ML20148H711

Insp Repts 50-321/88-05 & 50-366/88-05 on 880123-0219. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters,Maint Observation,Operational Safety Verification,Plant Mods & Physical Security

ML20148H711
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	03/07/1988
From:	Holmesray P, Menning J, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148H683	List: ML20148H680 ML20148H697 ML20148H711
References
50-321-88-05, 50-321-88-5, 50-366-88-05, 50-366-88-5, NUDOCS 8803300068
Download: ML20148H711 (11)

See also: IR 05000321/1988005

Text

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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

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AT LANTA, oEoRGI A 30323

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Report Numbers:

50-321/88-05 and 50-366/88-05

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

P. O. Box 4545

Atlanta, GA 30302

Docket Numbers:

50-321 and 50-366

License Numbers:

DPR-57 and NPF-5

Facility Name:

Hatch 1 and 2

Inspection Dates: January 23 - February 19, 1988

Inspectors:

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Peter Holmes 'Ra , Senior Resi/ent Inspector

Date Signed

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JohnE.Menning,ResidentIn@ector

Date Sitned

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AccompanyingPersgnel:/RanallA.Mussr

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Approved by:

Marvin \\f/. Sinkule, Chief, Project Section 3B

Date Signed

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of

Licensee Action

on

Previous

Enforcement Matters,

Operational

Safety

Verification, Maintenance Observation,

Plant Modification,

Surveillance

Observation,

Radiological

Protection,

Physical

Security,

Reportable

Occurrences, and Reactor Operating Events.

Results:

Two violations were identified.

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REPORT DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Licensee. Employees

T. Beckham, Vice President-Plant Hatch

• C. Coggin, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager

D. Davis, Manager General Support

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J. - Fitzsimmons, Nuclear Security Manager

• P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager

• 0. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager

• M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager

• H. Nix, Plant Manager

• T. Powers, Engineering Manager

• D. Read, Plant Support Manager

• H. Sumner, Operations Manager

• S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager

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R.-Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

• P. Holmes-Ray

• J. Menning

• R. Musser

NRC management on site during inspection period:

M. Sinkule, Chief, Project Section 38, Region II

• Attended exit interview

2.

Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 19, 1988,

with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

The licensee did not

identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the

inspectors during this inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings

and took no exception.

Item Number

Status

Description / Reference Paragraph

321/88-05-01

Open

VIOLATION - Bypassing of APRM

Downscale Scram Inputs

(paragraph 5)

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Item Number

Status

Description / Reference Paragraph

cont'd

321/88-05-04

Open

VIOLATION - Inadequate MWO for

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Vacuum Breaker Maintenance

(paragraph 8)

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321,366/86-41-01'

Closed

VIOLATION - Failure to follow

plant procedures which

resulted in partial loss of water

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from the fuel pools (paragraph 3)

321,366/88-05-02

Open

URI - Leak Testing of Test

Solenoid Valves (paragraph 5)

321/88-05-03

Open

URI - Inadequate APRM

Surveillance (paragraph 8)

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

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(Closed) Violation 321,366/86-41-01, Failure to follow plant procedures

which resulted in a partial loss of water from the fuel pools.

The GPC

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letter of response dated May 8,1987, was reviewed. Licensee corrective

action involved replacement of the transfer canal inflatable seal assembly,

an enhancement of the leak detection system (implemented by DCR 87-99),

the addition of redundant air supplies to the inflatable seal assembly and

annunciation in the control rocin for loss of seal air pressure (implemented

by DCR 87-100), and specific training for operations personnel on the

spill event.

The inspector reviewed the GPC corrective action package,

DCR's 87-99 and 87-100 (and associated MW0s), toured the new seal air

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supply system with the system engineer and determined that the required

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corrective actions had been performed.

Since the actions to correct the

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specifics of this violation have been completed, this item is closed.

4.

Unresolved Item (URI)*

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(0 pen) URI 321,366/88-05-02, Leak Testing of Test Solenoid Valves.

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(0 pen) URI 321/88-05-03, Inadequate APRM Surveillance.

(Closed) URI 321,366/87-02-03, Method to Ensure Qualified Personnel are

Available to Fill Emergency Organization Positions.

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In Inspection Report 321,366/87-18 the Emergency Preparedness Section

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opened IFI 87-18-04, Veri fy Shift Augmentation Times and Violation

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87-18-05, Failure to Maintain a Trained and Qualified Emergency Response

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Staff.

These two items cover the same concern as 87-02-03. URI 87-02-03

is closed to remove the redundancy.

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"An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to

determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.

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5.

Operational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall

plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant

operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various

members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits

to the control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints

and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on

equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to

limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily

journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access

controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions

with operators and their supervisors.

Weekly, when on site, selected

Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable.

The

confirmation was made by verifying the following:

accessible valve flow

path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation,

major component leakage, lubrication, cooling, and general condition.

General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis. Portions

of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside

areas were visited.

Observations included general plant / equipment

conditions, safety related tagout verifications, shif t turnover, sampling

program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection

equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection

controls, physical security, problem identification systems, missile

hazards, instrumentation and alarms in the control room, and containment

isolation.

On January 28, 1988, the inspector observed tools and other materials in

the Unit 1 reactor building in the vicinity of Core Spray System Outboard

Injection Valve 1E21-F004A.

These items had apparently not been removed

following the completion of maintenance work. This matter was brought to

the attention of the Unit 1 Shift Supervisor.

On February 9,

1988, while administering an NRC operator licensing

examination, the examiner noted that Unit I was potentially operating with

less than the minimum number of operable Average Power Range Monitor

(APRM) Downscale scram inputs required by the Technical Specifications

(TS).

At the time of this observation (approximately 0840) Unit I was

operating in the RUN mode at approximately 100 percent of rated power.

The examiner noted that APRM channel A and Intermediate Range Monitor

(IRM) channel C were both in the bypassed condition.

A review of a

f acility print (H-17789) confirmed that the bypassing of IRM channel C in

effect bypassed the Downscale scram input of APRM channel C.

Since APRM

channels A, C and E provide input to Reactor Protection system (RPS)

channel A, only APRM channel E remained available to provide Downscale

scram input to this RPS Channel.

During power operations Table 3.1-1 of

the TS requires a minimum of two operable channel inputs per RPS channel

for the APRM Downscale scram function. If the min' um number of operable

inputs cannot be met for an RPS channel, the affected RPS channel must be

tripped.

The examiner observed that RPS channel A was not tripped.

The

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examiner discussed his concerns with the Unit 1 Shift Supervisor and noted

that IRM channel C was subsequently unbypassed.

The resident inspector attempted to determine how long APRM channel A and

IRM channel C had been simultaneously bypassed in following up on this

matter. This could not be determined from a review of control room log

books. However, on duty operations personnel indicated that the condition

had existed since at least the start of their shift.

This event is

considered a violation of TS Table 3.1-1 in that only one APRM channel

was available to provide APRM Downscale scram input to RPS channel A and

the RPS channel was untripped.

This matter will be tracked as Violation

321/88-05-01 - Bypassing of APRM Downscale Scram Inputs.

At approximately 1500 on February 9,

1988, while conducting an NRC

licensed one"/.or examination, the examiner noticed that halon tanks

serv 4 *., the Unit 2 Remote Shutdown Panel were discharged.

Discussions

wi .n operations personnel revealed that the tanks discharged at 2237 on

February 8, 1988. Operations personnel also indicated that no action had

,een taken to replenish the halon.

Since Unit 2 was in cold shutdown

during this time period, halon protection was not required for the Remote

Shutdown Panel.

However, the examiner and the resident inspectors were

concerned that the licensee had taken no action to replenish the halon

almost 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> af ter the discharge had taken place.

The licensee is

currently reviewing this matter. Region II NRC personnel will also review

this matter during a future inspection.

At 1920 on February 12, 1988, with Unit 1 operating at 100 percent of

rated power, the licensee declared a loss of primary containment integrity

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and entered a 12-hour hot shutdown LCO.

Proper NRC notifications were

made at that time.

These actions were precipitated by the results of

local leak rate testing (LLRT) in Unit 2 which is currently in an outage.

The licensee had previously been conducting LLRTs on vacuum breaker test

solenoid valves 2T48-F342A - L.

These test solenoid valves are in lines

that supply air to the air operators of torus to drywell vacuum breakers

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These vacuum breakers normally operate in the

2T48-F323A

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self-actuated mode.

The air operators exist for the purpose on

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demonstrating opening capability on a monthly basis.

For containment

isolation purposes, the licensee considers the air operators to be primary

barriers.

Test solenoid valves 2T48-F342A - L are considered outboard

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isolation valves, and are identified as containment isolation valves in

the licensee's Pump and Valve Program.

Until the current Unit 2 outage,

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LLRT's on these valves had been performed with pressure applied on the

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side of the F342 valves away from accident pressure. When recently tested

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on the accident side, the valves failed to hold pressure.

As a result of the Unit 2 test failures and the similarity of equipment in

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Unit 1, the licensee promptly declared a loss of primary containment

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integrity in Unit 1.

The licensee subsequently restored primary containment

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integrity in Unit 1 by disconnecting and capping the air lines at test

solenoid valves 1T48-F343A - L.

This avoided shutdown of Unit 1 and was

accomplished within the LCO time allowed.

The licensee it currently

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investigating this matter and exploring options for corrective action.

Pending completion of the licensee's investigation and -NRC review, the

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matter will be identified as Unresolved Item 321,366/88-05-02 - Leak

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Testing of Test Solenoid Valves.

One violation was identified.

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6.

Maintenance Observation (62703) Units 1 and 2

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During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance

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activities.

The observations included a review of the work documents for

adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical

specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the

actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements,

and adherence to the appropriate quality controls.

The primary maintenance

observations during this month are summarized below:

Maintenance Activity

Date

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1.

Preventive maintenance on Limitorque operator

1/26/88

on valve 2E32-F001P per procedure

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52PM-MNT-005-0S (Unit 2)

2.

Plant service water pump "2A" sequencing

1/28/88

timer evaluation per procedure

42SP-011188-0J-1-2S.

(Unit 2)

3.

Inspection of "2C" diesel generator per

2/3/88

procedure 52SV-R43-001-05 (Unit 2)

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Inspection of Allis Chalmers Motor

2/8/88

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Control Center 2R24-5012 per

procedure 52PM-R24-001-05 (Unit 2)

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Removal of Valve 2E11-F005B per

2/9/88

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Maintenance Work Order 2-87-3462 for

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Inservice Inspection (Unit 2)

No violations or deviations were identified.

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7.

Plant Modification (37700) Unit 2

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The inspectors observed the performance of selected plant modification

Design Change Requests (DCRs). The observation included a review of the

DCR for technical adequacy, conformance to Technical Specifications,

verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of

the actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of

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the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability

based upon the acceptance criteria.

The primary DCR observations are

summarized below:

DCR

Date

.86-235

2/2/88

81-008

2/8/88

No violations or deviations were identified.

8.

Surveillance Testing Observations (61726) Units 1 and 2

The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillances.

The

observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy,

conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument

calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances,

removal from service and return to service of the system or components

affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the

acceptance criteria. The primary surveillance testing observations during

this month are summarized below:

Surevillance Testing Activity

Date

1.

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System

2/2/88

Pump Rated Flow Testing per

procedure 345V-E51-002-1S (Unit 1)

2.

Functional Testing of Offgas Vent Pipe

2/4/88

Radiation Monitor per procedure

575V-011-010-1 (Unit 1)

3.

Post Maintenance Functional Testing of

2/11/88

"2" Diesel Generator per procedure

52SV-R43-001-05 (Unit 2)

4.

Functional Testing and Calibration of APRMs

2/15/88

345V-C51-002-15 (Unit 1)

On February 15, 1988, at 1720, the licensee discovered that the

surveillance for Average Power Range Monitors (APRM) did not test all

contacts in the trip logic. The downscale and the flow biased high flux

trip contacts had not been included in the surveillance procedure and

therefore had not been tested weekly as required by Technical Specifications).

The APRMs were declared inoperable at 1720, 2-15-88 and the LC0 atiion required

by TS 3.1, Table 3.1-1, Scram Number 8 was entered. This required action

was to reduce power to the IRM range and to have the Mode Switch in Hot

Standby within eight hours.

The licensee requested that the NRC grant

discretionary enforcement to extend the LCO time for about eleven hours

(until 12:00 noon, 2-16-88) to allow time for procedure development and

testing of the APRM trips.

The request was processed through proper

channels and discussed. Since the LC0 time limit of eight hours was rot

exceeded, the discretionary enforcement was not utilized due to clearing

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of the LCO.

The Senior Resident Inspector reviewed the procedure and

witnessed the testing of one of the APRMs.

All APRMs were tested

satisfactorily and the LCO cleared .by 2302, 2-15-88.

This item,

Inadequate APRM Surveillance, will be tracked as URI 321/88-05-03. As

discussed in Region II Reports 321,366/87-29 and 321,366/87-33, several

Unit 1 torus to drywell vacuum breakers failed to test satisfactorily

during recent monthly operability testing.

More specifically, vacuum

breakers 1T48-F323 C and F did not test properly on November 11, 1987, and

vacuum breaker 1T48-F323E stuck open during testing on December 11, 1987.

Vacuum breaker li:.e-F323E eventually did close when the test switch at the

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local panel for vacuum breaker IT48-F323F was depressed.

The licensee

subsequently initiated a program to identify and correct wiring problems

in the test circuitry for these vacuum breakers.

Required corrective

actions were taken under Maintenance Work Orders (MW0s) 1-87-8123,

1-87-7516, 1-87-7517 and 1-87-7950 during the month of January 1988.

In

essence, the licensee found that solenoid valves in the air test lines for

IT48-F323C, E and F had been incorrectly wired and that individual wire

conductor labels for these solenoid valves were incorrect. The solenoid

valves (designated IT48-F342 C, E and F) are two-way valves that remain

open after the test button is released to assure that all air is relieved

from the test line.

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The licensee conducted a broader investigation af the vacuum breaker

testing problems to determine the root cause and identify any additional

needed corrective actions. The resident inspectors reviewed the report of

this investigation dated February 5,1988.

It was determined that the

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wiring discrepancies causing the testing problems were introduced in

October of 1987 during the performance of MWO 1-86-7823. This MWO was

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generated primarily to mark and stow a spare cable and verify the wiring

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of a new cable.

Personnel performing this work noticed and documented

improper conductor termination at test solenoid valves 1T48-F342C, E and

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F.

Unfortunately, MWO instructions to correct the observed wiring discrepa-

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ncies were inadequate, and subsequent corrective maintenance actually introduced

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wiring errors into the test circuitry.

The operability testing difficulties

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of vacuum breakers IT48-F323C, E, and F were subsequently experienced in

November and December of 1987.

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Technical Specification 6.8.1.a.

requires that written procedures be

established, implemented and maintained covering the activities recommended

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in Appendix

"A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2,

February 1978.

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Appendix "A" recommends that maintenance that can af fect the performance

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of safety-related equipment be properly preplanned and performed in

accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings

appropriate to the circumstances.

The rewiring of solenoid valves

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IT48-F342C,E and F in October 1987 is considered to be a violation of TS

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6.8.1.a. in that the instructions of MWO 1-86-7823 were inadequate and

resulted in improper wiring of the three vacuum breaker test soler.oid

valves.

This matter will be tracked as Violation 321/88-05-04

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Inadequate MWO for Vacuum Breaker Maintenance.

In reviewing this matter

the inspectors noted that the incorrect wiring of the test solenoid valves

did not impair the ability of the torus to drywell vacuum breakers to

function in the normal, self-actuated mode,

One violation was identified.

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9.

.ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve

and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified

both locally- and in the control room to ensure that . lineups were in.

accordance with operability requirements and that equipment material

conditions were satisfactory. The Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal system "A"

loop was walked down in detail.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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10.

Radiological Protection (71709) Units 1 and 2

The resident inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensee's radiological

protection program in the course of the monthly activities.

The

performance of health physics and other personnel was observed on various

shifts to include:

involvement of health physics supervision, use of

radiation work permits, use of personnel monitoring equipment, control of

high radiation areas, use of friskers and personal contamination monitors,

and posting and labeling.

No violations or deviations were noted.

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11.

Physical Security (71881) Units 1 and 2

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In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included

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a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of

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various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily

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activities to include: availability of supervision, availability of armed

response personnel, protected soc vital access controls, searching of

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personnel, packages and vehit 'es, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting

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of visitors, patrols and compensatory pests.

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On February 18, 1988, the resident inspectors toure, the new security

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building and observed operations in progress.

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No violations or deviations were noted.

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12.

Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700) Unit 1 and 2

A number of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential

generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective

actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were

also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications

were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost consideration.

Unit 1: 86-11, Personnel Error Causes ESF Actuation.

The events of

this LER were cited as Violation 86-03-03. The licensee's

corrective action was raviewed and the violation closed in

Inspection Report 86-28.

This LER is closed.

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87-01, Spurious Ground Fault Trips Turbine Overspeed Device

Causing Reactor SCRAM. The licensee's response to to this

event was reviewed and appeared adaquate.

No fault was

located in the turbine overspeed device and the device has

operated properly during Unit 1 power operations. This LER

is closed.

87-02, Ground Condition Trips Main Generator and Turbine

Resulting in Reactor SCRAM. A loose wire was located and

repaired.

Checks were made for other loose components or

ground conditions with none found. A review for possible

additional preventative measures is continuing.

This LER

is closed.

87-05. Blocked Air Port Prevents Damper Closure Resulting in

Improper ESF Actuation. This event was caused by a missing

locknut on the damper control valve bleed off port

adjusting screw. The nut was replaced, the screw properly

adjusted and locked and the other dampers inr.oected for

loose or missing locknuts.

This LER is closed.

Unit 2: 86-20, Primary Containment Penetrations Failed LLRT. All failed

penetrations were repaired and retested prior to Unit 2

startup.

This LER is closed.

87-05, Leaking Valves Cause RWCU Isolation (Group 5).

The leaking

valves were located and isolated and the Group 5 isolation

signal reset.

There is a continuing RWCU upgrade in

progress to which this problem has been added. This LER is

closed.

13. Operating Reactor Events (93702) Unit 2

As discussed in Report 321,366/88-01, the maximum reactor coolant system

cooldown rate of 100 degrees F per hour specified in Technical Specification 3.4.6.1 was exceeded during the shutdown of Unit 2 on

January 13, 1988. The licensee determined that a cooldown from about 520

to 375 degrees F occurred in one hour.

The associated technical specification

Action Statement required the licensee to perform an engineering

evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the

fracture toughness properties of the r6 actor coolant system and to determine

that the reactor coolant system remains acceptable for continued

operation.

An engineering evaluation, performed by General Electric

Company for the licensee, addressed the potential cor.cerns of brittle

fracture, allowable stress and f atigue.

The evaluation concluded that

brittle fracture was not a concern, and that the impact of the transient

on maximum stress and fatigue were less severe than those evaluated for

the design basis single relief valve blowdown event.

In summary, it was

concluded that there were no structural integrity concerns with continued

operation of Unit 2.

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The resident inspectors reviewed the General Electric engineering evaluation

dated January 18, 1988.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

14.

Information Meeting with Local Officials, (94600)

On February 2,1988, the Chief of Region II Projects Section 3B and the

resident inspectors held an information meeting with the Appling County

Board of Commissioners. The NRC representatives provided the Board with a

description of the NRC organization and responsibilities, a summary of

plant status and the business telephone numbers of appropriate NRC

contacts. Additionally, the Hatch resident inspectors were introduced and

the inspection program was briefly described.

Information available in

the local Public Document Rnom was also discussed. The NRC representatives

responded to questions posed by the Board at the conclusien of this

information meeting.

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