05000315/FIN-2013004-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | ||
| Inspector = B Cushman, D Reeser, J Ellegood, J Gilliam, J Lennartz, K Riemer, M Bielby, M Mitchell, T Taylord, | | Inspector = B Cushman, D Reeser, J Ellegood, J Gilliam, J Lennartz, K Riemer, M Bielby, M Mitchell, T Taylord, Szwarcm Mitchell, J Lennartz, J Benjamin, J Ellegood, P Laflamme | ||
| CCA = P.5, P.5 | | CCA = P.5, P.5 | ||
| INPO aspect = CL.1, CL.1 | | INPO aspect = CL.1, CL.1 | ||
| description = A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed on April 24, 2013, because the licensee failed to comply with requirements contained in procedure PMI-7030, Corrective Action Program, prior to restoring power to the Unit 1 reserve auxiliary transformer CD-101. Specifically, following multiple trips of supply breaker 12 CD, the licensee failed to correct an issue, defined as a condition adverse to quality in their corrective action program, prior to restoring power to the transformer on April 21. This ultimately led to the supply breaker to the Unit 1 and 2 reserve auxiliary transformers opening due to a faulted cable. No violations of NRC requirements were identified for this issue since the degraded cable was on a non-safety related portion of the electrical system. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as AR 2013-6194. The corrective actions for this issue included replacing the faulted cables and testing the unaffected cables. Using IMC 0612, the inspectors concluded that the issue was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and it adversely impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the degraded insulation failed causing a loss of the qualified circuit; a condition which lessened the likelihood of its availability for some events. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Section 6, a detailed risk evaluation, assuming inoperability of four days, determined the delta Core Damage Frequency was less than 1E-6; therefore the finding screens as very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors concluded this finding was associated with an aspect in Operating Experience component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee did not implement and institutionalize operating experience information from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) into processes and procedures. | | description = A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed on April 24, 2013, because the licensee failed to comply with requirements contained in procedure PMI-7030, Corrective Action Program, prior to restoring power to the Unit 1 reserve auxiliary transformer CD-101. Specifically, following multiple trips of supply breaker 12 CD, the licensee failed to correct an issue, defined as a condition adverse to quality in their corrective action program, prior to restoring power to the transformer on April 21. This ultimately led to the supply breaker to the Unit 1 and 2 reserve auxiliary transformers opening due to a faulted cable. No violations of NRC requirements were identified for this issue since the degraded cable was on a non-safety related portion of the electrical system. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as AR 2013-6194. The corrective actions for this issue included replacing the faulted cables and testing the unaffected cables. Using IMC 0612, the inspectors concluded that the issue was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and it adversely impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the degraded insulation failed causing a loss of the qualified circuit; a condition which lessened the likelihood of its availability for some events. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Section 6, a detailed risk evaluation, assuming inoperability of four days, determined the delta Core Damage Frequency was less than 1E-6; therefore the finding screens as very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors concluded this finding was associated with an aspect in Operating Experience component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee did not implement and institutionalize operating experience information from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) into processes and procedures. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:49, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Cook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000315/2013004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Cushman D Reeser J Ellegood J Gilliam J Lennartz K Riemer M Bielby M Mitchell T Taylord Szwarcm Mitchell J Lennartz J Benjamin J Ellegood P Laflamme |
| CCA | , |
| INPO aspect | CL.1, CL.1 |
| ' | |