ML20288A415

NRC-2018-000096 - Resp 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11 & 12 - Interims, Interim Response 5 to NRC-2018-000096 (FOIA-2018-0003)

ML20288A415
Person / Time
Issue date:	11/06/2017
From:	Stephanie Blaney NRC/OCIO
To:	Kolar J Government Accountability Project
Shared Package
ML20288A411	List: ML20288A413 ML20288A414 ML20288A415 ML20288A416 ML20288A417 ML20288A418 ML20288A419 ML20288A420 ML20288A421 ML20288A422 ML20288A423 ML20288A425
References
FOIA, NRC-2018-000096, NRC-2018-0003
Download: ML20288A415 (198)

Text

NRC FORM 464 Part I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA RESPONSE NUMBER (03-2017)

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.."1J..., ,f INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST RESPONSE TYPE 0 INTERIM D FINAL REQUESTER: DATE:

llJack Kolar, Government Accountability Project 11 1110612017 I

DESCRIPTION OF REQUESTED RECORDS:

Records corresponding to items 26-29, 31-33, 35-37, 39-41, 50-51, and 55, as more fully described in the Comments Section, below PART I. -INFORMATION RELEASED You have the right to seek assistance from the NRC's FOIA Public Liaison. Contact information for the NRC's FOIA Public Liaison is available at httgs://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/foia/contact-foia.html Agency records subject to the request are already available on the Public NRC Website, in Public ADAMS or on microfiche in the 0 NRC Public Document Room.

0 Agency records subject to the request are enclosed.

Records subject to the request that contain information originated by or of interest to another Federal agency have been D referred to that agency (see comments section) for a disclosure determination and direct response to you.

0 We are continuing to process your request.

0 See Comments.

PART I.A - FEES NO FEES AMOUNT" D You will be billed by NRC for the amount listed.

D Minimum fee threshold not met.

II i D You will receive a refund for the amount listed.

D Due to our delayed response, you will not be charged fees.

• see Comments for details D Fees waived.

PART 1.8--INFORMATION NOT LOCATED OR WITHHELD FROM DISCLOSURE We did not locate any agency records responsive to your request. Note: Agencies may treat three discrete categories of law D enforcement and national security records as not subject to the FOIA ("exclusions"). 5 U.S. C. 552(c). This is a standard notification given to all requesters: it should not be taken to mean that any excluded records do, or do not. exist.

0 We have withheld certain information pursuant to the FOIA exemptions described, and for the reasons stated, in Part II.

Because this is an interim response to your request, you may not appeal at this time. We will notify you of your right to 0 appeal any of the responses we have issued in response to your request when we issue our final determination.

You may appeal this final determination within 90 calendar days of the date of this response by sending a letter or e-mail to the FOIA Officer. at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington. D.C. 20555-0001, or FOIA.Resource@nrc.gov. Please be D sure to include on your letter or email that it is a "FOIA Appeal." You have the right to seek dispute resolution services from the NRC's Public Liaison, or the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). Contact information for OGIS is available at httgs://ogis.archives.gov/about-ogis/contact-information.htm PART l.C COMMENTS ( Use attached Comments continuation page if required)

This fifth interim response addresses 16 additional records described in your request. Although these records have been removed from ADAMS, because the NRC was able to locate them by the accession numbers during the processing of several FOTA requests seeking the same records within the past year, we have processed the records as described below.

We have processed these records, taking into account the privacy waiver furnished by Lawrence Criscione. Please note that our response should not be construed as our concurrence with the way in which you describe some of the records.

[continued on next page]

Signature - Freedom of Information Act Officer or Desianee Otgitally51gnedbyStephan1GA Blaney

!Stephanie A. Blaney ON* c=US, o*U S Govemment, ou=U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commss1on, ou:oNRC-PIV, cn=Stephanie A. Blaney, 0 92342.19200300 100 1 1"'200001997 O.te. 2017.11 0610*00:27-05'00' NRC Form 464 Part I (03-2017) Page 2 of 4

NRC FORM 464 Part I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA TORY COMMISSION FOIA RESPONSE NUMBER (03-2017)

RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION I 2018-0003 11 5

I ACT (FOIA) REQUEST Continued RESPONSE TYPE 0 INTERIM D FINAL REQUESTER: DATE:

Jack Kolar, Government Accountability Project 11 11/06/2017 I

PART l.C COMMENTS (Continued)

ML I 62 I 6A 706 (item 26) is a copy of a FOIA appeal letter with enclosures. The letter itself is already publicly available as ML I 3 I 89A005. Another copy of this letter, along with its enclosures, is enclosed with this response.

ML 162 I 6A 707 (item 27) consists of a June I 0, 2013 email from Mr. Criscione to various NRC staff and NTEU Chapter 208, which Mr. Criscione then forwarded to Chairman Macfarlane and her Legal Assistant on June 13, 2013. We have enclosed a redacted version of this record. Certain portions of the email have been redacted, and the attachment withheld in its entirety, on the basis of exemption 5, as it incorporates the deliberative process (DP) privilege. The portions of the email have been redacted to be consistent with the manner in which records responsive to FOIA-2015-0018/FOIA-2015-0019 were redacted; the attachment was previously denied in response to FOIA-2015-0020 (ML! 5113A6 l I, ML! 5111 A230, and ML I 5006A22 l, respectively). Please note that since this content was previously withheld on the basis of exemption 5 and the DP privilege, the NRC revisited that content before determining to continue asserting exemption 5 and the DP privilege.

ML I 62 I 6A 708 (item 28) is a June 13, 2013 letter from Patricia Hirsch to Mr. Criscione. ML 162 l 6A 709 (item 29) is a copy ofa May 24, 2013 email to various NRC officials, including the FOIA Officer at that time, attaching a letter, in which the sender raises concerns about the lack of a timely response to several pending FOIA appeals. Both records are enclosed.

ML I 62 I 6A 711 (item 31) is a copy of a briefing package prepared by David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists, ahead of meetings scheduled with then-Chairman Burns and Commissioner Baran, which the Commission has confirmed was received. It is enclosed.

ML! 6216A 712 (item 32) consists of a March 29, 2013 email, transmitting to the Chairman and various NRC staff, including in the FOIA Office, a letter in which Mr. Criscione seeks to appeal the failure to respond timely to three FOIA requests (FOIA-2013-0126, 2013-0127, and 2013-0128) that he, or other third party individuals, had filed. This appeal letter included 16 enclosures, many of which are already available to the public as noted below, or are enclosed herein:

Enclosure I: Incoming request, FOIA-2013-0126 (ML13044A481) : Acknowledgment letter for FOIA-2013-0126 (enclosed) : Incoming request, FOIA-2012-0128 (ML12030AI05) : Acknowledgment letter for FOIA-2012-0128(ML12363A094) : Form 464 response to FOIA-2012-0128#1 (ML16216A712) : Incoming request, FOIA-2012-0325 (ML12263A087) : President Obama's Memorandum on the FOIA (https://www.dol.gov/dol/foia/2009 FOIA_memo.pdf) : Attorney General Holder's Memorandum on the FOIA (https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/

legacy/2009/06/24/foia-memo-march2009.pdt) : List ofNRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure of Jocassee Dam (this list has been attached to multiple documents that are publicly available, such as ML I 5 J 28A609 (starting at p54). 0: Incoming request, FOIA-2013-0127 (ML13044A486) 1: Acknowledgment letter for FOIA-2013-0127 (enclosed) 2: Acknowledgment letter for FOIA-2013-0034 (enclosed) 3: Incoming request, FOIA-2013-0008 (ML12283A329) 4: Incoming request, FOIA-2013-0013 (ML12290A070) 5: Incoming request, FOIA-2013-0128 (ML091l70104) 6: Acknowledgment letter for FOIA-2013-0128 (enclosed)

NRG Form 464 Part I (03-2017) Page 3 of 4

NRC FORM 464 Part I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA TORY COMMISSION FOIA RESPONSE NUMBER I

(03-2017)

RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 2018-0003 11 5

I ACT (FOIA) REQUEST Continued RESPONSE TYPE 0 INTERIM D FINAL REQUESTER: DATE:

!Jack Kolar, Government Accountability Project I 11/06/2017 I

PART l.C COMMENTS (Continued)

ML 162 I 6A 713 (item 33) is a copy of a FOIA request, FOIA-2013-0262, to which the requester attached a copy of a page from the Commission's 2d Quarter Operating Plan FY-2013. The 2d Quarter Operating Plan was the subject of prior FOIA requests, FOIA-2013-026 l(and its appeal, FOIA-2013-002 IA) and FOIA-2016-0117. The Plan was denied in full pursuant to FOIA exemption 5. A copy of the FOIA request letter is enclosed with this response; however, the one-page attachment from the 2d Quarter Operating Plan FY-2013 (ML13149A079) (like the entire Operating Plan itself) continues to be withheld under FOIA exemption 5.

ML 16236AO 18 (item 35) is an email exchange between staff members in the Offices of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) and New Reactors (NRO), to which a red-lined draft of a "Style Sheet", including personal advice and recommendations about writing style by its author, was attached. This draft was not finalized, although it is similar to NUREG-1379, NRC Editorial Style Guide. It is also noted that the focus of the email exchange was a particular template NRO used to write reviews of post-Fukushima Recommendation 2.1 Flood Hazard Reevaluation Reports, which is different altogether from the red-lined draft the originating RES staff member had attached to his email. A copy of the email exchange is enclosed.

ML16236A019 (item 36), which is described as 2014-Jan-9 mpg video of the flooding at St. Lucie, 043 MOV03976_MPG and ML I 6236A02 l (item 37), which is described as 20 I 4-May-27 and 20 I 4-June-5 emails concerning the St. Lucie Jan 9 Reactor Auxiliary Building Flooding Video, are both enclosed.

Since all but one ofthe email exchanges included in MLl6237A004 (item 39) are already publicly available as a result of our processing ofFOIA-2013-0264, please refer to ML13226A261-ML13226A264, ML I 3123A204, and ML13226A259.

We note that the redactions of personally identifiable information (PH) on the basis of exemption 6 were already applied in the emails as you requested them. We have enclosed the one additional email exchange that is not publicly available; the PH appearing in this record has been redacted under exemption 6. ML16237A005 (item 40) is also already publicly available as a result of our processing of FOIA-20 I 3-0264; please refer to ML I 3226A259.

ML16237A006 (item 41) is an April 1I,2013 letter from Mr. Criscione to then-EDO Bill Borchardt and then-ChiefFOIA Officer Darren Ash, following up on a pending FOIA appeal, FOIA-2013-009A, including seven enclosures. The enclosures consist of: (I) an acknowledgment letter; (2) a Form 464 response package to 2013-0126 (which is already publicly available as ML 13 I 06A 167), including an appendix listing the already publicly available redacted records responsive to the request; (3) MLl3099A247 (as redacted); (4) MLI3039A084 (as redacted); (5) ML13039A0086 (as redacted); (5) a copy of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACE)'s Engineer Manual, "General Design and Construction Considerations for Earth and Rock-Fill Dams," (which is publicly available at ACE's website) and a Continuing Education & Development, Inc.

cover sheet for a program on this subject; (which is also publicly available at its website); and (7) an unredacted copy of the cross-section diagram of the Jocassee Dam. With the exception of enclosure 7, the pages of this record are enclosed. As for enclosure 7, this diagram has already been addressed in interim response 3 (relating to items 2 and 7 of your request, wherein it was redacted on the basis of exemption 7F.

ML I 6238AO 13 (item 50) and ML I 6238AO 14 (item 51) are copies of a NRC Form 183, Report of Security Incident/

JnfractionNiolation, and an undated memorandum from Mary Jane Ross-Lee to Richard Correia concerning the subject "Report of Security Incident (Information Spill)." Both are enclosed.

ML16242A344 (item 55) is a privacy waiver furnished by Mr. Criscione in conjunction with several third party FOIA requests submitted in the past year, which was subsequently revised and and later incorporated by reference in the privacy waiver he furnished with regard to your request. A copy is enclosed.

NRC Form 464 Part I (03-2017) Page4 of 4

NRC FORM 464 Part II U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA (03-2017) l"*

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PART II.A -- APPLICABLE EXEMPTIONS Records subject to the request are being withheld in their entirety or in part under the FOIA exemption(s) as indicated below (5 U.S.C. 552(b)).

D Exemption 1: The withheld information is properly classified pursuant to an Executive Order protecting national security information.

D Exemption 2: The withheld information relates solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of NRC.

D Exemption 3: The withheld information is specifically exempted from public disclosure by the statute indicated.

D Sections 141-145 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure of Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data (42 U.S.C. 2161-2165).

D Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure of Unclassified Safeguards Information (42 U.S.C. 2167).

D 41 U.S.C. 4702(b), which prohibits the disclosure of contractor proposals, except when incorporated into the contract between the agency and the submitter of the proposal.

D Exemption 4: The withheld information is a trade secret or confidential commercial or financial information that is being withheld for the reason(s) indicated.

The information is considered to be proprietary because ii concerns a licensee's or applicant's physical protection or material control and D accounting program for special nuclear material pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1 ).

D The information is considered to be another type or confidential business (proprietary) information.

D The information was submitted by a foreign source and received in confidence pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(d)(2).

0 Exemption 5: The withheld information consists ofinteragency or intraagency records that are normally privileged in civil litigation.

[{] Deliberative process privilege.

D Attorney work product privilege.

D Attorney-client privilege.

Exemption 6: The withheld information from a personnel, medical, or similar file, is exempted from public disclosure because its disclosure would result 0 in a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

0 Exemption 7: The withheld information consists of records compiled for law enforcement purposes and is being withheld for the reason(s) indicated.

D (A) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with an open enforcement proceeding.

D (C) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

D (D) The information consists of names and other information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to reveal identities of confidential sources.

(E) Disclosure would reveal techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or guidelines that could reasonably be D expected to risk circumvention of the law.

0 (F) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual.

D Other I I PART 11.B -- DENYING OFFICIALS In accordance with 10 CFR 9.25(g) and 9.25(h) of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations, the official(s) listed below have made the determination to withhold certain information responsive to your request.

APPELLATE OFFICAL DENYING OFFICIAL TITLE/OFFICE RECORDS DENIED EDO SECY IRochelle Bavol II Exec Asst to Secy to the Commission II item 33 ID 0 IBernice C. Ammon II Asst Gen Counsel for LC. Leg & Spec Proj II ltem27 I D [{]

IStephanie A Blaney II FO!A Officer IIItems 35. 39. and 41 I 0 D Appeals must be made in writing within 90 calendar days of the date of this response by sending a letter or email to the FOIA Officer, at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, or FOIA.Resource@nrc.gov. Please be sure to include on your letter or email that it is a "FOIA Appeal."

NRC Form 464 Part II (03-2017) Page 1 of 1

ucsusa.or g Two Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138-3780 t 617.547.5552 f 617.864.9405 1825 K Street NW, Suite 800, Washington, DC 20006-1232 t 202.223.6133 f 202.223.6162 2397 Shattuck Avenue, Suite 203, Berkeley, CA 94704-1567 t 510.843.1872 f 5!0.843.3785 One North LaSalle Street, Suite 1904, Chicago, IL 60602-4064 t 312.578.1750 f 312.578.1751 MARCH 13,,,2015 MATERIALS FOR MEETINGS WITH CHAIRMAN STEPHEN G. BURNS AND COMMISSIQ,NER JEFF B,ARAN DAVID LOCHBAUM DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR SAFETY PROJE.CT

AGENDA

<D Lying to the American Public about Nuclear Safety

@ Improperly Withholding Information from the Public Lessons from Fort Calhoun UCS Annual Report on the NRC and Nuclear Plant Safety February 26, 2015 Page 2

Lying to the American Public about Nuclear Safety

Background

On April 19, 201 l , the NRC staff conducted the annual assessment meeting for the Oconee nuclear station in Seneca, South Carolina (ML 111J 707829). The first of two bullets on slide 2 of the NRC staff's slideshow indicated that a purpose of the meeting was to provide:

• "A p ublic.forum/ or discussion of the licensee's performance in 2010" With Slide 15, the NRC staff summarized a yellow and a white finding by NRC inspectors during 2010.

But at a public meeting conducted 5 weeks after flooding caused three reactor meltdowns at Fukushima, the NRC staff failed to mention to the public that it had issued a Confirmatory Action Letter (ML12363A086) to Duke on June 22, 2010, requiring the company to talke 15 measures to better protect the three reactors at Oconee from meltdown from flooding damage should the upri ver Jocassee Dam fail.

The NRC staff had a tremendous opportunity to inform the public that, nine months prior to Fukushima, the NRC had identified similar flood protection vulnerabilities at Oconee and had taken steps to ensure those vulnerabilities were addressed. In fact, several of the 15 measures had already been implemented while several others were far down the road to implementation.

But instead the NRC staff opted to play "duck and cover" and lie to the public.

The stated purpose of the meeting was to discuss licensee performance in 2010.

The licensee's performance in 2010 prompted the NRC to issue a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) in June 20 10. CALs are rarely issued - the NRC staff issued more white findings in 2010 than CALs. The NRC staff chose to discuss its white finding at Oconee but remain silent about its CAL.

That incredibly poor judgment by the NRC staff undermined my trust and confidence in the agency. I now find it harder to believe it when the NRC staff says some condition is okay or that a problem has been resolved.

Given the staff's demonstrated propensity for hiding relevant information from the public and instead providing the public with a distorted, misleading version of nuclear plant safety, how can UCS and the public trust this agency to tell the whole truth and not just selective sub-truths?

February 26, 2015 Page 3

Improperly Withholding Information from the Public

Background

In October 2004, the NRC staff sought and obtained Commission permission to withhold all incoming documents from licensees about fire protection and emergency planning (ML0423 l 0663). Since then, the NRC developed guidance documents and revised regulations (10 CFR 2.390 in 2008) for licensees to ask NRC to withhold all or portions of documents they submit that contain sensitive security information. Despite this process being available for years, the NRC staff continues to withhold incoming fire protection and emergency planning documents, even when licensees do not request such withholding.

Many of the withheld documents involved license amendment requests. By improperly withholding these documents, the NRC staff deprived the public of rights under federal regulations to contest requested actions.

The NRC staff has been handling submissions of Updated Safety Analysis Reports (USAR) oddly. Some USARs are placed into public ADAMS in their entirety (e.g., Beaver Valley Unit 2 at ML14339A408, Byron and Braidwood at ML1436A393, and Watts Bar Unit 2 at ML14155A256). Some USARs are withheld from public ADAMS in their entirety (e.g., Diablo Canyon per NRC memo at ML14022A120). The NRC staff has told the Senate EPW staff, the N RC OIG staff, and me three different stories last fall on why USARs may or may not be publicly available.

The USARs are key licensing documents, perhaps the single most important licensing document in existence. The USARs are heavily relied upon by licensees and NRC staff in preparing, reviewing, and approving operating license amendments. By improperly depriving the public of access to these vital documents, the NRC staff is unfairly impeding the public's ability to participate in licensing proceedings in a meaningful way.

That so many USARs are publicly available in ADAMS strongly suggests there is no legitimate reason for withholding the other USARs.

UCS and others frequently request NRC Communication Plans via the Freedom of Information Act. The N RC staff typically provides the requested plans with only personal privacy information (i.e., home telephone numbers) redacted (e.g., Sal.e m/Hope Creek Safety Concious Work Environment issues at ML060620540, Oconee flood protection 50.54 letter at ML12326A389, Indian Point CST pipe leak at ML l 1003093 1, Seabrook concrete degradation at MLl 4 16 1A638, Davis-Besse concrete degradation at ML14171A271, etc.). But the NRC staff has also provided plan s with all information, except page numbers, redacted contending the withheld information was "deliberative process" (Diablo Canyon seismic re-analysis at ML15033A280).

The NRC staff is playing games. The issues at Indian Point and Seabrook involved aging issues at a time when the reactors were seeking operating license renewals. The NRC staff provided essentially unredacted Communication Plans.

February 26, 20 15 Page4

But the NRC staff redacted virtually the entire Communications Plan for Diablo Canyon' s seismic issues. True, the seismic issues are currently being monitored by the State and the NRC within an operating license re newal application proceeding, but agai n that was also the case at Indian Point and Seabrook.

UCS Recommendation UCS wrote to the NRC Chairman last November asking that the Commission reverse the policy of blanket withholding all incoming fire protection and emergency planning records.

UCS wrote to the NRC Inspector General asking that OIG investigate whether the agency violated federal regulations by approving licensing requests about fire protection and emergency planning while denying the public access to the underlying documents.

The NRC should suspend issui ng all operating licenses and approving all amendments to operating licenses until the agency has made publicly available all the documents it has been improperly withholding the past decade.

Withholding license amendment requests and USARs dep1ived the public its rights under federal regulations to participate in these licensing actions in a meaningful way. By improperly withholding these documents, the NRC staff is essentially giving its licensees uncontested proceedings and transforming purportedly open processes into closed, secret negotiations between the NRC staff and licensees.

The N RC cannot contest the "cozy" label by being "cozy" w ith licensees and denying the public its legal rights.

NOTE: UCS does not challenge the fact that certain information needs to be withheld. When information satisfies one or more of the criteri a for withholding, then by all means withhold it.

But when information does not meet any of the criteria for withholding, then don' t withhold it.

NOTE: UCS also recognizes that given the sheer volume of documents handled by the NRC staff, there will be occasiona l mistakes made withholding some that should not be and di sc.losing others that should be. UCS 's concerns are not with the exceptions to the rule. UCS's concern is when the rule is mis-applied allowing many documents to be handled improperly.

February 26, 2015 Page 5

Lessons from Fort Calhoun

Background

Fort Calhoun restarted in December 2013 following a 30-month outage to fi x many longstanding safety problems.

It marked the 5211d time that a U.S. reactor remained shut down longer than a year to correct safety problems.

Fort Calhoun's outage began in Apri l 2011, about a month after Fukushima.

The NRC formed a task force to extract lessons learnable from Fukushima and currently has a range of activities underway to implement those lessons.

The NRC did nothing to formally extract lessons learnable from Fort Calhoun.

Many of the safety problems that had to be fixed before NRC allowed Fort Calhoun to restart ex isted since 1996 or before.

Why had all the licensee's testing and NRC's inspections missed these safety problems?

Four times since the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) was initiated, the NRC staff retuned Fort Calhoun to Action Matrix Column 1. Each time, the many safety problems that were finally fixed in 2011-201 3 had existed but were overlooked.

Twice since the ROP was initiated, the NRC staff returned Fort Calhoun to Action Matrix Column 2 from Column 3. Each time, the many safety problems that were finally fixed in 2011 -

2013 had existed but were overlooked.

UCS Recommendation The NRC should formally e valuate Fort Calhoun's year-plus outage to identify lessons that enhance the effectiveness of its oversight efforts.

For example, the evaluation could take the safety issues o n the NRC staff' s Confirmatory Action Letter and reported to the NRC via Licensee Event Reports (LERs) from 2010 to 2014 and identify the NRC inspection procedures that examined these areas. These applicable inspection procedures could then be assessed to see whether changes in what gets examined or how it gets examined could have detected these problems. Similarl y, the evaluation might identify changes to the process used by the NRC staff to return Fort Calhoun to Action Matrix Columns l and 2 despite numerous safety problems that kept the reactor shut down for safety problems for 30 month. These might have been missed opportunities to have detected and corrected at least some of the many safety problems sooner.

Reference Document UCS Issue Brief "No More Fukushimas; No More Fort Calhouns," February 20 15.

February 26, 2015 Page 6

UCS Annual Report on the NRC and Nuclear Plant Safety

Background

UCS initiated a series of annual reports on the NRC and nuclear power plant safety in March 2011. Each report summarizes the events the prior year that prompted the NRC to dispatch special inspection teams (SlTs) or augmented inspection teams (AlTs). Each report summarizes positive outcomes achieved by the NRC the prior year as well as negative outcomes.

This year's report noted that both the number and the severity of events triggering SITs/AITs continues a declining trend a nd acknowledges that NRC's efforts very likely factored in these positive tre nds.

This year's report commends the NRC for undertaking two pro-active measures: the Reactor Oversight Process self-assessments and the Knowledge Management Program.

This year's report criticizes the NRC for improperly withholding documents from the public that denied meaningful participation in NRC's regulatory decision-making processes, for tolerating safety culture metrics that it found unacceptable when observed at nuclear plant sites and for subjecting two NRC engineers to recurring investigations because they voiced safety concerns.

UCS Recommendation The NRC instituted its Lessons Learned Program a decade ago. SECY-14-0101. (ML14175A780) is the most recent annual report on that program. It is a well-intended program gone terribly awry.

A total of merely seven ite ms were presented to the Lessons-Learned Oversight Board between August 2013 and May 2014. That list included only two reports from the NRC's Office of the Inspector General (OIG), no reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), none from the US Congress, and none from any external entity other than one classified, non-public DOE report.

It's virtually impossible to draw meaningful insights about trends and emerging problem areas from such paltry inputs. To be effective, the NRC's Lessons Learned Program must consider more inputs. For example, all OIG reports and GAO should be entered into the program.

Materials from external organizations should be reviewed for possible inclusion in the program.

The proliferation of inputs to the Lessons Learned Program would not require a linear increase in the full-time equivalents needed to implement the program. The NRC staff responds to OIG and GAO reports. Thus, the additional work load for the Lessons Learned Program would be to monitor the findings and recommendations from the inputs seeking to identify common themes and whether a problem found here might also exist there.

Reference Documents UCS report dated March 2015, "The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in 2014: Tarnished Gold Standard."

February 26, 2015 Page 7

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 April 25, 2011 Mr. T. Preston Gillespie, Jr.

Site Vice President Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672

SUBJECT:

PUBLIC MEETING

SUMMARY

• • • OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION ... DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287

Dear Mr. Gillespie:

This refers to the meeting conducted on April 19, 2011. in Seneca, SC. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and the NRC's annual assessment of plant safety performance for the period of January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2010. The major topics addressed were the NRC's assessment program and the results of the assessment. A listing of meeting attendees and information presented during the meeting are enclosed.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRG Public Document Room (PDR) or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRG Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rn1/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this meeting, please contact me at (404) 997-4607.

Sincerely, IRA/

Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees

2. Powerpoint Presentation cc w/encls: (See page 2)

Oconee Annual Public Meeting April 19, 201 l NAME AFFJLIATION

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• A public forum for discussion of the licensee's performance in 2010

• Address the performance issues identified in the annual assessment letter 2 Protecting People and the Environment Enclosure 2

14 January 1 - December 31, 2010 Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 were in the Degraded Cornerstone Column for all four quarters due to a Yellow Finding {Units 1, 2, and 3) and a White Finding (Units 2 and 3).

14 Protecting People and the Environment Enclosure 2

15 tl Safety Significant Findings or Pis

• Yellow Violation of TS 3.10.1 for SSF reactor coolant makeup subsystem inoperable for greater than allowed by technical specifications (Units 1, 2, and 3)

• White Violation of Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for a failure to promptly identify and correct an adverse condition affecting operability of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 standby shutdown facility (Units 2 and 3) 15 Protecting People and the Environment Enclosure 2

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 June 22, 201 O CAL 2-10-003 Mr. David A. Baxter Site Vice President Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672

SUBJECT:

CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETIER- OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 COMMITMENTS TO ADDRESS EXTERNAL FLOODING CONCERNS (TAC NOS. ME3065, ME3066, AND ME3067) .

Dear Mr. Baxter:

This letter confirms commitments made by Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (the licensee) in your June 3, 2010, letter. Specifically, the June 3, 2010, letter listed compensatory measures the licensee will implement at the Oconee Site and Jocassee Dam to mitigate potential external flooding hazards resulting from a potential failure of the Jocassee Dam. The compensatory measures listed in the enclosure shall remain in place until final resolution of the inundation of the Oconee site from the failure of the Jocassee Dam has been determined by the licensee and agreed upon by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and all modifications are made to mitigate the inundation. The compensatory measures and implementation dates are set forth in the enclosure to this letter.

In addition to implementing the compensatory measures, pursuant to my telephone conversation with Mr. Bill Pitesa of your company on June 22, 2010, you shall submit to the NRC by August 2, 2010, all documentation necessary to demonstrate to the NRC that the inundation of the Oconee site resulting from the failure of the Jocassee Dam has been bounded. Also, you shall submit by November 30, 2010, a list of all modifications necessary to adequately mitigate the inundation, and shall make all necessary modifications by November 30, 2011 .

Pursuant to Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, you are required to:

1) Notify me immediately if your understanding differs from tha.t set forth above;

2) Notify me if for any reason you cannot complete the actions within the specified schedule and advise me in writing of your modified schedule in advance of the change; and

3) Notify me in writing when you have completed the actions addressed in this Confirmatory Action Letter.

B-3

DEC 2 Issuance of this Confirmatory Action Letter does not preclude issuance of an Order formalizing the above commitments or requiring other actions on the part of the licensee; nor does it preclude the NRC from taking enforcement action for violations of NRC requirements that may have prompted the issuance of this letter. In addition, failure to take the actions addressed in this Confirmatory Action Letter may result in enforcement action.

This Confirmatory Action Letter will remain in effect until the NRC has concluded that all modifications necessary to adequately mitigate the inundation of the Oconee site from the failure of the Jocassee Dam has been completed.

Sincerely, IRA/

Luis A. Reyes Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55

Enclosure:

Compensatory Measures cc w/encl: (See next page)

COMPENSATORY MEASURES NUMBER COMPENSATORY MEASURES IMPLEMENTATION STATUS 1 Perform flooding studies using the Hydrologic Engineering Complete Center - River Complete Analysis System (HEC-RAS) model for comparison with previous DAMBRK models to more accurately represent anticipated flood heights in the west yard followinQ a postulated failure of the Jocassee Dam.

2 Maintain plans, procedures (Jocassee and Oconee) and Implemented guidance documents implemented (Oconee) to address mrlioo : oostuim:d floo~ * : : ~ic l<bJ(7)(FJ _ -~nd are consistent (b)(7)(F) I WI curren perspectives gameo owing the HEC-RAS sensitivity studies and the subsequent 20 inundation studies.

To the extent practical, the mitigation strategy is similar to

• existing extensive plant damage scenario (8.5.b) equipment, methods and criteria.

3 Duke Energy Hydro Generation will create a guidance Implemented document to consolidate river management and storm management processes. (Includes the Jocassee Development and the Keowee Develooment.)

4 Maintain a dam safety inspection program that includes: Implemented (1) weekly dam safety inspections of the Jocassee Dam by Duke Energy personnel, (2) dam safety inspections following any 2-inch or greater rainfall or felt seismic event, (3) annual dam safety inspections by Duke Energy, (4) annual dam safety inspections by FERC representatives, (5) five year safety inspections by FERC approved consultants. and (6) five vear undeiwater inspections.

5 Maintain a monitoring program that includes: (1) continuous Implemented remote monitoring from the Hydro Central Operating Center in Charlotte, NC, (2) monthly monitoring of observation wells, (3) weekly monitoring of seepage monitoring points. and (4) annual surveys of displacement monuments.

6 Assign an Oconee engineer as Jocassee Dam contact to Implemented heiahten awareness of Jocassee status.

• 7 Install ammeters and voltmeters on Keowee spillway gates Complete for equipment condition monitorina.

8 Ensure forebay and tailrace level alarms are provided for Complete Jocassee to support timely detection of a developing dam failure.

9 Add a storage building adjacent to the Jocassee spillway to Complete house the backup spillway gate operating equipment (e.g.,

compressor and air wrench).

Enclosure

2 NUMBER COMPENSATORY MEASURES IMPLEMENTATION STATUS 10 Obtain and stage a portable generator and electric drive Complete motor near the Jocassee spillway gates to serve as a second set of backuo soillwav aate ooerating eouioment.

11 Conduct Jocassee Dam failure Table Top Exercise with 06/30/2010 Oconee participation to exercise and improve response procedures.

12 Instrument and alarm selected seepage monitoring locations 08/31/2010 for timelv detection of dearadina conditions.

13 Provide additional video monitoring of Jocassee Dam (e.g., 08/31/2010

. dam toe, abutments, and groin areas) for timely assessment of degrading conditions.

14 Obtain and stage a second set of equipment (including a 11130/2010 8.5.b-type pump) for implementation of the external flood mitiaation auidance.

15 Conduct Jocassee Dam/Oconee Emergency Response 12/31/2010 Organization Drill to exercise and improve response procedures.

NOTES:

1. The word "complete" is used in the status column if the commitment regards a specific one-time equipment-related or analysis-related action that has been completed.

2. The word "implemented" is used in the*status column if the commitment describes an on-going action that has been implemented.

Enclosure

POLICY ISSUE (Notation Vote)

October 19. 2004 SECY-04-0191 FOR: The Commissioners FROM: Luis A. Reyes Executive Director for Operations /RN

SUBJECT:

WITHHOLDING SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION CONCERNING NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE PURPOSE:

To obtain Commission approval of guidance to be issued to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff, power reactor licensees, and other agency stakeholders for withholding sensitive unclassified (nonsafeguards) information from public disclosure.

SUMMARY

In a staff requirements memorandum dated May 7, 2004, the Commission directed the NRC staff to develop guidance to ensure information that could reasonably be expected to be useful to potential adversaries is withheld from public disclosure. In determining whether information should be withheld or released, the NRC staff must attempt to appropriately balance our desire to maintain the openness of NRC's regulatory processes with the need to protect the public from possible terrorist threats. This paper provides for Commission review and approval the NRC staff's proposed approach for determining the appropriate handling of information and more specific guidance for withholding or releasing information about nuclear power reactors (Attachment 1).

CONTACTS: William D. Reckley, NRR/IRT 301-415-1323 Margie Kotzalas, NRR/IRT 301-415-2737

Subject Discussio n and/or typical controls Test Program (Initial and lnservice Uncontrolled Inspections and Testing)

Accident Analysis Uncontrolled - Accident analyses typically included in licensing-related correspondence involve conservative models to demonstrate a plant's ability to respond to design basis transients (i.e., nonsecurity related events),

and is not treated as sensitive.

Technical Specifications (including Uncontrolled Bases)

Quality Assurance Uncontrolled Fire Protection Incoming documents are initially profiled as nonpublic -

staff will review for release upon request. Most information related to fire protection will not need to be designated as sensitive. Drawings showing details such as the specific location of equipment, doorways, stairways, etc. are to be withheld under 10 CFR 2.390.

Emergency Planning Incoming documents are initially profiled as nonpublic -

staff will review for release upon request. Most information related to emergency planning will not need to be designated as sensitive. Special attention is needed to determine if information relates to the response by a licensee or government agency to a terrorist attack. Note that some State and local governments consider parts of their emergency plans to be sensitive.

Security Information related to security programs at nuclear reactors is generally designated as SGI and is protected in a manner similar to classified confidential information.

Security-related information within the inspection program and reactor oversight process is withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2 .390.

Risk-Informed Decisionmaking Uncontrolled - exceptions include information related to (e.g., documents related to risk- security activities (e.g., vulnerability assessments) and informed licensing actions, information related to uncorrected configurations or accident sequence precursor conditions that could be useful to an adversary. Special (ASP) analyses, significance attention should be applied to this area and information determination process (SOP) should be withheld if it describes a vulnerability or plant-notebooks, design certifications) specific weakness that is more helpful to an adversary than are the insights provided in open source literature .

Detailed computer models have been and will continue to be withheld from public disclosure.

. I Beaver Valley Power Station FENOC' P.O. Box 4 Shippmgport.PA 15077 RrstEnergy Nuclear ~ting Company Eric A. t..arson. 724-682-5234 Site Vice President Fax: 724-643-8069 November 24, 2014 L-14-360 10 CFR 50.71(e) 10 CFR 50.54(a) 10 CFR 54.37(b)

ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-001

SUBJECT:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 Submittal of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Revision 21 In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.71 (e), the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) is hereby submitting to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS), Unit No. 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Revision 21 in CD-ROM format. This submittal reflects facility and procedure changes implemented between November 2, 2012 (the end of Refueling Outage 16), and May 23, 2014 (the end of Refueling Outage 17), along with several changes implemented after Refueling Outage 17.

In accordance with NRC guidance for electror'!ic submissions, Attachment 1 provides a listing of the document components that comprise the enclosed CD-ROM. In addition to the UFSAR, the CD-ROM includes the BVPS, Unit No. 2 Licensing Requirements Manual, Revision 81 , and the Technical Specification Bases, Revision 27. The Technical Specification Bases are submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 5.5.1 O.d, Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program."

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(a), FENOC is hereby submitting a copy of the current revision of the FENOC Quality Assurance Program Manual (QAPM). The QAPM ,

Revision 19, is included in the enclosed CD-ROM.

Attachment 2 includes a summary of information removed from the BVPS, Unit No. 2 UFSAR in accordance with Appendix A to Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 98-03, "Guidelines for Updating Final Safety Analysis Reports," Revision 1.

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 L-14-360 Page2 FENOC conducted a review of BVPS, Unit No. 2 plant changes for 10 CFR 54.37(b) applicability. No components were determined to meet the criteria for newly identified components as clarified by Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS} 2007-16, Revision 1, "Implementation of the Requirements of 10 CFR 54.34(b} for Holders of Renewed Licenses."

There are no regulatory commitment changes to be submitted in accordance with NEI 99-04, "Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes."

This certifies, to the best of my judgment and belief, that Revision 21 of the BVPS, Unit No. 2 UFSAR accurately presents changes made since the previous submittal that are necessary to reflect information and analysis submitted to the Commission or pursuant to Commission requirements.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments. If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Mr. Thomas A. Lentz, Manager - Fleet Licensing, at 330-315-681 0.

Sincerely, Eric A. Larson Attachments:

1. Document Components on CD-ROM

2. Information Removed from the BVPS, Unit No. 2 UFSAR

Enclosures:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 UFSAR, Licensing Requirements Manual, Technical Specification Bases, and QAPM (on CD-ROM) cc: NRC Region I Administrator NRC Resident Inspector NRC Project Manager Director BRP/DEP (without Enclosures)

Site BRP/DEP Representative (without Enclosures)

IArtt>ef isf5t& ti~~cWCretPi'ag@sln Pages

pwbpo~AMS Byron/Braidwood Nuclear Stations Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)

Revision 15 December 2014 Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-n NRC Docket Nos. STN 50454, STN 50455, and 72-68 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50456, STN 50-457, and 72-73

I rnt>fW&tlf'7m87urtte~a~el~sEffl dtlf)lj@~~bli c ADAMS to be withheld from Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390. When separated from this Enclosure, this letter is decontrolled.

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000 May 30, 2014 10 CFR 50.4 10 CFR 50.34(b) 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN : Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Docket No. 50-391

Subject:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN)- UNIT 2-FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (FSAR), AMENDMENT 112

References:

1. TVA letter to NRC dated February 13, 2014, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) - Unit 2 - Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Amendment 111"

2. TVA letter to NRC dated May 8, 2014, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN)

Unit 2 - lnservice Test (IST) Program/Preservice Test (PST) Program" This letter transmits WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 112 (A 112), which reflects changes made since the issuance of Amendment 111 on February 13, 2014 (Reference 1). contains a summary listing of FSAR sections and corresponding Unit 2 change package numbers associated with the A 112 FSAR changes.

FSAR A 112 is contained on the enclosed Optical Storage Media (OSM #1) (Attachment 1).

The FSAR contains security-related information identified by the designation "Security-Related Information -Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390." TVA hereby requests this information be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.390. A redacted version of the FSAR is contained on OSM #2 (Attachment 2),

which is suitable for public disclosure. contains a listing of the FSAR pages that have been redacted. Enclosure 3 lists the files and file sizes on the security-related OSM (OSM #1 ), and Enclosure 4 lists the files and file sizes on the publicly available OSM (OSM #2).

In regard to Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER), Appendix HH Open Items, the following can be stated to address three open items:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 May 30, 2014 For Open Item No. 1, involving power assisted cable pulls. WBN Unit 2 construction has not made nor will not be making any such power assisted cable pulls in the completion of WBN Unit 2. A 112 addresses Open Item No. 35, involving Component Cooling System (CCS), and Open Item No. 91 , involving Feedwater Purity.

In addition, FSAR Change Package 2-112-10 addresses a clarification to the IST Program code of record as committed to in Reference 2.

Attachment 3 provides replacement disks for Amendment 111 provided in Reference 1.

During the course of Amendment 112 preparation, it was discovered that the discs containing the Amendment 111 files previously provided by Reference 1 did not contain Section 6 .2.6.

Enclosures 5 and 6 have been updated to reflect this addition for file sizes related to the security-related and the publicly available OSMs for Amendment 111 .

There are no new commitments made in this letter. This letter does not close any "Generic Communications." If you have any questions. please contact Gordon Arent at (423) 365-2004.

I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 301h day of May, 2014.

Respectful!~ /

'((.a. ~?' (j_

Raymond A. Hruby. Jr.

General Manager, Technical Services Watts Bar Unit 2 Enclosures :

1. WBN Unit 2 FSAR A 112, "Summary Listing of A 112 FSAR Changes"

2. WBN Unit 2 FSAR A112 , "Summary of Redacted Pages"

3. W BN Unit 2 FSAR A 112, "List of files and file sizes on the security-related OSM (OSM #1 )"

4. WBN Unit 2 FSAR A 112, "List of files and file sizes on the publicly available OSM (OSM#2}"

Attachments:

1. OSM # 1: WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 112 - Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390

2. OSM #2: WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 112 - Publicly Available Version

3. OSM #1 : WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 111 - Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 OSM #2: WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 111 - Publicly Available Version cc: See Page 3

June 23, 2014 MEMORANDUM TO: Michael T. Markley, Chief Plant Licensing IV-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Peter J. Bamford, Project Manager IRA/

Plant Licensing IV-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - REVIEW OF FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT UPDATE, REVISION 21 (TAC NOS. MF2945 AND MF2946)

This memorandum documents the in-office review of Revision 21 to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Update for Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP), Units 1 and 2, dated September 16, 2013 (not publicly available). The FSAR Update was submitted by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E, the licensee), in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.71 (e). PG&E follows the guidance of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 98-03, Revision 1, "Guidelines for Updating Final Safety Analysis Reports," and NEI 99-04, Revision 0, "Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes."

The time requirements for FSAR submittals are stated in 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4). Revisions must be filed annually or 6 months after each refueling outage provided the interval between successive updates does not exceed 24 months. In its letter dated December 8, 1997, the licensee requested an exemption from the time requirements stated in 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) for DCPP, Units 1 and 2. As discussed in the licensee's exemption request, DCPP, Units 1 and 2, have a common FSAR. The rule would require FSAR updates within 6 months of each refueling outage, resulting in required FSAR updates every 12 months. As such, the licensee requested an exemption to allow the updates of the FSAR to be submitted within 6 months after each DCPP, Unit 2, refueling outage, but not to exceed 24 months from the last update. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff approved the exemption in a letter dated March 12, 1998 (ADAMS Accession No. ML022400141). DCPP, Unit 2, completed its last refueling outage on March 23, 2013. The previous update of the DCPP FSAR, Revision 20, was submitted on November 16, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11332A181 ). Therefore, the September 16, 2013, submittal date for Revision 21 of the DCPP FSAR meets the requirements approved in the exemption since the submittal was within 6 months of the last DCPP, Unit 2, refueling outage and does not exceed 24 months from the last FSAR update.

As stated in the licensee's letter dated September 16, 2013, Revision 21 of the DCPP FSAR contains changes to reflect the plant configuration as of March 23, 2013. This meets the requirement in 10 CFR 50. 71 (e )(4) which states that the revisions must reflect all changes up to a maximum of 6 months prior to the date of filing.

M. Markley Amendments Revision 2 1 covered changes to the FSAR Update during the period June 6, 2011 , through September 16, 2013. Each of the license amendments issued during the period were reviewed for impacts on the FSAR Update and included Amendment Nos. 211/213 through 216/218 (for Units 1 and 2, respectively). The following three amendments were identified which resulted in impacts on the FSAR Update:

• Amendment Nos. 211/213, dated March 29, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML120790338), modified FSAR Update Sections 8.1 .4.3, "Regulatory Guides," and 8.3.1.1.13.1, "Diesel Generator Unit Description," to identify an exception to Revision 0 of Regulatory Guide 1.9, "Application and Testing of Safety-Related Diesel Generators in Nuclear Power Plants";

• Amendment Nos. 212/214, dated October 31, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML120300114), modified FSAR Update Sections 15.2.7.3, "Results," and 15.2.16, "References," to adopt a new analysis methodology for establishing the reduced power range neutron flux high setpoint for one inoperable main steam safety valve; and

• Amendment Nos. 214/216, dated January 9, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12345A379), modified FSAR Update Section 4.3.2.2, "Power Distribution," to allow the use of the Best Estimate Analyzer for the Core Operations-Nuclear (BEACON) Power Distribution Monitoring System methodology, as described in Westinghouse Electric Company LLC's WCAP-12472-P-A, Addendum 1-A, "BEACON Core Monitoring and Operation Support System," January 2000.

The FSAR Update changes for Amendment Nos. 211/213 were not apparent in Revision 21 . The licensee had reorganized the FSAR Update, removing the numbered Sections 8.1.4.3 and 8.3.1.1.13.1. However, the licensee included the amendment's language in Section 8.3.1.1.6.3.13, "Safety Guide 9, March 1971 - Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies," and Section 8.3.1 .1.6.1.13, "Safety Guide 9, March 1971 - Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies." With the inclusion of this exception in these two sections, the NRC staff concludes that the FSAR Update is consistent with the updates stated in Amendment Nos. 211 /2 13.

Inspection Reports The inspection reports (IR) for the appropriate period were reviewed . The first, IR 2012004, involved a non-cited violation of Appendix B, Criteria V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," after PG&E failed to promptly evaluate the operability of plant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) after a newly discovered local fault line. The IR, dated February 14, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML120450843), indicated a need to update the FSAR Update with the new seismic information. The second, IR 2011005, dated November 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12318A385), involved a Severity Level IV violation where the licensee failed to update the FSAR Update with information describing how plant SSCs meet 10 CFR Part 50,

ML13155A238), documented an event in which the licensee identified an unanalyzed condition due to a nonconservative change in the FSAR Update Chapter 15, "Accident Analyses," which would have resulted in a higher received radiological dose received by control room operators during an accident, but would not exceed General Design Criteria 19. The LER described the corrective actions taken to address the event and NRC staff confirmed that Revision 21 of the FSAR Update incorporated the corrective actions described in the LER.

The NRC staffs sampling review of the FSAR Update, Revision 21 included the applicable amendments, IRs, and LERs. The staff did not find any commitments to modify the FSAR Update in its review. Based on the review, the staff concludes that the FSAR Update, Revision 21 was submitted consistent with the requirements in 10 CFR 50.71(e).

Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50- 323 DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC LPL4-1 R/F RidsNrrDorllpl4-1 Resource RidsNrrLAJBurkhardt Resource RidsNrrPMDiabloCanyon Resource RidsRgn4MailCenter Resource ADAMS Accession No. ML14022A120 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL4*2/PM N RRIDORL/LPL4-1 /PM NRRIDORL/LPL4* 1/LA NRRIDORL/LPL4*1/BC NRR/DORL/LPL4*11PM NAME MOrenak PIBamford JBurkhardt MMarkley PBamford DATE 6/17/14 6/17/1 4 6/17/14 6123114 6123/14

- ' 61 I ICIAE 632 Olk I 81!8_.Alf; itELA I 26 114F&SDPo rrgt' COMMUNICATIONS PLAN Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant Steam Generators Replacement Inspection January 2014 Point Of

Contact:

Atif Shaikh, Riii 630-829-9824 GOALS

• Be prepared to answer public questions on the steam generators replacement inspection

• Be prepared to answer internal questions on the steam generators replacement inspection KEY MESSAGES The NRC's oversight of the steam generator replacement process at Davis-Besse is comprehensive to ensure the safety of the plant and the public.

Inspections started on December 2, 2013, and these inspections will continue through the actual replacement installation work beginning in February 2014 the post installation tests performed by the licensee, and the plant's subsequent return to power. The results of this NRC inspection will be documented in a publically available report that will be issued by the NRC within 45 days of the conclusion of this inspection .

NRC inspectors will conduct direct observations along with reviews of records, calculations, and procedures to provide adequate assurance that the plant modifications associated with the replacement steam generators meet applicable regulatory requirements.

Inspections will be conducted by a team of inspectors with expertise in metallurgy, structural design, heavy loads, radiatiol) protection, security, and other relevant areas.

NRC inspectors will review the licensee's evaluation of relevant steam generator replacements operating experience (OpEx) to determine whether the licensee has adequately evaluated the OpEx potentially relevant to the Davis-Besse steam generators repla~ement.

NRC inspectors will ensure that any safety concerns identified during the inspection are adequately addressed by the licensee.

The NRC staff invited the public to listen in via conference call to its initial inspection planning meeting with the licensee during which the licensee provided a presentation and NRC staff answered questions from the public. That presentation remains available to the public in the NRC's ADAMS document system (ML No. 13078A249) via the NRC public web site.

iliiCI IAITV RE!!l!;ltlf'l~ IUP8AM:1 TIQft

NRC staff also discussed inspection plans with the public during the last end-of-cycle meeting near the plant and provided information in a meeting with local government officials. In addition. the NRC staff also plans to conduct a webinar to answer questions from the public related to the replacement steam generators at Davis-Besse.

BACKGROUND Davis-Besse is a Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) designed plant. It is a two loop plant and has two steam generators. The original steam generators are B&W designed once-through steam generators (OTSGs). The new replacement steam generators are also B&W designed OTSGs.

There are two basic types of steam generators used in the United States: recirculating steam generators (RSGs) and OTSGs. RSGs have tubes that are shaped like an inverted "U" while OTSGs have straight tubes. There are currently 59 units in the U.S. with RSGs and 6 units with OTSGs.

All steam generators are designed to limit the possibility of tube-to-tube contact since such a condition can result in the tubes rubbing against each other and leading to tube thinning. The thinning of the tube wall due to the interaction of two structures (e.g., tube-to-tube or tube-to-support) is commonly referred to as tube wear.

In Early 2012, the licensee for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3, which has recirculating steam generators, detected hundreds of tubes with wear attributed to tube-to-tube contact caused by a fluid~elastic instability. Some of these indications were significant including one that leaked during normal operation and led to the plant shutting down. These indications occurred after approximately 20 months of operation. In total, eight tubes were found that did not meet the structural integrity performance criteria specified in the plant's technical specifications. The steam generators at San Onofre were designed and fabricated by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI).

In early 2010, Three Mile Island , Unit 1 (TMl-1), completed the replacement of both its original OTSGs with new OTSGs that were fabricated by AREVA (France). The first inservice inspection of the TMl- 1 replacement steam generators took place in fall 2011 . During these inspections at TMl- 1, the licensee detected several tubes with indications. A more detailed in_vestigation led the licensee to conclude that these indications w ere a result of tube wear due to tube-to-tube contact.

In fall of 2013 the licensee for TMl-1 conducted their second inservice inspection of the replacement steam generators. The licensee reviewed their testing data and concluded that tube-to-tube wear was progressing slowly "as predicted" based on first cycle wear data from fall of 2011.

In spring 2006, Oconee, Unit 3 conducted the first inservice inspection of the replacement OTSGs that were installed in 2004. The inservice inspection results revealed widespread wear degradation of the tubing at tube support plant (TSP) locations. Oconee, Units 1 and 2, have also experienced this widespread tube wear degradation at TSP locations following the first cycle of operation since installation in 2004. In spring of 2012 the licensee for Oconee, Unit 3 also detected wear attributed to tube-to-tube contact in the replacement OTSGs. The Oconee replacement OTSGs were designed and fabricated by B&W Canada and are similar to the design of the Davis-Besse replacement O TSGs.

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The licensees for Oconee and TMI evaluated the severity of the tube-to-tube wear indications in their replacement steam generators. These evaluations concluded that the wear indications did not compromise tube integrity (i.e., the tubes could still perform their intended function consistent with their original design and licensing basis) . In addition, this tube-to-tube contact did not involve high energy fluid-elastic instability such as that experienced at SONGS. NRC staff reviewed the licensees' evaluations and did not identify any safety issues that would affect plant restart.

Q&As FOR DAVIS-BESSE STEAM GENERA TORS REPLACEMENT

1. Will this be a like for like replacement?

No, this will not be a like for like replacement. Although the replacement steam generators (SGs) are manufactured by the same vendor as the original SGs, there are some differences in the design of these replacement SGs. Hence, the licensee is required to perform an evaluation consistent with Section 50.59 of Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations ( 10 CFR) for the proposed modifications associated with the replacement SGs.1

2. What are the differences between the old and new steam generators?

The differences between the original SGs and the replacement SGs all relate to physical design aspects such as the material, component dimensions, number of tubes per generator. etc. The required design and safety functions of the SG remain the same.

The NRC staff will be reviewing the 50.59 analyses supporting the design changes to ensure that plant safety is not impacted by the changes and to evaluate licensee's conclusions regarding whether NRC approval is needed for the changes.

3. Can you explain the 50.59 process?

The 50.59 process involves implementation of the requirements set forth in 10 CFR 50.59, a federal regulation. Essentially, whenever a licensee decides to implement a physical change to its facility or change how the facility is operated, used or controlled ,

including changes to safety analyses or documentation (e.g., a calculation, evaluation, methodology), then the 50.59 regulation allows a licensee to implement that change without prior NRC approval only if the change meets criteria pertaining to the safety implications of the proposed change. Generally, if a change would place the plant outside of the safety boundaries established by the NRC and reflected in the plant's licensing basis (e.g., NRC regulations, licensing documents, and plant safety analyses report), then prior NRC approval would be needed.

4. Can you explain the license amendment process?.

In general, the license amendment application revie.w process has 5 steps: 1)

Conducting an acceptance review to determine if there is sufficient technical information for the NRC staff to begin a detailed technical review of the application; 2) Publishing a Federal Register notice that describes the application and gives members of the public an opportunity to comment on the proposed determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration (NSHC) and request permission to be a party in a hearing; 3) Conducting a technical review to determine the safety of, and the environmental impacts of. the proposed amendment, including, if needed, sending requests for additional information (RAls) to obtain additional information needed to make an informed regulatory decision;

4) Completing the NRC staff's safety evaluation (SE), which provides the technical, 0 551

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Qf§!?I' Is P&li ?tll:s" iiiW~UfY Mil:::'llili IDIF99" 0 r!O" safety, and legal basis for the NRC's decision on the amendment application: and 5) If the amendment is approved , issuing the amendment and publishing a Federal Register notice that indicates when the amendment issued and whether the NRC staff made a final NSHC determination.

5. How do 50.59 analyses and license amendments assure safety?

Both processes provide assurance that changes at operating reactors are not made until the safety significance of the change is considered. As noted above. the 50.59 process can lead to a determination that a 50.90 license amendment application. and thus prior NRC approval. is required.

6. What changes would require a license amendment?

If a proposed change is not consistent with a technical specification or places the plant outside of the safety boundaries established in the plant's licensing basis, then the change would require a license amendment.

7. Why not require a license amendment for the whole replacement?

NRC inspectors review samples of licensee 50.59 evaluations and decisions during the SG replacement inspections. If the Agency determines that a license amendment is required , the Agency can take appropriate enforcement action.

8. Are any license amendments needed for the SG replacements at Davis-Besse?

Davis-Besse submitted a license amendment request for Technical Specifications (TS) changes related to the replacement steam generators. *The NRC staff is currently reviewing this amendment request.

9. Have any concerns been raised regarding the steam generator replacement?

A request for hearing and petition to intervene on the Technic~ I Specification (TS) license amendment request was filed in May 2013. The petitioners challenged the 10 CFR 50.59 analyses on the steam generators replacement, contending that the steam generator replacement activities required an additional license amendment request. On August 12, 2013, the Atomic Safety Licensing Board (ASLB) denied the petition, The ASLB ruled that petitioners cannot challenge 10 CFR 50.59 analyses done to support steam generator replacement activities in a proceeding on a license amendment request to change TS related to operation with the new steam generators replacement. The ASLB also ruled that a ~hallenge to adequacy of 10 CFR 50 .59 analyses for replacement of the steam generators can only be made by filing a petition under 10 CFR 2.206. *

10. Will the NRC staff conduct an inspection concerning the steam generator replacement activities?

Yes. The NRC staff will inspect the licensee's SG replacement activities during inspections which began on December 2, 2013. During the inspection. the NRC staff will review10 CFR 50.59 analyses done to support the steam generator replacement. as well as monitor steam generator replacement activities. An inspection report will be issued to document the results of the NRC staffs review.

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11. Will the NRC's review of the new steam generators/50.59 evaluations be complete before the plant can start up with the new steam generators?

It is the licensee's responsibility to ensure changes associated with the new steam generators are thoroughly evaluated and are safe and implemented appropriately. While the NRC staff will complete its inspection review as expeditiously as possible, we can't guarantee we will reach final conclusions prior to plant restart. The NRC staff will take the time it needs to do a thorough and rigorous inspection and to arrive at supportable conclusions. However, if at any time the NRC staff concludes that the changes are not safe, the NRC would take appropriate enforcement action , including ensuring the plant stays in or is placed in a safe condition.

12. Will there be an NRC inspection report for the OB steam generators? Will the inspection results be publicly available before restart?

The inspection results for the SG replacement inspection will be documented in a publicly available NRC inspection report which will be issued within 45 days after the completion of the inspection. The NRC inspection is extensive and includes evaluation of licensee activities that occur throughout the replacement outage and subsequent startup. Hence, the inspection report will not be available prior to startup.

13. Has the NRC incorporated lessons learned from previous SG replacements in inspections for the Davis-Besse replacements?

Recent operating experience at facilities where SGs have been replaced is being incorporated (or was incorporated) into the inspection effort for the Davis-Besse SG replacements. Region Ill staff closely coordinates with NRC headquarters to identify areas for a rigorous review of 50.59 evaluations. For the Davis-Besse steam generator replacement inspection, the NRC will be reviewing the licensees' evaluation of previous operating experience, key design differences between original and replacement steam generators, and if they exist, design change challenges discussed between the licensee and its vendor.

14. Has Davis-Besse licensee reviewed the SONGS or other SG replacement operating experience such as at TMl-1 and Oconee Unit 3 in preparation for their steam generator replacements?

Yes, Davis-Besse described in a public meeting how they have considered the SONGS, TMI, and Oconee SG tube degradation operating experience in their steam generator design and replacement activities. The NRC inspectors will review this information and the 50.59 evaluations supporting these design modifications as part of the SG replacement inspection activities.

15. Are these new steam generators considered an experimental design?

No, these new replacement SGs are not considered an experimental design. They are similar in basic design to the original SGs. There is also operating experience available regarding replacemeAt steam generators of a similar design as those being installed at Davis-Besse. The NRC inspectors will be reviewing the licensee's evaluation of the operating experience available as it pertains to the specific design.

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16. What are the main differences between the steam generators at Davis-Besse and SONGS?

• The Davis-Besse and SONGS SGs are different designs.

The steam generators at SONGS are recirculating steam generator design. They are designed for a Combustion Engineering plant which requires larger steam

• generators, averaging close to 9,000 tubes per steam generator. The SONGS SGs were manufactured by MHI and are one of the largest steam generators used in the industry. The SONGS replacement SGs were modeled for vibration using MHl's proprietary modeling code.

• The Davis-Besse Steam generators are a completely different design from SONGS in that they are once through steam generators (they do not have a U-bend tube region , instead they consist of straight tubes) and were manufactured by B&W Canada. The Davis-Besse replacement SGs were modeled for vibration using an industry accepted EPRI modeling code.

17. Will DB cut a hole in the shield building for these replacement steam generators?

What impact will that cutting and opening process have on the existing shield building cracking?

In order to remove the old steam generators and install the new steam generators, the licensee will cut another hole in the reinforced concrete shield building. The hole will be located entirely within the boundaries of a previous hole that was cut for replacement of the reactor pressure vessel closure head, and hence will be in new concrete that was poured in 2012. Thus, the licensee does not expect there to be any impact on previously identified cracking in the older portions of the shield building wall.

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6

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 1600 E. LAMA~ BLVD.

ARLINGTON. TX 76011~5 1 I September 11, 2014 MEMORANDUM TO: Wayne Walker. Chief Division of Reactor Projects, Branch A FROM: Multiple Addressees. as listed below

SUBJECT:

COMMUNICATIONS PLAN- DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TOPICS OF INTEREST The purpose of this memo is to transmit and request comments/concurrence on the enclosed Communications Plan for Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). The enclosed document is based on several iterations of informal communication plans, Q&A documents. and responses to congressional questions developed primarily by Region IV. NRR. OPA. and OCA over the last several years.

This communication plan describes the methods and resources that NRC staff will use to communicate with internal and external stakeholders regarding the OCPP seismic history and ongoing seismic evaluations being conducted in response to the Japan Lessons Learned Near-Term Task Force recommendations. Additionally, as applicable to current issues of interest to DCPP stakeholders, this communications plan integrates key messages related to spent fuel/dry cask storage and waste confidence issues (primarily by referencing other active .

communication plans).

This revision also incorporates Q&As for the most recent issues of concern including the licensee's AB-1632 Report to the State of California and the *sewell Report:

Once finalized, the Communications Plan will be posted on the OEDO Communications website for use by the communications team and more broadly across the agency as necessary.

Most of those on concurrence have each provided significant input to iterations of this document (or documents from which this Plan was developed). As such, we are requesting your review/comments/concurrence In the next few daya (due by COB, Monday, September 16t. Please forward your comments/concurrence on the document to Theresa Buchanan (Theresa.Buchanan@nrc.gov and/or ph: (817) 200-1503} of my staff.

The concurrence block noted on the next page will be used to document your concurrence on the enclosed Communications Plan.

Enclosure:

As stated

OFFICIAL USE ONLY .. SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION (b)(5)

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Page 65 OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INIP'.ORMATION

Paul Gunter Jim Riccio Tim Judson Dave Lochbaum Lucas Hixson Beyond Nuclear Greenpeace Nuclear I nformation and Union of Concerned www. En f ormable.com Resource Service Scienti sts November 19, 2014 Dr. Allison M. Macfarlane, Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-000 I

Dear Chairman M acfarlane:

On behalf of the Freedom of Information Team, I respectfully ask the Commission to revisit and revise the information withholdi ng pol icies approved in Staff Requireme nts Memorandum (SRM) dated November 9, 2004, for SECY-04-0191 dated October 19, 2004.

In response to the tragic events of 9/11 , the NRC staff proposed a framework for withholding information from the public that might be useful to adversaries attempting radiological sabotage at NRC-licensed fac ilities. The Commission approved the staff' s proposal. ln the second paragraph of the SRM, the Commission directed that "the staff should move expeditiously to complete the necessary determinations and restore public access to the appropriate documents."

Since that time, the NRC and the nuclear industry have developed a system for withholding the proper information. For example, the NRC released Regulatory Issue Summary RIS-05-026, "Control of Sensitive Unclassified Nonsafeguards Information Related to Nuclear Power Reactors;" RIS-05-031 , "Control of Security-Related Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information Handled by Individuals, Firms, and Entities Subject to NRC Regulation of the Use of Source, Byproduct, and Special Nuclear Material;" RIS-07-04, "Personally Identi fiable Information Submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission;" and RIS- 12-03, "Reintegration of Security into the Reactor Oversight Program Assessment Program." The NRC also revised I 0 CFR 2.390 to clarify what information must be withheld.

The nuclear industry and the NRC have operating experience using this system. Today, there is a common understanding of what information needs to be withheld along with the appropriate means for withholding it.

It is now time to restore public access to the appropriate documents while retaining necessary protection against inappropriate di sclosures.

Specifically, we ask that the framework in Attachme nt I to SECY-04-0 19 1 profiling all incoming documents from plant owners about fire protection and emergency planning as nonpublic be reversed. All incomjng documents about fire protection and emergency plann ing should be profiled as public.

Plant owners now have clarity from the NRC regarding the nature and context of information that must be withheld from the public. Plant owners now also have an established and well-used process for submitting documents containing such information to the NRC so that the information is appropriately withheld. Thus, documents about fire protection or emergency planning containing sensitive information will be submitted by plant owners per 10 CFR 2.390 and collateral processes, obviating the need for blanket withholding of all fire protection and emergency planning documents.

We look forward to the NRC restoring public access to appropriate fire protection and emergency planning information.

Sincerely, David Lochbaum Director, Nuclear Safety Project Union of Concerned Scientists PO Box 15316 Chattanooga, TN 37415 423-468-9272, office dlochbaum@ucsusa.org November 19, 2014 Page 2

[

Unionof Concerne Scientists d *

• ucsusa.org Two Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138-3780 t 617.547.5552 f 617.864.9405 1825 K Street NW, Suite 800. Washington, DC 20006-1232 t 202.223.6133 f 202.223.6162 2397 Shattuck Avenue, Suite 203, Berkeley, CA 94704-1567 t 510.843.1872 f 510.843.3785 One North LaSalle Street, Suite 1904, Chicago, IL 60602-4064 t 312.578.1750 f 312.578.1751 December 17, 20 14 Hubert Bell, Inspector General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Mr. Bell:

On behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists, I respectfully ask the Office of the Inspector General to investigate whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commjssion violated federal statutes and/or federal regulations with the information withholding policy approved in Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) dated November 9, 2004, for SECY-04-0 '1 91 dated October 19, 2004.

Among other things, the policy authorized the NRC staff to withhold all documents it received from plant owners involving fire protection and emergency planrung. In the text on page 7 of the attachment to SECY-04-0191 , the NRC staff recognized that most of these incoming fire protection and emergency planning records would not likely contain sensitive information that needed withholding from the public. Yet the NRC staff recommended, and a majority of the Commission approved, withholding these incorillng records.

Earlier this year, I submitted requests under the Freedom of Information Act for fire protection and emergency planning records dated October 1, 2004, or later that were not already publicly available. The fire protection records provided to me in response to my FOIA requests are mostly contained in the October 3, 2014, folder in the NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS).

No documents were withheld in their e ntirety by the NRC when responding to my FOIA requests. And I have not yet located a single redaction in any of the fire protection records 1

released by the NRC staff in response to my FOIA requests. Thus, there was no justifiable basis for withholding these records from the public.

1 Some of the emergency planning records released in response to my FOIA requests had telephone numbers and similar information redacted, but those redactions represented considerably less than one percent of the material in the documents.

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But even if the tragic events of 9111 wainnted error on the side of caution, a policy decision cannot trnmp or negate federal statutes and regulations. This policy with regard to foe protection and emergency planning records seem s to have authorized practices that violate federal statutes a nd regulations. Several examples that strongly suggest that NRC violated federal statutes and regulations are summarized in the following table.

Table 1: Some of the Fire Protection Records Withheld by the NRC Date ADAMS Document Document Made Comment ML Date Public The NRC approved the exemption Response to NRC request for on 09/27 /2006. The approval additional information (ML062160387) was made public ML060300439 regarding fire suppression Ol/13/2006 10/03/2014 on 10/02/2006. Lack of access to exemption request at Turkey the exemption request prevented or Point Units 3 and 4 significantly impaired the public's ability to oppose it.

The NRC approved the exemption Response to NRC request for o n 09/27 /2006. The approval additional information (ML062 I60387) was made pub Iic ML0620 10.140 regarding fire suppression 07/12/2006 10/03/2014 on I0/02/2006. Lack of access to exemption request at Turkey the exemption request prevented or Point Units 3 and 4 significantly impa ired the public's ability to oppose it.

The NRC issued the amendment on 04/25/2007. The amendment (ML07 l I 60431) was made public License amendment request o n 05/17 /2007. Notice of the for fire protection pending amendment was published ML063200100 I 1/15/2006 10/03/2014 requirements at Browns Ferry in the Federal Register o n Units I , 2, and 3 04/05/2007. Lack of access to the amendment request prevented or significantly impa.ired the public's ability to oooose it.

The NRC issued license amendments on 09/16/2009. The amendment (ML082280465) was Supplement to license made public on 09/24/2008. Notice amendment request for of the pending amendments was ML082590007 deviation from fire protection 09/05/2008 10/03/2014 published in the Fe deral Register on require ments at South Texas 08/25/2009. Lack of access to the Project Un its I and 2 deviation request prevented or significantly impaired the public's ability to oppose it.

The NRC issued license amendments on 09/16/2009. The Response to NRC request for amendment (ML082280465) was additional information made public on 09/24/2008. Notice regarding requested deviation of the pending amendments was ML093350537 J 1/20/2009 10/03/20 14 fro m fire protection published in the Fe deral Register on regulations at South Texas 08/25/2009. Lack of access lo the Project Units I and 2 deviation request prevented or significantly impaired the public's ability to oppose it.

December 17, 2014 Page 2

Table 1: Some of the Fire Protection Records Withheld by the NRC Date ADAMS Document Document Made Comment ML Date Public The NRC approved the exemption on 03/11/2010. The approval Request for exemption from (ML! 00340670) was made public ML090570050 fire protection regulations at 02/18/2009 10/03/2014 on 03/12/20!0. Lack of access to FitzPatrick the exemption request prevented or significantly impaired the public's ability to oooose it.

The NRC approved the exemption Response to NRC request for on 03/ 1112010. The approval additional information (ML100340670) was made public ML090960214 regarding fire protection 03/30/2009 10/03/2014 on 03/12/2010. Lack of access to regulation exempt.ion request the exemption request prevented or at FitzPatrick significantly impaired the public's ability to oooose it.

Licensee event report (LER) While LERs do not constitute for deficiencies in Appendix R licensing action requests (e.g.,

ML09 l 320440 05/11/2009 10/03/2014 fire response plan at Point license amendments, exemptions, Beach Unit 1 deviations, etc.), they describe violations of regulatory requirements, e ither hardware or process related. When available, LERs could be cited by the public Licensee event report (LER) in opposing licensing requests for non-compliance manual involving hardware and process ML103570032 12/22/2010 10/03/20 14 actions in fire response plans changes. By withholding all fire at MonticeJlo protection LERs, the NRC significantly hampered the public's ability to evaluate fire protection program adequacy and contest perceived shortcomings.

The NRC prepared its finding of no significant hazards for the Federal Register on 02/25/2010. The notice (ML l 00560391) was made public License amendment request to on 03/15/2010. The NRC issued the ML09364l067 use fire-resistive electrical 12/16/2009 10/03/2014 amendment on 09/30/2010. The cable at Wolf Creek amendment (ML! 02560498) was made public on 10/01/2010. Lack of access to the amendment request prevented or significantly impaired the public's ability to oppose it.

By withholding license a mendment requests, the NRC seems to have violated 10 CFR

50. 9 1, Notice for public comment; State consultation. Even when the agency publishes notices about the requests in the Federal Register, withholding the underlying request rendered that opportunity for public comment meaningless. The publk lacked viable means to contest "secret" requests.

December 17, 2014 Page 3

10 CFR 50.91 also provides opportunities for States to review proposed licensing actions and comment on or oppose them. The NRC's information withholding policy may also have inf1inged on States' abilities to conduct their consultation function. We request that OTG's investigation also determine whether the NRC's policy adversely affected the States' role in licensing actions.

The NRC's information withholding policy would also seem to violate the spirit if not the letter of the Administrative Procedure Act. This federal statute requires agencies like the NRC to provide for public participation in rulemaking processes. While the fire pro tection and emergency planning records withheld by the NRC may not directly involve rulemaking, there most certainly is an indirect nexus. When plant owners requested exemptions from NRC's regulations promulgated via a public rulemaking process, the NRC deprived the public of its right to contest how the APA-compliant requirements were applied to the 1.icensed nuclear facilities in their communities. And when the NRC pursued rulemaking, as it is and will be doing regarding emergency planning in response to both Fukushima's lessons and numerous reacto r decommissionings, the NRC 's withho lding of the past decade's worth of emergency planning records essentially turned the APA-compliance rulemakings into a mockery of meaningful public participation. An oft-cited adage states that "information is power." The NRC's information withholding practice rendered the public powerless to partic ipate in the agency's rulemaking proceedings.

Along with several other NGO representatives, I met with the NRC staff about document classification and information redaction policies on O ctober 7, 2014, in a public meeting attended by some members of the OIG staff. We followed up with a letter to Chairman Macfarlane dated November 19, 2014, requesting the Commission to reverse the policy for withholding all incoming records involving fire protection and emergency planning . We have reason to belief the informatio n withholding pol icy will be changed in the near future.

While we are hopeful that the NRC staff will soon cease blanket withholding of incoming fire protection and emergency planning records, that will solve only part of the problem.

We respectfully request that OIG investi gate the policy to address the remainder of the problem. Even if the information withholding policy was justifiable, policy cannot violate federal statutes and regulations. Thus, the po licy adopted by the NRC in late 2004 should not have resulted in requests for license amendme nts, deviations, and exemptions of fire protection regulatory requirements be ing withheld fro m the public.

December 17, 2014 Page 4

The information withholding policy adopted by the NRC in late 2004 attempted to better protect the public' s safety. In applying the policy, the NRC undermined the public ' s rights.

Thus, the NRC' s good intentions were offset by the unintended consequences. The OIG's investigation would identify those consequences as well as factors that could have or should have enabled maximum benefits to be derived with minimal consequences. The report on the OIG 's investigation can help the NRC staff implement process fixes that better maintain the delicate balance between the legitimate need to withhold some information and the public's right to know the rest of the information.

Sincerely, David Lochbaum Director, Nuclear Safety Project Union of Concerned Scientists PO Box 153 16 Chattanooga, TN 37415 423-468-9272, office dlochbaum @ucsusa.org December 17, 2014 Page 5

Union of d * .

[ Concerne Sc1ent1sts ISSUE BRIEF No More Fukushimas; No More Fort Calhouns HIGHLIGHTS 1\vo significant nuclear power safety events occurred in the spring of 2011.

On April 9, 2011. operntors shut On March 11, an earthquake and the tsunami it spawned caused the meltdown of down tlw reactm* at the Fon Calhoun three reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in Japan. Less than a month later, on April 9, operators shut down the reactor at the Fort Calhoun nuclear nuclear plant in Nebraska for a routine plant in Nebraska for a routine refueling outage. But myriad safety problems dis-refueling outage. But myriad safety covered during the outage- many dating back to when the plant was constructed problems discovered during the outage- in the late 1960s and early 1970s-prevented the reactor from restarting for two many dating back to when tlie plant was and a half years.

constructed in tl1e late 1960s and early Following the first event, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),

1970s-prevented the reactor ji-0111 which oversees the safety of the nation's nuclear power plants, formed a task force restartingfor two and a halfyears. The that examined the Fukushima accide nt and identified more than 30 lessons that could reduce vulnerabilities in the United States. The NRC ordered plant owners U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to implement specific safety upgrades and is pursuing additional measures to (NRC), which oversees the nation's nuclear further reduce vulnerabilities.

power plants, needs to determine how its Following the second event, the NRC made no such effort to examine the Fort inspectors and the plant owner missed-or Calhoun situation. lt faile d to identify lessons that would enable it to detect safety dismissed nmncrous lon>,rstanding snfety violations sooner and correct them before they could accumulate to epidemic problems for years despite thousands of proportions requiring years to fix- or worse, contribute to an American Fukushima.

Fort Calhoun received its first operating license in 1973, and the NRC reli-hours ofinspections. It should appoint a censed the plant in 2003 to continue operating for as Jong as 20 more years.

task force to recommend changes to Neither of these licensing efforts, nor the tens of thousands of hours the NRC the NRC's inspection and oversight spent inspecting Fort Calhoun, led the agency to d iscover any of these many efforts, and then i111plc111cnt I hcsc safety problems.

changes as quickly as possible.

For lwo weeks in J1111e 2011 ,jloodingon lhe Missouri River lumed N<*braska's Fort Calhoun 11udear power plant into an island. The plant had already lieen shut down for myriad safecy pl'Oblems- many dating back to its construction in the late 1960s a11d early 1970s.

Fort Calhoun's shutdown was not an isolated incident: The fact that there have been 52 year-plus outages demon-its two-and-a-half-year outage marke d the fifty-second time a strates that U.S. reactors often operate while violating U.S. reactor remained shut down for longer than a year so the numer ous safety requirements. These safety violations not owner could correct accumulated safety problems (see the only make reactors more vulnerable to accidents, but also table). In each of those cases, the reac tor had been operating make them more likely to experience a Fukushima-scale w ith serious safety problems prior to the shutdown- problems disaster in the event of an accident.

that made an accident more likely. Moreover, these 52 outages By closing the gap between what its safety regulations have cost ratepayers and shareholdel'S billions of dollars. require and what U.S. plant owners actually do, the NRC The NRC's goal of preventing a Fukushima-scale accident would not only prevent another Fort Callhoun, it would also in th.is country must be accompanied by the goal of preventing strengthen its post-Fukushima reforms. And because year-ano ther prolonged safe ty outage li ke that at Fort Calhoun. plus outages for safety fixes are costly, preventing another Year-Plus Nuclear Reactor Outages Date Date Outage Date Date Outage Outage Outage Length Outage Outage Length Reactor Began Ended (years) Reactor Began Ended (years)

Fermi Unit 1 10/S/66 7/18/70 3.8 Surry Unit 2 9/10/88 9/19/89 1.0 Palisades 8/11/73 10/1/74 1.1 Palo Verde Unit 1 3/S/89 7/5/90 1.3 Browns Ferry Unil 2 3/22/7S 9/10/76 l.S Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 3/17/89 S/4/91 2.1 Browns Ferry Unit 1 3/22/7S 9/24/76 l .S Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 S/S/89 10/4/90 1.4 Surry Unit 2 2/4/79 8/19/80 1.5 FitzPat rick 11/27/91 1/23/93 1.2 Three Mile Island Ulllt 1 2/17/79 10/9/85 6.6 Brunswick Unit 2 4/21/92 5/15/93 1.1 Turkey Point Unit 3 2/11/81 4/11/82 1.2 Brunswick Unit 1 4/21/92 2/11/94 1.8 San Onofre Unit 1 2/26/82 11/28/84 2.8 South Texas Project 2/3/93 5/22/94 1.3 Nine Mile Point Unit 1 3/20/82 7/5/83 1.3 Unit 2 Indian Point Ulllt 3 3/2S/82 6/8/83 1.2 South Texas Project Unit 1 2/4/93 2/2S/94 1.1 Oyster Creek 2/12/83 11/1/84 1.7 Indian Point Unit 3 2/27/93 7/2/95 2.3 St . Lucie Unit 1 2/26/83 S/16/84 1.2 Sequoyah Unit 1 3/2/93 4/20/94 1.1 Browns Ferry Unit 3 9/7/83 11/28/84 1.2 Fermi Unit 2 12/25/93 1/ 18/95 1.1 Pilgrim 12/10/83 12/30/84 1.1 Maine Yankee 1/14/95 1/18/96 1.0 Peach Bottom Unit 2 1.2 Salem Unit 1 5/16/95 4/20/98 2.9 4/28/84 7/13/85 Fort St Vrain 6/13/84 4/11/86 1.8 Salem Unit 2 6/7/95 8/30/97 2.2 Browns Ferry Unit 2 9/l S/84 S/24/91 6.7 Millstone Unit 2 2/20/96 5/11/99 3.2 Browns Ferry Unit 3 3/9/8S ll/19/9S 10.7 Millstone Unit 3 3/30/96 7/ 1/98 2.3 Browns Ferry Unit 1 3/19/8S 6/12/07 22.2 Cryst al River Unit 3 9/2/96 2/6/98 1.4 Davis-Besse 6/9/8S 12/24/86 1.5 Clinton 9/S/96 5/27/99 2.7 Sequoyah Unit 2 8/22/85 S/13/88 2.7 LaSalle County Unit 2 9/20/96 4/11/99 2.6 Sequoyah Unit 1 8/22/85 11/10/88 3.2 LaSalle County Unit 1 9/22/96 8/13/98 1.9 Rancho Seco 12/26/85 4/11/88 2.3 D.C. Cook Unit 2 9/9/97 6/2S/00 2.8 Pilgrim 4/11/86 6/l S/89 3.2 D.C. Cook Unit 1 9/9/97 12/21/00 3.3 Peach Bottom Unit 2 S/22/89 2.1 Davis-Besse 2/16/02 3/16/04 2.1 3/31/87 Peach Bottom Unit 3 3/31/87 12/11/89 2.7 Fort Calhoun 4/9/11 12/21/13 2.7 Nine Mile Point Unit 1 12/19/87 8/12/90 2.6 SOURCE: UPDATED FROM LOCHBAUM 2006.

2 UNION OF CONCER N ED SCIENTISTS

safety problems reported by Fort Calhoun's owner during

[

These year-plus outages the prolonged outage included:

demonstrate that U.S. Inadequate flood protection. NRC inspectors had

]

already determined in 2010 that measures designed to reactors often operate protect safety equipment in the aux iliary building and at while violating safety the intake structure from external flooding had not been adequately implemented as specified by the original requirements. safety studies. Workers identified additional deficiencies during the outage (Bannister 20lla) . Furthermore, when the plant's owner replaced the original security system in Fort Calhoun would save ratepayers and sh areholders money.

1985, it left portions of the old system in place. Although Preventing financial meltdowns and avoiding reactor melt-the owner sealed the intake structure's walls up to the downs is a goal too good to pass up.

calculated flooding level to protect vital cooling water Just as it did for Fukushima, the NRC must formally pumps inside, it failed to seal areas where the old security examine the Fort Calhoun case, identify the lessons that system's cables penetrated the intake structure. As a should be learned, and make appropriate changes to its over-result, the safety-related water pumps could have been sight process to reduce the likelihood that safety problems damaged by flooding (Bannister 2011b).

remain undetected- and uncorrected- for months or years.

Missing safety system parts. Fort Calhoun's owner in-stalled 32 seismically quali fied General Electric electrical Safety Problems at Fort Calhoun relays in safety systems at the plant. Workers tested sev-e n of these relays and three failed the tests. Workers then In a presentation to the NRC on March 27, 2013, Fort Calhoun's owner reported that 20,000 tasks had been completed between discovered the cause was a missing part. Fu rther inquiries concluded that the relays were most likely missing this November 2012 and February 2013 and had approximately part when they were installed during the plant's original 5,000 other tasks to do before it could restart the reactor construction (Cortopassi 2013a).

(OPPD 2013). W hile many of these tasks involved preventive maintenance and routine inspections, some entailed Inadequate earthquake protection. Wor kers found correcting serious safety problems. that transmitters used to monitor reactor cooling wate r When a safety problem's severity rises above a fairly high pressure had been installed on an instrument rack that threshold, the plant owner must report it to the NRC. The was not designed to adequately protect them from

/11 Mal'ch 2013, Fort Calhoun's owner reported rhat ir had completed 20.000 casks rcquin*d by the N RC before rhc **eactor could be restarted but srill had appwximately 5,000 more to do. Some ofthe tasks entailed correcting serious sa}t'l.Y problems.

No More l'ukushimas; No More Fort Calhouns 3

movement during an earthquake. The owner informed this piping failed to comply with the piping code and the NRC that, "During a seismic event, the excessive therefore was not properly qualified (Cortopassi 2012).

weight of these instrument racks could cause the racks Improperly grounded reactor protection system.

to fail," resulting in a reactor cooling water leak that Workers discovered that the voltage in the reactor could not be isolated, increasing the risk of nuclear protection system- which detects unsafe conditions core damage (Bannister 2012a). and initiates automatic safety system actions- was nearly Vulnerability to high-speed debris. In the event of 10 times higher than the design allowed. As a result, the a tornado, debris propelled by high winds can disable system might not initiate the automatic responses the essential safety equipment. Workers identified numerous plant's safety studies assumed would happen. Even potential sources of such debris, including removable worse, this unacceptable condition had been previously hatches on the intake structure, t he exhaust stack for the identified and reported multiple times since 1993 but steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the vent stack never corrected (Reinhart 2011).

and fill line for the emergency diesel generator's fuel oil tanks, the cable pull boxes for the raw water pumps, and the exhaust stacks for the emergency diesel generators (Cortopassi 2013b).

Overloaded backup power source. Workers discovered that, in a situation where one of the two emergency diesel generators was unavailable, more equipment would be

[ Workers discovered that some ofthe support beams for the containment structure were not connected to the remaining emergency diesel generator than that generator could supply during certain types properly designed to ]

of accidents. The system designe d to disconnect non-essential equipment from the emergency diesel generator handle the weight they during an accident would not perform properly during supported.

these types of accidents, and the overloaded generator could fail to function (Bannister 2012b).

Safety pumps operated outside vendor limits. Work-Inadequately tested backup power source. ln 1990, ers determined that, since 1996, the motors for the com-workers revised a test procedure for the emergency diesel ponent cooling water (CCW) pumps had bee n operating generators and no longer checked whether the plant's under conditions beyond those recommended by the fuel oil transfer pumps would automatically start and manufacturer. The CCW system supplies cooling water send fuel from the onsite storage tank to the generators. to reactor components that could contain radioactive This check, required by the reactor's operating license, water (for example, reactor coolant pump lube oil and had not been performed for nearly a quarter of a century seal coolers, containment air cooling units, spent fuel (Bannister 2012c). pool heat exchanger). Motors operated outside the Overloaded support beam. Workers discovered that manufacturer's limits could fail during an accident some of the support beams for the containment structure (Bannister 2012e).

were not properly designed to ha ndle the weight they This list summarizes only a handful of the safety prob-supported (Bannister 2012d). lems that eluded detection and correction at Fort Calhoun Inadequate piping qualifications. Workers discovered for years, subjecting the surrounding population to undue that chemical and volume control system (CVCS) piping elevated risk. The plant's problems cove1*ed a range of engi-had not been properly qualified for the stresses it could neering disciplines: electrical, mechanical, civil, and instru -

experience during its lifetime. Among other factors, the ment and controls. They fell into several major safety areas, qualification was required to consider fatigue cycles- including fire protection, flood protection, and seismic that is, the number of times the water carried by the pip- design. In other words, the problems wer e programmatic ing goes from ambient temperature to reactor operating and pervasive, not isolated to a single plant department.

temperature and back again. These temperature changes The most recent of these problems dated to 1996, and cause the metal pipe walls to expand and shrink, which many dated back to when the plant was originally built. Thus, wears the piping out faster. Examination of two-inch- there were dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of opportunities diameter socket-welded fittings in the eves found that for workers and N RC inspectors to detect them before 2010.

4 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS

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Senior executives ft'om che Fort Calhoun plane briefed NRC staffand commissioners several times (inclmti11g here in June 2013) before chey were allowed to restart the reactor.

The NRC's Reactor Oversight Process inspectors' findings, then places the reactor into one of five Action Matrix columns. When the safety performance of a In May 1997 the Government Accountability Office (GAO, reactor falls within the expected regime, the reactor is placed then called the General Accounting Office) issued a report in Column land the NRC conducts only a baseline number titled Nt1clear Regulation: Preventing Problem Plants Requires of inspections. As safety performance declines, the ROP man-More Effective NRC Action (GAO 1997). At the time, both dates supplemental NRC inspections. If safety performance reactors at New Jersey's Salem nuclear plant were mired in declines too much and a reactor falls into Column 5, the ROP year-plus outages and the NRC had identified 43 problems will trigger a shutdown until the owner fixes the problems.

the owner had to correct before it could safely restart either The ROP Action Matrix for Fort Calhoun from the fourth unit. The GAO report stated that the NRC knew about 38 of quarter of2000 (when the ROP program began) to the third the 43 problems before the Salem reactors were shut down, quarter of 2014 is shown in the figure on p. 6. The NRC moved and it knew about one of these problems for more than six years Fort Calhoun from Column 1 into Column 2 in the third prior to the shutdown. The GAO also documented that the NRC quarter of 2002, but later concluded that safety performance was aware of unresolved safety problems at the Millstone plant in Connecticut and the Cooper plant in Nebraska.

These findings prompted the GAO to conclude:

"NRC has not taken aggressive enforcement action to force the licensees to fix their long-standing safety problems on a timely basis."

"NRC allowed safety problems to persist because it was

[ There were dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of opportunities for workers and NRC inspectors to confident that redundant design features kept plants inherently safe."

detect safety problems In response to criticism from the GAO and others, the NRC replaced its safety monitoring programs in April 2000 with its Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). The ROP evaluates a reactor's safety performance by combining 17 performance indicators (submitted quarterly by plant owners) with NRC at Fort Calhoun-opportunities that were missed.

]

No More l'ukushimas; No More Fort Calhouns 5

The NRC's ROP Action Matrix for Fort Calhoun, 2000-2014 2000 04 2001 01 2001 02 ~

2001 03 2001 04 2002 01 2002 02 2002 03 2002 04 2003 01 2003 02 2003 03 1, 2003 04 2004 01 2004 02 2004 03 2004 04 2005 01 2005 02 2005 03 2005 04 2006 01 2006 02 2006 03 2006 04 2007 01 2007 02 2007 03 2007 04 2008 01 2008 02 2008 03 2008 04 2009 01 2009 02 2009 03 2009 04 2010 01 2010 Q2 2010 03 2010 Q4 2011 Ql 2011 Q2 2011 Q3 2011 04 2012 Ql 2012 Q2 2012 Q3 2012 04 2013 Ql 2013 Q2 2013 Q3 2013 Q4 2014 Ql 2014 Q2 -

2014 Q3 0 2 3 4 5 ROP Column As a nuclear power plant's safety performance declines, the NRC moves it from Column 1 to Column 5 in the Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix. The NRC repeatedly moved Fort Calhoun back and forth in the matrix for over a decade until the agency decided the plant's problems were serious enough (Column S) to warrant a shutdown.

SOURCE: NRC N,0 6 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS

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NRG Gommissio11er William G. Os1e11do1:fJ(left) speaks wirh NRG Senior Resident Inspector John Kirkland about repair.< needed al Fort Galho1111 while touring the plant during its 30-mont/1 outage.

had improved and returned the reactor to Column 1. This or radiation release. At Fukushima, multiple problems caused happened again in the fourth quarter of 2003 and the third three reactors to melt down: the reactors lost off-site power, quarter of 2004. the backup generators located in the basements were damaged The NRC moved fort Calhoun into Column 3 in the when the basements flooded, floodwater disabled banks of second quarter of 2007 and the fourth quarter of2007, but batteries that backed up the backup generators, and workers each time returned the plant to Column 2. When the NRC could not deploy portable pumps and generators in time.

again moved Fort Calhoun into Column 3 in the second The 1986 Chernobyl and 1979 Three Mile Island accidents quarter of 2010, however, the plant subsequently slipped also occurred when numerous things went wrong.

into Column 4 and then into Column 5.

[

Thus, the ROP utterly failed to recognize the depth and Quite simply, the people breadth of the safety problems at Fort Calhoun until the third quarter of 2011. As noted above, all the safety problems sum- ofNebraska faced unduly marized here existed at Fort Calhoun since at least 1996. They existed when the NRC returned Fort Calhoun from Column 2 high risk for over a decade because the NRC did not

]

to Column 1 on four occasions and when it returned Fort Calhoun from Column 3 to Column 2 o n two occasions.

These problems were so serious that Fort Calhoun could accurately evaluate safety not safely resume operation under NRC rules until each one was corrected, yet it had operated for over a decade with all levels at Fort Calhoun.

of them. Quite simply, the people of Nebraska faced unduly high risk for over a decade because the NRC did not accu- Conversely, there have been cases where many things rately evaluate safety levels at Fort Calhoun. The ROP has went wrong and disaster was averted. For example, in 2002, clearly not fixed the problems identified by the GAO in 1997. workers at the Davis-Besse reactor in Ohio discovered that corrosion had caused a pineapple-sized hole in the reactor head, leaving only a thin steel cladding to contain the high-Preventing Another Fort Calhoun- pressure coolant. Once the reactor was shut down, workers and an American Fukushima discovered additional serious safety problems. Despite oper-ating with numerous safety problems, Davis-Besse avoided A key nuclear safety principle is "defense in depth." Reactors disaster beca use not all of its defense-in-depth barriers are designed so that no single problem will lead to a meltdown were compromised.

No More l'ukushimas; No More Fort Calhouns 7

Nevertheless, a reactor operating with pre-existing safety Bannister, D.J. 2012e. Licensee event report 2012-006, revisio11 O,for proble ms is more vulnerable to disaster when another safety the Fort Calhoun Station. Omaha, NE: Omaha Public Power District.

June 25. Online at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1217/

problem arises. Fort Calhoun, before its reactor was shut down, ML12178A293.pdf was more likely to experience a Fukushima-scale accident Bannister, D.J. 20lla. Licensee event report 2011-003, revision 2,for because it was already operating with multiple pre-existing the Fort Calhoun Station. Omaha, NE: Omaha Public Power District.

safety problems. Pre-existing problems undermine defense in March l. Online at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/ docs/ ML1206/

depth by reducing the number of things that must go wrong ML12061A224.pdf Bannister, D.J. 201 lb. Licensee event repor*t 2011-003, revision 3, for to transform a near-miss into a nightmare.

the Fort Calhoun Station. Omaha, NE: Omaha Public Power District.

If the NRC's effort to prevent an American Fukushima is December 17. Online at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/ docs/ ML1135/

to be successful, it must augment that with an effort to prevent ML113530555.pdf another Fort Calhoun. The NRC responded to Fukushima by Cortopassi, L.P. 2013a. Licensee eve11t report 2013-008, revision 0, for forming a task force that examined the accident and made more the Fort Calhoun Station. Omaha, NE: Omaha Public Power District.

June 7. Online at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/ docs/ ML1315/

than 30 recommendations to better manage nuclear power ML13158A138.pdf plant risks. It is now in the process of implementing those Cortopassi, L.P. 2013b. Licensee event report 2013-009, revision O,for recommendations. the Fort Calhoun Station. Omaha, NE: Omaha Public Power District.

The NRC similarly needs to respond to Fort Calhoun by June 14. Online at www.nrc.gov/ site-help/search.cfm?q=ML13168A376.

forming a task force to determine how the agency and the plant Corropass i, L.P. 2012. Licensee event report 2012-016, revision O,for the Fort Calhoun Station. Omaha, NE: Omaha Public Power District.

owner missed- or dismissed- numerous longstanding safety September 17. Online at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/ docs/ ML1226/

problems for years despite thousands of hours of inspections. ML12262A317.pdf The task force should recommend changes that will improve Government Accounting Office (GAO) . 1997. Nuclear regulation:

the effectiveness and reliability of the NRC's inspection and Preventing problem plants requires more effective NRC action.

oversight efforts. The NRC then needs to implement these Washington, DC. May. Online at www.gao.gov/products/

RCED-97-145.

changes as quickly as possible.

Lochbaum, D. 2006. Walking a nuclear l'ightrope: Unlearned lessons of year-plus reactor otll'ages. Cambridge, MA: Union of Concemed REFERENCES Scientists. September. Online at www.ucsusa.orw'nuc/ear_power/

Bannister, D.J. 20J2a. Licensee event report 2012- 010, revision O,for niaking-11uclear-power-safe1/who-is-respo11sible/ walki11g-a-nuclear-the Fort Calhoun Station. Omaha, NE: Omaha Public Power District. tightrope.litm/#.VOY11Sc80670.

August 3. Online at http://pbadupws.11rc.gov/ docs/ ML1221/

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). No date. ROP historical perfor-ML12219A010.pdf mance from previous quarters. Rockville, MD. Online at www.11rc.

Bannister, D.J. 2012b. Licensee event report 2012-011, revision O,for gov/ NRR/O VE RSIGHT/ ASSESS/ prevqtr.litml.

t/1e Fort Cal/10un Station. Omaha, NE: Omaha Public Power District.

Omaha Public Power District (OPPD). 2013. Fort Calhoun Station driving August 6. Online at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/ docs/ ML1222/

through restart. Omaha, NE: Omaha Public Power District. March 27.

MLl2220A 167.pdf Online at https://adamswebsearc/12.nrc.gov/ webSearch2/main.jsp?

Bannister, D.J. 2012c. Licensee event report 2012-005, revision O,fo1* Accessio11Nu111ber=MLJ3093A473.

t'he Fort Cal/Joun Station. Omaha, NE: Omaha Public Power District.

Reinhart, J.A. 20LL Licensee eve111 report 2011-002, revision 1,for the Apri l 23. Online at /Jttp://pbadupws.nrc.gov/ docs/ML1225/

Fort Calhoun Station. Omaha, NE: Omaha Public Power District.

ML122SOA189.pdf July 27. Online at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/ docs/ MLll20/

Bannister, D.J. 2012d. Licensee event report 2012-014, revision O,for M L112081990.pdf the Fort Calhoun Station. Omaha, NE: Omaha Public Power District.

September JO. Online at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/ docs/ ML1225/

ML1225SA038.pdf

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• FIND TIJIS DOCUMENT ONLINE: www.ucsusa.org/NoMoreFtCalhouns The Union ofConcerned Scientists puts rigorous, independent science to work to solve our planet's most pressingproblems. Joining with citizens across the country, we combine technical analysis and effective advocacy to create innovative, practical solutions for a healthy, safe, and sustainable future.

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC, OFFICE WEST COAST OFFICE MIDWEST OFFICE 1\vo Brat tie Square 1825 K St. NW, Suite 800 500 12th St., Suite 340 One N. Lc1Sallc St., Suite 1\104 Cambridge, MA 02138-3780 Washington, DC 20006-1232 Oakland, CA 94607-4087 Chicago. IL 60602-4064 Phone: (617) 547-5552 Phone: (202) 223-6133 Phone: (510) 843-1872 Pho ne: (312) 578-1750 Fax: (617) 864-9405 Fax: (202) 223-6162 Fax: (510) 843-3785 Fax: (312) 578-1751 w1m: www.ucsusa.org 0 PRINTE:D ON R~CYCLIW PAP~R USING VEC.ETl\Hl.E-8ASED INK." '" FEBRUARY 2015 UNION OF CO~Cf.RNW SCI U(J ISTS

[

Unionof Conceme dScientists EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in2014 Tarnished Gold Standard OUR FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT CARD The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) often claims to represent the gold The NRC often claims to be the gold standard for nuclear power plant safety regulation and oversight (Macfarlane standard for nuc/£'m* power plant safety 2013; Magwood 2013). Ample evidence, including the summaries of positive outcomes achieved by the NRC in this series of annual reports, suggests much regulation and ol'ersight. Ample evidence validity to these claims. One cannot count the number of nuclear disasters averted suggests much validity to these c!.1i111s.

by the NRC's effective regulatory performance, but one can generally count on One cannot count the number of nuclear the NRC to be an effective regulator. The NRC has done much to earn the gold disasters averted by the NRC's ejfeaive standard label.

regulatory performance, but om* Chapter 4 of this report describes how the NRC conducted two extensive can generally count 011 tlte NRC reassessments of its reactor oversight process-not in response to an accident to l>e an effective reg11lat'Or: demonstrating its inadequacy or to criticism suggesting an inadequacy, but as a proactive measure aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the existing process. Chapter 4 also describes how a decade ago the NRC recognized Bur the NRC's gold standard is it had an aging work force and developed formal programs to retain as much tarnished. For the past decade, tliey have tribal knowledge as possible before its retirees hit the golf courses and beaches been improperly withholding documents in their golden years. Such proactive actions enable the NRC to retain the gold about safety problems, have subj('cted standard label.

engineers who voiced safe~y concerns to Chapters 2 and 3 of this report describe how the number and severity of near misses at nuclear power plants have been steadily declining since 2010 repeated investigations ofa/feged (Table 1, p. 2), again consistent with the NRC being an effective regulator.

but wi.rnbstantiated wrongdoing, and ltave been using ncmw1ifbrm answer keys to grade standardized tests administered via its reactor oversight process.

If the NRC truly is tlte gold standard, it must restore the luster and prevent the tarnish .fi"om recurring Tlie Millstone Power Station in Waterfiird. CT, w/1ic/1 exp<*rienced rwo selfinflicred near misses in 2014 when recent maintenance and modificacio11s introduced problems that reduced safety margins.

TABLE 1. Near M isses 2010 to 2014 1 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 2 2 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 2 3 Braidwood Unit 1 2 4 Braidwood Unit 2 2 5 Browns Ferry Unit 1 6 Browns Ferry Unit 2 7 Browns Ferry Unit 3 8 Brunswick Unit 1 9 Brunswick Unit 2 2 10 Byron Unit 1 11 Byron Unit 2 2 12 Callaway 13 Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 2 14 Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 2 15 Catawba Unit 1 3 16 Catawba Unit 2 17 Clinton 18 Columbia 3 3 19 Cooper 20 Crystal River Unit 3 21 Davis-Besse 22 Diablo Canyon Unit 2 23 Farley Unit 1 24 Farley Unit 2 2 25 Fermi Unit 2 26 Fort Calhoun 4 2 27 Grand Gulf 28 H.B. Robinson 2 2 29 Joseph M. Farley Unit 2 30 LaSalle Unit 1 31 LaSalle Unit 2 32 Millstone Unit 2 2 33 Millstone Unit 3 2 2 2 UNION OF CO NCER N ED SCIENTISTS

TABLE 1. Near Misses 2010 to 2014 (continued) 34 North Anna Unit 1 35 North Anna Unit 2 36 Oconee Unit 1 37 Oconee Unit 2 38 Oconee Unit 3 39 Oyster Creek 40 Palisades 3 2 41 Palo Verde Unit 1 42 Palo Verde Unit 2 43 Palo Verde Unit 3 44 Perry 2 45 Pilgrim 2 2 46 River Bend 2 47 San Onofre Unit 2 48 San Onofre Unit 3 49 Shearon Harris 2 50 Surry Unit 1 51 Susquehanna Unit 2 52 Turkey Point Unit 3 53 Wolf Creek 4 2 The overall number ofnear misses continues to decline each year, as does the number ofaffected sites and the severity ofevents.

SOURCE: UCS.

But Chapter 5 reveals the gold standard to be tarnished. how the NRC has been using nonuniform answer keys to For the past decade, the NRC has been improperly withholding grade standardized tests administered via its reactor over-documents, including many about safety problems. By doing sight process (Table 2, p. 4), yielding numerical outcomes less so, the NRC deprived the public of legal rights for regulatory predictable than fluctuating gold prices. By improperly with-decision-making and painted a misleading picture of nuclear holding many safety problem reports and jiggling the grading safety. Chapter 5 also describes how two NRC engineers who of other safety problems, the improving trends may be more did their duties and voiced safety concerns were subjected fabrication than fact. If the NRC truly is the gold standard to repeated investigations of alleged but unsubstantiated of nuclear regulators, it must restore the luster by removing wrongdoing, sending a very clear message throughout the this tarnish and preventing it from recurring.

agency that "silence is golden." Finally, chapter 5 explains The NRC and Nuclear Power Pla1lt Safety in 2014 3

TABLE 2. Seven Cornerstones of the Reactor Oversight Process Initiating Condit ions that. if not properly controlled. require the plant's emergency equipment to maintain safety.

Events Problems in this cornerstone include improper control over combustible materials or welding activit ies.

causing an elevated risk of fire: degradation of piping. raising the risk that 1t will rupture: ond improper sizing of fuses. raising the ri sk that the plant will lose electrical power.

I-Mitigating Emergency equipment designed to limit the impact of init iat ing events. Problems in this cornerstone include Systems ineffective mointenance of an emergency d iesel generator, degrading the ability to provide emergency power to respond to a loss of offsite power: inadequate repair of a problem with a pump in t he emergency reactor-core cooling system, reducing the reliability of cooling during an accident: and non-conservative calibration of an automatic temperoture set point for an emergency ventilation system. delaying its startup longer than safety studies assume.

Barrier Integrity Multiple forms of containment preventing the release of radioactive material into the environment. Problems in this cornerstone include foreign material in the reactor vessel. which can damage fuel assemblies: corrosion of t he reactor vessel head; and malfunct ion of valves in piping t hat passes t hrough containment walls.

Emergency Measures intended to protect the public if a reac tor releases significant amount s of rad ioactive material.

Preparedness Problems in t his cornerstone include emergency sirens w ithin 10 miles of the plant that fail to work:

and underestimation of the severity of plant conditi ons during a simulated or actual accident, delaying protective measures.

Public Radiation Design features and administrative controls that limit public exposure to radiation. Problems in this Safety cornerstone include improper calibration of a radiation detector that monitors a pathway for t he release of potentially contaminated air or water to the environment.

Occupational Design features and administrative controls that limit the exposure of plant workers to radiation. Problems Radiation Safety in t his cornerstone include failure to survey an area properly for sources of radiation, causing workers to receive unplanned exposures; and incomplete accounting of individuals' radiation exposure.

Security Protection against sabotage that aims to release radioactive material into the environment. which can include gates. guards, and guns. After 9/11, the NRC reduced the discussion of this cornerstone 1n the public arena.

The NRC's Reaction Oversight Process f eatures seven cornerstones ofreactor safety to help inspectors detect problems before they become more serious.

SOURCE WWW.NRC.GOV/REACTORS/OPERAT/NG/OVERSIGHT/ROP*DESCR!PT/ON.HTML

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From: Dean, Bill Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2014 10:46 AM To: Heinly, Justin; Werkheiser, David; Dodson, Douglas; Perry, Neil; Rich, Sarah; Rutenkroger, Scott Cc: Nieh, Ho; Scott, Michael; Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James; Lew, David; Bower, Fred; McKinley, Raymond; Schroeder, Daniel; Burritt, Arthur; Dentel, Glenn; Powell, Raymond; DeFrancisco, Anne; Warnek, Nicole; Greives, Jonathan; Schmidt, Wayne; Cahill, Christopher; Cook, William; Daun, Travis; Bickett, Brice

Subject:

FW: St. Lucie Jan 9 Reactor Auxiliary Building Flooding Video



So in reflecting on this video and the chronology of an actual recent St. Lucie flooding event described below (I am sure that Jon is having some flashbacks from the Susquehanna event a few years ago seeing the water pour out of electrical boxes) that happened earlier this year during a massive rainstorm, I cant help but think about how you have recently identified vulnerabilities at your sites related to flooding protection that have helped to preclude such an event from occurring. Thanks for being vigilant and finding these vulnerable areas so they could be addressed before the incipient event occurs. That would be too late to find out the problem exists.

BILL

From: McCree, Victor Sent: Tuesday, May 27, 2014 1:33 PM To: Johnson, Michael Cc: Leeds, Eric; Dean, Bill; Pederson, Cynthia; Dapas, Marc

Subject:

St. Lucie Jan 9 Reactor Auxiliary Building Flooding Video



Mike, Attached, as we discussed, is the video of the St. Lucie Auxiliary Building Flooding event on January 9, 2014. We are completing the SDP on this event and it is likely to be greater-than-green. As I shared during your last Direct Reports meeting, flooding vulnerabilities remain a concern to me..

Heres a synopsis of what occurred at St. Lucie:

o On January 9th, St. Lucie experienced a severe 5-hr rain event between 1400 and 1900, during which

~7 inches of rain fell in the area.

o At 1803 hrs, the licensee declared a UE based on HU1 Natural or Destructive Phenomena Affecting Protected Area and, HU1.5 Visual sightings by station personnel that water levels are approaching storm drain system capacity.

o At 1630 Unit 1 entered the AOP for aux building flooding. Storm water was entering the -0.5 ft elevation of the reactor auxiliary building through a conduit that was connected to an electrical box (see gray electrical box in the video). This water intrusion created in 1-2 inches of water on -0.5 ft elevation

(~50,000 gal) for several hours.

o The licensee was able to manage this flooding by periodically cycling remotely operated drain valves that allowed the water to go to the safeguards room (ECCS) sump [note: this action was not included in their flood mitigation procedure]. Storm water stopped leaking from the conduit at ~ 2100 hrs.

o Portable pumps were installed in both units condenser pits to remove the water. The B.5.b pump was used to remove water from the Unit 1 condenser pit which had more water to remove.

o The licensee determined that flood waters entered the RAB through degraded or missing conduit seals in the open condenser pits. Although water in these pits normally drain to through storm drains to overflow basins south of the plant, the storm water drains backed up, allowing storm water to flood the open condenser pits and enter the Aux Building. [Note: these degraded and missing penetration seals were not identified during the Fukushima walkdowns].

o The licensee removed blockage that allowed the basins to drain to the South overflow basin; established a flow path from the south overflow basin to the retention pond; licensee cleaned out the 36 inch pipe connecting the two. The licensee also opened up a gate valve that drained down the retention pond to the intake.

More to come.

Vic



NRC FORM 183 REG U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (09-2012)

NRCMD 12.1 REPORT OF SECURITY INCIDENTIINFRACTIONNIOLATION TO: FROM: (DIVISION/OFFICE IN WHICH INFRACTION OCCURRED)

Division of Facilities and Security DRA IRES NAME(S) OF PERSON ACKNOWLEDGING RESPONSIBILITY TITLE Risk and Reliability Engineer Lawrence Criscione TYPE OF SECURITY REPORT: INCIDENT INFRACTION VIOLATION D

DATE OF OCCURRANCE: 9/18/2012 DATE REPORTED: 9/20/2012 HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION OF MATERIAL INVOLVED: SUNSI SGI CONFIDENTIAL SECRET TOP SECRET WAS RESTRICTED DATA INVOLVED? DYES [{] NO D N/A REASON OR CAUSE FOR INFRACTION A RESIDRA staff sent an email to Chairman Macfarlane and others within the agency and outside the agency. Those on distribution outside the agency include the U.S. Office of Special Counsel and House and Senate oversight committee members and staff. The email and both attachments contain sensitive information (SUNSI) but were not properly marked. The reason for not properly marking the information is unknown.

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT AND ASSOCIATED MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVES SECTION INVOLVED:

Sensitive information (SUNSI) was not appropriately labeled or marked and was transmitted outside the agency to other federal government entities. The email message does not appear to have been sent to anyone outside the federal government. Neither the email nor the attached letter was marked as containing sensitive information. Management Directive sections involved are MD 12.1 section V, "Infractions and Violations" and Part 11ofMD 12.6, "Protection and Control of Sensitive Unclassified Information."

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN: (See Page 2 for suggested disciplinary action.)

The transmittal outside the agency of sensitive information (SUNS I) without proper markings was reported to the Division of Facilities and Security on 9/20/2012. Additional corrective actions are under consideration.

CORRECTION MEASURES TAKEN PENDING LONG TERM RESOLUTION:

None yet identified.

NRC FORM 183 (09-2012)

SUBMIT

O~~JCJ,6,l.. Uii ONb.Y iiNSITIVi INTERNAl INFORMATION UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 MEMORANDUM TO: Richard P. Correia, Director Division of Risk Analysis Office of Nuclea; R~JJiatory Research FROM: "~-

Mary Jal')!~ :J'2' *~

/ /~/. ~

Division of Fl9 ies and Security Office of Adiflinistration

SUBJECT:

REPORT OF SECURITY INCIDENT (INFORMATION SPILL)

On September 20, 2012, the Division of Facilities and Security (DFS) notified the Computer Security Office, Policy Standards and Training of the subject infraction {see attached NRC Form 183"Report of Security lncidentllnfractionNiolation,"from Benjamin Beasley and emails detailing this incident) which occurred September 18, 2012. DFS staff concluded that since this incident does not involve protection of classified information, a security infraction did not occur. Instead, this report will be identified as a security incident for failure to follow applicable Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNS!) guidelines.

To prevent recurrence of additional incidents involving the inadvertent release of SUNSI documents, the person or individuals responsible for the security incident must review the SUNS! guidance located on the NRC internal web at ::1t;, /tw~_Yw_::-::23=.::3~::~;__;:.;:.::::..'~:~~-~~.:-* Once the SUNS! training has been completed, send a confirmation email to the Facilities Security Branch indicating that the person(s) responsible for the incident has completed their review and understands the information.

Please be advised that no infraction will be issued for the subject incident DFS has noted corrective measures are implemented to prevent recurrence. This memorandum closes this incident.

Enclosures:

1. NRC Form 183 "Report of Security lncidentllnfractionNiolation," (September 27, 2012)

2. Email detailing this incident CONTACT: Daniel Cardenas, ADM/DFS (301) 415-6184 OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION EXHIBIT 3