05000293/FIN-2010003-02: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.B.3, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System, requires that two RBCCW subsystems shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel, reactor coolant temperature is >212 F, and prior to startup from a cold shutdown. With one RBCCW subsystem inoperable, the required action is to restore the SUbsystem to operable within 72 hours or be in Cold Shutdown within an additional 24 hours. Contrary to the above, the "A" train of RBCCW was inoperable for an indeterminate amount of time that likely exceeded the 72 hours of TS allowed outage time. Upon discovery of the broken bolt on the seismic support, the "A" train of RBCCW was declared inoperable. An immediate corrective action was completed to install a new bolt on the seismic support and TS 3.5.B.3 was exited. The event is documented in Entergy's Corrective Action Program as CR-PNP-2010-0130. The finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding would not have resulted in the total loss of a safety function during a seismic event. | | description = Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.B.3, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System, requires that two RBCCW subsystems shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel, reactor coolant temperature is >212 F, and prior to startup from a cold shutdown. With one RBCCW subsystem inoperable, the required action is to restore the SUbsystem to operable within 72 hours or be in Cold Shutdown within an additional 24 hours. Contrary to the above, the \"A\" train of RBCCW was inoperable for an indeterminate amount of time that likely exceeded the 72 hours of TS allowed outage time. Upon discovery of the broken bolt on the seismic support, the \"A\" train of RBCCW was declared inoperable. An immediate corrective action was completed to install a new bolt on the seismic support and TS 3.5.B.3 was exited. The event is documented in Entergy\'s Corrective Action Program as CR-PNP-2010-0130. The finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding would not have resulted in the total loss of a safety function during a seismic event. | ||
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Latest revision as of 11:39, 30 May 2018
| Site: | Pilgrim |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000293/2010003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Richmond D Jackson S Pindale J Schoppy R Rolph B Smith M Schneider M Balazik S Rich D Molteni C Williams |
| INPO aspect | |
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