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| number = ML18312A118
| number = ML18312A118
| issue date = 11/08/2018
| issue date = 11/08/2018
| title = San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station; Presentation for San Onofre Special Inspection Webinar November 8, 2018
| title = Presentation for San Onofre Special Inspection Webinar November 8, 2018
| author name =  
| author name =  
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV
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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:San OnofreSpecial Inspection WebinarNovember 8, 2018NRC Region IV, Arlington, TX
{{#Wiki_filter:~us.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environnient San Onofre Special Inspection Webinar November 8, 2018 NRC Region IV, Arlington, TX
~us.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environnient LogisticsWebinar FormatBack-up Bridge Line(888) 469-1677, Passcode 2471451Questions and Answers 2 US.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment NRC StaffEric Simpson, Special Inspection Team LeaderRegion IV Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning BranchPatricia Silva, Branch ChiefDivision of Spent Fuel ManagementTroy Pruett, DirectorRegion IV Division of Nuclear Materials Safety 3 US.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment Webinar AgendaBackgroundCanister Downloading OperationsInspection Team FindingsCurrent StatusSummaryQuestions & Answers 4 US.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment ISFSI Layout5TN NUHOMSDesignHoltecUMAXDesign TransnuclearNUHOMS6 Holtec UMAX7 Vertically Ventilated Module (Vault)8 Spent Fuel Canister 9Holtec MPCTransfer Cask Downloading: Shield Cone10 Downloading: Transporter11 Downloading: Vault Door12 Downloading: Alignment13 Downloading: Attaching Slings14 Downloading: Attaching Slings15 Downloading Preparations16 17What Happened on August 3rd?Low Dose AreaLow Dose Area What Happened on August 3rd?18 What Happened on August 3rd?19 What Happened on August 3rd?20 21What Happened on August 3rd?
 
Post Event ActionsSpent Fuel Handling Activities SuspendedNRC Inspection ActivitiesSan Onofre Notification to NRCCausal EvaluationsCorrective Actions 22 US.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment Spent Fuel Handling Activities Suspended 23MPC 29 lowered into vaultSan Onofre suspends fuel loadingMPC 30 Inside Transfer CaskSeismically Restrained in Fuel Building US.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment NRC Inspection Activities 24August 6 th: NRC Region IV informally notified of Misalignment Event and initiates daily oversight communicationsAugust 7 th: San Onofrecommits to NRC review before resuming operationsAugust 17 th: NRC decides to conduct Special InspectionSeptember 10
US.NRC Logistics                            United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment
-14: NRC Special Inspection Team onsiteNRC to perform inspection prior to resumption of fuel loading US.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment NRC Inspection Activities 252 Preliminary Escalated Findings Failure to provide redundant drop protectionFailure to report 3 Preliminary Severity Level IV ViolationsProceduresCorrective actionsTrainingManagement Oversight Weaknesses US.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment Causal Evaluations 26San OnofreApparent Cause EvaluationHoltec Root Cause AnalysisCommon Cause Evaluation US.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment Root CausesSan Onofre Management failed to provideAdequate procedures Adequate training to support procedureAdequate oversight 27 US.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment Corrective ActionsTraining RequirementsProcedure EnhancementsEquipment EnhancementsOversight Improvements 28 US.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment Event SignificanceNo Actual Drop of CanisterNo Radiological ReleaseLoad Drop Analysis (if canister fell) 29 US.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment Next StepsIssue NRC Inspection ReportNRC Inspection of Causal AnalysesNRC Inspection of Corrective Actions 30 US.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment SummaryCould have been preventedWeaknesses in management oversightMultiple failed barriersIncreased NRC oversight 31 US.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment Questions32}}
* Webinar Format
* Back-up Bridge Line (888) 469-1677, Passcode 2471451
* Questions and Answers 2
 
US.NRC NRC Staff                                      United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment
* Eric Simpson, Special Inspection Team Leader Region IV Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning Branch
* Patricia Silva, Branch Chief Division of Spent Fuel Management
* Troy Pruett, Director Region IV Division of Nuclear Materials Safety 3
 
US.NRC Webinar Agenda                    United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment
* Background
* Canister Downloading Operations
* Inspection Team Findings
* Current Status
* Summary
* Questions & Answers 4
 
ISFSI Layout TN NUHOMS Design Holtec UMAX Design 5
 
Transnuclear NUHOMS 6
 
Holtec UMAX 7
 
Vertically Ventilated Module (Vault) 8
 
Spent Fuel Canister Holtec MPC Transfer Cask 9
 
Downloading: Shield Cone 10
 
Downloading: Transporter 11
 
Downloading: Vault Door 12
 
Downloading:
Alignment 13
 
Downloading:
Attaching Slings 14
 
Downloading:
Attaching Slings 15
 
Downloading Preparations 16
 
What Happened on August 3rd?
Low Dose Area Low Dose Area 17
 
What Happened on August 3rd?
18
 
What Happened on August 3rd?
19
 
What Happened on August 3rd?
20
 
What Happened on August 3rd?
21
 
US.NRC Post Event Actions                        United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment
* Spent Fuel Handling Activities Suspended
* NRC Inspection Activities
* San Onofre Notification to NRC
* Causal Evaluations
* Corrective Actions 22
 
US.NRC Spent Fuel Handling Activities Suspended      United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment
* MPC 29 lowered into vault
* San Onofre suspends fuel loading
* MPC 30
    - Inside Transfer Cask
    - Seismically Restrained in Fuel Building 23
 
US.NRC NRC Inspection Activities                                      United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment
* August 6th: NRC Region IV informally notified of Misalignment Event and initiates daily oversight communications
* August 7th: San Onofre commits to NRC review before resuming operations
* August 17th: NRC decides to conduct Special Inspection
* September 10-14: NRC Special Inspection Team onsite
* NRC to perform inspection prior to resumption of fuel loading 24
 
US.NRC NRC Inspection Activities                        United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment
* 2 Preliminary Escalated Findings
  - Failure to provide redundant drop protection
  - Failure to report
* 3 Preliminary Severity Level IV Violations
  - Procedures
  - Corrective actions
  - Training
* Management Oversight Weaknesses 25
 
US.NRC Causal Evaluations                    United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment
* San Onofre Apparent Cause Evaluation
* Holtec Root Cause Analysis
* Common Cause Evaluation 26
 
US.NRC Root Causes                                United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment
* San Onofre Management failed to provide
  - Adequate procedures
  - Adequate training to support procedure
  - Adequate oversight 27
 
US.NRC Corrective Actions      United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment
* Training Requirements
* Procedure Enhancements
* Equipment Enhancements
* Oversight Improvements 28
 
US.NRC Event Significance                      United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment
* No Actual Drop of Canister
* No Radiological Release
* Load Drop Analysis (if canister fell) 29
 
US.NRC Next Steps                            United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment
* Issue NRC Inspection Report
* NRC Inspection of Causal Analyses
* NRC Inspection of Corrective Actions 30
 
US.NRC Summary                              United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment
* Could have been prevented
* Weaknesses in management oversight
* Multiple failed barriers
* Increased NRC oversight 31
 
Questions 32}}

Latest revision as of 12:00, 20 October 2019

Presentation for San Onofre Special Inspection Webinar November 8, 2018
ML18312A118
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre  Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 11/08/2018
From:
NRC Region 4
To:
References
Download: ML18312A118 (32)


Text

~us.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environnient San Onofre Special Inspection Webinar November 8, 2018 NRC Region IV, Arlington, TX

US.NRC Logistics United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment

  • Webinar Format
  • Back-up Bridge Line (888) 469-1677, Passcode 2471451
  • Questions and Answers 2

US.NRC NRC Staff United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment

  • Eric Simpson, Special Inspection Team Leader Region IV Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning Branch
  • Troy Pruett, Director Region IV Division of Nuclear Materials Safety 3

US.NRC Webinar Agenda United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment

  • Background
  • Canister Downloading Operations
  • Inspection Team Findings
  • Current Status
  • Summary
  • Questions & Answers 4

ISFSI Layout TN NUHOMS Design Holtec UMAX Design 5

Transnuclear NUHOMS 6

Holtec UMAX 7

Vertically Ventilated Module (Vault) 8

Spent Fuel Canister Holtec MPC Transfer Cask 9

Downloading: Shield Cone 10

Downloading: Transporter 11

Downloading: Vault Door 12

Downloading:

Alignment 13

Downloading:

Attaching Slings 14

Downloading:

Attaching Slings 15

Downloading Preparations 16

What Happened on August 3rd?

Low Dose Area Low Dose Area 17

What Happened on August 3rd?

18

What Happened on August 3rd?

19

What Happened on August 3rd?

20

What Happened on August 3rd?

21

US.NRC Post Event Actions United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment

  • Spent Fuel Handling Activities Suspended
  • NRC Inspection Activities
  • San Onofre Notification to NRC
  • Causal Evaluations
  • Corrective Actions 22

US.NRC Spent Fuel Handling Activities Suspended United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment

  • MPC 29 lowered into vault
  • San Onofre suspends fuel loading

- Inside Transfer Cask

- Seismically Restrained in Fuel Building 23

US.NRC NRC Inspection Activities United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment

  • August 6th: NRC Region IV informally notified of Misalignment Event and initiates daily oversight communications
  • August 7th: San Onofre commits to NRC review before resuming operations
  • August 17th: NRC decides to conduct Special Inspection
  • September 10-14: NRC Special Inspection Team onsite
  • NRC to perform inspection prior to resumption of fuel loading 24

US.NRC NRC Inspection Activities United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment

  • 2 Preliminary Escalated Findings

- Failure to provide redundant drop protection

- Failure to report

- Procedures

- Corrective actions

- Training

  • Management Oversight Weaknesses 25

US.NRC Causal Evaluations United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment

  • San Onofre Apparent Cause Evaluation
  • Holtec Root Cause Analysis
  • Common Cause Evaluation 26

US.NRC Root Causes United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment

  • San Onofre Management failed to provide

- Adequate procedures

- Adequate training to support procedure

- Adequate oversight 27

US.NRC Corrective Actions United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment

  • Training Requirements
  • Procedure Enhancements
  • Equipment Enhancements
  • Oversight Improvements 28

US.NRC Event Significance United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment

  • No Actual Drop of Canister
  • No Radiological Release
  • Load Drop Analysis (if canister fell) 29

US.NRC Next Steps United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment

  • Issue NRC Inspection Report
  • NRC Inspection of Causal Analyses
  • NRC Inspection of Corrective Actions 30

US.NRC Summary United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment

  • Could have been prevented
  • Weaknesses in management oversight
  • Multiple failed barriers
  • Increased NRC oversight 31

Questions 32