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NOTATION                                    V O~T E                          .
RESPONSE SHEET l
l        TO:                                    John C. Hoyle l                                                Secretary of the Cozamission                                                      l FROM:                                  COMMISSIONER DIAZ l
l
 
==SUBJECT:==
SECY-97-036 - MILLSTONE LESSONS LEARNED REPORT, PART 2:                      POLICY ISSUES I
l        Approved                            so%      Disapproved [%                                                    Abstain Not Participating                                                                Request Discussion 1
COMMENTS:                                                                                                                  I h
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                                                                                              ~''SQ NATURE}
!        Release Vote                              / V/                                        4 -M '97 DATE
;        Withhold Vote                              /  /
;        Entered on "AS"                              Yes    V_              No t
f      9706020260 970520 Ic-      PDR        COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR
 
l I
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!                                          COMMISSIONER DIAZ' COMMENTS ON SECY-97-0%
l I agree with the staff's approach to improve NRC's regulatory process, as it relates to the lessons    ,
learned from Millstone. I believe the staff has identified three important regulatory areas that      :
need improved definition and guidance for implementation: licensing basis, design bases, and FSARs. A better articulation of the definitions and the inter-relationship between the licensing basis, design bases, and FSARs and their association with 10 CFR 50.59 should improve regulatory implementation.
FSARs are licensing documents with drastic variations in scope depending on the initiation of construction and of commercial operation. Its original purpose was to describe the facility to the NRC during the plant's licensing process, and was then used as a key scoping document during i-                    initial phases of plant operation. The FSAR, in the absence of other leadmg licensing l                    documents, was maintained as a guide for some aspects of inspection and enforcement. The                I l                    FSAR should, therefore, continue to serve as part of the original licensing basis and as a j                    reference document. However, the FSAR was not intended to contain the entire design basis for l                    the life time of the plant and is presently inadequate to serve as such. This is reflected in the inconsistent NRC and licensee interpretation of the requisite level of compliance with the FSAR updating requirement. In recent years, the FSAR has not been used as the dominating or                :
controlling document for an operating plant's inspection and assessment process. Indeed, such a use of the FSAR at this time would seem incompatible with a policy of consistent and equitable l                    treatment oflicensees, when licensing commitments and risk information provide pertinent l                    safety-related guidance for plant operation and protection of the public health and safety.
i If our goal is to resolve the issue of the regulatofy framework for nuclear power plant in a final, effective and efficient manner, there is no substitute for a holistic review and resolution of the inter-relationships of the FSAR, design basis, current licensing basis, and 10 CFR 50.34, S0.36, 50.59,50.65,50.71, and the associated inspection and assessment processes. The following staff actions are recommended to achieve these results in the near future:
i i                    1) Ensure that all definitions that deal with any and all of the above topics are consistent with l                    each other and properly reflected in the 10 CFR.
I
: 2) For operating nuclear power plants, the original / updated FSAR should be maintained only as l                    the original licensing document. In addition, a risk-informed, safety-br. sed Operating Safety          l
!                    Analysis Report (OSAR) should replace the FSAR as a day to day facility license document and            !
should reflect each power plant's and NRC's experience, knowledge, and risk information. Only those SSCs with safety significance, including the risk critical SSCs, should be in the OSAR.          I The OSAR can then serve es a basis for new inspection and assessment procedures, and when
}                    linked to the design basis and the current licensing basis, would become a key source document
!                    for helping to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety. The OSAR is a natural l                    document for inclusion of licensees' disposition of safety significant issues such as SBO, j                    ATWS, and EQ. NRC staff should consider the use ofincentives and other methods of achieving I
                                                                                    ,-        -                    e    v
 
~.
T s
i l s' 4      voluntary conversion to an OSAR, in a manner simihr to the NRC 6 encouragement of the use of        ;
;      improved standard technical specifications.
;                                                                                                          l l      3) Establish a clear guideline for the content of a design basis and current licensing basis
;      documentation system that would allowlicensee and NRC access to each and every part ofit.
l      The closure of this entire issue can only be achieved when a state-of-the-art computerized system
:. of data bases is developed and employed containing the OSAR, a compilation of the design            !
l      bases, and licensing commitments. This secure information system can be called a Licensing          l
:      Basis Information Control System; it is a long term solution to what is needed for appropriate i      documentation of facility features, specifications, procedures, licensing commitments and i      changes thereto. Such a system should be able to be used as a tracking tool for all of the licensed l      plant's features, commitments, and processes.
I do not believe a complete set oflicensing and design basis documentation should be required as part of the present FSAR. Normally, the licensing and design bases of a plant are not all          4 included in the corresponding FSAR but a maintained as different documents. As a short term action, licensees should identify and document the location of the licensing and design bases.      ,
This will ensure that the licensee is cognizant of and the NRC can access the licensing and        ,
design bases of the licensed facility. The responses to the 50.54(f) letters may be used to satisfy part of this short term action.                                                                    ;
I support proposed Actions 1,2,3,4, 8,10,12, and 13.
While we strive to clarify the various definitions and rule language as described above, it is imperative to realize that the NRC and the nuclear industry have a cumulative body of              !
knowledge, supported by risk information, that allows us now to make consistent safety              i decisions on regulatory matters. Th vefore, I dd not believe that increasing our regulatory attention and efforts on the enforcement of 50.71(e) compliance and emphasizing the use of          ,
FSARs in preparing for inspections is consistent with the body of knowledge and our                i encouragement of the use of risk assessment methods. During a 3-month period in 1996, our inspections demonstrated that out of the hundreds of discrepancies between plants and their FSAR descriptions, most of the discrepancies were oflow safety significance. Therefore, requiring licensees to focus their attention on making the FSAR the all inclusive and controlling document for operating plants would divert resources from other more risk critical areas.          t I do not support proposed Actions 11,14,15,16,17, and 18.
My specific comments on a few of the proposed action itrus are as follows:
Action 1 This action item is subject to the expeditious completion of Action Items 26 and 35 of the          l ADRP's Process Improvement Plan (PIP, Attachment 2 to SECY-97-036) dealing with licensing            l commitments. Upon completion, the staff should provide recommendations to the Commission.
The recommendations should take into r msideration proposed Action 4.
 
j                .
  \
Actions S. 6. 7 I agree with Commissioner Rogers that Actions 5,6, and 7 should be issued for public comment under an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The proposed rulemaking should provide                )
the opportunity for compilation of the licensing oasis in a database that could be incorporated in    ,
the FSAR, as a free standing document, or as part of a retrievable document system such as the        l Licensing Basis Information Control System mentioned earlier.
      .                    Action 9 I agree with Commissioner Rogers that the policy and resource implications of this item are such that it should not be approved without exposure to public scrutiny and comment. Thus, I would submit this item for public review as part of an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Key issues for comment would be whether 10 CFR 50.71(e) should be revised to limit updating requirements to matters important to safety and to permit deletion ofinformation and comments that are obsolete and/or oflittle safety significance, if this is not accomplished through the rulemaking on 10 CFR 50.59. Proceeding directly to short-term guidance would not address these fundamental threshold issues.
Action 11 Increased inspection and enforcement on an undefined issue will exacerbate already strained staff rrsources. This issue should be delayed until resolution of major areas of contention regarding toe scope and interpretation of 10 CFR 50.71(c)lis completed.
Action 12 The current design inspections should continue provided that we do not sacrifice the emphasis on operational safety. The staff should advise the Commission before initiating any other design verification activities.
Action 14 1
This policy statement encouraged licensees to conduct a self-assessment of accessibility and adequacy of their design basis documentation and to decide whether a design reconstitution l'
program was needed. The policy statement also stated that "[t]he design bases related information should be retrievable within a reasonable period of time, however, it is not necessary for all design basis documentation to be organized in one place." I agree with this statement.
The proposed long term Action 14 should be delayed until resolution of Action 9 is effected. It could also be resolved when the above-mentioned, long term Licensing Basis Information Control System is in place.
 
{^    .        .
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l              Actions 15.16 i
The FSAR was not intended to become the controlling document for NRC's inspection and assessment. Neither was it intended to capture all the design basis for a facility.
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Latest revision as of 00:09, 22 July 2020

Notation Vote Response Sheet,Approving in Part & Disapproving in Part w/comments,SECY-97-036, Millstone Lessons Learned Rept,Part 2:Policy Issues
ML20141L043
Person / Time
Site: Millstone  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 04/27/1997
From: Diaz N
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To: Hoyle J
NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
Shared Package
ML20141L002 List:
References
SECY-97-036-C, SECY-97-36-C, NUDOCS 9706020260
Download: ML20141L043 (5)


Text

_ . . _ _ _ . - . _ . . . _ .. . . _ . _ . . _ . _ . _ . - _ _ _ . . . _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ ~ _ _ _ .

i.

NOTATION V O~T E .

RESPONSE SHEET l

l TO: John C. Hoyle l Secretary of the Cozamission l FROM: COMMISSIONER DIAZ l

l

SUBJECT:

SECY-97-036 - MILLSTONE LESSONS LEARNED REPORT, PART 2: POLICY ISSUES I

l Approved so% Disapproved [% Abstain Not Participating Request Discussion 1

COMMENTS: I h

i i

i l

l 1

l .

il AAA~

~SQ NATURE}

! Release Vote / V/ 4 -M '97 DATE

Withhold Vote / /
Entered on "AS" Yes V_ No t

f 9706020260 970520 Ic- PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR

l I

s l

l

! COMMISSIONER DIAZ' COMMENTS ON SECY-97-0%

l I agree with the staff's approach to improve NRC's regulatory process, as it relates to the lessons ,

learned from Millstone. I believe the staff has identified three important regulatory areas that  :

need improved definition and guidance for implementation: licensing basis, design bases, and FSARs. A better articulation of the definitions and the inter-relationship between the licensing basis, design bases, and FSARs and their association with 10 CFR 50.59 should improve regulatory implementation.

FSARs are licensing documents with drastic variations in scope depending on the initiation of construction and of commercial operation. Its original purpose was to describe the facility to the NRC during the plant's licensing process, and was then used as a key scoping document during i- initial phases of plant operation. The FSAR, in the absence of other leadmg licensing l documents, was maintained as a guide for some aspects of inspection and enforcement. The I l FSAR should, therefore, continue to serve as part of the original licensing basis and as a j reference document. However, the FSAR was not intended to contain the entire design basis for l the life time of the plant and is presently inadequate to serve as such. This is reflected in the inconsistent NRC and licensee interpretation of the requisite level of compliance with the FSAR updating requirement. In recent years, the FSAR has not been used as the dominating or  :

controlling document for an operating plant's inspection and assessment process. Indeed, such a use of the FSAR at this time would seem incompatible with a policy of consistent and equitable l treatment oflicensees, when licensing commitments and risk information provide pertinent l safety-related guidance for plant operation and protection of the public health and safety.

i If our goal is to resolve the issue of the regulatofy framework for nuclear power plant in a final, effective and efficient manner, there is no substitute for a holistic review and resolution of the inter-relationships of the FSAR, design basis, current licensing basis, and 10 CFR 50.34, S0.36, 50.59,50.65,50.71, and the associated inspection and assessment processes. The following staff actions are recommended to achieve these results in the near future:

i i 1) Ensure that all definitions that deal with any and all of the above topics are consistent with l each other and properly reflected in the 10 CFR.

I

2) For operating nuclear power plants, the original / updated FSAR should be maintained only as l the original licensing document. In addition, a risk-informed, safety-br. sed Operating Safety l

! Analysis Report (OSAR) should replace the FSAR as a day to day facility license document and  !

should reflect each power plant's and NRC's experience, knowledge, and risk information. Only those SSCs with safety significance, including the risk critical SSCs, should be in the OSAR. I The OSAR can then serve es a basis for new inspection and assessment procedures, and when

} linked to the design basis and the current licensing basis, would become a key source document

! for helping to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety. The OSAR is a natural l document for inclusion of licensees' disposition of safety significant issues such as SBO, j ATWS, and EQ. NRC staff should consider the use ofincentives and other methods of achieving I

,- - e v

~.

T s

i l s' 4 voluntary conversion to an OSAR, in a manner simihr to the NRC 6 encouragement of the use of  ;

improved standard technical specifications.
l l 3) Establish a clear guideline for the content of a design basis and current licensing basis
documentation system that would allowlicensee and NRC access to each and every part ofit.

l The closure of this entire issue can only be achieved when a state-of-the-art computerized system

. of data bases is developed and employed containing the OSAR, a compilation of the design  !

l bases, and licensing commitments. This secure information system can be called a Licensing l

Basis Information Control System; it is a long term solution to what is needed for appropriate i documentation of facility features, specifications, procedures, licensing commitments and i changes thereto. Such a system should be able to be used as a tracking tool for all of the licensed l plant's features, commitments, and processes.

I do not believe a complete set oflicensing and design basis documentation should be required as part of the present FSAR. Normally, the licensing and design bases of a plant are not all 4 included in the corresponding FSAR but a maintained as different documents. As a short term action, licensees should identify and document the location of the licensing and design bases. ,

This will ensure that the licensee is cognizant of and the NRC can access the licensing and ,

design bases of the licensed facility. The responses to the 50.54(f) letters may be used to satisfy part of this short term action.  ;

I support proposed Actions 1,2,3,4, 8,10,12, and 13.

While we strive to clarify the various definitions and rule language as described above, it is imperative to realize that the NRC and the nuclear industry have a cumulative body of  !

knowledge, supported by risk information, that allows us now to make consistent safety i decisions on regulatory matters. Th vefore, I dd not believe that increasing our regulatory attention and efforts on the enforcement of 50.71(e) compliance and emphasizing the use of ,

FSARs in preparing for inspections is consistent with the body of knowledge and our i encouragement of the use of risk assessment methods. During a 3-month period in 1996, our inspections demonstrated that out of the hundreds of discrepancies between plants and their FSAR descriptions, most of the discrepancies were oflow safety significance. Therefore, requiring licensees to focus their attention on making the FSAR the all inclusive and controlling document for operating plants would divert resources from other more risk critical areas. t I do not support proposed Actions 11,14,15,16,17, and 18.

My specific comments on a few of the proposed action itrus are as follows:

Action 1 This action item is subject to the expeditious completion of Action Items 26 and 35 of the l ADRP's Process Improvement Plan (PIP, Attachment 2 to SECY-97-036) dealing with licensing l commitments. Upon completion, the staff should provide recommendations to the Commission.

The recommendations should take into r msideration proposed Action 4.

j .

\

Actions S. 6. 7 I agree with Commissioner Rogers that Actions 5,6, and 7 should be issued for public comment under an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The proposed rulemaking should provide )

the opportunity for compilation of the licensing oasis in a database that could be incorporated in ,

the FSAR, as a free standing document, or as part of a retrievable document system such as the l Licensing Basis Information Control System mentioned earlier.

. Action 9 I agree with Commissioner Rogers that the policy and resource implications of this item are such that it should not be approved without exposure to public scrutiny and comment. Thus, I would submit this item for public review as part of an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Key issues for comment would be whether 10 CFR 50.71(e) should be revised to limit updating requirements to matters important to safety and to permit deletion ofinformation and comments that are obsolete and/or oflittle safety significance, if this is not accomplished through the rulemaking on 10 CFR 50.59. Proceeding directly to short-term guidance would not address these fundamental threshold issues.

Action 11 Increased inspection and enforcement on an undefined issue will exacerbate already strained staff rrsources. This issue should be delayed until resolution of major areas of contention regarding toe scope and interpretation of 10 CFR 50.71(c)lis completed.

Action 12 The current design inspections should continue provided that we do not sacrifice the emphasis on operational safety. The staff should advise the Commission before initiating any other design verification activities.

Action 14 1

This policy statement encouraged licensees to conduct a self-assessment of accessibility and adequacy of their design basis documentation and to decide whether a design reconstitution l'

program was needed. The policy statement also stated that "[t]he design bases related information should be retrievable within a reasonable period of time, however, it is not necessary for all design basis documentation to be organized in one place." I agree with this statement.

The proposed long term Action 14 should be delayed until resolution of Action 9 is effected. It could also be resolved when the above-mentioned, long term Licensing Basis Information Control System is in place.

{^ . .

r l

l Actions 15.16 i

The FSAR was not intended to become the controlling document for NRC's inspection and assessment. Neither was it intended to capture all the design basis for a facility.

t i

l l

5 i

l l

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l l

4 I

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1 1

i 1 -..__2.,.,_____-__._..