05000348/FIN-2010002-04
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Maintain Control of Combustible Material |
| Description | A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, was identified for the licensees failure to maintain combustible material a distance of 35 feet or greater from the hot work area as required by station procedure FNP-0-AP-38, Use of Open Flame. Unit 1 entered a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) emergency action level on December 12, 2009, when a fire occurred in the CCW heat exchanger/pump room. The fire occurred below and to one side of the scaffold near the service water (SW) supply to the 1A CCW heat exchanger isolation valve Q1P16V003A. The cause of the fire was combustible material left in the work area by licensee personnel performing lead abatement on piping supports for a plant modification. Welding personnel had later entered the area, performed welding/grinding activities, then placed work-related material in a concentrated area under the work area. The licensee entered this performance deficiency into their CAP (CR 2009114825) for resolution. The finding was more than minor because it adversely affected the protection against the external factors attribute of the IE cornerstone to limit the likelihood of those events upsetting plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown, as well as power operations. Specifically, this finding resulted in upsetting plant stability and potentially affected plant safety-related equipment. This finding was assessed using the Phase 1 screening worksheets of Appendix 4 and Appendix F of MC 0609 SDP, and determined a Phase 2 analysis was required. Fire Damage State (FDS) 0 was assigned to the actual fire and any postulated fires due to the performance deficiency. FDS 0 indicated that no functions failed as a consequence of these fires. In the actual fire there was no functional damage to any target. Also, the peak heat release had happened and passed when the fire was extinguished. Consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, a maximum heat release rate of 200 KW was selected for the postulated transient combustible fires. No targets were observed in the zone of influence where the combustible material was located. Under step 2.2 of Appendix F performance deficiencies associated with FDS 0 fires were not analyzed in the Fire Protection SDP as a risk contributor. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). A contributing cause of the finding is the failure of supervisory personnel to ensure the area was free of combustible material as required by FNP-0-AP-38 and the actual open flame permit. Therefore, this finding was assigned a cross-cutting contributing cause related to the Human Performance work-practices component, and its aspect of the licensee ensures supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety is supported (H.4(c)) |
| Site: | Farley  |
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| Report | IR 05000348/2010002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Rose R Berryman C Even S Sandal L Pressley E Crowe S Shaeffer J Nadel |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Farley - IR 05000348/2010002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Farley) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (Farley)
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