ML20204J495

Insp Repts 50-413/86-24 & 50-414/86-26 on 860526-0625. Violation Noted:Failure to Follow Performance Test & Instrumentation Procedures

ML20204J495
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	07/24/1986
From:	Lesser M, Peebles T, Skinner P, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20204J483	List: ML20204J480 ML20204J486 ML20204J495
References
50-413-86-24, 50-414-86-26, IEIN-85-033, IEIN-85-059, IEIN-85-33, IEIN-85-59, NUDOCS 8608110112
Download: ML20204J495 (11)

See also: IR 05000413/1986024

Text

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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.

50-413/86-24 and 50-414/86-26

Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, N.C.

28242

, Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414

License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52

Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: May 26 - June 25, 1986

Inspectors:

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Approved by:

T. Peeble's, Section Chief

'Dats Sir,aed

Projects Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects

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SUMMARY

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Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site inspecting in

the areas of, review of plant operations (Units 1 & 2); surveillance observation

(Units 1 & 2); maintenance observation (Units 1 & 2); review of licensee

nonroutine event reports (Units 1 & 2); procedures (Units 1 & 2);

survey of

Licensee Response to Safety Issues (Units 1 & 2), Followup of Information Notices

(Units 1 & 2); and preparations for refueling (Unit 1).

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Results:

Of the eight (8) areas inspected, two (2) apparent violations were

identified, (Failure to follow procedures, paragraphs 6.b and 11.d; and Failure

to provide adequate procedures, paragraph 11.b).

1

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8608110112 860725

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REPORT DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

J. W. Hampton, Station Manager

E. M. Couch, Construction Maintenance Central Manager

H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent

• M. J. Brady, Asst. Operating Engineer

A. S. Bhatnager, Performance Engineer

T. B. Bright, Construction Engineer Manager

S. Brown, Reactor Engineer

B. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent

• J. W. Cox, Superintendent, Technical Services

T. E. Crawford, Operations Engineer

L. R. Davidson, QA Manager Technical Support

B. East, I. & E. Engineer

• C. S. Gregory, I. & E. Support Engineer

C. L. Hartzell, Licensing and Projects Engineer

• J. A. Kammer, Performance Test Engineer

• J. Knuti, Operating Engineer

P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer

W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

• W. R. McCullum, Superintendent, Integrated Scheduling

C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer

K. W. Reynolds, Construction Maintenance

• F.

P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer

G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendant

J. Stackley, I. & E. Engineer

D. Tower, Operating Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

• Attended exit interview.

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2.

Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 25, 1986, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.

No

dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not

identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the

inspectors during this inspection.

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3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Hotters

(Units 1 & 2)

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(92702)

a.

(OPEN) Unresolved Item 413/84-87-03- Review of operations corrective

action program.

The inspectors reviewed the employee training

presentation for the Pro'olem Investigation Report program being

developed to answer this item.

This presentation appears acceptable.

This item remains open pending full implementation of the new program.

b.

(OPEN)

Unresolved

Item No. 414/85-56-03:

Evaluation of Human

Engineering Discrepancies in Control Room. The discrepancies identi-

fied by this item have been corrected except for numbers on I/R Amps

meter and the legends not removed for valves 2RC3, 2RC4, 2ND26 and

2ND60.

Further review will be conducted regarding the remaining two

items.

c.

(CLOSED) Unresolved Item 414/86-22-01 : Review of Licensee Actions

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Concerning Control of Welding Inserts. The licensee had completed the

review of this issue.

The inspector held discussions with licensee

personnel to review the findings. It appears that reuse of the inserts

was being considered only if they could be fully justified by reestab-

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lishing traceability plus providing further technical justification.

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It is clear that new inserts were used and there is no evidence that a

coverup was attempted. Quality Assurance personnel were cognizant of

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the problem during its initial stages.

The inspector considers

licensee actions regarding this item to be acceptable.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

4.

Unresolved Items *

A new unresolved item is identified in paragraph 11.c.

An Unresolved

Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine

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whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation.

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5.

Plant Operations Review (Units 1 & 2) (71707 and 71710)

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a.

The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting

period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements. Technical

Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs,

danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the

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removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed.

Shift turnovers

were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with

approved procedures.

The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, the measures

taken to assure physical protection of the facility met current

requirements. Areas inspected included the security organization, the

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establishment and maintenance of gates, doors, and isolation zones in

the proper condition, that access control and badging were proper and

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procedures followed.

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In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were

observed for fire prevention and protection activities. These included

such things as combustible material control, fire protection systems

and materials, and fire protection associated with maintenance

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activities.

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b.

On June 5,

1986, the licensee requested a seventy-two (72) hour

extension to the time allowed under the Action statement of Technical

Specification (TS) 3/4.4.6.2 " Operational Leakage".

This request was

made due to an unidentified leakage of 1.9 gpm. The request was to

allow the unit to remain in Hot Standby to identify the leak.

Relief

was granted based on discussions between NRR, Region II, the Resident

Inspector and the licensee. The licensee has addressed this issue in a

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letter to Region II dated June 10, 1986,

c.

At approximately 11:00am on June 13, 1986, the computer program for

calculating unidentified leakage was showing

1.7 pm unidentified

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leakage.

An Unusual Event was declared at 3:00pm.

At 3:42pm, a

,

breaker shorted in a turbine building non-safety related power panel

(IMXD) causing smoke and damage to the panel along with a loss of power

to all loads served by that panel. One of these loads was the Hydrogen

cooling pump, the loss of which caused main generator temperatures to

start increasing.

The operator began unloading the generator due to

temperature increases. A second load was power to the control circuit

of the variable letdown orifice control valve (INV 849). The loss of

this control circuit caused this valve to fail full open giving a

letdown flowrate of about 110gpm. The operator shifted the letdown

orifice to a 45gpm orifice and immediately noted a high charging rate

and a very low letdown rate indicating a primary system leak.

Due to

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cooldown caused by unloading the generator and the leak, leakage rate

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at first appeared to be about 150gpm.

After about forty-five (45)

minutes the operators shut the letdown isolation valves (INV-1 and

1NV-2) which stopped the leak. A controlled shutdown of the reactor

was continued and the generator taken off the line. The Unit was in

Mode 3 at 5:00pm.

Subsequent leakage calculation (prior to shutting

INV-1 & INV-2) identified a leak of about 25gpm. A containment entry

was made and identified a 360 degree crack in a one (1) inch socket

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weld to the flange for the <ariable orifice control valve (INV 849)

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outlet side. Cooldown and d. pressurization was continued and the plant

was placed in Mode 5 at a15am on June 15, 1986.

The resident

inspectors were on site and closely monitored this event. The cause of

the failure of IMXD had been identified to be a vendor installed

nameplate (size

1"

x 2.5"),

which had caused a short circuit.

Preliminary evaluation by licensee design personnel indicates probable

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cause of the socket weld failure to be vibration induced fatigue. The

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weld was sent to the Westinghouse hot laboratory in Pittsburg, Penn.

for analysis.

Further licensee actions have included radiography of

welds, vibration tests on both units, procedural changes limiting use

of valve 1NV 849, removal of label plates from transformers in both

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units and rewelding to reinstall INV 849.

The inspectors verified

licensee actions.

Long term corrections are being reviewed.

The

residents will continue followup of this problem which will be reported

in detail to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Surveillance Observation (Units 1 & 2) (61726)

a.

During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations

were in compliance with various TS requirements.

Typical of these

requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor

coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems,

safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room ventila-

tion, and direct current electrical power sources.

The inspector

verified that surveillance testing was performed in accordance with the

approved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated,

limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and

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restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished, test results

met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the

individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified

during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate

management personnel,

b.

On June 11, 1986, a reactor trip from 85% power occurred on Unit 1.

Investigation into this by the licensee will be documented in a

Licensee Event Report. The inspector reviewed this event and identi-

fied the following sequence.

The instrumentation technicians (IAE)

were performing IP 0/A/3?40/11, Excore Nuclear Instrumentation System,

dated 7/16/85.

In accordance with step 10.1.6, IAE had requested the

reactor operator (RO) to turn the Steam Generator Program Level

Setpoint Indicator to a channel other than the one being tested. The

IAE performed the required adjustments on the specific channel he was

working. He then proceeded to the next channel without notification to

the R0 as required by a repeat of doing step 10.1.6.

This failure

resulted in the I/E performing action on the channel selected to

provide input to the steam generator level circuit. The input caused a

decrease of feed water to the steam generators and a resultant low-low

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level steam generator B reactor trip before actions could be taken to

correct the situation.

The actions by the IAE personnel in not

performing step 10.1.6 of IP 0/A/3240/11, is a violation of TS 6.8.1

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which requires procedures to be implemented as they are approved. This

example is being combined with other examples discussed in paragraph

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11.d to constitute one violation 413/86-24-01,414/86-26-01, Failure to

follow procedures associated with IP 0/A/3240/11, Station Directive

3.2.2, Operations Management Procedure 2-29 and Maintenance Management

Procedure 1.0.

One violation was identified as described in paragraph 6.b.

above.

No

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deviations were identified.

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7.

Maintenance Observations (Units 1& 2) (62703)

Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were

observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with

requirements. The inspector verified licensee conformance to the require-

ments in the following areas of inspection:

the activities were accomp-

lished using approved' procedures, and functional testing and/or calibrations

were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality

control records were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by

qualified personnel; and materials used were properly certified.

Work

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requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure

that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may

effect system performance.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8.

Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Reports (Units 1 & 2) (92700)

a.

The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to

determine if the information provided met NRC requirements.

The

determination included: adequacy of description, verification of

compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements,

corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems,

reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance

of each event.

Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant

personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated

by an (*).

The following LERs are closed:

• LER 413/85-53

Diesel Generator 1A Battery Charger

Inoperable Due to Blown Fuses

LER 413/85-67 Rev.1

Reactor Trip on Loss of Main Feedwater

Pump Due to Design Deficiency

• LER 413/86-01

Procedural

Deficiency

Caused

Missed

Surveillance of Control

Room Carbon

Filters

LER 413/86-06

Reactor Trip Due to Trip of the 1C2

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Heater Drain Tank Pump

• LER 413/86-07

Auxiliary Feedwater Start on Loss of Main

Feedwater Pump Turbine Condenser Vacuum

• LER 413/86-10

Alternate Power Sources Not Verified

Operable While

Diesel

Generator

1B

Inoperable

• LER 413/86-11

Both Trains of Annulus Ventilation System

Inoperable Due to Personnel Error

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• LER 413/86-12 Rev.1

Both

trains

of

Containment

Valve

Injection Water System Inoperable Due to

Defective Procedure

LER 413/86-13

Termination of Containment Release Due to

Spurious Radiation Alarm

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LER 413/86-14

Control Rod Surveillance Not Performed

Due to Defective Procedure

LER 413/86-16

Penetration

Surveillance

Interval

Exceeded Due to Personnel Error and

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Defective Procedure

• LER 413/86-17

Axial Flux Difference Requirements Not

Met Due to Computer Malfunctions

• LER 413/86-23

Reactor Trip Due to Failure to Block

Source Range High Flux Trip Setpoint

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LER 414/86-03

ESF Actuation - High/High Steam Generator

Level Caused By Main Feedwater Isolation

LER 414/86-09

Failure

to

Place

Inoperable Steam

Generator In A Tripped Condition Within

One Hour

LER 414/86-10

ESF Actuation - Auxiliary Feedwater Auto

Start Due to High/High Steam Generator

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Level

LER 414/86-12

ESF Actuation - Main Feedwater Isolation

on Steam Generator 2A Due to High/High

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Steam Generator Level

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b.

(CLOSED) CDR 413/84-16, 414/84-16: Unconsidered effects of superheated

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steam on safety-related components.

The inspectors observed safety

related equipment in the Unit 2 exterior doghouse to verify that the

licensee responses appropriately identified equipment possibly affected

by superheated steam.

Final NRC approval of the licensee analysis is

complete.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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9.

Survey of Licensee's Response to Safety Issues (Units 1 & 2) (92701)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the issue of biofouling of

cooling water heat exchangers as addressed in Inspection and Enforcement

Manual TI 2515/77.

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The licensee has developed several procedures that are used to monitor flow

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through service water heat exchangers. These procedures are conducted on a

quarterly basis by the performance engineering personnel.

Installed

instrumentation is not used to monitor degradation but more precision test

equipment is installed. Trends are maintained by these engineers.

Heat

exchangers that are not feasible to measure various parameters, have been

scheduled for routine periodic cleaning.

Fire protection systems are

periodically flushed and, in addition, are being modified to include a

chlorination system for chemical treatment.

Based on this review, the

actions taken and scheduled by the licensee appear to be acceptable.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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10.

Preparations for Refueling (Unit 1) (60705)

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The inspector reviewed preparations for refueling of Unit 1 presently

scheduled to commence August 15, 1986 and complete on October 23, 1986. The

inspector reviewed procedures for fuel handling, transfers, and core

verification; inspection of fuel to be reused; and various other procedures

that will be required during refueling.

The inspector reviewed the

following specific procedures:

IP 1/A/3230/06

Procedure for Disconnecting and Connection of

Incore T/C Cables, dated 6/2/86

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MP 0/A/7150/43

Reactor Vessel Internals Removal and Replacement,

dated 4/25/86

MP 0/A/7150/50

UHI Piping Removal and Replacement, dated 9/30/85

MP 0/A/7150/76

Rod Drive Assembly Installation and Removal, dated

11/21/85

MP 1/A/7150/42

Reactor Vessel Head Removal and Replacement, dated

2/4/86

OP 0/A/6550/04

Transferring New Fuel to the Elevator, dated

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6/19/84

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OP 0/A/6550/05

Primary Neutron Source Handling, dated 6/27/84

OP 0/A/6S50/07

Reactor Building Manipulator Crane Operation, dated

2/20/86

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OP 0/A/6550/08

Fuel Transfer System Operation, dated 6/27/84

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OP 0/A/6550/09

RCCA Change Fixture Operation, dated 6/21/84

OP 0/A/6550/14

Draining and Filling Spent Fuel Pool Transfer Canal

and Cask Area, dated 6/26/84

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OP 1/A/6200/13

Filling, Draining, and Purification of Refueling

Cavity, dated 6/29/84

OP 1/A/6550/06-

Transferring Fuel With the Spent Fuel Manipulator

Crane, dated 6/21/84

In addition, although' procedure identification numbers have been assigned

for areas such as Vessel Irradiation Sample Removal, Refueling Procedure,

Total Core Unloading, Total' Core Reloading and Spent Fuel Pool Shuffle of

Core Components, these procedures have not been issued at this time. The

inspector identified to the licensee his concern over issuance of these

procedures and minor errors in the procedures listed above including that a

two year review had not been performed to date.

The inspector also reviewed a proposed schedule for the refueling that

identifies major work to be accomplished during the outage. This schedule

also shows the Nuclear Station Modifications that are scheduled to be

performed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

11.

Plant Procedures (Units 1 & 2) (42700)

a.

The inspector reviewed various plant procedures to determine whether

overali plant procedures are in accordance with regulatory require-

ments, procedure changes were made in accordance with TS requirements,

the technical adequacy of the reviewed procedures is consistent with

desired actions and modes of operation, and procedures, when used, are

being followed as required.

In addition to the procedures identified

in paragraph 10 above the below listed procedures were also reviewed:

PT 1/A/4200/02A

Monthly Outside Containment Integrity

Verification

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PT 2/A/4200/02A

Monthly Outside Containment Integrity

Verification

PT 1/A/4200/02B

Cold

Shutdown

Inside

Containment

Integrity Verification

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PT 2/A/4200/02B

Cold

Shutdown

Inside

Containment

Integrity Verification

IP 0/A/3240/11

Excore Nuclear Instrumentation System

IP 1/A/3101/02

Refueling Water System Instrumentation

Calibration

SD 3.1.17

Fuel Handling Interlocks

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TP 1/A/1450/18

Spent Fuel Pool Filter Train Functional

Test

'As a result of this review one violation and one unresolved item was

identified as discussed below.

b.

The review discussed above identified several examples of inadequate

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procedures. The first example is contained in PT 2/A/4200/02A, Monthly

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Outside Containment Integrity Verification for Unit 2.

The purpose of

this PT is to insure that containmeat penetration integrity is being

maintained by verifying conditions of the penetration isolations

located outside of the containment.

A' review by the licensee of this

PT identified approximately twenty-five (25) valves located on various

penetrations that were not included in this procedure.

These are

identified in the licensee's non-routine event report C86-77-2 dated

6/5/86. The omission of these valves resulted in a violation of TS 4.6.1.1.a , which requires the penetrations to be checked every thirty

one (31) days. A subsequent check of these valves found them all in

their required positions.

Adequate corrective actions would have

included the prompt identification and correction of the following

examples and therefore this licensee identified example is a violation.

A second example was associated with . PT 2/A/4200/02B, Cold Shutdown

Inside Containment Integrity Verification. The purpose of this PT is

to insure that containment penetration integrity is being maintained by

verifying conditions of penetrations inside the containment. A review

of this procedure identified twelve (12) valves that are a part of

these penetrations that were not included in this procedure. As a

result of this the licensee violated T.S. 4.6.1.1.a.

A subsequent

check of these valves found them all in their required position.

The third example of inadequate procedures is associated with PT

1/A/4200/02A, Monthly Outside Containment Integrity Verification for

Unit 1.

A review of this procedure by the inspector identified one

valve that should be included in the procedure. The omission of this

valve also resulted in a violation of TS 4.6.1.1.a.

This valve was

also found in its required position.

These three examples are combined to constitute one Violation,

413/86-24-02 414/86-26-02, Failure to provide adequate procedures

resulting in a violation of TS 4.6.1.1.a.

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c.

During the inspectors review of PT 2/A/4200/02A several additional

questions were identified.

A comparison of this PT to the Unit 1

procedure identified approximately twenty (20) valves that were on the

Unit 1 procedure that were identified by the licensee, but similar Unit

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2 valves were not identified.

Positions for Numerous valves on the

Unit 2 procedure were identified as " CLOSED" whereas the Unit 1

procedure and the system flow diagrams identify these same valves as

" LOCKED CLOSED". These questions are being identified as an Unresolved

Item 413/86-24-03, 414/86-26-03: Procedural discrepancies associated

with similar procedures between Units 1 & 2 pending review by the

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licensee and additional review by the inspector to determine the extent

and significance of the discrepancies.

d.

The inspector also reviewed several administrative procedures that are

used to control work and testing associated with work.

The specific

procedures reviewed were Station Directive (SD) 3.2.2, Development and

Conduct of the Periodic Testing Program, Operations Management

Procedure (OMP) 2-29, Technical Specifications Logbook, and Maintenance

Management Procedure (MMP) 1.0, Work Request Preparation. In addition

to this review, the inspector reviewed various work items to insure

they were conducted in accordance with these administrative procedures.

SD 3.2.2, Section 8.0 requires after a valve has undergone maintenance

and prior to its return to service, it shall be tested as necessary to

demonstrate that the parameters affected by the maintenance are within

acceptable limits.

On May 17,1986, 2CF-87, 2CF-33, and 2CF-60 were

repaired and returned to service on May 19, 1986, without being tested

to demonstrate that the parameters affected were within acceptable

limits. OMP 2-29, Section 3.3.8 requires inoperable equipment that

causes operation in an ACTION statement of TS for the existing mode be

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logged in the TS Action Item Log (TSAIL).

Work request 31838 OPS,

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31841 OPS, 32033 OPS and 32046 OPS were all processed to be performed

on May 14, 1986, and were not logged in the TSAIL. The results of this

failure allowed work to be performed without performance of the

required functional testing. MMP 1.0, paragraph 4.3.10 states that the

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section of the Work Request entitled " Procedure Numbers" shall reflect

a complete listing of procedures to perform work, A review of the work

requests identified above identified that the procedures that were

required to be used to perform the required retesting was omitted

contributing to the failure to retest the work activity.

The above

examples are combined with the example discussed in paragraph 6.b to be

identified as one Violation : 413/86-24-01, 414/86-26-01; Failure to

follow procedures associated with IP 0/A/3240/11, Station Directive

3.2.2, Operations Management Procedure 2-29 and Maintenance Management

Procedure 1.0.

Two violations were identified as described in paragraphs 11.b. and d.

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above. No deviations were identified.

12.

Followup of IE Notices and IE Bulletins Sent For Information (Units 1 & 2)

(92701)

The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee upon receipt of an

IE Notice (IEN) sent for information purposes only.

The Compliance

Engineer, at present, controls receipt and distribution of these documents

to assure appropriate personnel review the contents and determine actions

that may be required as a result. The following notices were reviewed to

assure receipt, review by appropriate personnel, and any resulting action

identified, documented and followed to completion:

IE Notices 85-33

85-59

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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.-.

,

_ , .