05000313/FIN-2013003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Correctly Install Control Room Emergency Chiller Supply Breaker |
| Description | Inspectors documented a Green self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.4.1.a for the licensees failure to implement procedures recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow procedures for the replacement of the supply breaker for control room emergency chiller 2VE-1A. As a result, the breaker was installed incorrectly and the chiller was inoperable for over two months. Immediate corrective actions included proper installation of the breaker and procedural requirements for visual verification of breaker configuration. The licensee documented the issue in their corrective action program as CR-ANO-2-2013-00233. Inspectors concluded that the failure to follow Procedure 1403.179 for replacement of the train A control room emergency chiller breaker is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and is therefore a finding. Specifically, the loose breaker connection adversely affected the availability and reliability of the control room emergency chiller A. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, the inspectors determined that the finding required a detailed risk evaluation because it represented an actual loss of function of a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time. The senior reactor analyst performed a detailed risk evaluation using the Arkansas Nuclear One Standardized Plant Analysis Risk models. The dominant risk sequences include a seismically-induced loss of offsite power with the failure of control room emergency chiller A. The analyst assumed that the operators and control room instrumentation could survive a peak control room temperature of 120 F, and that chiller A was susceptible to failure during a seismic event for the 83 days. None of the core damage sequences affected by this performance deficiency were important to the large, early release frequency. Therefore, based on the combined internal and seismic ICCDP of 2.9 x 10-7, this finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with work practices, in that the licensee failed to use work practices that support human performance. Specifically, licensee personnel were aware of the possibility of misaligning the wire grip style lug, but failed to use adequate self and peer checking to ensure the lug was correctly installed. |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2013003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Fairbanks A Sanchez B Tindell D Allen D Bradley I Anchando J Melfi R Azua W Schaup |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2013003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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