ML17326A927

Control of Heavy Loads.

ML17326A927
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	11/20/1981
From:	Vosbury F FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
To:
Shared Package
ML17326A926	List: ML17326A927
References
CON-NRC-03-79-118, CON-NRC-3-79-118, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TER-C5257-68, NUDOCS 8112210060
Download: ML17326A927 (33)

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TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS INDIANA AND NICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY DONALD C, COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS j. AND 2 NRCDOCKETNO. 50-315, 50-316 FRC PROJECT C5257 NRCTAC NO. 07980, 07981 FRC ASSIGNMENT 3 VI NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC43-79-118 FRCTASKS 68, 69 Prepared'by Franklin Research Center Author. F. Vosbury The Parkway at Twentieth Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRCGroupLeader: x. H. sargenr Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NFIC Engineer: F. Clemenson October 23, 1981 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed ln this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.

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'llj Franklin Research Center A Division of The Franklin Institute The Seniarnln Franklin Parkway, Phile., Pa. 19103 (215) 448-) 000

TER-C5257-68 CONTENTS Section Title ~acae INTRODUCTIONe ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 1.1 Purpose of Review 1 1.2 Generic Background . 1

l. 3 Plant-Specif ic Background ~ ~ 2 EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ~ 3 2.1 General Guidelines . 3 2.2 Interim Protection Measures. 11 CONCLUDING SUMMARy ~ 14 3.1 General Provisions for Load Handling 14 3.2 Interim Protection Measures. 17

3. 3 Summary. 18 REFERENCES 19 (ill Franklin Research Center A oieition or The Fcltit5n lnsrautc

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TER-C5257-68 INTRODUCTION 1 1 PURPOSE OF REVIEW Thiss technical Th ec n evaluation report documen cumentss thee Franklin Research Center's (FRC) review of general load handling policy olic anand procedures at the Indiana and Michigan Electric Company s (IMEC) Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plan lant Units n 1 and 2.

't This evaluation was performed with the following objectives:

o to assess conformance c to thee general load handling guidelines of NUREG<<0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuc ear Power Plants" (1],

Nuclear Section S.X.1 o 'to assess conformance to th e interim n protection measures oof NUREG-0612> Section 5.3.

1. 2 GENERIC BACKGROUND Generic Techn ca 1 Act'ty xv' Task A-36 was establishe d b y the U.S. nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine 'ne staff licensing criteria and an the adeauacy of measures in ef feect aat: o p crating nuclear power plants to assure the safe han dlin zng oof heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes in these measures. This activity was xnitiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 (2] to all power reactor licensee, 'censees< requesting q

'f information concerning the control of hea cavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Tas k A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Paw'er Plants." The staff's sta conclusion from this evaluation s canc was that existing measures to contro e a plants< although providing protection from om certain cer ain popotential problems< do not aadequately equa e cover the major causes of load oa handling an accidents and should be u pg Iadedo In order to upgrade measures for the con trol ro oof heavy loads, the staff developed a series af guidelines ines des gne taa achieve a two-part objective designed using an accep t e d approach a or protection philosop oso hy.. The first portion oof the objective, ach eve d through a set af general guide '

uidelines uide 'fi identi e d in NUREG-0612< Article 5.1-1> is to ensure tthat a aall load handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and o crated so that their probability of nd operate

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TER-C5257-68 failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical. tasks in which they are employed. The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Articles 5.1.2. through 5.1.5, is to ensure that< for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load-handling systems< to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load-handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small.

Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.

The approach used to develop the staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a load drop was based on defense in depth and is summarized as follows: ~a

1. provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system 2,. define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment

3. provide mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to prevent movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or in proximity to equipment associated with redundant shutdown paths.

Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a program be initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants lo 3 'LANT-SPECIPIC BACKGROUND On December 22, 1980< the NRC issued a letter [3] to IMEC, the Licensee for D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2,. requesting that the Licensee review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREQ>>0612< and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines. IMEC responded on July 31, 1981 [4].

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TER C5257 "68 2o EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS PRC's evaluation of load handling at D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2 is divided into two categories. Th ese categories ca e deal separately with the general-guidelines o f Art'xc e 5 1.1 and the recommended interim pr otection measures of Article 5.3 of NUREG-0612. Applicable guidelines aze referenced in each category. PRC'onclusion s c and recommendations ar e p rovided in the summary for each guideline.

2. 1 GENERAL GUIDELINES The NRC has established seven general guidelin es which must. be met in order to provi'd e th e defense-in-depth approach for the handlin g of heavy loads. These guidelines consist of the followin owi g criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:

o Guideline 1 " Safe Load Paths o Guideline 2 Load Handling Procedures o Guideline 3 Crane Operator Training o Guideline 4 Special Lifting Devices o Guidel'ine 5 Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed) o Guideline 6 Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) o Guideline 7 - Crane Design.

These seven guiae'lanes a" ' s ou ld be satisfied for all overhead handling systems and programs use d too handle an heavy loads in. the vicinity o f the reactor vessel> near spent fue 1 in th e spent s fuel pool, or in other are areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. Thee Licensee's i verification of the extent to which these guidelines have been en satisfied sa s and FRC's evaluation of fi tion arere contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

this verificat 2.1.1 Overhead Hea Load Handlin S stems IMEC d t d a review conducte revie of the overhead handling systems which handle heavy loads in the vicinity of izra a e fuel or safe shutdown equipment and zradiated determined that the folloving cranes vere subje b'ect to this reviev:

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V TER C5257-68 o auxiliary building crane o new and spent fuel handling crane o polar cranes (one per unit) o manipulator cranes (one per unit) ~

2.1.2 Safe Load Paths Guideline 1, NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.1(1)

"Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc > such that if the load is droppedr the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown. on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load, is 'to be handled.

Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

a. Summa of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that defined load paths are being imposed on the movement oE heavy loads in the auxiliary building in the vicinity of the new fuel storage area. Heavy loads listed, in Table 3.1, with the exception of radiation protection shields, are moved at a height of 7 Eeet from the floor and as close as possible to the south wall. The auxiliary building crane, unloaded, is moved through the restricted area with the carriage as close as possible to themouth wall. The Licensee stated that special procedures for handling heavy loads in the auxiliary building will be written .to cover the above restiictions and the load path will be indicated'n the floor.

Heavy loads in the containment building are handled by the polar crane.

A procedure will be developed to'define the load path Eor the missile shields and cavity bulkhead sections.

b.. PRC Evaluation The Licensee's response provides insufficient information for FRC to deter-mine if safe load paths have been developed for the individual heavy loads handled by the polar cranes. A review of the plant arrangement drawings showing

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TER-C5257-68 the safe load paths in the auxiliary building indicates that the load paths are defined by excluding specific areas< rather than by defining individual safe load paths for each heavy load handled in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. Insufficient information was provided by the Licensee to allow PRC to determine if heavy loads are handled in accordance with the t

following criteria:

l. load paths have been selected to follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members

2. load paths are clearly marked on the floor

3. load paths are defined in the procedures

4. deviations from established load paths require written alternatives approved by the plant safety review committee

5. load paths are shown on equipment layout drawings.

c. FRC Conclusions and Recommendations IMEC does not comply with Guideline 1. The Licensee should develop safe load paths for individual heavy loads handled in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment.

The Licensee should ensure that the safe load paths comply with the criteria of this guideline (i.e., load paths are defined in procedures and drawings, follow structural members, are clearly marked, and deviations are strictly controlled) .

2.1.3 Load Handlin Pro'cedures Guideline 2 NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1{2 "Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads .listed in Table 3-1 of NJREG-0612.

These procedures should includes identification of required equipmentg inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."

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TER-C5 257-68

a. Summa of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Procedures are in effect to govern the movement of heavy loads that are or could be handled near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. The procedures include identification of required equipment< inspection and acceptance criteria required before movement of the load, and other special

'procedures. Procedures for the spent fuel shipping cask will be developed when required. Procedures for handling the missile shields and bulkhead walls including the designated load paths will be prepared.

b. FRC Evaluation ZMEC partially satisfies the criteria of'uideline 2; however, the information supplied was not sufficient for FRC to determine (1) if the procedures include the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load and (2) if safe load paths have been defined.

FRC does not find ' acceptable for safe load paths and procedures not to have been established for the spent fuel shipping cask. Since this review by FRC constitutes the only comprehensive evaluation of load handling'practices at D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2, all issues should be resolved either by compliance with the guideline or< if in the case of nonmompliance< by instituting the recommended corrective actions within a reasonable period of time so that no items are deferred to a future unspecified date. Therefore< the Licensee should develop the" necessary safe load paths for the spent fuel shipping cask in anticipation of subsequent load handling operations.

c. FRC Conclusions .and Recommendations D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2 partially comply with Guideline 2. Xn order to fully comply, IMEC should revise heavy load handling procedures to ensure that (1) safe load paths are defined and (2) the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load are included. The Licensee should develop, procedures for handling the spent fuel shipping cask< missile shields< and cavity bulkhead sections.

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TER-C5257 68 2.1.4 Crane Ooerator Trainin [Guideline 3 NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(3 "Crane operators should be trained, qualified and conduct .themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976, 'Overhead and Gantry Cranes'5]."

a. Summa of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated:

"Crane operators are trained, qualified, and are to conduct themselves in accordance with Section 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976, 'Overhead and Gantry Cranes.'o exceptions are taken to ANSI B30.2<<1976 with respect to operator training, qualifications, and conduct."

b. FRC Evaluation The Licensee has implemented crane operator training and qualification programs at D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2. However, the Licensee has not verified that programs exist to monitor operator conduct in accordance with Section e

2-3.1.7 of ANSI B30.2, but has stated that crane operators are expected to conduct: themselves in accordance with this guideline.

c. FRC Conclusions and Recommendations D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2 comply with Guideline 3. Training and'ualifica-tion programs developed by D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2 comply with ANSI B30.2.

The Licensee should srerify that suitable programs to monitor or ensure proper operator conduct have been implemented. These programs may consist of review of operator conduct during training and qualification, surveillance or monitoring of operators during actual load handling by. plant safety or quality l

'r assurance personnel, or supervision of load handling by selected senior crane plant supervisors.

2.1.5 S ecial Liftin Devices Guideline 4 NUREG-0612, Article 5-1.1 4)

"Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978,

'Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Neighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials'6l. This. standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy loads in ill) Franklin Research Center h Dh4slen of 'Ihe Fsani4n hsonac

TER-C5257-68 areas as defined above. For operating plants certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is in .lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the st:ress design factor on only the weight (st:atic load) of the load and of the interven-ing components of the special handling device."

a. Summa of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that the requirements for special lifting devices< as set forth in ANSI N14.6-1978, "Standards for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds or More for Nuclear Materials," are met in the following procedures:

o load monitoring device verification instructions o manipulator crane load test o auxiliary building crane interlock verification fuel handling o shipment of reactor vessel material surveillance capsule using SWRI

'ask and equipment.

b. FRC Evaluation The Licensee has developed a set of procedures which meet the criteria of Section 5 {Acceptance Testing and Assurance of Continued Compl'iance) of ANSI N14.6>>1978. However, the Licensee did not discuss the criteria of Section 3

{Design), Section 4 (Fabrication), or Section 6 (Special Lifting Devices for Critical Loads) of ANSI N14.6 or the recuirements of this guideline.

c. FRC Conclusions and Recommendations D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2 partially comply with Guideline 4. The Licensee should evaluate those special lifting devices in use to determine compliance with Sections 3, 4, and 6 of ANSI N14.6-1978 prior to their next use.

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TER-C5257 68 2.1.6 Liftin Devices (Not S eciall Desi ned) Guideline 5, NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.1(5)

"Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, 'Slings'7].

However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the 'static load'hich produces the maximum static and dynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."

a. Summa of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated:

"Lifting devices that are not specially designed follow the guidelines set forth in Handbook for Ri ers by W.G. Newberry, revised edition 1977."

b. PRC Evaluation IMEC did.not provide sufficient information for FRC to determine if the 'I lifting devices not specially designed are installed and used in accordance with ANSI B30.9-1971, or if plant procedures ensure proper sling selection, rating, and identification.

c. FRC Conclusions and Recommendations A conclusion with respect to Guideline 5 must be deferred. INC should review all handling devices, identify those which are not,specially designed and are use'd in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment, and ensure that these devices conform to the, criteria of ANSI B30.9<<1971 before they are next used. INEC should also ensure the following:

1. sling selection is based upon the sum of static and maximum dynamic loads

2. slings are marked with the "static load" which produces the maximum static and dynamic loads

3. slings restricted to use with only certain cranes are clearly marked to so indicate.

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TER-C5257-68 2.1.7 Cranes (Ins ection Testin and Maintenance) Guideline 6 NUREG<<0612 Article 5.1.1(6 "The crane should be inspected, tested> and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, 'Overhead and Gantry Cranes,'ith the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PNR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use) ."

a. Summa of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The cranes at D.C. Cook Units .1 and 2 are inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2.-2 of ANSI.B30.2-1976.

b. FRC Evaluation The Licensee has committed to crane inspection, testing, and maintenance in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976.

c. FRC Conclusion IMEC complies with the criteria of Guideline 6.

2.1.8 Crane. Desi n Guideline 7 NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.1 7 "The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2<<1976, 'Overhead and Gantry Cranes<'nd of CMAA-70r 'Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes'8]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied."

a. Summa of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that the cranes at- the D.C. Cook Units were built by Hhiting Corporation in accordance with Electric Overhead. Crane Institute

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TERM5257-68 Specification 61 (EOCI-61) [9] - -

and ANSI B30.2-1967.

9 an The Licensee is investigating th e diffe rences between the olderr spe s ecifications (EOCI-61 an ANSI B30. 2-1967) and current specif ications.

b. FRC Evaluation The Licensee has not provided suufficient ic en information for PRC to evaluate the design o f th e cranes in use at D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2.

c. PRC Conclusions and Recommendations A conclusion w ith respect, to Guideline 7 mus t bee deferred. The Licensee should perform a poin- oint-by-point comparison between desi es g n standards invoked in i

the s p ecif ication o f th e r cranes and those required staff Guideline b sta ed by ui e 7, identify variations between the two and just y th e a cceptability of current crane operations wh ere thee later standards are more stringent.

i 2~2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES The NRC has established six interim im pro ec i rotection measures to,be'. implemented at operating nuclear power plan t s to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy a loads wi will bee handled a over the spent fuel1 pool and that ool an a m measures exist ntial for accidental load drops too iimp act on fuel in the core or spent fuel pool. ool. Pour oof thee six interim measures of the repor conssist s of general Guideline 1, 1 Sa a Paths,; Guideline 2, Load Han Safee Load Handlinng li Pr ocedures; Guide ne 3 Crane Operator Training;; an ~

and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance). The two wo reremaining interim measures cover the following criteria: I

1. Heavy load technical specifications

'. Special review for h eaavy loads handled over the core.

Licensee implementation annd evaluation o f th e se interim protection measures is contaxne d in 'he succeeding paragraphs of this section.

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el TER-CS257-68 2.2.1 Technical S ecifications Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612 Article 5.3(l "Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7r

'Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool..Building,'or PNR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, 'Crane Travel,'or BWR's, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implemen-tation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5-1."

a. Summa of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee made no statements or conclusions regarding this interim protection measure.

b. FRC Evaluation Technical specifications implemented by the Licensee (Technical Specification 3.9.7) state that "Loads in excess of 2500 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool." This technical specification satisfies the criteria of Interim Protection Measure 1.

c. FRC Conclusions and Recommendations D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2 comply with Interim Protection Measure 1.

2.2.2 Administrative Controls Interim Protection Measures 2, 3 4, and 5 NUREG-0612 Articles 5.3 (2 - 5.3 (5)

"Procedural or administrative measures [including safe load paths, load handling procedures> crane operator training, and crane inspection]...

can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and. modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 of [NUREG-0612} ."

a. Summa of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Summaries of Licensee statements and conclusions are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections '2.1.2< 2-1.3<

2.1.4, and 2.1.7.

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b. FRC Evaluations Conclusions and Recommendations FRC's evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1. 2 2 1.3 2.1.4, and 2 1.7 2.2.3 S ecial Reviews for Hea Loads Over the Core Interim Protection Measure 6 NUREG-0612, Article 5.3 6 "Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the coze, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include the following for these loads: (1) review of procedures for installation o f rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear an d concise; (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, condact of operations, and content of procedures." "

a. Summa of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee made no statements or conclusions regarding this interim protection measure.

b. PRC Evaluation The Licensee has provided insufficient information for PRC to determine compliance with Interim Protection Measure 6.

c. FRC Conclusions and Recommendations A conclusion with respect to this interim protection measure must be deferred. The Licensee should perform a -speci.al review of heavy loads handled over the core-l)ll FranMln Research Center h Ohrsiari ar The FrenNrr Irnatute

TER-CS257-68 3 CONCLUDING SUNMARY This summary is provided to consolida t e the conclusions and recommenda-tions of Section 2 and to documen t FRC's overall., evaluation of the handling of heavy loads at D.C. Cook Units 1 an and 2. It is divided into two sections dealing with general provisions for load handl ing at nuclear power plant:s (NUREG-0612, Article 5.1. 1)) an d thee staff recommendations for interim protection, pending complete implementation of o the g uidelines of NUREG-0612 (NUREG-0612< Article 5 3) . In each case< recomm recommendations for additional Licensee action, an d a ddit'onal i NRC staff action where appropriate, are provided.

3 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR LOAD HANDLING The NRC staf f i h as es t, a blished seven guidelines concerning p xovisions for handling heavy loads in t: he area of the reactor vessel< near stored spent fuel, or in other areas where an accidental load dxo p could damage safe shutdown systems. Co 1'e Comp 'iance wi.thw these guidelines is necessary to ensure that. load han dl'ing sys tern e design administrative controls, and operator

'lit training an d qua lification are such that the possibi ' of a load drop is very small for the critical functions performed by. cranes c at nuclear power plants. Th ese g uidelines are partially satisfied a t D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2-This conclusion is presented in tabular form as Table 3.1. . . S p ecific P

recommendations for achieving full compliance with these guidelines, are provided as .followss Guideline Recommendation 1 a. Develop safe load paths for heavy loads handled in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment.

Ensure that sa fe 1 oa d paths ar'e defined in procedures and drawings, follow structural members, and are clearly mar marked, and that deviations are properly controlled.

2 a~ Revise h an dling procedures to ensure that safe lo load p aths are defined and that the steps and proper sequencec to be followed in handling the load are included.

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Thbla 3.1., O.C, Cook Vnlts 1 and 2/HVREG-0612 Cospllance Hatcix Height Intecin Intecln oc Guideline 1 Culdeline 2 Culdel inc 3 Guideline 6 Culdeline 5 Guideline 6 Culdellne 7 Heasuce 1 Hessuce 6 Safe Load Crane Operator Special Lifting Crane - 'Test Technical Special I d Capacity

~tons Pth P d ~TI I I I dttdt ~II 't tt ~dht I ~IIII tt htt ant ion

1. Polar Ccane 'ain 250 I

C C hux 35 Reactor Vessel Head 102 Upper Intecnals 58 Io<<ec Internals 80 In-Secvice Inspection tool 1.5 Hisslle Shields 100 I

Cavity bulkhead Sections 40 RC HC Plant Equipaent (Hsx) 38

2. Hsnlpulatoc Ccsne ld5 He<< and Spent tuel C Pd I ioenaee aCtiOn COupllea <<lth BUREC-0612 Culdellne. I HC Licensee action does not cosply <<1th HVREG-0612 Culdellne. t O pc ~ Licensee action psctislly cospl les <<lth lnlAEG-0612 culdeline M I ~ Insufficient Infornatlon provided by the Licensee. Ul Hot applicable. I rh CO

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Table 3.1 (Cont.l Height Interim Interin oc Suideline 1 Cuidellne 2 Cuideline 3 Culdellne 6 Guideline 5 Cuideline 6 Guideline 7 Heasuce 1 ~

Heasure 6 Capacity Safe Load Crane Operator Special i Iftiny Crane - Test Technical Special

~lh I d ~to s ta L a ~V D I ~all ~BX t 1 ~CD 1 ~SlCl rt Att* ti

3. Auxiliary Hain 150 Building Crane hux 20 C Spent tuel Shipping Cask 110 Radiation Protection Shields 55 Irradiated i Specinen cn Shipping Caa'k l.

Plant Eqoipaent iHaxl C Neu Fuel Shipping Containers eith hsaenbly 1.5 Spent Puel Rssenbly 0 95 NC 0

Neu tuel hsseably 0+95 NC Superstructure Neu and Spent Fuel Ccane 25 Equipnent Natch 65 Reactor Coolant I Pusp Rotating P A

tn hsseably 1$ M tn Reactor Coolant I Puap Hotor 3B Cl tO

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b. Develop procedures for thee spen s ent fuel e shipping cask< missile shields, and bulkhead walls.

3 (D.C. Cook Units 1 an d 2 co comply with this guideline.)

Evaluate special lifting devices in use for compl m liance with- ANSI N14.6-1978 prior to their next use.

iftin devices not specially de desi g ned used in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or safe sshutdown u own equipment and ensure and this guideline prior to their next use.

(D.C. Cook Units 1 an d 2 comply with this guideline.)

- oint comparison between design standards of the plant's cranes and those require d b y hi 'd li

3. 2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES The NRC staff has esstablisheda (NUREG-0612, Article 5.3) that certain i it' measures s should be n s.a e d to provide reasonable e assurance a dligof that h an n heavy loads will be performe rme in a safe manner unt rmed il final ina implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1 is complete. S ecified ete. Specs. e measures inc 'nclude the implementation oof a technical e specification to pro i rohibit x

te h h an dling of heavy loads over fuel i f -,

ue in the storage pools complian Guidel n es lr 2< 3< andd 6 o NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load han dling p rocedures and operator tr training;

'ce g, and a vs.sua inspection program, with including component'rep ent'repair or replacement as necessazy of cranes, slings, and

'e cessa o i

al lifting special f '

ng devices to eliminate defficiencies that coul 1 ea d to o component FRC's evaluation of information o provrovidede by y the Licensee indicates t at, thee following actions are ne that necessaryy to ensure tth a t: the staff's measures for interim protection at D.C. Cook Units 1 and C Coo 2 aze meta.

Interim Measure Recommendation (D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2 comply with this interim measure.)

2r 3g '4 Implement the recommendations of idelines 1, 2, and Guid 3 identified'n Section 3.1.

<<17>>

IlIl FranMln Research Center A Obison d The FtankSn Institute

'I

0 4 I

t 4

~ v

'ER-C5257-68 Interim Measure Recommendation 5 (D C Cook Units 1 arid 2 comply with this interim measure.)

Perform the special review required by this interim measure 3~3

SUMMARY

Measures have been implemented at Indiana and Michigan Electric Company I s Donald C. Cook Units 1 and 2 which satisfy and comply, to some extent< with NRC general guidelines and interim protection measures identified in NUREG-0612. In particular, implementation of ANSI B30.2-1976 for crane operator training. and qualification; crane testing< inspectionr and maintenance; and implementation of technical specifications to prohibit movement of heavy loads over the spent fuel pool satisfy the criteria of the NRC guidelines.

Action is required by the Licensee to satisfy NRC criteria for safe load paths, procedures, special lifting devices, lifting devices not specially designed, and special attent'ion for heavy loads handled over the core.

-18 III) Franklin Research Center A Decision of The Fzanl4n Iruome

Y ~

TER-C5257-68

4. REFERENCES NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" NRC, July 1980 20 V. Stello, Jr. (NRC)

Letter to all licensees

Subject:

Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel NRC, May 17, 1978 3~ NRC Generic letter 81-07 to D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 December 22, 1980 4~ R. S. Hunter (IMEC)

Letter to H. R. Denton (NRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads July 31, 1981 5 ANSI B30 2-1976 "Overhead and Gantry Cranes" American Society of Mechanical Engineers 1976

6. ANSI N14. 6-1978 "Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" American National Standards Institute, Inc.

February 15, 1972 7 ~ ANSI B30 ~ 9-1971 "Slings" American Society of Mechanical Engineers 1972

8. CMAA-70 "Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" Crane Manufacturers Association of America, Inc.

1975

9. Electric Overhead Crane Institute Specification No. 61, "Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" 000 Franklin Research Center A Dhtsion or The Frenksn Insatute