05000293/FIN-2009007-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to establish adequate procedures to prevent adverse impact due to spurious valve closure casued by fire damage |
| Description | The inspectors identified that Entergy did not ensure that plant procedures were adequate to prevent a spurious actuation from affecting the ability to provide a source of makeup water to the reactor vessel within 20 minutes following the evacuation of the control room during a fire as specified in procedure 2.4.143, Shutdown From Outside the Control Room, Revision 40. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) and a NCV of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 5.4.1. d, Procedures. Entergy entered the issue into the corrective action program and planned to implement changes to the procedure to resolve the issue. Entergy also reviewed completed reactor core isolation cooling(RCIC) and high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system startup job performance measures(JPMs) and performed procedure walkthroughs to assess the time needed to attempt a RCIC start and then transfer to, and start HPCI to confirm these actions could be taken in within the time necessary to prevent lowering vessel level to that of the top of active fuel. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the mitigating system cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (Le. core damage). Specifically, during a fire in the control room or cable spreading room there are four valves in each of the RCIC and HPCI systems that could spuriously close due to fire damage to cabling. Procedure 2.4.143 does not ensure that the associated motor control center circuit breakers are opened (to prevent spurious closure) and that the valves are in the correct position prior to starting one of the systems to provide make-up to the reactor vessel. Unidentified spurious closure of the valves during or after startup of the systems could disable the system and delay establishment of reactor vessel makeup. The inspectors assessed this finding in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. This finding affected safe shutdown capabilities and screened to very low safety significance (Green) in Phase 1 of the SDP because it was assigned a low degradation rating. A low degradation rating was assigned because it was determined to be a minor procedure issue that could be compensated for by operator experience and familiarity. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned because the inspectors concluded this issue was not indicative of current licensee performance. |
| Site: | Pilgrim |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000293/2009007 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Young R Fuhrmeister J Rogge L Scholl M Patel |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Pilgrim - IR 05000293/2009007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Pilgrim) @ 2009Q4
Self-Identified List (Pilgrim)
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