ML21074A346

Adams 2C

ML21074A346
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	08/29/2019
From:	Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	NRC/RGN-II
References
Download: ML21074A346 (45)

Text

ML21074A346 ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: ___Vogtle 1 & 2_____ Date of Examination: _06/10/2019_

Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: _2019-301_

Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Describe activity to be performed Code*

Conduct of Operations R, M a. V-NRC-JP-14005-ILT22: Determine Available Shutdown Margin Following a Failed Control Rod Operability Test

Description:

Unit 2 is at 100% reactor power. During control rod operability testing, two control rods in a group fail to move when demanded. In response to the failed control rod operability test, the applicant will be directed to determine the available Shutdown Margin for the given conditions using 14005-2, Shutdown Margin and keff Calculations, and to determine if the required Acceptance Criteria are met.

G2.1.43 RO 4.1 Conduct of Operations R, M b. V-NRC-JP-00012-ILT22: Determine On-Shift Manning Requirements for a Given Crew of Licensed and Non-Licensed Operators

Description:

Both units are at 100% reactor power during a holiday weekend. Some operators are on vacation and others are out due to illness. Given a list of operators who have arrived to take the shift and their license status and qualifications, the applicant will be required to determine if the minimum shift manning requirements are met by completing Figure 1 of 00012-C, Shift Manning Requirements.

G2.1.05 RO 2.9*

Equipment Control R, D c. V-NRC-JP-14405-ILT22: Perform Boron Injection Flow Path Verification in Response to Equipment Failure

Description:

Unit 1 is at 100% reactor power with 1HV-8801A, BIT Discharge Isolation, tagged out due to a failed surveillance. Subsequently, 1FV-121, Charging Flow Control, fails closed, which leads to a total loss of charging. Using the given conditions and data provided, the applicant will be directed to complete Figure 1 of surveillance 14405-1, Boron Injection Flow Path Verification During Operation, and determine if the Acceptance Criteria are met in order to verify that two boron injection flow paths are available.

G2.2.12 RO 3.7 ES-301-1 (Revision 11)

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Radiation Control R, M d. V-NRC-JP-00930-ILT22: Assess Radiological Conditions, Calculate Projected Dose to Determine Lowest Dose Route, and Determine if Task Can be Performed Without Exceeding the Task Dose Limit

Description:

An operator will be dispatched to manually open an MOV in the Unit 1 RHR Pump Room. The applicant will be given two possible routes to the valve, the radiological conditions associated with each route, and the time required to complete the task. Two maps will also be provided that include the RHR A Heat Exchanger Room and the RHR A Pump Room, so the applicant must select the correct dose rate. The applicant will then be directed to calculate the lowest dose route based on the projected dose to the operator and determine if the task can be performed without exceeding the established dose limit.

G2.3.12 RO 3.2 Emergency Plan N/A N/A NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

ES-301-1 (Revision 11)

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: ___Vogtle 1 & 2_____ Date of Examination: _06/10/2019_

Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: _2019-301_

Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Describe activity to be performed Code*

Conduct of Operations R, M a. V-NRC-JP-14005-ILT22: Determine Available Shutdown Margin and Evaluate Tech Spec / TRM Required Actions

Description:

Unit 2 is at 100% reactor power. During a control rod operability test, two control rods in a group fail to move when demanded. In response to the failed control rod operability test, the applicant will be required to calculate the available Shutdown Margin for the given conditions using 14005-2, Shutdown Margin and keff Calculations. The applicant will then be required to determine the applicable Tech Spec / TRM Required Actions.

G2.1.43 SRO 4.3 Conduct of Operations R, M b. V-NRC-JP-13009-ILT22: Determine Boration Requirements with the Boric Acid Storage Tank Out of Service and Evaluate Tech Spec / TRM Required Actions

Description:

Unit 2 is in Mode 5 when the BAST is taken out of service due to a high boron concentration. A boration of the RCS is necessary, so the applicant will be directed to calculate the volume of boric acid and the total charging time required using 13009-2, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System. The applicant will be given pictures of Integrated Plant Computer screens to gather data necessary to complete the calculations.

Based on the BAST out of service and completed surveillance data provided, the applicant will determine if there are any Tech Spec / TRM Required Action Statements to enter.

G2.1.23 SRO 4.4 ES-301-1 (Revision 11)

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Equipment Control R, D c. V-NRC-JP-10008-ILT22: Determine Tech Spec LCO Requirements for a Failed Steam Generator Pressure Instrument

Description:

With Unit 1 at 100% reactor power, one SG pressure instrument fails. Using the conditions provided, the Tech Specs, and the Tech Spec Bases, the applicant will be required to determine all applicable Tech Spec LCOs and to complete an LCO/TR Status Sheet using 10008-C, Recording Limiting Conditions for Operation.

G2.2.23 SRO 4.6 Radiation Control R, M d. V-NRC-JP-NMP-EP-144-ILT22: Assess Radiological Conditions, Calculate Projected Dose, and Determine if Responders can Complete Emergency Tasks

Description:

During a General Emergency, responders have been identified to perform lifesaving duties. The applicant will be given information about each responder, the dose rates associated with the lifesaving tasks, and the time required to complete the tasks. The applicant, serving as the Emergency Director, will be directed to calculate the projected dose for each task and to determine if the available responders can complete the tasks without exceeding the authorized emergency exposure limits in accordance with NMP-EP-144, Protective Actions.

G2.3.04 SRO 3.7 Emergency Plan R, M e. V-NRC-JP-NMP-EP-141-ILT22: Classify an Emergency Event and Complete the Emergency Notification Form

Description:

Using the conditions provided that lead to a plant event, the applicant will be directed to determine the highest emergency classification level for the event using NMP-EP-141, Event Classification. WebEOC will not be available, which will require the applicant to manually complete NMP-EP-142-F01, Emergency Notification Form (ENF). This JPM is time critical.

G2.4.41 SRO 4.6 NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

ES-301-1 (Revision 11)

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: ___Vogtle 1 & 2___ Date of Examination: _06/10/2019_

Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: _2019-301_

Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function

a. V-NRC-JP-13009-ILT22: Initiate Emergency Boration in Response A, L, M, S 1 to Three Stuck Control Rods

Description:

Unit 1 reactor tripped and is now stable in Mode 3. The crew is performing 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response, and determines three controls rods failed to fully insert. Per 19001-1, emergency boration is required. The applicant will be directed to initiate emergency boration using 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System. After starting a Boric Acid Transfer Pump, the applicant will not be able to open 1HV-8104, Emergency Borate Valve. After determining that 1HV-8104 will not open, the applicant will be required to initiate the emergency boration from the BAST through the normal charging flow path.

(RO / SRO-I / SRO-U) 024AA2.02 RO 3.9 SRO 4.4

b. V-NRC-JP-13006-ILT22: Place Safety Grade Charging in Service L, M, S 2 Using CCP B

Description:

Unit 1 is in Mode 3. 1FV-121, Charging Flow Control, failed closed, which resulted in a loss of charging. Per 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, and Operations Management, Safety Grade Charging will be used for RCS inventory control. The applicant will be directed to place Safety Grade Charging in service using CCP B at a flow rate of 30 gpm using 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System.

(RO / SRO-I) 022AA1.01 RO 3.4 SRO 3.3 ES-301-2 (Revision 11)

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2

c. V-NRC-JP-19013-ILT22: Transfer ECCS Pumps to Cold Leg A, D, EN, L, S 3 Recirculation

Description:

Unit 1 reactor trip and SI occurred due to a large break LOCA. The RWST level lowers until the RWST LO-LO LEVEL alarm (29%) is received, so the applicant will be directed to transfer all ECCS pumps (RHR pumps, SIPs, and CCPs) to the cold leg recirculation mode using 19013-1, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. 1HV-8811B, Containment Sump to RHR Pump B, will not automatically open, so the applicant will have to stop RHR pump B, close 1HV-8812B, RWST to RHR Pump B, open 1HV-8811B, and then re-start RHR pump B.

(RO / SRO-I) 011EA1.11 RO 4.2 SRO 4.2

d. V-NRC-JP-19012-ILT22: Isolate Accumulators During Post-LOCA A, D, EN, L, S 4P Cooldown

Description:

Unit 1 reactor was tripped in response to a LOCA, and a cooldown and depressurization were performed. Adequate RCS subcooling and pressurizer level are available to isolate the SI Accumulators. The applicant will be directed to isolate the SI Accumulators using 19012-1, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization. Accumulator #4 Isolation valve will not close from the Control Room, which will require the applicant to vent the non-isolable Accumulator #4.

(RO / SRO-I)

WE03EA1.01 RO 4.0 SRO 4.0

e. V-NRC-JP-13130-ILT22: Place Containment Hydrogen Monitors in A, D, EN, L, S 5 Service

Description:

Unit 1 reactor trip and SI occurred due to a LOCA. EOP actions are in progress in response to the event, so the applicant will be required to place the Containment Hydrogen Monitors in service using 13130-1, Post-Accident Hydrogen Control. Containment Hydrogen Monitor A will be placed in service, then, when placing Containment Hydrogen Monitor B in service, the Common Failure light will illuminate, which will require the applicant to return Containment Hydrogen Monitor B to Standby.

(RO / SRO-I / SRO-U) 028A4.03 RO 3.1 SRO 3.3 ES-301-2 (Revision 11)

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2

f. V-NRC-JP-13427-ILT22: Discontinue Parallel Operation by A, N, S 6 Removing DG1A from Bus 1AA02

Description:

Unit 1 is at 100% reactor power. DG1A was slow started and paralleled with RAT 1A, the normal power source to 4160 VAC 1E bus 1AA02, for a post-maintenance test. The test is complete so the applicant will be required to discontinue parallel operation by transferring the remaining load to RAT 1A and removing DG1A from bus 1AA02 using 13427A-1, 4160 VAC Bus 1AA02 1E Electrical Distribution System. When the applicant begins the DG1A load reduction, ALB35-D06 DG1A GEN UNDER FREQ will be received in conjunction with indication of low bus frequency. The Annunciator Response Procedure will direct the applicant to verify bus frequency is low and then trip the DG1A output breaker and stop the DG1A engine.

(RO / SRO-I / SRO-U) 064A2.02 RO 2.7 SRO 2.9

g. V-NRC-JP-18038-ILT22: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to D, S 8 Evacuation

Description:

A fire in the Unit 1 Control Room requires an evacuation per 18038-1, Operation from Remote Shut Down Panels. The fire is causing potential equipment degradation, and there is a threat to personnel safety. The applicant is directed to perform the 18038-1 Control Room actions required prior to evacuation that include tripping the reactor, tripping the RCPs, tripping the MFPs, and isolating main steam and main feedwater. The applicant will also shift charging pump suction to the RWST.

(RO / SRO-I) 068AA1.23 RO 4.3 SRO 4.4

h. V-NRC-JP-19253-ILT22: Respond to Containment High Radiation D, EN, L, S 9

Description:

Unit 1 reactor trip and SI occurred due to a large break RO ONLY LOCA. While performing the recovery actions for the loss of reactor coolant, the containment area radiation monitors exceed 755 mr/hour, which meets the YELLOW path entry criteria on the Containment CSFST. To respond to the high containment radiation, the applicant will be required to perform the actions of 19253-1, Response to High Containment Radiation Level, to isolate containment and to place the required containment ventilation units in service.

(RO)

WE16EA1.01 RO 3.1 ES-301-2 (Revision 11)

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U

i. V-NRC-JP-13610-ILT22: Reset the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle D, E, EN, L 4S Valve Following an Overspeed Trip

Description:

Unit 1 reactor tripped due to a loss of main feedwater.

Following the reactor trip, no MDAFW pump would start and the TDAFW pump experienced a mechanical overspeed trip due to a misaligned trip mechanism. Maintenance has re-aligned the trip mechanism and the TDAFW pump is ready to be reset. The applicant will be directed to reset the TDAFW pump trip and throttle valve using 13610-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System.

(RO / SRO-I / SRO-U)

WE05EA1.01 RO 4.1 SRO 4.0

j. V-NRC-JP-13431-ILT22: Startup 120 VAC 1E Vital Inverter Following E, M 6 Corrective Maintenance

Description:

On Unit 2, Inverter 2BD1I2 that supplies 120 VAC 1E Vital Instrument bus 2BY1B tripped due to voltage fluctuations. 18032-2, Loss of 120 VAC Instrument Power, was entered. Electrical Maintenance completed repairs and is ready to re-energize the inverter.

Battery 2BD1B is connected to 125 VDC 1E bus 2BD1. The applicant will be directed to startup inverter 2BD1I2, which is powered by 2BD1, using 13431-2, 120 VAC 1E Vital Instrument Distribution System.

(RO / SRO-I) 057AA1.01 RO 3.7* SRO 3.7

k. V-NRC-JP-18030-ILT22: Respond to a Loss of Spent Fuel Pool D, E, R 8 Level

Description:

Unit 1 has experienced a loss of Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) level, and the crew is performing the actions of 18030-C, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Level or Cooling. Makeup to the SFP has been initiated, but SFP level continues to lower. In response to the lowering level, the applicant will be required to shut down the in-service SFP cooling and skimmer pumps and close their associated suction and discharge valves using 18030-C.

(RO / SRO-I / SRO-U) 036AA1.04 RO 3.1 SRO 3.7

• All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

ES-301-2 (Revision 11)

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/1/1 (EN)gineered safety feature 1 / 1 / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/1/1 (S)imulator ES-301-2 (Revision 11)

ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Facility: Vogtle 1&2 Exam Date: June 2019 1 2 5 6 3 4 ADMIN Attributes Job Content LOD Admin JPMs Topic U/E/S Explanation (1-5) and K/A I/C Critical Scope Perf. Job Cues Overlap Key Minutia Focus Steps (N/B) Std. Link 2 Stuck Rod SDM Is determining acceptance criteria an RO function (i.e.,

RO A1a G2.1.43 3 E should it be a critical step)?

Acceptance criteria provided to the RO in Initial Conditions. Step is now critical.

Shift Staffing Could the second question affect the way that they look at the first question? Perhaps we could just ask the first question and ask to explain any holes if any? Then filling RO A1b G2.1.5 3 E each position with a qualified body would each be critical steps. Im not sure this second question adds any value.

Is this task a normal RO function?

Revised as suggested.

Boron Injection Flow Path Verification Im not sure how this JPM has more than 1 critical step.

This is also borderline for EC.

Will they understand that the valve is tagged closed?

RO A2 G2.2.12 2 X E How will they get the initial information about the status of the system? Are they to assume normal lineups?

Made correct filling out of the datasheet critical too.

Initial Conditions state that only two valves out of expected condition.

Assess rad conditions and determine if task can be completed.

Kind of simplistic. Could we strengthen by asking the HP RO A3 G2.3.12 1 U requirements to enter? Elsewhere I have seen this modified to require some kind of knowledge of the location of equipment?

Changing as requested. Still need to see final version.

Review SDM calculation with TS/TRM implications Make the SROs do the calculation and then make the TS SRO A1a G2.1.43 3 X E call.

Changed as requested.

Shift Staffing with TS/TRM implications Similar comment to RO B above. The SRO question SRO A1b G2.1.5 2 X E seems more appropriate for a written. Why is this adequate for an SRO JPM?

Rewritten. Need to see final version.

Determine TS LCO for SG Instrument LCO SRO A2 G2.2.23 2 X E How is this significantly different than what they are required to do in the scenarios?

How different is this from a failed instrument during the scenarios? Is this too much overlap? Scenario 2 Event 1 is only potential for this.

Lets talk about this operator aid and how it exists in the plant.

This is different because they are required to fill out the paperwork. The licensee inadvertently took this out of TS. They placed it in the bases until they could correct.

The SRO will need to find this information in order to complete JPM sat.

Evaluate rad conditions to determine if emergency responders can complete tasks SRO A3 G2.3.13 2 X E Maybe 2.3.4 Fix the grammar Responder John is a NOT a volunteer.

Changed as requested.

Classify an event and complete ENF SRO A4 2.4.41 3 E Why would they mark Drill Is this critical?

Licensee wants this as a critical step.

1 Simulator/In-Plant Safety Function JPMs and K/A Initiate EB Would it be acceptable to use one of the other two A 1 2 X E alternative methods? Perhaps we could fail those paths, so this wont be an option.

Modified as suggested.

Place safety grade charging in service Step 12 appears critical Could we make the standard look more like the cue or vice versa? If the standard says Close both valves the B 2 3 E cue should look like Closes both valves (closing either valve meets the critical aspect).

Step 12 is not critical. Step is performed in case AOV leaks by. Comment on standard verbiage accepted.

Transfer ECCS Pups to Cold Leg Recirc Will the CCPs trip off on RWST level? If so, how long C 3 3 E would it take? Is that a failure?

Yes, but at several hours. Should not get there if making adequate process.

Isolate accumulators during post-LOCA C/D This does not appear to meet alternate path criteria.

When the applicant enters the simulator, the lack of light indication tells him that the A accumulator cannot be D 4P 2 X E isolated.

This looks more like a Safety Function 3 than 4 Modified and corrected. Need to see it in simulator to fully evaluate. Need to review safety function after observing in the simulator.

Place containment hydrogen monitors in service JPM 2 (JPM 11) Applicant opens 1HV-2792A and OR E 5 3 S 1HV-2792B Revised as suggested.

Divorce DG1A from bus 1AA02 Is an emergency stop the right thing to do? Once it is F 6 3 X E divorced from the bus, a normal stop would make sense.

Not certain step 3 is critical

Is protect DG1A from exceeding its administrative operating limits a critical step; Is from operating unloaded, which can create a fire hazard due to combustion byproduct buildup in the exhaust system. An immediate concern and therefore a critical step Deleted note in that stated that emergency shutdown is expected due to carbon build-up concerns. Shutting down EDG is critical. Either method of S/D is ok. If the emergency shutdown we may have to ask why they chose that method if it is not obvious.

G 8 3 S Perform CR actions prior to an evacuation H 9 2 S Respond to Containment High Rad Reset the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve I 4S 3 S Following an Overspeed Trip Startup 120 VAC 1E Vital Inverter Following Corrective J 6 3 S Maintenance K 8 2 S Respond to a Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Level ES-301, Page 28 of 33 ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Instructions for Completing This Table:

Check or mark any item(s) requiring a comment and explain the issue in the space provided using the guide below.

1. Check each JPM for appropriate administrative topic requirements (COO, EC, Rad, and EP) or safety function requirements and corresponding K/A. Mark in column 1.

(ES-301, D.3 and D.4)

2. Determine the level of difficulty (LOD) using an established 1-5 rating scale. Levels 1 and 5 represent an inappropriate (low or high) discriminatory level for the license that is being tested. Mark in column 2 (Appendix D, C.1.f)

3. In column 3, Attributes, check the appropriate box when an attribute is not met:

• The initial conditions and/or initiating cue is clear to ensure the operator understands the task and how to begin. (Appendix C, B.4)

• The JPM contains appropriate cues that clearly indicate when they should be provided to the examinee. Cues are objective and not leading. (Appendix C, D.1)

ES-301, Page 29 of 33

• All critical steps (elements) are properly identified.

• The scope of the task is not too narrow (N) or too broad (B).

• Excessive overlap does not occur with other parts of the operating test or written examination. (ES-301, D.1.a, and ES-301, D.2.a)

• The task performance standard clearly describes the expected outcome (i.e., end state). Each performance step identifies a standard for successful

completion of the step.

• A valid marked up key was provided (e.g., graph interpretation, initialed steps for handouts).

4. For column 4, Job Content, check the appropriate box if the job content flaw does not meet the following elements:

• Topics are linked to the job content (e.g., not a disguised task, task required in real job).

• The JPM has meaningful performance requirements that will provide a legitimate basis for evaluating the applicant's understanding and ability to safely operate the plant. (ES-301, D.2.c)

5. Based on the reviewers judgment, is the JPM as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 5.

6. In column 6, provide a brief description of any (U)nacceptable or (E)nhancement rating from column 5.

Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound JPM is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.

ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Facility: Vogtle 1&2 Scenario: 1 ( IC 50% ) Exam Date: June 2019 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.

Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap Raise Power 1 X S 2017 Scenario 5 Event 1 Similar to Scenario 4 Event 1. Need to use on different people.

Pzr PORV PV-455 fails open X X S 2017 Scenario 2 Event 1 2 Similar to Scenario 3 event 9. Need to use on different people.

3 S HDP #1 trips VCT Level, LT-185 fails high X S 4 2017 Scenario 6 Event 1 1AA002 (1E 4160V) faults. 1A EDG starts but cannot tie on.

X X S 5 2015 Scenario 3 Event 4 6 S Control rod withdrawal casualty 7 S LOCA upon Rx trip (Major)

Containment mini-purge valves fail to auto close X X S 8 2017 Scenario 1 event 9 B CSP fails to auto start X X S 9 Similar to 2015 Scenario 2 Event 11 B RHR pump trips. Enter loss of recirc X S 10 2015 Scenario 2 Event 10

ES-301 Operating Facility: Vogtle 1&2 Scenario: 2 (IC 100%) Exam Date: June 2019 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.

Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap PZR Level LT-459 fails low 1 X X S 2017 Scenario 6 Event 3?

RO manual charging control Restore normal letdown X S 2017 Scenario 5 Event 5 2 RO manual control letdown PR N41 lower detector fails high X X S 2017 Scenario 3 Event 2 3 RO manual rod control NSCW #2 pump trips X S 4 2017 Scenario 4 vent 3 Control rod K-14 drops X X S 5 2017 Scenario 4 Event 4 A EHC pp trips X X S 6 2017 Scenario 4 Event 2 7 S Control rod D-4 drops. Rx trip.

Main Gen output breakers fail to auto open X S 8 2017 Scenario 4 Event 8 9 X S Pzr safety PSV-8010A fails open (Major) 10 S Containment Isolation Phase A fails to actuate

ES-301 Operating Facility: Vogtle 1&2 Scenario: 3 (IC 100%) Exam Date: June 2019 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.

Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap

1. 4 SG ARV, PV-3030, fails open 1 X S 2017 Senario 2 Event 6 Inadvertent turbine runback X S 2 2015 Scenario 2 Event 2 Loop 3 TC , TE-431B, fails high X X S 2015 Scenario 3 Event 1 3 RO manual control of charging

1. 2 SG 10 gpm tube leak X X S 4 2017 Scenario 3 Event 4 Rapid down power X S 5 2017 Scenario 3 Event 5 6 S B MFP trips. Rx trip. SGTR. (Major)

SI fails to auto actuate X X S 7 2017 Scenario 1 Event 8 8 X S #2 SG steam supply to TDAFW will not isolate Pzr PORV PV-455 fails open. Block valve fails to close X S 2015 Scenario 6 Event 9 9 Similar to Scenario 1 event 2. Need to use on different people.

ES-301 Operating Facility: Vogtle 1&2 Scenario: 4 (IC 75%) Exam Date: June 2019 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.

Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap Raise Power 1 X S 2017 Scenario 5 Event 1 Similar to Scenario 1 Event 1. Need to use on different people.

2 X S A CCW Train rupture 3 S Place B CCW Train in service LDHX Temp, TIC-130, fails low X S 2015 Scenario 1 Event 3 4 UO manual control 5 X S Dropped Spent Fuel Assembly Spray Valve, PIC-455B, controller fails valve at 60%

X X X S 2015 Scenario 3 Event 3 6 RO manual control 7 X S Main Gen trips. ATWS. Will not trip from MCR MDAFW pump fails to auto start X S 8 2017 Scenario 3 Event 8 NCP trips when generator trips X S 9 2017 Scenario 5 Event 4

ES-301 Operating Facility: Vogtle 1&2 Scenario: 5 Exam Date: June 2019 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.

Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap SD B MDAFW pp and place in STBY 1 X S 2015 Scenario 1 Event 1 Raise Rx power to MODE 1 X S 2 2017 Scenario 1 Event 2 3 S #1 TPCW pp trips. STBY fails to auto start RWST sludge mixing line breaks X X S 4 2017 Scenario 5 Event 3 Pzr pressure, PT-455, fails high X X X S 5 2017 Scenario 5 Event 2 LD isolation valve, LV-460, fails closed X S RO Manually control charging 6 2015 Scenario 4 Event 5

1. 2 ACCW pp fails with stby OOS X X S 7 2017 Scenario 2 Event 2 8 X S #3 SG faults outside containment before MSIV (major)

NCP fails to auto trip on SI X S 9 2017 Scenario 4 Event 7 SLI fails to auto actuate X S 10 2015 Scenario 5 Event 9

ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Instructions for Completing This Table:

Use this table for each scenario for evaluation.

2 Check this box if the events are not related (e.g., seismic event followed by a pipe rupture) OR if the events do not obey the laws of physics and thermodynamics.

3, 4 In columns 3 and 4, check the box if there is no verifiable or required action, as applicable. Examples of required actions are as follows: (ES-301, D.5f)

• opening, closing, and throttling valves

• starting and stopping equipment

• raising and lowering level, flow, and pressure

• making decisions and giving directions

• acknowledging or verifying key alarms and automatic actions (Uncomplicated events that require no operator action beyond this should not be included on the operating test unless they are necessary to set the stage for subsequent events. (Appendix D, B.3).)

5 Check this box if the level of difficulty is not appropriate.

6 Check this box if the event has a TS.

7 Check this box if the event has a critical task (CT). If the same CT covers more than one event, check the event where the CT started only.

8 Check this box if the event overlaps with another event on any of the last two NRC examinations. (Appendix D, C.1.f) 9 Based on the reviewers judgment, is the event as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 9.

10 Record any explanations of the events here.

In the shaded boxes, sum the number of check marks in each column.

• In column 1, sum the number of events.

• In columns 2-4, record the total number of check marks for each column.

• In column 5, based on the reviewer's judgement, place a checkmark only if the scenario's LOD is not appropriate.

• In column 6, TS are required to be 2 for each scenario. (ES-301, D.5.d)

• In column 7, preidentified CTs should be 2 for each scenario. (Appendix D; ES-301, D.5.d; ES-301-4)

• In column 8, record the number of events not used on the two previous NRC initial licensing exams. A scenario is considered unsatisfactory if there is < 2 new events. (ES-301, D.5.b; Appendix D, C.1.f)

• In column 9, record whether the scenario as written (U)nacceptable, in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory from column 11 of the simulator scenario table.

ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Facility: Exam Date:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 11 Scenario  % Unsat. Explanation Event Events TS TS CT CT Scenario U/E/S Totals Unsat. Total Unsat. Total Unsat.

Elements 1 10 0 2 0 2 0 0 S No manual control of automatic functions 2 10 0 3 0 2 0 0 S 3 9 0 2 0 2 0 0 S 4 9 0 3 0 2 0 0 S 5 10 0 2 0 3 0 0 S ES-301, Page 32 of 33 Instructions for Completing This Table:

Check or mark any item(s) requiring comment and explain the issue in the space provided.

1, 3, 5 For each simulator scenario, enter the total number of events (column 1), TS entries/actions (column 3), and CTs (column 5).

This number should match the respective scenario from the event-based scenario tables (the sum from columns 1, 6, and 7, respectively).

2, 4, 6 For each simulator scenario, evaluate each event, TS, and CT as (S)atisfactory, (E)nhance, or (U)nsatisfactory based on the following criteria:

a. Events. Each event is described on a Form ES-D-2, including all switch manipulations, pertinent alarms, and verifiable actions. Event actions are balanced between at-the-controls and balance-of-plant applicants during the scenario. All event-related attributes on Form ES-301-4 are met. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory events in column 2.

b. TS. A scenario includes at least two TS entries/actions across at least two different events. TS entries and actions are detailed on Form ES-D-2. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory TS entries/actions in column 4. (ES-301, D.5d)

c. CT. Check that a scenario includes at least two preidentified CTs. This criterion is a target quantitative attribute, not an absolute minimum requirement. Check that each CT is explicitly bounded on Form ES-D-2 with measurable performance standards (see Appendix D). Enter the total number of unsatisfactory CTs in column 6.

2+4+6 7 In column 7, calculate the percentage of unsatisfactory scenario elements: 100%

1+3+5 8 If the value in column 7 is > 20%, mark the scenario as (U)nsatisfactory in column 8. If column 7 is 20%, annotate with (E)nhancement or (S)atisfactory.

9 In column 9, explain each unsatisfactory event, TS, and CT. Editorial comments can also be added here.

Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.

ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Site name: Exam Date:

OPERATING TEST TOTALS Total Total Total  %

Total Explanation Unsat. Edits Sat. Unsat.

Admin.

9 0 5 4 JPMs Sim./In-Plant 11 0 5 6 JPMs Scenarios 5 0 0 5 Op. Test 25 0 10 25 0 Totals:

Instructions for Completing This Table:

Update data for this table from quality reviews and totals in the previous tables and then calculate the percentage of total items that are unsatisfactory and give an explanation in the space provided.

1. Enter the total number of items submitted for the operating test in the Total column. For example, if nine administrative JPMs were submitted, enter 9 in the Total items column for administrative JPMs.

For scenarios, enter the total number of simulator scenarios.

Enter the total number of (U)nsatisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the two JPMs column 5 and 2.

simulator scenarios column 8 in the previous tables. Provide an explanation in the space provided.

Enter totals for (E)nhancements needed and (S)atisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the previous 3.

tables. This task is for tracking only.

4. Total each column and enter the amounts in the Op. Test Totals row.

Calculate the percentage of the operating test that is (U)nsatisfactory (Op. Test Total Unsat.)/(Op. Test 5.

Total) and place this value in the bolded % Unsat. cell.

Refer to ES-501, E.3.a, to rate the overall operating test as follows:

• satisfactory, if the Op. Test Total % Unsat. is 20%

• unsatisfactory, if Op. Test Total % Unsat. is > 20%

Update this table and the tables above with post-exam changes if the as-administered operating test 6.

required content changes, including the following:

• The JPM performance standards were incorrect.

• The administrative JPM tasks/keys were incorrect.

• CTs were incorrect in the scenarios (not including postscenario critical tasks defined in Appendix D).

• The EOP strategy was incorrect in a scenario(s).

• TS entries/actions were determined to be incorrect in a scenario(s).

ES-301, Page 33 of 33

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Vogtle 1&2 Date of Exam: June 2019 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* Total A2 G* Total

1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 3 6 Emergency and Abnormal Plant 2 2 1 2 N/A 1 1 N/A 2 9 2 2 4 Evolutions Tier Totals 5 4 5 4 4 5 27 5 5 10 1 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 28 3 2 5 2.

Plant 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 0 1 2 3 Systems Tier Totals 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 38 4 4 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 3 3 1 3 2 2 1 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outline sections (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only section, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 radiation control K/A is allowed if it is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 category.)

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points, and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the outline. Systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification. Operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible. Sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7. The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics IRs for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. If fuel-handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. (Note 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G* Generic K/As

• These systems/evolutions must be included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan. They are not required to be included when using earlier revisions of the K/A catalog.

• • These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.

ES-401, Page 1 of 52

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

007EA2.02; Ability to determine or interpret the 000007 (EPE 7; BW E02&E10; CE E02) X following as they apply to a reactor trip: Proper 4.6 Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery / 1 actions to be taken if the automatic safety functions have not taken place.

008AK2.02; Knowledge of the interrelations 000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space X between the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident and 2.7 Accident / 3 the following: Sensors and detectors.

009EK3.24; Knowledge of the reasons for the 000009 (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA / 3 X following responses as the apply to the small break 4.1 LOCA: ECCS throttling or termination criteria.

011EK1.01; Knowledge of the operational 000011 (EPE 11) Large Break LOCA / 3 X implications of the following concepts as they apply 4.1 to the Large Break LOCA : Natural circulation and cooling, including reflux boiling.

X 015G2.1.32; Ability to explain and apply system 4.0 000015 (APE 15) Reactor Coolant Pump limits and precautions.

Malfunctions / 4 022AK3.03; Knowledge of the reasons for the 000022 (APE 22) Loss of Reactor Coolant X following responses as they apply to the Loss of 3.7 Makeup / 2 Reactor Coolant Makeup: Sequence of events for manually tripping reactor and RCP as a result of an RCP malfunction.

025K1.01; Knowledge of the operational 000025 (APE 25) Loss of Residual Heat X implications of the following concepts as they apply 3.9 Removal System / 4 to Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Loss of RHRS during all modes of operation.

026G2.4.35; Knowledge of local auxiliary operator 000026 (APE 26) Loss of Component X tasks during an emergency and the resultant 4.0 Cooling Water / 8 operational effects.

027AK3.01; Knowledge of the reasons for the 000027 (APE 27) Pressurizer Pressure X following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer 3.5 Control System Malfunction / 3 Pressure Control Malfunctions: Isolation of PZR spray following loss of PZR heaters.

029EK1.05; Knowledge of the operational 000029 (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient X implications of the following concepts as they apply 2.8 Without Scram / 1 to the ATWS: definition of negative temperature coefficient as applied to large PWR coolant systems.

038EA2.14; Ability to determine or interpret the 000038 (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube X following as they apply to a SGTR: Magnitude of 3.3 Rupture / 3 atmospheric radioactive release if cooldown must be completed using steam dumps or if atmospheric reliefs lift.

WE12EK2.2; Knowledge of the interrelations 000040 (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12) X between the (Uncontrolled Depressurization of all 3.6 Steam Line RuptureExcessive Heat Steam Generators) and the following: Facilitys heat Transfer / 4 removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

054AA2.05; Ability to determine and interpret the 000054 (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main X following as they apply to the Loss of Main 3.5 Feedwater /4 Feedwater (MFW): Status of MFW pumps, regulating and stop valves 055A1.07; Ability to operate and monitor the 000055 (EPE 55) Station Blackout / 6 X following as they apply to a Station Blackout: 4.3 Restoration of power from offsite.

X 055A2.01; Ability to determine or interpret the 3.7 following as they apply to a Station Blackout:

Existing valve positioning on a loss of instrument air system.

ES-401, Page 2 of 52

056AA2.34; Ability to determine and interpret the 000056 (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power / 6 X following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: 3.6 Rod bottom lights.

057AA1.04; Ability to operate and / or monitor the 000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC X following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC 3.5 Instrument Bus / 6 Instrument Bus: RWST and VCT valves.

058G2.2.42; Ability to recognize system parameters 000058 (APE 58) Loss of DC Power / 6 X that are entry-level conditions for Technical 3.9 Specifications.

062G2.1.32; Ability to explain and apply system 000062 (APE 62) Loss of Nuclear Service X limits and precautions. 3.8 Water / 4 065G2.4.9; Knowledge of low power/shutdown 000065 (APE 65) Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant 3.8 accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.

077G2.1.25; Ability to interpret reference materials, 000077 (APE 77) Generator Voltage and X such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. 4.2 Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 WE04EK2.2; Knowledge of the interrelations (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X between the (LOCA Outside Containment) and the 3.8 following: Facilitys heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

WE11EA2.2; Ability to determine and interpret the (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant X following as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency 3.4 Recirculation / 4 Coolant Recirculation): Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility*s license and amendments.

WE05EA1.1; Ability to operate and / or monitor the (BW E04; W E05) Inadequate Heat X following as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary 4.1 TransferLoss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 Heat Sink): Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

K/A Category Totals: 3 3 3 3 3/3 3/3 Group Point Total: 18/6 ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

000001 (APE 1) Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 X 001G2.4.18; Knowledge of the 4.0 specific bases for EOPs.

000003 (APE 3) Dropped Control Rod / 1 X 003AK1.04; Knowledge of the 3.1 operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Dropped Control Rod: Effects of power level and control position on flux.

000005 (APE 5) Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 (APE 24) Emergency Boration / 1 000028 (APE 28) Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control X 028G2.4.47; Ability to diagnose 4.2 Malfunction / 2 and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.

000032 (APE 32) Loss of Source Range Nuclear X 032AA2.08; Ability to determine 3.1 Instrumentation / 7 and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation:

Testing required if power lost, then restored.

ES-401, Page 3 of 52

000033 (APE 33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 000036 (APE 36; BW/A08) Fuel-Handling Incidents / 8 X 036G2.2.42; Ability to recognize 3.9 system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications.

000037 (APE 37) Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 (APE 51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 (APE 59) Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release / 9 X 059G2.4.30; Knowledge of events 4.1 related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator.

000060 (APE 60) Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9 X 060AA1.01; Ability to operate 2.8 and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste: Area radiation monitors.

000061 (APE 61) Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms

/7 000067 (APE 67) Plant Fire On Site / 8 X 067AA2.14; Ability to determine 4.3 and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site:

Equipment that will be affected by fire suppression activities in each zone.

000068 (APE 68; BW A06) Control Room Evacuation / 8 000069 (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity / 5 000074 (EPE 74; W E06 & E07) Inadequate Core Cooling / X WE07EK2.1; Knowledge of the 3.4 4 interrelations between the (Pressurized Thermal Shock) and the following: Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

000076 (APE 76) High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 X 076AK3.06; Knowledge of the 3.2 reasons for the following responses as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity:

Actions contained in EOP for high reactor coolant activity.

000078 (APE 78*) RCS Leak / 3 (W E01 & E02) Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 X WE01EK3.3; Knowledge of the 3.5 reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection/Rediagnosis):

Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

(W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure / 4 X WE13EA2.1; Ability to determine 2.9 and interpret the following as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure): Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

ES-401, Page 4 of 52

(W E15) Containment Flooding / 5 X WE15EK1.3; Knowledge of the 2.8 operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Containment Flooding):

Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Containment Flooding).

(W E16) High Containment Radiation /9 (BW A01) Plant Runback / 1 (BW A02 & A03) Loss of NNI-X/Y/7 (BW A04) Turbine Trip / 4 (BW A05) Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 (BW A07) Flooding / 8 (BW E03) Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 (BW E08; W E03) LOCA CooldownDepressurization / 4 (BW E09; CE A13**; W E09 & E10) Natural Circulation/4 (BW E13 & E14) EOP Rules and Enclosures (CE A11**; W E08) RCS OvercoolingPressurized Thermal Shock / 4 (CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage / 2 (CE E09) Functional Recovery (CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation/LOOP/Blackout / 4 K/A Category Point Totals: 2 1 2 1 1/2 2/2 Group Point Total: 9/4 ES-401, Page 5 of 52

ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor X 003A2.03; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 2.7 Coolant Pump the following malfunctions or operations on the RCPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Problems associated with RCP motors, including faulty motors and current, and winding and bearing temperature problems.

004 (SF1; SF2 CVCS) Chemical X 004K5.30; Knowledge of the operational 3.8 and Volume Control implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS: Relationship between temperature and pressure in CVCS components during solid plant operation.

X 004G2.1.25; Ability to interpret reference 4.2 materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

005 (SF4P RHR) Residual Heat X 005K2.01; Knowledge of bus power supplies to 3.0 Removal the following: RHR pumps.

006 (SF2; SF3 ECCS) X 006K5.04; Knowledge of the operational 2.9 Emergency Core Cooling implications of the following concepts as they apply to ECCS: Brittle fracture, including causes and preventative actions.

X 006G2.2.40; Ability to apply Technical 4.7 Specifications for a system.

007 (SF5 PRTS) Pressurizer X 007A1.01; Ability to predict and/or monitor 2.9 Relief/Quench Tank changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRTS controls including: Maintaining quench tank water level within limits.

008 (SF8 CCW) Component X 008K4.09; Knowledge of CCWS design 2.7 Cooling Water feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: The "standby" feature for the CCW pumps.

X 008A2.03; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 3.2 the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: High/low CCW temperature.

010 (SF3 PZR PCS) Pressurizer X 010K6.01; Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 2.7 Pressure Control malfunction of the following will have on the PZR PCS: Pressure detection systems.

012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor X 012K1.05; Knowledge of the physical 3.8 Protection connections and/or cause effect relationships between the RPS and the following systems:

ESFAS.

X 012G2.1.30; Ability to locate and operate 4.4 components, including local controls.

013 (SF2 ESFAS) Engineered X 013A3.01; Ability to monitor automatic 3.7 Safety Features Actuation operation of the ESFAS including: Input channels and logic.

022 (SF5 CCS) Containment X 022K3.02; Knowledge of the effect that a loss 3.0 Cooling or malfunction of the CCS will have on the following: Containment instrumentation readings.

X 022A3.01; Ability to monitor automatic 4.1 operation of the CCS, including: Initiation of safeguards mode of operation.

ES-401, Page 6 of 52

025 (SF5 ICE) Ice Condenser 026 (SF5 CSS) Containment X 026K4.01; Knowledge of CSS design 4.2 Spray feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Source of water for CSS, including recirculation phase after LOCA.

X 026A4.01; Ability to manually operate and/or 4.5 monitor in the control room: CSS controls.

039 (SF4S MSS) Main and X 039K1.08; Knowledge of the physical 2.7 Reheat Steam connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MRSS and the following systems:

MFW.

059 (SF4S MFW) Main X 059A2.12; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 3.1 Feedwater the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Failure of feedwater regulating valves.

X 059A4.03; Ability to manually operate and 2.9 monitor in the control room: Feedwater control during power increase and decrease.

061 (SF4S AFW) X 061A3.01; Ability to monitor automatic 4.2 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater operation of the AFW, including: AFW startup and flows.

X 061G2.2.39; Knowledge of less than or equal 3.9 to one-hour Technical Specification action statements for systems.

062 (SF6 ED AC) AC Electrical X 062A1.01; Ability to predict and/or monitor 3.4 Distribution changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ac distribution system controls including:

Significance of D/G load limits.

X 062A3.01; Ability to monitor automatic 3.0 operation of the ac distribution system, including: Vital ac bus amperage.

063 (SF6 ED DC) DC Electrical X 063A2.01; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 2.5 Distribution the following malfunctions or operations on the DC electrical systems; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Grounds.

064 (SF6 EDG) Emergency X 064K6.07; Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 2.7 Diesel Generator malfunction of the following will have on the ED/G system: Air receivers.

073 (SF7 PRM) Process X 073K1.01; Knowledge of the physical 3.6 Radiation Monitoring connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PRM system and the following systems: Those systems served by PRMs.

X 073A2.01; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 2.5 the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Erratic or failed power supply.

076 (SF4S SW) Service Water X 076K3.01; Knowledge of the effect that a loss 3.4 or malfunction of the SWS will have on the following: Closed cooling water.

078 (SF8 IAS) Instrument Air X 078K2.02; Knowledge of bus power supplies to 3.3 the following: Emergency air compressor.

X 078A4.01; Ability to manually operate and/or 3.1 monitor in the control room: Pressure gauges.

ES-401, Page 7 of 52

103 (SF5 CNT) Containment X 103A1.01; Ability to predict and/or monitor 3.7 changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the containment system controls including:

Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity.

X 103A2.05; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 3.9 the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Emergency containment entry.

053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) Integrated Control K/A Category Point Totals: 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 3/3 3 3 2/2 Group Point Total: 28/5 ES-401, Page 8 of 52

ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

001 (SF1 CRDS) Control Rod X 001G2.1.32; Ability to explain and apply 4.0 Drive system limits and precautions.

002 (SF2; SF4P RCS) Reactor X 002A4.02; Ability to manually operate and/or 4.3 Coolant monitor in the control room: Indications necessary to verify natural circulation from appropriate level, flow, and temperature indications and valve positions upon loss of forced circulation.

011 (SF2 PZR LCS) Pressurizer X 011K2.02; Knowledge of bus power supplies to 3.1 Level Control the following: PZR heaters.

014 (SF1 RPI) Rod Position X 014A2.04; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 3.9 Indication the following malfunctions or operations on the RPIS; and (b) based on those on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Misaligned rod.

015 (SF7 NI) Nuclear X 015A3.04; Ability to monitor automatic 3.3 Instrumentation operation of the NIS, including: Maximum disagreement allowed between channels.

016 (SF7 NNI) Nonnuclear Instrumentation 017 (SF7 ITM) In-Core X 017A1.01; Ability to predict and/or monitor 3.7 Temperature Monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ITM system controls including: Core exit temperature.

027 (SF5 CIRS) Containment Iodine Removal 028 (SF5 HRPS) Hydrogen X 028A2.03; Malfunctions or operations on the 3.4 Recombiner and Purge Control HRPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: The hydrogen air concentration in excess of limit flame propagation or detonation with resulting equipment damage in containment.

029 (SF8 CPS) Containment X 029K4.02; Knowledge of design feature(s) 2.9 Purge and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Negative pressure in containment.

033 (SF8 SFPCS) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 (SF8 FHS) Fuel-Handling X 034G2.1.25; Ability to interpret reference 4.2 Equipment materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

035 (SF 4P SG) Steam Generator 041 (SF4S SDS) Steam X 041K6.03; Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 2.7 Dump/Turbine Bypass Control malfunction on the following will have on the SDS: Controller and positioners, including ICS, S/G, CRDS.

045 (SF 4S MTG) Main Turbine X 045K5.23; Knowledge of the operational 2.7 Generator implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MT/B System: Relationship between rod control and RCS boron concentration during T/G load increases.

055 (SF4S CARS) Condenser Air Removal 056 (SF4S CDS) Condensate 068 (SF9 LRS) Liquid Radwaste ES-401, Page 9 of 52

071 (SF9 WGS) Waste Gas Disposal 072 (SF7 ARM) Area Radiation Monitoring 075 (SF8 CW) Circulating Water 079 (SF8 SAS**) Station Air X 079K1.01; Knowledge of the physical 3.0 connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the SAS and the following systems:

IAS.

086 Fire Protection X 086G2.2.36; Ability to analyze the effect of 4.2 maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.

050 (SF 9 CRV*) Control Room Ventilation K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1/1 1 1 1/2 Group Point Total: 10/3 ES-401, Page 10 of 52

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: Date of Exam:

Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-only IR # IR #

2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions. 3.8 Knowledge of the station's requirements for verbal 2.1.38 3.7 communications when implementing procedures.

Knowledge of RO duties in the control room during fuel handling, 2.1.44 such as responding to alarms from the fuel handling area, 3.9 communication with the fuel storage facility, systems operated from the control room in support of fueling operations, and supporting instrumentation.

2.1.1 Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements. 4.2 2.135 Knowledge of the fuel-handling responsibilities of SROs. 3.9 Subtotal 3 2 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

1. Conduct of 2.2.13 4.1 Operations Knowledge of the process for controlling equipment 2.2.14 configuration or status. 3.9 Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms.

2.2.43 3.0 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status 2.2.44 and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions 4.2 and directives affect plant and system conditions.

2.2.20 Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting 3.8 activities.

2.2.21 Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability 4.1 requirements.

Subtotal 3 2 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed 2.3.12 3.2 operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or 3.7 emergency conditions.

3. Radiation Control 2.3.

2.3.

2.3.

2.3.

Subtotal 1 1 2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.. 4.7 2.4.25 Knowledge of fire protection procedures. 3.3 2.4.39 Knowledge of RO responsibilities in emergency plan 3.9 implementation.

4. Emergency Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety functions during Procedures/Plan 2.4.22 abnormal/emergency operations. 4.4 Knowledge of procedures relating to a security event (non-2.4.28 4.1 safeguards information).

2.4.

Subtotal 3 2 Tier 3 Point Total 10 10 7 7 ES-401, Page 11 of 52

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier/Group Randomly Reason for Rejection Selected K/A 3 2.2.21 Unable to write RO question. This was swapped with 2.2.44(formerly SRO).

2/1 061A3.04 No automatic closure functions. Changed to 061A3.01.

3/1 2.2.44 Unable to write Tier 3 question. Changed to 2.2.13

ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9

3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other

1. 2.

6. Source 7. Status Q LOK LOD SR 8. Explanation Stem Cred. Job- #/ Back Q- (B/ M / N) (U /E /S)

(F/H) (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia O Focus Dist Link Units ward K/A Only 1 F 2 M S 001G2.1.32 001 002A4.02 001 Change second question to SRV #2 and #3 2 H 2 M S can/cannot be operated in from QMCB. Changed as suggestions 003A2.03 001 Are these pump trip setpoints required knowledge for an RO? If so, the question is OK. We would just 3 H 3 M S need to ensure that there is a statement that they should assume the temperature rates of change remain constant. Changed as suggested. Verified RO knowledge 003AK1.04 001 K/A is not really met here. The K/A is looking for what happens to power and flux on a dropped rod.

So perhaps something about what you have to do with the turbine to get Tavg at program. Maybe a question about whats going on with AFD or QPTR.

4 H 2 X M S I know this was a pre-submittal, but lets talk about this. Revised as requested Since the K/A seems to want to consider power level maybe the second part could ask the flux shift would/would not be larger at 50%?

Changed first part to will/will not lower Main Turbine Load 004K5.30 001 Is there any way an applicant could appeal that the temp changes within RHR does affect total flow and 5 H 3 M S therefore 1FV-618 would modulate? The question is not bound by time (i.e. 15 min.) Changed to 1TV-130 as a direct impact to temperature change.

Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts:

1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.

2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question a 1 (easy) to 5 (difficult); questions with a difficulty between 2 and 4 are acceptable.

3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:

• Stem Focus: The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).

• Cues: The stem or distractors contain cues (e.g., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length).

• T/F: The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.

• Cred. Dist.: The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, and more than one is unacceptable.

• Partial: One or more distractors are partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by the stem).

4. Check the appropriate box if a job content flaw is identified:

• Job Link: The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).

• Minutia: The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed-reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).

• #/Units: The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).

• Backward: The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.

5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved K/A and those K/As that are designated SRO-only. (K/A and license-level mismatches are unacceptable.)

6. Enter questions source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Verify that (M)odified questions meet the criteria of Form ES-401, Section D.2.f.

7. Based on the reviewers judgment, is the question, as written, (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?

8. At a minimum, explain any U status ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-9

3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other

1. 2.

6. Source 7. Status Q LOK LOD SR 8. Explanation Stem Cred. Job- #/ Back Q- (B/ M / N) (U /E /S)

(F/H) (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia O Focus Dist Link Units ward K/A Only 005K2.01 001 Since SI is reset on one train and not on the other, 6 H 3 X B S does this make distractors A and D not plausible?

Updated as required to meet K/A and make SAT 7 F 3 B S 006K5.04 001 007A1.01 001 This strays a bit too far from the K/A. Having the main part of the question deal with tailpipe temperatures instead of the tank is a bit of a K/A 8 F 2 X N S stretch. A simpler question might be PRT pressure is/is not maintained automatically AND PRT level is/is NOT maintained automatically. Updated as requested 008AK2.02 001 I see no references were planned to be provided. Is 9 F 2 M S this information expected to be memorized by the applicants?

Level is fundamental. Expected RO knowledge 10 H 3 M S 008K4.09 001 009EK3.24 001 11 H 3 M S Could we change the first question to RCS SCM does/does not lower? Updated as requested 12 H 3 M S 010K6.01 001 011EK1.01 001 13 F 2 B S this one doesn.t really appear to be modified from the original, just rewording is rearranged.

14 H 2 N S 011K2.02 001

3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other

1. 2.

6. Source 7. Status Q LOK LOD SR 8. Explanation Stem Cred. Job- #/ Back Q- (B/ M / N) (U /E /S)

(F/H) (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia O Focus Dist Link Units ward K/A Only This doesnt appear to be a bank. Maybe modified or new. Correctly classified 012G2.1.30 001 15 F 3 N S 012K1.05 001 Im having trouble with the first question. Why exactly would someone mistakenly think that a loss of a bus would keep the RTB from opening? Take this 16 H 2 B S to the extreme, would a total loss of power result in the reactor trip breakers still being closed? I know that this is a bank question, I probably just need help getting through it. Changed as requested, significantly modified 17 H 2 M S 013A3.01 001 18 H 2 N S 015A3.04 001 017A1.01 001 19 F 3 B S Is the first part RO knowledge without Table 3.3.3-1?

SNC verified TS table is RO knowledge.

022A3.01 001 Since both EDGs start, why would the different 20 H 2 X M S coolers behave differently? Distractors A and D are not plausible. Changed as required.

022AK3.03.001 Is the knowledge for the second question RO knowledge? I agree that they should know that the procedure would require them to know that they needed to put excess letdown in service. But is it reasonable to expect them to know that reactor power needs to be reduced because of that? This seems pretty deep in the procedure. Maybe if we 21 H 4 X X N S asked something at an overall procedural strategy level instead.

However, if the facility representative states that this would be required RO knowledge, it would be acceptable.

The first question might be better if we just asked if the valve did/did not close Lets discuss.

Changed Mwt to 100%, less minutia, RO knowledge 22 H 2 B S 022K3.02 001 23 H 3 M S 025AK1.01 001

3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other

1. 2.

6. Source 7. Status Q LOK LOD SR 8. Explanation Stem Cred. Job- #/ Back Q- (B/ M / N) (U /E /S)

(F/H) (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia O Focus Dist Link Units ward K/A Only 24 H 2 M S 026A4.01 001 25 F 2 M S 026K4.01 001 027AK3.01 001 By having the low pressuser PORV Block alarm come in, you are telling the applicant that pressure is low, Therefore sprays must be open and since no other parameters are given, DNBR S entered.

26 F 3 X N S This one might be as simple as changing the second question to whether or not they need to close the PORV.

Modified as requested. SAT 028A2.03 001 Given dilution as a solution, does that look too obvious? If instead we gave them a choice of the 27 F 2 M S preferred method is/ is not to place recombiner in service, would that be more discerning? Not Modified, rationalized as procedurally accurate.

028AG2.4.47 001 If the applicant miscalculated the expected level and determined that the controller was working properly, why would he/she choose that backup heaters were 28 H 3 X X N S on?

If the backup heaters are on, is it logical that pressure would be stable?

Modified as suggested.

029EK1.05 001 Is this an RO level question? Its pretty detailed 29 F 3 X M S knowledge of the procedure. Its a good question and meets the K/A. SNC verified RO knowledge regarding 5%. Modified for clarity 029K4.02 001 Distractor analysis comment: Containment Penetration rooms are maintained at a positive 30 F 2 M S pressure in order to prevent leaks from the Containment Building into the Auxiliary Building does not seem very plausible. Get rid of this part. Modified 036AG2.2.42 001 31 F 2 M S Is this information required to be known from memory for the ROs? Modified as suggested 32 F 2 X M S 038EA2.14 001

3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other

1. 2.

6. Source 7. Status Q LOK LOD SR 8. Explanation Stem Cred. Job- #/ Back Q- (B/ M / N) (U /E /S)

(F/H) (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia O Focus Dist Link Units ward K/A Only How credible is the option of 19033-2, "Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Steam Dump" at minimizing release?

Perhaps just toggle on 19033-2 will or will not minimize release. Modified as suggested 33 F 2 M S 039K1.08 001 34 H 2 B S 041K6.03 001 35 H 2 M S 045K5.23 001 055EA1.07 001 36 H 3 X N S Is this RO knowledge? Modifieded as suggested 056AA2.34 001 Would the MG set bkrs still be closed after losing 37 H 3 N S power to this much of the elec system? Modified for clarity 38 H 3 B S 057AA1.04 001 058AG2.2.42 001 If 1BY2B is auto energized, wouldnt that imply that 39 H 2 N S the diesel would start. So is discriminator C possible?

Is this really an RO question? It might be better to ask if the EDG will start. Modified as suggested 059A2.12 001 Lets change the first question a bit. Give them that 40 H 2 M S SG level is at 83%. Then make the first question The Main turbine has/has not automatically tripped.

Modified as suggested 059A4.03 001 Can we reword the first question to state In order to 41 F 2 M S place the first MFW pump in AUTO at least one BFRV or MFRV is/is not required to be in AUTO Modified as suggested 060AA1.01 001 Move the procedure title after the question and 42 F 3 M S before the answers (general comment) Modified as suggested 061A3.01 001 43 H 3 M S 061G2.2.39 001 On the first question, is it logical to ask if you have to 44 H 3 X N S close a bunch of valves on a pump that may be destroying itself prior to stopping it? I think we need

3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other

1. 2.

6. Source 7. Status Q LOK LOD SR 8. Explanation Stem Cred. Job- #/ Back Q- (B/ M / N) (U /E /S)

(F/H) (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia O Focus Dist Link Units ward K/A Only to reword the first question without distracting from the second Modified as requested 062A1.01 001 45 H 2 M S Is the 7000 KW limit required to be memorized by ROs? SNC verified RO knowledge 46 H 2 M S 062A3.01 001 062AG2.1.32 001 47 H 3 M S Is this RO knowledge. Modified as suggested 48 H 2 M S 063A2.01 001 064K6.07 001 B is not plausible. If the EDG meets TS than it better 49 H 2 X M S start.

The second part of the question meets the K/A.

Modified as requested 065AG2.4.09 001 50 F 2 B S Doesnt really look like this meets the definition of modified. SAT 073K1.01 001 51 F 2 N S Whats the difference between high and intermediate alarm? Explained SAT. No change 076AK3.06 This is ok as long as it is expected that your ROs are 52 F 3 M S required to know the TS limits by heart. Modified as suggested 53 H 2 M S 076K3.01 001 078A4.01 001 54 H 2 N S Is it credible that IA will be isolated from all containment? Resolved ok 55 F 2 N S 078K2.02 001 56 F 2 B S 079K1.01 001 103A1.01 001 57 F 2 M S Is knowing when to use the orifice RO knowledge?

SNC yes G2.1.32 001 Current guidance states that Tier 3 qusetions shall not be an extension of tier 1 or 2 questions. This is 58 X S an RHR question. Im not 100% certain that a Tier 3 question can be written. We can discuss. Modified as required. New Question

3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other

1. 2.

6. Source 7. Status Q LOK LOD SR 8. Explanation Stem Cred. Job- #/ Back Q- (B/ M / N) (U /E /S)

(F/H) (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia O Focus Dist Link Units ward K/A Only 59 F 2 N S G2.1.38 001 G2.1.44 001 Is the RO really going to suspend fuel movement or will he defer this responsibility to the SRO? Now if 60 X S the RO is on the phones with the refuelers, I might buy this.

I would focus on his NI responsibilities.

Changed as suggested. Verified RO duties at VOG G2.2.14 001 I get a little confused by the first question. Could we 61 F 2 N S change it to tag indicates that the component is/is not available Modified as suggested Current condition needs simplified. Clarified by SNC G2.2.43 001 Im ok with the first question, but the second question seems to be answered by the title of the attachment.

62 F 2 X X M S Could you change the second question to ask if it needs to be logged immediately or only if it will exceed the end of the shift? Modified as requested G2.2.44 001 G2.2.13 Current guidance states that Tier 3 questions shall not be an extension of tier 1 or 2 questions. This is a 63 S CVCS question. Im not 100% certain that a Tier 3 question can be written. We can discuss.

New Question G2.3.12 001 The second part appears to be minutia. Couldnt we 64 X M S ask about who needs to authorize entry instead?

Modified as suggested G2.4.06 001 65 F 2 M S Close to a Tier 1 question, but general enough.

66 F 2 N S G2.4.25 001 G2.4.39 001 K/A is not really met here. If it is an RO responsibility, then you could ask about how to communicate to outside agencies or what their 67 F S paperwork responsibilities are. If they really dont ave any EP responsibilities, lets consider a different K/A. Modified as suggested. SNC verified RO is ERO communicator 68 H 2 M S WE01EK3.03 001

3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other

1. 2.

6. Source 7. Status Q LOK LOD SR 8. Explanation Stem Cred. Job- #/ Back Q- (B/ M / N) (U /E /S)

(F/H) (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia O Focus Dist Link Units ward K/A Only WE04EK2.02 001 If the last step performed asks if the RHR valves are closed, why would the applicants think that the next valves to close are SI valves?

An easy fix would be to delete the third bullet and 69 H 2 X M S reverse the questions. The indication question would need slightly reworded to ask when if RHR is required to be isolated, then the breakers will/will not be required to be closed (or words to that affect)

Modified as suggested.

70 H 3 M S WE05EA1.01 001 WE07EK2.01 001 71 F 2 M S Is this RO knowledge? Modified 72 H 3 B S WE11EA2.02 001 73 H 2 M S WE12EK2.02 001 WE13EA2.01 001 We need to modify the second question a little.

74 H 3 M S Since steam is not allowed to be dumped until level is reduced, the second question needs to say when allowed to dump steam Modified WE15EK1.03 001 75 F 3 M S Is the liner really plausible? Maybe toggle on componenets instead.

001AG2.4.18 001 For the second part distractor to limit depressurization gives away too much information and makes the distractor much less plausible. Delete 76 H 3 M S that part of the distractor and this will be OK.

Can we guarantee that the SR trip will be bypassed?

Does the procedure make this happen or allow it to happen. Confirmed procedure ok 004G2.1.25 001 77 H 2 M S EAL Call If TS is met, will there be an EAL call?

006G2.2.40 001 78 H 2 N S 79 H 2 N S 007EA2.02 001

3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other

1. 2.

6. Source 7. Status Q LOK LOD SR 8. Explanation Stem Cred. Job- #/ Back Q- (B/ M / N) (U /E /S)

(F/H) (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia O Focus Dist Link Units ward K/A Only I know that this was considered SAT on the early submittal, but we still need to put the distractor analysis in this document too.

008A2.03 001 Original early submittal comment was The first question is not really related to the question stem. Generically, you cannot throttle CCW flow to the RHR HX. How about you change the question to 80 H 3 M S have both trains of RHR in service, then have the fault. Then ask if temperature can be controlled by throttling on the B train CCW. I think the second question can then be asked as written.

Modifictions made as suggested. Current question appears SAT.

014A2.04 001 81 X S K/A is about rod misalignment. This question is about rod tripability. Modified as requested 015AG2.1.32 001 Generic comment. Move procedure title to after question and before answers.

Im going to need convincing that this is at the SRO level. I read the comments how you need detailed 82 H 3 X M S knowledge of 13003-1 Fig 1 to get this knowledge.

This looks like RO knowledge though. As far as if the plant needs tripped before the pump. An RO should know what the max power is that a RCP can be tripped without tripping the plant first. Swapped out.

New Question SAT 83 F 2 N S 026AG2.4.35 001 032AA2.08 001 84 F 3 M S This is as close to the K/A as we can get and not test minutia 85 H >1 M S 034G2.1.25 001 054AA2.05 001 The answers to the first question have too much information. By adding by FWI or when verifying 86 H 2 M S FWI valves closed you are giving them ideas as to why the valves might be closed. Modified as suggested.

87 H 2 M S 055EA2.01 001

3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other

1. 2.

6. Source 7. Status Q LOK LOD SR 8. Explanation Stem Cred. Job- #/ Back Q- (B/ M / N) (U /E /S)

(F/H) (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia O Focus Dist Link Units ward K/A Only 88 H 3 M S 059AG2.4.30 001 067AA2.14 001 This doesnt appear to meet the K/A. The K/A is looking for equipment affected in a particular fire suppression activities. In this case, if you want to ask 89 X X X S what the crew must do due to this fire that would work. The second question does not appear to be related to the first question at all. Modified during ATL visit with SNC 073A2.01 001 Consider each statement individually.

Need to work on wording of first sentence. Maybe An alternate method to re-establish the release 90 F 2 M S without the rad monitor is/is not available.

Can we change the second distractor to make this to limit the dose to occupants on-site. Modified as suggested.

077AG2.1.25 001 91 H 3 N S Generic comment: move TS titles to below question and above the answers.

086G2.2.36 001 Under the current condition bullet, add the word 92 H 2 B S ONLY to the end of the sentence. Modified during ATL visit with SNC 103A2.05 001 This is a weak SRO match. Could we improve the level by asking if being in TS 3.6.2 would prohibit 93 H 3 M S starting up the plant to get into Mode 3 while repairs were underway? The TS would need to be provided.

Modified as suggested 94 F 3 M S G2.1.01 001 G2.1.35 001 Could we change Duty Reactor Engineer to Shift 95 F 3 M S Manager. The RE has no license therefore the plausibility is greatly lowered. Modified as suggested 96 F 2 M S G2.2.20 001 97 F 2 M S G2.2.21 001 98 F 2 M S G2.3.04 001

3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other

1. 2.

6. Source 7. Status Q LOK LOD SR 8. Explanation Stem Cred. Job- #/ Back Q- (B/ M / N) (U /E /S)

(F/H) (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia O Focus Dist Link Units ward K/A Only G2.4.22 001 99 H 2 B S Generic comment: move procedure titles G2.4.28 001 100 F 3 B S Generic comment. Move procedure section names below question