, and interface disci-pline transmittals. This documentation, in conjunction with the updated speci-fications and procedures, can provide the basis for CPSES configuration contro15 to facilitate maintenance and operation throughout the life of the plant.

In-depth quality and technical audits have been performed by SWEC Quality Assurance, TU Electric Quality Assurance, and the independent Engineering Functional Evaluations (EFE).

These audits, in addition to the third party overview performed by TENERA, L.P.

(TERA) for Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT), assured that the SWEC-PSAS procedures and the established design criteria complied with the licensing commitments.

t O

The Unit 1 and Common safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports Cor-rective Action Program (CAP) validates that:

The design of the small bore piping and pipe supports complies with i

the CPSES licensing commitments.

The as-built safety-related small bore piping and supports comply with the validated design.

The small bore piping and pipe supports comply with the CPSES licens-ing commitments and will perform their safety-related functions.

i i

i configuration control is a system to assure that the design and hardware j

remain in compliance with the licensing commitments throughout the life of the 1

plant.

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O V1 l

l 1

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f ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS q

V AISC American Institute of Steel Construction ANSI American National Standards Institute ARS Amplified Response Spectra ASLB Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ASME Section III American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler j

and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1, Nuclear Power Plant Components

]

BRP Piping Isometric Drawing j

CAP Corrective Action Program (TU Electric)

CASE Citizens Association for Sound Energy CAT Construction Assessment Team (NRC) i CFR Code of Federal Regulations CMC Component Modification Card CPE Comanche Peak Engineering (TU Electric)

CPPP Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPRT Comanche Peak Response Team (TU Electric)

CPSES Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station CYGNA CYGNA Energy Services DAP Design Adequacy Program (CPRT)

DBCP Design Basis Consolidation Program (SVEC-PSAS)

DBD Design Basis Document l

3 DCA Design Change Authorization DIR Discrepancy / Issue Resolution Report (CPRT-DAP)

(9 DR Deviation Report

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DSAP Discipline Specific Action Plan (CPRT)

DVP Design Validation Package DWG Design Drawing EA Engineering Assurance (SWEC)

Ebasco Ebasco Services Incorporated EFE Engineering Functional Evaluation FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report FVM Field Verification Method GIR Generic Issues Report HELB High-Energy Line Break HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning IAP Independent Assessment Program (CYGNA)

IEB Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin (NRC) j Impell Impell Corporation ISAP Issue-Specific Action Plan (CPRT)

IWA Integral Welded Attachment LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident MELC Moderate Energy Line Crack NCR Nonconformance Report NOV Notice of Violation (NRC)

NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission V

vii l

q NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRC)

Q NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System (Westinghouse)

NUREG NRC Document NUREG/CR NRC Document Developed by NRC Contractor PCHVP Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program PM Project Memorandum PSAS Pipe Stress Analysis and Support PSR Project Status Report PWR Pressurized Water Reactor l

QA Quality Assurance j

QAAD Quality Assurance Auditing Division (SWEC)

QC Quality Control QOC Quality of Construction and QA/QC Adequacy Program (CPRT)

RIL Review Issue List (CYGNA)

SDAR Significant Deficiency Analysis Report (TU Electric)

SER Safety Evaluation Report (NRC, NUREG-0797)

SIT Special Inspection Team (NRC Staff)

SRT Senior Review Team (CPRT)

SRT-NRC Special Review Team (NRC)

SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SSER Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (NRC, NUREG-0797)

SWEC Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation SWEC-PSAS Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation - Pipe Stress and Support Project

(

TAP Technical Audit Program (TU Electric) k TERA TENERA, L. P.

TET Thermal Expansion Testing TRT Technical Review Team (NRC Staff, SSERs 7-11)

UT Ultrasonic Testing VMG Vibration Monitoring Group VPB Vendor Program Branch (NRC) vitt

,m

1.0 INTRODUCTION

k In October 1984, TU Electric established the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) to evaluate issues that have been raised at CPSES and to prepare a plan for resolving those issues.

The Comanche 2cak Response Team (CPRT) program plan was developed and submitted to the NRC.

In mid-1986, TU Electric performed a qualitative and quantitative review of the preliminary results of the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) (References 79 and 84).

This review identified that the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) issues were very broad in scope and included each discipline.

TU Electric decided that the appropriate method to correct the issues r.aised and to identi-fy and correct any other issues that potentially existed at CPSES would be through one integrated program rather than a separate program for each issue.

TUElectricdecidedtoinitiateacomprehensiveCorrectiveActionProgram(CAPg (Reference 49) to validate the entirety of CPSES safety-related designs.1, The scope of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) has the following objectives:

Demonstrate that the design of safety-related systems, structures and components complies with licensing commitments.

Demonstrate that the existing systems, structures and components are in compliance with the design; or develop modifications which will bring systems, structures, and components into compliance with design.

(7,/

maintain compliance with licensing commitments throughout the life of Develop procedures, an organizational plan, and documentation to

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CPSES.

The Corrective Action Program (CAP) is thus a comprehensive program to validate both the design and the hardware at CPSES, including resolution of specific Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues.

IPortions of selected nonsafety-related systems, structures and components are included in the Corrective Action Program (CAP).

These are Seismic Cate-gory II systems, structures and components, and Fire Protection Systems.

2 Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) design and vendor hardware design and their respective QA/QC programs are reviewed by the NRC independently of CPSES, and are not included in the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as noted in SSER 13; however, the design interface is validated by the CAP.

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1-1

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/-~s TU Electric contracted and provided overall management to Stone & Webster Engi-( )

neering Corporation (SWEC), Ebasco Services Incorporated (Ebasco), and Impell i

Corporation (Impell) to implement the Corrective Action Program (CAP) and di-I vided the CAP into eleven disciplines as follows:

l l

Discipline Responsible Contractor l

Mechanical SWEC

-Systems Interaction Ebasco

-Fire Protection Impell Civil / Structural SWEC Electrical SWEC Instrumentation & Control SWEC Large Bore Piping and Pipe SWEC-PSAS Supports Cable Tray and Cable Tray Hangers Ebasco/Impell Conduit Supports Trains A,B, & C >2" Ebasco Conduit Supports Train C < 2" Impell Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports SWEC-PSAS Heating, Ventilating, and Air Ebasco Conditioning (HVAC)

Equipment Qualification Impell A Design Basis Consolidation Program (DBCP) (Reference 30) was developed to define the methodology by which SWEC - Pipe Stress and Support Project (SWEC-PSAS) performed the design and hardware validation. The approach of this DBCP f-~g is consistent with other contractors' efforts and products.

U The design validation portion of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) identified the design-related licensing commitments.

The design criteria were developed from the licensing commitments and consolidated in the Design Basis Documents (DBDs) (References 1, 2, 3, 61, and 62).

The DBDs identify the design criteria for the design validation effort.

If the existing design did not satisfy the design criteria, it was modified to satisfy the criteria.

The design valida-tion effort for each of the eleven Corrective Action Program (CAP) disciplines is documented in Design Validation Packages (DVPs).

The Design Validation Packages (DVPs) provide the documented assurance (e.g., calculations and draw-ings) that the validated design meets the licensing commitments, including res-olution of all Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues.

The design validation effort revised the installation specifications to reflect the validated design requirements.

The validated installation specifications also contain the inspection requirements necessary to assure that the as-built hardware complies with the validated design.

The hardware validation portion cf the Corrective Action Program (CAP) is im-plemented by the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP), which demonstrates that existing systems, structures, and components are in compli-ance with the installation specifications (validated design), including the modifications that are necessary to bring the hardware into compliance with the validated design.

(D 1-2

The results of the performance of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) for each

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discipline are described in a-Project Status Report (PSR).

This Project Status Report (PSR) describes the results for the Small Bore Piping and Pipe Sup-ports - Corrective Action Program (CAP).

SWEC-PSAS has performed a comprehensive design validation of safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) in order to demonstrate that the design of piping systems and supports.

complies with licensing commitments, and is performing the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) to demonstrate that the as-built piping and pipe supports comply with the validated design.

SWEC-PSAS was initially con-tracted by TU Electric in 1985 to validate small bore piping and pipe supports at CPSES.

When the TU Electric Corrective Action Program was created in 1986, it incorporated and expanded the exicting SWEC-PSAS program.

The validation process is conducted in accordance with the Piping - Design Basis Consolidation Program (Piping-DBCP), which controls implementation of the piping portion of the TU Electric Corrective Action Program (CAP).

The Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports - Corrective Action Program (CAP) encompassed the Comanche Peak Response Team Action Plan DSAP IX, Piping and Pipe Supports Discipline Specific Action Plan (CPRT-DSAP IX) (Reference 4).

The Small Bore Piping and Pipe Sup-ports - Corrective Action Program (CAP), shown schematically in Figure 1-1, was developed by SWEC-PSAS to implement the corrective actions for the small bore piping and pipe supports discipline following the directions specified in the TU Electric's Corrective Action Program (CAP).

The design bases of the Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports - Corrective Action Program (CAP) are contained within a consolidated set of CPSES Design Basis Documents (DBDs) for safety-related piping and pipe supports.

.O' Validation of the CPSES small bore piping and pipe supports is. accomplished by pipe stress and pipe support analyses and implementation of required field mod-ifications.

The results and the methodology used in implementing both the de-sign and hardware-related validations for Unit 1 and Common small bore piping

.and pipe supports are presented in this Project Status Report (PSR).

This Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Project Status Report (PSR) represents a road map of the validation effort from the early stages of design criteria development through the establishment and implementation of the detailed design and design control procedures.

The report traces the updating of design /

installation specifications, construction and Quality Control (QC) procedures, the implementation of the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) to validate the as-built piping and pipe support design, and the completion of the Unit 1 and Common small bore pipe stress analysis packages and pipe support calculations.

1-3

FIGURE 1-1 SMALL BORE PIPING AND PlPE SUPPORT

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CORRECTIVE ACTION l

PROGRAM (CAP)

IDENTIFY LICENSING I

FSAR COMMITMENTS

'd OTHER LICENSING DOCUMENTS DEVELOP DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS (DBDs)

PERFORM DESIGN I

CPRT (DAP & 000) ISSUES VALIDATION y

EXTERNAL ISSUES:

l

-NRC (SRT, SIT, TRT, C AT)

-CYGN A (IAP)

-CASE ASLB

.NRC INSPECTION REPORTS

,g MODIFICATION N YES L

DESIGN r

MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED

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I POST CONSTRUCTION l

2 BUILD / INSPECT j

H ARDWARE VALIDATION MODIFICATION PROGR AM (PCHVP)

J FINAL DESIGN l

l RECONCILIATION lS YES ADDITIONAL l

VALIDATION j

REQUIRED i

?

O NO l

I FINAL DOCUMENTATION l

(DESIGN VALIDATION PACKAGES)

CH47 6FT

l 2.0 PURPOSE

)

O The purpose of this ' Project Status Report (PSR) is to demonstrate _ that the safety-related small bore piping and pipe supports in Unit I and Common are in conformance with the CPSES licensing commitments, satisfy the design criteria, and will satisfactorily perform their safety-related functions.

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3.0 SCOPE

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The scope of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) implemented for CPSES Unit 1 and Common small bore piping and pipe supports as summarized in this Project Status Report (PSR) includes:

I 1.

Seismic Category I ASME Section III Code Class 1,

2, and 3 piping and pipe supports.

2 2.

Seismic Category II Piping and supports required to be included as extensions of a Seismic Category I Pipe Stress Analysis Package.

Piping and supports of high and moderate energy lines which are computer analyzed (for break and crack postul.ation purposes).

Other piping and supports as defined in the CPSES FSAR (Reference 26), the failure of which could cause damage to Seis-mic Category I structures, systems, or components.

The CPSES Piping and Pipe Supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) is shown schematically in Figure 1-1 and discussed below. The program requires:

f-'s 1.

Establishment of small bore piping and pipe support design criteria

(

)

which comply with licensing commitments.

,v 2.

Development of the Design Basis Documents (DBDs) for CPSES small bore piping and pipe supports, which contain the design criteria.

These TStructures, systems, and components that are designed and constructed to with-stand the effects of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and remain functional are designated as Seismic Category I in accordance with the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29 (Reference 78).

All ASME Section III Code Class 1, 2, and 3 piping and pipe supports in CPSES are Seismic Category I.

Those portions of structures, systems, or components whose continued function 2

is not required, but whose failure could reduce the functioning of any Seismic Category I system or component required to satisfy the requirements of Regula-tory Guide 1.29 to an unacceptable safety level or could result in incapaci-tating injury to occupants of the control room, are designated Seismic Cate-gory II and are designed and constructed so that the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) would not cause such failure.

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Design Basis Documents (DBDs) pro 7ide the basis for corrective and

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o preventive actions through the life of the plant.

These documents

!V) also identify the updated design / installation specifications, Quality Control (QC)/ Construction procedures, and technical and design control procedures used in the Salidation process.

3.

Implementation of design and hardware validations, consisting of analysis, identification and implementation of necessary modifica-tions, and field verifications as identified in the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP).

The as-built design of all small bore piping and pipe supports is validated by Quality Control (QC) inspections, engineering walkdowns, and engineering evaluations.

Analysis results are dociunented in Small Bore Piping Design Valida-tion Packages (DVPs).

4.

Resolution of[the design and hardware-relatUd issues of CPSES small bore piping,and pipe nupports and implementation of a corrective ac-tion plan for closure of these issues.

These isrees include external issues, Comanche Peak Resper.oe Teem (CPRT) issues, and issues identi-fied during the. ' performance 'if the Corrective Action Program (CAP)

(See Section 4.0).

(I 5.

The validated design documentation forms the basis for< configuration control of CPSES small bore piping and pipe supports. The validated design documentation and updated procedures /r. specifications will be provided to TU Electric to facilitate operation, maintenance, and A

future modifications following issuance of an operating license.

e t

Within Section 5.1, Section 5.1.1 describes the methodology by chich the CPSES i

licensing commitments were identified, the design criterla were established, and the procedures were developed.

These technical and design control proce-dures, in conjuncti_on with the CPSES quality assurance procedures and design updated to me'et'the corrective ac-and installation d ecifications that were tions for small bore piping and supports, are ektsolidated in the CPSES De11gn Basis Documents (DBDs).

/

Section S.1.2 describes the design velidation process, including,the calcula-tion input / output ren ews and inter {aci requirements with other di'sciplines,

and the preoperationti testing program.

J f

Section 5.1.3 describes the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) process and the procedures.for field verifications (inspections, engi-neering walkdowns, and engineering evaluatiom) required to be implemented to validate that the as-built small.bere piping and 1,ipe supports are in compli-ance.wlth the design documentation /

Section 5.2 presents a summary of the design validation and Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) results. including the hardware modifica-tions resulting from the Corrective Action Program (CAP).

{}

V 3-2 o

(

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-.--.___L

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/

Section 5.3 describes the quality assurance program implemented for the valiaa-

[)

tion process, including the SWEC Engineering Assurance audits, the Engineering (s /

Functional Evaluation (EFE) audits, and the TU Electric Technical Auditing Pro-gram audits.

Section 5.4 describes the SWEC-PSAS inputs to the TU Electric preventive ac-tions including the training of TU Electric Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) personnel and the transfer of a complete set of the validated design documen-tation and procedures to CPE. These procedures can provide the basis for CPSES configuration control throughout the life of the plant.

The design of the Unit I and Common small bore piping and pipe supports has been validated as follows:

Number of Small Bore Pipe Stress Number of Description Analysis Packages Pipe Supports Unit 1 and Common - ASME 455 (SWEC-PSAS) 6,626 (SWEC-PSAS)

Section III Code Class 2 and 3 (Seismic Category I)

Unit I and Common - ASME 1 (Westinghouse) 3 (SWEC-PSAS)

Section III Code Class 1 1 (SWEC-PSAS) 7 (SWEC-PSAS)

(Seismic Category I)

~s TOTAL 457 6,636 Appendix A of this Project Status Report (PSR) describes the details of Correc-tive Action Program (CAP) resolution of the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues.

Appendix B of this Project Status Report (PSR) describes the details of resolu-tions of issues identified during the performance of small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP).

These issues are Significant Defi-ciency Analysis Reports (SDARs) (10CFR50.55(e)) (Reference 58) initiated by TU Electric.

Appendix C of this Project Status Report (PSR) describes the preventive action taken resulting from the implementation of the small bore piping and pipe sup-ports Corrective Action Program (CAP).

i i

b 3-3

(

l l

4

) SPECIFIC ISSUES 1t'.

l l

Th(small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) re-

,- solved all the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) issues, external issues, and isshes identified during the performance of CAP.. Thin section presents a list'ing of piping-related issues addressed in this Project Status Report (PSR).

Technical. review and resolution of external and Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT)Lissues are described in Appendix A, including responses to the NRC staff 4

evaluatic>ns within the CFSESj Supplements to the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) s

'I (Reference 28).

Resolutions = and corrective action' taken for issues identified

.;g-during the performance of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) are described in l

Q Appendix B.

I

, \\\\

r Y

External issues were originally identified in the Large Bore Piping and Pipe

.s 4( [ ^, Sigports Generic Issues Report (GIR) (References 5 and '35).

This Generic Is-

' uvs Report (GIR) was transmitted 'to NRC, Citizens Association for Sound Energy

[

(CASE), ',iar_d CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA).

Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) cont >; acted TENERA, L.P.

(TERA) to perform the Third Party overview (Refer-ence 19)/for the donpleieness and adequacy of these issues /resolut. ions, and the t

overview of correttive / actions implemented by SWEC-PSAS to resolve these is-sues. The results,of these Third Party overviews are presented by TENERA, L.P.

-(TERA) in the Discipline Specific Results Report (Reference 46).

t h Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues are listed'below (issue

.I number corresponds to subappendix number in Appendix A):

Y

(, Qsue Title I

d.

/

Issue No.

),

Al Richmond Inserts A2 Local Stress in Piping

<M A3 Walbto-Wall and Floor-to-Ceiling Supports l,/ \\.

A4

',. Pipe Support /F,ystem Stability A5 Pipe Support Generic Stiffness A6

.Uncinched U-Bolt Acting as a Two-Way Restraint A7 Friction Forces p.

A8 AWS Versus ASME. Code Provisions-A9 A500, Grade B, Tube Steel A10 Tube Steel Section Properties i'

All U-Bolt Cinching

,1lA12 Axial / Rotational Restraints J6'A13 Bolt Hole Gap ts A14 OBE/SSE - Damping A15 Support Mass in Piping Analysis A16 Programmatic Aspects and QA Including Iterative Design l

/

A17 Mass Point Spacing High-Frequency Mass Participation A18

^

A19 Fluid Transients i

A20 Seismic Excitation of Pipe Support Mass e

A21 Local Stress in Pipe Support Members t

4-1

A22 Safety. Factors

Q(,/

A23 SA-36 and A307 Steel 1

A24 U-Bolt Twisting

-A25 Fischer/ Crosby Valve Modeling/ Qualification A26 Piping Modeling A27 Welding A28 Anchor Bolts /Embedment Plates A29 Strut / Snubber Angularity l

A30 Component Qualification A31 Structural Modeling for Frame Analysis A32 Computer Program Verification and Use A33 Hydrotest A34 Seismic /Nonseismic Interface A35 Other Issues A36 SSER-8 Review A37 SSER-10 Review A38 SSER-11 Review A39 CPRT Quality.of Construction Review on Piping and Pipe Supports Issues identified during the performance of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) are listed below (issue number corresponds to subappendix number in Appendix B):

Issue No.

Issue Title 1

B1' SDAR-CP-86-33, Stiffness Values for Class 1 Stress O.

Analysis B2 SDAR-CP-86-72, Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports B3 SDAR-CP-86-63, Pipe Support Installations B4 SDAR-CP-86-67, Preoperational Vibration Test Criteria B5 SDAR-CP-86-73, ASME Snubber Attachment Brackets l

l 4-2

l 5.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS O)

METH0'D0 LOGY AND WORK PERFORMED t

5.1 i

5.1.1 Licensing Commitments, Design Criteria, and Procedures l

l SWEC-PSAS reviewed the piping-relatcd CPSES licensing documentation (such as

)

the FSAR, NRC Regulatory Guides, NRC Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins, ASME Section III Code, and NRC/TU Electric correspondences) and identified licensing commitments related to the small bore piping and pipe supports.

SWEC-PSAS es-tablished design criteria to assure compliance with the licensing commitments.

The design criteria are documented in the Design Basis Documents (DBDs).

SWEC-PSAS then developed design procedures which encompass the following:

Design criteria Resolution of Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues e

SWEC's experience gained through the design of piping and pipe sup-ports for several recently licensed and operating United States nu-clear power plants Regulatory and Professional Society Guidance, such as applicable codes and standards; Welding Research Council Bulletin 300, Technical Positions on Criteria Establishment (Reference 13); and Sections 3.6, 3.7, and 3.9 of NUREG-0800 (Reference 7).

O()

SWEC-PSAS Procedures CPPP-7 (Reference 8) and CPPP-6 (Reference 9) are the pri-mary technical and design control procedures, respectively, for the small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP).

CPPP-6 is supple-mented by SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-15 (Reference 80).

CPPP-15 identifies three items unique to the small bore pipe stress analysis validation process:

Identification of small bore pipe stress analysis package boundaries were validated by SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPSP-16 (Reference 82)

Equivalent-static analysis was performed for small bore pipe stress analysis packages which have no supports (see Section 5.3.2.2)

The review jointly performed by the pipe stress and pipe support en-gineers is not applicable to small bore pipe stress analysis packages which have no supports (see Section 5.1.2.2)

Engineering methodology, based on SWEC-PSAS experience, has been incorporated within the SWEC-PSAS procedures.

A list of typical technical and design con-trol practices that are specified within the SWEC-PSAS procedures is presented in Table 5-8.

I The governing procedures implementing the Corrective Action Program (CAP) of small bore piping and pipe supports are shown in Figure 5-1.

These procedures assure compliance with the design criteria and the resolution of the Comanche C\\

(_ l 5-1

Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues.

Resolutions of these piping-

[_

related issues, whenever applicable, have been implemented for both the small

(

bore and large bore piping and prpe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP).

To assure that the licensing commitments related to small bore piping and pipe supports have been identified, appropriate design criteria established, and procedures developed which comply with the design criteria, several audits and overviews were conducted by the SWEC Corporate Quality Assurance Program and the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT).

SWEC Quality Assurance audits were performed as described in Section 5.3.

The Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) overview of large bore piping and pipe supports was performed by TENERA, L.P. (TERA).

The TENERA, L.P.

(TERA) conclusions for large bore piping and pipe supports are discussed in detail in the TERA Discipline Specific Results Report:

Piping and Supports (DAP-RR-P-001), Revision 1.

In this report, TENERA, L.P. (TERA) states on page 1-2:

"SWEC procedures were reviewed for compliance with applicable CPSES FSAR and licensing criteria.

Licensing commitments applicable to CPSES were used to establish a listing of criteria which were then used to check SWEC procederes.

The procedures were determined to be in compliance either with the existing criteria or criteria changes that were accepted by the NRC for submittals as FSAR amendments (see NRC letter to TUGC0 dated November 4, 1986, Reference 7.4.)"

The small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) used the same technical and design control procedures as used in the large bore pip-ing and pipe supports CAP.

The TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP) is performing an overview of the SWEC-PSAS Corrective Action Program (CAP) implementation and is auditing the CAP to assure that the design criteria are reconciled with the licensing com-mitments.

In addition, CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA) has reviewed and accepted SWEC-PSAS's resolution of piping and pipe supports issues that were identified by the Independent Assessment Program (IAP) of CYGNA.

5.1.1.1 Verification and Validation of Design Methodology SWEC-PSAS performed two sep.trate walkdowns of sauples of Unit 1 and Common as-built piping systems to verify and refine the design methodology used for the design validation process.

These walkdowns were performed by experienced

)

SWEC-PSAS personnel and are described below.

]

l The first walkdown, called the Small Bore Walkdown, was, conducted in accordance

{

with SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-5 (Reference 14).

The results of this walkdown j

are documented in References 15 and 83 The small bore piping walkdown was performed to determine whether the existing design documentation was adequate i

to initiate the pipe stress analyses. As a result of this walkdown, the exist-ing design documentation was determined to be adequate to initiate pipe stress analyses.

I l

5-2

l l

i The second walkdown, called the Engineering Walkdown, was performed in accor-q dance with SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-8 (Reference 10) to determine:

V Whether there were any additional technical issues related to the functional behavior of the piping system that should be evaluated during the Corrective Action Program (CAP).

Whether additional design inputs (or refinements thereof), guide-lines, or procedures were necessary to complete the small bore piping and pipe support validation effort.

The engineering walkdown was performed by 10 teama composed of both SWEC-PSAS pipe stress and pipe support engineers and encompassed 70 Unit 1 and Common large bore pipe stress analysis packages, including approximately 2,400 pipe supports.

The results of this walkdown are documented in Reference 11.

This walkdown identified the need for additional refinements that were then incorpo-rated into the technical procedure, CPPP-7, and design control procedure, CPPP-6 (such as the requirement to validate the valve stem extension depicted on the as-built drawing, which was incorporated into CPPP-6, see also Table 5-8), which have also been implemented in the small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP).

The engineering walkdown resulted in assurance that no additional technical issues existed, and that the SWEC-PSAS procedures, with the refinements incor-porated, were satisfactory to perform the validation of the small bore piping and pipe supporta.

pd Evaluation of Deviation Reports from CPRT - Quality of Construction (QOC)

Program SWEC-PSAS reviewed Deviation Reports (DRs) related to the piping system valida-tion program generated by the Quality of Construction (QOC) program of the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT), as discussed in Subappendix A39.

This re-view was performed in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-18 (Refer-ence 17).

The purposes of the review were to determine 1) whether any changes

)

were required to the inputs or the procedures that control the inputs to the SWEC-PSAS Piping and Pipe Supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) as a result of specific deviations or trends identified during the review, and 2) whether any additional programs, procedures, or changes to existing programs or proce-dures were required to enhance the inputs to the SWEC-PSAS Piping and Pipe Sup-ports CAP.

The review concluded (Reference 18) that no changes to the Piping and Pipe Supports CAP (which includes the PCHVP) in the form of programs or procedures were required to account for the Deviation Reports (DRs) identified by the Quality of Construction program (QOC). However, certain inspection at-tributes for piping and pipe supports were added to the piping and pipe sup-ports Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) inspection attributes matrix as a result of the Deviation Report (DR) reviews.

Corrective action for the hardware-related concerns identified by the Quality of Construc-tion program (QOC) or SWEC-PSAS, such as missing washers, spacers, and locking devices, is implemented through the TU Electric Post-Construction Hardware Val-idation Program (PCHVP) as described in Section 5.1.3.

5-3

5.1.1.2 Resolution of Piping-Related Design Issues

' ()

SWEC-PSAS evaluated the issues described in Section 4.0 and Appendixes A and B, and developed technical and design control procedures to resolve the issues.

Resolutions of all issues in Appendix A were reviewed by TU Electric Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE), and the resolutions of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were reviewed by TENERA, L.P.

(TERA).

The resolutions of the is-in Appendix B were reviewed by Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) and the TU sues Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP).

These resolutions were incorporated into the updated design and installation specifications, as well as the CPSES quality control and construction procedures.

l The issue resolution and implementation processes were as follows:

)

i 1.

For each issue that affected the small bore piping and pipe supports validation effort, SWEC-PSAS reviewed the associated documentation to gain an understanding of the background.

SWEC-PSAS then defined its understanding of the issue.

1 2.

With the issue thus defined, SWEC-PSAS developed and executed an ac-tion plan to resolve the issue.

3.

The resolutions were implemented in appropriate SWEC-PSAS project procedures used for the CPSES Corrective Action Program (CAP).

Com-pliance with these procedares is assured by the SWEC Corporate Quali-ty Assurance program.

Third Party Overview Results The methodology to resolve Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external is-sues was documented in SWEC-PSAS's Evaluation and Resolution of Generic Techni-cal Issues Report dated June 27, 1986.

Final revision to this Generic Issues Report (GIR) dated July 24, 1987, updates the resolution sections to encompass current revisions of SWEC-PSAS's procedures and memoranda, and its contents have been incorporated into Appendix A of this report.

TEKERA, L.P.

(TERA), the lead contractor for the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) Design Adequacy Program (DAP), conducted the third party overview of the large bore piping and pipe supports to assure that all CPRT and external issues are clearly identified and resolved in accordance with the CPRT Discipline Spe-cific Action Plan IX (DSAP-IX). The scope of third party overview included the completeness of issue identification, adequacy of issue resolution, and techni-cal procedures implemented by SWEC-PSAS.

During performance of Design Adequacy Program (DAP) overview, TENERA, L.P. (TERA) identified and documented issues in Discrepancy Issue Reports (DIRs).

SWEC-PSAS has responded to and closed all of the 972 Discrepancy Issue Reports (DIRs) received from TENERA, L.P.

(TERA).

TENERA, L.P.

(TERA) has completed the third party overview of the large bore piping and pipe supports and presented the results in the Discipline Specific Action Plan Results Report for Piping and Pipe Supports.

As described on OV 5-4

page 2-1 of Reference 46, three areas of overview identified in the Discipline Specific Action Plan IX (DSAP-IX) are discussed as follows:

1.

Issues "The Third - Party identified, reviewed, and tracked external source identified issues which were raised regarding pipe analysis and pipe support design.

This effort also included consideration of TRT Issues ISAP.V.c (Reference 7.5), which addresses design considera-i tions for piping between seismic Category I and nonseismic Category I buildings.

The criteria and methodology used by the Project (SWEC) for analysis of these systems were reviewed by the Third Party. This review provides reasonable assurance that the external source issues have been identified and that criteria and methodology used by the Project address all identified issues."

l 2.

Commitment Verification i

"The Third Party verified that commitments which establish piping and support-related design criteria and standards are adequately ad-dressed in procedures and other Project documents.

The commitment sources included the FSAR, design specifications, and the ASME Codes of Record for piping (Reference 7.6) and piping supports (Refer-ence 7.7).

For each criterion source and standard identified, the appropriate criteria and commitments were summarized. These criteria were used in the development of checklists for the review of specific i

program areas.

This review ensures that Project procedures are con-sistent with applicable criteria and commitments.

Where criteria changes have been submitted by the project to resolve differences between the approved FSAR and Project procedures (docu-mented on C-DIRs) closure is based on the assumption that the NRC will approve the amendments."

3.

Procedure Review "The Third Party reviewed procedures (including appropriate SWEC Pro-ject Management memoranda) developed by the Proj ect (SWEC) for the performance of the SWEC scope involving large bore piping analysis and support design to verify, by evaluation of the supporting analys-es, that they are adequate to achieve their intended purpose.

This review verifies that the proj ect procedures resolve the external source issues."

TENERA, L.P.'s (TERA) conclusion on the Third Party review of large bore piping and pipe supports is cited in their Discipline Specific Action Plan Results Report No. DAP-RR-P-001 on page 1-2.

"For each of the thirty-two issues, the resolution methodology has been reviewed by the Third Party and found to be responsive to the concern and in compliance with applicable FSAR and licensing criteria.

The Third

(

5-5

I L

Party has concluded that the overall objectives of the review have been l

/

met, and considers all piping-related external source issues applicable to L

the large bore piping scope to be closed with respect to the methodology being applied to the requalification effort assuming the NRC approves the i

FSAR amendments."

Small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) used the same technical and design control procedures as used in large bore piping and pipe supports CAP.

CYGNA Independent Assessment Program CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA), a consulting firm, was originally contracted by TU Electric to perform a project review identified as the Independent Assess-ment Program (IAP). As a result of this review, CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA) identified issues which they summarized in the CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4 (Piping-RIL) (Reference 86) and the Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4 (Supports-RIL) (Reference 16).

CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA) and SWEC held public meetings on November 13 and 14, 1986, at SWEC's Cherry Hill office and December 15 and 16,1986, at CPSES site to discuss the issue resolutions contained in the CYGNA Review Issue List (RIL) in conjunction with SWEC Project Procedures CPPP-7 and CPPP-6.

CYGNA Energy Services (CYGNA) then performed audits on the basis of SWEC-PSAS design criteria between November 1986 and May 1987.

At the public meeting in Glen Rose, Texas, on May 19, 1987, CYGNA Energy Ser-()

vices (CYGNA) announced that all pipe stress and pipe support issues were j

closed.

All issues relating to embedment plate design, anchorage allowables, spacing, and edge distances were transferred to the Civil / Structural Review Issues List, Revision 0, dated July 12, 1987 (Reference 19), and their resolu-tion is reported in the Civil / Structural Project Status Report (PSR)

(Reference 63).

5.1.2 Design Validation Process The SWEC-PSAS design validation program assures that the design conforms to the licensing commitments.

The program can be visualized as a three-step process.

The first step, described in Section 5.1.2.1, is to establish the input and the analytical models of the pipe stress analysis packages, to identify and imple-ment the necessary pipe support optimization and modifications in the analys-es, and to produce a set of pipe stress analysis results (e.g., pipe stresses, support loads, and equipment nozzle loads). The first-step results, described in Section 5.1.2.2, provide the pipe support design loads and determine that the computerized pipe stress analysis results are within the ASME Section III Code allowables.

The second step includes the detailed evaluation and design

)

of pipe supports (described in Section 5.1.2.3), the local stresses in piping (integral welded attachments), equipment nozzle and containment penetration loads, valve accelerations, pipe break locations, and floor-to-ceiling / wall-to-wall supports, as specified in SWEC-PSAS Procedures CPPP-15, CPPP-6 and CPPP-7.

Discrepancies identified in this step are resolved either by support O

5-6

_-____-__m

I i

modifications or by additional analyses. The third step, or final reconcilia-tion, described in Section 5.1.2.7, is the final process to consolidate analy-(

sis, hardware modifications, and inspection documentation from Step 2 into the piping design documentation.

The technical interfaces and flow charts for the small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) are shown schematically in Figures 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4.

5.1.2.1 Piping System Input Validation The design validation process of piping and supports requires a large quantity of input information, as identified in Table 5-1.

The SWEC-Mechanical Group and the SWEC-Civil / Structural Group validate the piping system input. The pip-ing system input validation by SWEC and the design inputs developed by SWEC-PSAS are described below.

SWEC-Mechanical Group The SWEC-Mechanical Group reviewed CPSES system design and operating condi-tions, which describe the temperatures and pressures of piping systems. These design and operating conditions are evaluated and revised as necessary based on the validated design.

Design and operating system temperatures and pressures for a wide range of plant conditions were documented and transmitted to the SWEC-PSAS pipe stress analysts for use in validation.

The SWEC-Mechanical Group validation effort is described in the Mechanical Project Status Report 1

(PSR) (Reference 64).

The SWEC-Mechanical Group identified essentia1 safety-related piping systems and components, high energy lines, and potential system fluid transients for evaluation by the SWEC-PSAS Fluid Transients Group. These O

fluid transients (such as quickly opening or closing control valves, relief O

valve discharge, pump startup or trip) were identified by following the guid-ance given in NUREG-0582 (Reference 23), using SWEC's past experience with oth-er pressurized water reactors (PWRs), and by an overall review of the CPSES system design descriptions and flow diagrams.

The SWEC-Mechanical Group reviewed the CPSES flow diagrams and stress boundary isometric drawings (BRPs) to assure that applicable piping lines were included in the pipe stress analysis packages.

SWEC-PSAS Fluid Transient Group The SWEC-PSAS Fluid Transient Group was responsible for developing the fluid transient loads (e.g., water hammer or steam hammer) f rom the potential tran-sients identified by the SWEC-Mechanical Group.

These loads were used to vali-i date the design of safety-related piping systems.

These efforts were necessary to address the issue of Subappendix A19.

The fluid transient loads developed by SWEC-PSAS for safety-related piping are summarized in Table 5-2.

lEssential systems and components are required to shut down the reactor and mitigate the consequences of a postulated piping failure, without offsite power.

O 5-2

1 I

p The fluid transient loads used for CPSES design validation process are docu-mented as specified in CPPP-10 (Reference 21).

Criteria for evaluation of the piping system responses due to fluid transient loads are described in CPPP-7.

SWEC-Civil / Structural Group The SWEC-Civil / Structural Group has provided validated seismic Amplified Response Spectra (ARS), as discussed in Civil / Structural Project Status Report (PSR) (Reference 63).

5.1.2.2 Pipe Stress Analysis Stress analysis of piping computes the responses (such as pipe stresses, load-ing on pipe supports, valve accelerations, and equipment nozzle loads) of a piping analytical model under the specified loading combinations (such as loads from deadweight, thermal, pressure, seismic, fluid transients, and Loss of Coolant Accident [LOCA)).

In Unit 1 and Common, there are 457 small bore Seis-l mic Category I and Seismic Category II pipe stress analysis packages with ap-proximately 6,630 pipe supports.

SWEC-PSAS has validated 456 ASME Section III Code Class 1, 2, and 3 (Seismic Category I) pipe stress analysis packages.

Westinghouse validated the other one ASME Section III Code Class 1 (Seismic Category I) pipe stress analysis package, including the continuation of Class 2 and nonsafety-related piping within the pipe stress analysis package boundary.

The pipe stress validation flow chart is shown schematically in Figure 5.3.

(

SWEC-PSAS Piping and Pipe Support System Review Prior to the initiation of the pipe stress analysis, each pipe stress analysis package, including the associated pipe supports, was jointly reviewed as a sys-tem by the pipe stress and pipe support engineers. The purposes of this review were to establish the piping physical configuration, to determine the location and orientation of the pipe supports with respect to the piping configuration, to evaluate the appropriateness of support types, and to identify areas of pip-ing or pipe support designs which may require special modeling techniques to account for the interactions between the pipe and the pipe supports.

SWEC-PSAS reviewed the pipe support drawings and support location drawings to determine whether the existing supporting system was appropriate and could per-form its safety-related function.

SWEC-PSAS reviewed the pipe support drawings to determine the appropriate stiffness values for the input to the pipe stress analysis.

The piping and pipe support system review also determined whether certain snubbers or other supports should be considered for elimination and whether additional pipe support optimization should be performed.

The results of this review were documented as a separate piping system review / stiffness assessment calculation for each pipe stress analysis package, which was used as design input for the pipe stress analysis.

By the incorpo-ration of this review into the validation process, SWEC-PSAS has assured that i

an integrated process, with consistent criteria for both pipe stress analysis O

5-8

l I

Piping Analytical Model l

.)

NJ The first step in the pipe stress analysis is the formation of the pipe stress isometric drawings and mathematical models, which are developed by using the input information shown in Table 5-1, in conjunction with the results of the Piping and Pipe Support System Review.

The mathematical model analytically describes the piping configuration, mass, and boundary conditions.

Piping mass is considered, including the applicable l

pipe support mass that affects the dynamic responses. Eccentric masses such as j

valve operators also are accounted for in the pipe stress analytical model.

j Sufficient mass points are included to assure that all significant dynamic modes are represented.

Appropriate representation of pipe support stiffness from the piping and pipe support system review is included.

Static and dynamic piping analyses were performed using the computer program NUPIPE-SW (Reference 24). The computer program output consists of pipe stress-es, displacements, valve accelerations, and interface loadings (e.g., loadings at pipe supports and equipment nozzles).

This output was used to qualify the piping, pipe supports, and related components in accordance with the applicable codes and licensing commitments as specified in the governing Design Basis Doc-uments (DBDs).

Static analysis was used for deadweight, thermal, and anchor movement loading 2

cases.

The time-history analysis method was used for fluid transient loading 2

cases, and the response spectrum analysis method was used for seismic loading f ~'

cases. Modal contributions above the cutoff frequency in the response spectrum i

method analyses were addressed by an analytical technique in accordance with NUREG/CR-1161 (Reference 25).

This technique, which incorporated the resolu-tion for the issues in Subappendix A18, assures that high frequency dynamic responses are included in the response spectrum analysis.

For small bore can-tilever vent and drain lines with no supports, standard and conservative equiv-alent static calculations can be performed in accordance with Section 4.1 of CPPP-15.

Based on the mathematical model and specified inputs, the computerized pipe stress analysis validates the following:

the piping pressure boundary integri-ty, the piping system structural adequacy, and that maximum calculated stresses are within the specified code allowables.

Additional results (otber than the computed pipe stresses) that were generated from the computerized pipe stress analysis and transmitted to other interfacing disciplines for acceptance (see Figure 5-3), are summarized as follows:

  • Analytical technique used to determine the response of structures to dynamic loads.

1 1

5-9

l Pipe Stress Analysis Results

)

m

(

\\

f 1.

Pipe support loads 2.

Equipment nozzle loads 3.

Containment penetration loads 4.

Expansion joint movements i

5.

Valve accelerations 6.

Valve operator support loads 7.

Valve nozzle loads j

8.

Flance loads 9.

Pipe movements at wall or floor sleeves 10.

Instrument root valve movements l

11.

Pipe movements at pipe rupture restraints 12.

Stress levels for pipe break / crack evaluations Transmittal of Pipe Stress Analysis Results Package Following completion of each pipe stress calculation, a results package that j

contains a summary of pipe stress analysis results was compiled and distributed to the SWEC-PSAS Pipe Support Group and other interfacing disciplines as shown i

in Figure 5-2.

The results package, consisting of information such as the d

equipment nozzle loads and valve accelerations, was sent to other disciplines j

for acceptance.

The pipe support summary transmittal identifies supports re-quiring modification and/or deletion and lists for each pipe support the sup-port function, orientation, loads, and movements.

Q Integral Welded Attachment Analysis b

A separate analysis was performed for each location on the piping which is fit-ted with an integrally welded pipe support attachment to assure that the local piping stress is within the allowable stress limit.

For Integral Welded At-tachments (IWAs) that could not be validated by the standard methods used by j

SWEC-PSAS for typical lug and trunnion configurations, the validation was based on finite element analysis techniques for the specific support, comparison to a similar specific support analysis, or comparison to a parametric. finite element analysis study.

Pipe Break / Crack Analysis As part of the CPSES licensing commitments, the locations of the postulated high energy line breaks (HELBs) and moderate energy line cracks (MELCs) have been evaluated and assessed using the validated results of SWEC-PSAS pipe stress analysis.

Piping stresses, including the local pipe stress from Inte-grally Welded Attachment (IWA) pipe supports, were reviewed to postulate break and crack locations in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-20 (Refer-ence 65).

New mandatory break and crack postulation points were compared to previous locations, and the results were forwarded to the Ebasco Services In-corporated (Ebasco) - System Interaction Group to determine the impact.

This impact may include elimination or addition of pipe rupture restraints or jet impingement shields, jet impingement system interaction studies, or reanalysis of the pipe stress if the consequences of the new postulated break locations (Q

/

5-10

are _ unacceptable.

The evaluation results from System Interaction Group are described in the Mechanical Project Status Report (PSR).

Piping and Pipe Supports Attached to Secondary Walls Special pipe stress analyses were performed in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Proce-dure CPPP-35 (Reference 59) to validate supports / penetrations that have been identified as being attached to a secondary wall.

5.1.2.3 Pipe Support Analysis Based on the pipe support loads from the SWEC and Westinghouse stress analyses results (see Figures 5-3 and 5-4), individual calculations for all small bore pipe supports were prepared to assure code compliance with the design criteria.

The pipe support validation process is shown schematically in Figure 5-4 and can be summarized as a process whereby the support analysis in conjunction with required modifications provide the final validation of the pipe support design.

Pipe support analysis results are distributed to the interface disciplines for acceptance as shown in Figure 5.4.

The validated pipe support calculations and drawings are distributed and filed in accordance with project procedures and are included within each Piping - Design Validation Package (DVP).

The CPSES Unit I and Common small bore pipe supports can be categorized into four types as follows:

p 1.

Standard Component Supports - Struts, spring hangers, and snubbers V

2.

Structural Frame Supports - Including supports for multiple pipes and modified rigid supports 3,

Integrally Welded Attachment (IWA) Supports - Trunnions and lugs 4.

Clamp Anchor Supports - Special type of pipe supports for small bore piping to provide transnational and rotational restraints Validation of these pipe support types is described below.

Standard Component Supporg Standard component supports were evaluated to assure that they are suitable to perform their design function.

Loads f rom the pipe stress analysis were com-pared with the manufacturer's standard component support capacities.

In addi-tion, the relative displacements under all specified load conditions were evaluated to validate the displacement ranges and swing angles of standard components.

Structural Frame Supports Frame type supports were validated by using hand calculations with standard structural analysis methods for simple designs or by computer analysis using n

5-11

STRUDL, STRUDAT, and SANDUL computer programs (described in CPPP-7) for more O-complex designs.

In addition to validating the adequacy of local stresses in the pipe, the validation included the evaluation of:

Member stress versus applicable stress allowables Reactions at all support joints, including local stress effects on tube steel members Weld adequacy at welded joints Adequacy of bolted connections, including washer plate design and local stress effects on tube steel members Adequacy of concrete anchors and base plates Adequacy of clearances between piping and the frame Special Pipe Support Frame Analysis Two special groups of pipe support frames, (i) the wall-to-wall and floor-to-ceiling supports and (ii) corner supports, required special analysis to address the effects of differential building movement at the support attachment loca-tions to the building and for restrained thermal expansion of the wall-to-wall and floor-to-ceiling supports.

These designs are validated in accordance with the criteria contained in Attachment 4-19 of CPPP-7 in resolution of the exter-nal issue described in Subappendix A3.

Integral Welded Attachment Analysis A separate analysis was performed for each location on the piping with an inte-grally welded pipe support attachment to assure that the local piping stresses and support member stresses are within the applicable stress allowables.

The piping local stress is discussed in Section 5.1.2.2.

Clamp Anchors Clamp anchors are used in small bore piping systems as an effective method to establish boundaries of pipe stress analysis packages.

Standard clamp anchor designs have been established in CPPP-7.

The pipe support engineers can speci-fy a standardized and easy-to-install anchor in lieu of integral welded 1

attachment.

5.1.2.4 Validation of Seismic Category II Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Over Seismic Category I Equipment SWEC-PSAS developed a Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-82 (Ref-crence 52) to validate the integrity of seismic Category II piping and pipe supports in accordance with the FSAR and CPPP-30 (Reference 56).

The purpose of this validation process is to provide additional assurance by engineering walkdown and evaluation that during or after a seismic event, Seismic 5-12

Category II piping systems identified in the FSAR will not fall and damage h

nearby Seismic Category I systems, structures, or components.

This Field Veri-U fication Method (FVM) specifies the engineering field walkdowns necessary to assure that the as-built Seismic Category II piping and pipe supports are in compliance with the acceptance criteria. A detailed discussion of this valida-tion process is contained in Section 5.1.3.1.

5.1.2.5 SWEC-PSAS Clearance Walkdowns SWEC-PSAS developed a Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-80 (Reference 50) to assure that sufficient clearance exists around validated pip-ing in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-22 (Reference 32).

Clearance is required to permit those anticipated piping displacements that could occir under plant operating conditions without any impediment to those displacements.

Impediment is defined as any structure, system, or component (e.g., pipe, conduit, cable tray, equipment) that encroaches on the envelope of anticipated pipe displacement.

A detailed discussion of this validation pro-cess is contained in Section 5.1.3.1.

5.1.2.6 Testing The CPSES preoperational and startup testing program provides assurance that piping systems, components, supports, and related structures have been ade-quately designed and installed. The correctness or conservatism of assumptions made in predicting plant responses is validated by analyzing data obtained in a controlled testing environment.

[~'i tj The testing includes verification by observation and measurement (as appropri-ate) to assure that movement, vibration, and expansion of piping and components are acceptable for:

ASME Section III Code Class 1, 2, and 3 piping systems.

Other nonsafety-related high energy piping systems inside seismic Category I structures whose failure could reduce the functioning of any seismic Category I structure, system, or component.

Seismic Category I portions of moderate energy piping systems located outside the containment.

The testing program consists of the following categories:

Vibration Testing The CPSES vibration testing program is set forth in SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-25 (Reference 57).

This program follows the guidelines of NRC Regu-latory Guide 1.68 (Reference 85) and ANSI /ASME Standard OM-3 (Refer-ence 27) for steady state and transient vibration testing of piping systems.

Piping systems are classified as Vibration Monitoring Group (VMG) VMG-1, VMG-2, or VMG-3, as defined in Reference 27.

Piping systems which have no potential vibration problems are classified as VMG-3.

If O'

l 5-13

unexpected vibrations are observed during testing, additional inspections

[ )4 are performed to determine the degree of the problem and the resolution.

If a piping system is identified as posing a potential vibration problem, the affected portion of the system is classified as Vibration Monitoring Group 2 (VMG-2).

This piping will be instrumented during testing to pro-vide a means for ascertaining the maximum vibration response.

Piping systems which exhibit a response not characterized by simple piping vibration modes, and piping systems for which the methods of Vibration Monitoring Group 2 (VMG-2) and Vibration Monitoring Group 3 (VMG-3) are not applicable, are classified as Vibration Monitoring Group 1 (VMG-1).

In these cases, more refined monitoring methods are utilized during testing.

All personnel who perform pipe vibration observations and measurements receive training and must pass a written certification examination (Reference 53).

The vibration data is aralyzed subsequent to collection. Transient vibra-tion test data which does not meet the acceptance criteria established f rom CPPP-25 must be referred to SWEC-PSAS for further analysis and reso-lution.

When appropriate, corrective action is implemented and retesting is conducted to verify final acceptance.

For steady-state pipe vibration, the vibration measurements are taken if

/

vibration can be visually observed.

When the measured peak-to-peak pipe V]

velocity exceeds the acceptance criteria, displacement measurements are obtained and compared to calculated allowable values.

If the system steady-state displacement exceeds the calculated allowable values, correc-tive action will be implemented and appropriate retesting will be conduct-ed to verify final acceptance.

Thermal Expansion Testing As part of the piping and pipe support validation program, SWEC-PSAS has reviewed the impact of analysis and modification on thermal expansion tests (TET).

Systems or portions of systems which require testing have been identified.

SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-24 (Reference 66) sets forth the methods for identifying piping for thermal expansion tests, for identifying the loca-tions and the supports to be monitored, for establishing acceptance crite-

ria, for reconciling results, and for recommending modifications to correct discrepancies.

Upon completion of all thermal expansion tests, an engineering report will be prepared summarizing the results.

l In summary, the CPSES piping and pipe support validation program encompasses j

appropriate field testing.

Rigorous requirements for evaluating and document-ing piping systems under static, dynamic steady-state and transient conditions l

are set f orth in the SWEC-PSAS procedures.

The results of field testing will OU.

5-14 l

.__ __________ a

provide physical confirmation that large bore piping and pipe support design

(s and installation comply with the design criteria, b

5.1.2.7 Final Reconciliation of Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports The purpose of final reconciliation is to resolve and incorporate pipe stress and pipe support analysis results (see Figure 1-1) with the final design input and as-built configuration.

The final reconciliation process is conducted in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-23, Pipe Stress / Pipe Support Reconcil-iation Procedure (Reference 29). The final reconciliation of small bore piping and pipe supports incorporates the following:

The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCRVP) results which provide the as-built small bore piping and pipe support config-urations (see Section 5.1.3).

Resolution of the open items in NRC Staff positions in Supplementary St.fety Evaluation Reports (SSERs) as described in Subappendixes A36, A)7, and A38.

Resolution of the piping-related Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) issue-specific action plans (ISAPs) and external issues.

Final reconciliation also includes confirmation that the interfacing organiza-tions have accepted the SWEC-PSAS results as compatible with their validated design.

Interfacing organizations receive results as described below and in Figure 5-2:

iV SWEC-Mechanical Group - Required reflective insulation removal at sleeves, penetrations, or f rame supports; expansion joint movements.

Ebasco System Interaction Group - Postulated pipe break locations; pipe movements at pipe rupture restraint locations.

Westinghouse - Results of ASME Section III Code Class 1 pipe supports I

validation, loads imposed by SWEC-PSAS analyzed piping on ASKE Sec-tion III Code Class 1 piping, support reaction loads on Westinghouse-designed equipment supports, and valve accelerations and equipment nozzle loads for Westinghouse-supplied valves and equipment.

SWEC-Civil / Structural Group - Structural interface reaction loads, including penetration loads, load patterns on embedments.

Impell Equipment Qualification Group - Valve nozzle loads, valve ac-celebrations and valve operator support requirements, and pipe move-ments at sealed sleeves.

SWEC-Instrument and Control Group - Root valve movements for instru-ment systems, bv 5-15 i

4

In addition, the validated piping weld locations are provided to TU Electric O) for the identification of locations for preservice and inservice inspections.

Closure of open items, observations, and deviations related to small bore pip-ing and pipe supports that were identified by TU Electric Quality Assurance, SWEC Engineering Assurance, and Engineering Functional Evaluation (EFE) are resolved prior to the completion of this reconciliation phase.

Open items from the NRC Notices of Violation (NOVs), and the TU Electric Significant Deficiency Analysis Reports (SDARs) (10CFR50.55[e]) are also resolved during the final reconciliation.

Each pipe stress analysis package, at the conclusion of final reconciliation, will be compiled into the Piping - Design Validation Package (DVP) as described in Section 3.0 and SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-23.

The Piping-DVP consists of the pipe stress analysis calculations, the hanger location drawings (identifying the pipe support locations and stress problem boundaries), the pipe supports calculations and drawings (including the design changes and as-built modifica-tions) within its pipe stress analysis package boundary, and related interface transmittals.

5.1.3 Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP)

{

The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) (Reference 48) is the portion of TU Electric's Corrective Action Program (CAP) which validates the final acceptance attributes for safety-related hardware.

The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) process is shown diagrammatically in Figure 5-5.

The input to the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is con-tained in the installation specifications.

The installation specifications implement the licensing commitments and design criteria of the Design Basis Documents (DBDs), which were developed during the Corrective Action Program (CAP) Design Validation process.

Acceptance inspection requirements identified in the validated installation specifications were used to develop the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) attribute matrix.

This matrix is a complete set of final ac-ceptance attributes identified for installed hardware.

The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP), by either physical validations or through an engineering evaluation methodology, assures that each of the attributes de-fined in the attribute matrix is validated.

I Physical validation of an attribute is performed by Quality Control inspection f

or engineering walkdown, for accessible components.

Quality Control inspec-I tions and engineering walkdowns are controlled by appropriate Field Verifica-f tion Method (FVM) procedures.

l l

The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) engineering evalua-I tion depicted in Figure 5-5 is procedurally controlled to guide the Corrective j

Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer through the evaluation of each item l

on the attribute matrix to be dispositioned by the engineering evaluation l

l l

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V 5-16 l

I

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method.

Dispositions of each attribute will be clearly documented.

If the

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technical disposition of the final acceptance attribute is "not acceptable" or

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the attribute cannot be dispositioned based on available information, an alter-nate plan consisting of additional evaluations, testing, inspections /walkdowns or modification as necessary will be developed to demonstrate and document the acceptability of the attribute.

Recommendations from the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) effort comprise a significant portion of this evaluation.

A major component of the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) program has been the inspection of a comprehensive, random sample of existing hardware using an independently derived set of inspection attributes.

The inspection was performed and the results evaluated by third party personnel in accordance with Appendix E to the Comanche Peak Recponse Team (CPRT) Program Plan (Reference 33).

The scope of the inspection covered the installed safety-related hardware by segregating the hardware into homoge-neous populations (by virtue of the work activities which produced the finished product).

Samples of these populations were inspected to provide reasonable assurance of hardware acceptability in accordance with Appendix D to the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) Program Plan.

Corrective action recommendations were made to TU Electric based on the evalu-ated findings when a Construction Deficiency existed, an Adverse Trend existed, or an Unclassified Trend existed, as defined in accordance with Appendix E to the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) Program Plan.

The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) assures that all Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) recommendations are properly dispositioned.

Figure 5-5 illustrates that during the evaluation of a given attribute from the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) attribute matrix, the initial task of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer is to determine if any of the following statements are true:

a.

The attribute was recommended for reinspection by the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT).

b.

Design Validation resulted in a change to design or to hardware final acceptance attribute that is more stringent than the original accep-tance attribute, or Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) did not in-spect the attribute, c.

Design Validation resulted in new work, including modification to existing hardware.

If the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) had no recommendations and Items b or e above do not apply, the attribute under consideration will be accepted.

This conclusion is justified by the comprehensive coverage of the Comanche Peak Re-sponse Team (CPRT) reinspection and the consistently conservative evaluation of each finding from both a statistical and adverse trend perspective.

The at-tribute matrix is then updated to indicate that neither the engineering walk-l down nor quality control inspection of the attribute is necessary.

A completed (N

5-17 1

I 1

evaluation package is prepared and forwarded to the Comanche Peak Engineering g)

(CPE) organization for concurrence. The evaluation package becomes part of the l

(d Design Validation Package (DVP) after Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) concur-rence is obtained.

If any of the three statements are true, it is assumed that the final accep-tance attribute must be further evaluated as follows:

I Determine Attribute Accessibility l

The Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer will determine if the attribute is accessible.

If the attribute is accessible, a field val-idation of the item's acceptability will be performed and documented in accordance with an approved Field Verification Method (FVM).

If the Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer reaches the conclusion that the attribute is inaccessible, an engineering evaluation 1

will be conducted by technical disposition of available information.

After completing the attribute accessibility review, the responsible engi-neer will update the attribute matrix as necessary to reflect the results of that review.

Technical Disposition The Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer identifies.the (7

data to be considered during the subsequent technical disposition process.

()

Examples of such items used in this disposition. may ine)ude, but are not limited to:

Historical documents (e.g.,

specifications, procedures, inspection results)

Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and external issues Construction practices Quality records Test results Audit reports Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) records Surveillance reports NCRs, DRs, SDARs, and CARS Inspections conducted to date l

1 b

5-18 I

I l

Results of Third Party reviews

(

Purchasing documents 1

Construction packages l

. Hardware receipt inspections i

Af ter compiling the data identified as pertinent to the attribute, the technical disposition will be performed.

The actual steps.and sequence of actions required for each technical disposition will differ; however, the j

tangible results from each technical disposition will be consistent.

These results will' include as a minimum:

a.

A written description of the attribute.

b.

A written justification by the Corrective Action Program (CAP) re-sponsible engineer for acceptance of the attribute.

c.

A written explanation of the logic utilized to conclude that the at-tribute need not be field validated, d.

A chronology demonstrating that the attribute has not been signifi-f cantly altered by redesign.

e.

All documents viewed to support the disposition.

j f.

Concurrence of the acceptance of the attribute's validity by Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE).

If the Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer' concludes that i

the data evaluated represents evidence of the attribute's acceptability, the conclusion will be documented.

The documentation will be reviewed and i

approved by Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) and filed in the Design Vali-I dation Package (DVP).

If the Corrective Action Program (CAP) responsible engineer determines that ' the data reviewed does not provide evidence of the attribute's acceptability, the documentation will explain why the at-tribute cannot be accepted and recommend an alternate course of action.

l The alternate course of action may take various forms such as making the attribute accessible and inspecting it, or testing to support the at-tribute's acceptability.

This alternate plan, after approval by Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE), will be implemented to validate the attribute.

In stumnary, the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is a com-prehensive process by which each attribute in the PCHVP attribute matrix is validated to the validated design.

The TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP) will audit the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP).

l This audit program is complemented by the Engineering Functional Evaluation being performed by an independent team comprised of Stone & Webster, Impell, and Ebasco engineering personnel working under the Stone & Webster QA Program and subject to oversight directed by the Comanche Peak Response Team's (CPRT) 5-19

(

_.m.._....____.-._._____

l Senior Review Team.

The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) h(/

will provide reasonable assurance that the validated design has been imple-mented for safety-related hardware.

SWEC-PSAS prepared Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) imple-mentation procedures for small bore piping and pipe supports.

The hardware j

validation process includes modifications, whenever necessary, to bring the piping and pipe supports into compliance with the validated design.

The at-

-tributes contained within the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program l

I (PCHVP) Attribute Matrix for piping and pipe supports incorporate the recom-mended corrective actions in the CPRT-QOC Issue-Specific Action Plan, ISAP-VII.c Results Report (Reference 36), thus resolving the hardware-related issues (see Subappendix A39).

The complete tabulation of piping-related in-spection attributes to address CPRT-QOC recommendations is presented in Table 5-3.

1 5.1.3.1 Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) Procedures 1

SWEC-PSAS developed procedures to validate that the as-built small bore piping I

and pipe supports are in compliance with the validated design procedures listed j

in Table 5-6.

These procedures are designated as Field Verification Methods

]

(FVMs) and are described below.

l FVM-81, Piping and Pipe Supports Inspection and Hardware Validation SWEC-PSAS ' developed the Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-81 (Reference 51) to coordinate the Unit 1 and Common piping and pipe support in-Q spection validation activities.

These piping inspections are performed and documented by Quality Control (QC) l personnel to assure that applicable inspection attributes are acceptable.

The piping inspection attributes are as below.

)

l Equipment and piping configuration Piping wall thickness at shop / field bends Radial weld shrinkage at stainless steel piping joints f

Equipment anchoring Remote valve operators Branch connections All pressure boundary items installation / base metal defects Valve orientations Pipe / sleeve details Permanent pipe support installation (no temporary or voided supports)

Verify location (span) dimensions / tolerances Applicable dielectric insulating sleeves over bolts / studs Linear dimensions of piping segments and in-line components The hardware validation of pipe supports assures that the removable items on a pipe support are installed as required by the design documentation.

The hard-l ware validation is implemented by Quality Control (QC) personnel in compliance with the validated support drawing.

Quality Control personnel verify and l

i k

5-20 l

l

document that all applicable hardware attributes listed on the hardware valida-

[,,s\\s_-} tion checklists are acceptable. The following pipe support hardware validation checklists are used, sr applicable:

Adjacent Weld Checklist Bolted Connection Checklist Hilti Bolt Checklist Pipe Clamp Checklist Richmond Insert Checklist Snubber Checklist Support Checklist Sway Strut Checklist Through Bolt / Embedded Bolt Checklist U-Bolt / Bolted U-Guide Checklist Variable / Constant Spring Checklist In addition to the hardware validation pipe support inspections, Quality Con-trol (QC) personnel also conduct inspections for pipe support configuration attributes as below:

Material acceptability Support configuration compliance with validated design drawing, including dimensions Support overhang length / tolerance Support projection length / tolerance Sway strut / snubber pin-to-pin dimension / tolerance g 'S Alignment and circumferential deviation of shear lugs e

(,)

Hilti bolt size /embedment Weld length of structural member on base plate Welded connection in accordance with validated drawing Edge distance for structural members and base plates Slope of bolted part with bolt head or nut Shim size / weld FVM-080, Clearance Walkdowns SWEC-PSAS developed the Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-80 (Reference 50) to assure that sufficient clearance exists around the validated piping.

Clearance is required to permit those anticipated piping displacements that could occur under plant operating conditions without any impediment to those displacements. An impediment is defined as any structure, pipe, conduit, cable tray, equipment, etc, that encroaches on the envelope of anticipated pipe displacement.

This field verification effort is performed by the SWEC-PAS engineering person-nel.

SWEC-PSAS has established clearance criteria and is responsible for training the clearance walkdown teams, evaluating clearance problems, and issu-ing design changes to correct any clearance violations, as follows:

i

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5-21 w_____-____

1.

SWEC-PSAS Site Engineering Group shall establish and train the clear-

/ )T ance walkdown teams, consisting of a stress engineer, a pipe support

(-

engineer, and others as required.

2.

Displacement and clearance criteria established by other disciplines will be used in the walkdown (e.g., conduit displacements, equipment displacements, proximity of heat sources), as applicable.

3.

A table will identify each pipe stress analysis package and the asso-ciated maximum displacements for other components, such as equipment, conduit, cable trays, piping, and pipe supports.

4.

An engineering walkdown is being performed for each pipe stress anal-ysis package to validate the as-built clearances acceptance criteria.

A Clearance Evaluation Form shall be completed for each violation of the clearance criteria.

Quality Control (QC) personnel will periodically accompany the SWEC-PSAS engi-neering walkdown teams and perform surveillance inspections to assure compli-ance with the Field Verification Methods (FVMs).

FVM-82, Validation of Seismic Category II Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Over Seismic Category I Equipment SWEC-PSAS developed the Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-82 (Reference 52) to validate the integrity of seismic Category II piping and pipe supports over Seismic Category I equipment as specified in the FSAR and (p

- )

CPPP-30.

The purpose of this Field Verification Method (FVM) is to assure, by engineering inspection and evaluation, that during or after a seismic event, the Seismic Category II piping systems as identified in the FSAR will not fall and damage nearby Seismic Category I systems, structures, or components. This Field Verification Method (FVM) specifies the engineering field walkdowns re-quired to assure that the installation of the piping and pipe supports is in compliance with the validated design.

The field verification effort is performed by SWEC-PSAS engineering personnel using the acceptance criteria for the configuration of the supports and the tolerances specified in Piping Erection Specification No. 2323-MS-100 (Refer-ence 38).

Tables 5-5 and 5-7 contain the piping and pipe supports checklists t

for this field verification effort.

Quality Control (QC) personnel will periodically accompany the SWEC-PSAS engi-neering walkdown teams and perform surveillance inspections to assure compli-ance with the Field Verification Methods (FVMs).

O_'

5-22 s

5.2 RESULTS This section discusses the results of the SWEC-PSAS Small Bore Pipe Stress and Pipe Support Corrective Action Program (CAP).

5.2.1 Pipe Stress Analysis Results The pipe stress analysis packages validated by SWEC-PSAS are within the allow-able stress criteria of the ASME Section III Code.

)

t j

- The pipe stress analysis results are described below.

Pipe Support Optimization (As a Result of Pipe Stress Design Valida-tion Process)

{

A total of 160 snubber supports were deleted through the pipe support optimization process.

Approximately 90 additional snubber supports j

were converted to rigid supports, bringing the total number of snub-j bers eliminated for Unit 1 and Common to 250.

This large reduction of snubbers (approximately 36 percent of the original total) is part of the overall plant improvement incorporated into the SWEC-PSAS val-idation effort.

-It represents a significant improvement in plant reliability and reduction in inservice inspection, worker radiation exposure, and cost of maintenance.

Integral Welded Attachments (IWAs)

All Integral Welded Attachments (IWAs) in small bore pipe stress analysis packages within Unit 1 and Common were analyzed, and 3 re-quire modification.

j Pipe Rupture Analysis

'High energy piping arrangement in CPSES Unit 1 and Common utilized the design criteria of postulated pipe ruptures protection by physi-I cal separation.

Consequently, of the 457 small bore pipe stress packages, pipe rupture analyses are required for 21 high energy and 2 moderate energy small bore pipe stress analysis packages.

These stress analyses were analyzed with the following results:

High Energy Line Break (HELB) Postulation - No mandatory postu-

)

lated intermediate breaks were identified.

Moderate Energy Line Crack (MELC) Postulation - A total of one mandatory postulated crack was identified.

Piping and Pipe Supports Attached to Secondary Walls The piping and pipe support validation procedure for secondary wall displacements, CPPP-35 was used to qualify 202 small bore pipe sup-ports / penetrations that have been identified as being attached to a 5-23 1

,o secondary wall.

Approximately 83 percent of these supports comply with the flexibility criteria of CPPP-35, and no further evaluation is required.

Those supports which did not comply with the flexibil-ity criteria affect 26 small bore pipe stress analysis packages in Unit I and Common.

This validation requires no modifications of pipe supports that spanned secondary and primary *:.11s within these small bore pipe stress analysis packages.

5.2.2 Pipe Support Analysis Results The Pipe Support Analyses validated that approximately 6,630 pipe supports within the 457 small bore pipe stress analysis packages comply with the design criteria.

During the SWEC-PSAS pipe support validation process, required sup-port modifications were identified. The pipe support modifications are catego-rized as follows:

1.

Prudent - Supports in this category may have been technically accept-able; however, more time and expense would have been involved in the detailed analysis than that required to physically modify the support and qualify the modification.

2.

Recent Industry Practice - Modifications implemented to eliminate snubbers to enhance plant maintainability, reduce inservice inspec-tion, and minimize worker radiation exposure during operating plant conditions.

p 3.

Adjustment - Minor modifications (such as retorquing or shimming)

V implemented to meet installation criteria contained in the resolution of the CPRT and external issues.

4.

Cumulative Effects - Modifications that are required due to the com-bined effect of previous issues.

From the results of the stress analysis, 449 supports were deleted and 315 sup-ports were added (including the addition of 132 pipe anchors).

The result of SWEC-PSAS pipe stress and support analysis has identified a total of 1,896 supports that require modification (including deletions and additions).

Table 5-4 contains a description of the types of modifications by the above categories.

The plant modifications resulting from the Small Bore Pipe Stress and Support Corrective Action Program (CAP) has been determined by TU Electric to be re-portable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

TU Electric reported to the NRC the small bore piping modifications in the Significant Deviation Analysis Report SDAR-CP-86-72 (see Subappendix B2).

5.2.2.1 Pipe Support Modifications Identified Prior to Stress Analysis The following types of pipe supports were identified for modification prior to i

stress analysis as a result of the resolution of the CPRT and external issues.

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  • i / Cinched U-Bolts on SinglegStruts or Snubbers i v 4

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/To avoid lengthy detailed stress evaluations for the pipe, ' '$b'olt,,

/ and crosspiece, all cinched U-bolt's on single strut or snubber small I

y ;bcre pipe supports for Unit 1 and Conunon are< identified for eldmina-

.'/'N tion or modification.

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All cinched U-bolt trapeze supports in Unit <1 and Common small bore pipe supports were identified for deletion hr modification.

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In addition to the cinched U-bolt supports,; both single strut and trapeze,. Project Procedure CPPP-7, Attachment 4-9, requires that po-tentially unstable supports be modified.

Such configurations identi-fied are trapeze supports with zero clearance box frames, spring hangers on trapeze, and spring hangers without a U-bolt.

These rupa ports mere redesigned, or identified for elimination during the vali-dation' p roces s.

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0 Clearance on, Rigid' Supports

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rtstraints such as frames, straps, unclin.hed U-bolts and lugs is in-1 p

spected an'd ' adjusted where required to meet the clearance require-(

ments specified in Project Procedure CPPP-7, Attachment 4-11.

Uncinched U-Bolts on Rigid Frames $

Uncioched U-bolts on rigid frames for pipe sizes 6 in. and smaller were analyzed and designed as two-way restraints in accordence with Project Procedure CPPP-7, Attachment 4-3.

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primarily in shear and/or torsion, were identified for elimination or to be modified by the addition of " outriggers" to increase the rigid-ity of the support'.

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i Long Tube Steel with Richmond Insert Bolts

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subject to LOCA temperature effects were identified for elimination w

or to be modified by limiting the tube steel length.

These s6pports i

'were primarily "run t'gether" multiple pipe supports.

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Special analyses were required for certain supports to evaluate the effect of differential movement of the attachment points and/or restrained thermal expansion.

Wall-to-Wall and Floor-to-Ceiling Supports l

Four wall-to-wall small bore pipe supports were identified in small bore pipe stress analysis packages within CPSES Unit I and Common.

These supports were validated by meeting the requirements specified jl in Table 4.7.2-1 and Attachment 4-19 of SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-7, and three modifications were required as a result of differential movement of attachment points and restrained thermal expansion.

Corner Supports SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-39 (Reference 54) identifies the pro-cedure for the identification, evaluation, and disposition of corner supports with wall-to-floor or wall-to-ceiling attachments encoun-tered during the validation effort, with 30 small bore corner pipe supports identified in small bore pipe stress analysis packages with-in Unit 1 and Common.

The design of all corner supports on CPSES Unit 1 and Common has been validated by meeting the requirements specified in Table 4.7.2-1 and Attachment 4-19 of SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPPP-7, and no modifications were required as a result of differen-p tial building movements.

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5.2.2.3 SWEC-PSAS As-Built Verification of Modifications SWEC-PSAS performs the as built piping validation of the CPSES Unit I and Com-4 mon small bore piping and pipe support modifications in compliance with NRC I&E Bulletin 79-14.

This process is conducted as part of the final reconciliation process described in' Section 5.1. 2. 7 in accordance with SWEC-PSAS procedure CPSP-12 (Reference 37).

The piping linear dimensions, elevations, valve orien-tations, angles, wall and floor sleeve penetrations, and interconnecting equip-ment are validated.

The modified pipe supports are validated to the as-built drawings, including configuration, mark number, dimensional location, function, angularity, and directions.

5.2.3 Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) Results 4

The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is implemented i

through the verification of the hardware-related attributes described in Sec-tion 5.1.3 for the small bore piping and pipe supports in Unit I and Common.

These field verifications listed below are in progress:

Field Verification Method (FVM) for hardware inspection / validation (CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081).

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i (CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-080).

D Field Verification Method (FVM) for Seismic Category II small bore piping and pipe supports over Seismic Category I equipment (CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-08,2)'.

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/"N 5.3 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM ij All activities of the Unit 1 and Common small bore piping and pipe support Cor-rective Action Program (CAP) were performed in accordance with SWEC's Quality Assurance (QA) program.

This program is consistent with SWEC's Topical Report SWSQAP 1-74A (Reference 20), Stone & Webster Standard Quality Assurance Pro-gram, which has been approved by the NRC.

In accordance with the Quality Assurance (QA) program, a project-specific QA program (Reference 6) including procedures covering the essentials of the SWEC-PSAS validation process were developed.

These SWEC-PSAS proj ect procedures were distributed to all supervisory engineers and were readily available to SWEC-PSAS personnel.

The issuance of design criteria, validation procedures, and major revisions of these documents was followed up with detailed training prog rams for applicable personnel.

In particular, pipe stress and support engineers on the project received training in the technical

_ procedure (CPPP-7), and the design control procedure (CPPP-6).

A Project Quality Assurance (QA) Manager, who is directly responsible to the SWEC Vice President of QA and has management experience in auditing and QA pro-gram procedure development for engineering activities, was assigned to the pro-ject in the earliest stages of project mobilization.

This reporting responsibility assures independence of the Quality Assurance (QA) functions.

The SWEC-PSAS Quality Assurance (QA) Manager has a staff of Engineering Assur-ance (EA) engineers assigned to assist him in his duties.

SWEC's EA Division is an integral part of SWEC's QA Program (Reference 20).

These individuals h

provide assurance that the QA program properly addresses all project activities NJ and assist SWEC-PSAS personnel to understand and properly implement the QA program.

To date, more than 164,000 man-hours have been expended by SWEC in activities directly attributable to the overall SWEC-PSAS Project Quality Assurance pro-gram (i.e., training, procedure development, auditing, and the project QA Man-ager's staff).

The adequacy and implementation of this Quality Assurance program was exten-sively audited by SWEC's Engineering Assurance Division, SWEC's Quality Assur-ance Auditing Division (QAAD), TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP) and the NRC's Vendor Program Branch (VPB) and Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

l A total of 23 audits were performed by these organizations to date for both i

Units 1 and Common small bore piping and pipe supports as follows:

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SWEC - QAAD 1

TU Electric - TAP 4 5

NRC 1

The SWEC, NRC, and TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP) audits evaluated the technical adequacy of the engineering product (e.g.,

calculations, draw-ings, and specifications) and assessed the adequacy and implementation of the SWEC Quality Assurance Prograw. A summary of these audits is presented in Sec-tions 5.3.1 and 5.3.2.

TU Electric conducted technical audits as part of the TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP).

The details of calculations, drawings, and procedural compliance and technical interfaces were evaluated.

These technical audits have resulted in enhancements to the procedures and methods and thus contrib-uted to the overall quality of the CPSES small bore pipe and support design.

The NRC Staff performed surveillance on the SWEC-PSAS validaton process, in-cluding in process reviews of SWEC-PSAS's progress and methods of resolving the generic technical issues and verification of the adequacy of SWEC-PSAS walk-downs. The NRC-VPB performed an audit of the SWEC-PSAS piping and pipe support Corrective Action Program (CAP).

A Third Party organization (TENERA, L.P.) was contracted by CPRT to overview the adequacy of SWEC-PSAS large bore piping and pipe support design methodology as discussed in Section 5.1.1.

The Third Party concluded that SWEC-PSAS's O-large bore pipe stress analysis and pipe support validation program was compre-hensive and capable of resolving Comanche Peak Review Team (CPRT) and external issues. This third party overview provides additional assurance that the CPSES large bore piping and supports meet the licensing commitments.

Small bore pip-ing and pipe supports Corrective Action Program (CAP) used the same technical and design control procedure as used in the large bore piping and pipe supports CAP.

1 In addition to these audits, TU Electric has initiated the Independent Engi-neering Functional Evaluation (EFE) program to provide an overview of the tech-nical activities being conducted on the CPSES project.

The Engineering Func-

'3 tional Evaluation (EFE) team has audited the SWEC-PSAS performance since June 1987.

Technical specialists have been assigned to the EFE group to per-form a detailed technical audit on samples of small bore pipe stress analysis package and pipe supports of the containment spray piping system.

This effort evaluates the containment spray system validation process, which begins from the licensing commitments, through the design validation process (such as de-sign basis documents, design criteria, calculations, drawings, and specifica-tions in discipline interfaces), and finally the hardware validation process of the small bore piping and pipe supports.

L The TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP) has been in effect since 4

j January 1987.

Prior to this the TU Electric Quality Assurance Department performed audits of selected engineering service contractors using technical f-~g specialists as part of its vendor audit program.

V 5-29

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L Surveillance activities have also been conducted by SWEC Engineering Assurance m

e personnel to assure conformance to procedures and standards.

Similar sur-veillances are performed by the TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP).

These audits described above represent a very detailed and complete assessment of the following:

1.

Adequacy of the Project Quality Assurance program.

2.

Implementation of the Quality Assurance program.

3.

Technical adequacy of the design criteria and procedures.

l 4.

Implementation of the design criteria and procedures.

These audits and surveillance identified instances in which some action was required to clarify or modify procedures to more clearly address some activi-ties, revise calculations to address an omission of clarifying statements or more properly address a situation, and provide additional training or project I

guidance to assure continued compliance with procedures.

A timely and complete

]

response was developed for every item identified throughout the audit process.

Whenever a question that suggests a need to improve any of these items was identified, the cause, extent of conditions, and any required corrective /

preventive actions were determined, properly documented, and implemented. Sub-sequent audits have verified that appropriate actions were taken to address previously identified items in these cases, and identified a trend of improved f

overall performance by SWEC-PSAS.

No audit items which would result in ques-tions of technical adequacy of SWEC-PSAS's overall validation program have been s

identified.

In addition to the audits and surveillance, a rigorous Quality Control (QC) inspection program is in place on the CPSES site. QC personnel are responsible for performing inspections of attributes as delineated in the inspection procedures.

In summary, an appropriate level of attention has been given to the quality of activities; the Quality Assurance (QA) program is appropriate for the scope of work; project performance has been demonstrated to be in compliance with the QA program, and appropriate corrective and preventive actions were taken when-ever they were required.

5.3.1 Summary of SWEC Engineering Assurance (EA) Audits To date, SWEC EA has performed 16 audits of the SWEC-PSAS small bore piping and pipe support validation process.

An average of five subjects were reviewed during each of these audits.

The following list of audit subjects describes the depth of auditing that has been performed:

1.

Adequacy of the SWEC-PSAS Design Procedures.

2.

Adequacy of the SWEC-PSAS Project Procedures.

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3.

ARS Data Conversion.

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Calculations - Technical adequacy.

5.

Calculations - Documentation 6.

Compliance with project procedures.

7.

Construction support activities.

8.

Document Control.

9.

Field walkdown activities.

10.

Indoctrination and training.

11.

Licensing activities.

12.

Records maintenance.

13.

Maintenance of Project Procedure manuals.

14.

Personnel qualification and experience verification.

15.

System inputs to pipe stress and pipe support analyses.

A chronological tabulation of SWEC Engineering Assurance (EA) audits is pre-Q sented in Table 5-9.

5.3.2 Summary of Audits by TU Electric-TAP, NRC-VBP, and SWEC-QAAD In addition to the SWEC Engineering Assurance (EA) Audits, the SWEC-PSAS was audited by TU Electric Quality Assurance (QA), NRC Vendor Program Branch (VPB),

and SWEC Quality Assurance Auditing Division (QAAD).

To date, TU Electric's Technical Audit Program (TAP) has performed 5 audits of the SWEC-PSAS.

Each SWEC-PSAS location has been audited at least once.

An average of nine (9) subjects were reviewed during each of these audits.

These audits are essentially equivalent to the SWEC Engineering Assurance (EA) audits discussed in Section 5.3.1.

Therefore, the list of audit subjects in Sec-tion 5.3.1 is representative for these audits.

A chronological tabulation of the TU Electric Quality Assurance (QA) TAPS audits is presented in Table 5-10.

I The NRC-Vendor Program Branch (VPB) performed one audit in mid-1986 of SWEC-PSAS validation process (Reference 31) and reviewed the following activities:

1.

Design control (pipe stress and support analyses).

2.

Document control (incoming and outgoing).

l 3.

Procurement control, n

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Training.

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Audits (SWEC-EA and TU Electric-TAP).

The SWEC Quality Assurance Auditing Division-(QAAD) performed one audit of the SWEC-PSAS.

This audit was performed to assess the Project Quality Assurance Manager's adherence to Corporate QA Program requirements, 'the adequacy of the Project's QA Program (CPPP-1), the Document Control Program, and the Records Management Program.

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5.4 CORRECTIVE AND PREVENTIVE ACTION pv SWEC-PSAS has developed technical and design control procedures and updated the design and installation / inspection specifications to implement the corrective actions resulting from the small bore piping and pipe supports Corrective Ac-tion Program (CAP).

These procedures and specifications are identified within the Piping - Design Basis Documents (DBDs) which contain the bases for validat-ing the small' bore piping and pipe supports in Unit 1 and Common.

As a result of this effort, the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Unit 1 and Common small bore piping systems and supports are validated as being capable of per-forming their safety-related functions.

This validation is documented in the drawings, calculations, and specifica-tions.

The validated design documentation will be provided to TU Electric.

This validated design documentation can provide the basis for configuration control of CPSES small bore piping and pipe supports to facilitate operation, maintenance, and future modifications following issuance of an operating license.

At the completion of the validation, SWEC-PSAS will provide TU Electric Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) with the complete set of drawings and calcula-tions, contained within the Small Bore Piping - Design Validation Packages (DVPs) for Unit 1 and Common.

SWEC-PSAS procedures used for small bore piping and pipe supports validation will be provided to Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE).

Implementation of these procedures by CPE assures that future CPSES small bore piping and pipe supports design is performed in accordance with the licensing commitments.

Training fo r Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) personnel will be provided by SWEC-PSAS.

The training will cover background assumptions and the methodology used in the validation of the piping and pipe support design. The importance of quality assurance will be stressed throughout the training program.

Practical experience has been provided to Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) engi-neers who have worked alongside SWEC-PSAS engineers during the ongoing valida-tion process.

Experience gained by CPE engineers included changes in design documents and familiarization with procedures followed and regulatory requirements.

TU Electric Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) is developing a program to assure a complete and orderly transfer of the engineering and design function from i

SWEC-PSAS to CPE.

The plan will provide for the identification of those tasks presently being performed by SWEC-PSAS which are to be transferred to CPE and the identification of all procedures, programs, training, and staffing require-ments.

The program will be based upon three prerequisites, 1) the piping-related Corrective Action Program (CAP) effort to support plant completion is finished for the particular task; 2) the Piping - Design Validation Packages I

(DVPs) are complete; and 3) any required preventive action taken, as discussed in Appendix C, is complete.

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This program will assure the transfer of complete design document and procedures to Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE).

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n FIGURE 5-1 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)

FLOW CHART AND GOVERNING PROCEDURES SMALL BORE PlPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS DESIGN VALIDATION CPPP 1(REF.6)

CPPP-28 (REF. 67)

CPPP 5 (REF.14)

CPPP 29(REF 77)

CPP P-6 (REF. 9)

CPPP-30 (REF. 56)

CPPP 7 (REF. 8)

CPPP-31 (R EF. 30)

CPPP 15 (REF. 80)

CPPP-35 (REF. 59)

CPPP 18 (REF.17)

DBD CS 065(REF.1)

CPPP 19 (REF. 71)

DBD CS 066 (REF.2)

CPPP 20 (REF.65)

DBD-CS 067 (REF. 3)

CPPP 24(REF.66)

DBD CS-069 (REF. 61)

CPPP 25 (REF. 57)

DBD CS 070(REF.62)

SPEC. 2323 MS46A (REF. 44)

CPSP 16 (REF.82)

SPEC. 2323 MS200 A (REF. 41) t ISSUE MODIFICATIONS CPPP 6 (REF. 9)

CPSP 10 (REF. 73)

[D CPSP 14 (REF. 72) 1 P BUILD AND INSPECT l f POST CONSTRUCTION HARDWARE VALID ATION AS BUILT INSPECTION (ECE 9.04.04/ECE 9.04 05)

OF PlPING & PIPE (REF 47/55)

SUPPORTS FVM.PS-080 (R EF. 50)

CP CPM 9.10 (REF. 43)

CP OAP 12.1 (REF. 34)

FVM PS 081 (REF. 51)

CP CPM 9.10A (REF. 40)

ECE DC 7 (REF.75)

FVM PS 082 (REF. 52)

AQP 11.2 (REF. 60)

CPSP 12 (REF. 37)

FVM SI 040 (REF. 76) 010 AP 11.1.28 (REF. 45)

CPPP 22 (REF.32)

CP OAP 12.1 (REF. 34)

SPEC. 2323 MS 100 (REF. 38)

CP AOP 12.1 (REF.12)

CPSP 12 (REF. 37)

I f FINAL RECONCILIATION J

7 CPPP 23 (REF. 29)

CPPP 33 (REF. 68)

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' r FIN AL DESIGN L PlPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS I

DOCUMENTATION F

COMPLETE CPPP 4 (REF. 69)

CPSP 11 (REF. 74)

CPPP 11 (REF. 70) cHer. ors

FIGURE 5-2 3

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP) TECHNICAL INTERFACES SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS TU ELECTRIC COM ANCHf PG All EN04NEf RtNG CAP MANAGEMENT e e WELO LOCAflONS FOA PAf st AvlCE ANO INSERvict to SPECTeoes$

IMPELL COAPCA Afl0N ESASCO f QUSPMENT GUALIFICAfl0N OAOUP SYSTEM iNf ERACTISN OROUP e ALLOA ASLE WALvf ACCEtE AAfi0 set e W ALVE ADOL #LE ALLOW Aett LOADS e SE ALE 0 SLEEVE ALLOW ASLE MOWEMENTS JET IMP 8NCEMENT e e pept enE A# POSTutAf t0N L O A05 e P6PE MOWEMEsett af PIPE AuPf utE WALVE et0GLE LOA 06 e RE STA ArNT LOC A70888 vAiWS ACCELE#AfeDNS AND e V Atwf OPE AAf0A SUPPont RE0uiAtMEnts PIPE MOVEMENT Af SE AL80 SLEEVES e e OESs0N Af 0ut#EWENTS FOR e AEWlEW AESOLuflCN 0p WESTiesGHoust. SUPPLito Esf enesAL f tCNNIC Ak aSBUES 3 f V ALVE S< toutPME N T e IttviEW PROCEDUAE AND -

0 SPECIAL REQUmEMENTS 80A Rf SULTS Of VALIDAfs0N CLASS l SUPPOAf 8 PAOGRAM e CLASS 5 ptPE SUPP0Af LOADS gggg pggg II CPRf F

W AL10Afl0N OF 7

Ovt Avlt w PlPtNG ANO CLASS 1 FIPING PIPE SUPP0ATS e AEBuLf B of CLASS t SUPPOAf e AESOLu110N 0f TfCNNtCAL IStutS W AUD AT@N e RESutfB 0F ANAlfStB e LOADS feePOS40 $W CL ASS i AND 3 i

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Pipme ON CLAS8 i PtP980 e VALVf ACCELERAfl0NS ANO foUIPMENT Nol2LE LOAOS FOA W8SfmONOUSg.

SUPPUED WALvtSe EOUSPMENT e SUP90Af RE ACTION LOA 08 04 WESfletONOUSE DESf08sE0 E0utPMGNT SUPPCATS SYSTEM 0PERAftese e CNAA ACTERelftCS STSTiif DES 80h e MOO 4FIC Af 9NS

&AS DA f A (INCt UDisse fME e A

CAfmM Of CODE e DE,sa,c,es,C HAN04,AE CO,MME se0 A rtoes$

CASE N 410

, gg g og jom uo Eugn,g CONTAMINAflON PElef fR ATION e e ADOT WAkvf M0vtMENTS FOA CONFIOuR A fl001 INSf AuMENT STSfEWS GEOLOGICAL MPut DAT A e e STRUCTUAAL leef t Af ACE AE ACTION A L Clou0 A880CIAfg5 SueL0ml AND SEiteetc e LOADS ST AYIC DISPLACEMENTS e CONT AiNME NT PENE TA Afs0el LO ADS ASSIST fu ELECTRIC ANO SinuCfuRAL mtEns ACE e e REf tECievE mSut Afiose nEMov&L Af StGEVES PENE T A Af t000S SWIC PS AS IN RESOkufl0N AE0ulAEMENT OA P A&Mt SUPPORTS OF TECHNIC AL ISSU(S PtPI AuPfuRE LOA 08 ON e M0efENT Af BTRAsedTS l I

!"LC e R$ECHAleeCAL GA0ur e CivlL/9T AVCfun AL 0A0up e (LECYAtCAL OAOUP e lleSTAUMENT4fl0N 4 CONTROL 0Aout l

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SWEC-PSAS PlPE STRESS DESIGN VAllDATION FLOW CHART 1

SWEC_

e PIPING OR AWINGS e SYSTEM P ARAMETERS e ARS CURVES

  1. SYSTEM OPER ATING CONDITIONS e ESSENTIAL SYSTEMS
  • BRE AN EXCLUSION SOUNDARIES SW EC. PSAS e SYSTEM REVIEW AND M ANGER OPisMlZATION REvtEW E8ASCO e INPUTS ANO MODELING M

e JETIMPlNCEMENT ING NUPIPE S e FLUID TRANSIENT ANALYSIS LO ADS ON PIPING RESULTS l

e MAXIMUM CALCULATED STRESSES e PIPE SUPPORT / CONTAINMENT j

PENETRAflON LOADS e EOulPMENT/V ALVE/ NOZZLE FLANGE LOAOS e VALVE ACCELER ATIONS ANO VALVE OPERATOR SUPPORT REQUIREMENT e EXPANSION JOINT MOVEMENTS e PIPF MOVEMENTS AT SLEEVES e ROOT VALVE MOVEMENTS FOR INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS e STRESS LEVEL FOR PIPE SRE AR POSTUL ATION e PIPE MOVEMENTS AT PlPE RUPTURE

(

RESTRAINT AND PlPE SUPPORTS L OC A TIONS EBASCO e FUNCTIONAL CAPABluTY EVALUAflON OF ESSENTIAL PIPING e POSTULATEO 8RE AA LOC ATIONS L,E,CTIVE IN e

LA N RE SL vtLOCAT NS RUPT RE R R NT OCATIONS E

NI LOSINPI NG IMPELL CORPOR ATION e LOADS FROM CLASS E/3 PIPING e PIPE MOVEMENT AT SEALEO ON CLASS 1 PIPING SLEEVES e E QUIPMENT /V ALVE LO AD$

y FOR WESTINGHOUSE SUPPLIEO e VALVE ACCELERATION F

e VALVE AND EQUIPMENT NOZZLE EQUIPMENT LOADS FOR NON WESTINGHOUSE 1

  • VALVE ACCELERATIONS FOR

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STRESS CALCULATION SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT j

wEsimoNOUSE Supputo e V ALVE OPER ATOR SUPPORT WITN DOCUMENTATION / TRANSMITTALS

"'*CI'U"'0*"I FOR DESIGN ACCEPTANCE

+

TU ELECTRIC SWEC SWEC PSAS e WELO LOCAflONS FOR

  • CONTAINMENT PENETRATION e PIPE SUPPORT V AllOATION PRE SERVICE AND LOADS (SEE FIGURE 6 4)

IN SERVICE INSPE CTIONS e EXPANSION JOINT MOVEMENTS e ROOT V ALVE MOVEMENTS FOR INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS e REFLECTIVE INSULAftON REMOVAL AT SLEEVES OR PENETRATION LOC ATIONS O

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A FIGURE 5-4 5N SWEC-PSAS PIPE SUPPORT DESIGN VALIDATION FLOW CHART I

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SWEC PSAS PIPE STRESS RESULTS I

(FROM FIGURE 5-3)

+

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  1. SAS WESTINGHOUSE SWEC PSAS AS-BUILT INFORMATION AND CLASS 1 PIPE SUPPORT LOADS NON-ASME ATTACHMENT LOADS PIPE SUPPORT GROUP FORMATION OF LOADING l

COMBINATIONS FOR l

PIPE SUPPORT VALIDATION A

k VALIDATION e COMPONENT STANDARD SUPPORTS e STRUCTURAL FRAMES e tNTEGRAL WELDED ATTACHMENTS e STIFFNESS FOR PIPE SUPPORTS WITHIN CLASS 1 PIPE STRESS ANALYSIS PACKAGE e ASME SECTION ill CODE CHECK e WELD / BOLT JOINT DESIGN

  • LOCAL STRESS e BASEPLATES, RICHMOND INSERTS, AND ANCHOR BOLTS SWEC MECHANICAL WESTINGHOUSE SWEC CIVIL / STRUCTURAL e CLASS 1 PIPE SUPPORT UPPORT CALCULATION e SUPPORT (INCLUDING MOMENT RESULTS, INCLUDING PIPE DOCUMENTATION /

SUPPORT STIFFNESSES RESTR AINTS)/ STRUCTUR AL INTERFACE REACTION LOADS TRANSMITTALS FOR e SWING ANGLE EXCEEDANCE o REFLECTIVE INSULATlON DESIGN ACCEPTANCE

  • SUPPORT REACTION LOADS REMOVAL AT BOX FRAME ON WESTINGHOUSE DESIGNED PIPE SUPPORT LOCATIONS EQUIPMENT SUPPORTS

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TU ELECTRIC CONSTRUCTION /OUALITY CONTROL r

INSTALL AND INSPECT l

MODIFICATIONS CH87 644

FIGURE 5-5

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TABLE 5-1

'O PIPING SYSTEM INPUT DATA

1.

Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) 2.

ASME III Code Class 1, 2, and 3 piping drawings and Seismic Category II piping drawings within the same piping stress analysis package 3.

Pipeline designation list 4.

Piping design specifications 5.

Flow diagrams, system description'and operating conditions 1

6.

Seismic response spectra. (including the application of ASME Code Case N-411) 7.

Seismic structural displacements data 8.

General arrangement and civil / structural drawings 9.

As-built piping support location drawings 10.

Pipe support drawings 11.

Thermal structural displacements data 12.

Containment pressure test displacement data 13.

Wall and floor sleeve sealant design data l

l 14.

Jet impingement loads 15.

Pipe whip impact loads 16.

Structural and equipment layout drawings 17.

Valve and valve operator weights (including extended attachments), center of gravity, yoke natural frequency and acceptable valve acceleration limit 18.

Equipment movement data and allowable nozzle loads 19.

As-built location of pipe with respect to wall and floor sleeves 20.

Existing pipe break locations, pipe rupture restraint locations and de-tailed drawings 21.

Valve nozzle allowables j

1

i TABLE 5-1 (Cont) 22.

As-built pipe thickness

'23.

Westinghouse Class 1 pipe stress reports 1

24.

ADLPIPE computer listing for'each pipe stress analysis package-25.

Containment displacements due to loss of coolant accident (LOCA)

26. ' Component drawings (equipment, penetration, valve, etc)
27.. Calculations a.

Pipe stress analysis (if applicable).

b.

Pipe support analysis and stress report (if applicable) c.

Fluid transient analysis (if applicable) 28.

Loads from non-ASME attachments on pipe supports 29.

Geotechnical data for buried pipe analysis

30. ' Flexible hose design criteria and vendor's design report 31.

As-built information for tie-back support 32.

As-built pipe weld shrinkage and locations i

l i

I o

2

. TABLE 5-2 FLUID TRANSIENT LOADINGS l

)

Containment Spray System i

Containment spray pump startup Safety Injection System Check valve closure following pump-trip Senice Water System Pump trip and pump start j

Residual Heat Removal System Relief valve discharge Chemical and Volume Control System Relief valve discharge Main Steam System l

Main steam turbine trip Auxiliary feedpump turbine trip Feedpump turbine trip.

. Safety and relief valve discharge l

Feedwater System Check valve closure following pump trip j

Rapid closure of isolation or control valve Check valve closure analysis following postulated pipe rupture Auxiliary Feedwater System Check valve closure following trip of one auxiliary feedwater pump Boron Recycle System Relief valve discharge Component Cooling Water System Relief valve discharge LO

l I

TABLE 5-3 PCHVP, REINSPECTION ATTRIBUTES AND RESOLUTIONS

.IN. RESPONSE TO CPRT QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION ISAP-VII.C RESULTS REPORT l

SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS i

Construction ISAP-VII.c Results PCHVP Attributes Work Category Report Recommendations FVM/ Procedures Small Bore Reinspect flow elements to CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 Piping Configur-verify that they are orien-(Reference 51) ation ted in the proper direction CP-QAP-12.1.

i Figure F.23 (Reference 34)

' Verify existing piping-CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-080 clearance criteria and (Reference 50) walk down all insulated CPPP-22,' Clearance small bore piping Walkdown Procedure (Reference 32)

Reinspect safety-related CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 piping expansion joints CP-QAP-12.1 Figure F.23 Verify the accuracy and CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 consistency of linear and CPSP-12, As-Built locating dimensions in Verification piping isometrics (Reference 37)

Pipe Bend Verify by Ultrasonic Testing CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 Fabrication (UT) that installed pipe CP-QAP-12.1 bends meet the minimum wall Figures F.23 and F.26 l-thickness requirement j

Revise QC Procedure Procedure AQP-11.2 I

QI-QAP-11.1-26 to require (Reference 60) Super-l t

that wall thickness after seded QI-QAP-11.1-26 bending be verified by Ultrasonic Testing (UT) and l'

recorded Pipe Welds Reinspect butt welds in CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 and Materials Schedule 80 or thinner Figure F.23 stainless steel piping made l

prior to 1982 that are

]

replacement welds and/or have received extensive j

repairs q

1

(

i TABLE 5-3 (Cont)

'V.

l

. Construction ISAP-VII.c Results PCHVP Attributes Work Category Report Reconsnendations FVM/ Procedures Small Bore Inspect for proper gaps be-CPE-SWEC-IVM-PS-080

' Pipe Supports tween pipe and pipe support CPPP-22, Clearance l

I and verify adequate clearance Walkdown Procedure between pipe weld and pipe CP-QAP-12.1 l

support Figure F 9

-]

Inspect and install suitable CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 l

locking devices.on all Figures F.15, F.16, vendor-supplied components F.13, and F.20 that do not have high-l strength bolting; install 1

locking devices-on all high-t strength bolting that is not torqued to an acceptable pre-load l

I Verify that the fasteners CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 have been secured for all CP-QAP-12.1 vendor-supplied components Figures F.13, F.15, t

(sway struts, snubbers, and F.16, and F.17 j

A spring cans) during plant.

startup and reoperation using a complete and de-t tailed procedure and check-list provided and verified i

by QC 4

1

{

2 j

J

TABLE 5-4

. v UNIT 1 AND COMMON SMALL BORE PIPE SUPPORTS MODIFICATION

SUMMARY

i Category Number of Modifications Prudent 189 Recent Industry Practice 626 I

Adjustment 76 Cumulative Effects 1005 TOTAL 1896 Modification Description Category Richmond Insert Single Tubes Prudent Allowable Stress Exceeded for Structural Member Cumulative Effects Support Deleted Recent Industry Practice Support Added Cumulative Effects Rigid Trapeze Prudent Trapeze Snubber Prudent Allowable Stress Exceeded for Welds Cumulative Effects Allowable Load Exceeded for Standard Component Cumulative Effects O

Allowable Load Exceeded for Concrete Anchor Cumulative Effects C/

Cinched U-Bolt Modification Prudent Component Exceeds 5 Degree Offset Adj ustment Revise Clearances Adjustment To be Modified Into a Clamp Anchor Prudent Box Frame on Pin Connection Prudent Modify to Increase Stiffness Prudent Preliminary Study Revises this into a Clamp Anchor Prudent Change from Rigid to Anchor or from Anchor to Rigid Prudent Change from Snubber to Rigid Recent Industry Practice Change from Rigid to Snubber Cumulative Effects Two Way Rigid Restraint Changed to a One Way Restraint or One Way Changed to Two Way Restraint Cumulative Effects Three Way Changed to One or Two Way Restraint Cumulative Effects U-Bolt on a Rigid Frame (One or Two Way Restraint)

Cumulative Effects Change from Rigid Hanger to Spring or Spring to Rigid Cumulative Effects Relocate Hanger Cumulative Effects Pipe Bearing Stress Failure Cumulative Effects Reset Spring or Snubber Settings Adj ustment Exceeds Lateral Movement for Spring Adjustment O

1 l

)

TABLE 5-5 p

SEISMIC CATEGORY II SMALL BORE PIPING OVER SEISMIC CATEGORY I EQUIPMENT PIPING CHECKLIST The field verification of Seismic Category II piping located over Seismic Category I systems, structures, or components is documented using a checklist addressing these attributes:

1.

Establish seismic to nonseismic boundaries in piping systems and de-termine whether the boundary requires further evaluation to ensure the integrity of'the seismic portion during a seismic event.

2.

Determine if. pipe supports restrain thermal expansion of a long straight piping run.

3.

Determine if supports have existing design loads that are less than calculated threshold loads.

4.

Determine if supports are next to a heavy concentrated weight (valves or components).

5.

Determine if long straight runs or ricers are not adequately support-ed for seismic in axial direction of pipe.

/;

V 6.

Determine if piping extends to different buildings.

7.

Determine if the system design temperature exceeds 150*F.

8.

Verify that hot piping configuration and component alignment are in accordance with the design drawings.

l f}U E__ _

J

TABLE 5-6

- g-g PCHVP SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS INSTALLATION / INSPECTION PROCEDURES SWEC-PSAS Field Verification Methods (FVMs) for large bore piping and pipe sup-ports Post Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) are in compliance with the following procedures:

1.

Comanche Peak Piping Erection Specification No. 2323-MS-100 (Reference 38) 2.

Comanche Peak ASME Section III Code Class 2 and 3 Piping Design Spec-ification No. 2323-MS-200 (Reference 41) 3.

Comanche Peak Nuclear Safety Class Pipe Hangers and Supports Specifi-cation No. 2323-MS-46A (Reference 44) 4.

Comanche Peak Structural Embedments Specification No. 2323-SS-30 j

(Reference 39) 5.

Comanche Peak Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10, Component Support i

Installation (Reference 43) 6.

Comanche Peak Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10A, Installation of

' ~'T Vendor-Supplied Component Supports Catalog Items (Reference 40)

[d 7.

CPSES Quality Assuratice Procedure CP-QAP-12.1, Mechanical Component Installation Verification (Reference 34) 8.

CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28, Fabrication and Installation Inspection of Safety Component Supports (Reference 45) 9.

CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-26, Piping and Equip-ment Installation Inspection (Reference 42) l

)

1 1

Ob

1 TABLE 5-7 j

N

^N i

~

SEISMIC CATEGORY II SMALL BORE PIPING OVER i

SEISMIC CATEGORY I EQUIPMENT PIPE SUPPORT CHECKLIST j

i l

The field verification of Seismic Category II piping located over Seismic

. Category I systems, structures, or components is documented using a checklist l

addressing these attributes:

l 1.

-General Support Requirements i

a.

Location b.

Function c.

Orientation d.

Dimensions / configuration / material per control drawing /

I document e.

Physical damage / completeness f.

Hole edge distance in structural members l

g.

Gap clearances h.

Minimum 1 in. clearance l

1.

Voided supports removed 1

2.

Welding I

a.

Weld type b.

Welds properly wrapped j

3.

Base Plates / Anchor Bolts a.

Bolt size b.

Edge di' stance of holes c.

Size and hole spacing d.

Attachment location e.

Nut tightness / thread engagement f.

Locking devices g.

Washers h.

Clearance with adjacent Hilti bolt 4.

Bolted Connections (Including Clamps) a.

Bolt / pin size j

b.

Thread engagement c.

Nut tightness

)

d.

Locking devices / cotter pins j

e.

Clamp size / proper spacer i

f.

Tightness of bolt and clamp I

hlo

)

l i

l l

L' l

l TABLE 5-7 (Cont)

I 5.

Snubber / Strut / Spring Components a.

Size / type / load pin size b.

Spherical bearing adequacy / free to swivel c.

Angularity with tolerance d.

Setting adequate per drawing e.

Eye rod thread engagement / nut tightness f.

Ends not binding g.

Locking devices h.

Extension weld adequacy 4

1.

Lubrite plate 0

6.

Design Considerations Support instability (e.g., uncinched U-bolts) a.

b.

Threshold loads exceed previous design load c.

Nonseismic interface loads d.

Seismic loading inclusion in original support load e.

Adequacy of gang support f.

Integral attachment adequacy 7

Aircraft Cables i

/"'s a.

Cable diameter

(

b.

Ceiling / wall connection c.

Clamp type / rod type d.

End loop configuration Eye nut tightness / lock washers e.

f.

Cable clamp tightness g.

Cable slack / configuration h.

Tie spacing / bundled cables tied together i.

Support location / span J.

Cable restraint modifications for 12 in. and 10 in.

diameter pipe k.

End of cables wrapped to prevent fraying D

2

l 1

1 1

TABLE 5-8 TYPICAL SWEC-PSAS TECHNICAL AND DESIGN CONTROL PRACTICES 1.

Add terminal anchors in the pipe stress problem boundary to bound the l

stress problem, i

2.

Establish a

seismic-to-nonseismic piping interface anchor design i

requirement.

3.

Revise pipe stress analysis package boundary decoupling requirement.

4.

Establish branch line mass effect on main piping requirement.

5.

Establish functional capability evaluation requirement.

6.

Document the validation of thermal stress cycles and stress range reduc-tion factor requirement.

7.

Establish stiffness modeling of sleeve sealant.

8.

Revise clearance requirement between pipe and structural frame.

9.

Establish a clamp anchor design for 6 in. and smaller nominal size pipe.

p 10.

Revise the seismic design loads for nonsafety-related piping attached to

(

safety-related ganged pipe supports.

11.

Revise the tube steel wraparound welding length evaluation requirement.

12.

Document the strut, snubber, and spring hanger swing angle evaluation re-quirement, including thermal, seismic, and fluid transient movements.

13.

Establish an integrated clearance validation program (engineering walkdown to validate clearance).

14.

Establish the requirement to validate the valve weight list and the valve stem extension in the as-built drawing.

15.

Establish the pipe stress and pipe support system review documentation requirement.

16.

Establish the review and validation of CPSES plant design and operating conditions.

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6.0 REFERENCES

tO:

t 1.

CPSES Design Basis Document DBD-CS-065 ASME Class 1 Iiping Analysis,

)

Revision 0, October 1, 1987

/

l,

\\

./

\\

P

'2.

CPSES Design Basis Document BD-CS-066 ASME Class 2 and 3 Piping d

Analysis, Revision 0, July 31, 1987

/

3.

CPSES Design Basis Document DBD-CS-067 ASME Class 1, 2, a'nd 3 Pipe Support Design, Revision 0, July 31,1987 i

I 4.

TU Electric Comanche Peak Response Team Acthn Plan, DSAP IX, Piping and Supports Discipline ' Specific. Action

Plan, Revision 2, June 18, 1987 y,

(}

}

j 5.

SWEC-PSAS CPSES Generic Technicil Issue

Report, Revisionfo, June 27, 1986 e

s?

p, j

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-1, Management'(P)sn Vor?, t 6.

Project Quality- (Piping System Qualification /Requalifics, tion) Reki O sion 7, March 25, 1987

(

s i

7.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, Section 3.6, Revision 1, July 1981, Section 3.7, Revision 1, July 1981, Sections 3.9.1, 3.9.2, Revision 2, July 1981, and,,

Section 3.9.3, Revision 1, July 1981, Appendix A, Revision 1, April 1984 8.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPN', Design Criteria for Pipe Stress and Pipe Supports, Revision 3, fe' uary 23, 1987 s

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-6l Pipe Stress /Suppotj 9.

Requalificat' ion Procedure - Unit 1, Revision 4, April 8, 1987 iG

\\

10.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-8, Piping and Support l

System Engineering Walkdcwn j Procedure, Revision 1, April 25, 1986 1

c '7 l

s 11.

SWEC-PSAS Piping and Support System Engineering Walkdown Final Re-port, CPSES Unit 1, June 4',

1986 12.

CPSES ASME Quality Proc 4/ure AQP '1?.il, Prftssure Testing Inspection, Revision 0, July 10, 1987' 4,

13. I Welding Renearch Coused (WBC) Bulletin [300, Technical Positions on s

, Critub Establishment { 1)amping Valuer, in Piping, Response Spectra Broadening, and IndusuJ Practice by Tech'nical Committee on Piping I,

Systems,, December 1984 <

14.

SWEC-hSAS Comanche Peak Proje Procedure CPPP-5, Field Walkdown Procedure - Unit 1, Revision 2, March 12, 1986

\\

/

/

q

\\

6-1

)

,y f

\\

{

,f' k

i

l l

t 15.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Unit 1, Small Bore Field Walkdown Report,

~' (%

June 19, 1986 l

16.

Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, September 17, 1987, l

l transmitted from N. H. Williams (CYGNA) to W. G. Counsil l

(TU Electric) on September 18,

1987, CYGNA Letter No. 84056.120 1

l'7.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure,. CPPP-18, Procedure for Evaluation of ERC Deviation Reports, Revision 2, June 17, 1987 l

18.

SWEC-PSAS Report No. 15454-N(C)-010, Impact of Construction Devia-tions on Stress Requalification Program, Revision 1, October 1, 1987 l

\\

19.

Civil-Structural Review Issues List, Revision 0, July 21, 1987; transmitted from N. H. Williams (CYGNA) to W. G. Counsil I

(TU Electric) on July 22, 1987 20.

SWEC-PSAS Topical Report SWSQAP-1-74A, Stone & Webster Engineering -

Corporation Standard Quality Assurance

Program, Revision E, February 21, 1986 I

21.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-10', Procedure for Re-view of Plant Operating Mode Conditions, Revision 1, April 1, 1986 22.

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1 Nuclear Power Plant Components, 1974 Edition, including the 1975 Summer Ad-denda of Subsections NC and ND and 1975 Winter Addenda bf l

(

Subsection NF 23.

NUREG-0582, Waterhammer in iluclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, July 1979 24.

NUPIPE-SW, Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation Computer Program ME-110U, Stress Analysis of Nuclear Piping, Version 4, Level 2 (Proprietary) 25.

NUREG/CR-1161, Recommended Revisions to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Design Criteria, Prepared by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory for USNRC, May 1980 26.

Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Units 1 and 2, Final Safety Analysis Report, current as amended 27.

ANSI /ASME OM-3-1982, Requirements for Preoperational and Initial '

Startup Vibration Testing of Nuclear Power Plant Systems, Revision 1

,]

(Proposed), May 1985 28.

NUREG-0797, Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and Supplement (SSER) f Nos. I through 4 and 6 through 13, Comanche Peak Steam Electric Sta-tion, Units'1 and 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1981, Supplements dated through May 1986 4

6-2 c

?

1 l

l

'29.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Proj ect I?rocedure CPPP-23, Pipe Stress /

,. m

% -)

Support Final Reconciliation Procedure, Revision 1, July 31, 1987

(

7 30.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-31, CPSES Safety-Related' Piping and Pipe Supports Desiga Basis Consolidation Program, Revision 1, May 15, 1987 31.

NRC

Letter, R. F. Heishman, Vendor Program Branch
Chief, to R. B. Kelly, Docket No. 99900509/86-01 dated January 2,1987 32.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-22, Clearance Walkdown Procedure, Revision 0, November 21, 1986 33.

Comanche Peak Response Team Program Plan and Issue-Specific Action Plans, Appendix D, CPRT Sampling Policy, Applications and Guidelines, Revision

'1, January 31, 1986, and Appendix E, Resolution of Discrep-ancies Identified by the CPRT, Revision 3, June 18, 1987 34.

CPSES Quality ' Control Procedure CP-QAP-12.1, Mechanical Component Installation Verification, Revision 20, July 10, 1987 35.

SWEC-PSAS CPSES Large Bore Pipe Stress and Pipe Support Generic Is-sues Report, Revision 1, July 24, 1987

' 6..

CFRT-QOC Issue-Specific Action Plan, ISAP-VII.c Results Report, Con-c struction Reinspection / Documentation Review Plan, Revision 0, May 19,

.j Q M87

' %,I 37.

SWEC-PSAS Site Procedure CPSP-12 Piping As-Built Verification, Revision 4, September 3, 1987 38.

CPSES Piping Erection Specification-No. 2323-MS-100, Revision 9, August 17, 1987 39.

CPSEfDStructural Embedments Specification No. 2323-SS-30, Revision 2, Jime 13,1986 40.

CPSN Construction Procedaro CP-CPM-9.10A, Installation of Ven'4b -Supplied Component Supports Catalog

Items, Revision 1, August 15, 1985 41.

CPSES Piping,Engin2ering and Design ASKE III Code Classes 1, 2, and 3,

ANSI B31/1, Classes 5 and G,

Specification No. 2323-MS-200, Revision 5, August 6, 1987 42.

CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure Q1-QAP-11.1-26, Piping and Equip-ment Installation Inspection, Revision 0 43.

CPSES Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10, Component Support Installa-tion, Revision 16, December 29, 1986

, n.;

U/

6-3 1

I A:

na

1 44.

CPSES Nuclear Safety Class Pipe Hangers and Supports Specification I

ml No. 2323-MS-46A, Revision 7, May 12, 1987 45.

CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28, Fabrication and Installation Inspection of Safety Class Component Supports, Revi-sion 36, April 22, 1987 46.

TENERA, L.P.,

Discipline Specific Results Report, Piping and Sup-ports, DAP-RR-P-001, Revision 1, August 27, 1987 47.

TU Electric Engineering and Construction Engineering Procedure ECE-9.04-04, Post Construction Hardware Validation Program - Imple-mentation Plan - SWEC-PSE, Revision 0, July 28, 1987 48.

TU Electric Engineering and Construction Procedure EC-9.04, Post Con-struction Hardware Validation Program, July 29, 1987 49.

TU Electric Engineering and Construction Policy No. 1, CPSES Correc-tive Action Program, Revision 1, August 30, 1987 50.

SWEC-PSAS CPSES Field Verification Method, Clearance Walkdown, CPE-SWEC-FV':-PS-080, Revision 0, July 29,1987 51.

SWEC-PSAS CPSES Field Verification Method, Hardware Validation and Supplemental Inspection Programs, CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081, Revision 0, July 29, 1987

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52.

SWEC-PSAS CPSES Field Verification Method, Validation of Seismic Category II Large Bore Pipe Support Designs, CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-082, Revision 0, July 29, 1987 53.

ANSI /ASME N45.2.6 - 1978, Qualification of Inspection, Examination, and Testing Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants, January 15, 1979 54.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Memorandum PM-39, Administrative Pro-cedure for Qualifying Wall-to-Wall, Floor-to-Floor, and Corner Pipe Supports, Revision 3, June 2, 1987 55.

TU Electric Engineering and Construction Procedure ECE 9.04-05, Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program - Engineering Evalua-tions, Revision 0, September 1, 1987 56.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-30, Validation of Seismic Category II Large Bore Piping and Pipe Support Designs, Revision 1, August 5, 1987 57.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-25, Piping Vibration Test Procedure - Unit 1, Revision 0, December 8, 1986 58.

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 13, Part 50, Paragraph 50.55(e)

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59.

SVEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-35, Piping and Pipe l'mI Support Qualification Procedure for Secondary Wall Displacements, U

Revision 0, June 8, 1987 60.

CPSES ASME Quality Procedure _, AQP-11.2, Fabrication and Installation Inspection of Pipe and Equipment, Revision 0, July 10, 1987 j

61.

CPSES Design Basis Document DBD-CS-069, Thermal Expansion Testing and Piping Vibration Monitoring, Revision 0, July 31, 1987 62.

CPSES Design Basis Document DBD-CS-070, Reactor Coolant Loop Piping and Support Design, Revision 0, October 1, 1987 63.

TU Electric CPSES Unit I and Common, Civil / Structural Project Status Report, Revision 0 64.

TU Electric CPSES Unit 1 and Common, Mechanical Project Status Re-port, Revision 0 65.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-20, Pipe Break / Crack Postulation Analysis Procedure, Revision 1, April 30, 1987 66.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-24, Thermal Expansion Test Procedure - Unit 1, Revision 0, December 1, 1986 67.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-28, Procedure for (7

Identification and Evaluation of Interfaces between Seismic and Non-(,,/

seismic Piping, Revision 0, February 20, 1987 68.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-33, Engineering Activ-ities to Support SWEC Certification of ASME III, Class 2 and 3 System N-5 Data Reports as Piping System Designer, Revision 0, May 21,1987 69.

SWEC-PSAS Coma. he Peak Project Procedure CPPP-4, Project Records Management Procedure, Revision 2, February 27, 1987 70.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-11, Administrative Control of Calculations, Revision 1, February 13, 1987 71.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Site Procedure CPSP-19, Preparation, Review, and Approval of Specifications and Specification Revisions, Revi-sion 0, May 27, 1987 72.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Site Procedure CPSP-14, Processing Design Changes Utilizing DCAs, Revision 4, July 27, 1987 73.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Site Procedure CPSP-10, New Pipe Support De-signs, Revision 0, October 15, 1987 74.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Site Procedure CPSP-11, TSMD Drawing Prepara-tion, Revision 4, June 22, 1987 A

6-5

75.

TU Electric CPSES Engirrering Procedure ECE-DC-7, Preparation and Review of Design Drawings, Revision 19, October 31, 1986 76.

TU Electric Field Verification Method CPE-EB-FVM-SI-40, Seismic /

Nonseismic Walkdowns, System Interaction

Program, Revision 0, June 15, 1987 77.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-29, Moment Restraint Support Qualification Procedure and Design Criteria, Revision 0, 1

September 25, 1987 78.

U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.29, Revi-sion 2, Seismic Design Classification, February 1976 79.

TU Electric Letter No. TXX 6631, W. G. Counsil to U.S. Nuclear Regu-latory Commission, Comanche Peak Programs, August 20, 1987 80.

SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Project Procedure CPPP-15, Small Bore Stress /

Support Requalification - Unit 1, Revision 1, January 7, 1987 81.

TU Electric CPSES Unit 1 and Common, SWEC-PSAS Large Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Project Status Report, Revision 0, October 1, 1987 82.

SWEC-PSAS Site Procedure CPSP-16, Preparation of Problem Boundary Sketches for Small Bore Piping Unit 1, Revision 2, July 17, 1987

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83.

SWEC-PSAS CPSES Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Generic Issues V

Report, Revision 0, December 5, 1986 84.

TU Electric Letter No. TXX6500, W. G. Counsil to U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, Comanche Peak Programs, June 25, 1987 85.

U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.68, Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2, August 1978 86.

Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4, September 16,

1987, transmitted from N. H. Williams (CYGNA) to W. G. Counsil (TU Elec-tric) on September 16, 1987, CYGNA Letter No. 84056.119

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APPENDIX A pb COMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM (CPRT) AND EXTERNAL ISSUES 1

INTRODUCTION This appendix describes the details of the resolutions of issues resulting from the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and from external issues. Each of thir-ty-nine issues listed below is described in an individual subappendix which includes discussions of resolution methodology and corrective and preventive actions.

SWEC-PSAS has' reviewed the CPSES Supplemental Safety Evaluation Reports (SSERs) l

-(NUREG-0797), and determined that the procedures and design criteria for the piping and pipe support Corrective Action Program (CAP) are consistent with the l

actions required of TU Electric by the NRC staff as stated in the SSERs.

Issue No.

Issue Title Al Richmond Inserts A2 Local Stress - Piping A3 Wall-to-Wall and Floor-to-Ceiling Supports l

A4 Pipe Support / System Stability A5 Pipe Support Generic Stiffness i

A6 Uncinched U-Bolt Acting as a Two-Way Restraint A7 Friction Forces

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A8 AWS Versus ASME Code Provisions A9 A500, Grade B Tube Steel A10 Tube Steel Section Properties All U-Bolt Cinching A12 Axial / Rotational Restraints A13 Bolt Hole Gap

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A14 OBE/SSE Damping

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A15 Support Mass in Piping Analysis 1

A16 Programmatic Aspects and QA Including Iterative

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Design A17 Mass Point Spacing A18 High-Frequency Mass Participation i

A19 Fluid Transients l

A20 Seismic Excitation of Pipe Support Mass A21 Local Stress in Pipe Support Members l

I A22 Safety Factors A23 SA-36 and A307 Steel A24 U-Bolt Twisting l

A25 Fischer/ Crosby Valve Modeling/ Qualification A26 Piping Modeling A27 Welding l

A28 Anchor Bolts /Embedment Plates A29 Strut / Snubber Angularity A-1 i

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Issue No.

Isrue Title fsi, j A30 Component Qualification A31 Structural Modeling for Frame Analysis A32 Computer Program Verification and Use A33 Hydrotest A34 Seismic /Nonseismic Interface A35 Other Issues A36 SSER-8 Review A37 SSER-10 Review A38 SSER-11 Review A39 CPRT Quality of Construction Review on Piping and Pipe Supports

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SUBAPPENDIX Al t

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RICHMOND INSERTS 1.0 Definition of the Issue There were several interrelated issues regarding the use of Richmond in-I serts (see Figure Al-1)

The issues were related to design allowables, j

methods for calculating bolt loads in tube steel connections, and modeling References 4.1 through 4.9):

of insert / tube steel connections.

The specific issues are as follows (see 1.1 Safety Factors / Testing The issue was that a safety factor of two was used for Richmond insert designs instead of the manufacturer's recommended safety factor of three.

Related questions were raised regarding the tests performed by TU Electric on Richmond inserts to determine the load-carrying capacity of the insert and to examine the behavior of the connection for combined loading.

In specific, the representativeness of the tests to actual plant conditions and the interpretation of the test results was questioned.

1.2 Concrete Strength The issue was that Richmond inserts may have been installed in concrete f-~'

weaker than the 4000 psi design strength used in the analyses.

s 1.3 Fatigue Life The issue was that the reduction in fatigue life of the threaded rod in Richmond insert tube steel connections caused by cyclic loading was not considered.

1.4 Simplified Evaluation Method The issue was that justification of the simplified method of Richmond in-sert design was based on improperly interpreted finite element analysis results.

1.5 Richmond Insert / Tube Steel Finite Element Modeling The issue was that a simplified method was used in evaluating connections made with tube steel without considering bolt angularity or bending in the bolt due to the torsion in the tube steel member.

Tube steel / insert connections were inconsistently modeled as pin or fixed connections.

This affects the support stiffness, support frame stresses, and the evaluations of the loads on bolts / rods and inserts.

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1.6 Allowable Spacing 5

The issue was that the lack of a structural attachment interface program may have resulted-in a failure to consider spacing effects of nearby anchors / sleeves in the structural evaluation of inserts.

1 1.7 Allowable Shear Loads The issue was that allowable shear loads for 1 1/2 in. Richmond inserts, l

which were extrapolated from test data for 1 in. and 1 1/4 in. size in-J serts, may not be. conservative.

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1.8 Thermal Expansion of Long Tube Steel Members The issue was that thermal expansion of long tube steel members, under LOCA. conditions, anchored by two or more inserts was not considered.

1.9 Tube Steel Local Stress The issue was that the local stress in tube steel walls, which may cause punching-type failure, was not evaluated.

t 1.10 Oversized Holes The issue was that the holes made in the connections are oversized, and therefore the sharing of shear loads cannot be assumed to be equal for all of the bolts.

1.11 Misuse of Allowable Loads Tt.e issue was that tension and shear allowables for inserts were occasion-ally used to evaluate threaded rods / bolts in the analyses.

2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Safety Factors / Testing SWEC-PSAS has specified a safety factor of 3 for Richmond inserts under normal, upset, and emergency loading conditions, as recommended by the Richmond Screw Company.

For faulted conditions, a safety factor of 2 has been specified based on ACI 318-71 (Reference 4.10).

The allowables are based on averaging TU Electric insert capacity failure loads based on test results as described in References 4.11 and 4.12.

SWEC-Civil / Structural Group has verified (Reference 4.13) that the tests were representative of CPSES Richmond insert installation and that the tests were performed in accordance with the industry-wide accepted ASTM Standard E488-76 (Reference 4.14).

The allowable loads for Richmond inserts and threaded rods, based on the appropriate safety factors, are provided in Attachment 4-5 of CPPP-7.

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l-2.2 Concrete Strength gn, V

This issue is addressed in Subappendix A36, 2.3 Fatigue Life CPPP-7, Section 4.3.1, specifies that threaded rods used in Richmond inserts / tube steel connections are designed in accordance with AISC re-quirements.

SWEC-PSAS has demonstrated by analysis that the number of equivalent stress cycles on pipe supports at CPSES is less than 7,000, and therefore in accordance with AISC 7th Edition (Reference 4.15), Sec-tions 1.7.1 and 1.7.2 and Appendix B, fatigue is not a concern for thread-ed rods used in these connections.

2.4 Simplified Evaluation Method The procedure developed and implemented by SWEC-PSAS for the qualification of Richmond inserts and bolts (Attachment 4-5 of CPPP-7) is independent of previously completed finite element analyses.

2.5 Richmond Insert / Tube Steel Finite Element Modeling SWEC-PSAS established the tube steel to bolt load transfer mechanism for shear and torsion loads (with respect to the tube steel) and developed a conservative design methodology for evaluating these connections.

R. L. Cloud and Associates (RLCA) performed an independent analysis of the tube steel to bolt load transfer mechanism and confirmed that the SWEC-g(J PSAS methodology is appropriate (Reference 4.16).

l The SWEC-PSAS model simulated a member with bolt properties (in the STRUDL computer program) to connect the center of tube steel to the face of con-crete.

Support joints were modeled as fixed except for the bolt's tor-sional moment. The force and moment reactions were first used directly in the interaction equation for qualifying the bolts and were later converted to tension for evaluating the inserts. This interaction equation was doc-umented by both RLCA (Reference 4.17) and SWEC-PSAS (Reference 4.18).

This method of analysis represents a conservative means of transferring shear and torsion loads from the tube steel to the bolts.

Single tube steel members, subject to torsion, were modified by outriggers installed at the connections to eliminate the moment on the bolt. -5 of CPPP-7 provides the modeling procedure for qualifying the Richmond insert when used in conjunction with tube steel for all sup-port configuration types, including the proper interaction equation for qualifying the bolts / rods.

2.6 Allowable Spacing -5 of CPPP-7 specified spacing requirements and the effects of reduced spacing on Richmond insert allowables.

A project-wide program on Richmond insert spacing, conducted by the SWEC Civil / Structural Group as bd Al-3

l discussed in the Civil / Structural PSR (Reference 4.13), is being imple-fs (O

mented (also see Subappendix A28, Sections 1.1 and 2.1).

)

2.7 Allowable Shear Loads TU Electric performed additional tests (see Section 2.1 above and Refer-ences 4.11 and 4.12) to establish shear allowables for all discrete sizes of Richmond inserts used at CPSES including the 1 1/2 in. Richmond insert.

Design allowable values were based on these tests.

2.8 Thermal Expansion of Long Tube Steel Members The effects of thermal expansion on long tube steel members anchored by two or more inserts was evaluated by RLCA in Reference 4.19, and limits on tube steel length were established. -5 of CPPP-7 provides limits on tube steel length of long tube steel members anchored by two or more inserts due to the effects of LOCA-induced thermal expansion.

2.9 Tube Steel Local Stress SWEC-PSAS developed and implemented a procedure for the evaluation of lo-cal stresses due to nuts bearing on tube steel walls.

This was incorpo-rated into Attachment 4-13 of CPPP-7.

For additional discussion of this issue, refer to Subappendix A21, Section 2.0.

A(j 2.10 Oversized Holes SWEC-PSAS procedures assume equal distribution of shear loads resulting from rod and hole fit-up tolerances, where tubing is anchored by two or more Richmond inserts.

However, for Richmond inserts and threaded rods with high shear interaction ratios (greater than 0.25), potential unequal shear loading is addressed by checking that these Richmond inserts and roJ3 are capable of resisting twice the calculated shear (Reference 4.20).

2.11 Misuse of Allowable Loads The SWEC-PSAS procedure for the validation of Richmond inserts and bolts (Attachment 4-5 of CPPP-7) requires separate evaluations for the inserts and for the threaded rods / bolts using specified allowables and interaction equations.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution l

of the issue.

i Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

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l The corrective action to resolve the issues regarding the analysis l',h and design of Richmond inserts used in conjunction with tube steel V

was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided l

I in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-5 during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Sections VII and VIII, August 22, 1983 4.2 Reply to NRC Staff questions from W. A. Horin to G. Mizuno, June 11, 1984 4.3 Reply to NRC Staff questions, September 1984 4.4 Affidavit of CASE witness M. Walsh before the ASLB, September 11, 1984 4.5 Structural Embedments Specification No. 2323-SS-30, Revision 1, Gibbs &

Hill, Inc., February 10, 1984 4.6 Richmond Inserts / Anchorages for Concrete Constructions, Bulletin No. 6, Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 1971 4.7 Testimony of N. H. Williams in response to CASE questions of Febru-ary 22, 1984, to CYGNA Energy Services, April 12, 1984

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4.8 June 20, 1984, and August 9, 1984, meeting with NRC Staff discussing Rich-mond Inserts' affidavit 4.9 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 4.10 ACI Code 1971, Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete, American Concrete Institute, Detroit 4.11 TU Electric Test Report, Shear Tests on Richmond 1 1/2 in. Type EC-6W In-serts, March 30, 1983 4.12 TU Electric Test Report, Shear and Tension Loading on Richmond Inserts, 1 1/2 in. Type EC-6W and 1 in. Type EC-2W, April 19, 1984 4.13 TU Electric Units 1 and Common, Civil / Structural Project Status Report, Revision 0, October 1987 4.14 ASTM Standard 488-76, Standard Test Methods for Strength of Anchors in Concrete and Masonary Elements 4.15 AISC Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural l

Steel for Buildings, 7th Edition, 1969 p

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4.16 RLCA Report No. RLCA/P142/01-85/003, Richmond Insert / Structural Tube Steel O

Connection, Revision 0, September 10, 1986

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4.17 RLCA Report No. RLCA/P142/01-86/008, Richmond Insert / Structural Tube Steel Connection, Design Interaction Equation for Bolt / Threaded Rod, Revision 0, September 10, 1986

.]

4.18 SWEC-PSAS Report No. 15454.05-N(C)-002, Interaction Relation for a Struc-tural Member of Circular Cross Section, May 1986 4.19 RLCA Report, Richmond Insert / Structural Tube Steel Connection Effect of Thermal Expansion of Tube Steel on Richmond Inserts and Bolts 1

4.20 SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum 141, Unequal Shear Loading Effect on Richmond Insert and Threaded Rods Used in Conjunction with Tube Steel O

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SUBAPPENDIX A2

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LOCAL STRESS - PIPING 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue was (References 4.1 through 4.4) that local stresses in piping, due to the relative displacements between the pipe and supports, were not properly addressed at CPSES in the items listed below:

1.1 Zero Gap Restraints Zero gap restraints are box frame pipe supports with the specified gap on the pipe support drawing less than the predicted radial ther-mal expansion of the pipe.

Therefore, these support types restrain the radial thermal expansion of the pipe.

The loads due to the re-strained pipe expansion, combined with the mechanical loads, have the potential to overstress the frame, welds, and pipe.

In addition, zero gap restraints used in conjunction with struts or snubbers are potentially unstable.

1.2 Integral Welded Attachments (IWAs)

Integral welded pipe support attachments (IWAs), such as trunnions and lugs, induce local stresses in the pipe wall.

Anchor supports r-'s with opposing trunnions attached to different support structures may

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restrain the radial thermal pipe expansion and induce additional loe,d in the pipe, trunnions, and support structures.

The load from restrained radial thermal pipe expansion, when combined with the mechanical loads, has the potential to overstress the pipe, trunnion, welds, support structure, and support structure anchorage.

2.0 Issue Resolution The issue of local stress on piping was resolved as follows:

2.1 Zero Gap Restraints i

i Frame-type pipe supports, designed to restrain the lateral movement J

of the pipe through point, line, or surface contact, induce local j

stresses in the pipe wall due to the bearing contact force. The is-sue of local pipe stress due to bearing contact was resolved as follows:

2.1.1 Zero clearance box frames are eliminated or modified to l

provide sufficient gaps to allow for the thermal expansion i

l of the pipe in accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-11.

The modification of zero gap restraints on struts or snub-bers, to provide stability, is discussed in Subappendix A4.

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2.1.2 Guidelines were provided in CPPP-7, Attachments 4-6B and

'i 4-6C, to assess the local longitudinal line/ point contact U

and circumferential bearing stresses in piping restrained by pipe support frames, 2.2 Integral Welded Attachments CPPP-7, Attachment 4-6A provided simplified analysis methods for the evaluation of pipe local stress at trunnions and lugs, with and with-out pipe reinforcing pads.

The local pipe stress for trunnions on elbows is evaluated in accordance with PM-162.

Local pipe stresses at IWAs that did not meet the geometric limitations of the simplified methods (such as multiple trunnions attached at the same location, or pipe-through trunnions) were qualified based on finite element analy-sis techniques.

In accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.6.4.1, supports with opposing trunnions attached to different support structures were specially analyzed to predict the additional load induced on the pipe, trun-l nion, support structure, welds, and support structure anchorage due to the restrained thermal expansion of the pipe.

This load was added to the thermal load due to the longitudinal thermal expansion of the pipe to determine the thermal design load for the pipe local stress evaluation and the design of the trunnion, support structure, welds, and support structure anchorage.

The trunnion was then analyzed in accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-6A as discussed above.

m 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the local pipe stress issues with zero clearance box frames was to eliminate the support or modify the support to provide proper gaps between the pipe and support during i

the design validation. The corrective action to resolve the stabili-ty issue for zero gap restraints is discussed in Subappendix A4.

The corrective action to resolve the local pipe stress issue with frames and IWAs was to provide analysis methodologies and acceptance crite-ria consistent with licensing commitments in CPPP-7, Attach-ments 4-6A, B, and C during the design validation.

All local pipe stress design validation analyses were performed in accordance with these attachments.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

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4.0 References O

i 4.1 CASE's Proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations),Section IV, August 22, 1983.

4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no Genuine Issue Regarding Consideration of Local Displace-ments and Stressos, August 24, 1984.

4.3 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Reply to ' CASE's Answer to App 1! cant's I

Motion for Summary, Disposition Regarding Local Displaceme..ts and Stresses, October 4, 1984.

-4.4 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987.

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SUBAPPENDIX A3 WALL-TO-WALL AND FLOOR-TO-CEILING SUPPORTS 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 and 4.2) was that when a pipe support is at-tached from floor-to-ceiling or wall-to-wall, the support members effec-tively act as building structural members.

Loadings due to the thermal expansion of the frame, relative displacements between building attachment j

points from seismic building movements, time-dependent displacements such

]

as concrete creep, and the cumulative effects of these could be signifi-cant.

Since these loads and displacements were not considered in the de-sign, the potential existed for support members to become overstressed.

]

2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Floor-to-Ceiling and Wall-to-Wall (F-C/W-W) Supports The large F-C/W-W frames were qualified for loading combinations that j

include frame thermal expansion, differential building displacements.

due to seismic movements, long-term concrete creep, and live loads.

Relative building displacements, long-term creep, and live load ef-fects were demonstrated to be insignificant for corner supports.

The loading combinations and the allowable stresses are delineated in i -19 of CPPP-7.

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2.1.1 Large Frames Outside the Service Water Tunnel l

i All large F-C/W-W frames, except those in the service water tunnel, are being modified by adding slip joints.

2.1.2 Large Frames in the Service Water Tunnel 1

l The large F-C/W-W frames in the service water tunnel were assessed for stresses caused by floor live load, differen-tial floor / wall displacements due to long-term concrete creep, thermal expansion, and seismic excitation as speci-fled in Section 2.1.

Supports assessed as being inadequate are being modified (Reference 4.3).

2.2 Corner Supports A generic study of these supports was performed utilizing the assess-4 ment methods in Section 2.1.

The supports were then reviewed based on the study results, and the designs were validated.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

A3-1

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All the pipe support modifications tesulting from resolution of is-f

!g sues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable l

under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, l

f SDAR-CP-86-72).

l The corrective action to resolve the issue with the proper evaluation of floor-to-ceiling and wall-to-wall and corner supports was accom-i plished through the implementation of the criteria of CPPP-7, Attach-ment 4-19 during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References i

4.1 CASE's. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations),Section VI, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Partial Answer to Applicant's Statement of Material Facts, in the Form of Af fidavit of CASE Witness, Mark Walsh, August 27, 1984 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Report No. 15454.05-N(C)-013, Qualification of Wall-to-Wall / Floor-to-Floor Supports, April 1987 4.4 SWEC-PSAS Report No. 15454.05-N(C)-012, Revision 1,. Qualification of Corner Supports, June 2, 1987

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SUBAPPENDIX A4 t

PIPE SUPPORT / SYSTEM STABILITY 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 through 4.5) was that certain pipe support con-figurations installed at CPSES were potentially unstable or their buckling capacity was not properly evaluated.

An unstable support is defined as a support that can shift or move to an unqualified position. An unqualified position is a position other than that assumed in the piping stress analy-sis. A related issue was that the stability of the overall piping systems must be assured.

1.1 Potentially Unstable Support Configurations The following are configurations whose buckling capacity was not properly assessed, or which were potentially unstable because they had the potential to move axially along the pipe and/or rotate around the pipe, creating a three pin linkage system.

1.1.1 Zero-Clearance Box Frames Supported by Single and/or Multiple Struts or Snubbers DO l

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The issue was that if there were unstable supports in a piping system, then the overall system would be unstable.

2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Potentially Unstable Support Configurations t

A4-3 l

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l A stable support is a support that cannot shift or move to an unqual-ified position.

Unqualified position means a position that exceeds 5

the specified tolerances from the position assumed in the pipe stress analysis.

The stability of supports was assured by qualifying column-strut sup-ports and by modifying potentially unstable configurations in accor-dance with CPPP-7, Section 4.2.4 and Attachment 4.9, as follows:

2.1.1 Zero-Clearance Box Frame Supported by Single or Multiple Struts or Snubbers These support types were either eliminated or modified, such as by removing the existing box frame and replacing it with a standard pipe clamp or rigid frame.

2.1.2 Uncinched U-Bolts on Single Strut or Snubber All supports of this nature were eliminated or are being modified by replacing the U-bolt assembly with a design consistent with the required support function.

2.1.3 Multi-Strutted Gang Support Frames These supports were redesigned as rigid frames.

/

2.1.4 Trapeze Supports With U-Bolto All supports of this nature were eliminated or are being modified as described in Subappendix A12, Axial, Rotation-al, and Trapeze-Type Restraints.

2.1.5 Column-Strut Stability A procedure to evaluate the critical buckling load of a column-supported strut was developed and is included in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-9.

2.2 System Stability The stability of the overall piping system was assured by the i

following:

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1)

Each installed support was individually qualified to be stable (in accordance with the definition in Section 2.1).

l 2)

The system integrity was analyzed and qualified to the ASME Section III, Division 1 Code allowables for deadweight, thermal, and applicable occasional loads (fluid transients) and seismic excitations in three orthogonal directions.

A4-4

__-___-________O

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the issue of pipe support and system stability was accomplished through the analysis methods and support modifications specified in CPPP-7, Section 4.2.4 and Attachment 4-9 during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations),Section III, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Motions and Answer to TU Electric's Motions for Summary Dispo-sition Regarding Stability of Pipe Supports, October 15, 1984 4.3 Testimony of N. H. Williams in Response to CASE Question of February 22, 1984, to CYGNA Energy Services

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4.4 Letter to Mr. J. B. George of TU Electric from N. H. Williams of CYGNA in reference to stability of pipe supports, April 30, 1985 4.5 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987.

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I SUBAPPENDIX A5 f-~

PIPE SUPPORT GENERIC STIFFNESS 1.0 Definition of the Issue 1.1 Generic Stiffness Methodology The issue (References 4.1 through 4.6) was that there is no assurance that the assumed set of generic stiffness values used in the piping sufficiently representative of the stiffnesses stress analyses were of the installed supports. Therefore, the results of the pipe stress analyses may not be valid.

Supports were designed to allowable stresses and to a deflection lim-it of 1/16 in. for Level B (upset condition) loads.

No check was performed on the support stiffness, since it was assumed that the 1/16-in. deflection limit would ensure that the actual support stiff-ness was acceptably close to the assumed values used in the piping stress analyses.

1.2 Pipe Support Stiffness Evaluation It was also noted that the flexibilities of all pipe support compo-nents, such as U-bolts and base plates, should have been included in

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the support stiffness calculation.

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1.3 Effect of Oversize Holes on Pipe Support Stiffness Evaluation The bolt hole sizes for 1 in, diameter bolts were 1/16 in. larger than allowed by the ASHE Section III Code of record.

The issue was that these oversized holes were ignored in the pipe support deflec-tion check and therefore could have an unconservative impact on the seismic analysis of the piping system.

2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Generic Stiffness Methodology Pipe support stiffnesses were represented in the pipe stress analysis in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 3.10.8.

The following approach was followed to develop a generic stiffness methodology for CPSES.

2.1.1 Determination of Generic Values The following three types of supports were selected from the CPSES pipe supports installed in the plant:

1)

Rigid supports, including frames and struts t

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2)

Anchors

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3)

Snubbers l

i For rigid supports, generic values were analytically devel-oped (Reference 4.7) for groups of pipe sizes.

For snub-bers, generic values were based on snubber sizes.

The generic values for anchors were developed in terms of nondimensional values, which are independent of pipe sizes.

The nondimensional stiffness values of all sample anchors for all pipe sizes can thus be used together in developing histograms.

2.1.2 Pipe Support Stiffness Histograms For all the supports evaluated, stiffness values were calculated.

Histograms of the calculated stiffnesses (Reference 4.8) were developed and representative values (median values) determined.

2.1.3 Minimum Acceptable Stiffness for Use of the General Value To assure that the use of generic values produce valid pipe Q

stress analyses, a minimum stiffness value was established.

V The minimum stiffness was determined with consideration of its effect on thermal, static, and dynamic responses (Reference 4.7).

This approach utilized simplified piping models end fundamental engineering principles.

2.1.4 Screening Procedure Before the beginning of pipe stress analyses, each pipe support was assessed to determine if its stiffness falls l

above the minimum stiffness; if so, it was assigned the generic stiffness.

When a pipe support's stiffness had been determined to fall below the minimum value, the calcu-lated stiffness value was used in the pipe stress analysis in lieu of the generic value.

A set of CPSES generic stiffness values and acceptable minimum values have been incorporated in the design

criteria, CPPP-7, Section 3.10.8.

2.2 Pipe Support Stiffness Evaluation In accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.3.2.2, the stiffness of each component in the support assembly, such as vendor-supplied compo-nents, structural members, and base plates was assessed in the evalu-ation of the support stiffness.

O i

A5-2 L.

To facilitate the support stiffness evaluation, the stiffnesses of 3

commonly used supports and subassemblies have been provided in graph-ic and tabular forms and incorporated in Attachment 4-18 of CPPP-7.

2.3 Effect of Oversize Bolt Holes on Pipe Support Stiffness Evaluation As discussed in Subappendix A13, Bolt Hole Gaps, CPSES anchor-bolt hole sizes were in compliance with ASME 1985 Summer Addenda NF-4721(a) and are not oversized. Therefore, consistent with industry practice, the effects of bolt hole gaps were not included in the support stiffness assessments.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the issues regarding pipe support generic stiffness was accomplished by implementing the procedures provided in CPPP-7, Sections 3.10.8 and 4.3.2 and Attachment 4-18 during the design validation.

/

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CA3E's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations)Section IX, August 22, 1983 4.2 Affidavit of CASE Witnesses J. Doyle and M. Walsh, CASE's. Partial Answer to Applicants' Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no Genuine Issue Regarding Applicants' Use of Generic Stiffnesses Instead of Actual Stiffnesses in Piping Analysis, August 24, 1984, and August 27, 1984 4.3 CYGNA Phase 3 Final Report, TR-84042-01, Revision 1, Appendix J, Note 8, November 20, 1984 4.4 N. H. Williams (CYGNA) letter to V. Noonan (USNRC), Open Items Asso-ciated with Walsh/Doyle Allegations, CYGNA Letter No. 84042.022 dated January 18, 1985 4.5 Testimony of N. H. Williams in response to CASE questions of February 22, 1984, to CYGNA Energy Services 4.6 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List Revision 4, CYGNA Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987

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I 4.7 SWEC-PSAS Report No. 15454-N(C)-003, Generic Pipe Support Stiffness fealysis, September $986 Values for Piping /,

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t 4.8 Pipe Support Genetic Stlffness Stify, CPPA-48,974, TU Electric, g<, ',/

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UNCINCHED U-BOLT ACTING AS A TWO-WAY RESTRAINT

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l 1.0 Definition of the Issue i

The issue (References 4.1 and 4.2) was that certain uncinched U-bolts at-tached to rigid frames were modeled and analyzed as one-way restraints (i.e., as providing restraint in the direction parallel to the axis of the threaded portion of the U-bolt) but will actually behave as two-way re-straints (i.e., as stated above and laterally). This was viewed as having a two-fold effect:

1 1.1 Modeling I

l Failure to include the two-way restraining action of the U-bolts may invalidate the results of pipe stress analyses that utilized U-bolts modeled as one-way restraints.

t 1.2 Uncinched U-Bolt Qualification Guideline i

4 Such U-bolts may not meet the manufacturer's recommended interaction limits when the lateral loads are applied.

2.0 Issue Resolution

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2.1 Modeling 2.1.1 For pipe sizes equal to or greater than 8 in.

NPS, uncinched U-bolts were replaced in the model with e compo-nent commensurate with the support function.

2.1.2 In the piping analysis, uncinched U-bolt supports for pipe sizes 6 in, and smaller that are attached to rigid. frames were modeled as two-way restraints.

1 2.2 Uncinched U-Bolt Qualification Guideline 2.2.1 STRUDL models of U-bolts were developed to derive the stiffness value and resultant loading (moment, shear,.and tension) at the attachment to the frame. For static (i.e.,

signed) loads, a friction coefficient of 0.3 was considered to act in the axial direction of the pipe.

Res olution; of the friction issue is discussed in Subappendix A7.

2.2.2 Based on the above STRUDL analyses, allowable U-bolt load I

ratings were developed.

2.2.3 The uncinched U-bolt qualification procedure was incorpo-rated in Section 4.2.5.2 and Attachment 4-3 of C PPP -7.

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2.2.4 Stiffness values for uncinhed U-bolts, modeled as two-way 73 j restraints were developed and issued in CPPP-7, Sec-

'd tion 4.3.2.2 and Attachment 4-18.

3.0. Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.

/

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subsppendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under

/

provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the concern of U-bolts e.cting as two-way restraints was accomplished by implementing the criteria of CPPP-7, Sections 4.2.5.2 and 4.3.2.2, and Attachments 4-3 and 4-18 during the design validation.

The preventive action for dis issue is identified in Appendix C.

. 4.0 References l

4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Walsh/Doyle Allegations) Section -II, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE Answer to Applicant.'s Motion for Sunuary Disposition of CASE's

/~T Allegations Regarding U-Bolts Acti.ng as Two-Way Restraints, i

August 20, 1984

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SUBAPPENDIX A7 FRICTION FORCES 1.0 Definition of the Issue

.The issue (References.4.1 through 4.4) was that friction loads were not considered in the original pipe support designs when the predicted pipe movement was less than 1/16 in.

2.0 Issue Resolution Friction loads were considered in the validation of pipe supports at CPSES.

Section 4.7.3 and Attachment 4-7 of CPPP-7 required that friction be considered in all load cases for noneyclic loads (i.e., static and/or steady state loads) regardless of the magnitude of pipe movement.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolut. ion i

of the issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were. determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the issue of friction forces ' was

(

accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-7 during the design valiation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations),Section XVI, August 22, 1983.

4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition Regarding Consideration of Friction Forces in the Design of Pipe Supports with Small Thermal Movements, August 6, 1984.

4.3 CASE's Answer to Applicants' Reply to CASE's Answer to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition Regarding Consideration of Friction Forces, October 1, 1984.

4.4 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 A7-1

l l p SUBAPPENDIX A8 V

i AWS VERSUS ASME CODE PROVISIONS 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 through 4.4) was that certain aspects of weld design, welding practices, and the effects of punching shear (local stress) on structural members were not adequately addressed.

The items discussed are grouped into the following four groups:

1.1 Skewed T-Joint Welds The issue was that the effective throats of skewed T-joint welds were incorrectly calculated in the original design.

The AWS angle limita-tion between the joined parts was violated in the evaluations of skewed T-joint welds at CPSES.

1.2 Effective Throat of Flare Bevel Welds The issue was that since the ASME Code does not adequately address the determination of the effective throat for flare bevel welds, there is no assurance that the evaluations of these welds were prop-erly performed.

1.3 Welding Practices

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/b The issue was that since the ASME Code does not adequately address various welding practice related items such as preheat requirements, cap welding, ceave welding, downhill welding, drag and work angles (which limit the space allowed for welders to function), and lap joint requirements, that these welding processes may not have been l

properly addressed in the existing welding procedures.

1.4 Punching Shear (Local Stress)

The issue was that punching shear has not been considered in the de-signs at CPSES since the ASME Code does not adequately address this subject.

Local stresses, which can be significant, develop in the immediate vicinity of the joint between two members.

Based on the relative sizes of items joined, one member tends to punch through the wall of the other.

2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Skewed T-Joint Welds Pipe support welds at CPSES were installed in accordance with Weld Procedure BR-WPS-11032. Weld configurations contained in this proce-dure were qualified by testing in accordance with ASME Section III, A8-1

Subsection NF requirements; therefore, the limitations of prequalified welds did not apply.

Cuidelines for the design. validation of the effective throat of skewed T-j oint welds were incorporated in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-2.

These requirements were consistent with AWS D1.1.

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2.2 ~ Effective Throat of Flare Bevel Welds Resolution of the issue regarding the determination of the effective throat for flare bevel welds is addressed in Subappendix A10.

2.3 Welding Practices Resolution of the issues regarding inadequate weld procedure-related l

i items is addressed in Subappendix A27.

l 2.4 Punching Shear-(Local Stress)

Resolution of the issue regarding the evaluation of local stresses in the-walls of structural pipe support members is addressed in Subappendix A21, 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution l

of this issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from the resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of' 10CFR50,55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

.l The corrective. action to resolve the issue of AWS versus ASME Code

. provisions was accomplished through the implementation of the crite-ria provided in Section 4.4 and Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7 during the design validation.

l The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References i

4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L1w (Walsh/Doyle allegations),Section V, August 22, 1983.

4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no Genuine Issue Regarding Certain Case Allegations Regard-ing AWS and ASME Code Provisions Related to Design Issues, August 4, 1984.

j 4.3 NRC Staff Response to Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition on j

f AWS and ASME Code Provisions on Weld Design, November 2, 1984.

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A8-2

4.4 Affidavit of David Terao on AWS and ASME Code Provisions on Weld De-sign, November 2, 1984, 1

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SUBAPPENDIX A9 O) t A500, GRADE B TUBE STEEL 1.0 Definition of the Issue The original design of CPSES pipe supports used a design yield strength Sy of 42 ksi for A500, Grade B, tube steel (cold formed) in accordance with ASME Code Case N-71-9.

Later versions of ASME Code Cases N-71-10 through N71-14 revised the yield strength from 42 ksi to 36 ksi.

Therefore, the issue (References 4.1 through 4.4) was that all designs for tube steel supports at CPSES should be revised to incorporate the lower design yield strength.

2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Basis of ASME Code Case Revision The basis of the ASME Section III NF Code Committee revision of ASME Code Case N-71-9 (42 ksi) to N-71-10 (36 ksi) is the concern that the yield strength in the heat-affected zone at weldments could be slightly reduced.

Since test data were not available at the time to quantify the reduction, the ASME Section III Code allowable for A500 Grade B (cold-formed tube steel) was reduced to that of A501 (hot-formed).

The Code Committee's action was considered a conservative measure.

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The Code Committee has evaluated test data on this issue.

The test data demonstrate that the yield strength in the heat-affected zone of A500 Grade B tube steel is not reduced below 46 ksi.

ASME Code Case N-71-15, which specifies Sy = 46 ksi for A500 Grade B7 j

tube steel in rectangular shapes, was issued in December 1986.

j l

2.2 SWEC-PSAS Validation l

The design of pipe supports using A500, Grade B tube steel at CPSES I

were validated using a yield strength of 36 ksi in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.7.2.1.

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Pipe supports where the calculated stress exceeded 36 ksi but did not I

exceed 42 ksi were not modified. The yield stress of 42 ksi is based on ASMG Section III Code Case N-71-9 which is consistent with CPSES licensing commitments and is acceptable and conservative in light of ASME Section III Code Case N-71-15 which specifies the allowable yield strength of A500 Grade B tube steel as 46 ksi.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action l

No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

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A9-1 1

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Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in

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Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the A500, Grade B tube steel issue was accomplished through the implementation of criteria provided in CPPP-7, Section 4.7.2.1, during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 Affidavit of W. P. Chen on Revised A500 Steel Yield Values, May 29, 1984 4.2 Testimony of N. H. Williams in Response to CASE Questions of February 22, 1984, to CYGNA Energy Services 4.3 Meeting Between CASE and TU Electric with SWEC in Attendance, Large Bore Pipe Supports, March 12, 13, and 14, 1987 4.4 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987

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SUBAPPENDIX A10

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TUBE STEEL SECTION PROPERTIES 1.0 Definition of the Issue 1.1 Section Properties The section properties for A500 Grade B cold-formed tube steel used in the pipe support design at CPSES had been obtained from three au-thoritative source documents.

Each source documen' listed small dif-ferences in section properties based on different nominal corner tangent radii (RT) as follows:

a.

AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 7th Edition, RT E 3t.

(t = thickness of tube steel wall) b.

1974 Welded Structural Tube Institute (WSTI) Manual of Cold-Formed Welded Structural Steel Tubing, RT e it.

c.

AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 8th Edition, RT 2 2t.

These small differences in nominal section properties led to the con-tention that tube steel milled prior to 1980 had different corner radii and that tube steel had been procured for use at CPSES both

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prior to and after 1980.

Therefore, the issue was that the vintage

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of the tube steel must be established and the proper section proper-ties used (References 4.1 and 4.2).

1.2 Effective Throat of Flare Bevel Welds The 8th Edition of AISC states that the effective throat of flare bevel groove welds is t = 5/16 R unless it can be established that a larger effective throat

  • can be obtained.

The design of flare bevel l

welds at CPSES used two different effective throats of t = 0.645t e

and t = t.

Because of the differences in assumed corner radii of tube steel, the effective throat evaluation of flare bevel welds was questioned.

1.3 Bolt Hole Effects The issue was that the effect of bolt holes on section properties had not been considered in the design.

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A10-1

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2.0 Issue Resolution 1 d

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2.1.Section Properties i

SWEC reviewed the material manufacturer's dimensional standards for A500, Grade B tube steel supplied to CPSES.

The-review was performed for ASTM A500 (standard specification for l

cold-formed welded and seamless structural tubing in rounds and

~j shapes), which included a 12-year span starting from issue date 1974 l

l-through 1986.

Since the standard mill tolerances did not. change dur-ing this period of time, it was concluded that the fabrication toler-ances and section properties of tube steel members in CPSES have been maintained to a consistent standard.

SWEC-PSAS also confirmed that Welded Steel Tube Institute (WSTI) amended its 1974 issue to agree with the 8th Edition of the AISC.

This amendment is the latest revision to date.

These section proper-

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ties are based on a nominal corner tangent radius of 2t and are con-l sidered representative of cold-formed tube. steel.

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l SWEC-PSAS resolutions are summarized as follows:

J The use of section properties in AISC Manual of Steel Construc-j i

tion, 8th Edition is appropriate, since it represents the actual cold-formed tube steel used at CPSES.

O The 8th Edition of AISC is used by SWEC-PSAS in the selection of D

section properties for structural tube steel.

SWEC-PSAS surveyed tube steel corner dimensions on installed supports at CPSES (Reference 4.3) and confirmed that the in-stalled supports have a nominal 2t corner radius.

Section 4.3.2.1 of CPPP-7 specifies that structural tube steel section properties are selected from the 8th Edition of the AISC

.f steel manual.

2.2 Effective Throat of Flare Bevel Welds SWEC-PSAS performed a survey of tube steel dimensions on installed ASME Section III, Subsection NF pipe supports at CPSES and weld tests l

of worst-case configurations to determine the appropriate effective l

throat to be used for flare bevel welds (Reference 4.3).

Based on i

the results of this survey, it was concluded that an effective throat i

of t = t - 1/16 in. is justified for all tube sizes except TS 2 x 2.

=

t-1/8 in. is For "TS 2x2 sections, an effective throat t,

appropriate.

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i A10-2

__________________ ___ a

Existing welds on TS 2x2 sections are qualified to the t

=

(o'v) e t-1/8 in.

criteria, unless it is verified that the weld has a larger effective throat by performing a field inspection of the weld in accordance with the methods described in SWEC-PSAS Project Memo-randum No. 140 (PM-140).

Specification No. 2323-MS-100 was revised on March 2, 1987 to assure that an effective throat of t

=t-1/16 in. is achieved for welds on TS 2 x 2 tube steel for any* subsequent work.

Section 4.4 and Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7, as amended by SWEC-PSAS PM-140, specify the effective throats of flare bevel welds.

2.3 Bolt Hole Effects The section properties for tube steel are reduced for the effects of bolt holes as required by CPPP-7, Section 4.3.2.1 which is in accor-dance with the requirements of ASME Section III, Appendix XVII requirements.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in

/7 Subappendix Al through A35 were determined tc be reportable under

()

provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action for tube steel section properties and bolt hole effects was provided in Section 4.3.2.1 of CPPP-7.

The corrective action for the effective throats of flare bevel welds was accom-plished through the implementation of the criteria provided in Attach-ment 4-2 of CPPP-7 and SWEC-PSAS PM-140 during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations),Section XVIII, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicants' Statements of Material Facts as to Which There Is No Genuine Issue Regarding CASE's Allegations Regarding Sec-tion Property Values, August 12, 1984 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Report No. 15454-N(C)-004, Survey of Structural Tube Steel Dimensions to Verify the Effective Throat of Flare Bevel Welds, March 1987 A

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SUBAPPENDIX All f g C

1 U-BOLT CINCHING 1.0 Definition of the Issue The following issues (References 4.1 through 4.6) were raised regarding the use of cinched U-bolt supports with single struts or snubbers.

1.1 Evaluation of the Cinched '-Bolt Assembly U

The stresses in the run pipe, the U-bolt, and the support cross-piece due to the combined effect of preload (i.e., cinching), pipe thermal and pressure expansion, and external loadings were not considered in the design of the cinched U-bolt supports.

1.2 Use of SA-36 and A307 Material for Cinched U-Bolts.

1.2.1 Preload Maintenance SA-36 material is similar to A307 material, which is prohibited in the AISC Code, 7th Edition, Table 1.5.2.1, as bolting materi-al in friction connections. Maintenance of joint preload is the underlying issue.

/"'N 1.2.2 Fatigue t,

ASME Section III, Appendix XVII, Table XVII-3230-1, Footnote 4, and AISC 7th Edition, Appendix B, Table B2, Footnote 4, recom-mend that A307 bolts not be used in connections subject to stress reversal.

Fatigue of the A307 material is the issue.

Both these issues regarding the use of A307 material were ex-tended to the SA-36 U-bolt used in cinched U-bolt supports.

1.3 Preload-Torque Relationship The established preload-torque relationship was questioned, especial-ly in light of the potential for galling under U-bolt nuts while tightening.

1.4 Stability of Cinched U-Bolt Supports

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The stability of the cinched U-bolt pipt support assembly is depen-dent on attaining and maintalaing the required preload.

In light of l

the uncertainty in the praload-torque relationship, as discussed in Section 1.3, and the issue regarding the fatigue life and preload maintenance ability of A307 material, as discussed in Section 1.2, the stability of cinched U-bolt supports with struts and snubbers was l

questioned.

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2.0 Issue Resolution l

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'd Due to the extensive engineering effort required to validate cinched U-bolt type supports with struts or snubbers, and the uncertainty in the ability to attain and inaintain required preload levels, all cinched U-bolt supports with struts or snubbers are deleted or modified to other stable support designs consistent with the required support functions.

l l

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.

)

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under i

provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

j The corrective action to resolve the issues of 1) the proper evalua-I tion of the pipe and cinched U-bolt assembly, 2) the use of SA-36 material in cinehed U-bolts, 3) the preload-torque relationship, and 4) stability, is being accomplished through the elimination or l

modification of cinched U-bolt supports with struts or snubbers in j

accordance with the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Section 4.2.5.1 used during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

lO

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4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Walsh/Doyle Allegations)Section IV, August 22, 1983 4.2 ASLB Memorandum and Order at 27, 28, 33-41, December 28, 1983, and reconsidered in Memorandum and Order at 25-6A, 20-4C, February 8, 1984 4.3 Westinghouse Report No. WCAP-10620, U-bolt Support / Pipe

Test, July 1984 4.4 Westinghouse Report No. WCAP-10627, U-bolt Support Assembly Finite Element Analysis, July 26, 1984 4.5 CASE Answer to Applicant's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue Regarding to Consideration of Cinched U-bolts, Affidavit of CASE Witness J. Doyle, October 8, 1984 4.6 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List (RIL), Revision 4, Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987

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l lU A11-2 1

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l SUBAPPENDIX A12

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AXIAL / ROTATIONAL RESTRAINTS 1.0 Definition of the Issue Three groups of axial and/or trapeze-type supports listed below use welded lug or trunnion attachments to transfer loads to frames or component hardware.

a.

Single or dual trunnions with component supports b.

Non-trunnion component supports Trapeze supports with U-bolts Riser clamps with dual components Riser clamps with single components c.

Frame supports with lugs i

The issues (References 4.1 and 4.2) regarding these specific types of sup-ports are summarized as follows:

1.1 Rotational Load The issue was that rotational restraint effects must be treated as a g)g

(,

primary load for the support design.

1.2 Eccentric Loading The issue was that eccentric loading, which can result from effects such as differential snubber lockup and support steel stiffness vari-ations, must be considered in the design process.

1.3 Snubber Lockup l

The issue was that snubber end clearance effects may cause signifi-cant increase in loads or invalidate linear analysis results.

1.4 Lug / Frame Design Load The issue was that multiple lug configurations must consider a con-servative loading distribution for lug and frame design.

1.5 Clearances The issue was that insufficient clearances or eccentricities may ex-art rotational restraint on the pipe.

.A A12-1

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'2.0 Issue Resolution r

2.1' Rotational Load j

i The eccentric line of action of single component riser clamps and single axial' trunnion, and the rotational resistance to the pipe of dual. trunnion-type supports, were modeled in the pipe stress analy-sis.

The pipe supports were design validated considering the result-ing load as.a primary load.

2.2 Eccentric Loading i

The effect of differential snubber lockup in the dual trunnion sup-port was addressed by increasing the design load on each trunnion snubber and its supporting structure by 20 percent. The variation in support steel stiffnesses for dual component riser clamps was ad-dressed by limit'ing the acceptable variation in stiffness between the supporting structures for each component and increasing the component design load from 50 percent to 75 percent of the total support design load.

Four lugs are typically used for nonintegral axial clamp supports.

I Each lug was validated to 50 percent of the total load for dual com-ponent supports modeled as a single component.

Dual component riser clamps with variations in support stiffnesses exceeding the acceptable value were modeled in the stress analysis as l

1 E

eccentric (one-sided) transnational restraints, and the support is being modified by the removal of the component on the sof ter side.

'For such eccentrically modeled supports, the load for each lug is l

based on statics with the assumption that all of the moment is react-ed at the lugs, i.e.,

the clamp-to pipe connection does not resist the moment.

Trapeze supports with cinched U-bolts are being eliminated or modi-fied to provide a stable support configuration consistent with sup-I port function as discussed in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-8.

2.3 Snubber Lockup To assure valid stress analysis results, snubber pairs used in dual component applications (dual trunnions and riser clamps) are matched as defined in Reference 4.3.

I 1

2.4 Lug / Frame Design Load Lugs for rigid frame-type axial restraints were each validated for i

1-the total load if only two lugs are used, or 50 percent of the total load if four lugs are used.

A12-2 i

Analysis of load distribution at lug / frame interfaces was based on

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CPPP-7, Attachment 4-8, which maximized the critical stress in the frame.

2.5 Clearances The clearances between the pipe and the frame and the lugs and riser clamps and frame are controlled in accordance with CPPP-7, Attach-ment 4-11 to assure proper function of the pipe support.

Pipe sup-port eccentricities are discussed in Section 2.2 above.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.

t Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the issue of axial / rotational re-straints was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria in CPPP-7, Section 3.10.5.2 and Attachment 4-8 of CPPP-7.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References fs

\\-~'1 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations),Section XII, August 22, 1983 4.2 Affidavit of Lase Witness Mark Walsh - CASE's Partial Answer to Ap-plicant's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There was No Genu-ine Issue Regarding Allegations Concerning Consideration of Force Distribution in Axial Restraints, August 27, 1984 4.3 Nuclear Standard, Mechanical and Hydraulic Snubbers for Nuclear Ap-plication, NE-E7-9T, September 1984, U.S. Department of Energy, Nu-clear Energy Program l

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SUBAPPENDIX A13 A

BOLT H0LE GAP

.1. 0 Definition of the Issue Bolt _ hole gap, as used herein, refers to the radial clearance between an anchor bolt and the bolt hole edge. in pipe support member / base plates.

Issues regarding the effect of bolt ' hole gaps are as follows (Refer-ences 4.1 to 4.4):

-1.1 Oversized Holes l

The issue was that. bolt holes in support base plates are oversized.

Bearing connections are not allowed if the. bolt hole is greater than the standard size hole specified by the AISC Code.

1.2 Shear Distribution j

The issue was that it is impossible to predict how many bolts are 3

involved in the transfer of shear.. Inelastic action that distributes the shear load to all anchor bolts is appropriate for static loads only.

1.3 Effect on Support Stiffness The issue was that the presence of gaps in joints under dynamic con-ditions adversely affects the stiffness of the pipe support and its seismic response. -The usual procedure is to assume that two bolts react to the load regardless of the number of bolts in the pattern.

2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Oversized Holes Hole sizes allowed by the ASME Section III Code, paragraph NF-4721, were compared to existing hole sizes at CPSES as shown below.

ASME Code Table NF-4721(a)-1 specifies the allowable bolt hole sizes for bearing-type connections as follows:

Bolt Size Hole Size Equal to or less than 1 in.

Bolt diameter +1/16 in.

Between 1 and 2 in.

Bolt diameter +1/8 in.

I The allowable bolt hole sizes of the installed CPSES base plates were j

as follows:

i A13-1 l

1

Bolt Size Hole Size p

i Equal to or less than 3/4 in.

Bolt diameter +1/16 in.

i 1 in, to 1 1/2 in.

Bolt diameter +1/8 in.

Therefore, it was concluded that only the bolt holes for 1-in, diame-ter bolts at CPSES have an allowable size larger than the code allow-able (by 1/16 in.).

The 1985 Summer addenda of the ASME Section III Code, paragraph NF-4721(a) clarified that for anchor bolts, the hole size may be increased by 1/16 in. over the values specified in Table NF-4721(a)-1.

ASME Section III, 1985 Summer Addenda NF-4721(a) was added to the CPSES Code of Record in CPPP-7, Section 2.2, and Specification No. MS-46A (Reference 4.5).

2.2 Shear Distribution Design af base plate connections at CPbES is based on standard steel design practices where equal shear load sharing among bolts is used.

This practice is described in References 4.6 and 4.7, which compare the ultimate shear load sharing in plate connections to the equal distribution assumed at design levels.

Support designs at CPSES were examined and it was concluded that the Richmond ir. sert to tube steel connection may not be covered by these normal practices.

Therefore, Richmond insert to tube steel connec-fg{'}

tion drugns are reviewed in accordance with SWEC-PSAS Project Memo-randum No. 141 (PM-141) to confirm that unequal shear load sharing is not an issue.

2.3 Effect on Support Stiffness The effect of bolt hole gap on support stiffness is discussed in Appendix AS.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the bolt hole gap issue was accom-plished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachments 4-4 and 4-5, SWEC-PSAS PM-141, and Specification No MS-46A during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

i O

A13-2

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'4.0 References O

l 4.1 : CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle l

-Allegations),Section XXI, August-22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Answer to the' Applicants' Statement of Material Facts in the l --

Form of Affidavit of CASE Witness M. Walsh, August 12, 1984 4.3 CYGNA's response to CASE Question No. Doyle 16 4.4 CASE's'4th Round Answer to Applicants' Reply to CASE's Answer to Ap-plicants' Motion. for Sumnary Disposition Regarding the Effects of.

Gaps, December 19, 1984-4.5 Comacche Peak Nuclear Safety Class Pipe Hangers and Supports Specifi-cation No. 2323-MS-46A, Revision 7, July 6, 1987 4.6 B. Kuzmanovic and N. Williams, Steel Design for Structurel Engineer, 2nd Edition, 1983, Prentice Hall, Inc., page 321 4.7 C. Salmon and J. Johnson, Steel Structures Design and Behavior, 1971, Intext Educational Publishers I.

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SUBAPPENDIX A14 s.

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OBE/SSE DAMPING l

i 1.0 Definition of the Issues

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The issue (References 4.1 to 4.4) was that the improper damping values I

were used in the stress analysis at CPSES.

j 1.1 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 Damping The issue was that piping systems containing active components (e.g.,

valves) used the damping for piping which was higher than the damping prescribed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Reference 4.5) for active valves.

Damping values higher than the allewables in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 were used in the pipe stress analysis at CPSES.

1.2 Damping for Mixed Size Piping The issue was that in certain pipe stress analysis packages which are comprised of piping of different sizes, the damping values for the 12-in. or greater piping were used even though the pipe stress analy-sis package contained piping smaller than 12 in.

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2.0 Issue Resolution 1

2.1 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 Damping CPPP-7 Section 3.4.5.4.1 specified the use of NRC-recommended damping values for piping addressed in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61.

In fact, the NRC has recently approved the higher damping values for piping systems contained in ASME Code Case N-411 (Reference 4.6).

There-fore, the lower damping for active components in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 is not applicable to the CPSES piping system analysis.

I 2.2 Damping for Mixed Size Piping CPPP-7 specified that mixed-size piping systems (containing pipes above and below 12-in. NPS) are conservatively evaluated with the lower damping values of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61.

l Use of the damping values specified in ASME Code Case N-411 that are applicable to all pipe sizes was approved for implementation at CPSES by the NRC Staff.

CPPP-7 authorized the use of Code Case N-411 for all systems, including mixed-size CPSES piping systems, except where stress analysis is perfo rmed using the Independent Support Motion Method.

I i

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A14-1 l

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3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action n

\\

O No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

All the pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of is-sues in Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve OBE/SSE damping issue was accom-plished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Section 3.4.5.4.1 during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations),Section XXII, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition Regarding Alleged Errors Made in Determining Damping Factors for OBE and SSE Loading Conditions, August 6, 1984 4.3 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Reply to CASE's Answer to Applicant's Motion Regarding Alleged Errors Made in Determining Damping Factors

(/

for OBE and SSE Loading Conditions, October 2, 1984 4.4 CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 4.5 USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1973 4.6 NRC Letter from V. S. Noonan to W. G. Counsil dated March 13, 1986, Evaluation of Request for Use of ASME Code Cases N-397 and N-411 l

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i-SUBAPPENDIX A15 C

SUPPORT MASS IN PIPIN0 ANALYSIS-1.0 Definition of the Issue i

The issue was that the mass contribution of the support to the piping sys-tem is significant and it cannot be omitted from the-analysis

.(Reference 4.1).

The support mass contribution to the piping model was not always consid--

ered. in the CPSES pipe stress analysis, because it was considered small relative to the total mass of the piping system.

2.0 Issue Resolution The ' support mass, eccentric and noneccentric, was accounted for in pipe stress analyses in 'accordance with CPPP-7, Section 3.10.4.

A detailed procedure for pipe support mass determination and inclusion in the piping system analysis was included in Attachment 3-4 of CPPP-7, with additional guidance on the. modeling of eccentric mass included in Attachment 3-11.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.-

All the pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of is-sues'in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under-provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the support mass in piping analysis issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachments 3-4 and 3-11 during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is specified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CASE'S Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations),Section XIV, August 22, 1983 i

A15-1 J

ii SUBAPPENDIX A16 nj t

PROGRAMMATIC ASPECTS AND QA INCLUDING ITERATIVE DESIGN 1.0 Definition of the Issue The following miscellaneous issues with programmatic aspects and QA were identified (References 4.1 and 4.2).

1.1 Fragmented Responsibility and Interface Control The issue was that inadequate interface control and f ragmented re-sponsibilities between analysis, design, and construction phases of piping'and support design phases resulted in. numerous inadequacies and inconsistencies.

1.2 Iterative Design The issue was that the identification and correction of design errors was delayed until the end of the iterative design process.

-}

1.3 Quality Assurance and Personnel The issue was that calculations did not follow project guidelines for f

quality assurance. No standards were specified for the qualification

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of personnel at different levels.

1.4-Timeliness The issue was that problems which were generic in nature.were not resolved promptly, resulting in numerous ' deficiencies of a similar nature.

1.5 Construction and Field Changes The issue was that procedures for construction and :. installation were inadequate and were not kept up to date. Field changes were not ap-proved, and resulted in calculations justifying as-built conditions.

1.6 Procedures The issue was that frequent changes and lack of adequate control of procedures resulted in many violations of the procedures.

1.7 Calculation Errors l

The issue was that in random checks of calculations, numerous errors were found.

L A16-1 I

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1.8 Miscellaneous r,

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The issue was that various other issues were raised regarding the updating of criteria and the adequacy of various practices used in design / qualification activities.

2.0 Issue Resolution SWEC-PS AS 's Management Plan for Project Quality, CPPP-1 (Reference 4.3),

outlines SWEC-PSAS's approach to resolving the various programmatic issues through issuance of Project Procedures, which implement SWEC corporate procedures (Engineering Assurance Procedures, and Quality Standards).

CPPP-1 addrerses each of the 18 criteria of 10CFR50, Appendix B.

The in-dividual issues listed in Section 1.0 are resolved as follows:

2.1 Fragmented Responsibility and Interface Control The issue of fragmented responsibility between piping analysis and support design was resolved by the integrated design process in the SWEC-PSAS validation program.

All ASME Section III Code Class 2 and 3 piping systems and all ASME Section III Code Class 1, 2,

and 3 supports were validated by SWEC-PSAS in accordance with CPPP-7 which provides consistent crite-ria for both pipe stress analysis and pipe support design. Each pipe stress analysis package was reviewed in accordance with Section 7.3

("')N of CPPP-6, as a system, by pipe stress and pipe support engineers to

(

assure that the interactions between the pipe stress and the pipe support efforts are properly accounted for in the SWEC-PSAS portion of the Corrective Action Program (CAP).

As part of the integrated design process, interfaces between analy-sis, design, and construction are controlled in accordance with CPPP-6.

Personnel performing the validation effort are trained by project management in the use of the applicable project procedures.

2.2 Iterative Design Design criteria changes were issued during the pipe stress and pipe support validation by means of controlled documents (project memoran-da) and revisions to CPPP-7.

Prompt review was required for any de-l sign criteria changes containing the potential for support modifi-I cation.

As-built verification of piping and pipe supports is being performed as part of the PCHVP.

All modifications are provided to TU Con-struction via procedurally controlled design change documentation prepared by SWEC-PSAS.

[(

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2.3 Quality Assurance and Personnel

/

1 I

V SWEC-PSAS's Management Plan for Project Quality (CPPP-1) identifies

)

the procedures to be followed during the generation and review of project calculations.

These procedures appropriately emphasize re-view of calculations for technical adequacy of the resulting designs (calculation conclusions).

The emphasis on review for technical ade-quacy assures that any inconsistencies / documentation discrepancies l

will ' not affect the overall conclusion of the calculations.

All identified occurrences of inconsistencies and documentation discre-j pancies are promptly resolved.

1 Engineering personnel are assigned to tasks after an evaluation of i

their ability to perform that task. This evaluation is initiated by l

verification of the employee's academic and professional credentials and employment history in conjunction with the normal employment in-terviews. Personnel are then assigned to work at an appropriate lev-el under a supervisor.

The supervisor is responsible for evaluating and training the employee.

This process assures that appropriately qualified personnel are assigned to all engineering tasks.

Personnel involved in the validation effort were trained in the use of the applicable project procedures.

2.4 Timeliness A

Early in the validation process, all CPRT and external issues were Q

identified and SWEC-PSAS resolutions to these issues were developed.

During the design validation, any additional issues identified were addressed in a timely manner and appropriate corrective and preven-tive actions identified and implemented.

2.5 Construction and Field Changes l

Field changes were controlled by SWEC-PSAS project procedures which required that new designs, modifications, or reconciliations with as-built conditions be documented and approved by qualified respon-sible engineers.

Walkdowns in accordance with SWEC-PSAS procedures, as well as inspection under the PCHVP, as. ured that the as-built con-dition of piping and pipe supports was properly reflected in the de-sign validation.

2.6 Procedures Controlled copies of CPPP-6 and CPPP-7 (and revisions / changes there-to) were issued to the pipe stress and pipe support supervisory per-sonnel assigned to the SWEC-PSAS CPSES effort.

The issuance and modification of these procedures are controlled in accordance with CPPP-14 (Reference 4.4).

I m

A16-3 3

Revisions to these procedures were followed by detailed training of

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i pipe stress and support personnel.

'LJ 2.7 Calculation Errors As addressed under paragraph 2.3 above, the SWEC QA Program assures the technical adequacy of the engineering product.

SWEC-PSAS re-quires all employees to develop technically correct and precise cal-culations.

Whenever documentation discrepanices are observed, they are promptly corrected.

2.8 Miscellaneous The various project procedures used in the validation effort along with the corporate engineering and quality assurance procedures were sufficient to address any issues related to the validation of pipe stress and pipe supports at CPSES. This conclusion was also reached by the third party reviewers (see Section 5.1.1).

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action I

No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution l

of the issue.

l Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under

/]

provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

N/

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The corrective action to control discipline interfaces and to provide

]

consistent design criteria between pipe stress analysis and pipe sup-l port design was accomplished through the issue and control of CPPP-1, CPPP-6, CPPP-7, and other project procedures during the design vali-dation.

Many audits were conducted to assure that SWEC-PSAS person-j nel followed the procedures (see Section 5.3).

1 1

The preventive action for this issue is specified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle I

Allegations), August 22, 1983 4.2 Comanche Peak Response Team, Design Adequacy Program, Discipline Spe-l cific Results Report, Piping and Supports, DAP-RR-P-001, Revision 1, August 27, 1987 l

l 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-1, Revision 7, Management Plan for Project Quality (Piping System Qualification /Requalification),

l March 25, 1987 l

l l

4.4 SWEC-PSAS Project Pro"edure CPPP-14, Revision 3, Procedure for the l

l Preparation and Control of Proj ect Procedures, September 19, 1986 l

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A16-4 i

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SUBAPPENDIX A17 p-MASS POINT SPACING x-1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (Reference 4.1) was that the project procedures which estab-lished requirements for minimum mass point spacing were not followed and that the computer program used improperly lumped concentrated masses.

2.0 Issue Resolution Modeling guidelines for locating the mass points in the computerized pipe stress analysis were included in Section 3.10.6.1 and Attachment 3-7 of CPPP-7.

To assure adherence to these requirements, mass point spacing was included as a review item in the pipe stress analysis checklist in CPPP-6, -9.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.

All the pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of is-in Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable sues 1

/N ander provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2,

(,)

SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the issue of mass point spacing was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Section 3.10.6.1 and -7 during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.119, dated September 16, 1987 A

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j HIGH IREQUEhlCY MASS PARTICIPATION h,

s l'.'O Definition of the Issue. F q.

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The issue (References 4.1 and, 4. 2) was that the 33-Hz cutoff, frequancy I

criteria used in the CPSES pipe stress seismic analysis may rltSt.be ade-

.quate.

The.- pipe stress Analysis did not comply' with the CPSES FSAR re-'

['4l quirement1 that the inclusion of high frequhacy modes beyond the cutoff frequency in the. resp 8ase spectrum analysis do not result in more than a

/

10-percent increase in the system res onse. j g

(

2.0-Issue Resolution L

J k

Two analysis options were developed andt utilized to address the high-gg frequency mass participation issue.

Perform seismic amplified response spectrum (ARS) modal analysis withr.'

50-Hz cutoff frequency, including a high-frequency missing mass corpl E

rection' option, by using NUPIPE-SW (V04/LO2) or later issue.

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Perform an e utva: Lent stati,c enalysis by using the zero-period accel-

  1. g..

y eration (ZPA balues in all three directions. Combine these results by the square root of s the sum of the squares (SRSS) method with the results of the seismic analysis with a 50-Hz cutoff frequency that did not include the' high-frequency missing mass correction.

Addi-i tional studies (Ref erence 4.3) verified the' adequacy of this method-V ology for CPSES piping systems whose ZPA is less than 50 Hz.

i r The high-frequency mass payticipatio'n teriteria was specified in Section g

j 3.10.6.8 of CPPP-7.

i 'i iI s

7 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resoiution of the issue.

O

' l, sues in Subappendix Al through A35 were > determined to be, report-

'\\y

'All the pipe support modification.s resulting from resolution of is-able under provisions of 10CFR50.55(ejt (see Subappf tdix B2, l

SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolse the high frequency mass participc-s, y tion issue was accomplished through the' implementation of the crite-N

'pf ria provided in CPPP-7, Section 3.10.6.8 and the use

/

NUPIPE-SW(V04/LO2) during design validation.

\\i The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

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4.0 References D

4.1 Question 2, CYGNA Communications

Reports, J.O.No. 83090 dated October 5, 1983 4.2 CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4, CYGNA Lettet No. 84056.119 dated September 16, 1987 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Letter No. CH-1CP0-1456 dated February 6, 1987, from A. Chan to L. Nace, Attachment A, Justification for Terminating Comanche Peak Piping Response Spectrum Analysis at 50 Hz Instead of at the Frequency Corresponding to the Zero Period Acceleration i

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d ijb S?JBAPPENTIX A19

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F_LU,ID TRANSIENTS 1.0 Definition of the"7ssue i

Fluid transients are occasional mechanical loads that should be considered in stress evaluation of ASME Section III Code Class 2 and 3 piping.

The previous analysis prepared for CPSES considered fluid transients on sever-al piping systems.

The issue was that the adequacy of the analysis and the completeness of the identification of these fluid transients was ques-tioned (Reference 4.1).

2.0 Issue Resolution The following process was followed to assure that fluid transients were properly addressed in the SWEC-PSAS validation of the pipe stress analysis.

Specific fluid transients were identified and summarized in Attach-ment 1 of CPPP-10. These transients were identified by following the t

guidelines given in NUREG-0582, past experience with other PWRs, and by assessing an overall review of the CPSES system flow diagrams.

Additionally, system engineers reviewed the piping system operating components which could produce significant fluid transients, such as

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rapid valve opening or closing actions of control valves, relief

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valve discharge, pump startup or trip, and turbine trip.

The piping systems identified in Attachment 1-1 of CPPP-10 were ana-lyzed for the effects of fluid transients in accordance with the re-quirements of CPPP-7, Section 3.4.5.5 and Attachment 3-1.

These analysis methods resolve CPRT and external fluid transient issues.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the fluid transient issue was accom-plished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachment 3-1 during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

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4.0 References 4.1 TES draft Letter No. 6216-7 dated February 21, 1985, from D. F. Landers to V. S. Noonan, Director, Comanche Peak Project, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which transmitted Technical Report No. TR-6216B, Preliminary Consulting Report on Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Piping and Support Design OO

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,es SUBAPPENDIX A20 SEISMIC EXCITATION OF PIPE SUPPORT MASS 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue was that the effect of seismic acceleration of the support mass (i.e., self-weight excitation) was not included in the design of the CPSES pipe support structures (References 4.1 and 4.2).

2.0 Issue Resolution SWEC-PSAS resolved these issues by the following methodology:

Seismic acceleration of pipe support mass was evaluated for all pipe supports with frames on seismic systems.

The procedure to include the effects of pipe support self-weight ex-citation in the pipe support evaluation was incorporated in CPPP-7 as -21.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in

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Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the seismic excitation of pipe sup-port mass issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-21 during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

I 4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), August 22, 1983,Section X 4.2 NRC Inspection Report 50-445/82-26 and 50-446/82-14, Febru-ary 14, 1983 (NRC Staff Exhibit 207, pages 34, 35, and 36)

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~s SUBAPPENDIX A21 LOCAL STRESS IN PIPE SUPPORT MEMBERS 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issues (References 4.1 through 4.6) regarding the evaluation of local stress in pipe support members are as follows:

1.1 Local Stress in Tube Steel Members The issue was that local stress in tube steel members, induced by attached support components, such as beam brackets, lugs, or other tube steel members, was not considered in the design.

1.2 Other Support Configurations Requiring Local Stress Evaluations The issue was that several other support types and support details were identified as requiring evaluations for local stresses:-

Cinched U-bolt supports with struts and snubbers Piping anchors Zero gap box frames Wide flange webs at connections

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1.3 Short Beam Stresses (O

The issue was that short structural members were incorrectly analyzed in full flexure.

It was noted that more localized stress distribu-tion due to plate behavior would result.

2.0 Issue Resolution -13 of CPPP-7 specified the requirements to evaluate local stresses in pipe support members.

I 2.1 Local Stress in Tube Steel Members

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l A procedure to evaluate local stress in tube steel members based on i

I the methods of AWS Code D1.1 Section 10.5, including yield line anal-ysis, was developed and incorporated in Attachment 4-13 of CPPP-7.

2.2 Other Support Configurations Requiring Local Stress Evaluations Resolutions for the issue regarding the need for local stress evalua-l tions on other support configurations is as listed below:

Cinched U-bolt supports on struts and snubbers are being elimi-nated or modified as discussed in Subappendix All.

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Resolution of the issue regarding the local stress evaluation j

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j for piping anchors is addressed in Subappendix A2-x/

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Zero gap box frames are being eliminated or modified as dis-cussed in Subappendix A2 l

Requirements for the evaluation of local stresses in wide flange l

member webs at connections, consistent with the AISC Code re-i quirements, were developed and incorporated into Attachment 4-13 i

of CPPP-7 l

2.3 Short Beam Stresses -13 of CPPP-7 requires that short beam support members be I

analyzed for local stress effect.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution

)

of the issue.

1 Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under

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provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

1 The corrective action to resolve the issue of local stress in pipe

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support membe rs was accomplished through the implementation of the

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criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-13 during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations),Section IX, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Answer to Applicants' Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Geniune Issue Regarding Consideration of Local Displace-ments and Stresses, August 27, 1984.

4.3 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Reply to CASE's Answer to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition Regarding Local Displacements and Stresses, October 9, 1984.

4.4 NRC Staf f Response to Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition on AWS and ASHE Code Provisions on Weld Design, November 2, 1984 j

4.5 CASE's Answer to Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition of Cer-tain CASE Allegations Regarding AWS and ASME Code Provisions Related to Design Issues, August 6, 1984

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4.6 Transcript of Proceedings Before the United States Nuclear Regulatory O

Commission, Washington, DC, in the Matter of Meeting to Conduct Feed-V back Discussions with Messrs. Walsh and Doyle Re Concerns About the Comanche Peak Plant Held March 23, 1986 i

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SUBAPPENDIX A22 SAFETY FACTORS l

1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 and 4.2) was that the industry practice of ne-glecting to factor small potential loads into design calculations is not supported by adequate CPSES factors of safety.

The issue also was that CPSES safety factors had already been eroded by poor and insufficient de-sign practices.

2.0 Issue Resolution CPRT and external issues have been resolved and incorporated into the technical and design control procedures.

Therefore, the inherent design margin (safety factor) accumulated from the built-in conservatism in codes, inputs, and regulatory positions is applicable.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the issue of safety factors has been implemented in the SWEC-PSAS Corrective Action Program (CAP) through the resolution of all applicable CPRT and external issues which have been inco rporated into the technical and design control procedures.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations),Section I, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Partial Answer to TU Electric's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue Regarding Safety Factors, August 27, 1984

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SUBAPPENDIX A23 J

SA-36 AND A307 STEEL 1.0 Definition of the Issue The following issues were identified (References 4.1 through 4.3) regarding the use of SA-36 and A307 material in pipe supports at CPSES.

1.1 Design Allowables Derived from Tests The issue was that the material allowables used in the design of cinched U-bolts, U-bolts as two-way restraints, and SA-36 threaded rod used with Richmond inserts for pipe supports at CPSES were derived from tests and not from the ASME Section III Code minimum yield stress, since questions arose as La whether the material tested in the following tests represented the actual material used onsite.

1.1.1 Cinched U-Bolt Tests Conducted by Westinghouse 1.1.2 U-Bolts as Two-Way Restraints Tests Conducted by ITT Grinnell 1.1.3 Richmond Insert Tests Conducted by TU Electric 1.2 Friction Connections The issue was that AISC Code 7th Edition Table 1.5.2.1 prohibits the use of A307 as bolting material in friction connections.

Attainment ano main-tenance of joint preload is the underlying issue.

SA-36 and A307 materi-als are similar.

ASME Section III Code Inquiry NI86-030 (Reference 4.4) clarifies that cinched U-bolts are not friction connections.

However, since the U-bolt design relies on friction and preload to provide stabili-ty, the AISC prohibition needs to be addressed.

1.3 Fatigue The issue was that SA-36 material used in cinched U-bolts, U-bolts as two-wtj restraints, and as rod, threaded into Richmond inserts, are sub-ject to load cycling, which must be considered in the qualification. ASME Section III, Appendix XVII, Table XVII-3230-1, footnote 4; and AISC 7th edition, Appendix B, Table B2, footnote 4, state "Where stress reversal is involved, use of A307 bolts is not recommended." Fatigue of the A307 ma-terial is the issue.

Since SA-36 material is similar to A307, this issue was extended to SA-36 U-bolts and threaded rods used with Richmond inserts.

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1.4 Allowable Stresses in Bolting Material

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l The issue was that the allowable stresses used in the design of bolting material exceed the material yield strength under the faulted condition (Level D) service limit.

This does not conform to the guidance of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.124, Reference 4.5, which limits the load increases to l

1.5 times the normal operating (Level A) service limit, because of the potential for nonductile behavior.

1.5 Use of Low-Strength Nuts with High-Strength Bolts The issue was that low-strength nuts, A563 Grade A, were used with high-strength bolting, instead of the code compatible A194 Grade B nut.

The issue was that the resultant connection capacity should have been reduced in the analysis.

2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Design Allowables Derived from Tests In accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.2.5.1, cinched U-bolts with struts or snubbers are being eliminated or modified.

Design allowables for linear components, such as SA-36 U-bolts and SA-36 threaded rod used with Richmond inserts, were derived by SWEC-PSAS from the ASME Section III Code minimum yield strength specified in Section 2.2 of CPPP-7 O

and not from tests.

Y 2.2 Friction Connections In accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.2.5.1, cinched U-bolts with struts or snubbers are being eliminated or modified.

U-bolts used as two-way restraints do not rely on preload for load transfer.

Richmond insert connections were designed as bearing connections and do not rely on friction (preload) for load transfer capability.

2.3 Fatigue U-bolts used as two-way restraints and SA-36 threaded rod used with Richmond inserts were subject to reversing stress fields due to seismic and fluid tran-sient loads.

The SA-36 U-bolts used as two-way restraints as well as the threaded rod used with Richmond insert tube steel joints were designed as ASME Section III, lin-ear NF support components in accordance with ASPE Section III, Appendix XVII, and AISC, respectively.

ASME Section III Code Appendix XVII Table XVII-3230-1 and AISC Code 7th Edition, Appendix B, Table B2, footnote 4 define the lower bound value for consideration of stress cycles as 20,000.

SWEC-PSAS demon-O A23-2

strated that the number of equivalent stress cycles for these components was p

less than 7,000.

Therefore, fatigue was not relevant as defined in these codes.

2.4 Allowable Stresses in Bolting Material 3

Bolting material was esigned in accordance with ASME Section III, Para-graph NF-3225 Summer 1983 addenda, which limited the stresses at temperature at the faulted condition (Level D) to yield. The use of this later code paragraph assures ductile behavior and thus conforms to the guidance of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.124.

2.5 Use of Low-Strength Nuts with liigh-Strength Bolting In accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-5, the tensile allowable load for l

high-strength bolts using low-strength nuts was reduced to 60 percent of the normal high-strength bolt allowable, to account for the reduced proof load stress of the A563 Gude A nut.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the SA-36 and A307 steel issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in l

CPPP-7, Sections 2.2 and 4.2.5.1, and Attachment 4-5 during the j

design validation.

l The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Alle-l gations,Section III), August 22, 1983.

4.2 CASE's Fourth Motion for Summary Disposition to Disqualify the Use of A307 and SA-36 Threaded Parts, January 14, 1985.

4.3 CASE's Partial Answer to Applicants' Statement of Material Facts Relating to Richmond Inserts as to Which There are No Material

Facts, September 10, 1984 4.4 ASME III Code Inquiry NI86-030 "Section III, Division 1, NF-3324.6 (a)(3)(b) Friction Type Joints, NF-3324.6(a)(4) Slip Resistance, Friction Type Joints, NF-3225.4, Friction Type Joints, 1983 Edition with the Winter 1985 Addenda," June 25, 1986 l

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i 4.5 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.124, Service Limits and Loading Combinations for Class 1 Linear Type Component Supports, Revision 1, January 1978 l

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SUBAPPENDIX A24 l

O U-BOLT TWISTING 1.0 Definition of the Issue This issue (References 4.1 through 4.3) was that out-of-plane rotation of the l

crosspiece of a trapeze cinched U-bolt support may result when the struts are in compression.

This rotation would induce twisting on the U-bolt, for which it was not designed.

2.0 Issue Resolution Due to the extensive engineering effort required to demonstrate the acceptabil-ity of this type of support, cinched U-bolt trapeze supports with struts or snubbers are being eliminated or modified.

Modification options are discussed in Subappendix A12, Axial / Rotational and Trapeze Restraints.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action for the twisting of U-bolts on trapeze supports with struts or snubbers is being accomplished through the elimination or modification of this support type in accordance with CPPP-7, Sec-tion 4.2.5.1 during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations),Section III, August 22, 1983 4.2 CASE's Motions and Answer to Applicants' Motions for Summary Disposi-tion Regarding Stability of Pipe Supports, October 15, 1984 4.3 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987

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SUBAPPENDIX A25

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FISHER / CROSBY VALVE MODELING/ QUALIFICATION i

1.0 Definition of the 1ssue i

The issues (References 4.1 through 4.4) related to Fisher and Crosby valve modeling and qualification were as follows:

1.1 Crosby Valves The issue was that the main steam (MS) safety relief valves (SRV) which have a double ported outlet configuration used an unconserv-ative assumption of a 55/45 split in the flow distribution in lieu of the 60/40 split flow distribution, as suggested by Crosby Valve.

There are five such valves located along the MS line that discharges into vent stacks.

1.2 Fisher Valves The issue was that the Fisher valve operators may not be qualified to withstand the loads imposed on them by the snubbers that support the valve operator.

The Fisher valve is a control valve that is used to control main steam (MS) flow by relieving stear. to the atmosphere.

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1.3 Flexible Valves The issue was that the modeling of " flexible" valves (frequency less than 33 cycles per second) was inadequate.

It was found that valves noted in Reference 4.4 (excluding Fisher valves) were the only " flex-ible" valves within the original scope of work.

It was determined that the valve accelerations for those valves were acceptable; howev-cr, the modeling of the Fisher valve yoke, which is laterally sup-ported at the end, was not addressed.

If the yoke is modeled much stiffer than it actually is, it may have an effect on the analysis results.

1.4 Valve Accelerations and Loads The issue was that the validity of a sampling process to assure the acceptability of valve accelerations and valve flange loads has not been demonstrated.

2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Crosby Valves SWEC-PSAS discussed the flow distribution of doubled-ported SRV with Crosby (Reference 4.5), and Crosby verified that the SRV has an equal O

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,.S (50/50) flow distribution ratio (instead of 60/40, as was thought).

For conservatism, a 55/45 SRV flow distribution ratio was used to k}

i calculate the blowdown force.

SWEC-PSAS evaluated the multiple SRV loading combination issue and concurred that all five valves opening simultaneously must be consid-ered for piping and pipe support design.

Since valves may open in a set or random sequence, those cases were also considered. The vali-dation process identified the design basis for multiple SRV openings, including five simultaneous valves opening, for stress analysis eval-uation.

The cases evaluated covered all possible circumstances based on the system design, including the worst load condition.

2.2 Fisher Valves The SWEC-PSAS validation of the Fisher relief valve branch connection piping model included the effects of the snubber supports at the valve.

In accordance with Section 7.4.3 of CPPP-6 both valve accel-erations and support loads on the valves were transmitted to the equipment qualification organization (Impell Corporation) for valida-tion, except for Westinghouse-supplied valves, which were transmitted to Westinghouse for validation.

4 2.3 Flexible Valves The yokes of flexible valves were modeled to properly predict the Q

yoke frequency.

CPPP-7, Section 3.10.6.5 specified the proper valve l

V yoke modeling of flexible valves.

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l 2.4 Valve Accelerations and Loads l

All valves were validated for applicable accelerations and valve noz-j zie loadings in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 3.10.5.2.

Also, j

since all valves were validated, the concern regarding sampling has

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been satisfied.

i 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendix Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the issue of valve modeling and qualification was sceomplished through the implementation of the cri-teria provided in G"'P-6, Section 7.4.3 and CPPP-7, Sections 3.10.5.2 and 3.10.6.5 during the design validation.

i The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

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I 4.0 References 4.1 Tel-con dated October 21, 1976, between Crosby Valve and Gibbs &

Hill, J. R. Zahorsky and M. H. Giden, regarding Contract No. 2323A, i

Double-Ported Safety Valves 4.2 Telex from Crosby Valve to Gibbs & Hill regarding Contract No. 2323A, Main Steam Safety Valves, J. R. Zahorsky to Dr. Kim, October 12, 1976 4.3 CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.119 dated September 16, 1987.

4.4 Communications Report between Krishnan/ Ray (Gibbs & Hill) and Minichiello (CYGNA), June 18, 1984.

4.5 Tel-con dated February 21, 1986, between R. Martin and J. R. Zahorsky of Crosby Valve and W. Wang, A. J. Cokonis, and W. H. Green of SWEC, regarding Crosby double ported relief valve discharge loads.

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q SUBAPPENDIX A26 PIPING MODELING 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue was that incorrect inputs were used in the pipe stress analysis as follows (Reference 4.1):

Incorrect pipe wall thickness was used to calculate an allowable noz-zle load (Reference 4.1, Issue 2).

Improper stress intensification factors were used (Reference 4.1, Issue 10).

Fluid content and insulation weights were not included for valves and flanges (Reference 4.1, Issue 4).

Valve acceleration and flange loads were not always checked in the piping analysis (Reference 4.1, Issue 21).

Two piping segments were input into the stress analysis with the in-correct wall thickness (Reference 4.1, Issue 12).

2.0 Issue Resolution

[~T All pipe stress analysis packages were validated in accordance with Pro-(m.)

ject Procedures CPPP-6 and CPPP-7, which provided direction for the proper modeling of piping systems.

SWEC Engineering Assurance Procedure EAP 5.3 provided guidance on the preparation and review of calculations, including the need to assure that proper input is used.

Checklists were included in project procedures to provide additional assurance that correct piping models were created and that proper review of the input and output was performed.

In addition, personnel were trained in the implementation of the proce-dures.

This training was further enhanced by daily contact with the expe-rienced on-project technical supervision.

The SWEC Engineering Assurance Division performed audits of project activities to verify that procedural requirements were met and that calculations were technically acceptable.

The combination of the procedures, the procedural control, and the audit program provided assurance that the inputs were correct and the calcula-tions were complete and technically acceptable.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

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Pipe support modifications resulting frcm resolution of issues in (f s\\

Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under k-provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the issues related to piping model-ing was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria pro-vided in Sect. ion 3.0 of CPPP-7 during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

l 4.0 References i

4.1 CYGNA Pipe Stress Review Issues List, Revision 4, a.d Transmittal Letter No. 84056.119 dated September 16, 1987 I

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l SUBAPPENDIX A27 l

WELDING 1.0 Definition of the Issue The following welding-related issues were identified (Reference 4.1):

1.1 Undersized Fillet Welds The issue was that the sizes of two fillet welds were found to be less than the minimum requirements of Table XVII-2452.1-1 in Appen-dix XVII of the ASME Code Section III.

1.2 Penetration Veld Subsurface Cracking The issue was that there is a potential for subsurface cracking on welds with deep penetrations.

The shrinkage due to weld cooling may be resisted where the joined surfaces approach being parallel. Under these conditions, subsurface cracking can occur without the crack propagating to the surface.

Upon loading, this subsurface crack may propagate through the weld causing joint failure.

1.3 Eccentricity of Three-Sided Welds (Unsymmetrical Welds)

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The issue was that analyses of three-sided welds have not consistent-ly considered the eccentricity between the center of gravity of the member and the weld.

1.4 Linear Versus Plate and Shell Weld Design for Base Plates The issue was that the practice of qualifying base plate welds using Jinear analyses (as opposed to plate and shell analyses) was questioned.

1.5 Combination Welded / Bolted Connections The issue was that no evidence was found to support the fact that combination welded / bolted connections are designed in accordance with Appendix XVII, subparagraph XVII-2442,Section III of the ASME Code.

1.6 Crosspiece Cover Plate Welds The issue was that it was observed that shear flow has not always been considered in the analysis of welds attaching cover plates to crosspiece members.

l 1.7 One-Third Increase of Weld Allowable Stress for Emergency and Faulted Conditions O

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The issue was that the practice of increasing weld allowable stresses

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by one-third for emergency and faulted conditions was questioned.

1.8 Welding Practices The issue was whether welding procedures qualified by test in accor-dance with the ASME Code are adequate in light of AWS requirements for prequalified welds.

This issue involves the following inadequate l

welding practices:

cap welding, weave welding, lap joint require-ments, downhill welding, and preheat requirements.

2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Undersized Fillet Welds ASME Code Case N-413 eliminated the minimum weld size requirements of Table XVII-2452.1-1 in the ASME Section III Code. -2 of CPPP-7 incorporates ASME Code Case N-413.

2.2 Penetration Weld Subsurface Cracking As part of the resolution of this issue, SWEC-PSAS reviewed Refer-ence 4.3, which states that the tendency to develop subsurface weld cracks stems from the "... misuse of a welding process that can achieve deep penetration or poor joint design.

A few preventive mea-sures can ensure elimination of both of these factors.

Limiting the

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penetration and the volume of weld metal deposited per pass, through

\\m-speed and amperage control, and using reasonable depth of fusion are

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both steps in the right direction."

All CPSES pipe support welds are fabricated in accordance with CPSES Weld Procedure WPS-11032.

SWEC-PSAS reviewed WPS-11032 and concluded that it is a qualified i

procedure in accordance with ASME Section IX which adequately con-l trols the joint design, travel speed, electrode size, and amperage

)

and that the SMAW process is not a deep penetration process.

)

I Therefore, all pipe support welds fabricated in accordance with CPSES Weld Procedure WPS-11032 are in compliance with the ASME Code.

2.3 Eccentricity of Three-Sided Welds (Unsymmetrical Welds)

In accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-2, paragraph 3, the eccen-tricity between the center of gravity of the member and the weld has been considered.

O A27-2 i

2.4 Linear Versus Plate and Shell Weld Design for Base Plates ASME Section III, Subsection NF-1230 allows the use of either plate-and-shell or linear-type support analysis for the design of welds connecting linear and plate and shell elements.

In accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-2, these welds were validated using the linear-l type support analysis.

I 2.5 Combination Welded / Bolted Connections Welds used in combination welded / bolted connections were designed in accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-2, paragraph 3.1.3 for the en-tire shear

force, which complies with ASME Section III, paragraph XVII-2442, 2.6 Crosspiece Cover Plate Welds In accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-2, paragraph 3.1.5, members which use cover plates for strength purposes had the plate-to-member attachment weld validated for shear flow.

2.7 One-Third Increase in Allowable Weld Stress for Emergency and Faulted Conditions 2.7.1 A one-third increase in allowable weld stress for emergency and faulted conditions is acceptable.

ASME Code, Sec-tion III Subsection NF, paragraph NF 3231.1(b), Design of

,x Linear-Type Supports by Analysis for Class 1 Component Sup-ports, and Appendix XVII-2110(a), Linear Elastic Analysis, specify an allowable stress increase for emergency and faulted conditions.

The emergency condition is stated as having a

one-third allowable increase.

Both para-graph NF 3231.1(b) and Appendix XVII-21100 refer to ASME Section III, Subsection NF for the faulted condition, where the factor is always greater than one-third.

2.7.2 AISC has allowed the one-third increase since the 7th edition.

2.7.3 Correspondence from K. Ennis, Assistant Secretary of ASME, to W. M. Eifert of SWEC, dated September 25, 1985, confirms this position (Reference 4.2).

2.8 Welding Practices SWEC-PSAS reviewed WPS-11032 and concluded that it is a qualified procedure in accordance with ASME Section IX, and thus, the limita-tions of AWS for prequalified weld configurations do not apply.

Therefore, all pipe support welds fabricated in accordance with weld procedure WPS-11032 are in compliance with the ASME Code.

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Furthermore, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), using an I

NRC staf f comparison of ASME versus AWS and their own review of ex-I 1

isting welding procedures, concluded (on June 29, 1984, Refer-ence 4.4) that compliance with the ASME code has been adequate to assure the acceptability of the CPSES welding procedures.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.

All the pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of is-sues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve pipe support welding concerns was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in -2 of CPPP-7 during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

j 4.0 References 4.1 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987.

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4.2 Letter from K. Ennis, Assistant Secretary of ASME, to W. M. Eifert of SWEC dated September 25, 1985.

4.3 Design of Welded Structures, Omer W.

Blodgett, 1966.

4.4 ASLB Memorandum and Order LBP-84-25 (Written - Filing Decisions, No. 1:

Some AWS/ASME Issues), June 29, 1984.

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SUBAPPENDIX A28 eg I

i ANCHOR BOLTS /EMBEDMENT PLATES 1.0 Definition of the Issue Issues were raised (Reference 4.1) involving embedment plate, anchor bolt, and base place designs at CPSES. They are as follows:

1.1 Embedment Plates and Through-Bolts The issue was that there was no evidence that the spacing between attachments to embedment plates was checked at CPSES and that for existing designs, moment connections to the embedments require stiff-eners, but no procedure for the design of a stiffener was provided.

Also, there was no written evidence documenting that as-built loads from pipe supports that use through-bolts were transmitted to the Civil / Structural Group for acceptance.

In addition, several instances were observed of Hilti Kwik-bolts in-stalled close to through-bolt base plates that were not shown on the support drawing.

1.2 Base Plate Edge Distance iV The issue was that anchor bolt edge distance tolerances could result in a 15-percent increase in base plate stresses for base plate de-signs with struts, springs, or snubbers with a 5-degree offset.

1.3 Hilti Kwik-Bolt Embedment Length The issue was that there was a discrepancy identified between the bolt embedment lengths on support drawings and the lengths used in calculations.

1.4 Concrete Edge Distance Violation The issue was that instances were observed where pipe sleeve penetra-tions exist close to support base plates but were not shown on sup-port drawings.

2.0 Issue Resolution These issues were addressed as described below:

The SWEC Civil / Structural Corrective Action Program (SWEC-C/S-CAP) devel-oped uniform desi p;n criteria for all concrete anchorages (References 4.2 i

and 4.3), including the evaluation of spacing between different discipline commodities.

The design criteria were incorporated into CPPP-7, I

A28-1 i

Attachments 4-4, 4-5, and 4-25 via SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-210.

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Pipe support anchorage validation was performed in accordance with these attachments.

Specific resolutions of these issues are as follows:

2.1 Embedment Plates and Through-Bolts SWEC Civil / Structural is responsible for structural attachment load evaluations.

CPPP-6 controlled the transmittal of pipe support at-tachment loads on embedded plates, through-bolts, and base plates to SWEC Civil / Structural discipline.

SWEC Civil / Structural will identi-fy base plates installed close to through-bolts to SWEC-PSAS for val-idation.

SWEC Civil / Structural design validation of embedded plates and structures is described in the Civil / Structural PSR (Reference 4.3).

2.2 Base Plate Edge Distance An analysis was performed by SWEC-PSAS to determine the effects of edge distance tolerances on the bolt loads and plate stresses, and it was concluded that the edge distance tolerance was acceptable.

Furthermore, the PCHVP will validate the as-built base plate bolt hole edge distances.

2.3 Hilti Kwik-Bolt Embedment Length Embedment lengths shown on the drawings were used in calculations to

  • O validate pipe support anchorage designs in accordance with Attach-ment 4-4 of CPPP-7.

2.4 Concrete Edge Distance Violation During PCHVP, SWEC Civil / Structural will identify base plates which are installed close to pipe sleeve penetrations and transmit this information to SWEC-PSAS for validation.

Base plate validation is performed in accordance with CPPP-7.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the anchorage issues has been accom-plished by the incorporation of the DBD (Reference 4.2) into CPPP-7 l

for the validation of embedments in concrete and the PCHVP for the f

identification of anchorage spacing violations.

L A28-2

I The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C 4.0 References 4.1 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120, dated September 18, 1987.

4.2 TU Electric, CPSES Units 1 and 2, Design Basis Document DBD-CS-015, Revision 4, June 10, 1987 4.3 TU Electric, CPSES Unit I and Common, Civil / Structural Project Status Report, Revision 0, October 1987 13 V

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SUBAPPENDIX A29 STRUT / SNUBBER ANGULARITY l

s 1.0 Definition of the Issue 1.1 The issue (Reference 4.1) was that the loading component

(" kick" load) resulting from the angular swing of' the strut / snubber from its nominal position, due to construction tolerances and pipe movements, was not assessed in designs.

1.2 The NRC Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin IEB-79-14 program re-quires all as-built angular tolerances over 2 deg to be measured

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and assessed (Reference 4.2).

The issue was that the construction angular tolerance for the installed CPSES struts / snubbers was i 5 degrees.

2.0 Issue Resolution l

2.1 The angular swing.of struts / snubbers due to construction tolerances and pipe movements from applicable thermal, seismic, and/or fluid I

transients were assessed.

The effect of the swing angle load compo-nent (maximum swing angle of 5 deg) was considered in the support design.

If the i 5-deg tolerance was exceeded, the proper function and load rating of strut / snubber assemblies were ensured in addition to the component load consideration. These requirements were includ-O ed in Sections 4.2 and 4.2.6 of CPPP-7, 2.2 All installed struts / snubbers were measured and those that exceeded i 2-deg tolerance were assessed in the validation program.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolte the issue of strut / snubber angulari-ty was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria pro-vided in Sections 4.2 and 4.2.6 of CPPP-7 during the design validation and is physically validated in the Post Construction Hard-ware Validation Program (PCHVP) through the implementation of Field Verification Method CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 (Reference 4.3).

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

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4.0 References O

4.1 Transcript of Proceedings of Feedback Discussion Between USNRC and Walsh and Doyle on the Concerns About the CPSES, March 23, 1985 4.2 NUREG-0797, Supplementary No. 11, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of CPSES Units 1 and 2, USNRC,. Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, May 1985 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Field Verification Method, Hardware Valida-tion and Supplemental Inspection Programs CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081, Revision 0, July 29, 1987 A29-2

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SUBAPPENDIX A30 U

COMPONENT QUALIFICATION 1

l 1.0 Definition of the Issue j

Issues related to the qualification of member components in CPSES pipe supports were identified as follows (Reference 4.1):

I 1.1 Dynamic Pipe Movements in Support Design The issue was that all dynamic piping movements were not included in the support design when checking frame gaps, swing angles, or spring j

travel.

Existing designs addressed only the seismic effects.

This l

is applicable to frame gaps in the unrestrained direction, strut /

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snubber swing angles, and both spring and snubber travel.

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1.2 Incorrect Standard Component Allowables l

The issue was that incorrect U-bolt allowables were used in the de-l sign of support RH-1-064-011-S22R.

l 1.3 Untightened Locknut on Struts The issue was that the upper locknut on one strut was not tightened, O

which could lead to rotation of the strut and a subsequent load redistribution.

1.4 Inverted Snubbers The issue was that four supports were identified in which the snub-bers were installed 180 degrees from the configuration shown on the support drawings.

l 2.0 Issue Resolution j

2.1 Dynamic Pipe Movements in Support Design I

l Predicted pipe movements for all design conditions for pipe supports were evaluated in the design validation in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.2.

2.2 Incorrect Standard Component Allowables RH-1-064-011-S22R was a cinched U-bolt support with a strut.

This support is being modified in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.2.5.1.

Component standard-type pipe supports were validated in accordance with CPPP-7, Section 4.1, by comparison to vendor-supplied load ca-j pacity data sheets (LCD) or certified design report summaries (CDRS).

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2.3 Untightened Locknuts on Struts The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is being performed to validate the proper hardware installation including locknuts throuth inspections performed in accordance with Field Veri-fication Method CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081.

-2.4 Inverted Snubbers

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The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is being performed to validate the proper hardware installation including anubbers through inspections performed in accordance with Field Veri-fication Method CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Actica l

No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of the issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in l

Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under i

provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the locknut and snubber installation issues is being accomplished through the implementation of pipe sup-port hardware inspections and rework.

The corrective action to re-solve the component allowable and dynamic pipe movement issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of.CPPP-7 during the design validation.

The corrective action to resolve the design of Support RH-1-064-011-S22R was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided '

in CPPP-7, Section 4.2.5.1.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 4.2 SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Fiel'd Verification Method, Hardware Valid-ation and Supplemental Inspection Programs CPC-SWEC-FVM-PS-081, Revision 0, July 29, 1987 i

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SilBAPPENDIX A31 STRUCTURAL MODELING FOR FRAME ANALYSIS 1.0 Definition of the Issue Issues were raised (Reference 4.1) relating to the structural modeling for frame supports:

1.1 Torsion Evaluation The issue was that for wide flauge members, the torsional deflections were underestimated and members were not checked for local stresses at points of torsional loading.

1.2 Boundary Conditions for Richmond Insert / Tube Steel Connections The issue was that modeling of member end restraints at Richmand insert / tube steel connections was inconsistent.

Three different mem-ber end conditions varying from fully fixed to fully free were as-sumed.

Each assxaption may be conservative for one member and uncon-servative for another.

1.3 Support Boundary Conditions The issue was that supports were identified in which the assumed A

boundary conditions were questionable.

2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Torsion Evaluation In accordance with Section 4.3.2.1 of CPPP-7 member properties used in the pipe support validation, including values for torsional resis-tance, were taken from AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 8th Edi-tion.

Tables 4.7.2-3 through 4.7.2-7 of CPPP-7 provided equations for evaluating member stresses, including local effects due to tor-sional loading.

2.2 Boundary Conditions for Richmond Insert Tube Steel Connections Consistent modeling techniques ware used for Richmond insert tube steel connection validation as specified in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-5 to assure that member end restraints were properly modeled.

2.3 Support Boundary Conditions Attachment of the pipe support to the building structure was reflect-l ed in the frame analysis by the proper modeling of the connection I

stiffness in accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-18.

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3.0 Correcti.y. gJ Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A3' were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve this issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, Sec-tion 4.3.2.1, Tables 4.7.2-3 and 4.7.2-7, and Attachments 4-5 and 4-18 during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), Sections VII and XII, August 22, 1983 O) iu.-

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SUBAPPENDIX A32 O

COMPUTER PROGRAM VERIFICATION AND USE 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 and 4.2) was whether there was adequate quality assurance for the verification and use of appropriate versions of the following computer programs:

ADLPIPE Version 2C (dated April 1977) - Piping Analysis FUB-II - Base Plate Qualification - ITT Grinnell Corner and Lada Base Plate Qualification Program 2.0 Issue Resolution The computer programs for which specific issues were raised were not used in the pipe stress and pipe support validation effort.

The computer programs that were used for piping and pipe support valida-tion were identified in CPPP-7, Section 5.0.

The computer programs used in the validation effort were verified in ac-cordance with SWEC QA program requirements for verification, technical adequacy, and appropriate version.

The computer program verification was documented, and identified the various project applications.

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3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the concern regarding computer pro-gram verification was accomplished through the implementation of the SWEC Quality Assurance Program.

Ths preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CYGNA Design Control Review Issues List, Revision 1, June 21, 1985 4.2 NRC Inspection Report No. 50-445/83-12:50-446/83-07, Inspection Con-ducted by J. I. Tapia and W. Paul Chen, May 13, 1983 n

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SUBAPPENDIX A33 O

i HYDROTEST Cj 1.0 Definition of the Issue The issue (References 4.1 and 4.2) was that hydrostatic test loading con-ditions were not properly considered for ASME Section III Code Class 2 and 3 piping analysis and pipe support designs.

2.0 Issue Resolution The hydrotest loads for piping and supports were evaluated for 1.5 times the design pressure, in accordance with the ASME Section III Code of Record, except for the ASME Section III Class 2 and 3 piping, which was evaluated for 1.25 times the design pressure consistent with the actual hydrostatic test conditions.

The lower design pressure for Classes 2 and 3 piping is in accordance with a later code version which is accept-able, since the project met the requirements of ASME Section III Code pa ragraph NA-1140, which allows the use of later Code provisions where appropriate.

Evaluation of piping and supports for hydrotest loading was performed as spec.ified in CPPP-7, bections 3.6.2.4 and 4.7.2.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution

/

of thia issue.

'u Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the hydrotest issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-7, See-tions 3.6.2.4 and 4.7.2, during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CASE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations),Section XIII, August 22, 1983 4.2 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revision 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 I

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SUBAPPENDIX A34

'V SEISMIC /NONSEISMIC INTERFACE 1.0 Definition of the Issue The following issues (Reference 4.1) were raised relating to the design of isolation anchors:

1.1 Seismic Category I Piping Attached to Nonseismic Piping The issue was that the seismic effects of nonseismic piping attached to safety-related piping were not adequately considered.

1.1 Piping Routed Between Seismic Category I and Nonseismic Buildings 1.2.1 The issue was that safety-related piping was not seismi-cally isolated when it was routed between seismic Cate-gory I and nonseismic buildings.

1.2.2 Tbe issue was that postulated failure of the turbine build-ing due to an earthquake, which is a nonseismic building, was not considered in the design of safety-related piping which is routed between the turbine building and seismic Category I buildings.

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2.0 Issue Resolution J

2.1 Seismic Category I Piping Attached to Nonseismic Piping In accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 4-10, Sections 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 the following two methods were used for the design validation of safety-related piping attached to nonseismic pipinS:

2.1.1 A plastic hinge was assumed to occur on the nonseismic pip-ing immediately adjoining the anchor.

The anchor was ana-lyzed for plastic moments.

2.1.2 One or mote restraints and the piping supported by these restraints on the nonseismic side were seismically ana-lyzed.

In addition, the effect of the remaining portion of nonseismic piping was accounted for by the assumption of a plastic hinge.

2.2 Piping Routed Between Seismic Category I and Nonseismic Buildings SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum No. PM-203 clarified the requirements of l

CPPP-7, Attachment 4-10, and limits the use of Option 2.1.2 to piping in seismically analyzed buildings.

Therefore, the interface between seismic Category I piping and nonseismic piping occurring at the j

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boundary between seismic Category I and nonseismic buildings (e.g.,

the main steam line) was modeled by a plastic hinge as discussed in Item 2.1.2.

i 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (See Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve the seismic /nonseismic interface issue was a momplished through the implementation of criteria provid-ed in CPPP-/, Attachment 4-10 during the design validation.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

t 4.0 References 4.1 CYGNA Pipe Support Review Issues List, Revisicn 4, and Transmittal Letter No. 84056.120 dated September 18, 1987 i

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SUBAPPENDIX A35 1%

kb OTHER ISSUES 1.0 Definition of the Issue Subappendixes Al through A34 have addressed the CPRT and external issues (excluding the SSER and CPRT-QOC issues addressed in Subappendixes A36 through A39).

These 34 subappendixes represent the consolidation of all but 51 of the 972 piping-related Discrepancy Issue Reports (DIRs), gener-ated by TENERA, L. P.

to track closure of issues as part of their third party review.

The remaining 51 DIRs (Reference 4.1, Attachment B) are unrelated to the 34 primary issue topics discussed in the previous 34 sub-appendixes.

The issues raised by these 51 DIRs must be resolved by the SWEC-PSAS validation effort.

2.0 Issue Resolution SWEC-PSAS resolved the issue identified in each of the 51 DIRs described above by referencing the applicable design or administrative procedure that resolved each issue.

These 51 DIRs are considered closed by SWEC-PSAS and TENERA, L. P.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution p

of this issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of issues in Subappendixes Al through A35 were determined to be reportable under provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

The corrective action to resolve this issue was accomplished through the implementation of the criteria provided in CPPP-6 and CPPP-7.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 CPRT Design Adequacy Program Descipline Specific Results Report:

Piping and Supports, DAP-RR-P-001, Revision 1, August 27, 1987 l

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SUBAPPENDIX A36

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SSER-8 REVIEW 1.0 Definition of the Issue SSER-8 describes the NRC Staf f evaluation and resolution of technical is-sues relating to the civil, structural, and miscellaneous issues of CPSES (Reference 4.1).

The issue war whether the concrete design strength of CPSES safety-related concrete installed between January 1976 and February 1977 was 4,000 psi or greater.

2.0 Issue Resolution The results of the concrete strength tests, performed between January 1976 and February 1977, were reviewed by the SWEC Civil / Structural Group (Reference 4.2).

As a result of the consistency between the cylinder dats and the Schmidt-Hammer data, SWEC Civil / Structural concluded that there is no evidence of systematic falsification of cylinder data or improper test-ing; therefore, it was further concluded that the 4000 psi design strength of the safety-related concrete placed during that period was substantiated (Reference 4.3).

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action N- '

No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

This issue has been determined to be not reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e).

No corrective action on the design basis is required due to this issue.

Current construction and QC concrete testing procedures are adequate.

No additional preventive action is required due to this issue.

4.0 References 4.1 NUREG-0797, Supplement No. 8, Sections 3.1.3 and 4.1.2, Safety Evalu-ation Reported Related to the Operation of CPSES Units 1 and 2, Dock-et Nos. 50-a45 and 50-446, USNRC, February 1985 4.2 TU Electric CPSES Unit 1 and Common, Civil / Structural, Project Status Report, Revision 0 j

4.3 CPRT Action Plan II.b Results Report, Concrete Compression Strength, Revision 1, February 28, 1986

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l SUBAPPENDIX A37 l

O.

V SSER-10 REVIEW 1.0 Definition of the Issue i

j SSER-10 describes the NRC Staff evaluation and resolution of technical

)

issues relating to the mechanical and piping group (Reference 4.1).

The four piping design related issues are:

1.1 Uncontrolled Weld Repairs by Plug Welding The SSER indicated that a plan is required for sampling inspection of plug welds in CPSES for cable tray supports, pipe supports, and base plates.

A bounding analysis is required to assess the ranging ef-fects of uncontrolled plug welds on pipe supports, cable tray sup-ports, and base plates to serve their intended functions.

A report documenting the results of the assessment is required.

1.2 Installation of Main Steam Line Pires - Unit 1, Loop 1 The SSER indicated that Tasks 4.5.1 through 4.5.8 in SSER-10, which iaclude stress assessment and nondestructive examination of Loop 1 msin steam (MS) and feedwater (FW) lines, must be performed. Results of analysis, examinations, and reviews are required to be documented fg in a report.

V 1.3 Isolation of Seismic Category I Piping from Nonseismic Piping The SSER indicated that an analysis shall be performed and documen-tation shall show that piping systems such as MS, FW, and auxiliary steam lines routed from seismic Category I to nonseismic Category I buildings are in conformance with the licensing commitments.

1.4 As-Built Verification of Type 2 Skewed Welds on NF Supports The SSER indicated that confirmation is required that the Type 2 skewed welds on pipe supports are not undersized. This may be accom-plished through the verification of previous weld inspections or through reinspection.

2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 Uncontrolled Weld Repairs by Plug Welding SWEC-PSAS reviewed the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) Action Plan V.d Results Report (Reference 4.2) and concluded that since the unau-thorized repair of plug welds does not compromise the structural in-tegrity of the components, there is no impact of plug weld repairs on j

the validation of pipe supports at CPSES.

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2.2 Installation of Main Steam Line Pipes - Unit 1, Loop 1 b

The CPRT Action Plan V.e Results Report (Reference 4.3) was reviewed by SWEC-PSAS and, based on the main steam and feedwater pipe stress analysis, which incorporated bounding parameters, it was concluded that no deleterious effects resulted from the sequence of events as-sociated with Unit 1, Loop 1, main steam and feedwater (FW) lines hydrostatic tests.

2.3 Isolation of Seismic Category I Piping from Nonseismic Piping This topic is addressed in Subappendix A34.

2.4 As-Built Verification of Type 2 Skewed Welds on NF Supports Pipe support welds at CPSES are espected in accordance with Inspec-tion Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 (Reference 4.4).

However, since Type 2 skewed welds are typically found on the weld of the trunnion to the pipe, inspection procedures for Type 2 skewed welds were included in the pipin8 weld inspection Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-26 (Reference 4.5).

CPRT Action Plan V.a Results Report (Reference 4.6) confirmed that inspections were performed in accordance with QI-QAP-11.1-26, and that skewed welds are not undersized.

Pipe support weld inspection Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 has since been revised to include inspection procedures for Type 2 skewed welds.

3.0 C,orrective and Preventive Action No additional issue was discovered during the review and resolu-tion of this issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of isola-tion of Seismic Category I piping from nonseismic piping has been determined reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subcppendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

No modifications were re-quired as a result of the resolution of the issues discussed in Sections 1.1, 1.2, and 1.4.

The corrective action to resolve the issue of the isola-tion of Seismic Category I piping from nonseismic piping has been accom-plished through the implementation of criteria provided in CPPP-7, Attachment 4-10, during the design validation.

The corrective action to resolve the issue of the installation j

of main steam line piping was accomplished through implementa-l tion of CPSES Construction Procedure CP-CPM-1.2 (Reference 4.7) and SWEC-PSAS Procedure CPSP-30 (Reference 4.8), which requires engineering to evaluate the installed piping and pipe support configuration including the proper design of temporary supports l

prior to a piping system hydrostatic test to assure the inte-

rity of the installed safety-related piping and pipe supports.

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The corrective action for the issue of uncontrolled plug weld C]/

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repair was accomplished through enhanced pipe support l

installation and inspection criteria.

The corrective action for the issue of verification of Type 2 skewed welds on NF supports was accomplished through the revi-sion of Weld Inspection Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 to include in-spection procedures for Type 2 skewed welds.

l The preventive action for this issue is specified in Appendix C.

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1 4.0 References 4.1 NUREG-0797, Supplement No. 10, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of CPSES Units 1 and 2, USNRC, Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, April 1985 4.2 CPRT Action Plan V.d Results Report, Plug Welds, Revision 1, December 18, 1986 4.3 CPRT Action Plan V.e Results Report, Installation of Main Steam Pipes, Revision 1, October 15, 1986 4.4 CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28, Fabrication and Installation Inspection of Safety Class Component Supports p

4.5 CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-26, Piping and Equip-j ment Installation Inspection 4.6 CPRT Action Plan V.a Results Report, Inspection for Certain Types of Skewed Welds in NF Supports, Revision 1, October 22, 1986 4.7 CPSES Constre tion Procedure CP-CPM-1.2, Construction Activities for Systems and/or Areas Accepted and/or Controlled by TU Electric Plant Operations, Revision 5, March 4, 1987 4.8 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPSP-30, Processing TU Electric Requests for Temporary Hangers, Revision 0, October 7,1987 O.

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SUBAPPENDIX A38 1

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SSER-11 R2 VIEW 1.0 Definition of the Issue SSER-11 (Reference 4.1) describes the NRC Staff TRT position on the evalu-ation and resolution of technical questions and allegations relating to the QA/QC Group.

The issues identified by SSER-11 in the design process that are related to piping design are as follows:

1.1 As-Built Inspection Program (Allegations AQ-50, AQ-21, AQ-22, and AQ-119, Reference 4.1)

As-built issues were classified into hardware, procedural, as-built, and weld-related categories.

Specifically, six pipe support con-struction issues in Unit I were listed as follows:

1.1.1 Excessive snubber spherical bearing clearance.

1.1.2 Missing strut and snubber load pin locking device.

1.1.3 Pipe clamp halves not parallel.

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( j 1.1.4 Snubber adapter plate bolts not fully engaged.

1.1.5 Hilti-Kwik bolts installed with less than minimum embedment.

1.1.6 Absence of locking devices for threaded fasteners on NF supports.

1.2 Isolation Anchors The issue was that isolation anchors were not always used in the de-aign of seismic-to-nonseismic piping.

The isolation anchor must be designed to withstand the combined loading imposed by both seismic Category I and nonseismic piping (Allegation SRT-13, Reference 4.2).

1.3 Main Steam Loop Hydro The issue was that the design of the main steam lines in Unit 1 did not take into account the stresses caused by repositioning of the line after flushing >and by the settling of tempora ry supports (Reference 4.1).

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A 1.4' Girth Welds 6

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The issue was that radial shrinkage of girth welds in thin-walled stainless steel pipe was not always adequately analyzed (Allegations j

AQ-50, Ref. 4.1; and AW-52, AW-59, AW-62, Ref. 4.2).

2.0 Issue Resolution 2.1 As-Built Inspection Program The issue of the as-built QC verification of supports at CPSES was also identified in Subappendixes A39 and B3.

The resolution of this issue and the corrective and preventive actions associated with this issue are addressed in Subappendixes A39 and B3.

2.2 Isolation Anchors The isolation anchor issue was also identified in SSER-10 (Refer-ence 4.2) and is discussed in Subappendixes A34 and A37. The resolu-tion of this issue and the corrective and preventive actions associated with this issue are audressed in Subappendixes L4 and A37.

2.3 Main Steam Loop Hydro The Unit 1 main stcam loop hydro issues were also identified in SSER-10 and are discussed in Subappendix A37. The resolution of this U;

r issue and the corrective and preventive actions associated with this issue are addressed in Subappendix A37.

2.4 Girth Welds The effects of radial shrinkage of girth welds on the pipe stress analysis were analyzed in accordance with CPPP-7, Attachment 3-15.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of the issue of isolation anchors and girth weld shrinkage have been determined re-portable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) (see Subappendix B2, SDAR-CP-86-72).

Pipe support modifications resulting from resolution of the issue of as-built verification of pipe supports have been de-termined reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B3, SDAR-CP-86-63).

The corrective action to resolve the girth weld issue was accom-plished through the implementation of the criteria specified in -15 of CPPP-7 during the design validation.

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The corrective actions to resolve the issues of the as-built inspec-

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tion program, the isolation anchors, and the main steam loop hydro-static test are discussed in Subappendixes A39, A34, and A37, respectively.

The preventive actions for these issues are specified in Attachment C.

4.0 References 4.1 NUREG-0797, Supplement No. 11, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of CPSES Units 1 and 2, USNRC, Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, May 1985 4.2 NUREG-0797, Supplement No. 10, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of CPSES Units 1 and 2, USNRC, Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, April 1985 l

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SUBAPPENDIX A39 CPRT QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION REVIEW ON PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS 1.0 Definition of the Issue Evaluation Research Corporation (ERC) was contracted by CPRT to perform the Quality of Construction (QOC) sample inspection of the safety-related components installed in CPSES, including piping and pipe supports.

This task was impleraented in accordance with CFRT Action Plan VII.c, and the results were discussed in Section 5.2.5 of the CPRT Action Plan VII.c Re-sults Report (Reference 4.1).

ERC inspection covered approximately 82,500 inspection points for piping and pipe supports.

ERC evaluated the results and recommended corrective action on the adverse trends and construction deviations on the piping components, gaps, locking devices, pipe clamp spacers, pipe clamps, cotter keys, and angularity offsets.

The recommended corrective actions on the adverse trends and construction deviations of the pipe supports identified in the CPRT-QOC Results Report are summarized as follows:

Construction CPRT Action Plan VII.c Results g

t Work Category Report Recommendations 1.1 Small Bore Piping Reinspect flow elements to verify Configuration that they are oriented in the proper direction 1.2 Small Bore Piping Verify existing piping clearance Configuration criteria and walkdown on all small bore piping with insulation installed 1.3 Small Bore Piping Reinspect safety-related piping Configuration expansion joints 1.4 Small Bore Piping Verify the accuracy and consis-Configuration tency of linear and locating dimensions in piping isometrics 1.5 Pipe Bend Verify by Ultrasonic Testing (UT)

Fabrication that installed pipe bends meet the minimum wall thickness requirement i

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Construction CPRT Action Plan VII.c Results

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Work Category Report Recommendations I

1.6 Pipe Bend Revise QC Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-26 Fabrication to require that wall thickness after bending be verified by Ultra-sonic Testing (UT) and recorded 1.7 Pipe Welds and Reinspect butt welds in Sched-Materials ule 80 or thinner stainless steel piping made prior to 1982 that are replacement welds and/or have received extensive repairs 1.8 Small Bore Inspect gaps and verify adequate Pipe Supports clearance between pipe welds and pipe support 1.9 Small Bore Inspect and install suitable Pipe Supports locking devices on all vendor-supplied components that do not have high-strength bolting; install locking devices on all high-strength bolting that is not torqued to an acceptable preload n) 1.10 Small Bore Verify that the fasteners have (V

Pipe Supports been secured for all vendor-supplied components (sway struts, snubbers, and spring cans) during plant startup and reoperation using a complete and detailed procedure and checklist provided and verified by QC 2.0 Issue Resolution The Post-Construction Hardware Validation Progrsm (PCHVP) (Reference 4.2) is the portion of TU Electric's Corrective Action Program (CAP) which val-idates the final acceptance attributes for safety-related hardware.

The input to the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) is l

contained in the installation specifications.

Final acceptance inspection requirements identified in the validated installation specifications were used to develop the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) attribute matrix.

This matrix is a complete set of final acceptance at-tributes identified for installed hardware.

The Post-Construction Hard-ware Validation Program (PCHVP), by either physical validations or through l

an engineering evaluation methodology, assures that each of the attributes defined in the attribute matrix is validated, O

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SWEC-PSAS developed the Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-(,)

PS-081 (Reference 4.3) to coordinate the Unit 1 and Common piping and pipe j

support inspection validation activities.

1 Piping inspections are performed and documented by Quality Control (QC) personnel to assure that applicable inspection attributes are acceptable.

The piping inspection attributes are as below:

Equipment and piping configuration Piping wall thickness at shop /fie}d bends Radial weld shrinkage at stainless steel piping joints Equipment anchoring Remote valve operators Branch connections All pressure boundary items installation / base metal defects Valve orientations Pipe / sleeve details Permanent pipe support installation (no emporary or voided supports)

Verify location (span) dimensions / tolerances Applicable dielectric insulating sleeves over bolts / studs Linear dimensions of piping segments and in-line components The hardware validation of pipe supports assures that the removable items on a pipe support are installed as required by the design documentation.

The hardwart validation is implemented by Quality Control (QC) personnel

[-s in compliance with the validated support drawing.

Quality Control person-

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nel verify and document that all applicable hardware attributes listed on the hardware validation checklist.s are acceptable.

The following pipe support hardware validation checklists are used, as applicable:

Adjacent Weld Checklist Bolted Connection Checklist Hilti Bolt Checklist Pipe Clamp Checklist Richmond Insert Checklist Snubber Checklist Support Checklist Sway Strut Checklist Through Bolt / Embedded Bolt Checklist U-Bolt / Bolted U-Guide Checklist Variable / Constant Spring Checklist In addition to the hardware validation pipe support inspections, Quality Control (QC) personnel also conduct inspections for pipe support configu-ration attributes as below:

Material acceptability Support configuration compliance with validated design drawing, including dimensions A39-3

p Support overhang length / tolerance Q

Support projection length / tolerance

~ Sway strut / snubber pin-to-pin dimension / tolerance Alignment and circumferential deviation of shear lugs Hilti bolt size /embedment Weld length of structural member on base plate Welded connection in accordance with validated drawing Edge distance for structural members and base plates Slope of b lted part with bolt head or nut Shim size / weld SWEC-PSAS developed the Field Verification Method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-080 (Reference 4.4) to assure that sufficient clearance exists around the validated piping.

Clearance is required to permit those anticipated piping displacements that could occur under plant operating conditions without any impediment to those displacements.

An impediment is defined as any structure, pipe,' conduit, cable tray, or equipment that encroaches on the envelope of. anticipated pipe displacement.

This field verification effort is performed by the SWEC-PSAS engineering personnel.

SWEC-PSAS han established clearance criteria and is responsi-ble for training the clearance walkdown teams, evaluating clearance prob-lems, and issuing design changes to correct any clearance violations.

The physical validation of mechanical piping attributes (e.g.,

flow ele-ment _ orientation and expansion joint installation) is performed by SWEC O

mechanical discipline PCHVP as discussed in the SWEC Mechanical Project U

Status Report (Reference 4.5).

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These corrective actions also envelop the resolution of issues in Sub-appendixes A29, A30, A38, and B3.

The quality of construction require-ments for piping and pipe supports in the PCHVP were incorporated into the J

construction and QC inspection procedures to serve as the preventive action.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

The quality of construction of pipe support installation issue was determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e)

(see Subappendix B3, SDAR-CP-86-63).

The corrective action to resolve this issue is accomplished through the implementation of the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program.

The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

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-g 4.0 References 4.1 CPRT Action Plan VII.c Results Report, Construction Reinspection /

Documentation Review Plan, Revision 0, June 11, 1987 4.2 TU Electric Engineering and Construction Procedure EC-9.04, Post Con-struction Hardware Validation Program, July 17, 1987 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Field Verification Method, Hardware Valida-tion and Supplemental Inspection Programs, CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081, Revision 0, July 29, 1987 4.4 SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Field Verification Method, Clearance Walk-down, CPE-SWEC-FVM-P!1-080, Revision 0, July 28, 1987 4.5 TU Electric, CPSES Unit 1 and Common, Mechanical Project Status Re-I port, Revision 0

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APPENDIX B h

INTRODUCTION This appendix describes the details of resolutions of issues identified during the performance of the piping Corrective Action Program (CAP).

Included in this appendix are the piping-related Significant Deficiency Analysis Reports (SDARs) initiated by TU Electric.

Each of the five issues listed below is described in an individual sub-appendix which includes discussions of resolution methodology and corrective and pre-ventive actions.

Issue No.

Issue Title B1 SDAR-CP-86-33, Stiffness Values for Class 1 Stress Analysis B2 SDAR-CP-86-72, Small Bore Piping and Supports B3 SDAR-CP-86-63, Pipe Support Installations B4 SDAR-CP-86-67, Preopert tional Vibration Test Criteria B5 SDAR-CP-86-73, ASME Snubber Attachment Brackets O

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SUBAPPENDIX B1 SDAR-CP-86-33, STIFFNESS VALUES FOR CLASS 1 STRESS ANALYSIS 1.0 Definition of Issue TU Electric identified a deficiency in the stiffness values of pipe sup-ports for ASME Section III Class I piping stress analysis (Reference 4.1).

The pipe support stiffness values used in the previous Westinghouse stress analysis of ASME Section III Code Class 1 piping in Unit I were based on input from the existing design.

These pipe support stiffness values changed with implementation of the corrective actions from the pipe stress and pipe support validation program, thus rendering the previous results of ASKE Section III Class 1 pipe stress analysis in Unit 1 inconsistent with the pipe stress and pipe support validation program.

Appropriate ASME Section III Code Class 1 pipe support stiffness values that incorporated corrective actions and modifications resulting from the pipe stress and pipe support validation program must be used in the vali-dated ASME Section III Code Class 1 pipe stress analysis.

2.0 Issue Resolution The calculations of the stiffness values for the pipe supports for the ASME Section III Code Class 1 pipe stress analysis packages were completed and these results were transmitted to Westinghouse in accordance with O

Section 7.5.7 of project procedure CPPP-6 (Reference 4.2) and SWEC-PSAS

\\d Project Memorandum PM-130 (Reference 4.3).

Westinghouse reanalyzed these stress problems and issued revised support loads for pipe support validation.

TU Electric determined that this issue was reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and submitted reports (References 4.1 and 4.4) to the NRC Staff on May 28, 1986, and October 17, 1986.

The small bore pipe support modifications and hardware validation status is being updated under 10CFR50.55(e) via SDAR-CP-86-36 (Subappendix B2).

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

This issue was dete rmined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

The corrective action to resolve this issue was accomplished by the validation of the ASME Section III Code Class 1 pipe stress analysis by Westinghouse and by the SWEC-PSAS validation of the pipe supports in accordance with Sections 3.10.8 and 4.3.2.2, and Attachment 4-18 of CPPP-7.

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The preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

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4.0 References 4.1 TU Electric Letter No. TXX-4831, W. G. Counsil to E. H. Johnson, Di-rector, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, Stiffness Values for Class 1 Pipe Stress Analysis, May 28, 1986 (SDAR-CP-86 Interim Report).

4.2 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-6, Pipe Stress / Support Requalifica-tion Procedure - Unit 1, Revision 4, April 8, 1987 4.3 SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-130, Transmittal of Requalification Results to Westinghouse, December 19, 1986.

4.4 TU Electric Letter No. TXX-6025, W. G. Counsil to E. H. Johnson, Di-rector, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, Stiffness Values for Class 1 Pipe Stress Analysis, October 17, 1986 (SDAR-CP-86 Final Report).

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SDAR-CP-86-72, SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS 1.0 Definition of Issue Impact of CPRT and external issues tabulated in Subappendixes Al through A35 on the adequacy of the piping and pipe support design and installation processes is significant.

2.0 Issue Resolution l

l SWEC-PSAS was contracted to validate the piping and pipe supports at CPSES.

Modification of certain pipe supports provided expedient accep-I tance for the expanded requirements.

Support modifications are cate-Borized as follows.

1.1 Prudent - Supports in this category may have been technically ac-ceptable; however, more time and expense would have been involved in the detailed analysis than that required to physically modify the support and qualify the modification.

1.2 Recent Industry Practice - Modifications implemented to eliminate j

snubbers to enhance plant maintainability, reduce inservice inspec-tion, and minimize worker radiation exposure during operating plant conditions.

v 1.3 Adjustment - Minor modifications (such as retorquing or shimming) i implemented to meet installation criteria contained in the resolution of the CPRT and external issues.

1.4 Cumulative effects - Modifications that are required due to the com-

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bined effect of previous issues.

The implementation of the physical modifications of pipe supports is be-l ing performed by TU Electric Construction and is being validated by the PCHVP.

TU Electric determined that this issue was reportable under the provisions i

of 10CFR50.55(e) and submitted the initial Significant Deviation Analysis l

Report No. SDAR-CP-86-72 (Reference 4.1) on October 15, 1986.

Periodic I

status reports are being submitted to the NRC Staff.

l 3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues have been discovered during the review and reso-lution of this issue.

This issue was determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

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The corrective ' action to resolve this issue is accomplished through t

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the piping and. pipe supports CAP.

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The preventive actions for this - issue are described in Appendix C.

- '4 '. 0 References 4.1 TU Electric Letter No. TXX-6042 dated October. 15, 1986, W. G. Counsil to E. H. Johnson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Small Bore Piping and Supports, SDAR-CP-86-72 (Interim Report)

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i sN-SUBAPPENDIX B3 SDAR-CP-86-63,-PIPE SUPPORT INSTALLATIONS 1

1.0 Definition of the Issue-i on September 4, 1986, a deficiency was identified involving a broken cotter pin on a snubber (Reference 4.1).

l 2.0 Issue Resolution The piping CAP includes the PCHVP that will validate cotter pin installa-tion in accordance with field verification method CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081 (Reference 4.2).

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3.0. Corrective and Preventive Action l

0 See Section 3.0 of Subappendix A39.

j 4.0 References 4.1 - 1RJ Electric Letter No. TXX-6027, W. G. Counsil to E. H. Johnson, Di-i rector, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, Pipe Supports, SDAR-CP-86-63 (Interim Report),

November 3,.1986

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4.2 SWEC-PSAS Comanche Peak Field Verification Method, Hardware Valida-tion and Supplemental Inspection Programs CPE-SWEC-FVM-PS-081,

' Revision 0, July 29,-1987

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SUBAPPENDIX B4 SDAR-CP-86-67, PREOPERATIONAL VIBRATION TEST CRITERIA 1.0 Definition of the Issue TU Electric identified a deficiency (Reference 4.1) in the preoperational vibration test criteria.

The CPSES criteria document, Preoperational Vi-bration Test Program, Issue 1, June 1980, was reviewed, and it was found

'that the mathematical formulas used to determine stress endurance limits, allowable deflections, and flexibility characteristics of certain piping systems may not have been accurate.

Vibration calculations and test re-sults were evaluated to determine the validity of the original calculations.

The evaluation yielded the following results:

1.

Two test data points (from a total of 21 system tests) were found to exceed the allowable deflection limits.

2.

The measured direction of deflection movement was not clearly identi-fled in all instances.

3.

The test deflections were measured in only one direction in some cases.

'v 2.0 Issue Resolution As a result of the piping Corrective Action Program (CAP) and extensive modifications to the piping systems, TU Electric will repeat the preopera-tional vibration testing.

SWEC-PSAS has established Project Procedure CPPP-25, Unit 1 Piping Vibration Test Procedure (Reference 4.2), for the management and assessment of piping system vibration as required by the CPSES FSAR Section 3.9.B.2.

This preoperational vibration test procedure is based on information contained in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.68 (Refer-ence 4.3) and Section 3.9 of NUREG-0800 (Reference 4.4). SWEC-PSAS will provide technical services to the testing program.

TU Electric determined that this issue is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and submitted SDAR-CP-86-67 on February 19, 1987.

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

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This issue vas determined to be reportable in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

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repeating the preoperational piping vibration testing by a new test procedure to resolve the concerns.

Preventive action for this issue is identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 TU Electric Letter No. TXX-6072 dated October 27, 1986, W. G. Counsil to U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attention:

Document Control Desk, SDAR-CP-86-67 Preoperational Vibration Test Criteria 4.2 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-25, Piping Vibration Test Procedure, Revision 0, December 8, 1986 4.3 USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.68, Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled 3

Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2, January 1978 j

i 4.4 USNRC Standard Review Plan NUREG-0800, Section 3.9.2, Revision 2,

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SUBAPPENDIX B5 SDAR-CP-86-73, ASME SNUBBER ATTACl&fENT BRACKETS 1.0 Definition of the Issue TU Electric identified a deficiency (Reference 4.1) involving restriction of the snubber swing angle by the snubber rear brackets.

Rear brackets on safety-related snubbers have the potential to cause restricted movement and binding due to the use of the incorrect rear bracket.

2.0 Issue Resolution l

A drawing review of ASME Section III, Code Class 1, 2, and 3 snubbers was conducted to verify the adequacy of swing clearances, and identified 1063 anubbers as having attachment brackets. As a result of field examination, the number of snubbers requiring evaluation has been reduced to 165.

2.1 These 165 supports were evaluated by comparing the field verified swing angle data with the predicted movements.

The results are as follows:

83 supports were determined to have sufficient field verified swing angle to accommodate the predicted pipe movement.

15 supports were determined to be unnecessary in a previously initiated pipe support validation effort (and are being deleted).

33 supports are being modified as a result of the pipe support validation effort (but not as a result of this deficiency).

31 supports have been identified as having less clearance than required by analysis and are being modified to correct the situation.

3 supports have no safety-related function and do not impair the safety-related function of other components and therefore re-quire no further evaluation for safety significance.

2.2 TU Electric determined that this issue was reportable under the pro-visions of 10CFR50.55(e) and submitted Significant Deficiency Analy-sis Report SDAR-CP-86-73 (Reference 4.1).

3.0 Corrective and Preventive Action No additional issues were discovered during the review and resolution of this issue.

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This issue was determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

The corrective action to resolve the snubber rear bracket issue is being accomplished through the implementation of CPSES Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10A, paragraph 3.6 and CPSES Quality Control Procedure Nos. CP-QAP-12.1 and QI-QAP-11.1-28, which require a check for bi'nding on the rear bracket. Additionally, a backfit inspection was ' implemented in accordance with Field Verification Method TNE-FVM-PS-038.

The preventive actions are identified in Appendix C.

4.0 References 4.1 TU Electric Letter No. TXX-6104, W. G. Counsil to E. H. Johnson, Di-rector, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission, Snubber Rear Brackets, SDAR-CP-86-73, November 19, 1986

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APPENDIX C - PREVENTIVE ACTIONS I(

The preventive actions are embodied in the procedures developed and used for the Corrective Action Program.

These procedures resolve all CPRT and external issues as well as all issues identified during the performance of the CAP.

l Implementation of the preventive actions will assure that the design and hard-ware for CPSES Unit I and Common can continue to comply with the licensing commitments throughout the life of the plant as described in Section 5.4.

The particular preventive actions preclude the recurrence of the issues identified in Appendixes A and B

as summarized below in Sections'1.0 and 2.0, respectively, i

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1.0 APPENDIX A ISSUES - PREVENTIVE ACTION A1.

Richmond Inserts -5 of CPPP-7 (Reference C.1) provides requirements and instructions for the inclusion of bending stress in the analysis of bolting used in Richmond inserts with tube steel, the proper modeling of Richmond insert to tube steel connections, length limits of tube l

steel members used with two or more Richmond inserts, and evaluations

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of spacing between inserts. -13 of CPPP-7 provides pro-cedures for the evaluation of local stresses due to nuts bearing on i

tube steel walls.

SWEC-PSAS Proj ect Memorandum PM-141 (Refer-ence C.2) provides procedures to chect the potential unequal shear loading when the tube steel connectic:. is anchored by two or more Riclunond inserts.

Additionally, Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 (Reference C.3) was revised to include inspection for proper thread engagement.

I A2.

Local Stress in Piping Attachments 4-6A, 4-6B, and 4-6C of CPPP-7 provide requirements and instructions for the evaluation of local run pipe stresses due to integral welded attachments (4-6A), and support bearing loads (4-6B and 4-6C).

The use of zero-gap box frames, the evaluation of pipe support stiff-nesses and the evaluation of local stresses in pipe support members are discussed in the preventive actions of Subappendixes A4, AS, and A21, respectively.

A3.

Wall-to-Wall and Floor-to-Ceiling Supports -19 of CPPP-7 provides procedures for the inclusion of the effects of differential seismic displacements and the long-term effects of concrete creep on supports which span wall-to-wall and floor-to-ceiling.

A4.

Pipe Support / System Stability Section 4.2.4 and Attachment 4-9 of CPPP-7 provide requirements for the modification of potentially unstable pipe support configurations.

A5.

Pipe Support Generic Stiffness Section 3.10.8 of CPPP-7 provides baseline stiffness values for rigid pipe supports, anchors, and snubbers.

Section 4.3.2.2 of CPPP-7 out-lines the approach to be used in determining pipe support stiffnesses and Attachment 4-18 is a tabular / graphic compilation of support com-ponent and standard support subassembly.

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Uncinched U-Bolt Acting as Two-Way Restraint 7-s

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Section 4.2.5.2 and Attachment 4-3 of CPPP-7 provide requirements and instructions for the proper application and evaluation of uncinched U-bolts used as two-way restraints.

Section 4.3.2.2 and Attach-ment 4-18 of CPPP-7 provide the stiffness values for uncinched

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U-bolts used as two-way restraints.

A7.

Friction Forces Section 4.7.3 of CPPP-7 requires that the effects of friction forces acting on pipe supports be included in the design for all noneyclic loads. -7 of CPPP-7 provides the methods of implementing this requirement.

A8.

AWS Versus ASME Code Provisions Section 4.4 and Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7 provide guidance for the design / qualification of skewed joint welds.

The angular limits of skewed, T-joint welds requires no preventive action since CPSES weld procedures are qualified by testing, which overrides the AWS angle limitations.

A9.

A500, Grade B Tube Steel

't Section 4.7.2.1 of CPPP-7 specifies the design criterion of pipe sup-ports using A500, Grade B tube steel.

A10. Tube Steel Section Properties Section 4.3.2.1 of CPPP-7 requires the use of the 8th Edition of the AISC Manual of Steel Construction (Reference C.4) in the selection of section properties for support design / qualification to preclude the use of inappropriate section properties for tube steel.

Specification No. 2323-MS-100 (Reference C.5) has been revised to assure that an effective throat of t = t-1/16 in. is achieved for

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welds on all tube steel sizes for any new design in the future.

i Section 4.4 and Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7, Revision 3, as amended by SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-140 (Reference C.6), specifies effec-tive throat dimensions for flare bevel welds which meet the criteria of AWS.

The revised guidelines of PM-140 will be followed for any future weld evaluation to preclude the recurrence of inadequate ef-fective throat size.

All. U-Bolt Cinching I

Section 4.2.5.1 of CPPP-7 deleted the use oi' cinched U-bolts /

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crosspiece supports with struts / snubbers.

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A12. Axial / Rotational Restraints Sections 3.10.6.2 and 4.6.3, and Attachments 3-11 and 4-8 of CPPP-7 establish the procedure for the analysis of axial and rotational restraints.

A13. Bolt Hole Gap Attachments 4-4 and 4-5 of CPPP-7 and SWEC-PSAS Project ~ Mem-i l

orandum PM-141 provide procedures for the design and evaluation of base plate bolt holes.

Specification No. MS-46A (Reference C.7) and Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 specify the design re-quirements and QA inspection tolerance of the bolt hole diameters.

A14. OBE/SSE Damping Section 3.0 of CPPP-7 requires the use of OBE/SSE damping values that are consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Reference C.8) as modified by ASME Code Case N-411.

A15. Support Mass in Piping Analysis Section 3.10.4, Attachment 3-4, and Attachment 3-11 of CPPP-7 provide guidance for the determination of pipe support mass and require the inclusion of this mass in the piping stress analysis.

O A16. Programmatic Aspects and Quality Assurance, Including Iterative Design Project Procedures CPPP-1, (Reference C.9) CPPP-6, (Reference C.10) and CPPP-7 control the validation of the piping and pipe supports.

This is an integrated effort within one organization and assures proper interface between piping analysis and pipe support design.

Additionally, personnel involved in the validation process receive training in the proper application of the requirements.

Interface with Westinghouse for Class 1 stress analysis is discussed in Subappendix B.1.

A17. Mass Point Spacing Section 3.10.6.1 and Attachment 3-7 of CPPP-7 provides guidelines for the proper location of mass points in pipe stress analyses.

A18. High-Frequency Mass Participation Section 3.10.6.8 of CPPP-7 specifies the criteria to account for high frequency mass participation in stress analyses.

Use of computer program NUPIPE-SW (V04/LO2) has been revised to automatically account for high frequency mass corrections.

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A19. Fluid Transients g!

iV' Project Procedure CPPP-10 (Reference C.11) describes the procedure by which fluid transient events are identified for applicable systems for incluaion in the pipe stress analyses.

Section 3.4.5.5 and Attachment 3-1 of CPPP-7 provide requirements and instructions for the inclusion of these load conditions in the stress analyses.

A20. Seismic Excitation of Pipe Support Mass

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l -21 of CPPP-7 specifies the requirements for inclusion of

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the effects of pipe support self-weight excitation in the support evaluation.

A21. Local Stress in Pipe Support Members -13 of CPPP-7 establishes the requirements to evaluate j

local stresses which may occur in pipe support membern.

A22. Safety Factors The technical and design control procedures assure that the piping systems are designed in accordance with the CPSES design criteria, and therefore, they will perform their safety-related function.

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A23. SA-36 and A307 Steel Section 2.0 of CPPP-7 lists the applicable governing codes to be used to assure that the proper allowable stresses (determined from the minimum material yield strengths) are used in the design.

Sec-tion 4.2.5.1 of CPPP-7 deletes the use of cinched U-bolts / crosspiece i

supports with struts / snubbers. -5 of CPPP-7 establishes the requirement for the reduced allowables of high strength bolts used with A563 Grade A nuts.

A24. U-Bolt Twisting Section 4.2.5.1 and Attachment 4-8 of CPPP-7 provides guidance for the modification of U-bolt trapeze supports.

Cinched U-bolts used l

with struts or snubbers are deleted from CPSES.

1 A25. Fisher / Crosby Valve Modeling/ Qualification The validation process requires a conservative 55/45 flow distribu-tion ratio on the outlet configuration.

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Section 7.4.3 of CPPP-6 establishes the requirements for assuring that valves are properly qualified to the as-built loadings.

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Section 3.10.6.5 of CPPP-7 addresses the proper valve yoke modeling G

of flexible valves.

A26. Piping Modeling Section 3.0 of CPPP-7 provides direction and requirements for the proper modeling of piping systems.

A27. Welding Section 4.4 and Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7 provide requirements for the design and analysis of welded joints.

A28. Anchor Bolts /Embedment Plates -4 of CPPP-7 provides guidance and requirements for the evaluation of anchor bolt embedded depths and edge distances.

i Project Procedure CPPP-6 provides controls to assure that reaction loads on embedded plates, attachment spacing between embedded plates, and as-built loads for through-bolts are transmitted to responsible groups for evaluation.

A29. Strut / Snubber Angularity Section 4.2.6 of CPPP-7 specifies requirements to assure that force J

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components resulting from off-axis loading of struts and snubbers is V

included in the support design.

Specification No. 2323-MS-100, Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10A l

(Reference C.12), and Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1.28 have been revised to incorporate the resolutions of the items related to this issue.

l A30. Component Qualification Sections 3.4.5 and 4.2 of CPPP-7 delineate the requirements to assure that piping movements due to system design conditions are considered in the evaluations of frame gaps, swing angles, and spring and snubber travel.

Quality Assurance Procedures QI-QAP-11.1-28 and CP-QAP-12.1 (Refer-ence C.13) have been revised to include inspections for the existence and tightness of all locking devices on pipe supports.

l A31. Structural Modeling for Frame Analysis Section 4.3.2.1 of CPPP-7 requires the use of AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 8th Edition for the selection of the member properties used in the analysis, including values for torsional resistance.

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i -5 of CPPP-7 provides the modeling technique used for the O

Richmond insert / tube steel connection.

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,s l -18 of CPPP-7 provides procedures for the proper modeling of the connection stiffness for use in the frame analysis.

A32. Computer Program Verification and Use l

Section 5.0 of CPPP-7 identifies the computer programs acceptable for use in the validation of piping and pipe supports. This list assures that only those programs verified in accordance with SWEC standard QA program requirements for verification, technical adequacy, and appro-j priate version are used in the validation program.

l A33. Hydrotest Sections 3.6.2.4 and 4.7.2 of CPPP-7 provide guidance for the evalua-tion of piping'and supports for hydrotest loading.

A34. Seismic /Nonseismic Interface Attactment 4-10 of CPPP-7 provides requirements and instruction for the design of safety-related piping attached to nonseismic piping.

A35. Other Issues O

CPPP-6. and CPPP-7 provide technical and administrative procedures to

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address the concerns described in the 51 DIRs referenced in Subappendix A35.

A36. SSER-8 Review Resolution of this issue requires no preventive action, since. design allowables for Richmond inserts and anchor bolts are based on the actual strength of concrete at CPSES.

A37. SSER-10 Review No preventive action is required for the uncontrolled plug welding issue.

As concluded by the CPRT Action Plan V.d Results Report l

(Reference C.14), the current procedures and practices for the repair of mislocated holes are adequate to preclude the recurrence of undoc-umented plug welds.

TU Electric Construction Procedure CP-CPM-1.2 (Reference C.15) and i

Project Procedure CPSP-30 (Reference C.16) provide procedures for

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the evaluation of the installed piping and pipe support configuration i

including 'the proper design of temporary supports prior to a piping system hydro to assure the integrity of the installed safety-related j

piping and pipe supports.

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I g-~3 Project Procedure CPPP-28 (Reference C.17) and Attachment 4-10 to I

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CPPP-7 provide direction and requirements for the identification and i

evaluation of interface anchors between seismic and nonseismic piping

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to assure isolation of Category I systems from non-Category I systems.

Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 has been revised (Revi-sion 30) to include acceptance criteria and measurement techniques for the inspection of Type 2 skewed welds.

A38. SSER-11 Review -15 to CPPP-7 provides the procedure to analyze girth j

welds.

Quality Control Procedures QI-QAP-11.1-28 and CP-QAP-12.1 have been revised to assure that the items related to the QA Inspection Program have been addressed.

A39. CPRT Quality of Construction Review on Piping and Pipe Supports TU Electric instituted the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Pro-gram (PCHVP) (Reference C.18) to validate that the as-built hardware complied with the design for Unit 1 and Common safety-related piping and pipe supports.

The quality of construction requirements for pipe supports in the PCHVP were incorporated into Quality Assurance Pro-()T cedures QI-QAP-1.11-28 and CP-QAP-12.1.

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2.0 AP_PENDIX B ISSUES - PREVENTIVE ACTION Bl.

SDAR-CP-86-33, Stiffness Values for Class 1 Stress Analysis Project Procedure CPPP-6 requires that support stiffness values for pipe supports for Class 1 lines be computed and provided to Westing-house for use in the stress analysis of Class 1 lines.

B2.

SDAR-CP-86-72, Small Bore Piping and Supports Design Basis Documents (DBD) (References C.19, C.20, and C.21) for small bore piping and the supports have been established.

These doc-uments delineate the applicable specifications, detailed technical procedures, and construction and QC inspection procedures, required to maintain the validated design.

B3.

SDAR-CP-86-63, Pipe Support Installation The as-built verification procedure, CPSP-12 (Reference C.22), and the Pipe Stress / Support Final Reconciliation Procedure, CPPP-23 (Reference C.23), combined with those Quality Assurance inspection procedures identified in the DBD-CS-067 (Reference C.18) provide as-o Y

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surance that pipe support installations will meet the requirements of

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lY the design.

B4.

SDAR-CP-86-67, Preoperational Vibration Test Criteria The results of the preoperational vibration testing will be reviewed by SWEC-PSAS to assure that the results satisfy the design criteria.

No further preventive action is required because preoperational vi-bration testing is a one-time event, which will not be repeated fol-lowing the issuance of an operating license.

B5.

SDAR-CP-86-73, ASME Snubber Attachment Brackets Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28 has been revised to in-spect for the incorrect use of the correct attachment brackets for snubbers.

REFERENCES:

C.1 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-7, Design Criteria for Pipe Stress and Pipe Supports, Revision 3, February 27, 1987 C,2 SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-141, Unequal Shear Loading Effect on Richmond Insert and Threaded Rods Used in Conjunction with Tube Steel, Revision 0, March 25, 1987 O

,V C.3 CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-28, Fabrication and Installation Inspection of Safety Component Supports, Revision 35, January 8, 1987 C.4 AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 8th Edition, 1980 C.5 CPSES Piping Erection Specification No. 2323-MS-100, Revision 9, August 17, 1987 C.6 SWEC-PSAS Project Memorandum PM-140, Flare Bevel Groove Welds, Revision 1, May 1, 1987 C.7 CPSES Nuclear Safety Class Pipe Hangers and Supports Specifica-tion No. 2323-46A, Revision 7, May 7, 1987 C.8 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1973 C.9 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-1, Management Plan for Project Quality (Piping System Qualification /Requalification), Revision 7, March 25, 1987 C.10 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-6, Pipe Stress / Support Requal-ification Procedure, Revision 4, April 8, 1987 O

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L C.11 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-10, Procedure for Review of Plant q

,'IV j3 Operating Mode Conditions, Revision 1, April 1, 1986 C.12 CPSES Construction Procedure CP-CPM-9.10A, Installation of Vendor Supplied Component Supports Catalog

Items, Revision 1, August 15, 1985 C.13 CPSES Quality Assurance Procedure CP-QAP-12.1, Mechanical Component Installation and N-5 Certification, Revision 18, January 12, 1987 C.14 CPRT Action Plan V.d Results Report, Revision 1, Plug Welds, December 18, 1986 C.15 CPSES Construction Procedure CP-CPM-1.2, Construction Activities for Systems and/or Areas Accepted and/or Controlled by TU Electric Plant Operations, Revision 5, March 4, 1987 C.16 SWEC-PSAS Project Site Engineering Procedure CPSP-30, Processing TU Electric Requests for Temporary
Hangers, Revision 0, October 7, 1987 C.17 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-28, Procedure for Identification and Evaluation of Interfaces Between Seismic and Nonseismic Piping, Revision 0, February 20, 1987 C.18 TU Electric Engineering and Construction Procedure EC-9.04, Post

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Construction Hardware Validation Program, July 29, 1987 C.19 TU Electric Design Basis Document DBD-CS-065, ASME Class 1 Piping Analysis (Draft), August 14, 1987 l

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C.20 TU Electric Design Basis Document DBD-CS-066, ASME Class 2 and 3 J

Piping Analysis, Revision 0, July 31, 1987

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l C.21 TU Electric Design Basis Document DBD-CS-067, ASME Class 1, 2, and

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3 Pipe Support Design, Revision 0, July 31, 1987 C.22 SWEC-PSAS Project Site Engineering Procedure CPSP-12, As-Built Ver-ification (Piping), Revision 0, November 12, 1986 C.23 SWEC-PSAS Project Procedure CPPP-23, Pipe Stress / Support Final Rec-conciliation Procedure, Revision 0, March 2, 1987

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