05000275/FIN-2014004-03: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = C Alldredge, C Osterholtz, J Mateychick, J O, | | Inspector = C Alldredge, C Osterholtz, J Mateychick, J O'Donnell, J Reynoso, L Carson, L Micewski, L Ricketson, M Bloodgood, N Greene, T Hipschman, W Walker | ||
| CCA = H.5 | | CCA = H.5 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.1 | | INPO aspect = WP.1 | ||
| description = The inspectors reviewed a Green self-revealing finding for the licensees failure to provide appropriate acceptance criteria to ensure work activities were satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide acceptance criteria for torqueing or verification of acceptable torqueing during the re-assembly of the load tap changer in Work Order 64006965, Reinhausen Tap Changer Overhaul, for the re-termination of the Unit 1 startup transformer load tap changer diverter switch flex lead terminations. The licensee documented this issue in Notification 50578636. The licensee replaced the load tap changer and revised the procedure as part of their corrective actions. The licensees failure to provide appropriate acceptance criteria in Work Order 64006965 for the re-termination of the Unit 1 Startup Transformer load tap changer diverter switch flex lead terminations was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the work order did not provide acceptance criteria for torqueing or verification of acceptable torqueing during the re-assembly of the load tap changer diverter switch flex lead terminations. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone objective and adversely affected the objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because, it did not result in a reactor trip or a loss of mitigating equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. This finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with work management, specifically in that the licensee did not implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. | | description = The inspectors reviewed a Green self-revealing finding for the licensees failure to provide appropriate acceptance criteria to ensure work activities were satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide acceptance criteria for torqueing or verification of acceptable torqueing during the re-assembly of the load tap changer in Work Order 64006965, Reinhausen Tap Changer Overhaul, for the re-termination of the Unit 1 startup transformer load tap changer diverter switch flex lead terminations. The licensee documented this issue in Notification 50578636. The licensee replaced the load tap changer and revised the procedure as part of their corrective actions. The licensees failure to provide appropriate acceptance criteria in Work Order 64006965 for the re-termination of the Unit 1 Startup Transformer load tap changer diverter switch flex lead terminations was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the work order did not provide acceptance criteria for torqueing or verification of acceptable torqueing during the re-assembly of the load tap changer diverter switch flex lead terminations. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone objective and adversely affected the objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because, it did not result in a reactor trip or a loss of mitigating equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. This finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with work management, specifically in that the licensee did not implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 23:21, 21 February 2018
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000275/2014004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Alldredge C Osterholtz J Mateychick J O'Donnell J Reynoso L Carson L Micewski L Ricketson M Bloodgood N Greene T Hipschman W Walker |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |