05000315/FIN-2013004-04
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Finding | |
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Title | Reactor Trip Due to Improper Control Valve Setpoint |
Description | A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance occurred because the licensee failed to program the automatic controller for the condensate heater condensate bypass control valve, 2-CRV-224, with the correct setpoint. Specifically, the automatic controller (2-RU-2) setpoint was not set at the required 240 psig because licensee personnel incorrectly interpreted information in SD-ENG-05400, System Description Condensate System. Consequently, an incorrect set point of 188 psig was incorporated in procedure 2-OHP-4021-001-006, Power Escalation, which was used to program the automatic controller. As a result, 2-CRV-224 did not open as designed to mitigate the lowering main feedwater pump suction pressure, which resulted in the west main feedwater pump tripping on low suction pressure and a subsequent manual reactor trip. For corrective actions, the licensee programmed the correct setpoint into the automatic controller; revised the associated procedures to ensure setpoint changes are accurately incorporated and reviewed prior to implementation; developed plans to communicate lessons learned to the site; and entered the condition into the CAP. Using IMC 0612 the inspectors determined that this issue was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, failure to set the 2-CRV-224 automatic controller to the design setpoint of 240 psig resulted in the subsequent loss of the west main feedwater pump during a feedwater heater level transient, which caused steam generator water levels to lower and required the operators to manually trip the reactor. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) using Exhibit 1 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, because the finding did not cause both a reactor trip and a loss of mitigating equipment. The inspectors concluded that this finding was associated with an aspect in the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area. Specifically, the procedure used to program the automatic controller for 2-CRV-224 was not accurate in that it did not contain the correct design setpoint. |
Site: | Cook |
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Report | IR 05000315/2013004 Section 1R20 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
Type: | Finding: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
Inspectors (proximate) | B Cushman D Reeser J Ellegood J Gilliam J Lennartz K Riemer M Bielby M Mitchell T Taylord Szwarcm Mitchell J Lennartz J Benjamin J Ellegood P Laflamme |
CCA | H.7, Documentation |
INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Cook - IR 05000315/2013004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cook) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Cook)
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