05000298/FIN-2016004-04: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = C Henderson, G Warnick, J O, | | Inspector = C Henderson, G Warnick, J O'Donnell, M Phalen, P Elkman, P Voss | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensees failure to maintain Station Procedure 2.2.56, Main Steam System, Revision 49, to prevent a main steam line high flow Group 1 primary containment isolation signal when opening an inboard main steam isolation valve. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain Station Procedure 2.2.56 with adequate differential pressure limits for reopening closed main steam isolation valves during plant shutdown, which caused the unexpected closure of all the open main steam isolation and drain valves during the plant cooldown process. This resulted in a loss of the main steam line decay heat removal path, which caused reactor coolant system pressure and temperature to increase by approximately 13 psig and 3 degrees Fahrenheit, respectively, during the event. The immediate corrective actions were to reset the Group 1 isolation signal and open the main steam line drain valves to recommence plant cooldown. The licensee entered this deficiency into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-CNS-2016-05835, and the licensee initiated an apparent cause evaluation to investigate this condition. The licensees failure to maintain Station Procedure 2.2.56 to prevent a main steam line high flow Group 1 isolation signal when opening an inboard main steam isolation valve, in violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the procedural quality attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the associated cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown. Specifically, the Group 1 isolation signal closed the main steam line drain valves, which resulted in a loss of the main steam line decay heat removal path and caused reactor coolant system pressure and temperature to increase. The inspectors determined Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, dated May 9, 2014, was not applicable because plant temperature and pressure were not within the normal residual heat removal/decay heat removal system operating parameters. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it did not cause both a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of a trip to a stable shutdown condition. A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned to this finding because the performance deficiency occurred in 1988 when the licensee changed the procedural limits for differential pressure across the main steam isolation valves when reopening them, and therefore, was not indicative of current licensee performance. | | description = The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensees failure to maintain Station Procedure 2.2.56, Main Steam System, Revision 49, to prevent a main steam line high flow Group 1 primary containment isolation signal when opening an inboard main steam isolation valve. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain Station Procedure 2.2.56 with adequate differential pressure limits for reopening closed main steam isolation valves during plant shutdown, which caused the unexpected closure of all the open main steam isolation and drain valves during the plant cooldown process. This resulted in a loss of the main steam line decay heat removal path, which caused reactor coolant system pressure and temperature to increase by approximately 13 psig and 3 degrees Fahrenheit, respectively, during the event. The immediate corrective actions were to reset the Group 1 isolation signal and open the main steam line drain valves to recommence plant cooldown. The licensee entered this deficiency into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-CNS-2016-05835, and the licensee initiated an apparent cause evaluation to investigate this condition. The licensees failure to maintain Station Procedure 2.2.56 to prevent a main steam line high flow Group 1 isolation signal when opening an inboard main steam isolation valve, in violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the procedural quality attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the associated cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown. Specifically, the Group 1 isolation signal closed the main steam line drain valves, which resulted in a loss of the main steam line decay heat removal path and caused reactor coolant system pressure and temperature to increase. The inspectors determined Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, dated May 9, 2014, was not applicable because plant temperature and pressure were not within the normal residual heat removal/decay heat removal system operating parameters. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it did not cause both a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of a trip to a stable shutdown condition. A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned to this finding because the performance deficiency occurred in 1988 when the licensee changed the procedural limits for differential pressure across the main steam isolation valves when reopening them, and therefore, was not indicative of current licensee performance. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 00:24, 22 February 2018
| Site: | Cooper  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000298/2016004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2016 (2016Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Henderson G Warnick J O'Donnell M Phalen P Elkman P Voss |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |