05000461/FIN-2010003-07: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = B Kemker, D Lords, D Melendez, | | Inspector = B Kemker, D Lords, D Melendez Colon, E Coffman, J Cassidy, M Mitchell, M Ring, R Russell, S Mischke | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 required, in part, that each primary containment isolation valve be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3. TS 3.6.1.3, Condition C.1 stated that with one or more penetration flow paths with the leakage rate not within the limit restore the leakage rate to within the limit within 4 hours. Technical Specification 3.6.1.3, Condition E stated that if the required action and associated completion time of Condition C is not met, be in Mode 3 within 12 hours and Mode 4 within 36 hours. Contrary to the above, primary containment isolation valve 1B21F032A was found with leakage in excess of the limit during testing on January 28, 2008. The licensee determined the cause for the failure was age-related degradation of lubrication on the valve actuator, causing increased friction. Based on the cause determination, the inspectors concluded that this valve had not been capable of performing its specified safety function (and thus was inoperable) for a period of time before its discovery longer than allowed by TS 3.6.1.3. The inspectors determined that this violation was associated with a licensee-identified finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) during a Phase 2 SDP review using the guidance in IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, because the as-found leakage from the penetration was significantly less than the 1,000% containment volume per day criterion in Table 6.2, Phase 2 Risk Significance Type B Findings at Full Power. The inspectors also noted that multiple barriers exist to a large release through the feedwater system lines. This violation of TS 3.6.1.3 is being treated as a NCV consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The licensee entered this violation into its corrective action program as AR 01047133. The licensee submitted LER 05000461/2008-003-00 on May 17, 2010, but did not characterize the event as a condition prohibited by the plant‟s TSs. The licensee entered this minor reporting issue into its corrective action program as AR 01076505. Refer to Section 4OA3.1 of this inspection report for the review and closure of the LER. | | description = Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 required, in part, that each primary containment isolation valve be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3. TS 3.6.1.3, Condition C.1 stated that with one or more penetration flow paths with the leakage rate not within the limit restore the leakage rate to within the limit within 4 hours. Technical Specification 3.6.1.3, Condition E stated that if the required action and associated completion time of Condition C is not met, be in Mode 3 within 12 hours and Mode 4 within 36 hours. Contrary to the above, primary containment isolation valve 1B21F032A was found with leakage in excess of the limit during testing on January 28, 2008. The licensee determined the cause for the failure was age-related degradation of lubrication on the valve actuator, causing increased friction. Based on the cause determination, the inspectors concluded that this valve had not been capable of performing its specified safety function (and thus was inoperable) for a period of time before its discovery longer than allowed by TS 3.6.1.3. The inspectors determined that this violation was associated with a licensee-identified finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) during a Phase 2 SDP review using the guidance in IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, because the as-found leakage from the penetration was significantly less than the 1,000% containment volume per day criterion in Table 6.2, Phase 2 Risk Significance Type B Findings at Full Power. The inspectors also noted that multiple barriers exist to a large release through the feedwater system lines. This violation of TS 3.6.1.3 is being treated as a NCV consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The licensee entered this violation into its corrective action program as AR 01047133. The licensee submitted LER 05000461/2008-003-00 on May 17, 2010, but did not characterize the event as a condition prohibited by the plant‟s TSs. The licensee entered this minor reporting issue into its corrective action program as AR 01076505. Refer to Section 4OA3.1 of this inspection report for the review and closure of the LER. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 10:40, 30 May 2018
| Site: | Clinton  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000461/2010003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Kemker D Lords D Melendez Colon E Coffman J Cassidy M Mitchell M Ring R Russell S Mischke |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |