05000348/FIN-2009005-07
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | TS 5.4.1.a, requires written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities in Regulatory Guide 1.33 Revision 2, Appendix A. Appendix A, Section 9 states in part, maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriated to the circumstances. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to properly vent and refill the Unit 2 RHR to the charging line (piggy-back line), resulting in a gas void in excess of calculated values for that portion of piping and rendered the 2A charging pump inoperable. The ECCS system was returned to service, TS 3.5.2 exited, and the gas void was later discovered. The control room staff reentered TS 3.5.2. The piggy-back line was properly filled and vented (vacuum refill method). At this time, the licensee had been in TS 3.5.2 for 79 hours9.143519e-4 days <br />0.0219 hours <br />1.306217e-4 weeks <br />3.00595e-5 months <br /> and 17 minutes elapsed (which was 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 17 minutes into the requirement to enter MODE 4). This issue was identified in the licensees CAP as CR 2009113434. This finding was assessed using IMC 0609, SDP, Phase 1 screening worksheet for the mitigating systems cornerstone column and determined to require a Phase 2 analysis because the finding represented the loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its allowed T.S. outage time. A Regional Senior Reactor Analyst performed a Phase 3 evaluation under the Significance Determination Process and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The exposure time was 79 hours9.143519e-4 days <br />0.0219 hours <br />1.306217e-4 weeks <br />3.00595e-5 months <br /> and 17 minutes. The analysis assumed that Emergency Core Cooling Piggyback Valve, 8706A, function to open failed as the surrogate for the performance deficiency. This function was not recoverable in the analysis. The dominant accident sequence was Main Steam Line Break downstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valves followed by operators failing to terminate Safety Injection. Then, when operators transferred to Emergency Core Cooling recirculation, one train of Low Pressure Injection was in maintenance and the other train failed due to the performance deficiency. Without core cooling, core damage would have occurred |
Site: | Farley ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000348/2009005 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | E Crowe S Shaeffer W Rogers G Macdonald B Caballero S Sandal |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Farley - IR 05000348/2009005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Farley) @ 2009Q4
Self-Identified List (Farley)
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