ML17208A766

Environ Qualification of Electrical Equipment in Harsh Environ Which Is Required for Accident Mitigation/ Monitoring

ML17208A766
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	06/01/1980
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17208A765	List: ML17208A763 ML17208A766 ML17208A767
References
IEB-79-01B, IEB-79-1B, NUDOCS 8007020321
Download: ML17208A766 (25)

Text

FLORIDA POWER 6c LIGHT COMPANY

RESPONSE

TO I6K BULLETIN 79-013 PHASE I (ACTION ITEMS 1-3)

FOR ST LUCIE UNIT NO.

1 ENVIRONMENTAL UALIFICATION OF EIZCTRICAL E UIPMENT IN A HARSH EWiIRONMENT WHICH IS RE UIRED FOR ACCIDEFZ MITIGATION/MONITORING JlPiK 1, 1980

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TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 1.1 1.2

1.3 INTRODUCTION

Contents of Report Methodology Systems Analysis Approach l-l 1-1 1-1 1-2 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 POST-ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT Post-LOCA Environmental Conditions Main Steam. Line Break Environmental Conditions Eigh Energy Line Break Outside Containment Environmental Conditions 2-1 2-1 2-2 3.0 MASTER LIST 3-1 4.0 COMPONENT EVALUATION SHEETS 4-1

INTRODUCTION Contents of Report This report is submitted in response to IE Bulletin 79-01B as Phase I of a two phase effort, where Phase I responds to Action Items 1, 2

and 3.

Phase II responds to Action Items 4 and 5 of the subject Bul-letin and will be submitted two month from the date of this report.-

Florida Power

& Light Company (FP&L} responded to IE Bulletin 79-01 (via letter L-79-181 dated July 2, 1979) as regards equipment inside containment.

This, report therefore follows'he format of the pre-vious report but has been expanded to respond to the increased scope of IE Bulletin 79-01B, i.e., to address equipment located outside containment.

In addition, in order to facilitate completion of the NRC evaluation of the St Lucie Unit 1 submittals, a "systems analysis" approach has been used as discussed in Seccdon 1.3 infra.

This report consists of three major divisions:

a main report contain-ing descriptive and e~lanatory information; a Master List which de-

lineates, by major system, the equipment which sees a harsh environ-ment and is required to mitigate/monitor the accident, and the Com-ponent. Evaluation Sheets which present-detailed environmental. parameters for each component exposed to the h'arsh environment.

Hethodolo Equipment qualification by its. very nature involves. consideration of the "design basis accident,"

(DBA} scenario wherein the postulated..

accident results in the worst-case environmental conditions (e.g.,

pressure, temperature, humidity) to which the equipment is exposed and under which it. must function.

Therefore for equipment inside containment the DBA's are defined as the LOCA and the Mb LB which give the worst environmental conditions with respect to containment pres-sure. and/or temperature; the worst cases were identified per the FSARianalyses and are discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 below.

High energy line breaks (HELB) outside containment are defined and dis-cussed in FSAR Appendices 3C and 3D.

Whereas equipment. inside con-tainment sees the environment of the accident it is required to mitigate or to monitor, the equipment required, for an HELB outside containment in most cases is not. exposed to the harsh environment of the pipe break under consideration.

Therefore the response to IE Bulletin 79-01B involved 1) a definition of the accident

2) a deter-mination of equipment required to mitigate the accident,

3) a deter-mination of equipment required to monitor recovery from the accident,

4) definition of the resultant environmental conditions and plant area(s) involved and 5) location of the equipment identified in steos (2), (3) and (4).

Sources utilized for the above determinations included the FSAR, Technical Specifications, Emergency Operating Procedures, Piping Instrumentation Drawings, Electrical Equipment Lists, Valve Lists,

0 0

1.2 (Continued)

Cable and Conduit, Lists, the previous response to 79-01, and onsite surveys.

1.3 S stems Anal sis An roach Table 1-1 is a list of the systems reviewed to determine whether any components within those systems were exposed to the accident environment and were required for accident mitigation (AM) or post-accident monitoring (PAM).

This approach ensured that all components exposed to the accident environment were considered for evaluation, even if such equipment had not been previously identified as safety-related, or Class lE, or defined as an engineered safety feature.

Conversely, this ap-proach also identified systems. which, although required for AM or PAM, are located in a plant area remote from the accident environment, and which are not subject to a harsh environment.

Using the systems analysis

approach, systems were identified as serv-ing an AM or PAM function.

These systems were then investigated to determine what, if any,. components were exposed to the accident en-vironment; this investigation was done on a "loop" basis; that is the electrical loop from the accident area boundaries to the affected de-vice was traced and each component evaluated.

For example, if the Safety Injection System is actuated for a DBA-LOCA by a pressure transmitter, inside. containment, the entire electrical loop is evalu-

ated, from the containment electrical penetration assembly via cables,

splices, switches etc to the transmitter, for-qualification to the DBA-LOCA environment inside containment.

On the other hand a Com-ponent Cooling Water System pressure differential transmitter which is used to monitor CCW flow to the containment fan coolers, but which is located in the RAB in an area unaffected by the DBA-LOCA conditions (eg, unaffected by shine from piping recirculating radio-active sump fluid) need. not be evaluated further.

Similarly, equip-ment inside the Control Room, Electrical Equipment

Rooms, and-other plant areas unaffected by the accident under consideration, which sees an ambient environment 'is not evaluated further.

Note that FP&L is evaluating.,

as a separate item under Phase II of the response to IE Bulletin 79-01B, the effects. of radiation on equipment against the guidelines provided in Enclosure 4 of the Bulletin.

During the course of this review, using the sources described in Subsection 1.2 it was-determined that some equipment, for example the reactor coolant pumps, did not serve as an accident mitigator or monitor, but instead were used in "best estimate" accident scenarios for operator convenience.

Where it was determined that the operation of such equipment was not relied upon to mitigate the environmental 1-2

1.3 (Continued) effects of the accident, or where such equipment was not the primary means to achieve safe shutdown, further evaluation was not performed.

The Emergency Operating Procedures generally are based on a "best estimate" or realistic accident scenario and thus call out more equip-ment for operator use than is assumed available in the traditional DBA scenario.

Since.the DBA results 9.n' worst-case accident environment, it governed the choice of AM and PAM equipment.

1-3

TABLE 1-1 ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS ST LUCIE UNIT 1 SYSTEMS ANALYSED ENGIiNEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM ZODINE'EMOVAL.SYSTEM CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM HYDROGEN, CONTROL SYSTEM RADIATION MONXTORING SYSTEM ECCS AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM CONTAIiiENT PURGE SYSTEM CONTAINMENT VACUUM RELIEF SYSTEM SHIELD BUXLDING VENTILATION SYSTEM CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM BATTERY ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CHEMICAL VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM COOLING WATER SYSTEM MAIN STEAM SYSTEM MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM WASTE. iiNAGEKNT SYSTEM SAMPLING SYSTEM ELECTRICAL EQUZPKBFZ iiISCELLANEOUS PENETRATIONS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM INSTR~iT AIR SYSTEM 1-4

2.0 POST-ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT 2.1 Post-LOCA Environmental Conditions The plant environmental service conditions within the containment are classified in the following environmental design categories described in FSAR Section 3.11.1:

I-A, Long term containment environment following LOCA or steam line break accident (up to one year).

I-B Short term containment environment following LOCA or steam line break accident (up to 15 minutes, or for certain ECCS components, up to initiation of recir-culation).

The environmental conditions of temperature,

pressure, humidity, and radiation for each of these two categories are presented in Table 3.11-1 of the FSAR and are repeated in Tables 2-1 and 2-2 herein.

These Tables axe presented as Attachment I to the Compon-ent Evaluation Sheets in Section 4.0.

The category I-A and I-B environmental conditions completely enve-lope the worst case loss of coolant accident (LOCA) considered in the FSAR.

This worst case LOCA is a double ended slot rupture at the suction of the reactor coolant pump in the cold leg (9.82 ft2 break area)..

This results in the highest'eak containment pressure Q8.4 psig) and'oincident temperature (259oF).

The postulated accident pressure and temperature time history curves are presented in Figures 6.2-1A and 6.2-1C of the FSAR and are included in Figures 2-1 and 2-2 of this Section respectively.

The containment radiation environment is based on a LOCA fission product release source consisting of 50 percent of the core halogen inventory, 100 percent, of core inventory and 1 percent core solid fission product. inventory.

In addition to the temperature,

pressure, humidity, and radiation environments described in the above categories, the electxical equipment within the containment-will be e~osed to a chemical environment.

The pH of the containment spray is maintained be-tween about 8.5 and 10.5 during both injection and. recirculation by'he addition.

of sodium hydroxide.

This chemical spray environ-ment will exist for only a limited period following which the equipment in question will begin to dry.

2.2 Main Steam Line Break Environmental Conditions The worst case MSLB accident occurs at 105% power with a 5.355 ft break area.

The postulated. accident pressure and temperature time history curves are presented in Figures 6.2-14 and 6.2-12 of the FSAR and are included in Figure 2-3 and 2-4 of this section re-spectively.

The same Figures are given as Attachment II to the Component Evaluation Sheets in Section 4.0.

The containment atmospheric temperature only exceeds that of cate-gories I-A and I-B (see Tables 2-1 and 2-2) for the worst case main steam line break (MSLB) accident, for approximately 40 seconds.

This temperature (290oF) has not been used as a basis foz environmental qualification. of electrical equipment: due to the. extremely short time of the. transient as discussed in'he FSAR at Subsection 6.2.13.

2..3 Hi h. Enez Line Break Outside Containment Environmental Conditions A line is considered a high energy line if the service temperature is greater than 200 F or if the design pressure is greater than 275 psig; piping which is pressurized only. during testing (eg, miniflow lines) is not considered high energy.

In, general a.high'nergy line, break (HELB) outside containment does not result'n jeopardizing the capability to maintain the plant in a.safe condition, nor does an HELB outside containment seriously impair the capability to reach safe shutdown.

For example, a break in an. auxiliary steam line, or'n a steam generator blowdown line, is immediately self-isolating and plant operation. is unhindered; thus "accident mitigation" consists of line isolation only and "post-accident monitoring" is limited to ensuring that the line re-main's isolated until. repairs are effected. It should be noted also that the systems analysis" approach is, appropriately so, a func-tional review such that..the question of whether there should be IE equipment on non-safety class lines is moat; the review was con-ducted to ensure that aa AM..or PAM function exists and= that the equip-merzt required for that function is, qualified for the appropriate environment.

FSAR Appendices 3C and 3D present,a discussion of high energy line breaks (HELB) outside containment.

The following HELB (and.corresponding design conditions) were considered therein and, were the basis for the review in this report of HELB outside containment:

a)

Main steam lines (885 psig, 520 F) b)

Main feedwater lines (1050 psig, 440 F) c)

Shutdown Cooling System (450 psig, 300 F) d)

Steam generator blowdown lines (900 psig; 532oF) e)

Auxiliary steam lines (40 psig, 350oF) f)

Chemical 6 Volume Control System letdown (2200 psig, 450 F) and charging (2300 psig, 120 F) 2-2

2.3 (Continued}

The shutdown cooling system is exempted from HELB based on the short operational pex'iod criterion of MEB 3-1 and in any case is enveloped by a CVCS HELB as discussed below.

Zn addition to the above HELBs outside containment, the AuMliary Feedwater (AFW) System (985 psig, 120oF) was reviewed for adverse environmental effects on AM/PAM equipment, during the plant opera-tional modes of staxtup and shutdown..

As regards "accident mitiga-tion" and"post-accident monitoring" in these modes,. again. effective isolation of the broken line. is the paramount concern; following an AFW break the" plant would be placed in the shutdown mode if in start-up, or continued to shutdown utilizing the redundant AFW pump(s) if the bxcak occurs: at the onset of shutdown cooling.

The six systems identified above were reviewed. for a postulated high-energy line break outside containment'.

The. postulated accident environment was located on plant general arrangement drawings and AM/PAM equipment was x'eviewed to determine its inclusion on the Master List (refexence Subsections 1.2 and 1.3).

Per the discussions in FSAR Appendices 3C and 3D-the resultant accident environments are given below:

a) main steam Uncs (the steam trestle area being the area of concern):

up. to 320oF for about

95. seconds (ie, MSZS occurs at 485 psig); 14.7 psia. since this is an outdoor area;.

100% relative humidity (RH) from the escaping

steam, only if'he break is oriented toward AM/PAM equipment.

b) main feedwatex': lines.(steam trestle area):

since. the temperature is about. 80oF lower this HELB is enveloped by the environmentel oondtMone of ieem. (eg

~eu re; 320oF/95 seconds;: 14.7 'psia; 100% RK.

c) steam generator blowdown lines (piping; penetration'rea of RAB being the area. of concern):

this HELB. is, enveloped by a CVCS 1'etdown line HELB in the same RAB area, item (e),

.below, since the letdown line is assumed.

to release cool-ant at about 600 F; up to 175 F, less than 1 psig; up to 100% RH.

d) a~liary, steam lines (the only safety-related concern is the line 12-AS-1 running outdoors 12 feet from the control room north outside air intake):

up to 350 F; 14.7 psia since an outdoor area; up to 100%

RH if the HELB is directed toward AM/PAM equipment.

Note that the CR ambient tempera-ture rises only about 12 F above ambient conservatively assuming 750 cfm intake of 500 F steam per the FSAR.

2-3

2.3 (Continued) e)

CVCS - letdown Une (piping penetration area):

up to 175 F; less than 1 psig (blowdown is terminated in about 6 seconds);

up to 100% RH.

CVCS - charging line (only that portion from the pump dis-charge is high energy):

120 F; 14.7 psia; up to 100% RH.

Note that the charging pumps are of the reciprocating type thus no pressure buildup is postulated.

f} auxiliary feedwater system (lower steam trestle area being the area, of concern).:

up to 120 F; 14.7 psia since an out-door area; up to 100%

RH only if AFV break is, directed to-ward AM/PAM instruments.

Note that loss of one of the three trains of AFW does not impair safe shutdown capability and that the AFW System is manually operated and closely monitored.

As indicated in Section 1.0, the harsh environment resulting from each of the three classes of breaks given above (LOCA, MS', HELE) was located. during the review of systems/equipment required to miti-gate that particular accident to determine whether; such equipment was exposed to the harsh environment.

The xeview assumed that no single failures: occurred and that. offsite power was available in order to maximize the kinds and quantities of components sub)ect to xeview for environmental qualification.

Results are presented in Sections 3.0 (Mastex List) and 4.0 (Component Evaluation-Sheets) of this report.

2-4

TABLE 2-1 ENVIROiiHENTAL REQUIREMENTS ST LUCIE UNIT 1 LICENSING COiEI'BAHTS Cate o

I-A (Lon -term)

Time 0 2 hr 2 24 hr 1-31 day 31 day 1 yr Temperature

('F) 270 240 150 130 Pressure si

)

44 27 Humidity V.)

100 100 100 100 Radiation (R/hr) 2 x 10 6 lx106 3x10 3 10 NOTES:

(1)

Integrated. Accident Dose (R):

40 years of Norma1 Operation (R):

Total Integrated Dose (R) 2.8 x 10 7 3.5 x 10 2.8 x 10 7 (2}

For Hain Steam Break Qua1ification see Section 2.2 2-5

TABLE 2-2 ENVIROKKNTALREQUI~TS ST LUCIE UNIT 1 LICENSING CO~INITNENTS Cate o

I-A (Short-term)

Time (Mn.)

Temperature

('z Pressure Humidity

~X)

Radiation

~(R 15 270 44 100 7.6 x 105 NOTE:

Integrated Accident Dose (R):

40 years of Normal Operation (R):

Total Integrated Dose (R) 7.6 K 105 3.5 x 10 5 1.1. x 10 6 2-6

SS 20 2$

20 I

I'x 8

lS

'10 101 102 IOT TUIE ISEC1 10I IOS Rev.

32 9/6/ I4 FLOR<UA POwER a LIGnr CHARY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT I CONtAINMENTP/ESSURE VS. Tla:E FOR 9.$ 2 FT SLOT 8REAK FIGURF. 4.2.1A

~

200 150 100 101 102 TIME (SEC1 10S 104 10S FLORIOA POWER 4 LIGMT COMPANT ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT I COMTAINMEtlTATMOSPHERE ANO SUMP WATER TEMPERATURES VS. TIME fOR 9.82 P'12 SLOT BREAK FIGURE 4.2.1C

CA 0LJ~

IA5 CE CO CAOo O

K CLI C9 CT.I-C3 10 TtHE(SEC) 1C Rev.

32 - 9/6/74 FLORIDA POWER E LIQIT COSCPA5IT ST. LUCIE PLAHT UHIT 1 COHTAINIIEHTPRESSURE VS. TIIIE FOR A SOS'OWER (149$ VWTIl5X SREAK AREA {$.355 FTTI STEAII LIHE RREAK FIGURE

6. 2-l4

o MMf'hTHHEN'TITISPHERE no 14 Ill AI IAJ Cl IASo

+N I-CZ ISJ0-o I-LIQUID oo 10 TtHE(SEC)

Rev.

32 9/6/74 FLORIDA POWER L LIGHT COSIPAHT ST. LUCIE PLAHT UNIT 1 COHTAIHMEHT ATMOSPHERE ANO LIOUIO

~ TEMPERATURES VS. TISIE FOR A 105%

, POWER I2494 MARTI SSX BREAK AREA IS.SSS FT21 STEAMLIHE RREAK FIGURE 6. 2-12

3.0 iQsSTER LIST Per Action Item 1 of lE Bulletin 79-01B equipment and components were identified, using the Systems Analysis methodology described in Section 1.0, as required to mitigate (AM) or to monitor (PAM) the course of an accident.

Based on the harsh environment result-ing from each accident, as described in Section 2.0, equipment re-

'quired for AM/PAM and exposed to the harsh environment was entered on the Master List of systems/equipment which is appended hereto.

The Master List follows the general format of Enclosure 2 of IE Bulletin 79-01B.

AM/PAM equipment inside containment required for' DBA-LOCA, or a DBA~LB inside containment, is included on the Master List.

In addition AM/PAM equipment inside containment required for an HELB outside containment is included on the Master List and is reviewed on the Component Evaluation Sheets (Section 4.0) against the normal 40-year containment environment (eg, integrated radiation exposure; up to 120 F; up to 100X RH).

AM/PAM equipment outside containment, required for an HELB outside containment, is entered on the Master List if such equipment is also exposed to the harsh environment of the accident which it mitigates and/or monitors.

AM/PAM equipment outside containment which sees an ambient environment is not in-cluded on. the Master List per the guidance contained in IE Bulletin 79-01B and the Supplement Information thereto.

For the purposes of this report and in accordance with the St Lucie Unit 1 FSAR, ambient environment is defined as up to 104 F (120 F inside containment),

atmospheric

pressure, and relative humidities ranging up to 100 percent.

1'uring the. review and evaluation of the Master List the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (Table 1-1) was identified within the context of specific components within the major system which were actuated by the ESFAS.

For example a Reactor Coolant System solenoid ~alve actuated by a CIS is included in the RCS list and not enumerated separately under a containment isolation "system" since such a system does not est per se.

Similarly the Iodine Removal, System, components are listed under the Containment Spray System.

Refer to the first page of the Master List for identifi-cation of the System numbering and the functiona3; components, ie, mechanical, instrumentation, ventilation or electrical.

Note that cross-referencing to the Component Evaluation Sheets (Section 4.0) is provided by System/function coding.

3-1

4.0 COMPONENT EVALUATION SHEETS Per Action Items 2 and 3 of IE Bulletin 79-01B each component iden-tified in the'Master List (Section 3.0)was evaluated for its re-quired environmental qualification.

The Component Evaluation Sheets (CES) appended hereto follow the same format and content as Enclosure 3 to IE Bulletin 79-01B and as such each sheet is self-explanatory.

Zn order to facilitate the NRC review and to eschew obfuscation of the St Lucie Unit 1 submittals thus far, however, the CES informa-tion is elucidated below.

Environment Parameters a)

Operating Timet in general the component operating time requirements are given. in the FSAR as "long-term" or "short term'"; also.refer to Section 2.1 of this report.

Per FSAR Sections 3.11, 6.2 and 7.5, the long-term gen-erally refers to a period of time up.to one year post-

accident, as the time required for. post-accident monitoring instrumentation to function..

"Short-term" is delineated in the CES (and Attachment I to the CES) as 15 minutes, with the understanding that a majority of instruments actuated by ESFAS are required to function for only the first few seconds following an accident and are then not relied upon further.

For elle, a pressure transmitter will send. a high-containment-pressure (5 psig) signal. for'IS on or. bef'ore about". Os8 seconds (refer to Pigure 2-1 ~su ra) and thence have served its function.

Engineering judgement is used in some cases to infer re-quired operating time and this is so noted on the CES by a footnote.

b)

Temperature:

given as the ultimate temperature peak reached in the specified operating time or as a function of time per Attachments I and II.

Engineering judgement is used in some instances to infer resultant operating temperature and is so noted on the CES.

Also see Section 2.2.

c)

Pressure:

similar to temperature, is, given as the peak ex-pected or as Attachment Z. or ZI to the CES.

Engineering judgement is noted if used.

d)

Relative Humidity:

100 percent is generally given. as the ultimate expected even though this value may not be attained during the course of some accidents, notably HELB in 'an outdoor area separated many feet from AM/PAN equipment.

Note that up to.100 percent RH is defined as an ambient condition because of the 'semi-tropical environment of St Lucie Unit 1.

4-1

4.0 (Continued) e)

Chemical spray:

St Lucie Unit l,utilizes a sodium hydrox-ide additive to the containment spray system as an iodine removal agent; the Iodine Removal System is discussed in FSAR Subsection 6.2.6.

The pH of the containment spray at the spray nozzle is maintained between 10.0 - 10.5 and the equilibrium pH of the sump is greater than or equal to 8.5.

Thus a range of chemistry pH of 8.5 - 10.5 is indicated in the CES.. A'ange of ppm boron is also indi-cated which depends.

on the amount of boric acid present in the RCS and injected from the Refueling Water Storage Tank.

f)

Radiation:

For. a DBA-LOCA the radiation exposure is given by Attachment I, which is based on a LOCA release as des-cribed in Section 2.1 above.

AM/PAM equipment inside con-tainment is thus enveloped.

by the LOCA source term.

For equipment outside containment the dose.rate maps contained in FSAR Section 12.1 were used in conjunction with engineer-ing analysis/judgement to infer equ)pment radiation ezposure.

Zn the ECCS area values of up to 10 rads were used per FSAR Subsection 6.3.3.3..

Note that FP&L will address the subject of post-LOCA radiation. effects upon. submittal of the Phase ZI report two months hence.

g}

Aging:

FP&L will address aging bases and. criteria. at the Phase II report submittal.

Although "aging" was not a requirement for'lass 1E electrical equipment. during the operating; license review period for St Lucie Unit 1, this parameter is identified as an "open item" in the CES for the majority of the equipment reviewed.

h}

Submergence:

Per 1E Bulletin 79-01B and the Supplement Information, thereto, submergence is a criterion for AM/

PAM equipment inside containment only.

Environment' ecification is given as the FSAR requirement'or all parameters; if inferred from FSAR data (eg, operating time.require-ments) this fact is so noted on the CES.

Environment uglification is test report data as indicated in the Documentation Reference column; if engineering judgement/analysis as to FSAR equivalency is in process this fact is noted on the CES.

Where environmental qualification specifics were not available a

letter to the vendor has been issued and noted on the CES.

FP&L is attempting to obtain responses to these letters within the next 60 days.

Information derived from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRZ) compendium of qualification data from 27 power plants is so identified.

4-2

~

~

l

~

4.0 (Continued)

Documentation. Reference Specification is the PSAR Section or Sub-section wherein the environmental parameters are set forth. If such parameters are inferred by engineering judgement this is noted on the CES.

Documentation Reference - uglification delineates the test result parameters; if engineering judgement was used this is so noted, and if analyses as to-equivalency are ongoing this fact appears as a

footnote on the CES.

Information derived from the EPRI data is identified as such and. efforts are presently underway to obtain the actual test report(s).

ualification Method is indicated as the vendor's simultaneous or sequential test and/or engineering analysis; if ongoing engineering analyses are being performed by FP&L or our architect-engineer or NSSS vendor this is so noted on the CES.

Outstandin Items are indicated in this column where additional in-formation (eg, vendor. test reports, EPRI-listed test reports) is presently being pursued, where engineering analyses are under way, where additional information is being developed and/or where a para-meter will be addressed.

during the Phase II report.

Note that FP&L will address all open items identified. as such in this report,. in the Phase II report to be submitted within two month.

During this intervaL additional clarification. on items such as opera-ting time, radiation environment etc will be developed.

and. presented in the Phase II report, and the status of expediting vendor replies to the CES open items will be given.

A "none" in the Outstandin Items column indicates that: either 1').the qualification test data meet the environmental parameter required by the St Lucie Unit 1 PSAR or 2) the= parameter is not construed as a

"harsh" environment; or 3) the parameter is not applicable.

Thus a, "none" indicates no further action is required.

4-3

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I 4

J 1

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