05000275/FIN-2012003-08: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = L Ricketson, M Peck, L Willoughby, N O, | | Inspector = L Ricketson, M Peck, L Willoughby, N O'Keefe, N Greene, N Makris | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = Title 10 CFR 50.55a(g)4 requires in part, that ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components be inspected throughout the service life of the reactor. Contrary to the above, until November 2011, the licensee failed to enter the reactor vessel supports, a Class 1 component, into the inservice inspection program and failed to perform required code inspections of accessible portions of reactor vessel supports. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and performed the nondestructive examinations required by ASME Code. This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected it would become a more significant safety concern. The failure to enter required components into the inservice inspection program and perform required inspections of safety-related components could have allowed undetected flaws to remain in service. These undetected flaws could grow in size until failure of the component, degraded system reliability, or if sufficient general corrosion occurred, a gross failure of the component could occur. The finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not represent a loss of safety function and the nondestructive examination for the Unit 1 reactor vessel supports did not identify any relevant indications. The licensee has scheduled the examination for the Unit 2 reactor vessel supports for the next refueling outage. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Notification 50433947. | | description = Title 10 CFR 50.55a(g)4 requires in part, that ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components be inspected throughout the service life of the reactor. Contrary to the above, until November 2011, the licensee failed to enter the reactor vessel supports, a Class 1 component, into the inservice inspection program and failed to perform required code inspections of accessible portions of reactor vessel supports. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and performed the nondestructive examinations required by ASME Code. This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected it would become a more significant safety concern. The failure to enter required components into the inservice inspection program and perform required inspections of safety-related components could have allowed undetected flaws to remain in service. These undetected flaws could grow in size until failure of the component, degraded system reliability, or if sufficient general corrosion occurred, a gross failure of the component could occur. The finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not represent a loss of safety function and the nondestructive examination for the Unit 1 reactor vessel supports did not identify any relevant indications. The licensee has scheduled the examination for the Unit 2 reactor vessel supports for the next refueling outage. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Notification 50433947. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 00:18, 22 February 2018
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000275/2012003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson M Peck L Willoughby N O'Keefe N Greene N Makris |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |