05000482/FIN-2012009-03: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 93800 | | Inspection procedure = IP 93800 | ||
| Inspector = G Replogle, J Dixon, J Watkins, M Baquera, M Runyan, N O, | | Inspector = G Replogle, J Dixon, J Watkins, M Baquera, M Runyan, N O'Keefe, N Okonkwo | ||
| CCA = H.13 | | CCA = H.13 | ||
| INPO aspect = DM.1 | | INPO aspect = DM.1 | ||
| description = The team reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d for the failure to have procedures appropriate for the implementation of fire protection compensatory measures. Specifically, Procedure SYS FP-290, Temporary Fire Pump Operations, Revision 10, did not have appropriate guidance for the installation and operation of a temporary diesel driven fire water pump. This pump was a compensatory action for the nonfunctional normally installed diesel driven fire water pump. The licensees corrective actions included revising Procedure SYS FP-290 to provide adequate instructions to operate the temporary diesel driven fire water pump continuously to preclude another loss of fire water suppression capability; completing a temporary modification for the installation of the temporary diesel driven fire water pump; and replacing the permanently installed diesel driven fire water pump. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 43710 and 51821. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inadequate procedure contributed to the delayed recovery of the fire water system for approximately 9 hours. A Region IV Senior Reactor Analyst determined that NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, could not be used to evaluate this issue because the firewater system was credited in both the fire suppression and the internal events probabilistic risk assessment models. Therefore the analyst performed a bounding detailed risk evaluation for this performance deficiency. The exposure period of 68 days was used for the time when the pump was placed in a cold-weather alignment. The senior reactor analyst determined that bounding change to the core damage frequency was 5.9E-7 per year. The dominant core damage sequences included loss of offsite power initiating events (including fire induced loss of offsite power events), the failure of component cooling water, and the failure to establish alternate lube oil cooling to the charging and high pressure safety injection pumps. This finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with the decision making component in that the licensee failed to make safety-significant decisions using a systematic process to ensure safety was maintained while reviewing changes to the plant and procedures necessary to implement required compensatory measures | | description = The team reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d for the failure to have procedures appropriate for the implementation of fire protection compensatory measures. Specifically, Procedure SYS FP-290, Temporary Fire Pump Operations, Revision 10, did not have appropriate guidance for the installation and operation of a temporary diesel driven fire water pump. This pump was a compensatory action for the nonfunctional normally installed diesel driven fire water pump. The licensees corrective actions included revising Procedure SYS FP-290 to provide adequate instructions to operate the temporary diesel driven fire water pump continuously to preclude another loss of fire water suppression capability; completing a temporary modification for the installation of the temporary diesel driven fire water pump; and replacing the permanently installed diesel driven fire water pump. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 43710 and 51821. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inadequate procedure contributed to the delayed recovery of the fire water system for approximately 9 hours. A Region IV Senior Reactor Analyst determined that NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, could not be used to evaluate this issue because the firewater system was credited in both the fire suppression and the internal events probabilistic risk assessment models. Therefore the analyst performed a bounding detailed risk evaluation for this performance deficiency. The exposure period of 68 days was used for the time when the pump was placed in a cold-weather alignment. The senior reactor analyst determined that bounding change to the core damage frequency was 5.9E-7 per year. The dominant core damage sequences included loss of offsite power initiating events (including fire induced loss of offsite power events), the failure of component cooling water, and the failure to establish alternate lube oil cooling to the charging and high pressure safety injection pumps. This finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with the decision making component in that the licensee failed to make safety-significant decisions using a systematic process to ensure safety was maintained while reviewing changes to the plant and procedures necessary to implement required compensatory measures | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 00:19, 22 February 2018
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2012009 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93800 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Replogle J Dixon J Watkins M Baquera M Runyan N O'Keefe N Okonkwo |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
| ' | |