ML20204J495
| ML20204J495 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1986 |
| From: | Lesser M, Peebles T, Skinner P, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204J483 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-86-24, 50-414-86-26, IEIN-85-033, IEIN-85-059, IEIN-85-33, IEIN-85-59, NUDOCS 8608110112 | |
| Download: ML20204J495 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1986024
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.
50-413/86-24 and 50-414/86-26
Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, N.C.
28242
, Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414
License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52
Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: May 26 - June 25, 1986
Inspectors:
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Approved by:
T. Peeble's, Section Chief
'Dats Sir,aed
Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
&
SUMMARY
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Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site inspecting in
the areas of, review of plant operations (Units 1 & 2); surveillance observation
(Units 1 & 2); maintenance observation (Units 1 & 2); review of licensee
nonroutine event reports (Units 1 & 2); procedures (Units 1 & 2);
survey of
Licensee Response to Safety Issues (Units 1 & 2), Followup of Information Notices
(Units 1 & 2); and preparations for refueling (Unit 1).
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Results:
Of the eight (8) areas inspected, two (2) apparent violations were
identified, (Failure to follow procedures, paragraphs 6.b and 11.d; and Failure
to provide adequate procedures, paragraph 11.b).
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8608110112 860725
ADOCK C5000413
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
J. W. Hampton, Station Manager
E. M. Couch, Construction Maintenance Central Manager
H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent
- M. J. Brady, Asst. Operating Engineer
A. S. Bhatnager, Performance Engineer
T. B. Bright, Construction Engineer Manager
S. Brown, Reactor Engineer
B. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent
- J. W. Cox, Superintendent, Technical Services
T. E. Crawford, Operations Engineer
L. R. Davidson, QA Manager Technical Support
B. East, I. & E. Engineer
- C. S. Gregory, I. & E. Support Engineer
C. L. Hartzell, Licensing and Projects Engineer
- J. A. Kammer, Performance Test Engineer
- J. Knuti, Operating Engineer
P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer
W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
- W. R. McCullum, Superintendent, Integrated Scheduling
C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer
K. W. Reynolds, Construction Maintenance
- F.
P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer
G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendant
J. Stackley, I. & E. Engineer
D. Tower, Operating Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview.
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2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 25, 1986, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No
dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not
identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the
inspectors during this inspection.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Hotters
(Units 1 & 2)
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(92702)
a.
(OPEN) Unresolved Item 413/84-87-03- Review of operations corrective
action program.
The inspectors reviewed the employee training
presentation for the Pro'olem Investigation Report program being
developed to answer this item.
This presentation appears acceptable.
This item remains open pending full implementation of the new program.
b.
(OPEN)
Unresolved
Item No. 414/85-56-03:
Evaluation of Human
Engineering Discrepancies in Control Room. The discrepancies identi-
fied by this item have been corrected except for numbers on I/R Amps
meter and the legends not removed for valves 2RC3, 2RC4, 2ND26 and
2ND60.
Further review will be conducted regarding the remaining two
items.
c.
(CLOSED) Unresolved Item 414/86-22-01 : Review of Licensee Actions
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Concerning Control of Welding Inserts. The licensee had completed the
review of this issue.
The inspector held discussions with licensee
personnel to review the findings. It appears that reuse of the inserts
was being considered only if they could be fully justified by reestab-
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lishing traceability plus providing further technical justification.
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It is clear that new inserts were used and there is no evidence that a
coverup was attempted. Quality Assurance personnel were cognizant of
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the problem during its initial stages.
The inspector considers
licensee actions regarding this item to be acceptable.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Unresolved Items *
A new unresolved item is identified in paragraph 11.c.
An Unresolved
Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine
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whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation.
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5.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 & 2) (71707 and 71710)
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a.
The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting
period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements. Technical
Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs,
danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the
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removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed.
Shift turnovers
were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with
approved procedures.
The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, the measures
taken to assure physical protection of the facility met current
requirements. Areas inspected included the security organization, the
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establishment and maintenance of gates, doors, and isolation zones in
the proper condition, that access control and badging were proper and
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procedures followed.
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In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were
observed for fire prevention and protection activities. These included
such things as combustible material control, fire protection systems
and materials, and fire protection associated with maintenance
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activities.
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b.
On June 5,
1986, the licensee requested a seventy-two (72) hour
extension to the time allowed under the Action statement of Technical
Specification (TS) 3/4.4.6.2 " Operational Leakage".
This request was
made due to an unidentified leakage of 1.9 gpm. The request was to
allow the unit to remain in Hot Standby to identify the leak.
Relief
was granted based on discussions between NRR, Region II, the Resident
Inspector and the licensee. The licensee has addressed this issue in a
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letter to Region II dated June 10, 1986,
c.
At approximately 11:00am on June 13, 1986, the computer program for
calculating unidentified leakage was showing
1.7 pm unidentified
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leakage.
An Unusual Event was declared at 3:00pm.
At 3:42pm, a
,
breaker shorted in a turbine building non-safety related power panel
(IMXD) causing smoke and damage to the panel along with a loss of power
to all loads served by that panel. One of these loads was the Hydrogen
cooling pump, the loss of which caused main generator temperatures to
start increasing.
The operator began unloading the generator due to
temperature increases. A second load was power to the control circuit
of the variable letdown orifice control valve (INV 849). The loss of
this control circuit caused this valve to fail full open giving a
letdown flowrate of about 110gpm. The operator shifted the letdown
orifice to a 45gpm orifice and immediately noted a high charging rate
and a very low letdown rate indicating a primary system leak.
Due to
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cooldown caused by unloading the generator and the leak, leakage rate
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at first appeared to be about 150gpm.
After about forty-five (45)
minutes the operators shut the letdown isolation valves (INV-1 and
1NV-2) which stopped the leak. A controlled shutdown of the reactor
was continued and the generator taken off the line. The Unit was in
Mode 3 at 5:00pm.
Subsequent leakage calculation (prior to shutting
INV-1 & INV-2) identified a leak of about 25gpm. A containment entry
was made and identified a 360 degree crack in a one (1) inch socket
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weld to the flange for the <ariable orifice control valve (INV 849)
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outlet side. Cooldown and d. pressurization was continued and the plant
was placed in Mode 5 at a15am on June 15, 1986.
The resident
inspectors were on site and closely monitored this event. The cause of
the failure of IMXD had been identified to be a vendor installed
nameplate (size
1"
x 2.5"),
which had caused a short circuit.
Preliminary evaluation by licensee design personnel indicates probable
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cause of the socket weld failure to be vibration induced fatigue. The
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weld was sent to the Westinghouse hot laboratory in Pittsburg, Penn.
for analysis.
Further licensee actions have included radiography of
welds, vibration tests on both units, procedural changes limiting use
of valve 1NV 849, removal of label plates from transformers in both
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units and rewelding to reinstall INV 849.
The inspectors verified
licensee actions.
Long term corrections are being reviewed.
The
residents will continue followup of this problem which will be reported
in detail to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Observation (Units 1 & 2) (61726)
a.
During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations
were in compliance with various TS requirements.
Typical of these
requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor
coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems,
safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room ventila-
tion, and direct current electrical power sources.
The inspector
verified that surveillance testing was performed in accordance with the
approved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated,
limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and
,
restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished, test results
met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the
individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified
during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate
management personnel,
b.
On June 11, 1986, a reactor trip from 85% power occurred on Unit 1.
Investigation into this by the licensee will be documented in a
Licensee Event Report. The inspector reviewed this event and identi-
fied the following sequence.
The instrumentation technicians (IAE)
were performing IP 0/A/3?40/11, Excore Nuclear Instrumentation System,
dated 7/16/85.
In accordance with step 10.1.6, IAE had requested the
reactor operator (RO) to turn the Steam Generator Program Level
Setpoint Indicator to a channel other than the one being tested. The
IAE performed the required adjustments on the specific channel he was
working. He then proceeded to the next channel without notification to
the R0 as required by a repeat of doing step 10.1.6.
This failure
resulted in the I/E performing action on the channel selected to
provide input to the steam generator level circuit. The input caused a
decrease of feed water to the steam generators and a resultant low-low
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level steam generator B reactor trip before actions could be taken to
correct the situation.
The actions by the IAE personnel in not
performing step 10.1.6 of IP 0/A/3240/11, is a violation of TS 6.8.1
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which requires procedures to be implemented as they are approved. This
example is being combined with other examples discussed in paragraph
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11.d to constitute one violation 413/86-24-01,414/86-26-01, Failure to
follow procedures associated with IP 0/A/3240/11, Station Directive
3.2.2, Operations Management Procedure 2-29 and Maintenance Management
Procedure 1.0.
One violation was identified as described in paragraph 6.b.
above.
No
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deviations were identified.
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7.
Maintenance Observations (Units 1& 2) (62703)
Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were
observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with
requirements. The inspector verified licensee conformance to the require-
ments in the following areas of inspection:
the activities were accomp-
lished using approved' procedures, and functional testing and/or calibrations
were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality
control records were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by
qualified personnel; and materials used were properly certified.
Work
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requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure
that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may
effect system performance.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Reports (Units 1 & 2) (92700)
a.
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to
determine if the information provided met NRC requirements.
The
determination included: adequacy of description, verification of
compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements,
corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems,
reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance
of each event.
Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant
personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated
by an (*).
The following LERs are closed:
- LER 413/85-53
Diesel Generator 1A Battery Charger
Inoperable Due to Blown Fuses
LER 413/85-67 Rev.1
Reactor Trip on Loss of Main Feedwater
Pump Due to Design Deficiency
- LER 413/86-01
Procedural
Deficiency
Caused
Missed
Surveillance of Control
Room Carbon
Filters
Reactor Trip Due to Trip of the 1C2
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Heater Drain Tank Pump
- LER 413/86-07
Auxiliary Feedwater Start on Loss of Main
Feedwater Pump Turbine Condenser Vacuum
- LER 413/86-10
Alternate Power Sources Not Verified
Operable While
Diesel
Generator
1B
- LER 413/86-11
Both Trains of Annulus Ventilation System
Inoperable Due to Personnel Error
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- LER 413/86-12 Rev.1
Both
trains
of
Containment
Valve
Injection Water System Inoperable Due to
Defective Procedure
Termination of Containment Release Due to
Spurious Radiation Alarm
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Control Rod Surveillance Not Performed
Due to Defective Procedure
Surveillance
Interval
Exceeded Due to Personnel Error and
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Defective Procedure
- LER 413/86-17
Axial Flux Difference Requirements Not
Met Due to Computer Malfunctions
- LER 413/86-23
Reactor Trip Due to Failure to Block
Source Range High Flux Trip Setpoint
>
ESF Actuation - High/High Steam Generator
Level Caused By Main Feedwater Isolation
Failure
to
Place
Inoperable Steam
Generator In A Tripped Condition Within
One Hour
ESF Actuation - Auxiliary Feedwater Auto
Start Due to High/High Steam Generator
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Level
ESF Actuation - Main Feedwater Isolation
on Steam Generator 2A Due to High/High
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Steam Generator Level
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b.
(CLOSED) CDR 413/84-16, 414/84-16: Unconsidered effects of superheated
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steam on safety-related components.
The inspectors observed safety
related equipment in the Unit 2 exterior doghouse to verify that the
licensee responses appropriately identified equipment possibly affected
by superheated steam.
Final NRC approval of the licensee analysis is
complete.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Survey of Licensee's Response to Safety Issues (Units 1 & 2) (92701)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the issue of biofouling of
cooling water heat exchangers as addressed in Inspection and Enforcement
Manual TI 2515/77.
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The licensee has developed several procedures that are used to monitor flow
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through service water heat exchangers. These procedures are conducted on a
quarterly basis by the performance engineering personnel.
Installed
instrumentation is not used to monitor degradation but more precision test
equipment is installed. Trends are maintained by these engineers.
Heat
exchangers that are not feasible to measure various parameters, have been
scheduled for routine periodic cleaning.
Fire protection systems are
periodically flushed and, in addition, are being modified to include a
chlorination system for chemical treatment.
Based on this review, the
actions taken and scheduled by the licensee appear to be acceptable.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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10.
Preparations for Refueling (Unit 1) (60705)
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The inspector reviewed preparations for refueling of Unit 1 presently
scheduled to commence August 15, 1986 and complete on October 23, 1986. The
inspector reviewed procedures for fuel handling, transfers, and core
verification; inspection of fuel to be reused; and various other procedures
that will be required during refueling.
The inspector reviewed the
following specific procedures:
IP 1/A/3230/06
Procedure for Disconnecting and Connection of
Incore T/C Cables, dated 6/2/86
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MP 0/A/7150/43
Reactor Vessel Internals Removal and Replacement,
dated 4/25/86
MP 0/A/7150/50
UHI Piping Removal and Replacement, dated 9/30/85
MP 0/A/7150/76
Rod Drive Assembly Installation and Removal, dated
11/21/85
MP 1/A/7150/42
Reactor Vessel Head Removal and Replacement, dated
2/4/86
OP 0/A/6550/04
Transferring New Fuel to the Elevator, dated
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6/19/84
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OP 0/A/6550/05
Primary Neutron Source Handling, dated 6/27/84
OP 0/A/6S50/07
Reactor Building Manipulator Crane Operation, dated
2/20/86
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OP 0/A/6550/08
Fuel Transfer System Operation, dated 6/27/84
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OP 0/A/6550/09
RCCA Change Fixture Operation, dated 6/21/84
OP 0/A/6550/14
Draining and Filling Spent Fuel Pool Transfer Canal
and Cask Area, dated 6/26/84
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OP 1/A/6200/13
Filling, Draining, and Purification of Refueling
Cavity, dated 6/29/84
OP 1/A/6550/06-
Transferring Fuel With the Spent Fuel Manipulator
Crane, dated 6/21/84
In addition, although' procedure identification numbers have been assigned
for areas such as Vessel Irradiation Sample Removal, Refueling Procedure,
Total Core Unloading, Total' Core Reloading and Spent Fuel Pool Shuffle of
Core Components, these procedures have not been issued at this time. The
inspector identified to the licensee his concern over issuance of these
procedures and minor errors in the procedures listed above including that a
two year review had not been performed to date.
The inspector also reviewed a proposed schedule for the refueling that
identifies major work to be accomplished during the outage. This schedule
also shows the Nuclear Station Modifications that are scheduled to be
performed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Plant Procedures (Units 1 & 2) (42700)
a.
The inspector reviewed various plant procedures to determine whether
overali plant procedures are in accordance with regulatory require-
ments, procedure changes were made in accordance with TS requirements,
the technical adequacy of the reviewed procedures is consistent with
desired actions and modes of operation, and procedures, when used, are
being followed as required.
In addition to the procedures identified
in paragraph 10 above the below listed procedures were also reviewed:
PT 1/A/4200/02A
Monthly Outside Containment Integrity
Verification
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PT 2/A/4200/02A
Monthly Outside Containment Integrity
Verification
PT 1/A/4200/02B
Cold
Shutdown
Inside
Containment
Integrity Verification
1
PT 2/A/4200/02B
Cold
Shutdown
Inside
Containment
Integrity Verification
IP 0/A/3240/11
Excore Nuclear Instrumentation System
IP 1/A/3101/02
Refueling Water System Instrumentation
Calibration
SD 3.1.17
Fuel Handling Interlocks
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TP 1/A/1450/18
Spent Fuel Pool Filter Train Functional
Test
'As a result of this review one violation and one unresolved item was
identified as discussed below.
b.
The review discussed above identified several examples of inadequate
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procedures. The first example is contained in PT 2/A/4200/02A, Monthly
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Outside Containment Integrity Verification for Unit 2.
The purpose of
this PT is to insure that containmeat penetration integrity is being
maintained by verifying conditions of the penetration isolations
located outside of the containment.
A' review by the licensee of this
PT identified approximately twenty-five (25) valves located on various
penetrations that were not included in this procedure.
These are
identified in the licensee's non-routine event report C86-77-2 dated
6/5/86. The omission of these valves resulted in a violation of TS 4.6.1.1.a , which requires the penetrations to be checked every thirty
one (31) days. A subsequent check of these valves found them all in
their required positions.
Adequate corrective actions would have
included the prompt identification and correction of the following
examples and therefore this licensee identified example is a violation.
A second example was associated with . PT 2/A/4200/02B, Cold Shutdown
Inside Containment Integrity Verification. The purpose of this PT is
to insure that containment penetration integrity is being maintained by
verifying conditions of penetrations inside the containment. A review
of this procedure identified twelve (12) valves that are a part of
these penetrations that were not included in this procedure. As a
result of this the licensee violated T.S. 4.6.1.1.a.
A subsequent
check of these valves found them all in their required position.
The third example of inadequate procedures is associated with PT
1/A/4200/02A, Monthly Outside Containment Integrity Verification for
Unit 1.
A review of this procedure by the inspector identified one
valve that should be included in the procedure. The omission of this
valve also resulted in a violation of TS 4.6.1.1.a.
This valve was
also found in its required position.
These three examples are combined to constitute one Violation,
413/86-24-02 414/86-26-02, Failure to provide adequate procedures
resulting in a violation of TS 4.6.1.1.a.
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c.
During the inspectors review of PT 2/A/4200/02A several additional
questions were identified.
A comparison of this PT to the Unit 1
procedure identified approximately twenty (20) valves that were on the
Unit 1 procedure that were identified by the licensee, but similar Unit
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2 valves were not identified.
Positions for Numerous valves on the
Unit 2 procedure were identified as " CLOSED" whereas the Unit 1
procedure and the system flow diagrams identify these same valves as
" LOCKED CLOSED". These questions are being identified as an Unresolved
Item 413/86-24-03, 414/86-26-03: Procedural discrepancies associated
with similar procedures between Units 1 & 2 pending review by the
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licensee and additional review by the inspector to determine the extent
and significance of the discrepancies.
d.
The inspector also reviewed several administrative procedures that are
used to control work and testing associated with work.
The specific
procedures reviewed were Station Directive (SD) 3.2.2, Development and
Conduct of the Periodic Testing Program, Operations Management
Procedure (OMP) 2-29, Technical Specifications Logbook, and Maintenance
Management Procedure (MMP) 1.0, Work Request Preparation. In addition
to this review, the inspector reviewed various work items to insure
they were conducted in accordance with these administrative procedures.
SD 3.2.2, Section 8.0 requires after a valve has undergone maintenance
and prior to its return to service, it shall be tested as necessary to
demonstrate that the parameters affected by the maintenance are within
acceptable limits.
On May 17,1986, 2CF-87, 2CF-33, and 2CF-60 were
repaired and returned to service on May 19, 1986, without being tested
to demonstrate that the parameters affected were within acceptable
limits. OMP 2-29, Section 3.3.8 requires inoperable equipment that
causes operation in an ACTION statement of TS for the existing mode be
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logged in the TS Action Item Log (TSAIL).
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31841 OPS, 32033 OPS and 32046 OPS were all processed to be performed
on May 14, 1986, and were not logged in the TSAIL. The results of this
failure allowed work to be performed without performance of the
required functional testing. MMP 1.0, paragraph 4.3.10 states that the
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section of the Work Request entitled " Procedure Numbers" shall reflect
a complete listing of procedures to perform work, A review of the work
requests identified above identified that the procedures that were
required to be used to perform the required retesting was omitted
contributing to the failure to retest the work activity.
The above
examples are combined with the example discussed in paragraph 6.b to be
identified as one Violation : 413/86-24-01, 414/86-26-01; Failure to
follow procedures associated with IP 0/A/3240/11, Station Directive
3.2.2, Operations Management Procedure 2-29 and Maintenance Management
Procedure 1.0.
Two violations were identified as described in paragraphs 11.b. and d.
.
above. No deviations were identified.
12.
Followup of IE Notices and IE Bulletins Sent For Information (Units 1 & 2)
(92701)
The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee upon receipt of an
IE Notice (IEN) sent for information purposes only.
The Compliance
Engineer, at present, controls receipt and distribution of these documents
to assure appropriate personnel review the contents and determine actions
that may be required as a result. The following notices were reviewed to
assure receipt, review by appropriate personnel, and any resulting action
identified, documented and followed to completion:
IE Notices 85-33
85-59
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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