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E.I. Hatch, Units 1 and 2 - Technical Specifications. Part 3 of 4
	ML15350A411
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Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	12/15/2015
From:	Pierce C R; Southern Co, Southern Nuclear Operating Co
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ML15351A023	List: ML15350A409; ML15350A410; ML15350A411; NL-14-1075, E.I. Hatch, Units 1 and 2 - Technical Specifications. Part 2 of 4; NL-14-1075, E.I. Hatch, Units 1 and 2 - Technical Specifications. Part 3 of 4; NL-14-1075, Technical Specifications. Part 4 of 4;
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{{#Wiki_filter:INSERT -Bases 3.7.1 Condition D0.If one RHRSW subsystem is inoperable or one RHRSW pump in one or two subsystems isinoperable and not restored within the provided Completion Time, the plant must be brought to acondition in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must bebrought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours.Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 5) and because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action 0.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit.The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach therequired plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and withoutchallenging plant systems. RHRSW SystemB83.7.1BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply tovalves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 10.6.2. FSAR, Subsection 14.4.3.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements,"

July 23, 1993.4. GEH 0000-0126-6532-Ri, "Ultimate Heat sink Temperature Increase to 970F Impact on OBA-LOCA Analysis and DWEquipment Qualification Analysis," June 2011.INSERT -BASES 3.7.1IReference HATCH UNIT 1B 3.7-6HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-6 L~~1 INSERT -Bases 3.7.1 Reference

5. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

PSW System and UHSB 3.7.2BASESACTIONS 0.(continued) With one PSW pump inoperable in each subsystem, one inoperable pump must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With theunit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE PSW pumps areadequate to perform the PSW heat removal function;

however, theoverall reliability is reduced.

The 7 day Completion Time is based onthe remaining PSW heat removal capability to accommodate anadditional single failure and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period.0.1_&With one PSW turbine building isolation valve inoperable in eachsubsystem, one inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLEstatus within 72 hours. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE PSW valves are adequate to perform the PSWnonessential load isolation function;

however, the overall reliability isreduced.

The 72 hour Completion Time is based on the remaining PSW heat removal capability to accommodate an additional singlefailure and the low probability of an event occurring during this timeperiod.INSERT -BASES 3.7.2Condition EIWith one PSW subsystem inoperable for reasons other thanCondition A and Condition B (e.g., inoperable flow p~ath, both pumpsinoperable in a loop, or both turbine building isolation valvesinoperable in a loop), the PSW subsystem must be restored toOPERABLE status within 72 hours. With the unit in this condition, theremaining OPERABLE PSW subsystem is adequate to perform the(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 .71B 3.7-10 INSERT -Bases 3.7.2 Condition EE.__IIf one PSW pump in one or both subsystems is inoperable, or one PSW turbine buildingisolation valve in one or both subsystems is inoperable, and is not restored to OPERABLEstatus within the required Completion Times, the plant must be brought to a condition in whichoverall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at leastMODE 3 within 12 hours.Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 5) and because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action E.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit.The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach therequired plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and withoutchallenging plant systems. PSW System and UHSB 3.7.2BASESACTIONS (continued) heat removal function.

However, the overall reliability is reducedbecause a single failure in the OPERABLE PSW subsystem couldresult in loss of PSW function.

The 72 hour Completion Time is based on the redundant PSWSystem capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem, the lowprobability of an accident occurring during this time period, and isconsistent with the allowed Completion Time for restoring aninoperable 0G.Required Action d6diied by two Notes indicating that theapplicable Conditions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources -Operating," LCO 3.4.7, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown CoolingSystem -Hot Shutdown," be entered and Required Actions taken ifthe inoperable PSW subsystem results in an inoperable DG or RHRshutdown cooling subsystem, respectively. This is in accordance withLCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for thesecomponents. Conitionibte meCt,° orP Iboth npsW mwsubfsystems are inoperable for reasons other than Conditions C and D, or the UHSis determined inoperable, the unit must be placed in a MODE in whichthe LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must beplaced in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based onoperating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from fullpower conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unitsystems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1REQUI REMENTSThis SR verifies the UHS is OPERABLE by ensuring the water level inthe pump well of the intake structure to be sufficient for the properoperation of the PSW pumps (net positive suction head and pumpvortexing are considered in determining this limit). In addition, if atemporary weir is in place, the river level must also correspond to alevel in the pump well of the intake structure of > 60.7 ft MSL with noweir in place. If the water level is > 61.7 ft MSL, there is sufficient (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 .71B 3.7-11 PSW System and UHSB 3.7.2BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 10.7.2. FSAR, Section 5.2.3. FSAR, Chapter 14.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements,"

July 23, 1993.IINSERT -BASES 3.7.2<IReference HATCH UNIT 1 B371B 3.7-13 INSERT -Bases 3.7.2 Reference

5. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

MCREC SystemB 3.7.4BASESACTIONSB.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued) probability that CRE occupants will have to implement protective measures that may adversely affect their ability to control the reactorand maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA. Inaddition, the 90 day Completion Time is a reasonable time todiagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problems with theCRE boundary. c.1In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable MCREC subsystem or the CREloveral ln boundary cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the requiredCopeto Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes Iisc~cJ~risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in atleast MODE 3 within 12 oursrJq +/-i OE Theallowed Completion based on operating experience, to reach the requir~ unit conditions from full power\conditions in an orderly manner nd without challenging unit syst ins.L--Time is I INSERT -BASES3.7.4D.1, D.2.1. D.2.2. and D.2.3ICondition CThe Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactoroperations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuelassemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, if theinoperable MCREC subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLEstatus within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE MCRECsubsystem may be placed in the pressurization mode. This actionensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failuresthat would prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that anyactive failure will be readily detected. An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately suspendactivities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that mightrequire isolation of the CRE. This places the unit in a condition thatminimizes the accident risk.If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuelassemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 .72B 3.7-22 INSERT -Bases 3.7.4 Condition CRemaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 11), because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action C.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit. MCREC SystemB 3.7.4BASESACTI ONS 0.1, D.2.1. D.2.2, and D.2.3 (continued) immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not precludecompletion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, ifapplicable, action must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVsto minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until theOPDRVs are suspended. IINSERT -BASES 3.7.4E.1 ICondition EIIf both MCeC bsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3 forreasons oth erthan an inoperable ORE boundary (i.e., Condition B),the System may not be capable of performing the intendedF.1. F.2, and F.3The Required Actions of Condition F are modified by a Noteindicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuelassemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement isindependent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, withtwo MCREC subsystems inoperable or with one or more MORECsubsystems inoperable due to an inoperable ORE boundary, actionmust be taken immediately to suspend activities that present apotential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of theORE. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accidentrisk.If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuelassemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not precludecompletion of movement of a component to a safe position. Ifapplicable, action must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVsto minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until theOPDRVs are suspended. (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B372B 3.7-23 INSERT -Bases 3.7.4 Condition ETherefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. Toachieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within12 hours.Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 11) and because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action E.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit.The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach therequired plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and withoutchallenging plant systems. MCREC SystemB 3.7.4BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS consequences is no more than 5 rem TEDE and the ORE occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke. This SR verifiesthat the unfiltered air inleakage into the ORE is no greater than theflow rate assumed in the licensing basis analyses of DBAconsequences When unfiltered air inleakage is greater than theassumed flow rate, Condition B must be entered. Required Action B.3allows time to restore the ORE boundary to OPERABLE statusprovided mitigating actions can ensure that the ORE remains withinthe licensing basis habitability limits for the occupants following anaccident. Compensatory measures are discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.196, Section 0.2.7.3, (Ref. 9) which endorses, withexceptions, NEI 99-03, Section 8.4 and Appendix F (Ref. 10). Thesecompensatory measures may also be used as mitigating actions asrequired by Required Action B.2. Temporary analytical methods mayalso be used as compensatory measures to restore OPERABILITY (Ref. 11). Options for restoring the ORE boundary to OPERABLEstatus include changing the licensing basis DBA consequence

analysis, repairing the ORE boundary, or a combination of theseactions.

Depending upon the nature of the problem and the corrective action, a full scope inleakage test may not be necessary to establish that the ORE boundary has been restored to OPERABLE status.REFERENCES

1. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 6.4.2. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 9.4.1.3. FSAR, Section 5.2.4. FSAR, Chapter 14.5. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 6.4.1.2.2.

6. Unit 2 FSAR, Table 15.1-28.7. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements,"

July 23, 1993.8. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T2.1-1.9. Regulatory Guide 1.196.10. NEI 99-03, "Control Room Habitability Assessment," June2001.~INSERT -BASES 3.7.4Reference (continued) HATCH UNIT 1B3724B 3.7-24b INSERT -Bases 3.7.4 Reference

11. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

Control Room AC SystemB 3.7.5BASESACTIONS C.1 and C.2(continued) With three control room AC subsystems inoperable, the Control RoomAC System may not be capable of performing its intended function. Therefore, the control room area temperature is required to bemonitored to ensure that temperature is being maintained such thatequipment in the control room is not adversely affected. With thecontrol room temperature being maintained within the temperature limit, 72 hours is allowed to restore a Control Room AC subsystem toOPERABLE status. This Completion time is reasonable considering that the control room temperature is being maintained within limits andthe low probability of an event occurring requiring control roomisolation. Alternate methods of maintaining control room temperature, such as non-safety grade air conditioning systems or fans, can alsobe used to maintain control room temperature. D. 1 --overall plantIIn MODE 1, 2, or 3, with any Requi ed Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, C not met, the unit must beplaced in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unitmust be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours ;,Di ~,, allowed Completion~ reasonabe based on operatig experience, to reach the required nit conditions from full power co ditions in an orderly manner and wi houtchallenging unit sy ,tems.\,.*, -BASES 3.7.5 Tiime is" i Condition DE.1, E.2.1, E.2.2. and E.2.3The Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactoroperations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, ifRequired Action and associated Completion Time for Condition A isnot met, the OPERABLE control room AC subsystems may be placedimmediately in operation. This action ensures that the remaining subsystems are OPERABLE, that no failures that would preventactuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected. ('continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B372B 3.7-28 INSERT -Bases 3.7.5 Condition DRemaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 4) and because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action 0.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit. Control Room AC SystemB 3.7.5BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.1REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system issufficient to remove the control room heat load assumed in the safetyanalysis. The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.REFERENCES

1. Unit 2 FSAR, Sections 6.4 and 9.4.1.2. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements,"

July 23, 1993.3. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T2.1-1.INSERT -BASES 3.7.5S Reference HATCH UNIT 1 B373B 3.7-30 INSERT -Bases 3.7.5 Reference

4. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

Main Condenser OffgasB 3.7.6BASES (continued) APPLICABILITY The LCO is applicable when steam is being exhausted to the maincondenser and the resulting noncondensables are being processed viathe Main Condenser Offgas System. This occurs during MODE 1, andduring MODES 2 and 3 with any main steam line not isolated and theSJAE in operation. In MODES 4 and 5, steam is not being exhausted to the main condenser and the requirements are not applicable. ACTIONS A.1If the offgas radioactivity rate limit is exceeded, 72 hours is allowed torestore the gross gamma activity rate to within the limit. The 72 hourCompletion Time is reasonable, based on engineering

judgment, thetime required to complete the Required Action, the large marginsassociated with permissible dose and exposure limits, and the lowprobability of a Main Condenser Offgas System rupture.If the gross gamma activity rate is not restored to within the limits inthe associated Completion Time, all main steam lines or the SJAEmust be isolated.

This isolates the Main Condenser Offgas Systemfrom the source of the radioactive steam. The main steam lines areconsidered isolated if at least one main steam isolation valve in eachmain steam line is closed, and at least one main steam line drainvalve in the drain line is closed. The 12 hour Completion Time isreasonable, based on operating experience, to perform the action~sfrom full power conditions in an orderly manner and withoutoverall plant risk is Ichallenging unit systems.minimzed.An alternative to Required ctions B.1 and B.2 is to placethe unit in a MODE in whicl Toachieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3within 12 hours .adi ;OE4;',th" q3 bsr.The allowedCompletion reasonable, based on op ~atingex erience,'t reach the required unit conditions/from full power]Time is conditions in an orderly manner and without ch Illenging unitsystems. INSERT -BASES 3.7.6 L(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 .73B 3.7-32 INSERT -Bases 3.7.6 Condition BRemaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 4), because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action B.3 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit. Main Condenser OffgasB 3.7.6BASES (continued) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.6.1This SR, on a 31 day Frequency, requires an isotopic analysis of anoffgas sample to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. Thenoble gases to be sampled are Xe-133, Xe-135, Xe-i138, Kr-85m,Kr-87, and Kr-88. If the measured rate of radioactivity increases significantly (by > 50% after correcting for expected increases due tochanges in THERMAL POWER), an isotopic analysis is alsoperformed within 4 hours after the increase is noted, to ensure thatthe increase is not indicative of a sustained increase in theradioactivity rate. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under theSurveillance Frequency Control Program.This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR is not required tobe performed until 31 days after any main steam line is not isolatedand the SJAE is in operation. Only in this condition can radioactive fission gases be in the Main Condenser Offgas System at significant rates.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 9.4 and Appendix E.2. 10 CFR 50.67.3. NRC No. 93-1 02, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements,"

July 23, 1993."INSERT -BASES 3.7.6Reference HATCH UNIT 1 B373B 3.7-33 INSERT -Bases 3.7.6 Reference

4. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONS F.1 (continued) Guide 1.93. In addition, the loss of a required Unit 2 DG concurrent with the loss of a Unit 1 or swing DG, is analogous to the loss of asingle DG in the Regulatory Guide 1.93 assumptions; thus, entry intothis Condition is not required in this case.)G.___With both Unit 2 DGs and the swing DG inoperable (or otherwise incapable of supplying power to the LPCI valve load centers), and anassumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient standbyAC sources are available to power the LPCI valve load centers. Sincethe offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power forthe LPCI valve load centers at this level of degradation, the riskassociated with operation for a very short time could be less than thatassociated with an immediate controlled shutdown. (The immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total lossof AC power.) Since any inadvertent unit generator trip could alsoresult in a total loss of offsite AC power, the time allowed forcontinued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoidthe risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown andminimize the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdownand minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation. According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), with two or more DGsinoperable, operation may continue for a period that should notexceed 2 hours. (Regulatory'Guide 1.93 assumed the unit had twoDGs. Thus, a loss of both DGs results in a total loss of onsite power.)Therefore, a loss of both Unit 2 DGs and the swing DG results indegradation no worse than that assumed in Regulatory Guide 1 .93,and the 2 hour Completion Time is acceptable. H.1 __overall plant risk isIf the inoperable AC electrical power orso cnnt erestored toOPERABLE status within the associ dCmltonTmte unitmust be brought to a MODE in which~t" LC c. .ToITime is achieve. .this status,_, the, ,-,--unit must, ...be brought to at least MODE 3within 12 ,..... ........... q.The allowedCompletion lreasonable, based on op rating experience, toreach the required plant conditions from full pow r conditions in anorderly manner and without challenging plant systems.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B381B 3.8-17 INSERT -Bases 3.8.1 Condition HRemaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 15) and because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action H.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit. AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1No change. Included forBASES information only.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.18 (continued) REQUIREMENTS the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with theengine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. It ispermissible to place all three DGs in test simultaneously, for theperformance of this Surveillance. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.I SR 3.8.1.19With the exception of this Surveillance, all other Surveillances of thisSpecification (SR 3.8.1.1 through SR 3.8.1.18) are applied only to theUnit 1 DG and offsite circuits, and swing DG. This Surveillance isprovided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the requiredUnit 2 DG and offsite circuit are governed by the Unit 2 Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable Unit 2 Surveillances willsatisfy both any Unit 2 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 1SR. Several exceptions are noted to the Unit 2 SRs: SR 3.8.1.6 isexcepted since only one Unit 2 circuit is required by the Unit 1Specification (therefore, there is not necessarily a second circuit totransfer to); SRs 3.8.1.10, 15, and 17 are excepted since they relateto the DG response to a Unit 2 ECCS initiation signal, which is not anecessary function for support of the Unit 1 requirement for anOPERABLE Unit 2 DG.The Frequency required by the applicable Unit 2 SR also governsperformance of that SR for both Units.REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.2. FSAR, Sections 8.3 and 8.4.3. FSAR, Chapter 5.4. FSAR, Chapter 6.5. FSAR, Chapter 14.6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B383 EIIN6B 3.8-36REVISION 69 AC Sources -Operating B83.8.1BASESREFERENCES (continued)

7. Generic Letter 84-15.8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.9. Regulatory Guide 1.9, March 1971.10. Regulatory Guide 1.108, August 1977.11. Regulatory Guide 1.137, October 1979.12. IEEE Standard 387-1984.

13. IEEE Standard 308-1980.

14. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements,"

July 23, 1993.INSERT -BASES 3.8.1S Reference HATCH UNIT 1 B383B 3.8-37 INSERT -Bases 3.8.1 Reference

15. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4BASESACTIONS B._I (continued) case accident, continued power operation should not exceed12 hours. The 12 hour Completion Time provides a period of time tocorrect the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining the OG DC electrical power subsystem OPERABLE. (The DG DCelectrical power subsystem affects both the DG and the offsite circuit,as well as the breaker closure power for various 4160 VAC loads, butdoes not affect 125/250 VDC station service loads.)C._1Condition C represents one Unit 1 station service division with aloss of ability to completely respond to an event, and a potential loss of ability to remain energized during normal operation. It istherefore imperative that the operator's attention focus onstabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of DCpower to the affected division. The 2 hour limit is consistent withthe allowed time for an inoperable DC Distribution System division. If one of the required DC electrical power subsystems is inoperable (e.g., inoperable

battery, inoperable battery charger(s),

or inoperable battery charger and associated inoperable battery), the remaining DCelectrical power subsystems have the capacity to support a safeshutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent postulated worst case single failure could result in the loss ofminimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a postulated worst case accident, continued power op~ration should not exceed2 hours. The 2 hour Completion Time is based on Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7) and reflects a reasonable time to assess unitstatus as a function of the inoperable DC electrical power subsystem and, if the DC electrical power subsystem is not restored toOPERABLE status, to prepare to effect an orderly and safe unitshutdown. F.overall plant risk isD. 1 rt-9 minimized. If the DC electrical power subsy tem cannot be restored toOPERABLE status within the r~ uired Completion Time, the unit mustbe brought to a MODE in which I'"cLOds t py.j To achievethis status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within Condirdpation ditosfo(fl inanorderly HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-56 PEl, ZI,_,.,,ON 3 INSERT -Bases 3.8.4 Condition DRemaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 11) and because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action D.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit. DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4BASESACTIONS D.1 and 0.2 (continuod) ~u ~ tl~ uiittu r~1oDEi 4 ~, ~11 ~t~Ijt ~;th th~ t;iie ie~uied ~flegulatc~y Cu~de 1.~3 (rzcf. 7).E.1Condition E corresponds to a level of degradation in the DC electrical power subsystems that causes a required safety function to be lost.When more than one DC source is lost, and this results in the loss ofa required

function, the plant is in a condition outside the accidentanalysis.

Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence acontrolled shutdown. SURVEILLANCE The SRs are modified by a Note to indicate that SR 3.8.4.1 throughREQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.4.8 apply only to the Unit 1 DC sources, and that SR 3.8.4.9applies only to the Unit 2 DC sources.SR 3.8.4.1Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge for thebatteries helps to ensure the effectiveness of the charging system andthe ability of the batteries to perform their intended function. Floatcharge is the condition in which the charger is supplying thecontinuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of abattery (or battery cell) and maintain the battery (or a battery cell) in afully charged state. Voltage requirements are based on the nominaldesign voltage of the battery and are consistent with the initialvoltages assumed in the battery sizing calculations. The voltagerequirement for battery terminal voltage is based on the open circuitvoltage of a lead-calcium cell of nominal 1.215 specific gravity.Without regard to other battery parameters, this voltage is indicative ofa battery that is capable of performing its required safety function. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.SR 3.8.4.2Visual inspection to detect corrosion of the battery cells andconnections, or measurement of the resistance of each inter-cell, (continued) HATCH UNIT 1 B385B 3.8-57 DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4BASES (continued) REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GOC 17.2. Regulatory Guide 1.6.3. IEEE Standard 308-1971.

4. FSAR, Section 8.5.5. FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6.6. FSAR, Chapter 14.7. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.8. IEEE Standard 450-1987.

9. Technical Requirements Manual, Section 9.0.10. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977.INSERT -BASES 3.8.4 ______ReferenceI 11 I Ni [ iu ued12. IEEE Standard 485-1983.

13. NRC No. 93-1 02, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements,"

July 23, 1993.14. Not used.HATCH UNIT 1 B386B 3.8-62 INSERT -Bases 3.8.4 Reference

11. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

Distribution Systems -Operating B 3.8.7BASESACTIONS D.__1 (continued) This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "timezero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This allowance results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.7.a wasinitially not met, instead of at the time Condition D was entered. The16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential of failing to meet the LCO indefinitely.Ioverall plant risk isIf the inoperable distribution subsys m cannot be restored toOPERABLE status within the associfrd Completion Time, the unitmust be brought to a MODE in whic / , achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3within 12 hou t, .. '-he allowedlCompletion reasonable, based on ope ~,ng experience, toreach the required plt conditions from full power co qditions in anorderly manner and witl out challenging plant systems.Tie s INSERT -BASES 3.8.7 1F. 1 Condition ECondition F corresponds to a level of degradation in the electrical power distribution system that causes a required safety function to belost. When more than one AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystem is lost, and this results in the loss of a required

function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysiS.

Therefore, noadditional time is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0.3 must beentered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.7.1REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical powerdistribution systems are functioning

properly, with the correct circuitbreaker alignment.

The correct breaker alignment ensures theappropriate separation and independence of the electrical buses aremaintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each requiredbus. The verification of proper voltage availability on the busesensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as wellas control functions for critical system loads connected to thesebuses. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under theSurveillance Frequency Control Program.(continued) HATCH UNIT 1 .-0REIINOB 3.8-80 INSERT -Bases 3.8.7 Condition ERemaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 5) and because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action E.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit. Distribution Systems -Operating B 3.8.7BASESREFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6.2. FSAR, Chapter 14.3. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements,"

July 23, 1993.INSERT -BASES 3.8.7Reference HATCH UNIT 1B 3.8-81HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-81 II~ jI INSERT -Bases 3.8.7 Reference

5. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2BASESACTIONS A.__1 (continued) operations personnel to take corrective actions or to place the plant inthe required condition in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.Alternately, if it is not desired to remove the power supply from service(e.g., as in the case where removing the power supply(s) from servicewould result in a scram or isolation), Condition C or D, as applicable, must be entered and its Required Actions taken.B.1If both power monitoring assemblies for an inservice power supply(MG set or alternate) are inoperable or both power monitoring assemblies in each inservice power supply are inoperable, the systemprotective function is lost. In this condition, 1 hour is allowed torestore one assembly to OPERABLE status for each inservice powersupply. If one inoperable assembly for each inservice power supplycannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the associated powersupply(s) must be removed from service within 1 hour (Required Action B.1). An alternate power supply with OPERABLE assemblies may then be used to power one RPS bus. The 1 hour Completion Time is sufficient for the plant operations personnel to take corrective actions and is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowingtime for restoration or removal from service of the electric powermonitoring assemblies. Alternately, if it is not desired to remove the power supply(s) fromservice (e.g., as in the case where removing the power supply(s) fromservice would result in a scram or isolation), Condition C or D, asapplicable, must be entered and its Required Actions taken.plant shutdown is accomplished byplacing te plant in MOE3within n Ob 4 ;9,,,,,.3 allowed Completion lLm c c rlreasonabe bae noeaiexperience, to reach the"I NSERT -BASES 3.38.2 ! TimeICondition C l(continued) HAT H NI 2B 3.3-196 III IHATCH UNIT 2 INSERT -Bases 3.3.8.2 Condition CRemaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 4) and because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action C.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit. RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2BASESACTIONS0.1 (continued) required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderlymanner and without challenging plant systems.0.1, D.2.1. and D.2.2If any Required Action and associated Completion Time ofCondition A or B are not met in MODE 4 or 5 with any control rodwithdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies orwith both RHR shutdown cooling valves open, the operator mustimmediately initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods incore cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. RequiredAction 0.1 results in the least reactive condition for the reactor coreand ensures that the safety function of the RPS (e.g., scram of controlrods) is not required. In addition, action must be immediately initiated to either restore oneelectric power monitoring assembly to OPERABLE status for theinservice power source supplying the required instrumentation powered from the RPS bus (Required Action D.2.1) or to isolate theRHR Shutdown Cooling System (Required Action D.2.2). RequiredAction D.2.1 is provided because the RHR Shutdown Cooling Systemmay be needed to provide core cooling. All actions must continueuntil the applicable Required Actions are completed. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when anRPS electric power monitoring assembly is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry intoassociated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to6 hours provided the other RPS electric power monitoring assemblyfor the associated power supply maintains trip capability. Uponcompletion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the assembly must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.SR 3.3.8.2.1 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each overvoltage, undervoltage, and underfrequency channel to ensure that the entirechannel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specificsetpoint methodology. (continued) HATCH UNIT 2B33-7B 3.3-197 RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2BASES (continued) REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 8.3.1.1.4.B.

2. NRC Generic Letter 91-09, "Modification of Surveillance Interval for the Electrical Protective Assemblies in PowerSupplies for the Reactor Protection System."3. NRC No. 93-1 02, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements,"

July 23, 1993.INSERT -BASES 3.3.8.2S Reference HATCH UNIT 2B3319B 3.3-199 INSERT -Bases 3.3.8.2 Reference

4. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

ECCS -Operating B 3.5.1BASESACTIONS A. 1 (continued) based on a reliability study (Ref. 12) that evaluated the impact onECCS availability, assuming various components and subsystems were taken out of service. The results were used to calculate theaverage availability of ECOS equipment needed to mitigate theconsequences of a LOCA as a function of allowed outage times (i.e.,Completion Times).B. 1 plant riskIf the inoperable low pressure ECCS subsystem cannot be restored toOPERABLE status within the associ ted Completion Time, the plantmust be brought to a MODE in C osntapy Toachieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3within 12 hours allowedCompletion rJeasonable, based on ope itng experience, toreach the required conditions from full power c oditions in anorderly manner and wit ut challenging plant systems.) T-iime ... is I INSERT -BASES 3.5.1 1C.1 and C.2 ICondition BIf the HPCI System is inoperable and the RCIC System is verified tobe OPERABLE, the HPCI System must be restored to OPERABLEstatus within 14 days. In this condition, adequate core cooling isensured by the OPERABILITY of the redundant and diverse lowpressure ECCS injection/sprayosubsystems in conjunction with ADS.Also, the RCIC System will automatically provide makeup water atmost reactor operating pressures. Verification of RCICOPERABILITY within 1 hour is therefore required when HPCI isinoperable. This may be performed as an administrative check byexamining logs or other information to determine if RCIC is out ofservice for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean toperform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the RCIC System. If the OPERABILITY of the RCIC Systemcannot be verified,

however, Condition E must be immediately entered.

If a single active component fails concurrent with a designbasis LOCA, there is a potential, depending on the specific failure,that the minimum required ECCS equipment will not be available. A14 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited inReference 12 and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience. (continued) HATCH UNIT 2B356B 3.5-6 INSERT -Bases 3.5.1 Condition BRemaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 18), because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action B.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCOG 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCOG 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit. EGOS -Operating B 3.5.1BASES (continued) ACTIONSD.1 and D.2If any one low pressure EGOS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable in addition to an inoperable HPCI System, the inoperable lowpressure EGOS injection/spray subsystem or the HPCI System mustbe restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this condition, adequate core cooling is ensured by the OPERABILITY of the ADSand the remaining low pressure EGOS subsystems.

However, theoverall EGOS reliability is significantly reduced because a singlefailure in one of the remaining OPERABLE subsystems concurrent with a design basis LOCA may result in the EGOS not being able toperform its intended safety function.

Since both a high pressuresystem (HPCI) and a low pressure subsystem are inoperable, a morerestrictive Completion Time of 72 hours is required to restore eitherthe HPCI System or the low pressure EGOS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status. This Completion Time is based ona reliability study cited in Reference 12 and has been found to beacceptable through operating experience.F. adg2JINSERT -BASES 3.5.1Condition EWith one ADS valve inoperable, no action is required, because ananalysis demonstrated that the remaining six ADS valves are capableof providing the ADS function, per Reference 16.I aeny ,equ:,red Act:,n and assoc",ated Comp'et=,n Ti,,me MfJC ...... ... .......... jtwo or more ADS valves areinoperable, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the LCO"does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought toat least MODE 3 within 12 hours and reactor steam dome pressurereduced to < 150 psig within 36 hours. Entry into MODE 3 is notrequired if the reduction in reactor steam dome pressure to < 150 psigresults in exiting the Applicability for the Condition, and the < 150 psigis achieved within the given 12 hours. The allowed Completion Timesare reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the requiredplant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner andwithout challenging plant systems.When multi Il EGOS subsystems are inoperable, as stated inCondition he plant is in a condition outside of the accidentanalyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately. (continued) HATCH UNIT 2B35-B3.5-7 INSERT -Bases 3.5.1 Condition E5.__If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D is not met, theplant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve thisstatus, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours.Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 18) and because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action E.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit.The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach therequired plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and withoutchallenging plant systems. EGOS -Operating B 3.5.1No change. Included forlinformation only.BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.5.1.12 (continued) seat of the S/RV is verified by steam testing at the vendor facilitybefore installation. SRs 3.5.1.11 and 3.3.5.1.5 overlap this SR toprovide testing of the S/RV relief mode function. Additional functional testing is performed by tests required by the ASME OM Code (Ref.17).The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.SR 3.5.1.13This SR ensures that the EGOS RESPONSE TIMES are less than orequal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. Response time testing acceptance criteria are included inReference

14. A Note to the Surveillance states that theinstrumentation portion of the response time may be assumed fromestablished limits. The exclusion of the instrumentation from theresponse time surveillance is supported by Reference 15, whichconcludes that instrumentation will continue to respond in themicrosecond to millisecond range prior to complete failure.The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under theFrequency Control Program.Surveillance REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Paragraph 6.3.2.2.3.

2. FSAR, Paragraph 6.3.2.2.4.

3. FSAR, Paragraph 6.3.2.2.1.

4. FSAR, Paragraph 6.3.2.2.2.

5. FSAR, Subsection 15.1.39.(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B351 EIIN8B 3.5-13REVISION 81 ECCS -Operating B 3.5.1BASESREFERENCES

6. FSAR, Subsection 15.1.40.(continued)

7. FSAR, Subsection 15.1.33.8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.9. FSAR, Subsection 6.3.3.10. NEDC-31376P, "E.I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2SAFER/GESTR-LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Analysis,"

December1986.11. 100CFR 50.46.12. Memorandum from R. L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC),"Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCSComponents," December 1, 1975.13. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.14. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T5.0-1.15. NEDO-32291, "System Analyses for Elimination of SelectedResponse Time Testing Requirements," January 1994.16. NEDC-32041P, "Safety Review for Edwin I. Hatch NuclearPower Plant Units 1 and 2 Updated Safety/Relief ValvePerformance Requirements," April 1"996.17. ASME, OM Code -2004 Edition, "Code for Operation andMaintenance of Nuclear Power Plants," Appendix I.INSERT -BASES 3.5.1Reference HATCH UNIT 2 B351B 3.5-14 INSERT -Bases 3.5.1 Reference

18. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.I RCIC SystemB 3.5.3BASESACTIONS A.1 and A.2If the RCIC System is inoperable during MODE 1, or MODE 2 or 3with reactor steam dome pressure

> 150 psig, and the HPCI Systemis verified to be OPERABLE, the RCIC System must be restored toOPERABLE status within 14 days. In this condition, loss of the RCICSystem will not affect the overall plant capability to provide makeupinventory at high reactor pressure since the HPCI System is the onlyhigh pressure system assumed to function during a loss of coolantaccident (LOCA). OPERABILITY of HPCI is therefore verified within1 hour when the RCIC System is inoperable. This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information, todetermine if HPCI is out of service for maintenance or other reasons.It does not mean it is necessary to perform the Surveillances neededto demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the HPCI System. If theOPERABILITY of the HPCI System cannot be verified, however,Condition B must be immediately entered. For non-LOCA events,RCIC (as opposed to HPCI) is the preferred source of makeup coolantbecause of its relatively small capacity, which allows easier control ofthe RPV water level. Therefore, a limited time is allowed to restorethe inoperable RCIC to OPERABLE status.The 14 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study (Ref. 3)that evaluated the impact on ECCS availability, assuming variouscomponents and subsystems were taken out of service. The resultswere used to calculate the average availability of ECCS equipment needed to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA as a function ofallowed outage times (AOTs). Because of similar functions of HPCIand RCIC, the AOTs (i.e.; Completion Times) determined for HPCIare also applied to RCIC.If the RCIC System cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within[minimized.J sim .aneously inoperable, the plant must be brought to a condition inwhicw .ITo achieve this status, the plant mustbe bou£ht o atleat MDE 3witin 2 horsln The allow sedCompletio reasonable, based on operating xperience, toreach the r quired plant conditions from full power condi ons in an(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-23I INSERT -Bases 3.5.3 Condition BRemaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 6) and because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action B.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit. RCIC SystemB 3.5.3BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.3.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS low water level (Level 2) signal received subsequent to an RPV highwater level (Level 8) trip and that the suction is automatically transferred from the CST to the suppression pool. The LOGICSYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.2 overlaps thisSurveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safetyfunction. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.This SR is modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection duringthe Surveillance. Since all active components are testable and fullflow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the test line,coolant injection into the RPV is not required during the Surveillance. REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 33.2. FSAR, Section 5.5.6.3. Memorandum from R.L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC),"Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCSComponents,"

December 1, 1975.4. GE Report AES-4!-0688, "Safety Evaluation for Relaxation of"RCIC Performance Requirements for Plant Hatch Units 1"and 2," July 1988.5. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.INSERT -BASES 3.5.3< iReference HATCH UNIT 2 B352B 3.5-26 INSERT -Bases 3.5.3 Reference

6. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum BreakersB 3.6.1.7BASESACTIONS 0.1(continued) With one line with one or more vacuum breakers inoperable foropening, the leak tight primary containment boundary is intact. Theability to mitigate an event that causes a containment depressurization is threatened,

however, if both vacuum breakers in at least onevacuum breaker penetration are not OPERABLE.

Therefore, theinoperable vacuum breaker must be restored to OPERABLE statuswithin 72 hours. This is consistent with the Completion Time forCondition A and the fact that the leak tight primary containment INSERT -BASES 3.6.1.7 }_ boundary is being maintained. Condition D __]With two lines with one or more vacuum breakers inoperable foropening, the primary containment boundary is intact. However, in theevent of a containment depressurization, the function of the vacuumbreakers is lost. Therefore, all vacuum breakers in one line must berestored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. This Completion Time isconsistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, which requires thatprimary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.If the vacuum breakers inone or more lines cannot be lra, a~tbclosed or restored to IH he plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does notOPERABLE status within __ply/. To achieve this status, the plant must brought to at leastthe equied Cmpleion MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. TheTherqired, oplto allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating Timeexperience, to reach the required plant conditions from full powerconditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plantsystems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.7.1 REQUI REM ENTSEach vacuum breaker is verified to be closed to ensure that apotential breach in the primary containment boundary is not present.This Surveillance is performed by observing local or control roomindications of vacuum breaker position or by verifying a differential pressure of 0.5 psid is maintained between the reactor building andsuppression chamber. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B364B 3.6-40 INSERT -Bases 3.6.1.7 Condition DD. 1If one line has one or more reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakersinoperable for opening and they are not restored within the Completion Time in Condition C, thEremaining breakers in the remaining lines can provide the opening function. The plant must bebrought to a condition in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plantmust be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours.Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action D.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit.The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach therequired plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and withoutchallenging plant systems. Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum BreakersB 3.6.1.7BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.7.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Two Notes are added to this SR. The first Note allows reactorbuilding-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers opened inconjunction with the performance of a Surveillance to not beconsidered as failing this SR. These periods of opening vacuumbreakers are controlled by plant procedures and do not represent inoperable vacuum breakers. The second Note is included to clarifythat vacuum breakers, which are open due to an actual differential

pressure, are not considered as failing this SR.SR 3.6.1.7.2 Each vacuum breaker must be cycled to ensure that it opens properlyto perform its design function and returns to its fully closed position.

This ensures that the safety analysis assumptions are valid. The92 day Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements ofthe Inservice Testing Program.SR 3.6.1.7.3 Demonstration of vacuum breaker opening setpoint is necessary toensure that the safety analysis assumption regarding vacuum breakerfull open differential pressure of < 0.5 psid is valid. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency ControlProgram.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.2.1.2. NRC No. 93-1 02, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements,"

July 23, 1993.INSERT- BASES 3.6.1.7I< Reference HATCH UNIT 2 B364B 3.6-41 INSERT -Bases 3.6.1.7 Reference

3. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum BreakersB 3.6.1.8BASESACTIONS A._.1 (continued) considered acceptable due to the low probability of an event in whichthe remaining vacuum breaker capability would not be adequate. ISR -BSES 36.18 F_Condition B ~TAn open vacuum breaker allows communication between the drywelland suppression chamber airspace, and, as a result, there is thepotential for suppression chamber overpressurization due to thisbypass leakage if a LOCA were to occur. Therefore, the openvacuum breaker must be closed. The required 2 hour Completion Time is allowed to close the vacuum breaker due to the low probability of an event that would pressurize primary containment. D~.1 and D'2Igi# e plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does notappl To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at leastMODI 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. Theallowe~ Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experi nce, to reach the required plant conditions from full powerconditi ns in an orderly manner and without challenging plantsystem I.Jf the open suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuumbrae be closed within the required Completion Time,.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.8.1 REQUIREMENTS Each vacuum breaker is verified closed to ensure that this potential large bypass leakage path is not present. This Surveillance isperformed by observing the vacuum breaker position indication or byverifying that a differential pressure of 0.5 psid between the drywelland suppression chamber is maintained for 1 hour without makeup.However, if vacuum breaker position indication is not reliable due to,for example, a dual or open indication with torus-to-drywell differential pressure remaining < 0.5 psid, alternate methods of verifying that thevacuum breaker is closed are detailed in Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) (Ref. 4), T3.6.1, "Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-451 INSERT -Bases 3.6.1.8 Condition BBAIf a required suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breaker is inoperable for opening and isnot restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must bebrought to a condition in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plantmust be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours.Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 4) and because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action B. 1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit.The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach therequired plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and withoutchallenging plant systems. Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum BreakersB 3.6.1.8BASES (continued) REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.2.1.2. NRC No. 93-1 02, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements,"

July 23, 1993.3. Technical Requirements Manual.INSERT -BASES 3.6.1.8Reference HATCH UNIT 2 B364B 3.6-47 INSERT -Bases 3.6.1.8 Reference

4. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling(continued) With two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems inoperable, onesubsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. Inthis condition, there is a substantial loss of the primary containment pressure and temperature mitigation function. The 8 hour Completion Time is based on this loss of function and is considered acceptable due to the low probability of a DBA and because alternative methodsto remove heat from primary containment are available. Reuie Action and associated Completion Time cannot bemet, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO doesnot apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to atleast MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. Theallowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full powerconditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, andautomatic valves in the RHR suppression pool cooling mode flow pathprovides assurance that the proper flow path exists for systemoperation. This SR does not apl:ily to valves that are locked, sealed,or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to bein the correct position prior to locking,

sealing, or securing.

A valve isalso allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can bealigned to the accident position within the time assumed in theaccident analysis. This is acceptable since the RHR suppression poolcooling mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require anytesting or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that thosevalves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. ThisSR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B365B 3.6-58 INSERT -Bases 3.6.2.3 Condition Bg__1If one RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is inoperable and is not restored toOPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to acondition in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must bebrought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours.Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 4) and because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action B. 1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit.The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach therequired plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and withoutchallenging plant systems. RHR Suppression Pool CoolingB 3.6.2.3BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.6.2.3.2 Verifying that each required RHR pump develops a flow rate> 7700 gpm while operating in the suppression pool coolingmode with flow through the associated heat exchanger ensures thatpump performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow is anormal test of centrifugal pump performance required by ASME Code,Section XI (Ref. 2). This test confirms one point on the pump designcurve, and the results are indicative of overall performance. Suchinservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of thisSR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.2.2.2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements,"

July 23, 1993. _ BASES3.23 / Reference 3.23B 3.6-59HATCH UNITV2,B 3,6-59 I INSERT -Bases 3.6.2.3 Reference

4. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

RHR Suppression Pool SprayB 3.6.2.4BASESACTIONS A.__ (continued)

However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure inthe OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced primarycontainment bypass mitigation capability.

The 7 day Completion Timewas chosen in light of the redundant RHR suppression pool spraycapabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the lowprobability of a DBA occurring during this period.B. 1With both RHR suppression pool spray subsystems inoperable, atleast one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within8 hours. In this Condition, there is a substantial loss of the primarycontainment bypass leakage mitigation function. The 8 hourCompletion Time is based on this loss of function and is considered acceptable due to the low probability of a DBA and becausealternative methods to remove heat from primary containment areavailable. C. 1 i [minimized.I \If any Required Action and associated Completion T/ime cannot bemet, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which.hLCdcsnt To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at leastMODE 3 within 12 hourslo... .,,. ,u .Tde allowedSCompletioni-, esa-1reasonable, based on operating expe etoTmisreach the r buired plant conditions from full power conditions in an "[Tie i Iorderly manner and without challenging plant systems. cninINsERT-cBASES 3.6.2.4SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.4.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, andautomatic valves in the RHR suppression pool spray mode flow pathprovides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for systemoperation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed,or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to bein the correct position prior to locking,

sealing, or securing.

A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided itcan be aligned to the accident position within the time assumed in theaccident analysis. This is acceptable since the RHR suppression pool(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-62I INSERT -Bases 3.6.2.4 Condition CRemaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action 0.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit. RHR Suppression Pool SprayB 3.6.2.4BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.2.4.1 (continued) cooling mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require anytesting or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that thosevalves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. ThisSR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.SR 3.6.2.4.2 This Surveillance is performed every 10 years to verify that the spraynozzles are not obstructed and that flow will be provided whenrequired. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under theSurveillance Frequency Control Program.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.2.2. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements,"

July 23, 1993. -BASES 3.6.2.4Reference HATCH UNIT 2 B366 EIIN7B 3.6-63 INSERT -Bases 3.6.2.4 Reference

3. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1BASES (continued) ACTIONS A.1_If secondary containment is inoperable, it must be restored toOPERABLE status within 4 hours. The 4 hour Completion Timeprovides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment duringMODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable isminimal.overall plant risk is If secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status[minimized, within the requ ed Completion Time, the plant must be brought to aMODE in whichl .I To achieve this status, theplant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 ,vu he allowed Completion WIireasonable, based on ope experience, to reach the required plantconditions from full power con #t.,ns in an orderly manner and withoutchallenging plant systems.INSERT -BASES 3.6.4.1C.1, C.2. and C.3 [Condition BMovement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS, and OPDRVs can be postulated to causefission product release to the secondary containment. In such cases,the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fissionproducts to the environment. CORE ALTERATIONS and movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended if thesecondary containment is inoperable. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing anaction that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also,action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimizethe probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential forfission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs aresuspended. Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating thatLCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies whilein MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If movingirradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movementis independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case,(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-79 IEIIN7 INSERT -Bases 3.6.4.1 Condition BRemaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 5), because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action B.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit. Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS maintain > 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge for 1 hour at a flow rate< 4000 cfm for each SGT subsystem. The 1 hour test period allowssecondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady stateconditions. Therefore, these two tests are used to ensure secondary containment boundary integrity. Since these SRs are secondary containment tests, they need not be performed with each SGTsubsystem. The SGT subsystems are tested on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, however, to ensure that in addition to the requirements of LCO 3.6.4.3, each SGT subsystem or combination of subsystems will perform this test. The number of SGT subsystems and therequired combinations are dependent on the configuration of thesecondary containment and are detailed in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 3). The Note to SR 3.6.4.1.3 andSR 3.6.4.1.4 specifies that the number of required SGT subsystems be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, "StandbyGas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration. TheSurveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.2. FSAR, Section 15.1.41.3. Technical Requirements Manual, Section 8.0.4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements,"

July 23, 1993. -BASES 3.6.4.1Reference HATCH UNIT 2 B368 EIIN7B 3.6-81 INSERT -Bases 3.6.4.1 Reference

5. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

SGT SystemB 3.6.4.3BASESACTIONS A.1 and B.1 (continued) failure in one of the remaining required OPERABLE subsystems couldresult in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 and 30 day Completion Times are based onconsideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLEredundant SGT subsystems and the low probability of a DBAoccurring during this period. Additionally, the 30 day Completion Timeof Required Action A.1 is based on three remaining OPERABLE SOTsubsystems, of which two are Unit 2 subsystems, and the secondary containment volume in the Unit 1 reactor building being open to thecommon refueling floor where the two Unit 2 SGT subsystems canreadily provide rapid drawdown of vacuum. Testing and analysis hasshown that in this configuration, even with an additional single failure(which is not necessary to assume while in ACTIONS) the secondary containment volume may be drawn to a vacuum in the time requiredto support assumptions of analyses. C.1 an -- ___overall plant risk is I-- ' I minimized.I If the SOT subsyst m cannot be restored to OPERABLE status withinthe required Compl ,tion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must bebrought to a MODEn w~~~ ~cLOde o plITo achieve thisstatus, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 iIcd cMOE4 ;itMq allowed Completion [[{e"-rrreasonable, based on operating ~perience, to reach the requiredplant conditions from full power co ditions in an orderly manner andwithout challenging plant systems. IJNSERT -BASES 3.6.4.3In the event that a Unit 1 SOT subsystem is the one not restored toOPERABLE status as required by Required Action A.1 or B.1,operation of Unit 2 can continue provided that Unit 1 is shut down, theUnit 1 reactor building zone is isolated from the remainder ofsecondary containment and the SOT System, and the Unit 1Technical Specifications do not require Operability of Zone I. In thismodified secondary containment configuration, only three SOTsubsystems are required to be OPERABLE to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, andno limitation is applied to the inoperable Unit 1 SOT subsystem. Thisin effect is an alternative to restoring the inoperable Unit 1 SOTsubsystem, i.e., shut down Unit 1 and isolate its reactor building zonefrom secondary containment and SOT System.(continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B369B3.6-92 INSERT -Bases 3.6.4.3 Condition CRemaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 8), because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action C.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit. SGT SystemB 3.6.4.3BASESACTIONS D.1, D.2.1, D.2.2, and 0.2.3(continued) During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, whenRequired Action A.1 or B. 1 cannot be completed within the requiredCompletion Time, the remaining required OPERABLE SGTsubsystems should immediately be placed in operation. Thisaction ensures that the remaining subsystems are OPERABLE, thatno failures that could prevent automatic actuation have occurred, andthat any other failure would be readily detected. An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately suspendactivities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material tothe secondary containment, thus placing the plant in acondition that minimizes risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must immediately besuspended. Suspension of these activities must not precludecompletion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, ifapplicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVsin order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown andsubsequent potential for fission product release. Actions mustcontinue until OPDRVs are suspended. The Required Actions of Condition 0 have been modified by a Notestating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuelassemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify anyaction. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3,the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, ineither case, inability t6 suspend movement of irradiated fuelassemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactorshutdown. E.__11If two or more required SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2or 3, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT Systems may not be capable of]supporting the required radioactivity release control function. ]INSERT -BASES 3.6.4.3I \[Condition E(continued) HATCH UNIT 2B 3.6-93HATCH UNIT 2B[3.6-93 f ,','l~O 741 I INSERT -Bases 3.6.4.3 Condition ETherefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. Toachieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours.Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 8) and because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action E.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management

actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of ashutdown of the unit.The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach therequired plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and withoutchallenging plant systems. SGT SystemB 3.6.4.3BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.3.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR verifies that each required Unit 1 and Unit 2 SOT subsystem starts on receipt of an actual or simulated initiation signal. The LOGICSYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR toprovide complete testing of the safety function. This Surveillance canbe performed with the reactor at power. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41.2. Unit 1 FSAR, Section 5.3.2.3.3. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 6.2.4.4. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 15.2.5. Unit 2 FSAR, Section 15.3.6. Technical Requirements Manual, Section 8.0.7. NRC No. 93-1 02, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements,"

July 23, 1993.IiNSERT -BASES 3.6.4.3< Reference HATCH UNIT 2 B369B 3.6-95 INSERT -Bases 3.6.4.3 Reference

8. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification toSelected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

RHRSW SystemB 3.7.1BASESACTIONS0.__1 (continued) INSERT -BASES 3.7.1Condition DThe Required Action is modified by a Note indicating that theapplicable Conditions of LCO 3.4.7 be entered and Required Actionstaken if the inoperable RHRSW subsystem results in an inoperable RHR shutdown cooling subsystem. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components. With both RHRSW subsystems inoperable for reasons other thanCondition B (e.g., both subsystems with inoperable flow paths, or onesubsystem with an inoperable pump and one subsystem with aninoperable flow path), the RHRSW System is not capable ofperforming its intended function. At least one subsystem must berestored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. The 8 hour Completion Time for restoring one RHRSW subsystem to OPERABLE status, isbased on the Completion Times provided for the RHR suppression pool cooling and spray functions. The Required Action is modified by a Note indicating that theapplicable Conditions of LCO 3.4.7 be entered and Required Actionstaken if an inoperable RHRSW subsystem results in an inoperable RHR shutdown cooling subsystem. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components. ofCondition eJIf the RHRSW subsystems cannot be not rest r d status within the associated Completion Times, he unit must beplaced in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve thisstatus, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hoursand in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times arereasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unitconditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and withoutchallenging unit systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.1REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for each manual, power operated, andautomatic valve in each RHRSW subsystem flow path provides(continued) HATCH UNIT 2B 3.7-5HATCHUNIT2 B .7-5REVISION 49 INSERT -Bases 3.7.1 Condition D0.If one RHRSW subsystem is inoperable or one RHRSW pump in one or two subsystems isinoperable and not restored within the provided Completion Time, the plant must be brought to acondition in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must bebrought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours.Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 issimilar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 5) and because the time spent in MODE 3 toperform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.Required Action 0.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable whenentering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startupwith the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability ofentering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management