05000313/FIN-2013004-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = M Hairea, | | Inspector = M Hairea, Fairbanksb Tindell, G Werner, J Laughlin, J Melfi, L Carson, M Young | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The inspectors documented a self-revealing finding for the licensees failure to adequately implement a design change to the main feedwater startup and low load feedwater control valves. As a result, the valves were inoperable for longer than their technical specification allowed outage time for their main feedwater isolation safety function. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2012-00267. The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately implement a design change to the main feedwater control valve circuitry was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and was therefore a finding. Specifically, the latent design error adversely affected the ability of the main feedwater valves to close on a main steam line isolation signal. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, the inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the degraded condition was a design deficiency that affected system operability; did not represent an actual loss of function of a system; did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train or two separate trains for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time; did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety significant; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the cause of the performance deficiency occurred more than three years ago, and was not representative of current licensee performance. | | description = The inspectors documented a self-revealing finding for the licensees failure to adequately implement a design change to the main feedwater startup and low load feedwater control valves. As a result, the valves were inoperable for longer than their technical specification allowed outage time for their main feedwater isolation safety function. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2012-00267. The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately implement a design change to the main feedwater control valve circuitry was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and was therefore a finding. Specifically, the latent design error adversely affected the ability of the main feedwater valves to close on a main steam line isolation signal. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, the inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the degraded condition was a design deficiency that affected system operability; did not represent an actual loss of function of a system; did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train or two separate trains for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time; did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety significant; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the cause of the performance deficiency occurred more than three years ago, and was not representative of current licensee performance. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:49, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2013004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Hairea Fairbanksb Tindell G Werner J Laughlin J Melfi L Carson M Young |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |