05000315/FIN-2013010-01

Finding

Title

Failure to Maintain Emergency Operating Procedures for Mitigating the Consequences of a SGTR per TS Section 5.4.1, Procedures.

Description

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance, with two associated NCVs of Technical Specification (TS), Section 5.4.1, Procedures, and TS 3.7.4, Steam Generator (SG) Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs), for the failure to implement design measures which were consistent with the licensing bases for a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) concurrent with a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) to the station. Specifically, the licensees emergency operating procedures (EOPs) 1(2) OHP-4023-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, failed to provide adequate actions to mitigate the consequences of a SGTR, coincident with a LOOP, in sufficient time to prevent overfilling the ruptured steam generator. Additionally, the licensee failed to declare the affected units SG PORVs inoperable and complete the required actions when the non-safety-related control air compressor (CAC) was made unavailable and incapable of providing its required support function. With the units CAC unavailable, the SG PORVs would not be capable of being remotely operated from the control room during a SGTR concurrent with the LOOP. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and completed modifications to establish Nitrogen as another motive force to support SG PORV operability. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power. Based on the Detailed Risk Evaluation required, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the resulting change in the Core Damage Frequency (CDF) was equal to 2.4E-8/yr. The inspectors determined the cause of this finding involved the crosscutting area of human performance, the component of decision making, and the aspect of conservative assumptions, H.1(b) in that the licensee did not adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather licensee incorrectly assumed the unaffected units plant air system (not backed by the emergency diesel generators) would be available during the SGTR scenario to supply motive power to the affected units SG PORVs. This assumption failed to take into account the licensing basis requirement of considering a SGTR and a loss of offsite power to the station (both units).

01
Site:	Cook
Report	IR 05000315/2013010 Section 1R21
Date counted	Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2)
Type:	NCV: Green
cornerstone	Mitigating Systems
Identified by:	NRC identified
Inspection Procedure:	IP 71111.21
Inspectors (proximate)	R Baker B Jose C Tilton
Violation of:	Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification
CCA	H.14, Conservative Bias
INPO aspect	DM.2
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v • d • e

Finding - Cook - IR 05000315/2013010

2(3)3(2)4(8)5(1)7(0)8(0)9(4)10(2)201(1)403(2)404(0)405(0)406(0)407(0)502(0)503(0)1(0)

IR 05000315/2013010: 1 2

Finding List (Cook) @ 2013Q2

CCA Matrix: 2013Q2

	Q	CCA	Title
05000316/FIN-2012008-09	2012Q3		Computer Program Used for Operability Evaluation Was Not Benchmarked
05000316/FIN-2012008-01	2012Q3		Vortexing was not evaluated for the volume control, containment spray additive, refueling water storage tanks
05000316/FIN-2012008-02	2012Q3		Incomplete methodology for developing acceptance criteria for suction voids
05000316/FIN-2012008-03	2012Q3	H.13	Procedures were not developed for performance monitoring of plant parameters
05000315/FIN-2012004-01	2012Q3	H.5	Failure to Properly Preplan and Perform Maintenance on Safety-related Equipment
05000316/FIN-2012008-04	2012Q3		Minimum flowrates and time requirements for dynamic flushing were not established
05000316/FIN-2012008-05	2012Q3	P.5	Inadequate Procedure for Responding to a MODE 4 LOCA
05000316/FIN-2012008-07	2012Q3		10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for modification of RHR pump casing drain lines was not performed
05000316/FIN-2012008-08	2012Q3		Inadequate Procedure for RCS Vacuum Fill During Reduced Inventory Operations
05000315/FIN-2012004-02	2012Q3		Follow-up Inspection of Actions from NOED
05000315/FIN-2012004-03	2012Q3		Design Basis of Seismic Category I Structures and Equipment
05000315/FIN-2012008-06	2012Q3		10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for modification of RHR pump casing drain lines was not performed
05000315/FIN-2012004-04	2012Q3		Inadequate Procedures for Implementation of Annulus Cooling to Remain in a Analyzed Thermal Condition
05000315/FIN-2012007-05	2012Q4		Concerns with Operability of SG PORVs with Control Air Compressor Unavailable
05000315/FIN-2012007-02	2012Q4		Qualification Basis for Safety-Related Relays and Motor-Starter Contactors
05000315/FIN-2012007-03	2012Q4		Concerns with Periodic Design Basis Testing of Installed Relays and Motor-Starter Contactors
05000315/FIN-2012007-04	2012Q4		Concerns with Ensuring Margin to Overfill in a Ruptured SG
05000315/FIN-2012007-01	2012Q4		Non-conservative Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Cross-Tie NPSH Calculation
05000315/FIN-2012005-03	2012Q4	H.12	Failure to Maintain HELB and Fire Barriers
05000315/FIN-2012005-01	2012Q4	H.8	Failure to Perform an Evaluation on Essential Service Water Piping
05000315/FIN-2012005-02	2012Q4		Not Reporting the Use of CPAP Devices by Licensed Operators
05000315/FIN-2013002-02	2013Q1		Operability Evaluation Relied on Alternate Methods Not Demonstrated to be Technically Appropriate
05000315/FIN-2013002-01	2013Q1	H.2	Failure to Establish Feed Pump Control Bands
05000315/FIN-2013010-02	2013Q2	H.14	Failure to Enter the Limiting Condition for Operations and Perform Required Actions per TS 3.7.4, SG PORVs.
05000315/FIN-2013010-01	2013Q2	H.14	Failure to Maintain Emergency Operating Procedures for Mitigating the Consequences of a SGTR per TS Section 5.4.1, Procedures.
05000315/FIN-2013009-04	2013Q2	H.5	Evaluate Routing of Fiber Optic Cable in Combustible Exclusion Zone
05000315/FIN-2013009-03	2013Q2		Failure to Incorporate Required Shutdown Guidance into Fire Response Procedure
05000315/FIN-2013009-02	2013Q2		Failure to Assure that a Second Fire Pump would Start upon Demand at the Setpoint
05000315/FIN-2013003-02	2013Q2	H.2	Failure to Implement the Scaffold Guidelines Procedure
05000315/FIN-2013003-01	2013Q2	H.5	Failure to Identify Through-Wall Leak
05000315/FIN-2013009-01	2013Q2		Propped Open Fire Doors Required Manual Actuation of the CO2 System to Close

Self-Identified List (Cook)

	Q	Title
05000316/FIN-2012008-10	2012Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000315/FIN-2012404-01	2012Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000315/FIN-2012404-02	2012Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000315/FIN-2013002-03	2013Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000315/FIN-2013403-01	2013Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000315/FIN-2013403-02	2013Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation

[Cook Findings full list]

05000315/FIN-2013010-01

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