The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of
10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure of engineering personnel to follow Procedure
70TI-9ZC01 Boric Acid Walkdown Leak Detection, to provide an evaluation of an active
boric acid leak prior to the end of the outage. Specifically, a
boric acid leak from the packing of the charging backpressure
header control valve did not receive an evaluation prior to the end of the outage when it was left in service as an active leak and corrective actions were deferred. The licensee performed the
boric acid leakage evaluation and determined that monitoring coupled with mitigating actions of cleaning and greasing were sufficient to support the functionality of the valve. The licensee plans to repair the valve at the soonest available opportunity and prior to restart after any maintenance or refueling outage. This finding has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PVAR 4191552. The failure of engineering personnel to provide an evaluation of an active
boric acid leak prior to the end of the outage is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, therefore a finding, because if left uncorrected the performance deficiency could possibly become a more significant safety concern in that unevaluated
boric acid leaks could result with unmitigated
boric acid corrosion of components. The inspectors evaluated the significance of the issue under the
Significance Determination Process, as defined in
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings. Inspectors determined that the finding affected the
Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and screened the finding using 0609 Appendix A, The
Significance Determination Process (
SDP) for Findings at-Power. Inspectors concluded the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding is a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in the loss of operability or functionality. The inspectors determined this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance with the decision making component because the licensee failed to make decisions using a systematic process when faced with unexpected circumstances because decisions associated with
boric acid corrosion mitigation and management were made outside of the
boric acid corrosion control program
