The inspectors identified a Green finding and an associated non-citied violation of
Technical Specification 5.4.1, Procedures, for a failure to provide controls for material near the station transformers. Specifically, station procedure
CPS 4302.01, Tornado/High Winds, Revision 21b, did not include guidelines or examples of the types of materials to control as potential missiles in high velocity winds or tornadoes, and did not include triggers to perform walkdowns when
high winds were predicted, prior to off-normal entry, to control material adjacent to the offsite power transformers that could result in the loss of offsite power. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program (
CAP) as action request (
AR) 2388608. The licensee is currently preparing a transformer exclusion zone map for incorporation into the station house keeping procedure. Additionally the licensee has an operator that checks for potential missiles near the transformer yard as part of their rounds. The failure to provide guidelines or examples of the types of materials to control as potential missiles in high velocity winds or tornadoes and provide triggers to perform walkdowns when
high winds are predicted was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor in accordance with
IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Screening," dated September 7, 2012, because, it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiatin
Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations and is therefore a finding. Using
IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The
Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, issued June 19, 2012, the finding was screened against the
initiating events cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not involve the complete or partial loss of a support system that contributes to the likelihood of, or caused, an initiating event and did not affected mitigation equipment. The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of problem identification and resolution in the aspect of operating experience where the organization systematically and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely manner. Specifically, the licensee operating experience program failed to ensure evaluation and implementation of internal operating experience in a timely manner after previous identification in the
CAP (P.5).
