05000298/FIN-2013004-03: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | ||
| Inspector = C Henderson, D Allen, J Josey, J Laughlin, J O | | Inspector = C Henderson, D Allen, J Josey, J Laughlin, J O'Donnell, L Ricketson, P Elkmann | ||
| CCA = H.14 | | CCA = H.14 | ||
| INPO aspect = DM.2 | | INPO aspect = DM.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, Drawings, associated with the licensees failure to follow Station Procedure 0.5OPS, Operations Review of Condition Reports/Operability Determination, and properly document the basis for operability when degrading or nonconforming condition was identified. Specifically, the licensee failed to consider that failure of a relay prevented residual heat removal Division II minimum flow valve RHR-MOV-16B from opening automatically when residual heat removal pump B flow was lowered, and concluded a failure of the replacement relay would not have an adverse effect on nuclear safety. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program for resolution as Condition Report CR-CNS-2013-06455. The failure to properly assess and document the basis for operability when a degraded or nonconforming condition was identified was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective. Specifically, the licensees failure to properly document and assess the basis for operability resulted in a condition of unknown operability for a degraded nonconforming system, thereby affecting the associated objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design and qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than their technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision-making component because the licensee did not adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action was safe in order to proceed, rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it was unsafe in order to disapprove the action. | | description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, Drawings, associated with the licensees failure to follow Station Procedure 0.5OPS, Operations Review of Condition Reports/Operability Determination, and properly document the basis for operability when degrading or nonconforming condition was identified. Specifically, the licensee failed to consider that failure of a relay prevented residual heat removal Division II minimum flow valve RHR-MOV-16B from opening automatically when residual heat removal pump B flow was lowered, and concluded a failure of the replacement relay would not have an adverse effect on nuclear safety. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program for resolution as Condition Report CR-CNS-2013-06455. The failure to properly assess and document the basis for operability when a degraded or nonconforming condition was identified was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective. Specifically, the licensees failure to properly document and assess the basis for operability resulted in a condition of unknown operability for a degraded nonconforming system, thereby affecting the associated objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design and qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than their technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision-making component because the licensee did not adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action was safe in order to proceed, rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it was unsafe in order to disapprove the action. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 00:20, 22 February 2018
| Site: | Cooper  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000298/2013004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Henderson D Allen J Josey J Laughlin J O'Donnell L Ricketson P Elkmann |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
| ' | |