TS 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, requires that each containment isolation valve shall be
operable in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. Condition D requires one or more penetration flow paths containing containment purge valves with penetration leakage, such that with the sum of the leakage for all Type B and C tests, is not within limits, the affected penetration flow path is isolated by use of at least one closed and deactivated automatic valve, closed manual valve or blind
flange within
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Contrary to the above, on January 15, 2010, Unit 1 containment purge exhaust penetration number 13 was declared
inoperable due to excessive leakage, but the wrong containment mini-purge valve (Q1P13HV2867D) was closed and deactivated. This was corrected on January 26, 2010, when, as the result of additional troubleshooting, the licensee discovered the main containment purge valve (Q1P13V283) had seat leakage resulting in the excessive leakage identified during the
LLRT on January 15, 2010. Immediately following the discovery on January 26, 2010, the licensee closed and deactivated containment mini-purge valve (Q1P13HV2867C) as required by
TS 3.6.3. The licensee entered this condition in its
CAP as CR 2010100931. This finding was assessed using
IMC 0609, Phase 1 screening worksheets of Attachments 4 and Appendix H relating to Containment
Barrier Integrity, and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the leaking penetration would not have allowed the entire volume of containment to exit through the opening within a
24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.
