ML17328B021

Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,changing TS to Comply W/Commitments Re Generic Ltr 90-06, Resolution of Generic Issues 70 'Porv & Block Valve Reliability & Generic Issue 94, 'Addl Overtemp....'

ML17328B021
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	04/16/1991
From:	FITZPATRICK E INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	MURLEY T E NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17328B022	List: ML17328B021 ML17329A000
References
REF-GTECI-070, REF-GTECI-094, REF-GTECI-NI, TASK-070, TASK-094, TASK-70, TASK-94, TASK-OR AEP:NRC-1131A, GL-90-06, GL-90-6, NUDOCS 9104220175
Download: ML17328B021 (17)

Text

SUBJECT:

Application foramendstoLicensesDPR-58&DPR-74,changing TStocomplyw/commitments reGenericLtr90-06,"Resolution ofGenericIssues70'PORV&BlockValveReliability

&GenericIssue94,'AddiOvertemp....'"

SDISTRIBUTION CODE'019D COPIESRECEIVED:LTR fENCL~SIZEiR+25TXTLE:GenericLtr90-06Resolution ofGE70N94PORVs&BlockValveRelxabil/DNOTES:ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRTIONSYSTEMREGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSXON NBR:9104220175 DOC.DATE:

91/04/16NOTARXZED:

NODOCKET'ACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,Indiana&0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,Xndiana&05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATXON FXTZPATRICK,E.

IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana&MichiganEleRECIP.NAME RECXPIENT AFFILIATION RMURLEY,T.E.

DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)RECIPXENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1LACOLBURN,T.

INTERNALKXRKNOODIRNLS3NBEGFXT'EE701R/RPSIBEXTERNAL:

NRCPDRCOPXESLTTRENCL111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDNRR/EMEBPICKETT,D 13H15RES/DSXR/EXB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT COPIESLTTRENCL1111111111DDDNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

DDPLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'7NEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR12ENCL12 IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyP.O.Box16631Coiumbus, OH43216AEP:NRC:1131A DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2DocketNos,50-315and50-316LicenseNos.DPR-58andDPR-74RESOLUTION OFGENERICISSUE70,"POWER-OPERATED RELIEFVALVEANDBLOCKVALVERELIABILITY,"

ANDGENERICISSUE94,"ADDITIONAL LOW-TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION FORLIGHT-WATER REACTORS,"

(GENERICLETTER90-06),PROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGESU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Attn:T.E.MurleyApril16,1991

DearDr.Murley:

Thisletteranditsattachments constitute anapplication foramendment totheTechnical Specifications (T/Ss)forDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2.Thisamendment isrequested tocomplywithcommitments madeinourprevioussubmittal, AEP;NRC:1131, whichresponded toGenericLetter90-06("Resolution ofGenericIssue70,Power-Operated ReliefValveandBlockValveReliability,"

andGenericIssue94,"Additional Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection forLight-Water Reactors"

).AsnotedinourresponsetotheGenericLetter,wearegenerally adoptingthepower-operated reliefvalve(PORV)andoverpressure protection T/Ssproposedbythestaffwiththreeexceptions andalsowithminormodifications necessary toreflecttheplant-specific designfeaturesofCookNuclearPlant.Thefirstexception concernstheinapplicability oflowtemperature overpressure protection toMode4.Thesecondexception concernsourintenttonotlimitplantoperation inModes1,2,and3withanyofthethreePORVsorblockvalvesinoperable forreasonsotherthanexcessive seatleakagetoperiodsoflessthan72hours.Thethirdexception involvesourintenttonotincorporate valvesinthePORVcontrolairsystemintothein-service testingprogram.Justifications foreachoftheseexceptions arediscussed inAttachment 1tothisletter.P10ggg0>75 910416,PDRADOCK05000315Pi'DRfQf Dr.T.E.Murley-2-AEP:NRC:1131A Thereasonsfortheproposedchangesandouranalysisconcerning significant hazardsconsiderations arealsocontained inAttachment 1tothisletter.TheproposedT/Sschangesarecontained inAttachment 2.AcopyoftheexistingT/Sspagesmarked-up toreflectthechangesbeingproposediscontained inAttachment 3.WebelievethattheproposedT/Sschangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificant changeinthetypesofeffluents orasignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposures Werequestthatthissubmittal beapprovedbytheNRCnolaterthanDecember1,1991inordertoalloworderlyimplementation oftheseT/Sschangesduringappropriate windowsofeachunit'snextrefueling outage'~,TheproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee andbytheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee.

Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(10),

copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted toMr.J.R.PadgettoftheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andtheMichiganDepartment ofPublicHealth.Thisdocumenthasbeenpreparedfollowing Corporate procedures thatincorporate areasonable setofcontrolstoensureitsaccuracyandcompleteness priortosignature bytheundersigned.

Sincerely, E.E.FitzptrickVicePresident ldpAttachments cc:D.H.Williams, Jr.A.A.Blind-BridgmanJ.R.PadgettG.CharnoffA.B.Davis-RegionIIINRCResidentInspector

-BridgmanNFEMSectionChief Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1131A Description ofProposedChangesandSignificant HazardsConsideration Analysis V4l1~I Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1131A Page1DescritionofProosedChanesChanestothe"OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS"Technical Secification 3.4.9.3Units1and2Thefollowing T/Sspagesareimpacted:

UnitNo.1:Page3/44-31Page3/44-32UnitNo.2:Page3/44-29Page3/44-30Attachment B-2ofEnclosure BtoGenericLetter(GL)90-06notesthatforplantswithexistingT/SsforPORVsusedforlowtemperature overpressure protection (LTOP),theonlyrequiredchangeistorestricttheapplicability ofthe7-dayallowable outagetimeforasingleLTOPchanneltoMode4.Anexception isbeingtakentothisGLrequirement sincethecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Sslimitapplicability oftheLTOPsystemtowhenthetemperature ofoneormoreofthereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)coldlegsislessthanorequalto170F(Unit1)or152F(Unit2),exceptwhenthereactorvesselheadisremoved,Sincethesetemperatures represent Mode5conditions, the7-dayallowable outagetimeproposedbytheGLforMode4(350F>Tavg>200 F)cannotbeappliedtoCookNuclearPlant.0oHowever,theallowable outagetimeforasingleLTOPchannelinModes5and6(whenLTOPisrequiredtobeoperable) isbeingreducedfrom7daysto24hours,consistent withtheguidanceoftheGL.Asapointofinformation, T/S3.4.9'forUnit1(Page3/44-31)isthesubjectofaseparateT/Sschangerequest(AEP:NRC:08940 datedOctober29,1990),inwhichweproposedarevisedLTOPsetpointof'435psigforthePORVs,withanenabletemperature of152F(currentlimitsare400psigand170F).Thefollowing voluntary changesarebeingmadetogenerally conformtothe"Modified Technical Specifications forCombustion Engineering andWestinghouse Plants"contained inAttachment B-1ofEnclosure BtoGenericLetter90-06,"consistent withthedesignemployedatCookNuclearPlantforoverpressure protection systems.Additionally, afewminoreditorial changesarebeingmadeforthesakeofclarity.The"Limiting Condition forOperation (LCO)"and"Applicability" sectionsarebeingrevisedtoreflectthatthedepressurizing andventingoftheRCSisnotclassified asanoverpressure protection system.Theapplicability oftheLCOisalsobeingrevisedtoexcludeMode6whentheRCSisadequately ventedbya2-square-inch orlargervent,orthroughanysingleblockedopenPORVandtoclarifyapplicability forMode6as"whentheheadisonandfastenedtothereactorvessel."SincetheBasesalreadyreflectthateitherLTOPPORVhasadequaterelieving capacitytoprotecttheRCSfromacoldoverpressure transient, anyofthethreePORVs,whichhaveidentical flowcharacteristics, maybeblockedopentoprovideanacceptable RCSventtoprecludeapplicability ofthis 44I(

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1131A Page2specification.

Additionally, wehaveevaluated theconsequences ofacoldoverpressure transient withthereactorheadrestingonbutnotfastenedtothereactorvessel.Ourevaluation indicated thattheRCSwouldbeadequately ventedthroughthereactorvesselflangeinthisscenario, andwehavetherefore clarified the"Applicability" sectiontonotethattheheadmustbeonandfastenedtothereactorvesselforthespecification tobeapplicable.

ThesechangeswillavoidanyquestiononSpecification

3.0. 4beingappliedtoprecludefastening

theheadonthevesselifanypartoftheLCOisnotmetwhentheRCSisvented.The"Action"sectionofeachunitsT/Ssisbeingrevisedasfollows;ACTION(a)isbeingmodifiedtoincorporate thereducedallowable outagetimeforasingleLTOPchannelorRHRsafetyvalvefrom7daysto24hoursandtonotethattheRCS'maybeventedthroughasingleblockedopenPORV.Editorial changesarealsobeingmadetobetterdefinetheactionrequirements forvariousscenarios.

ACTION(b)isbeingeditorially revisedtoprovideconsistency withtheT/Sscontained intheGLandtonotethattheRCSmaybeventedthroughasingleblockedopenPORV,asdiscussed above.ACTION(c)isanewparagraph whichincorporates theprovisions ofparagraph (d)oftheT/Sscontained intheGL.Thisrequirement iscontained inparagraphs 4.4.9.3.4 (Unit1)and4.4,9.3.3 (Unit2)ofthesurveillance requirements sectionofeachunit'sT/Ssandisbeingdeletedfromthosesections.

ACTIONS(d)and(e)correspond toACTIONS(c)and(d)ofthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ssandremainotherwise unchanged.

ThesearesimilartoACTIONS(e)and(f)oftheT/Sscontained intheGL.Thesurveillance requirements sectionofeachunit'sT/Ssisbeingrevisedtodeletethereference totestingofthePORVsasASMECategoryBvalves.Thisreference isbeingmovedtothesurveillance requirements sectionofSpecification 3.4.11,consistent withtheT/Sscontained intheGL.Accordingly, thereference tothePORVsinparagraph 4.4.9.3.3 (Unit1)isbeingremovedandinparagraph 4.4.9.3.1.d (Unit2)isbeingdeletedinitsentirety, withsubsequent paragraph 4.4.9.3.1.e renumbered to4.4.9,3.l.d.

Thereference totestingoftheRHRsafetyvalve(whichisalsousedforLTOPprotection) asanASMECategoryCvalveisbeingretainedinthisspecification.

Paragraphs 4.4.9.3.4 (Unit1)and4.4.9.3.3 (Unit2)arebeingdeletedsincetherequirements forRCSventverification arebeingmovedtotheACTIONsectionofT/S3.4.9,3,ACTION(c),asdescribed above.

3I%4t'I Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1131A Page3Theotherparagraphs ofthissection'contained inthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ssprovidesurveillance requirements thatareconsistent withorsurpassthosecontained intheGLandtherefore remainunchanged.

Itshouldbenotedthatpage3/44-32(Unit1)isthesubjectofaseparateT/Sschangerequest(AEP:NRC:0433N, datedAugust7,1990),whichproposedmodifiedreferences tothein-service testingprogramrequirements ofASMESectionXItopromoteconsistency betweenUnits1and2.TheresultofthispendingT/SschangewillmakeUnit1T/Spage3/44-32identical toUnit2T/Spage3/44-30.Therefore, thechangesdescribed abovefortheUnit2T/Swillbeapplicable totherevisedUnit1T/Spage.Chanestothe"BASES-PRESSURETEMPERATURE LIMITS"Technical Secification 34.4.9Units1and2Thefollowing T/Spagesareimpacted:

Unit1:PageB3/44-7Unit2:PageB3/44-10TheBasesfortheoverpressure protection T/Scontained inparagraph 3/4.4.9.3 ofeachunit'sT/Ssarebeingclarified tonotethattheRCSmaybeventedthroughasingleblockedopenPORV,asdiscussed above,andthatanRCSventopeningofgreaterthanorequalto2squareinchesisnotconsidered anoverpressure protection system.Finally,Attachment B-3ofEnclosure BtotheGLwasreviewedagainsttheCookNuclearPlantT/SstoensurethattheT/Sscontainthedesignbasisrestrictions forsafetyinjection/centrifugal chargingpumpoperability anddifferential temperature restrictions forreactorcoolantpumprestart.Ourreviewhasdetermined thattheserestrictions havealreadybeenappropriately implemented withintheCookNuclearPlantT/Ssandnofurtheractionsarerequired.

Chanestothe"RELIEFVALVES-OPERATING" Technical Secification 3.4.11Units1and2Thefollowing T/Spagesareimpacted:

UnitNo.1:Page3/44-35Page3/44-36UnitNo.2:Page3/44-32Page3/44-33Attachment A-2ofEnclosure AtoGenericLetter90-06providesguidancetomodifythelimitingconditions foroperation ofPORVsandblockvalvesintheT/SsforModes1,2,and3.TheCookNuclearPlantT/Ssarebeingrevisedtocomplywiththosecontained inthatattachment withoneexception, Attachment A-2isintendedforapplication toWestinghouse plantswiththreePORVs.WhileeachCookNuclearPlantunithasthreepressurizer PORVs,theoriginalWestinghouse designcontained onlytwoPORVs,Westinghouse was 1Ilg.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1131A Page4requested toprovideplantmodifications toachievethecapability tocarryplantauxiliaries underallloadrejection conditions, including fullloadrejection.

Athirdpressurizer PORVwasspecifically addedasaresult.Thecapacityofthesecondary sidesteamdumpsystemwasoriginally designedconsistent withthisintent.Theoriginaldesigncapacityofthesteamdumpsystemwas85'toffullloadsteamflow,whichwouldallowtheturbinegenerator totakealoadreduction from100'ttotheplantauxiliaries loadwithoutareactortrip.Therefore, theavailability ofathirdPORVshouldbeviewedasanenhancement totheoriginaldesignwhichwasaddedonavoluntary basis,ratherthanasanessential initialdesignfeature.Inordertoachieveconsistency withtheassumptions initially contained inthegenericATWSmitigating systemactuation circuitry (AMSAC)designdeveloped bytheWestinghouse OwnersGroup,andalsotoreduceexcessive operational expenseandmaintenance problemswiththesteamdumpvalves,adesignchangehasbeenimplemented onbothCookNuclearPlantunitstoreducethesteamdumpsystemloadrejection capability from85%to40't.ThisisinlinewiththeWestinghouse standardplantdesign,whichalsoprovides40%steamdumpcapacity.

Sincethesecondary sideoftheplantisnolongerdesignedtosustainalargeloadrejection withoutareactortrip,theavailability ofthethirdPORVeffectively assumestheroleofaninstalled spareformanagement ofloadreduction transients.

WithregardtotheUnit1UFSARChapter14safetyanalysis, Section14.2',"SteamGenerator TubeRupture,"

statesthatduringtherecoveryprocessforthecasewithoutoffsitepower,theoperatorwillopenthePORVsasrequiredtoreduceRCSpressuretolessthan1000psia.Theseactionswillautomatically reducethepressureinthefaultedsteamgenerator below1100psia.Therecoveryprocessisperformed inaccordance withtheEmergency Operating Procedures developed basedontheWestinghouse OwnersGroupEmergency ResponseGuidelines.

OnePORVissufficient forthispurposeasindicated intheWestinghouse Emergency ResponseGuideline E-3,Step18.ThisappliestoUnit2aswell.ThecurrentT/Ssreflectthisbyrequiring twoofthreePORVstobeoperable, withonevalveassumedtofailandtheotherbeingavailable todepressurize theRCS.NRCacceptance ofthecurrentT/SsandtheroleofthePORVswasconveyedintheSafetyEvaluation ReportsrelatedtoAmendment Nos.120(Unit1)and82(Unit2)forFacilityOperating LicensesDPR-58andDPR-74,respectively.

Basedontheseconsiderations, wearerequesting anexception tothestaffpositionthatplantoperation inModes1,2,and3withanyofthethreePORVsorblockvalvesinoperable forreasonsotherthanseatleakagebelimitedtoperiodsofnomorethan72hours,Insteadweareproposing tocontinuethecurrentpracticeofpermitting operation inthesemodeswithonePORVorblockvalveinoperable.

Thisconstitutes thesecondexception totheGLrequirements.

Thefollowing specificT/Sschangesareproposed.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1131A Page5The"Action"sectionofeachunit'sT/Ssisbeingrevisedasfollows:Alloftheapplicable actionstatements havebeenchangedtoterminate theforcedshutdownwiththeplantbeinginhotshutdownratherthancoldshutdownbecausetheapplicability requirements oftheLCOdonotextendpastthehotstandbymode,aspermitted bytheGL,ACTION(a)isanewparagraph whichdistinguishes PORVinoperability duetoseatleakage,andrequiresthatpowerbemaintained toclosedblockvalvestoisolateleakingPORVs.ThecurrentT/Sscontainfootnotes statingthatPORVsisolatedtolimitRCSleakagethroughtheirseats,withtheblockvalvesshuttoisolatethisleakage,arenotconsidered inoperable.

Consistent withtheT/Sscontained intheGL,powerwillbemaintained toblockvalvesthatareclosedtolimitseatleakagesothattheyremainoperableandmaybesubsequently openedtoallowtheassociated PORVstobeusedtocontrolRCSpressure.

ACTION(b)reflectsthesecondexception totheT/Sscontained intheGLdescribed abovebyallowingcontinued operation inModes1,2,and3withasinglePORVinoperable duetocausesotherthanexcessive seatleakageprovideditsblockvalvecanbeclosedandpowerremovedwithinonehour.Ifthiscannotbeaccomplished, theunitmustbetakentohotstandbywithin6hoursandhotshutdownwithinthefollowing 6hours.Thisisgenerally consistent withaction(a.l)ofthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ss.ACTION(c)isgenerally consistent withAction(b)oftheT/Sscontained intheGL,exceptitonlyappliestotwoPORVs,inoperable, ratherthanoneortwoPORVs,asaresultoftheexception proposedinparagraph (b)above.Therefore, Action(c)alsoallowsrestoration ofonlyonePORVinsteadofboth(foratotaloftwooperable) asanacceptable condition for,exitingtheactionstatement.

Thisparagraph effectively corresponds toAction(a.2)ofthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ss.ACTION(d)isgenerally consistent withAction(c)oftheT/Sscontained intheGLandcorresponds toAction(a.3)oftheCookNuclearPlantT/Ss.ACTION(e)continues thesecondexception totheT/Sscontained intheGLbyallowingcontinued operation inModes1,2,and3withasingleinoperable blockvalveprovideditsassociated PORVisplacedinmanualcontrolortheblockvalveisclosedwithpowerremovedwithinonehour.Ifthiscannotbeaccomplished, theunitmustbetakentohotstandbywithin6 Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1131A Page6hoursandtohotshutdownwithinthefollowing 6hours.Thisisgenerally consistent withAction(b.l)ofthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ssexceptthattheassociated PORVistobeplacedinmanualcontrolratherthanclosedwithpowerremovedfromtheassociated solenoidvalve,Closingtheassociated PORVandremovingpowerfromtheassociated solenoidvalveisnotspecified sincethePORVwouldnotlikelybeopenandremovalofpowerfromthesolenoidvalvewouldprecludeusingthePORVforRCSpressurecontrol.Whentheblockvalveisinoperable, placingthePORVinmanualcontrolissufficient toprecludethepotential forhavingastuck-open PORVthatcouldnotbeisolatedbecauseofaninoperable blockvalve.Althoughnotidentified asanoptionintheT/Sscontained intheGL,theabilitytocloseandremovepowerfromasingleinoperable blockvalve,whichiscurrently contained intheCookNuclearPlantT/Ss,isbeingretainedsinceaninoperable blockvalvemaystillbefunctional andcapableofbeingclosed.Closureofaninoperable blockvalveconstitutes anacceptable meansofisolating asinglePORVpath,whichleavestworemaining operablepaths,consistent withtheproposedexception.

ACTION(f)isgenerally consistent withACTION(d)oftheT/Sscontained intheGL;however,itappliestotwoormoreblockvalvesinoperable ratherthanone'rmoreblockvalvesinoperable asaresultofthesecondexception proposedinActions(b)and(e)above.Therefore, Action(f)alsoallowsrestoration oftwo(ratherthanthree)blockvalveswithin72hoursasanacceptable condition forexitingtheactionstatement.

Thisparagraph effectively corresponds toAction(b.2)ofthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ss.ACTION(g)corresponds toAction(c)ofthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ss,andclearlydefinestheactionstobetaken'ifPORVsandblockvalvesnotinthesamelinearesimultaneously inoperable.

Theneedforthisparagraph arisesasaresultofourproposaltocontinuethecurrentpracticeofpermitting operation inModes1,2,and3withonePORVorblockvalveinoperable, Thesurveillance requirements sectionofeachunit'sT/Ssisbeingrevisedtogenerally reflecttheT/Sscontained intheGL.Areference totherequirements ofSpecification 4.0.5(in-service testingprogram)isbeingaddedtoparagraph 4.4.11.1toagreewiththeGLT/Ss.Thisreference iscurrently contained inandisbeingdeletedfromthesurveillance requirements sectionoftheCookNuclearPlantoverpressure protection systemsT/S.Itshouldbenotedthatthisreference appliesonlytotestingofthePORVs(andblockvalves)withinthein-service testingprogramandnottovalvesinthecontrolairsystemasintheGL.Thisconstitutes thethirdexception totheGL.AsnotedinourresponsetotheGL(AEP:NRC:1131 datedDecember21,1990),webelievethatcurrent Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1131A Page7in-service testingofthePORVsalreadyindirectly providesassurance ofproperoperation ofthecontrolairsystemvalves.Indirecttestingofthecontrolairsystemvalveswillcontinuetobeaccomplished bytestingthePORVsonacoldshutdownfrequency underthein-service testingprogram.Plantprocedures willbeenhancedtoprovidefurtherassurance thatthecontrolairsystemvalvesperformtheirrequiredfunctions whenthePORVsarestrokedoffboththenormalandbackupairsuppliesevery18monthsduringcoldshutdown.

Paragraph 4.4.11.1.a isunchanged fromthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Sandrequirestheperformance ofaPORVchannelfunctional test,excluding valveoperation, onceper31days.Althoughthisrequirement isnotcontained intheT/SproposedintheGL,thissurveillance requirement isconsidered necessary toperiodically demonstrate PORVoperability andistherefore beingretained.

Revisedparagraph 4.'4.11.1,b incorporates thenewrequirements inparagraph 4.4.4.1ofAttachment A-2ofGLEnclosure AtocyclethePORVsonceper18monthsinModes3or4.Paragraph

.4.4,11',cincludesnewrequirements, pertheGL,tooperatethesolenoidaircontrolvalvesandcheckvalvesinthePORVcontrolsystemsthroughonecompletecycleoffulltravelonceper18months,Theserequirements willbesatisfied viatestingwhichensuresthatthePORVsstrokeusingboththenormalandbackupairsupplies(forthosevalveswithabackupairsupply),whichimpliesproperoperation ofassociated solenoidandcheckvalves.However,itshouldbenotedthatthebackupairsupply,whichisprovidedononlytwoofthethreePORVs,isintendedforuseonlywhenthesevalvesarebeingusedforLTOPservice,ratherthaninModes1,2,and3.Thisproposednewtestingshouldnotbeconstrued asanindication thatthebackupairsupplyisrequiredtobeoperableinModes1,2,and3,Althoughachannelcalibration waspreviously requiredbytheexistingT/Ssperparagraph 4.4.11.1.b, thisre'quirement hasbeeneditorially revisedtoagreewiththe'ording contained intheGL,andrenumbered asparagraph 4.4.11,1,d.

Paragraph 4.4.11.2, whichrequirescyclingoftheblockvalvesinMode5,butnotmorefrequently than92days,hasbeenrevisedtomakereference torevisedparagraphs inthe"Action",section ofthespecification, Finally,paragraph 4.4.11,3remainsunchanged sincethewordingintheexistingT/SsprovidesmorespecificguidancethanthatproposedintheGL.k Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1131A Page8Chanestothe"BASES-RELIEFVALVES"Technical Secification 34.4.11Units1and2Thefollowing T/Spagesareimpacted:

UnitNo.1:PageB3/44-13UnitNo.2:PageB3/44-11TheBasesforthereliefvalvesT/Scontained inparagraph 3/4.4.11ofeachunit'sT/SsarebeingenhancedtoreflecttheexpandedroleofthePORVsandblockvalvesasdiscussed intheGLandtonotetheroleofthebackupairsupplywhenthePORVsarebeingusedforLTOPservice.10CFR50.92SinificantHazardsConsideration AnalsisPer10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment toanoperating licensewillnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment satisfies thefollowing threecriteria:

1)Doesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously

analyzed, 2)Doesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or3)Doesnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1TheproposedT/Sschangesinthissubmittal generally adoptthePORVandoverpressure protection T/SsproposedbythestaffinGenericLetter90-06withthreeexceptions, andalsowithminormodifications necessary toreflecttheplant-specific designfeaturesofCookNuclearPlant,Thestaff'sproposedT/SswillresultinanincreaseinPORVandblockvalvereliability aswellasadditional LTOP.SincetheproposedT/Sschangesaugmentorpreservetherequirements contained inthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ss,andsincethethreeexceptions toGL90-06retainthecurrentT/Ssrequirements, itisconcluded thattheproposedT/Sschangesdonotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously analyzedinChapter14,"SafetyAnalysis,"

oftheUpdatedFSARforCookNuclearPlant.Criterion 2TheproposedT/SschangeseitherretainorenhancetheLCOs,actionstatements, andsurveillance requirements ofthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ss.Itisconcluded, therefore, thattheproposed Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1131A Page9T/Sschangesdonotcreatethepossibility ofanevordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated inChapter14,"SafetyAnalysis,"

oftheUFSAR.Criterion 3TheproposedT/SschangeseitherretainorenhancetheLCOs,actionstatements, andsurveillance requirements ofthecurrentCookNuclearPlantT/Ss.Itisconcluded, therefore, thattheproposedT/Sschangesdonotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.